*Lectura obligatoria:*

- Thomas Oatley. 2012. *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*. Pearson Education, Inc., New York, NY. cap. 3 y 9.

*Lecturas ampliatorias:*

  - Davis, Christina L., y Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. "Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication." *Journal of Politics* 71(3): 1033–49.

  - Gowa, Joanne, y Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. An exclusive country club: The effects of the GATT on trade. *World Politics*, 57:453–478

  - Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, y Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61(1):37–67.

  - Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2011. Why do some countries get better WTO accession terms than others? *International Organization*, 65:639-672.

  - Sattler, Thomas, Gabriele Spilker, y Thomas Bernauer. 2013. "Does WTO Dispute Settlement Enforce or Inform?" *British Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 877–902.

  - Wade, Robert Hunter. 2003. "What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space.’" *Review of International Political Economy* 10(4): 37–41.

  - Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, y Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49(3): 309–38.

  - Hankla, Charles R. 2006. "Party Strength and International Trade." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(9): 1133–56.