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University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, IN 46556
www.undpress.nd.edu
Cover design: Juanita Dix

ISBN 0-268-01772-7
90000
9 780268 017729

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SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

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Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America

Ruth Berins Collier
and David Collier

Preface by Guillermo O'Donnell

SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

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UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS NOTRE DAME, INDIANA

Manufactured in the United States of America

ISBN 0-268-01772-7

The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support of
the Kellogg Institute in the reissuing of this book.

A record of the Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
is available upon request from the Library of Congress.

∞ *This book is printed on acid-free paper.*

For Stephen, Jennifer, and Shep

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Preface to the 2002 Edition

Guillermo O'Donnell

THE UNIVERSITY of Notre Dame Press should be congratulated for its decision to reissue this remarkable book. *Shaping the Political Arena* follows the best Weberian tradition of historical political sociology, in several senses.

In one of these senses, which will be immediately obvious to the reader, this book displays encyclopedic knowledge and the skillful utilization of a huge and varied literature.

In a second sense, the Colliers have a broad—macro—and very important question: What were the patterns, and the consequences, of the incorporation of labor (basically, urban labor) into the national arenas of politics of Latin America?[1] The authors trace these consequences in relation both to labor and, no less importantly, to the overall characteristics of the political regimes and more generally of the societies that emerged during and after (and, as they show, partly as a result of) the political incorporation of labor in Latin America.

In a third sense, as Weber did, this book uses a rather wide array of causal factors without reducing its explanations to any of them. Yet this is not intellectually undisciplined eclecticism: these factors are carefully sorted out and assessed in each case and across cases.

Fourth, and related to the preceding remark, I found it particularly pleasurable, as I did in Weber's *Economy and Society*, to "watch" the authors of *Shaping the Political Arena* move in each step of their analysis with clear—and explicit—self-consciousness of their methodology. In many passages of their book, the Colliers do us the important service of pointing out what they believe are the scope, the possible robustness, and the likely limitations of their findings and arguments. In fact, I have found this methodological self-consciousness extremely useful both for my own work and for my teaching—it is nice, and indeed helpful, to watch very good minds carefully telling us about the rationale of the conceptual and empirical steps they are taking.

Fifth, because the Colliers have a theoretical framework backed by impressive research, they come out with a series of hypotheses and con-

[1] Always mindful of the need to offer clear definitions, the authors consider incorporation as the "first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement" (p. 161).

clusions that add enormously to our knowledge not only of labor but also of political processes—broadly understood—in Latin America.

A book of this scope and complexity invites various uses and readings. Mine, as implied above, is that of the study of a complex collective actor by means of a theoretical framework that moves both through time (tracing the history of the respective labor movements in eight countries) and by means of "horizontal" comparisons. The main comparisons are of cases that are paired by means of similarities in certain factors that the theory indicates as particularly relevant. Some of these pairings are counterintuitive, and certainly they would not have been generated had the questions posed been different from the ones of this book; for example, it took me some time and several discussions with the authors until I fully understood—and agreed with—the pairing of two cases, Brazil and Chile, that in many other respects are very different, as the Colliers themselves emphasize. Here, as usual in these procedures, the proof of the pudding is in the eating: as the reader will notice, these pairings highlight important similarities, both in the process of labor incorporation and in the overall consequences they generated. Furthermore, these procedures are disciplined by the innovative and conceptually powerful typologies that the authors elaborate on the relationships between the labor movement on one side, and the various kinds of incorporation effected by the state and political parties, on the other.

The book moves analytically back and forth between histories of each case, told in considerable detail and with remarkable knowledge, and comparisons that are apposite because they are anchored in similarities that are shown to be theoretically relevant and empirically useful. This, as noted above, is comparative historical (political) sociology at its best. It is extremely difficult and time consuming to do this well, and its product—the present book—well deserves the attentive reading it demands.

Notice what, in my reading (and, I take it, in the intention of the authors), this book accomplishes. To begin with, it deals with a most important fact in the history of modern politics: the constitution and eventual incorporation into the main political arenas of a major social actor, the working class, especially its urban segment. This class was not already "there," constituted as such before its political incorporation. It had, nonetheless, characteristics largely determined by social, economic, ideological, and political factors that long preceded its incorporation, and that show significant differences among the countries included in this study—hence the first comparative excursion of the book. In turn, these factors, interacting with elite strategies, heavily influenced the kinds—and the limits—of political incorporation of the working class, and in so doing defined the specific characteristics with which this class was constituted as an actor in the respective national political arenas. The periods in which these incorporations occurred are what the authors call *critical*

junctures, epochal times that transform important societal parameters and have long-standing reverberations—a concept that can be and has been fruitfully used by several authors in the study of other topics.

For the study of these critical junctures, the comparisons, now in terms of paired cases, are very helpful. As the authors persuasively show, in Latin America there were at least four patterns of labor incorporation: (1) the *radical populism* of Mexico and Venezuela; (2) the *labor populism* of Argentina and Peru; (3) the *electoral mobilization (of labor) by a traditional party* of Uruguay and Colombia; and (4) the pattern that at least in the initial period was more exclusionary, involving the *depolitization and control* effected in Brazil and Chile.[2] The Colliers further show, by going back to the history of each case and then returning to the four paired comparisons, that each mode of incorporation generated its own "legacy," disaggregated into the more or less immediate reactions to labor incorporation (the "aftermath") and its longer term "heritage." As they argue, and highlight in the title of their book, this flow of events has significantly contributed to "shaping the political arena" of these eight countries (which as a set contain a very large proportion of the Latin American population and territory). The incorporation of the working class into the national political arena—however precarious, subordinated, and controlled it was in most cases, and notwithstanding the reactions, sometimes repressive, it provoked—deeply influenced the politics and, indeed, the whole of society in these countries.[3] Even with its limitations—closely mapped in this book—this incorporation meant the end of oligarchic domination and of a predominantly agrarian society in these countries.

As this book makes clear in the reflections it includes under the heading of "Heritage," these events did not lead directly to democracy (rather, in some of these countries, they led to nasty authoritarian reactions). Consequently, among many other valuable contributions, this book shows that in Latin America the paths to democracy have been quite different from those traversed by the highly developed capitalist countries. The historical specificity of the Latin American paths to democracy is a topic that still needs much research. It is an important topic, both in its own right and because it should be a major explanatory factor of the characteristics—and failings—of contemporary democracy in this region. This is not the main focus of this book. Yet, as Weber did with his work, the present study illuminates and opens up areas of inquiry that are not central to its purpose, furnishes knowledge that is extremely relevant to those

[2] I use, in italics, the terms used by the authors.

[3] The authors summarize nicely their approach when they point out that their work "builds upon an analysis of the dialectical interplay between labor control and labor mobilization" (p. 745).

areas, and shows in an exemplary way how a theoretically guided and methodologically self-conscious approach may be used in dealing with some broad—and extremely important—issues.[4]

Writing this preface in 2002, I cannot avoid an additional note. In Latin America, the social actor this book traces—the working class, especially its urban segment—never achieved full political incorporation, understanding by this a broadly accepted and properly represented location in the circuits of political, economic, and social power. Furthermore, in most of our countries, the ravages of economic and social crises and policies, under both authoritarian and democratic rule, have significantly diminished the absolute and relative weight of the working class. Still, it is very hard to imagine a democratic future (other than a rather perversely updated version of oligarchic rule) without a vigorous presence of the working class in what this book calls "the political arena." Whether this kind of presence is still possible, and in what ways, is a major question for the answer to which this study, beyond its great intrinsic interest, provides indispensable historical, theoretical, and methodological background.

[4] As the authors properly note, "Obviously, the argument is *not* that labor politics and state-labor relations can, by themselves, explain broader patterns of change. Rather, the focus on these issues provides an optic through which a larger panorama of change can be assessed and, in part, explained" (p. 745, italics added).

Authors' Note to the 2002 Edition

THE YEARS since the initial publication of *Shaping the Political Arena* have seen major changes both in the larger scholarly literature in which this study is embedded and also in Latin American politics—the topic of the book.[1] *Shaping the Political Arena* has been part of a lively, expanding research program of comparative-historical analysis. This program builds on evolving conceptions of critical junctures, path dependence, and historical institutionalism. Its methodological tools are, in important measure, those of small-N analysis and controlled comparison. Among the many substantive themes that have been analyzed in this tradition, the study of national political regimes has had a central place.[2] In the intervening years, it has also become more evident that Latin American politics is, indeed, experiencing the new critical juncture we discussed at the end of the last chapter. The class coalitions, party systems, and resulting regime dynamics that were our central focus have in important respects been destabilized. In some countries, they have been superseded entirely.

For this new printing of the book, we have not undertaken the Herculean task of updating the text to respond either to the evolving literature in comparative-historical analysis or to recent developments in Latin American politics. In this Authors' Note we would, however, like to offer some brief comments about the book's central claims. This study was conceived and initially written (if not finally published) when political-economic and dependency perspectives were influential in research on Latin America. Our purpose was to offer an alternative approach that put greater weight on social and political factors. Specifically, the book analyzes the critical juncture during which organized labor was initially incorporated into the political and legal system. The goal was to explore the impact of party systems on regime dynamics, where the party system is understood as the political institutionalization of class coalitions. These new coalitions were integrally linked to changes in social structure: the

[1] We thank the University of Notre Dame Press for its efforts in reissuing this book, as well as the Kellogg Institute of International Studies at Notre Dame for its support of this initiative.

[2] See James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

formation of two "new" classes and the move from, schematically, a two-class society of lord and peasant to a four-class society that also included a proletarian working class and the urban middle sectors.

Long books often have the disadvantage of provoking simplistic take-home messages with which they become identified. In the case of *Shaping the Political Arena*, these have included: "labor incorporation matters" and "critical junctures are important." Indeed, the proposition that the initial incorporation of the labor movement *is* a critical juncture that *matters* is central to our argument. But how does it matter? And for what?

Labor incorporation occurs in diverse ways, producing distinctive patterns of reaction and counterreaction. These differences are consequential for subsequent party structure and regime dynamics: for whether, during the period of new opposition movements and political and economic crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, politics was integrative or polarizing; for whether countries established, or failed to establish, political institutions and resources that helped to meet the political and economic challenges of this period; and for whether, in the end, these political systems self-destructed during those decades. The crucial intervening variable is the party system.

Three key steps in the argument are as follows.[3]

- Class Coalitions in the Incorporation Period. The critical juncture of initial labor incorporation centrally involves the construction of new class coalitions that take two basic forms. In some cases an *accommodationist* alliance produces a modus vivendi among the upper classes and pits them against the lower classes in a sustained effort to control and depoliticize labor organizations (with the peasants initially, though unreliably, attached to agrarian elites through clientelistic ties). In other cases a *populist* alliance links the organized working class (and sometimes the organized peasantry) with the middle sectors, a pattern accompanied by diverse forms of worker mobilization.
- Party Heritage. The incorporation period is followed by intense reactions and counter-reactions that fundamentally transform the balance between political mobilization and control that the state had sought to establish in the prior phase. New coalitional relationships emerge, building on key aspects of coalitional patterns from the incorporation period. These new relationships then crystallize in the party system, through which they are institutionalized in the political arena, creating patterns we call the party heritage of incorporation. We typologize the divergent forms of this heritage in light of the political and coalitional location of the organized working class and labor-based parties, including crucially their relationship to a centrist majority electoral bloc (Figure 7.2, p. 504).
- Regime Dynamics. In the final step of the argument, these party systems structure distinctive processes of accommodation and conflict, producing integrative versus conflictual political dynamics. These ultimately influence the political capacity to avoid, rather than succumb to, bureaucratic-authoritarian coups.

[3] The timing of each step in the argument for each country is explained in detail in the main text, and many key terms and distinctions are defined in the glossary.

Looking beyond these steps in the argument, it merits emphasis that we explicitly viewed the trajectories of change explored in this book—which encompass much of twentieth-century Latin American politics—as a delimited historical episode, centered on the transition to a "modern" social structure and the emergence of mass politics. At the end of the book we speculated about a new critical juncture in the current period. Today it is even clearer that with the rise of neoliberalism in national economic policies, the partial eclipse of union power, and the uncertain emergence of alternative popular sector actors, among many other transformations, Latin America is in the midst of fundamental political change.

As was the case with the previous critical juncture, this new episode involves a basic alteration of the relationships among class structure, party systems, and regime dynamics. Though this process will have common features across a number of countries, it will be variegated in its content and timing and in the trajectories of change that emerge in the political arena. Reactions and counterreactions growing out of the earlier party heritage will contribute to shaping these divergent trajectories in this new era.

This brief commentary is not the proper place to launch an analysis of these processes. However, we would like to conclude by observing that the conceptual and methodological tools of comparative-historical research, noted above, will prove valuable in ongoing efforts to undertake such an analysis. Very crucially, these tools strengthen the analyst's capacity to evaluate continuity and change in terms of carefully conceptualized variables, as well as to assess short-term and long-term explanations for emerging patterns of change.

Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier
Berkeley, May 2002

Figures and Tables

Figures

Tables

Acknowledgments

FIRST and foremost, we wish to give full recognition to the contribution of Ronald P. Archer and James W. McGuire. Their work on this project, which began with their role as research assistants, expanded to a form of collaboration that makes them coauthors of portions of the book. Specifically, Archer is coauthor of the analysis of Colombia and Uruguay in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, as well as portions of the analysis of Venezuela in Chapter 6. McGuire is coauthor of the analysis of Argentina in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. McGuire also provided invaluable assistance in the analysis of Uruguay. We deeply appreciate their analytic skill and hard work, and we greatly enjoyed collaborating with both of them.

A number of other Berkeley students worked as skilled research assistants or provided extensive comments on earlier drafts: Judith Biewener, Maxwell A. Cameron, Maria Lorena Cook, Peter Houtzager, Wendy Hunter, Ollie Johnson, Peter Kingstone, James Mahon, Carol Ann Medlin, Peter Molloy, Deborah L. Norden, Tony Pickering, Timothy R. Scully, Jeffrey Sluyter, Deborah J. Yashar, and Florence Zolin. Our Peruvian colleague Francisco Durand and also Cynthia Sanborn provided exceptionally skilled assistance.

This project was initiated under a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-8017728), and the publication of the book has been supported by a grant to Princeton University Press from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Generous support for research assistance and other project expenses was provided by the Institute of Industrial Relations, the Institute of International Studies, the Department of Political Science, and the Center for Latin American Studies at Berkeley. Ruth Collier received support from a fellowship awarded by the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of SSRC/ACLS, from the Berkeley Department of Political Science, and from the Berkeley Program in Mexican Studies. David Collier was supported by an award from the Latin American Committee of SSRC/ACLS, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the National Fellows Program of the Hoover Institution, and the Faculty Fellows Program of the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame.

We acknowledge publishers' permission to draw material from the following two articles: Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,' " *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (December 1979), pp. 967–86; and Ruth Berins Collier, "Popular Sector Incorporation and Political Supremacy: Regime Evolution in Brazil and Mexico," in Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982).

As we complete a project of this scope, we recognize with gratitude the role played by colleagues who provide that special combination of astute crit-

icism, intellectual support, and sustained friendship. We especially single out John Coatsworth, Robert R. Kaufman, Guillermo O'Donnell, and John Wirth, who gave detailed and helpful comments on the manuscript. We also want to make special mention of Louis W. Goodman, Terry Karl, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Alfred Stepan. Alex M. Saragoza, in his role as Mexicanist, as chair of the Berkeley Center for Latin American Studies, and as friend, offered invaluable insight and encouragement.

Margaret Case, Sanford Thatcher, David Nelson Blair, and other colleagues associated with Princeton University Press provided outstanding assistance with the preparation of the manuscript. Greer and Sue Allen gave timely advice on such esoterica as ascenders and x-heights.

Institutional assistance, as well, occasionally goes far beyond the ordinary. Ruth Collier greatly appreciates the ongoing support of the Berkeley Institute of International Studies and of its staff, which provided an eminently hospitable setting for her work. She wishes especially to acknowledge the professional and personal generosity of the Institute's recent director, Carl G. Rosberg. David Collier's work was greatly aided by his opportunity to spend time in the remarkable environment for research and scholarly debate provided by the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. The Institute's founding directors, Guillermo O'Donnell and Ernest Bartell deserve abundant credit for creating this outstanding research center.

Over a number of years, in response both to seminar presentations and written drafts, many other colleagues provided helpful suggestions that aided us in revising the book, and we can acknowledge only some of them here: Robert Alexander, Marcelo Cavarozzi, Marc Chernick, Julio Cotler, Tom Davis, Charles Davis, Henry Dietz, Albert Fishlow, John D. French, Gary Gereffi, Manuel Antonio Garretón, Paulette Higgins, Joel Horowitz, Friedrich Kratochwil, Eugenio Kvaternik, David Leonard, Jennifer McCoy, Michael McIntyre, Alejandro Portes, Juan Rial, Luis Salamanca, Peter H. Smith, J. Samuel Valenzuela, Aaron Wildavsky, Harold Wilensky, and Carlos Zubillaga.

We also recall the stimulating experience of writing this book at Berkeley while Gregory M. Luebbert was completing parallel research on Western Europe. We greatly valued our interaction with him over the two projects, along with the opportunity to work with graduate students who were intellectually engaged with the issues raised by both studies. His tragic death in a boating accident in May 1988 was an extraordinary loss.

Esther and Maurice Berins and Donald Collier were a source of encouragement throughout this project, and Malcolm Collier's insight and enthusiasm remain very much with us. Maurice Berins would have loved to see this book in print after the support he gave us in this endeavor, as in all aspects of our lives. Only our affectionate memories begin to ease our deep sense of loss.

Finally, our deepest gratitude goes to our children, Jennifer and Stephen, to whom this book is lovingly dedicated. They, unfortunately, had to live with the book as long as we did, and we regret that imposition. Their occasional prodding was as helpful and appreciated as their nearly constant patience.

SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

Overview

In the course of capitalist development in Latin America, one of the fundamental political transitions has been the emergence of worker protest and an organized labor movement, along with the varied responses of the state to this new actor within society. During a relatively well-defined period in most countries, a historic change took place in the relationship between the state and the working class. An earlier pattern—in which repression was generally a far more central feature of the state response to worker organization and protest—gave way to state policies that launched the "initial incorporation" of the labor movement. State control of the working class ceased to be principally the responsibility of the police or the army but rather was achieved at least in part through the legalization and institutionalization of a labor movement sanctioned and regulated by the state. In addition, actors within the state began to explore far more extensively the possibility of mobilizing workers as a major political constituency.

The terms on which the labor movement was initially incorporated differed greatly within Latin America. In some countries the policies of the incorporation period aimed primarily at establishing new mechanisms of state control. In other cases the concern with control was combined with a major effort to cultivate labor support, encompassing a central role of a political party—or a political movement that later became a party—and sometimes producing dramatic episodes of worker mobilization. The alternative strategies of control and mobilization produced contrasting reactions and countereactions, generating different modes of conflict and accommodation that laid the foundation for contrasting political legacies.

The analysis of these distinct patterns of conflict and accommodation offers new insight into important contrasts among countries such as: whether a cohesive, integrative political center was formed or more polarized politics emerged; whether and how party systems came to channel social conflict; and, more specifically, why in some countries the electoral and trade-union arenas came to be dominated by parties of the center, whereas elsewhere parties of the left came to play a far greater role. The analysis sheds light on alternative patterns of sectoral and class coalitions, distinct modes of centrifugal and centripetal political competition, and contrasting patterns of stability and conflict. It also helps explain whether countries followed a democratic or authoritarian path through the period of new opposition movements and economic and political crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.

The emergence of different forms of control and mobilization during the initial incorporation periods, along with their varied legacies, is the focus of this book. The study is based on a comparative-historical analysis of the eight countries with the longest history of urban commercial and industrial

development in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

It bears emphasis that single-country monographs and historical studies focused on each of these eight countries have commonly asserted that the years we identify as the initial incorporation periods were historical watersheds that had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of politics.[1] Yet these analyses, focusing as they do on individual countries, not surprisingly have lacked consistent criteria for identifying and comparing the incorporation periods, as well as for carrying out a comparative assessment of their legacies. The goal of this book is to provide a framework for this comparison and to offer a methodological and analytic basis for assessing the causal impact of the incorporation periods on the national political regime.

In focusing on the state's role in shaping the labor movement and on the reactions and counterreactions at the level of national politics produced by these state initiatives, we do not intend to suggest that workers and labor leaders did not themselves play a major role in constituting labor movements. Their role has been amply documented,[2] and at various points it plays an important part in the present analysis.[3] However, our primary attention centers at a different level: the repercussions for the larger evolution of national politics of alternative state strategies for dealing with the labor movement. At this level of analysis, one can identify fundamentally contrasting trajectories of change that merit sustained attention in their own right.

In that the book seeks to trace out these contrasting trajectories of national political change, we see this study as part of the ongoing quest in the Latin American field over the past 30 years to explain the different paths of national development found within the region.[4] In this context, our analysis is

[1] For example, Argentina: Corradi 1985:58; Doyon 1975:153; Mallon and Sourrouille 1975:7; Horowitz 1990; Wynia 1978:43–44, 80; Luna 1969:15; Fayt, quoted in Ciría 1968:326; Waisman 1987; Torre 1989:530. Brazil: Schmitter 1971:127; Mericle 1977:304; Erickson 1977:11; Ianni 1970:89; Simão 1981:169. Chile: Morris 1966:2; Barría 1972:37–38; S. Valenzuela 1976:141; Bergquist 1981:45–46; 1986:75; Pike 1963:188. Colombia: Urrutia 1969a:109, 113; Dix 1967:91; Molina 1974:280; 1977:85, 101. Mexico: Hansen 1974:34, 98–101; Garrido 1982:11, 296; Córdova 1974; 1976:204, 211; 1979:9–11; Cornelius 1973:392–93. Peru: Sulmont 1977:82; Pareja 1980:115; Angell 1980:21; Adams 1984:36–37; and from a comparative perspective C. Anderson 1967:249. Uruguay: Finch 1981:9; Vanger 1963:272, 274; 1980:348; Caetano 1983a:5; Fitzgibbon 1954:122. Venezuela: Levine 1973:29; Alexander 1982:224; Martz 1966:62; Godio 1982:30, 85; and from a comparative perspective, C. Anderson 1967:283–84.

[2] At the level of a broad comparative-historical analysis, see Bergquist (1986). Many excellent monographic studies also adopt this perspective.

[3] Chapter 3 focuses on the early history of the labor movement from the perspective of worker organization and worker protest. In the analysis of the incorporation periods in Chapter 4, the discussion of the goals of actors within the state who initiate incorporation—the "project from above"—is juxtaposed with a discussion of the goals of the leading sectors of the labor movement, the "project from below."

[4] A partial list of relevant authors and citations dealing with the comparative analysis of South America and Mexico that address these themes might include J. Johnson (1958), Silvert and Germani (1961), Hirschman (1965, 1977, 1979), Di Tella (1965, 1968), C. Anderson (1967), Halperín Donghi (1969), Cardoso and Faletto (1969, 1979), Schmitter (1972), O'Donnell (1973, 1975), Bambirra (1974), R. Kaufman (1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1986), Stepan (1978b, 1988), D. Collier (1979), Therborn (1979), O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), and Bergquist (1986).

both narrow and broad. It is narrow in that it focuses on critical transitions in the relationship between the state and one particular actor in society, the organized labor movement. Yet it is broad in that this focus serves as an optic through which a much larger spectrum of political relationships and patterns of change can be integrated into an explanatory framework. The analysis is likewise broad because it is framed by scholarly debates on democracy and authoritarianism, corporatism, patterns of state transformation in the face of new social forces, the formation of distinct types of party systems, and the relative autonomy of politics.

Obviously, the issues considered here are not unique to Latin America. They are, for instance, the focus of a broad spectrum of authors concerned with European development, from Karl Marx to T. H. Marshall and Reinhard Bendix, who have analyzed these themes within the context of what Bendix (1964:23) refers to as the "pervasive, structural transformations" of Western societies that encompassed in the economic sphere the spread of market relationships and in the political sphere the spread of individualistic authority relationships. Crucial to the latter was the extension of citizenship to the lower class, involving the right of "association" and "combination" and the diverse ways in which worker organization, worker protest, and state policy toward worker associations interacted to shape the evolution of national politics (Bendix 1964:chap. 3, esp. 80–87). The present study parallels the concerns of various analysts of Europe who have viewed the incorporation of the working class as a pivotal transition within this larger process of societal change.[5]

The method of this book is a type of comparative history designed to discover and assess explanations of change. The method has two components. The first is the generation and evaluation of hypotheses through the examination of similarities and contrasts among countries. The second is the procedure of "process tracing"[6] over time within countries, through which explanations are further probed. We thereby evaluate whether the dynamics of change within each country plausibly reflect the same causal pattern suggested by the comparison among countries. The result is an analysis centrally concerned with the elaboration of concepts and comparisons, but also shaped by the conviction that this elaboration must be anchored in a close, processual analysis of cases over long periods of time. The book thus presents an extended examination of each case over several decades, and we hope that for readers who lack a close knowledge of these countries, this historical presentation will make our argument clear. However, we do not intend this as

[5] Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Waisman 1982; Lipset 1983; Luebbert 1986, 1987; J. Stephens 1986.

[6] The procedure was proposed by George and McKeown (1985:34ff.). It is similar to the procedure of "discerning" earlier advocated by Barton and Lazarsfeld (1969) and of "pattern matching" advocated by Campbell (1975).

a general political history of these countries—nor even of the labor movement or of state-labor relations. Rather, the historical treatment is selective, focused on probing arguments related to our principal thesis about the emergence and impact of the incorporation periods.

The Historical Argument

In the first decades of the 20th century, the relationship between the state and the labor movement changed fundamentally. Prior to that time, state policy commonly involved extensive repression of working class organization and protest, repression that on many occasions resulted in the death of dozens or even hundreds of workers. This earlier era saw occasional ad hoc state cooperation with labor groups in sectors too important economically or politically to permit their continual repression, as well as occasional state efforts to mobilize the support of workers. Nonetheless, the labor movement was dealt with in important measure coercively—by the police or the army.

During a well-defined period in each country, this relationship was altered. In general, some use of repression continued, but control was to a greater degree accomplished through the legalization and institutionalization of certain types of labor organization. Unions became legitimate actors within these societies. In conjunction with the unions' more legitimate role, political leaders also began to pursue far more extensively than before the option of mobilizing workers as a base of political support.

This change to new modes of state-labor relations—from repression to institutionalization, from exclusion to incorporation—generally took place in the context of a larger set of political transformations also occurring in the early decades of this century. These included a decline in the political dominance of older oligarchic groups and the assumption of power by newer elites drawn in part from the "middle sectors,"[7] whose social, economic, and political importance was increasing rapidly with the sustained economic expansion and the growing importance of the urban commercial and manufacturing sector during this period. Reformist elements that emerged from the more traditional elite also played a significant role in this period of change. The new political leadership promoted a transition from a laissez-faire state to a more interventionist state, a change signaled by the promulgation of new "social constitutions." The state came increasingly to assume new social, welfare, and economic responsibilities involving above all the modern sector of the economy, but in a few cases also encompassing a restructuring of work and property relations within the traditional rural sector.

The incorporation of the labor movement was typically high on this agenda of change, though its timing varied among countries. In conjunction with the new social and welfare responsibilities, the state introduced new legislation regulating such things as working conditions, minimum wage,

[7] See discussion of this term in the glossary.

and social security. With the new economic responsibilities, the state began to establish a regularized system of labor relations, assuming a role as mediator of class conflict and arbiter of labor-management disputes. Actors within the state established regularized, legal channels of labor relations and made some concessions to correct the worst abuses of the working class, thereby seeking to take the labor question out of the streets and away from the police or army and bring it into the realm of law by providing mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. The goal, in the terms in which it was commonly conceived, was to "harmonize the interests of labor and capital." These changes were accompanied by the introduction of corporatism as a new set of structures for the vertical integration of society. Corporatism in Latin America thus involved the legalization and institutionalization of an organized labor movement, but one that was shaped and controlled by the state.

This, then, is the historical commonality of these countries. In the course of capitalist modernization, two broad new sectors produced by modernization, the working class and the middle sectors, began to be integrated into the polity in more subordinate and more dominant positions, respectively, within the framework of an important redefinition of the role of the state in society.

The argument of this book is that within the framework of this historical commonality, there were fundamental political differences in how this process of labor incorporation occurred. In most cases the result was ultimately the creation of an organized labor movement and system of industrial relations in important measure controlled and regulated by the state. Yet this occurred in very different ways. Correspondingly, the larger political legacy of these earlier periods differs fundamentally among countries. To introduce these differences, it is necessary to discuss further the incorporation periods themselves.

Types of Incorporation Periods. We define the initial incorporation of the labor movement as the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. During the incorporation periods, institutionalized channels for resolving labor conflicts were created in order to supersede the ad hoc use of repression characteristic of earlier periods of state-labor relations, and the state came to assume a major role in institutionalizing a new system of class bargaining.

The analysis of initial incorporation revolves around two arguments. First, this fundamental change in state-labor relations occurred in relatively well-defined policy periods. These periods correspond to historical experiences as chronologically diverse as the Batlle era in the first decade and a half of the 20th century in Uruguay, the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in the years following the 1917 constitution, the Vargas administration in Brazil beginning in 1930, and the Perón era in Argentina beginning in the 1940s. In most but not all cases, these incorporation periods coincided with the larger period of political reform and expansion of the role of the state discussed

above. Issues that arise in the identification and comparison of the incorporation periods are discussed in the glossary.

The second argument is that the different forms of control and support mobilization that emerged, along with the distinct actors that led the incorporation projects, are a key to distinguishing among them. At the most general level, we identify two broad types of incorporation experiences: *state* incorporation and *party* incorporation.

In the case of state incorporation, the principal agency through which the incorporation period was initiated was the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and the principal goal of the leaders who initiated incorporation was the control and depoliticization of the labor movement. In the case of party incorporation, a central agency of incorporation was a political party or political movement that later became a party, and a fundamental goal of political leaders, in addition to control, was the mobilization of working class support through this party or movement. This mobilization of labor contrasted sharply with the depoliticization characteristic of state incorporation.[8] In addition to distinguishing between state and party incorporation, we also explore three subtypes of party incorporation, discussed below.

Legacy of Incorporation. The distinct types of incorporation had a fundamental impact on the subsequent evolution of national politics. In all eight countries the incorporation experience produced a strong political reaction, and in most countries this reaction culminated in the breakdown of the national political regime under which the incorporation policies had been implemented. In the face of this reaction and of the counterreaction it often produced, the ultimate legacy of incorporation commonly entailed outcomes quite divergent from the goals of the leaders of the original incorporation period. To understand these outcomes, one must examine closely these reactions and subsequent counterreactions. We will refer to the period of reactions and counterreactions as the "aftermath" of incorporation, and to the longer-term consequences as the "heritage" of incorporation.

Two sequences of change may initially be identified. In cases of state incorporation, the incorporation project was principally concerned with state control of the labor movement and was implemented under an authoritarian regime. Correspondingly, the initial regime breakdown brought with it a process of democratization. In the cases of party incorporation, the incorporation period promoted progressive social policies and the political mobilization of the working class, and the regime under which incorporation occurred was in most cases more democratic and competitive. Here the incorporation period triggered a strong conservative reaction, which in most cases ultimately led to a coup and a period of authoritarian rule, followed

[8] Given the definition of incorporation periods presented above, the state by definition played a role in both types of incorporation. The key question is whether, in addition, a party or movement played a major role and whether a central goal was depoliticization, as opposed to politicization in favor of this party or movement. For a further discussion of these distinctions, see Chapter 5.

later by the institution of some form of more competitive, civilian electoral regime.

By tracing the movement of the countries through these different sequences of change, we gain new insights into the evolving role of the labor movement in sectoral and class alliances and hence into the character of these alliances, the articulation of these alliances with the party system and the character of the party system, and the way crucial issues concerning the legitimation of the state were resolved—or often, not resolved. Special attention focuses on whether a stable majority bloc emerged roughly at the center of the electoral arena, whether unions were linked to parties of the center or parties of the left, and, relatedly, whether the union movement was generally in the governing coalition or tended to be excluded. On the basis of these dimensions, four broad types of outcomes are identified: integrative party systems, multiparty polarizing systems, systems characterized by electoral stability and social conflict, and stalemated party systems.

The consequences of these distinct patterns were dramatically manifested in the period of social and economic crisis and new opposition movements during the 1960s and 1970s, a period that culminated in the emergence of "the new authoritarianism" in some, but not all, of the most modernized countries of Latin America. The problem of explaining this outcome, as well as the contrasting experience of other relatively modernized countries that retained civilian regimes, has received wide scholarly attention over more than a decade.[9] We argue that an important part of the explanation of these contrasting regime outcomes is the structure of contestation and cooperation in the national political arena, which was in important respects the legacy of incorporation and of the reaction to it.

For each country, the analysis extends either to the onset of these authoritarian periods or to approximately 1980. After this point, significant changes in the parameters of politics occurred. Nonetheless, contrasts among countries that are in part the legacy of incorporation remain fundamental to understanding the agenda of political issues faced both by military governments and by the leaders of later democratization efforts. A primary goal of the book is to explore this evolving legacy of incorporation.

Looking at the overall trajectory of the different countries through this sequence of change, one observes a complex relationship between the character of the incorporation period and its legacy. In the intermediate run, the control-oriented approach of state incorporation in some important respects created a greater opportunity for future polarization. This occurred for several reasons, among them that many of the legal controls of unions broke down with the competitive bidding for workers' votes under a subsequent democratic regime, and that state incorporation left unresolved the partisan affiliation of workers and unions, leaving them available for mobilization by other actors in later periods. By contrast the often radical mobilization of party incorporation created political ties and loyalties that in some cases

[9] O'Donnell 1973, 1975, 1982; Stepan 1973; Linz and Stepan 1978; D. Collier 1979.

later contributed to conservatization of the labor movement and its integration within a centrist political bloc. Thus one potential trajectory of change was from *control to polarization*, and a second from *mobilization to integration*. A major goal of the analysis is to probe the factors that led particular countries to follow either of these two trajectories.

A final observation is in order about the normative implications of alternative outcomes such as polarization and integration. Under some circumstances and from some normative perspectives, the "stability" or reduction of conflict that might be associated with the outcome of integration are preferable to instability and conflict. Under other circumstances and from other normative perspectives, stability and reduction of conflict may be seen as blocking needed change, whereas polarization may open new avenues for change. These alternative assessments were actively contested in the eight countries during the periods studied here, and they are explicitly debated by social scientists who study these countries. In this book, our goal is not primarily to evaluate these outcomes but rather to advance the understanding of the political context in which they were fought out.

Relative Autonomy of the Political and the Impact of Socioeconomic Change

The book thus explores the long-term impact of *political* differences among countries during the incorporation period. By contrast, much of the literature on political change in Latin America has focused on social and economic explanations. Although we do not claim to present a monocausal model—in that we do not pretend to explain all the observed variations or features of regimes on the basis of political factors—the political argument explored here nonetheless does raise the issue of the relative autonomy of the political.

In recent decades in the context of the larger debate—both Marxist and non-Marxist—on the state, much attention was paid to the issue of political autonomy, particularly on a theoretical level. Yet, during the period when dependency theory was ascendant in Latin American studies, political analysis at times seemed to lose its way and politics was often considered epiphenomenal. What really mattered was the underlying pact of domination, which came part and parcel with the economic base.[10]

Subsequently, concern with the political sphere was revived and reinforced. In part this was due to the particular conjuncture in Latin America. As the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s left the scene, attention turned to the possibility of creating a political arena that safeguarded democratic values, even in a situation where the underlying economic parameters had not changed.[11] Thus, there was interest first in political values that were

[10] For a critique of this perspective, see Cardoso (1979).

[11] O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) and Goodman (forthcoming) are examples of this focus.

previously disparaged and secondly in institution-building in the political arena for the consolidation of democracy.

It seems clear that some facets of the political process act as powerful and fundamental causal variables in social life and provide the basis for an underlying "political logic" that animates change, which is in a sense analogous to the "capital logic" that is a central concern of the dependency perspective. One component of this political logic is the generation of political projects in order to form coalitions to gain or retain political power.[12] It consists of a potentially autonomous realm of conflict over political incumbency and entails a political dynamic that played a central role in shaping the incorporation projects. Another component is the pursuit of legitimation, which is a fundamental imperative of the state and one that may conflict with other imperatives such as the protection and promotion of capital accumulation (Habermas 1975; O'Connor 1973). In addition to the potentially autonomous dynamic of change that revolves around these imperatives of incumbency and legitimacy, other sources of political autonomy are found in vested interests, sunk costs, and institutional rigidities.

The argument is not that the socioeconomic context of politics is unimportant. Rather it is that the political arena is not simply fluid, constantly responding to socioeconomic change. Instead, because of an autonomous political logic and vested interests, it may be resistant to such change over significant periods of time. Socioeconomic change is important to political outcomes, but the political arena may to some degree follow its own pattern and pace of change, that at times takes a highly discontinuous form.

This pattern of discontinuity contrasts with many forms of economic and social change. Socioeconomic change, such as urbanization or economic growth, is often a continuous process that proceeds at a more-or-less even rate—or an evenly fluctuating rate. It commonly entails the aggregation of innumerable changes or decisions by individual actors over time. A model of this type of incremental change is so fundamental to neoclassical economics that on the title page of his seminal work *Principles of Economics*, Alfred Marshall (1916) placed the maxim *natura non facit saltum*—nature makes no leaps. Some political change—for instance, that in the "behavioral" or attitudinal realm—may also occur incrementally.

However, other aspects of political change, in the structural, institutional, and policy spheres, may be more discontinuous. This discontinuity consists of macro transformations, deriving from a process of decision making for the collectivity regarding the distribution of political and societal resources and associated issues of conflict and cooperation. This process leads to the founding of new legal orders, state structures, or other institutional arrangements.

[12] See Cavarozzi (1975:33–37). This focus is related to C. Anderson's widely noted discussion of the logic of "winning, consolidating, and maintaining power" that is part of his "prudence model" of developmental policy-making in Latin America (1967:87, Chaps. 3–4) and parallels both Anderson (1967:87) and Ames's (1987) concern with "political survival." The focus is obviously similar to the larger concern in political analysis with how the goal of gaining and retaining power shapes political action (Downs 1957).

Such episodes of macro change may be followed by periods of minimal change or by more incremental and perhaps more informal change. For instance, smaller incremental changes in policy may be made, laws may not be applied, their implementation may evolve, and institutions and structures may begin to operate or behave in different ways. But these involve relatively minor shifts within a framework in which changes on a large scale are relatively infrequent. Between such major changes, institutions and structural rigidities create a partially autonomous logic of the political arena.

It is within this framework that the uneven impact of social and economic change on politics, of the kind explored in this book, must be understood. This perspective is introduced further in Chapter 1.

Approach to Comparison

Selection of Cases. The choice of the eight countries analyzed here is based on three criteria. First, along with vast differences in their social and economic makeup, these countries have the longest history of urban commercial and manufacturing development in Latin America. More than other Latin American countries, their modern sectors have for much of this century been sufficiently large to create an active arena of labor politics and state-labor relations. As a result, labor politics has long been a central issue on the national political agenda.[13]

Second, because these countries represent a "comparison set" that provides a useful basis for exploring hypotheses about industrial modernization, they have already received substantial attention in previous research on the political economy of industrialization and regime transformation. The present study therefore can build on an important body of analysis comparing the evolution of these cases. In particular, *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (D. Collier 1979), analyzed the same eight countries, focusing on the period of opposition movements, crises, and the rise of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s. The present volume, by contrast, takes the analysis for these eight cases from roughly the beginning of the 20th century up to this period of opposition and crisis. It thus responds to the challenge posed

[13] In conjunction with this shared experience of economic and industrial growth and the related issue of country size, these eight countries loom large within the overall picture of demographic and economic expansion in Latin America. As of 1980 they contained 84 percent of the population of the 20 countries commonly defined as Latin America—i.e., with a "Latin" (Spanish, Portuguese, or French) colonial history—and as of 1979 they had 92 percent of the gross domestic product (not including Cuba). Although the major role of Cuba within the Latin American and international scene since the 1960s and the importance of the Central American crisis in the 1980s belies any argument that big countries are "more important," the demographic and economic preponderance of these eight countries merits note. Among the 20 countries, Brazil had 35 percent of the population, Mexico 20 percent, and the other six countries 29 percent. Among the 19 countries, Brazil had 32 percent of the GDP, Mexico 25 percent, and the other six countries 35 percent (Wilkie and Haber 1983:5, 280–81).

in the final chapter of *The New Authoritarianism*: that it is essential to view the rise and fall of authoritarianism in Latin America that occurred between the 1960s and the 1980s within the framework of longer cycles of regime change within the region (394–95).

Third, this set of countries is auspicious because for each of these cases there is an extensive body of historical and monographic literature on national politics and trade unions that constitutes an invaluable basis for the type of comparative analysis of secondary sources carried out here.

Differences and Commonalities among Cases. A principal challenge of comparative-historical research is to push the systematic comparison of cases as far as possible without pushing it to a point where it does violence to the distinctive attributes of each case. Scholarly debates on comparative research are enlivened by strong disagreements about where that point is located.

It is easy to enumerate prominent features of the national political evolution of each country that are of great relevance for this analysis and which appear conspicuously unique. For instance, in Mexico these would include the revolution and its very nonrevolutionary one-party heritage; in Uruguay the peculiar tradition of two-party politics, the reformist genius of Batlle, and the social welfare state, juxtaposed with the economic and political stagnation of recent decades. In Chile, they would include strong parties of the left located in a national political system also characterized by a strong right and deeply ingrained conservatism; and in Argentina the explosive mobilization of Peronism, its conservatization and fragmentation, and its troubled political legacy.

Any comparative analysis that did not address these distinctive attributes would fail to capture the reality of these countries. Yet it is equally obvious that a meaningful understanding of these cases cannot be gained only by dwelling on their unique traits, but must be achieved in part through a comparative assessment of the larger political issues that are fought out and the commonalities, as well as contrasts, in the political and institutional forms taken by the resolution of these issues.

Splitters and Lumpers. The problem of adequately assessing these similarities and contrasts suggests the relevance here of the distinction suggested by J. H. Hexter (1979:241–43) between two types of analysts: "splitters" and "lumpers."[14] Splitters are quick to see contrasts among cases and to focus on the distinctive attributes of each case. Their contribution is essential, since the close, contextually rich analysis they tend to produce is invaluable for understanding the cases under consideration, for bringing to light new information, for generating new hypotheses and theories, and for providing the basic data on which all comparative analysis depends. Lumpers, by contrast, have an eye for generalizations and commonalities, for fitting particular

[14] The following discussion parallels in important respects Skocpol and Somers's (1980) analysis of different approaches to comparison. Splitters generally follow their method of "contrast of contexts"; lumpers follow their method of "parallel demonstration of theory"; and the middle ground that we advocate corresponds to their "macro-causal analysis."

cases into broad categories. Their approach is likewise essential, since it plays an important role in synthesizing the details presented in case studies.

One major risk for the lumpers is the methodological problem identified by Eldon Kenworthy (1973) in his article entitled "The Function of the Little Known Case in Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn't." Kenworthy, a specialist in Argentine politics, criticized the misuse of the case of Peronist Argentina, which at an earlier point was poorly understood by broad comparativists. These comparativists, according to Kenworthy, distorted the Argentine experience to fit it into their conceptual categories.

A variant of this problem, which has arisen in the comparative analysis of the historical periods of concern in this book, could be referred to as "the misuse of the best known case." In this instance, a general pattern for a whole region is derived from the best known case (or cases) writ large. For instance, in the analysis of state-labor relations and populism in Latin America, the experiences of two or possibly three leaders have often commanded the attention of analysts: Perón (a relatively well-known case among Latin Americanists), Vargas in Brazil, and perhaps Cárdenas in Mexico. Generalizations have too often presented a single picture for Latin America that combined elements of each of these experiences, forming a composite that ultimately corresponds neither to the original case or cases on which the generalization is based, nor to other cases to which it is applied (R. Collier 1982:98–100).

What is too often missing is an analytic middle ground between splitters and lumpers that encompasses simultaneously a concern with similarities *and* differences. In carrying out description, such an approach attempts to identify multiple patterns rather than necessarily to "lump" cases into a single type. In testing explanations, this approach employs the systematic examination of similarities *and* contrasts among cases as a means of assessing hypotheses about patterns of change.

An important concomitant of occupying this middle ground is the recognition of a crucial point: the claim that two countries are similar or different with regard to a particular attribute does not, and is not intended to, assign to them the overall status of being similar or different cases. It is relevant to underline this point because in the fields of comparative analysis and Latin American studies, when scholars engage in a carefully contextualized comparison of "whole countries,"[15] there can be a tendency to depict certain countries as "really" similar or different—to a degree that may paralyze comparative research. For instance, students of the Southern Cone commonly hold that Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay share an underlying socioeconomic structure that contrasts markedly with the rest of South America, giving a common "meaning" to the dynamics of their politics. Yet in terms of the structure of its party system, Uruguay has historically had much more in

[15] Obviously, no one really compares "whole countries," but only specific attributes of countries. This expression is used to refer to what Ragin (1987) has called the "case oriented," rather than "variable oriented," approach of comparative-historical analysis, which is strongly concerned with how each variable is embedded in its larger context within a given case.

common with Colombia than with its Southern Cone neighbors. Uruguay is not inherently more similar either to Colombia or to other Southern Cone countries. Rather, it shares with each important similarities *and* differences.

In sum, our methodological stance recognizes the contribution of both splitters and lumpers, but insists on the flexible application of a middle position that acknowledges a diversity of similarities and contrasts among any combination of cases.

Most Similar and Most Different Systems Designs. In focusing on the analysis of similarities and differences, we employ two strategies of comparison, a combination of a "most similar" and a "most different" systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Przeworski 1987).[16] These two designs are "ideal types," and the matching and contrasting of cases that they posit is never perfectly achieved in any real analysis. Yet they are invaluable points of reference in constructing comparisons.

First, the overall analysis of the eight countries can be considered a most similar systems design. These eight cases are broadly matched, in that among the countries of Latin America, they have overall the longest history of urban, commercial, and industrial development, and in conjunction with this development have experienced the broad transformations in the political sphere discussed above. Further, these changes have occurred within a common regional and cultural context. Against the backdrop of these similarities, this methodological design identifies four broad types of incorporation periods and seeks to discover whether corresponding contrasts emerge in the legacy of incorporation.

Second, the comparison of countries with similar types of incorporation constitutes a most different systems design. Countries with similar incorporation experiences typically exhibited major contrasts in the pattern of socioeconomic development, the characteristics of the labor movement, and other important political attributes. The comparison within these sets of cases therefore constitutes a most different systems strategy, which juxtaposes cases that are fundamentally different in a number of respects. Within the framework of these differences, if countries that had a similar incorporation experience were also similar in terms of longer-term outcomes, then one has a stronger basis for inferring that these outcomes were indeed a consequence of the type of incorporation. The profound differences in the background variables thus serve to place in sharp relief the conjunction of similar types of incorporation period and similar outcomes.

Types of Incorporation and Country Pairs

In addition to the distinction between state and party incorporation presented above, we identify three subtypes of party incorporation. The eight countries distributed themselves among the four resulting types of incorpo-

[16] These correspond to J. S. Mill's (1974/1843) methods of difference and agreement, respectively.

ration periods in a way that placed two countries within each type. The book is thus organized around the analysis of four pairs of countries: Brazil and Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, Uruguay and Colombia, and Peru and Argentina. From the perspective of the most different systems design, it is essential to emphasize both the similarities and contrasts within each pair.

Similarities within Each Pair. The core similarity in each pair derives from the analysis of the incorporation periods, presented in Chapter 5. The cases of state incorporation, where the state sought primarily to impose new methods of control, are Brazil (1930–45) and Chile (1920–31). Among the cases of party incorporation, where the concern with control was accompanied by a major effort at support mobilization, we distinguish three subtypes. First, in Colombia (1930–45) and Uruguay (1903–16), the mobilization of workers was carried out by traditional parties as an aspect of electoral competition within an established two-party system. Since these parties were founded in the 19th century and had strong ties to the economic elite, not surprisingly this type involved the most limited mobilization of the working class, being restricted largely to electoral mobilization. We refer to this category as *electoral mobilization by a traditional party*.

The other two types of party incorporation were led by new, explicitly anti-oligarchic parties, and both involved more comprehensive forms of mobilization. In Peru (1939–48) and Argentina (1943–55), the party or movement that led the incorporation period not only engaged in the electoral mobilization of workers, but also systematically and successfully built partisan ties to labor organizations and drove out of the labor movement elements affiliated with other parties, leading us to label these cases *labor populism*.

Finally, in Mexico (1917–40) and Venezuela (1935–48), the mobilization of the incorporation period took its most comprehensive form. In the other six countries the transformations of the incorporation period were almost entirely restricted to the labor movement in the modern sector of the economy and did not encompass peasants in the traditional rural sector.[17] However, in Mexico and Venezuela the incorporation project was extended to this part of the rural sector, accompanied by agrarian reform, and therefore represented the most comprehensive assault on rural property relations and on the existing oligarchy.[18] Given the comprehensive character of the transformations launched by these incorporation periods, we refer to them as *radical populism*.

[17] We treat workers in modernized rural enclaves as being in the modern sector. A discussion of these terms is found in the glossary.

[18] As is clear in Chapter 4 and 5, in the other four cases of party incorporation, the incorporation of the peasantry and the corresponding reorganization of rural property relations were not a central feature of this period for two very different reasons. In Peru and Colombia, the oligarchy was sufficiently strong to make this an unlikely outcome, whereas in Argentina and Uruguay and extensive traditional peasantry did not exist. Hence, although within both pairs of cases (Peru-Argentina and Uruguay-Colombia) this outcome had different *causes*, its *consequences* were partially similar, as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6. Although in Argentina important reforms occurred in the rural sector, they did not encompass a restructuring of rural property relations of the kind found in Mexico and Venezuela.

Two further observations may be made about this grouping of cases. First, although these pairs are derived from a comparison of the incorporation periods, this grouping of cases had deep roots in the periods prior to incorporation and extends well beyond them. Second, it is essential to think of these types of incorporation periods as analytic categories, not as perfect descriptions of each country. Obviously, the two countries within each category are not identical in terms of the defining dimensions, but they are far more similar to one another in terms of these dimensions than they are to the countries identified with the other categories.

Differences within Each Pair. In the framework of the most different systems design, we are centrally concerned with fundamental economic, social, and political differences within each pair. These differences represent the contrasting contexts within which the analysis focuses on the similarity in the incorporation period and on the hypothesized similarity in the legacy within each pair. In three of the four pairs (excluding Mexico and Venezuela), this most different systems design juxtaposes within each pair: (1) a more socially homogeneous, relatively urban, far more European society of the Southern Cone, which is relatively modernized in terms of per capita indicators of education, literacy, and urbanization—Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina—with (2) a more socially heterogeneous, less urban society, which has a substantial population of Indian or African extraction and which is considerably less modernized in per capita terms—Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (see Table 0.1).

Marked contrasts are also found between Mexico and Venezuela, though these contrasts have changed during the decades covered in this study. In the

TABLE 0.1
Pairs of Countries: Similarities and Differences

	Political Similarities during Incorporation Period			
		Party Incorporation		
Socioeconomic Differences	*State Incorporation*	*Electoral Mob. by Trad. Party*	*Labor Populism*	*Radical Populism*
More socially homogeneous, higher on per capita modernization indicators	Chile	Uruguay	Argentina	Venezuela[a]
Less socially homogeneous, lower on per capita modernization indicators	Brazil	Colombia	Peru	Mexico[a]

[a] This ordering of Venezuela and Mexico refers roughly to the period of the 1950s to the 1970s. In the late 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, the ordering of these two countries on several of these variables was the opposite from that reflected here (see Chapter 3), and in the 1970s and 1980s, they more nearly converged.

19th century and into the first decades of the 20th century, Venezuela was among the least developed of the eight countries. However, with the rise of the petroleum sector, by roughly the 1950s Venezuela corresponded more nearly to the first row in Table 0.1, with high levels of per capita income; whereas in important respects Mexico lagged behind. However, with Mexico's oil boom in the 1970s, it gained again on some indicators. Depending on the particular period under consideration, different contrasts therefore come into play in the comparison of Mexico and Venezuela.

Political differences within the pairs are also of great importance to the analysis. Some political differences vary consistently with the socioeconomic contrasts noted above, and others do not. For instance, given the link between patterns of socioeconomic development and the emergence of strong labor movements (see Chapter 3), the countries in the upper row of Table 0.1 generally have stronger labor movements, and those in the lower row, with greater surplus labor, generally have weaker labor movements. On the other hand, differences in type of party system are of great importance to the analysis, but do not vary consistently among the pairs. The strong parties of Chile and the weak parties of Brazil present a major contrast that is crucial for our analysis, though we will argue that in the 1960s these two countries were distinctive among the eight in the degree to which they were characterized by polarizing, multiparty politics. Similarly, it is important to distinguish the two-party system of Venezuela from the one-party dominant system of Mexico, though we label both integrative party systems.

Major parts of the book are organized around the discussion of these pairs. We juxtapose the two cases in each pair in order to explore their parallel (though certainly not identical) experiences with the incorporation periods and their legacies. At the same time, we explore contrasts within each pair.

Alternative Explanations

To assess the explanatory value of a focus on incorporation periods and their legacies, it is helpful to probe the relationship between this perspective and other explanatory approaches. Some of the most relevant of these approaches may be noted briefly here.

Many studies have explored the impact of social and economic change on the evolution of national politics in Latin America, focusing on such interrelated dimensions as differing levels of socioeconomic modernization, distinct patterns of economic development and social change, and contrasting modes of articulation with the international economy. Such explanations receive substantial attention in this book. Chapter 3 examines their impact on the initial emergence of different types of labor movements, and Chapter 4 assesses their role in the emergence of reform movements that challenged the "oligarchic state" and that in most cases launched the incorporation period. We address other aspects of the impact of socioeconomic change as well, though we hypothesize that once the incorporation periods occurred,

distinctive political dynamics were set in motion that must be analyzed in their own right and not simply as a reflection of economic and social forces.

In addition to the impact of social and economic change, transnational political developments must be considered. For instance, the diffusion of ideologies and modes of political organization had an important impact. This includes the demonstration effect of the revolutionary ideologies and models derived from the Russian and Cuban revolutions, as well as the organizational and ideological alternatives presented to the labor movement in each country by the different types of trade unionism emerging in Europe and in other parts of Latin America. The policies of foreign governments were also of great importance, particularly those of the United States. Other international actors played a role as well, such as the international communist movement, whose evolving policy had a major impact on the coalitional position not only of national communist parties but also of national labor movements, thereby strongly influencing domestic coalitional patterns. Both world wars had major ramifications in Latin America.

Piecing together these various external influences, one can picture a kind of transnational historical "grid" through which these countries passed. The grid consisted of a series of historical episodes that occurred at the international level, and the episodes within the grid can collectively be thought of as phases in what is sometimes referred to as "world historical time." Considering these episodes in chronological order, and recognizing that some may overlap, they would include (1) the decline of anarchism and the rise of alternative approaches to worker organization, including socialism, communism, and national populism; (2) the Russian Revolution and its immediate aftermath, along with the internal wage-price squeeze triggered in part by the economic impact of World War I, which precipitated in most of Latin America and in much of the Western world a dramatic wave of worker protest; (3) the international depression of the 1930s; (4) the Comintern's coalitional strategy before and during World War II of "popular frontism" and class collaboration in support of the Allied war effort that was adopted as part of the struggle against fascism; (5) the onset of the cold war after 1945, which brought a dramatic change in coalitional patterns in a number of countries; (6) the internationalization of important sectors of the economy in these countries beginning as early as the 1950s in response to new external opportunities and pressures; (7) the Cuban Revolution and the broader international climate of social protest and radicalization of the 1960s and early 1970s; and (8) the international dimensions of the reaction that sought to limit the impact of this protest and radicalization, involving the very important role of the U.S. government.

One of the fascinating issues posed by this study is the uneven relationship between these phases of world historic time and the analytic phases that are the focus of this book—that is, the periods of the oligarchic state, initial incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. We thus confront the interaction between a *longitudinal* and a *cross-sectional* perspective: between the unfolding over time within each country of phases of political change, and a

sequence of international developments that influenced all the countries at roughly the same chronological time, but often at a different point in relation to these internal political phases.

In this framework, timing is important. Depending on timing, an incorporation period may have been cut short by the impact of the depression; or, if it began later, its leaders may have had the "advantage" of appearing to offer a solution to the problems of the depression. Similarly, the conflicts of the aftermath period may have been worked out in the atmosphere of more conciliatory class relations of the later 1930s or early 1940s or in the more conflictual atmosphere of the late 1940s. Such differences had a significant impact on the patterns we analyze, and throughout the study we seek to be sensitive to this impact.

A final observation should be made about the problem of assessing rival explanations in a work of comparative-historical analysis such as this book. Research in this tradition draws great strength from its close focus on relatively few countries and from the rich treatment of cases often entailed in the construction of the complex categorical variables that are commonly employed. Yet this tradition is weaker in its capacity to address two issues that can be handled routinely with statistical analysis. Comparative-historical analysis lacks the capacity to state precisely the degree to which a given factor is a partial explanation of some important outcome, and it lacks a precise means of summarizing relationships in terms that are probabilistic rather than deterministic.

The practitioner of this approach must therefore rely on historical analysis and common sense both in weighing alternative explanations and in recognizing that the relationships under analysis are probabilistic and partial. It is in this spirit that we explore the impact of the incorporation periods: as explanatory factors that must be looked at in conjunction with other explanations and as important explanations that make certain outcomes more likely, but not inevitable.

The idea of partial explanation is crucial in the analysis of the pairs of countries. Simply because two countries had parallel experiences in the incorporation period, we would not expect that they will come out exactly the same on the relevant variables in the heritage period. Rather—as is particularly evident in the case of Chile and Brazil, where enormous differences might lead one to predict sharply contrasting trajectories of change—the hypothesized finding is that the two countries will prove to be *more similar than one might otherwise expect*. Our goal is to develop this kind of multivariate perspective in assessing our argument.

Organization of the Book

Following this Overview, Chapter 1 explicates the underlying analytic framework, drawing on Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) model of discontinuous political change that focuses on "critical junctures" and their legacies. The reader

more concerned with the discussion of Latin America than with these generic issues of discontinuous change may wish to turn directly to Chapter 2, which examines the context within which the analysis is situated by exploring basic issues of state-labor relations within the region.

Chapter 3 begins the historical analysis, assessing the events that set our story into motion: the dramatic emergence of worker organization and protest at the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, during the era of what is commonly referred to in Latin America as the "oligarchic state." Chapter 4 then traces the emergence of the reformist challenges to oligarchic domination. This challenge was led by elements of the middle sectors and dissident members of the traditional elite, who in all eight countries eventually launched a reform period that inaugurated the transformation of the oligarchic state. To orient the reader, Figure 0.1 provides a chronological overview of these reform periods (R), as well as of the subsequent periods discussed below: incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. The definitions and assumptions that underlie the identification of these periods are presented in Chapters 1, 4 and 5, and in the glossary.

Chapter 5 analyzes the incorporation periods, exploring the distinctive dynamics of state incorporation and of the three types of party incorporation. As can be seen in Figure 0.1, in five of the countries, the onset of incorporation and the reform period discussed above coincided, whereas in three others there was a delay before the onset of incorporation (indicated by an arrow following the "R"). The circumstances of this delay are analyzed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 6 explores what we define as the aftermath period, constituted by the initial political reaction and counterreaction to the incorporation experience. Chapter 7 then analyzes the larger heritage, focusing on the institutional arrangements forged during the period of incorporation and its aftermath. The concluding chapter, in addition to synthesizing the argument, poses the question of whether the legacy of incorporation still persists or has been superseded in each of the eight countries. This question arises both in the countries that had military governments in the 1960s and 1970s and in those that experienced continuous civilian rule.

Following the concluding chapter, the glossary defines a number of terms used in this book and presents an extended discussion of the concept of the initial incorporation of the labor movement. Readers interested in the issues of method and comparison that arise in applying this concept should refer to the glossary, as well as to the analysis of critical junctures in Chapter 1.

Within each of the historical chapters—that is, Chapters 3 to 7—the order of presentation is intended to highlight the contrasts among the pairs of countries. Thus, each of these chapters begins with Brazil and Chile, thereby establishing one pole of comparison involving the traits associated with state incorporation (or its antecedents or legacy, according to the chapter). We then examine Mexico and Venezuela, the two cases that exhibited all the key traits of party incorporation and that thereby represent the other pole of the

Figure 0.1 Chronological Overview: Onset of Reform Period, Incorporation. Aftermath, and Heritage



[a] R (reform period) followed by no dashes indicates that the incorporation period began immediately with the onset of the reform period. R with dashes and an arrow indicates a delay.

[b] AFT (aftermath period) refers to the immediate political dynamics following incorporation.

[c] HER (heritage period) refers to the longer-term legacy of incorporation. The heritage period encompasses most of the aftermath period, excluding only the episodes of conservative, authoritarian rule that followed incorporation in five of the cases of party incorporation. The complex issue of when each heritage period ends is explored in Chapter 8.

[d] COUP refers specifically to the major coups, which occurred in five of the countries in the 1960s or 1970s and which launched periods of military rule that interrupted the mode of party politics that characterized the heritage period. Chapter 8 asks whether the pattern of politics that reemerged after this period of military rule reflected a continuation of the heritage of incorporation.

comparison. Finally, we analyze the other two pairs, which in some important respects are intermediate cases.[19]

To encourage systematic comparison, we have presented the analysis of the eight countries in a standardized format that lends itself to the close examination of similarities and contrasts among cases. To this end, we have

[19] In the historical chapters, as a practical matter we faced the alternative of writing up the two members of each pair separately or weaving them into a single analysis. At different points we found the material lent itself more readily to one or the other mode of presentation, and we proceeded accordingly. The eight cases are presented separately in Chapter 3, which deals with the early history of the labor movement. In Chapter 4, both Brazil and Chile and also Uruguay and Colombia are presented together as pairs, and the same format is used for Brazil and Chile in the following chapters. In Chapters 4–7 all the remaining countries are presented separately, though with frequent comparison both within and between the pairs.

used a common set of headings within each chapter for most of the countries, introducing variations as needed to capture distinctive features of specific cases. These variations are particularly evident for Brazil and Chile, which, as cases of state incorporation, follow a contrasting trajectory of change.

The analysis proceeds in the following manner. In examining the emergence of working-class organization and protest in Chapter 3, we present for each country first an analysis of the socioeconomic context and then of the labor movement itself. The analysis of the reformist challenge in Chapter 4 focuses on the period of the oligarchic state, the emergence of the reform alliance, the initial transition and change of government, and the role of labor in the transition. The assessment of the incorporation periods in Chapter 5, for the cases of party incorporation, focuses on the "project from above"—that is, the goals and strategies of the leaders of the incorporation period; the "project from below"—that is, the goals and strategies of the labor movement, the political exchange on which the incorporation period was founded, the role of the party, and the emergence of opposition and polarization. For the cases of state incorporation, where there is little or no exchange, party role, or polarization, these latter three sections are replaced by a general analysis of labor policy. The analysis of the aftermath of incorporation in Chapter 6, in the cases of party incorporation, focuses on the conservative reaction, the formation of a new governing coalition in counterreaction to this conservative period, and the transformation of the party that accompanies the emergence of this new coalition. Finally, in analyzing the heritage of incorporation in Chapter 7, we first provide an overview of the party system and then systematically review for each country the reaction to the new opposition movements and crises of the late 1950s to the 1970s.[20]

The organization of the book is intended to facilitate different approaches to reading it. Readers who wish to focus on a particular analytic period in a number of countries can follow the headings for each country that correspond to the standardized subsections noted above. For readers interested in an overview of the analysis, each chapter begins with an introduction to the relevant step in the argument and provides a summary of the country patterns in that step. The write-up of each pair of countries in Chapters 5 to 7 begins with a further introduction to the pair, and Chapter 8 provides an overall summary of the argument. Finally, readers who wish to focus on a specific country should read the chapter introductions and the introductions to the relevant pair of countries as well as the appropriate country sections. For any of these approaches, readers will be aided by the Index of Countries by Analytic Period.

[20] For the countries where the heritage period as analyzed here is ended by a coup in the 1960s, this part of the analysis stops in the 1960s.

Part I

INTRODUCTION

Part III

CRITICAL JUNCTURE

5

Incorporation: Recasting State-Labor Relations

THE PERIOD of initial incorporation of the labor movement is defined as the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. During this period, the state played an innovative role in constructing new institutions of state-labor and labor-capital relations and new approaches to articulating the labor movement with the party system.

The incorporation period emerged out of the experience of working class activation and elite debate on the social question discussed in the previous two chapters. This first major attempt to incorporate labor was important for a number of reasons: it addressed a fundamental crisis or potential crisis in these societies; it represented one of the most significant periods in Latin American history in which the state was challenged to address a fundamental reform agenda; and it constituted an opportunity to shape national political institutions for years to come, an opportunity that was seized—or in some instances aborted, initially postponed, and later reinitiated—in different ways in different countries.

Our basic thesis is that the incorporation periods were a crucial transition, in the course of which the eight countries followed different strategies of control and mobilization of the popular sectors. These differences had a long-term impact on the evolution of national politics. We do not intend to suggest that once the initial incorporation period had occurred, the patterns established remained unchanged. Quite the contrary, these periods set into motion a complex sequence of reactions and counterreactions, and the legacy of incorporation is to be found in the working out of this sequence. These reactions often led to consequences quite different from those intended either by the actors within the state who initiated incorporation or by the labor leaders who may have cooperated with them. Correspondingly, with regard to labels, when we assert that a country is an instance of a particular type of incorporation, we are referring to this earlier historical transition and not to the subsequent trajectory of change.

The analysis of incorporation is based on a number of choices concerning the appropriate identification of these periods and the treatment of subperiods within the overall incorporation experience. These issues may be of great interest to some readers and of little interest to others. We have therefore discussed them primarily in the glossary and have also treated them to some degree in Chapter 1. Questions concerning the beginning and end points of the incorporation periods are also addressed within the historical analysis in the present chapter, as well as in Chapter 4.

Figure 5.1 gives a chronological overview of the incorporation periods in the eight countries, identifying for each country both an initial, more cautious phase of incorporation, led by "conservative modernizers," and characterized to varying degrees by modernization, tentativeness, stalemate, and failure; and a second phase during which state initiatives generally assumed a more vigorous form.

Figure 5.1 Chronological Overview of Incorporation Periods



Notes: 1 = onset of first phase of "conservative modernizers"; 2 = onset of second phase of incorporation period.

Table 5.1 provides a more detailed overview of these two phases of incorporation, including the event (coup, assassination, election, or worker demonstration) that marked the transition between the phases. The table also shows the relation between the onset of the reform periods analyzed in the last chapter and the incorporation periods. In Mexico, Peru, and Argentina, the onset of reform brought an unsuccessful attempt to launch an incorporation project, followed by delays of varying lengths prior to the onset of the incorporation period.

Types of Incorporation Periods

The classification of these incorporation experiences is derived from the answers to a series of questions concerning the overall *goals* of the political leaders who initiated incorporation, the principal political *agency* involved in the incorporation period, two dimensions of the *mode* of incorporation,[1] and the *scope* of incorporation.

[1] If one were providing a generalized description of the incorporation periods, in contrast to the present concern with establishing a scheme for differentiating among them, a third dimension of the *mode* of incorporation should also be emphasized: i.e., bureaucratic linkage, involving the systematic effort to establish bureaucratic ties between the state and the labor movement. This is obviously a basic feature of corporatism and is an important part of the incorporation experience in all of the countries except Uruguay. In Uruguay, in the pluralistic setting of the two presidential terms of José Batlle y Ordóñez at the beginning of the century, labor control tended to take the more "traditional" form of police surveillance of union activities rather than bureaucratic-corporative forms of control.

Goals: *Control and Support*. Was the major goal of the political leaders who initiated incorporation primarily to control the working class, with at most marginal concern with mobilizing its support, or was the mobilization of support part of a political strategy to gain and maintain power of at least equal importance?

Agency: *State versus Party or Movement*. Was the incorporation project principally concerned with linking the labor movement to the state, or was it, in addition, centrally concerned with linking labor to a political party or political movement that later became a party?

Mode: *Electoral Mobilization*. Did the leaders of the incorporation project seek the support of workers in the electoral arena?

Mode: *Union-Party/Movement Linkage*. Were strong organizational links established between labor organizations and the political party or movement through which support was organized?

Scope: *Inclusion of Peasantry*. In addition to encompassing modern sector workers in urban areas and modernized enclaves, was there a parallel mobilization and incorporation of peasants in the traditional rural sector?

These questions led us to distinguish four basic types of incorporation periods, delineated in Figure 5.2. We should reiterate that these are analytic types, not comprehensive descriptions of each case, and in fact not every country fits each category perfectly, as can be seen in the footnotes to the figure. However, the countries identified with each type are far more similar to one another in terms of the defining dimensions than they are to the other countries, and we believe this typology captures fundamental differences among the incorporation experiences.

State Incorporation. On the basis of the first two questions, we initially distinguish cases of state incorporation where the principal agency involved in the incorporation project was the state and the principal goal was to create a legalized and institutionalized labor movement that was depoliticized, controlled, and penetrated by the state. Among the countries considered here, the high point of state incorporation occurred under authoritarian rule, and the mobilization of the electoral support of workers was at most a marginal concern, though such mobilization did become important *after* these periods. Union-party links were prohibited, and preexisting political currents in the labor movement were repressed. A basic premise that helped sustain the governing coalition was that social relations in the traditional rural sector would remain unchanged. The two cases of state incorporation are Chile (1920–31) and Brazil (1930–45).

Party Incorporation. Given our definition of the incorporation period, the state played a role in all cases, and as can be seen in Figure 5.2 the control of

TABLE 5.1
Phases of Incorporation

	Onset of Reform Period	*Aborted Incorporation Initiatives*	*First Phase: Conservative Modernizer*	*Second Phase: Full-Blown Incorporation Project*
Brazil	1930		Vargas 1930–37	Coup of 1937; Estado Novo, 1937–45.
Chile	1920		Alessandri 1920–24[a]	Coup of 1927; presidency of Ibáñez, 1927–31.
Mexico	1911	Madero 1911–13	Carranza 1917–20	Assassination of Carranza in 1920; Sonoran Dynasty of 1920s, incorporation culminated in 1930s under Cárdenas.
Venezuela	1935		López Contreras and Medina, 1935–45	Coup of 1945; Trienio of 1945–48.
Uruguay	1903		Batlle 1903–7; Williman 1907–11	Batlle consolidated his position by onset of second term in 1911; Second Batlle presidency 1911–15, incorp. period extends to 1916.
Colombia	1930		Olaya 1930–34	López wins presidency in 1934; incorp. period extends to 1945.
Peru	1919	Leguía 1919–20	Prado 1939–45	In 1945, move beyond toleration of APRA to electoral alliance with APRA; Bustamante govt., 1945–48.
Argentina	1916	Yrigoyen 1916–20	Military leadership of June 1943 to Oct. 1945[b]	Worker demonstration of Oct. 1945 and election of Feb. 1946 consolidate Perón's power; Perón presidency of 1946–55.

[a] In Chile, the period 1924–27 saw crisis and instability as Ibáñez sought to consolidate his power.

[b] Immediately after the 1943 coup, these military leaders adopted highly restrictive policies toward the labor movement. The policy alternative represented by Perón's initiatives was already well-defined by late 1943, but Perón was strongly opposed by important sectors of military leadership until the second part of 1945. He formally became president in June 1946.

the labor movement was always a goal of the incorporation project. However, in six of the countries, a crucial additional agency was a political party or political movement that later became a party, and a central goal was the mobilization of labor support. These countries were distinguished as cases of party incorporation.[2]

The six cases of party incorporation had in common the fact that the incorporating elite sought to win the support of workers in the electoral arena. They differed in terms of whether strong union-party links were established and whether there was a parallel incorporation of the peasantry, thereby establishing the basis for identifying three subtypes of party incorporation.

1. **Electoral Mobilization by Traditional Party.** Colombia (1930–45) and Uruguay (1903–16) experienced active electoral mobilization of labor support, but the effort to link unions to the party was either limited or nonexistent, and the incorporation project did not encompass the peasantry. The political context was the expansion of the scope of electoral competition as an aspect of the competition between two traditional parties, both of which had existed since the 19th century. This was the most limited form of party mobilization, where new groups were added to the old party coalitions, where the addition of unions as a major element in these coalitions tended to be problematic, and where the economic elite maintained close ties to both parties.
2. **Labor Populism.** Peru (1939–48) and Argentina (1943–55) experienced active electoral mobilization of labor support and a major effort to link unions to a party or political movement, but the incorporation project did not encompass a peasantry.[3] Because the more extensive mobilization of this type remained restricted to labor in the modern sector, we refer to it as labor populism. The political context was the emergence or consolidation of a populist party or movement that displaced traditional parties and/or the traditional political class. The incorporation period was strongly antioligarchic, but not to the point of fundamentally altering property relations in the rural sector.
3. **Radical Populism.** Mexico (1917–40) and Venezuela (1935–48) experienced broad electoral mobilization of labor support, a major effort to link unions to the party, and, along with the modern sector working class, a parallel incorporation of the peasantry. Because the agrarian reform that accompanied peasant mobilization represented a more comprehensive assault on the oligarchy and on preexisting property relations, we refer to this as radical populism.

Two caveats may be introduced regarding the label party incorporation. First, we use this designation for the sake of convenience, yet as the definition makes clear, the category includes cases involving a "party or a political movement that later became a party." This is crucial because in Mexico and

[2] Since the state also played a central role in these cases, they could be called "party/state incorporation." However, this is a clumsy label, and we feel that in light of the above discussion the meaning of the label "party incorporation" is clear.

[3] Obviously, whereas in Peru this latter outcome was not plausible due to the strength of the oligarchy, in Argentina it was not plausible due to the lack of a major peasant population. It should be noted that both APRA and Perón did have rural electoral support, but not the support of an organized peasantry equivalent to that found in Venezuela and Mexico.

Figure 5.2 Types of Incorporation



Figure 5.2 (*cont.*)

Electoral mobilization	No	No	Yes[c]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Union linkage to party or movement	No	No	No	Weak[d]	Yes	Yes	Yes[e]	Yes
Peasantry included	No	No	No	No	No	No[f]	Yes	Yes

[a] Parties were introduced in Brazil shortly before the collapse of the Vargas government in 1945.

[b] A government-sponsored party played a marginal role under Ibáñez in Chile.

[c] Batlle's effort to mobilize workers' electoral support can best be thought of as a successful investment in future support, in that during the incorporation period itself, workers were still strongly anarchist and tended not to vote.

[d] The important role of the Communist Party within the main labor confederation and the ability of the Conservative Party to inhibit union formation by the Liberal labor confederation within certain regions seriously limited the development of links between the Liberal Party and the labor movement in comparison with the cases further to the right in the chart.

[e] The presence of the Communist Party within the main confederation initially diluted the tie between the PRM and the labor movement.

[f] Important benefits were extended to rural wage workers who could be considered part of the modern sector, as well as to some peasant groups. However, in the absence of a substantial peasantry, there was no project of peasant incorporation that was politically equivalent to those in Mexico and Venezuela.

Argentina the relevant organization at the onset of the incorporation period was a movement, not a party.[4]

Second, though the role of political parties is a crucial element in this classification, it must be emphasized that neither this typology nor the related typologies developed for subsequent analytic periods are intended as a substitute for more conventional classifications of parties. Indeed, such classifications may cut across the categories employed here. For instance, the two cases of state incorporation, Brazil and Chile, which both experienced an antiparty, depoliticizing incorporation period, had very different types of parties: those in Chile had deeper roots in society and were far better institutionalized, whereas those in Brazil were shallowly rooted in society and poorly institutionalized. In the two cases of labor populism, Peru and Argentina, the respective labor-based parties—that is, APRA and Peronism—likewise differed profoundly in their degree of institutionalization, both in the incorporation period and subsequently. These other patterns of variation among the parties are recognized in the present analysis and are occasionally introduced as factors that help account for differences between the cases within the country pairs. But it is important to insist that they are different dimensions of differentiation among the countries than those we seek to capture with the analysis of the incorporation periods and their legacies.

The analysis in this chapter is organized around the two well-defined poles evident in Figure 5.2. The cases of state incorporation—Brazil and Chile—exhibited none of the dimensions of mobilization, and the cases of radical populism—Mexico and Venezuela—exhibited all of them. As in the previous chapter, we first examine these two pairs of extreme cases and then turn to the two intermediate pairs.

In the treatment of each country, we first explore the "project from above" (i.e., the basic goals and strategies of the political leaders who initiated the incorporation period) and the "project from below" (i.e., the goals and strategies of the labor movement). For the cases of state incorporation, where labor policies were basically imposed on the labor movement, we then present an overview of the evolution of labor policy. For the cases of party incorporation, where labor policy was not simply imposed, but to a greater extent represented a bargain between the state and the organized labor, we present a more differentiated analysis that focuses on the political exchange with the labor movement, around which the mobilization of labor support was organized; the role of the political party or movement in mediating political support; and finally the conservative opposition that emerged in reaction to the mobilization and progressive policies of the incorporation period.

[4] As we emphasize in this and the following chapters, in Argentina Peronism continued to have an ephemeral existence as a party, yet by the definition of that term in the glossary, it unquestionably continued to function as a party.

BRAZIL AND CHILE: DEPOLITICIZATION AND CONTROL

Introduction

The fall of the oligarchic state in Brazil and Chile inaugurated a type of incorporation that was distinct from those experienced by the other countries in this study. Unique among all the cases, this important historical transition occurred without the political mobilization from above of the working class. Underlying this form of incorporation was a particular coalition: state incorporation was based on a "hybrid" state or on a modus vivendi, imposed through authoritarian rule, between the traditional oligarchy and the newer reformist middle sectors. It was premised on the transformation to a new activist state along with the protection of the essential interests of the traditional oligarchy, despite their loss of political control. Equally important, it avoided the expansion of the political arena and the mobilization of the popular sectors. Accordingly, there was no central role for a populist political party that could attract the loyalty and channel the political participation of the popular sectors. Furthermore—unlike party incorporation, in which unions were strengthened and in which the government often encouraged the spread of collective bargaining and, to some extent, union demand-making—in state incorporation the government severely constrained the newly legalized and legitimated unions in the sphere of labor-capital relations and conceived of unions more centrally as organizations through which the state could paternalistically grant social welfare benefits. In sum, state incorporation oversaw the creation of a highly corporative system of state-labor intermediation. It did not share a basic feature of party incorporation, a kind of bargain, in effect, between the state and labor in which the terms of exchange between the actors reflected differential power relations. Rather than a bargain or exchange, the preeminent feature of state incorporation was the attempt to address the social question by repressing the preexisting unions and replacing them with highly constrained, state-penetrated labor organizations that would avoid class conflict and instead "harmonize" the interests of capital and labor.

The incorporation period in these two countries must be delineated. In Brazil it is identified as the first presidency of Vargas, from 1930 to 1945; and in Chile, the Alessandri/Ibáñez period, from 1920 to 1931. In combining the Alessandri and Ibáñez presidencies into a single analytic period, it is worth noting that Ibáñez thought of himself as adopting the Alessandri agenda and pursuing the same goals and objectives that had been adopted but proved elusive in the Alessandri regime. This continuity is shown in the way the 1924 coup occurred: in the fact that it did not oust Alessandri from the presidency but rather forced the passage of his stalemated legislative program, particularly a new labor law, and in the fact that following his resignation Alessandri was brought back to power by the Ibáñez forces. Alessandri himself

recognized this continuity. In late 1932, when confronted with the suggestion that "President Ibáñez was in many respects the one who continued the work of your government, and, in large part, the one who realized many of the fundamental [but frustrated] aspirations of your program," Alessandri immediately replied, "Well, of course! It's true, and if we leave aside the arbitrary acts committed by Ibáñez, his program and achievements were nothing but the complement of mine" (Montero 1952:184).[5]

The incorporation period in these two countries is divided into two subperiods. At the outset, from 1930 in Brazil and from 1920 in Chile, the ongoing strength of the oligarchy led, as it did elsewhere, to a period of substantial stalemate and political immobilism of the new civilian government. In Chile, the deadlock was nearly complete, and even the issue of labor reform was not immune, despite the widespread agreement on the need for such reform on the part of the different sectors of the Chilean elite. In Brazil the situation was not so extreme. During the provisional government, Vargas was able to initiate changes and to proceed with a reform program in a number of areas, including new labor legislation. Nevertheless, the opposition remained strong, as was evident most dramatically in the São Paulo revolt of 1932 and in the influence of the liberal opposition on the 1934 constitution. In the following constitutional period, conflict and deadlock accelerated. The period 1930–37, then, was one of struggle and confrontation among the various elite sectors (Baretta and Markoff 1981:20).

That the initial period of attempted reform of the state was one of stalemate, of tentativeness, and largely of failure is not unique to these two countries. They differ, however, in the solution adopted to resolve the political impasse. In Mexico and Venezuela, where the oligarchy was comparatively weak, or in Colombia and Uruguay, where it was divided along long-standing partisan lines, the reform movement sought to pursue a mobilization strategy and enlist the support of the popular sectors to increase its political strength vis-à-vis the opposition. In Brazil and Chile, the strength of the oligarchy—due in part to its clientelistic control of the countryside and thus to the "unavailability" of the peasantry—meant that mobilization would not

[5] Further justification for treating these years as a single analytic period may be found in other quotations from both actors and observers. Referring specifically to labor policy, Olavarría, a family friend of Alessandri and close political associate of Ibáñez in the 1950s, said of the latter's presidency, "Finally making a reality the postulates advocated by don Arturo Alessandri, it had enacted the Labor Code and established the tribunals which must decide on conflicts of workers and employees with their employers" (Olavarría Bravo 1962, vol. 1:299). Also emphasizing the similarities between these two regimes, Alexander cites the comments of a number of observers who have called the Ibáñez regime "a bulwork of the social conquests of Alessandri's" or have pointed out that one "cannot fail to note that, for the most part, [the two regimes] were strikingly similar. . . . The general solutions that they both recommended for the economic and social problems are identical." Commenting on the change from the Alessandri to the Ibáñez regime, one remarked, "Alessandri has given way to Alessandrismo," and of Alessandri and Ibáñez another stated that these "two men . . . appear before history as perfectly complementary in a common and transcendental task" (1977:499–501).

be adequate to overcome oligarchic power. In these cases, the military became a more decisive actor. These military establishments included substantial reform elements that had constituted part of the core of the original "modernizing" opposition to oligarchic rule. Under the leadership of these groups, the military intervened to break the political impasse and to oversee the onset of the introduction of the new state. Thus, in the absence of mobilization as a strategy, the solution to the political stalemate in Brazil and Chile was found in the authoritarian regime backed by the military.

In Brazil, the authoritarian solution to impasse was imposed by Getulio Vargas in the coup of 1937, which initiated the Estado Novo. In Chile, the initiation of the authoritarian regime occurred more gradually through a less decisive process. It began with the 1924 military coup of Ibáñez, Grove, and other military officers, but authoritarian rule was not consolidated until 1927, when Ibáñez formally took over as head of state. The years that followed constituted the second subperiod in which the reform of the state was advanced and new institutions of labor incorporation were consolidated, although in both cases the new framework of state-labor relations had been initiated a few years earlier.

The result of these events in both countries, then, was a military-backed authoritarian regime and a coercively imposed modus vivendi among the dominant sectors. Despite the conflict that preceded and led to the authoritarian solution, no major sectoral cleavage emerged comparable to that which occurred elsewhere. Although the solution to the political impasse was coercive and authoritarian, the continuing power of the oligarchy made some sort of pact with it necessary. The modus vivendi imposed by the authoritarian regime was one in which the reformers, to whom the oligarchy had to cede control of the state, would protect the material interests of the oligarchy. The project of those who came to power was one of social, political, and administrative reform, which would change the nature of the state and displace the hegemony of the oligarchy, but would not attack the economic position of the oligarchy nor leave it without substantial political power. Significantly, in these two countries, there was virtually no popular sector mobilization and hence no populist alliance that would be the basis for such a cleavage. What emerged was a compromise state with a conservative-reformist or conservative-modernizing orientation based on a hybrid elite, which has been widely noted in analyses of both countries (Fausto 1970:113; Moisés 1978:2), and the political exclusion of the popular sectors.

Brazil and Chile, then, are distinctive in that the period of incorporation was characterized not by party-centered popular mobilization but by a politics of accommodation between the oligarchy and the reformers. This was based on at least three factors. The first was the ongoing political and economic importance of the oligarchy. The second was the social solidarity of the newer middle sectors and the oligarchy, a widely noted and important feature, though one that was not unique to Brazil and Chile. This was reflected in family ties and multiple economic activities of individuals that blurred the distinctions among sectors. It was also seen in the aspirations of

the middle sectors to assimilate into the oligarchy (a phenomenon that led to the Chilean expression *siútico*, referring to one seeking such assimilation). The third was the overriding fear felt by both sectors of the danger of the rising working class, which, as we have seen, had never been part of the original reform coalition.

Project from Above

The project from above in Brazil and Chile had two broad components. The first was the consolidation of power of reformist groups once the transition from the traditional oligarchic state occurred in 1930 and 1920 respectively. The second was a set of substantive reforms, of which labor incorporation and the establishment of regularized and controlled channels of industrial relations as a response to the social question held a high priority.

Brazil. In Brazil, the period from 1930 to 1937 was one of stalemate and impasse. Vargas, however, began his presidency with substantial success despite important and growing opposition. The period before the new constitution of 1934, particularly before the 1933 elections to the constituent assembly, is one in which the modernizing project of the *tenentes* was begun. Several important innovations reflecting this orientation were made in the context of the impact of the world crash, in the face of which Vargas undertook new economic policies and in the process embarked on a centralization of political power. In 1930 Vargas issued a decree that lodged greater power in the federal government and paved the way for a series of moves that centralized the state and increased its role in economic modernization (Skidmore 1967:33). Notable among these was the transfer of responsibility for policy concerning the coffee sector from the states to the federal governments and the new policy of the federal government to regulate the supply of coffee through government purchases with the goal of promoting the recovery of the export sector (Dean 1969:196–206).

Another early emphasis of the Vargas government was social welfare legislation. Starting immediately in the first year of the new government, a number of decrees provided for retirement pensions for some categories of workers, industrial accident insurance, greater holiday benefits, regulation of working hours and of employment of minors, and benefits related to emergency treatment, and maternity benefits. Though Vargas had more success in promulgating these provisions than Alessandri, his Chilean counterpart, it should be noted that they were not implemented effectively in this earlier period (Flynn 1978:102).

Perhaps the most important measure undertaken by Vargas in this initial period was the establishment in 1930 of a Labor Ministry and the promulgation of a labor law in the next year. The law, which indicated the direction of labor policy during the Estado Novo, provided for the registration and legalization of unions. It also subjected the legalized unions to substantial state control, aimed particularly at eliminating politically oriented unions.

Quite clearly, it sought to replace the existing unions, which were under communist, anarchist, and socialist influence, with an apolitical labor movement made up of unions that would function as "consultative organs of government," substituting a model of class harmony and collaboration for one of class conflict (Harding 1973:71–73).

In the first years of the Vargas period, then, there was tenuous agreement on two issues—the elimination of state corruption and the necessity of addressing the social question by some sort of transformation of the "dangerous classes" organized in politically radical unions into a cooperative labor movement, even if the granting of some benefits were necessary. There was, however, substantial and growing conflict between the *tenentes*, who advocated authoritarian rule to advance their program of modernization, centralization, and structural change, and the liberal constitutionalists, who were strongly represented in Congress and whose power was lodged in the states. They thus resisted the centralizing measures and advocated a liberal democratic regime that would protect their political influence (Skidmore 1967:13; Baretta and Markoff 1981:5–25).

A major reason why Vargas was more successful than Alessandri in avoiding policy immobilism was the greater constitutional discontinuity with the Old Republic that occurred in 1930 in Brazil. In Chile, Alessandri tried to govern, at a comparable stage in 1920, within the framework of the preexisting Parliamentary Republic and confronted overwhelming congressional opposition. Vargas, by contrast, coming to power in the "Revolution of 1930," which constituted a more decisive break with the Old Republic, abolished the legislative bodies at the local, state, and national levels and assumed virtually dictatorial powers (R. Levine 1970:5).

Though congressional opposition was thus initially avoided, conflict erupted in other arenas. This conflict took the form of a series of confrontations, which were most explicit in the regional revolts of 1932 in São Paulo and Pernambuco, in which "Vargas narrowly prevented full-scale civil war" (R. Levine 1970:8). The conflict was also evident in 1934 in the Constituent Assembly over the issue of centralization and the degree of autonomy to be granted to the states. The 1934 constitution, though very much a hybrid document (Skidmore 1967:19), strengthened the hand of the liberal opposition. The general amnesty issued by the Constituent Assembly paved the way for the return of political exiles and strengthened the challenge of the liberal constitutionalists based in the states. The introduction of democratic procedures also weighted the balance in favor of the opposition since the rural oligarchy controlled local voting. Partisans of the *tenente* position, which was thus losing influence, "complained bitterly that Vargas was opening the door for the oligarchy to regain power in the states and thereby erase all revolutionary gains" (R. Levine 1970:11, 14–15).

By the middle of the decade, then, the conflict between Vargas and the opposition was out in the open. The deadlock intensified in 1934–35 as a series of clashes occurred between the minister of war and political figures in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. These battles ended in the resignation of

MEXICO AND VENEZUELA: RADICAL POPULISM

The onset of the incorporation period was marked in Mexico by the end of the civil war and the new constitution of 1917 and in Venezuela by the new government that followed the death of Gómez in 1935. As in Brazil and Chile, the challenge of this transition involved the political task of consolidating a new reformist coalition. In Mexico this task was undertaken against the backdrop of Madero's failure and the ensuing years of bloody civil war. In Venezuela it was undertaken in ambiguous circumstances. Following Gómez's death, government passed on not to the middle sector opposition but to Gómez's followers in the army, so there is little sense in which it could be said that the reformist opposition even came to power. Nevertheless, the death of Gómez marked the end of an era, and the coloration of the new government and its openness to reform was an issue to be explored and worked out. A crucial factor that distinguishes Mexico and Venezuela from Brazil and Chile was the strategy of the new political leadership vis-à-vis the popular sectors in their attempt to attain and/or consolidate power; that is, in Mexico and Venezuela political leaders viewed the popular sectors as crucial political resources that could be mobilized in the struggles among sectors of the dominant classes. This mobilization was a central feature of the incorporation pattern in these countries.

In Mexico and Venezuela, this support mobilization took the form of what we have labeled radical populism, in which both the working class and the peasantry were mobilized electorally and organized into functional associations, such as unions, linked to the reformist political movement or party. There was some difference between the two countries in this respect. In Venezuela both working-class and peasant organizations were united in the same national labor confederation and in the same sectoral structure within the populist party. In Mexico the two union structures remained organizationally separate—indeed during the 1920s the urban and rural popular sectors even tended to be affiliated with different parties, and from the 1930s on they formed parallel but separate sectors within the dominant, populist party.

The inclusion of the peasantry in the politics of support mobilization meant two things from the point of view of the present perspective. First, it made the politics of incorporation appear like a more radical challenge, since the appeal to the peasantry necessitated a call for land reform—an element not found in the other six incorporation projects considered here and one that seemed to constitute a more thorough-going attack on private property and capitalist (and precapitalist) relations of production. Second, the mobilization of the peasantry meant that the dependence of political leaders on the working class was somewhat diluted since an alternate base of popular support was available. Nevertheless, despite this greater coalitional flexibility, in both Mexico and Venezuela leaders' dependence on labor support was

great and was reflected in strong prolabor policies and substantial state cooperation with existing labor organizations.

On the one hand, one must understand radical populism as an elite project to establish the political dominance of elements of the emerging urban middle sectors. To this end, populism was pursued as part of a political strategy in which the popular sectors were mobilized as a political support base, as a political resource to build a constituency in order to consolidate power. This mobilization did not take the form of the encouragement of autonomous mobilization from below, but of controlled mobilization from above. A central feature of this mobilization from above was the establishment of a reformist multiclass political party to channel popular sector political participation into support for the government.

On the other hand, what is crucial to understand is that the very process of support mobilization took on a dynamic of its own. In order to mobilize support successfully, an exchange was necessary in which real concessions were offered for the support sought, for the popular sectors were not so passive nor so easily duped that they would collaborate without extracting some benefits. This, then, is the source of the political dynamic contained within populism throughout Latin America. The exchange that is a fundamental feature of support mobilization, while not threatening the basic capitalist orientation of the state and while in fact doing much to co-opt the working class (and the peasantry where included, as in Mexico and Venezuela), nevertheless involved substantive concessions, the formation of a progressive alliance, and some degree of power-sharing with the working class. These alienated important sectors of society. The result was political polarization as the alienated groups defected from the coalition. Despite efforts of the political elite to maintain the multiclass alliance, it tended to break apart, so that increasingly there was a situation in which a progressive coalition in power was opposed by the dominant economic sectors, which formed a counterrevolutionary or counterreform alliance.

Genuine populism, then, was not a static or equilibrium condition but contained within it a political dynamic and contradiction that made it most unstable. It must be understood in terms of a central emphasis on this contradictory feature: though mobilization was undertaken largely from above, and though in many ways it is a co-optive mechanism, the dynamics of mobilization turned the incorporation project in a sufficiently progressive direction to result in political polarization, as important, economically dominant groups went into vehement opposition, a situation that was unsustainable in the context of capitalist development.

With respect to the role of the working class in Mexico and Venezuela, the contrast with Brazil and Chile may be emphasized. Unlike the attempt to depoliticize the labor movement that was characteristic of state incorporation, the mobilization strategy by its very nature involved as an essential aspect the politicization of the working class. In this way, incorporation involved as a first priority not only the integration of the labor movement as a functional group but also its integration as a political movement, organized

in a multiclass political party that would reflect the populist alliance and that would channel working class political activity.

This difference meant that compared to state incorporation, radical populism involved more concessions and a more favorable political position for the labor movement. Leftist and independent unions were tolerated (though not necessarily favored) and in some cases even became part of the coalition. A corporative labor code was promulgated, but it had fewer constraints on unions and union activities. The same kind of officialist, state-penetrated union movement was not established, even though mobilization meant that the labor movement came to support the government and, in receiving benefits from it, became dependent on the state. These differences occurred within the framework of certain commonalities with state corporatism. In cases of state incorporation, some real benefits were paternalistically granted, and in cases of radical populism the political elite also recognized the importance of structuring a labor movement that it could control and of preventing the emergence of a strong, autonomous working class. Nevertheless, the adoption of a mobilization strategy implied a more advantageous power position for the working class, since the usefulness to the political leadership of popular sector support was dependent upon increasing the power of organized labor in order to enhance its weight as a political resource.

Compared to state incorporation, then, radical populism represents a contrasting model of labor incorporation, a different state response to the challenge of the emergence of an industrial working class. The different response corresponds to a distinct strategy for maintaining or consolidating the power of reformist political leadership. The two types of experiences differ with regard to the nature of conflict among contending factions of the dominant classes, the coalitions formed, the strategic political location of popular sectors, the degree to which they were mobilized, and the degree of class polarization that resulted.

Peasant Incorporation

Since in the following pages we will be primarily concerned with analyzing state-labor relations, which are the focus of this book, a few observations may be added here about a dictinctive feature of Mexico and Venezuela: the inclusion of the peasantry in the politics of incorporation. In their willingness to mobilize the peasants and, in the process, to adopt policies of agrarian reform, the leaders of the incorporation projects in these two countries thereby also demonstrated a willingness to risk the hostility of landowners and raise more basic questions about the sanctity of private property and about the scope of the new interventionist state.

In Mexico, the mobilization of peasant support began during the civil war that pitted Carranza against Villa and Zapata, whose main support was found among peasants, rural workers, and ranchers. Zapata in particular had a base

in the peasantry and had promulgated the Plan de Ayala to promote peasant interests. In response the Constitutionalists backed agrarian reform, and after the war the new constitution championed issues of social justice and laid the legal basis for land expropriation. In the following years, mobilization of peasant support was undertaken by leaders at many levels, reflecting both the fluidity of the post-revolutionary period and the attempt to consolidate power in the face of it. On the federal level, the governments of the 1920s promoted centralized peasant organizations and parties and adopted agrarian reform programs to mobilize peasant support for multiple reasons: to prevent more radical, independent peasant movements; to confront pressures from counterrevolutionary groups, and to quash rebellions, the most important of which were the de la Huerta and Cristero rebellions (Hamilton 1982:68, 75).

Peasant support, like labor support, was also a basis of political power cultivated by governors. Perhaps the most dramatic, but certainly not the only, example occurred in the state of Veracruz, where the governor supported the agrarian leagues, organized by Communist-affiliated labor and tenant unions, in their fight against the landed elite. To gain peasant support the governor distributed land to peasants and allowed peasant leaders to occupy major political and administrative posts. In Michoacán, Governor Lázaro Cárdenas also carried out an agrarian reform program and armed women's leagues to defend the newly acquired land (Hamilton 1982:98–99).

During the six-year interim of more conservative government (1928–34), policy turned more hostile toward peasants. In an effort to eliminate independent bases of power, the central government moved to obstruct and forcibly defeat peasant mobilization by state governors. In addition, the land reform program was pronounced a failure, and an attempt was made to get the governors to call it off and provide guarantees to landowners. At the same time, many of the peasant leagues were destroyed or weakened (Hamilton 1982:99–100, 175).

The radical populist government of Cárdenas (1934–40) brought an abrupt change, as peasants were brought into the incorporation project in parallel fashion to the labor movement. During the Cárdenas presidency, nearly 18 million hectares of land were distributed to more than 800,000 peasants, surpassing in six years the accumulated totals up to that time (Hamilton 1982:177). In addition to the extent of the program, other aspects made it more radical than previous programs. First, previously exempted commercial estates became subject to expropriation, and many henequen, rice, wheat, livestock, and sugar estates were included in the program. Secondly, the government encouraged the organization and mobilization of rural workers, particularly over the issue of obtaining a labor contract, as a prerequisite for expropriation. Third, in part for ideological reasons and in part as a mechanism for maintaining the integrity of these large estates, communal production based on the *ejido* was encouraged and favored by the government. A new Ejidal Bank provided credit and in a host of other ways supported and oversaw the functioning of the *ejido*, promoting it over other kinds of rural ownership. All in all, the agrarian program of Cárdenas constituted a major

assault on the power of landowners and provoked intense opposition (Hamilton 1982:164–78).

In exchange, of course, the government benefited from the political support that was forthcoming from the peasantry. To institutionalize the peasant-state alliance, agrarian leagues were constituted at the state level, and in 1938 these were brought together in the CNC (National Peasant Confederation). The CNC, representing about 3 million peasants and rural workers, was formally incorporated into the governing party, which Cárdenas reorganized in the same year.

In Venezuela, peasant mobilization and organization were closely integrated into the larger labor movement, which included both urban and rural sectors and which was regulated by the same labor law. To that extent, the longer discussion below applies equally to the incorporation of the peasantry. Nevertheless, a few additional details may be added at this point.

Between 1935 and 1945, the government itself had little interest in politically mobilizing the peasantry. With the 1936 labor law, a conservative incorporation project was initiated with the provision for legalized but highly constrained unions. During this period, however, groups in opposition to the government were vigorous in their efforts to organize a political movement (which eventually became the party Democratic Action—AD) and mobilize a support base. The peasantry as well as urban labor figured prominently in this strategy, and the agricultural sector received a great deal of attention in the development program of the new movement (Powell 1971:36, 56). The first peasant union was organized in 1937, and in the following years, as local peasant leaders joined the movement or were recruited by it, unionization spread, as did peasant protest and clashes with landlords. By 1945, 77 unions with a membership of over 6,000 were legally recognized, and Powell (1971:60) indicates that when not restricted to legally recognized unions, the effective peasant support base of AD when it came to power in 1945 consisted of "500 embryonic unions, with as many as 2,000 local peasant leaders in the villages and scattered hamlets, and an estimated 100,000 peasants within the orbit of influence of these local leaders."

Once in the power, AD continued to place high priority on the mobilization of peasant support, and agrarian policy became a central component of the new government's program. The agrarian reform law was promulgated in 1948, but even before that, indeed on the first day of the new government in 1945, agrarian policy began to take shape as guidelines to prevent peasant eviction were announced and a program of land distribution through leasing was begun. That program was expanded with more categories of public and private land made available for lease. The new constitution of July 1947 provided the legal basis for an agrarian reform law, which was promulgated in October 1948. However, it accomplished little since it was quickly superseded by the military coup, which ousted the government the following month.

Despite its abbreviated duration, the Trienio government, through its agrarian policy, was effective in mobilizing peasant support and consolidating a state-peasant alliance based on "an explicit quid pro quo: you help us to achieve power with your votes . . . , and we will respond with an agrarian reform through the channel of the Peasant Federation. . . . [The] mobilization system . . . depended both on intermittent peasant contributions at the polls and on a flow of agrarian goods and services in return" (Powell 1971:83).

After just the first year of the new government, land was distributed to over 23,000 peasants. In addition, peasant organization increased dramatically. Over the three-year period of the Trienio, the number of unions grew by a factor of almost ten and membership by a factor of almost 11 (Powell 1971:79). These peasant organizations were promoted as the vehicles through which land and credit were distributed. Powell (1971:75, 80) suggests that the new policy led to a basic redistribution of power in the countryside, as these unions and their leaders were empowered by the terms of the program to influence not only land distribution but also the location of public works projects. To oversee the process, a commission was established on which a sole representative of landowners could be outvoted by the other four members—three government representatives and a representative of the peasant unions. Furthermore, the formal role of unions in the policy process had a partisan impact since most of these unions were linked to AD, the government party.

The agrarian policy, taken as a whole, provoked much opposition. This opposition came not only from landowners, who were no longer free to dispose of their land without constraints, but also from opposition parties, which did not establish the same links to peasant unions and stood to loose politically from AD's mobilization strategy.

In both Mexico and Venezuela, then, the inclusion of the peasantry in the incorporation project generated substantial opposition. However, by the end of the incorporation period, the traditional landed oligarchy had been further undermined. Hence, though this opposition was part of the pressure for the subsequent move to the right (which will be explored in the next chapter), this sector did not persist in subsequent decades as a powerful pole of antagonism to the populist party as it did in Peru and Argentina.

upheaval AD seemed to be promoting" (Lieuwen 1961:88). The AD government, then, fell not because it alienated only the military, but because of the broad opposition radical populism provoked. As Daniel Levine (1978:92) has stated: "The overthrow of AD thus stemmed ultimately from the threat its continued rule had come to pose to a wide range of social interests." Similarly, Hellinger (1984:49) has suggested that the government fell because "the Venezuelan bourgeoisie was insufficiently mature to accept at that time the structural changes in the economy and society that the Trienio government was introducing in order to . . . make possible the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. . . . [It] was not prepared to accept the institution of labor unions, for example."

The result of radical populism in the Trienio, then, was "extreme polarization" (Fagan 1974:81) and the activation of an accelerating or spiraling populist dynamic in which the loss of support, occurring as an outcome of a populist alliance and reformist program, led to an increasing dependence of the government on a popular-sector support base. As opposition mounted, the government, "in order to strengthen its remaining base of legitimating support . . . succeeded in producing an ever more dependable, but ever narrower, support structure" (Powell 1971:84). "As a result, by 1948 [urban and rural] organized labor . . . was perhaps the only secure base of the government's support" (Fagan 1974:81), and it was insufficient to prevent the counterreformist coup, which reflected the widespread opposition to radical populism and attracted the passive—if not active—support of broad sectors of society.

URUGUAY AND COLOMBIA: ELECTORAL MOBILIZATION BY A TRADITIONAL PARTY

In contrast to other cases of party incorporation, in Uruguay and Colombia the parties that led the incorporation period—the Colorados and the Liberals—were traditional, multiclass, multisectoral parties founded in the 19th century. By contrast, in the other four countries the incorporating parties emerged in the 20th century in response to issues of social protest and social reform. Due to the deeply ingrained multiclass and multisectoral character of the Colorados and Liberals, issues of fractionalization arose quickly as soon as the progressive wing of the party initiated the more intensive phase of reform and tried to establish its dominance over the more traditional wing of the party. Hence, the conflicts and polarization of this period involved as much intraparty as interparty tensions.

The incorporation periods in Uruguay and Colombia were also distinctive, as noted in Chapter 4, in that they came early. The Batlle era in Uruguay was early in an absolute, chronological sense—being the first incorporation period in the region—and also came early in relation to the emergence of the Uruguayan labor movement. In Colombia, incorporation came considerably later in chronological terms, beginning in the 1930s, but was early in relation to the development of the Colombian labor movement. This early timing had important consequences for the dynamics of incorporation.

Uruguay and Colombia exhibit other commonalities as well. In both countries a tradition of power-sharing between the two main parties was abandoned during the incorporation period as the reform party sought to establish its dominance, forming a "party government" (*gobierno de partido*). Both parties introduced major labor reforms to cultivate the working class as a political constituency, with the goal of building a new electoral majority. However, due to the early timing and hence the limited electoral role of workers, especially in Uruguay, this appeal was more an investment in the future, rather than in current electoral support. Yet it appears to have been a successful investment, in that both parties emerged from this period commanding a majority in the electoral arena.

The construction of links between the incorporating party and unions was even more problematic than the electoral appeal to workers, in part due to party fractionalization. Efforts by the progressive wing of both parties to build such links tended to be particularly threatening to the established balance of forces within the party and sharply exacerbated intraparty tensions. For this and other reasons, the partisan mobilization of unions by the incorporating party, which was a central feature in other cases of party incorporation, either did not occur at all during this period (Uruguay) or was only partly successful (Colombia).

Though there was some rural reform in both countries, neither saw a major effort to extend the incorporation project to the rural sector. Both countries

had previously experienced civil wars or major civil violence in rural areas, yet control over rural property relations on the part of the most powerful landed interests was strong, and these interests were well represented in both traditional parties in both countries. Correspondingly, policies that went beyond modest rural reform to a more fundamental restructuring of property and political relationships in the countryside were not adopted.

URUGUAY

During the Uruguayan incorporation period, José Batlle y Ordóñez launched his extraordinary program of social, economic, and political reform. This period is best understood in two phases. In the first, which began with Batlle's first administration (1903–7) and extended through that of Williman (1907–11), the primary focus was on extending Colorado dominance over the state and securing Batlle's control of the Colorado Party. The second, which saw the passage of important segments of Batlle's reform program, began during his second administration (1911–15) and lasted until mid-1916, during the Viera administration (1915–19). This active phase of reform brought growing division in the Colorado Party and came to an end with the defeat of the Batlle forces in the 1916 elections for the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent decision of President Viera to withdraw his support for extending Batlle's program. The famous "Alto de Viera" (Viera's Halt) ended the incorporation period.

Project from Above

When Batlle came to power in 1903, he faced two important challenges: a military revolt by elements of the National Party—also known as the Blancos—and division within his own Colorado Party. By the end of his first administration in 1907, he had successfully addressed both problems and had begun to present to the legislature his program for the political and economic transformation of Uruguay. Although prior to 1903 Batlle had strongly emphasized worker rights during his tenure as editor of the daily newspaper, *El Día*, upon achieving the presidency he first turned his attention to the threat to Colorado rule presented by the revolt of the National Party. Consequently, Batlle's labor and social program was delayed. Nevertheless, even during his first presidency Batlle used his position to support workers' right to strike and took a strong stand favoring workers' demands, thereby making this earlier phase part of the incorporation period.

Just months after Batlle's election, forces of the National Party led by Aparicio Saravia rose in revolt because Batlle had broken the terms of the 1897 agreement for coparticipation between the parties. This revolt ended in compromise, only to be followed by a full-fledged civil war that lasted until Saravia's death at the battle of Masoller in 1904 (Vanger 1963:160–61). Upon defeating the National Party's forces, Batlle ended the coparticipation agreement of 1897, as well as the partisan division of Uruguayan territory. Batlle was by now strongly opposed to coparticipation (Vanger 1963:33) and, like López during the incorporation period in Colombia in the 1930s, believed in the need for "government by the majority party" (*gobierno de partido*). The national state and the Colorado Party would rule all of Uruguay. If the Na-

PERU AND ARGENTINA: LABOR POPULISM

The experiences of Peru and Argentina with incorporation had many common traits. Regarding the antecedents, both countries had experienced failed attempts to initiate incorporation periods in the 1910s and 1920s, followed by a long postponement of incorporation. In the intervening years, both saw an incremental growth of the state role in the labor movement, yet without experiencing a policy period that fits the definition of incorporation.

In the incorporation period itself, Peru and Argentina saw intense popular activation in the urban sector, involving both the mobilization of electoral support of workers and the consolidation of strong ties between trade unions and the party or movement that led the incorporation project. Partly due to the long delay of initial incorporation in relation to the reform period of the 1910s and 1920s, the incorporation project in each country was built on top of an already strong popular movement—the APRA Party and its labor base in Peru and the CGT (General Labor Confederation) in Argentina.

Perón's reform program had a far greater impact in rural areas than did that of APRA, and Perón's policies went further in directly affecting the economic interests of the export elite. Yet in neither case was there a basic restructuring of property relations in the rural sector or widespread peasant mobilization, in marked contrast to Mexico and Venezuela. Correspondingly, the economic elites of the agrarian sector remained an important economic and political force in both Peru and Argentina and emerged as a powerful pole of opposition to the new political forces unleashed by the incorporation period.

With regard to the character of the populist party, there was a major contrast and a major similarity. A central feature of the Peruvian experience was the exceptionally strong, well-disciplined organization of APRA. By contrast, the party structure to which the CGT came to be linked in Argentina was not well institutionalized, either during the incorporation period or for many years thereafter, and for many purposes it is more appropriate to think of Peronism as a political movement rather than a party.[64] Despite this contrast in party organization, APRA and Peronism were similar in the degree to which they were overwhelmingly dominated by a single personality—Víctor Raul Haya de la Torre and Juan Domingo Perón. Subsequent antagonism toward the two parties was directed as much at these two individuals as toward the parties more broadly.

The coherence of policy during the incorporation period differed substantially. The incorporation project in Argentina was one of the most extensive in terms of the scope of new labor legislation, the growth in the number of unions and union membership, the coverage of social benefits, and the dramatic shift away from earlier patterns of state-labor relations to one in which, in symbolic and ideological terms, the government dramatically sided

[64] Recognizing this fact, for the sake of convenience we will generally refer to Peronism as a party.

with the working class. By contrast, the incorporation period in Peru emerged incrementally under the government of Prado between 1939 and 1945, and even during its more ambitious phase from 1945 to 1948 was marred by political stalemate, legislative paralysis, a failure to initiate many proposed reforms, and intense antagonism among the principal actors involved. These years were relatively unproductive in terms of new labor legislation.

These features of the Peruvian experience could lead one to question if this incorporation period was in fact an important transition in Peru. Such skepticism might be reinforced by the observation that prior to the 1940s APRA was already a major force in the labor movement. Hence, more than in most cases, the incorporation period could be seen as reinforcing an already existing political relationship between the labor movement and a populist party.

Yet despite political failures and policy paralysis in many spheres, APRA's remarkable organizational capabilities allowed it to make excellent use of its access to state resources. The result was a fundamental transformation in the sphere of labor relations, to the extent that this period is commonly interpreted as a crucial transition in the evolution of APRA's position in the labor movement.[65] However, it was not as dramatic a reorientation as occurred in several other countries.

[65] Sulmont (1977:82) considers the Bustamante period "a crucial moment in the political life of the country" which "permitted the worker movement and the popular sector more broadly to consolidate its trade-union and political organization." Pareja (1980:115) suggests that by using the resources secured through its role in the Bustamante administration, "APRA became the most important vehicle for the institutionalization of the labor movement. The relationship between the party and trade unionism expanded to the point of near identity." Parallel observations are made in Angell (1980:21) and Adams (1984:36–37), both of whom stress the importance of APRA's access to state resources in achieving this end. From a comparative perspective, Anderson (1967:249) makes the more general observation that "the die of Peruvian postwar politics was cast" in the 1945–48 period.

6

Aftermath: Reaction to Incorporation and Postincorporation Dynamics

IN ALL EIGHT COUNTRIES, the incorporation periods produced strong political reactions, and in most cases the regimes under which incorporation had been inaugurated eventually broke down in the face of rising opposition. This chapter analyzes the aftermath of incorporation, focusing on this regime change and the reshaping of state-union-party relations that accompanied and followed it.

The two broad types of incorporation periods—state and party incorporation—triggered distinct political reactions. In Brazil and Chile, state incorporation had been antidemocratic and antimobilizational. It had been carried out under authoritarian regimes, and this authoritarianism generated substantial opposition that culminated in the restoration of competitive, electoral regimes. Under these new regimes, the question of the political role of the working class, postponed rather than answered in the incorporation period, had to be addressed anew. The repoliticization of the working class, and of the parties and other channels through which labor would participate in the new competitive regime, emerged as major political issues.

The countries that experienced party incorporation followed a contrasting pattern. Party incorporation had been reformist and mobilizational and had occurred under regimes that were in most cases more democratic.[1] The opposition movements that emerged were conservative and oriented toward political demobilization. In Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela, the incorporation period was brought to an end by a military coup that ousted the reformist governments and inaugurated a period of counterreformist military rule. In Uruguay and Colombia, the incorporation period ended with a relatively mild conservative reaction under the existing civilian regime, followed later by a coup that pushed the conservative reaction even further. In Mexico alone the incorporating party managed to stay in power, and under its own leadership the reformism of the incorporation period was brought to a halt.

In sum, except for Mexico, the aftermath of party incorporation can be traced out in two steps: (1) a conservative reaction in which the party or leadership that led the incorporation period fell from power and (2) an initial

[1] As we saw in Chapter 5, in Mexico, Uruguay, and Colombia, the incorporation periods occurred under more-or-less competitive regimes. In Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru, the incorporation periods were initiated under authoritarian regimes or regimes whose electoral credentials were dubious. Yet the leaders of these incorporation projects later consolidated their power in relatively free elections. Among these latter three cases, only in Argentina did the regime subsequently become authoritarian during the incorporation period.

period of a restored, competitive regime, during which a number of measures were initiated to ensure that the polarization of the incorporation period would not recur. Though in Mexico the incorporating party remained in power, that country experienced the same political changes as the other countries in this last period.

The analysis of the aftermath period covers the following years (see Figure 6.1): in Brazil, from the fall of Vargas in 1945 to 1960; in Chile, from the fall of Ibáñez in 1931 to 1952; in Mexico, from 1940 to 1952, a period which saw a self-transformation of the governing party in a conservative direction; in Venezuela, from the 1948 coup, through the restoration of a competitive regime in 1958, to the early 1960s; in Uruguay, from the halt in the reform effort in 1916, through the coup of 1933, through the restoration of a competitive regime in 1942, to the mid-1940s; in Colombia, from the resignation of López in 1945, through the coup of 1953 and the restoration of a semicompetitive, civilian regime in 1958, to roughly 1960; in Peru, from the 1948 coup, through the restoration of a semicompetitive regime in 1956, to roughly 1960; and in Argentina, from the coup of 1955, through the restoration of a semicompetitive regime in 1958, to roughly 1960.

Aftermath of State Incorporation

For the cases of state incorporation, the analysis begins with this restoration of competitive regimes in 1945 in Brazil and 1931 in Chile. In these cases, a crucial item of "unfinished business" from the earlier incorporation period

Figure 6.1 Chronological Overview of Aftermath Periods



Notes: For countries that had coups after the incorporation period, C = coup, R = restoration of a more competitive regime.

was the *political* role of the working class. The depoliticization of the incorporation periods had provided only a temporary resolution of this issue. From the point of view of the labor movement, the political opening represented a new opportunity for political participation and influence, and in this new context the repoliticization of the working class occurred quickly. As a concomitant of the prior depoliticization of the incorporation period in Brazil and Chile, the incorporation experiences had not left a legacy of deeply ingrained political ties between the union movement and a multiclass party or party bloc that was capable of holding power. Hence, in the aftermath of state incorporation, workers' political affiliations were less well-defined, and in that specific sense the labor movement had a greater degree of political independence. In this context, the repoliticization and radicalization of the working class occurred quickly. In both countries during this period, the Communist Party achieved substantial success in attracting worker support, and a significant challenge to state-controlled unions was mounted, though the pace at which this took place and the degree of success were not as great in Brazil, at least in part because of the reimposition of state controls.

From the point of view of reformist elements within the political elite, one of the problems in the aftermath of state incorporation was the absence of the type of political party—commonly referred to as populist—that had been created or reinforced in many cases of party incorporation: a multiclass party with strong ties to the working class that could potentially be a vehicle to generate support for reform. To address this problem, reformers who had previously been leaders during the earlier periods of state incorporation—that is, Vargas in Brazil and Marmaduque Grove in Chile—now established such parties, which successfully gained influence within the working class. However, unlike most of the parties that had led party incorporation, these postincorporation parties in the cases of state incorporation—specifically the PTB in Brazil and the Socialist Party in Chile—never achieved a majority position. Rather, they became junior partners in political coalitions headed by other, center or center-right parties. Characteristically, during elections these coalitions had a populist character, but once the government was in power the actual practice of policy-making shifted toward the orientation of the accommodationist alliance that had been worked out during the incorporation period. Eventually, these experiments in "populism" failed with the discrediting of the coalitions and the radicalization of the populist parties. Here again, this process went further in Chile.

We define the aftermath period for Brazil and Chile as corresponding to this aborted experiment with coalitional populism, which ended in 1960 in Brazil and in 1952 in Chile. Two features mark this failure. First, the populist party (or important factions within it), and especially its working-class base, was insufficiently rewarded for its electoral support and began to reject the collaborative, coalitional strategy in favor of more radical orientations. Second, the center or center-right party that held the predominant position in these coalition governments could no longer hold on to power. With the collapse

of these attempts, a process of polarization, set in motion during the aftermath period, subsequently became a central feature of political life.

Aftermath of Party Incorporation

For the cases of party incorporation, two issues were pivotal in the aftermath period. The first was the conservative reaction, with its counterreformist policies that in most cases included the marginalization or repression of the party and unions that had earlier played a key role in the incorporation period. The second was the terms under which these parties would subsequently be readmitted to the political game—or, in the case of Mexico, would be capable of continuing in power. The conservative reaction to incorporation made clear the limits to reformism and also the inability of the political system to deal with the opposition and polarization engendered by it. This situation gave rise to various attempts to avoid future polarization by constituting a broad centrist coalition that could consolidate civilian rule. Accordingly, party leaders oversaw a number of changes in the parties that had led the incorporation periods. We will focus on three dimensions of party evolution, which occurred to varying degrees among the cases: (1) a programmatic shift toward the center; (2) the expulsion or departure of the left; and (3) the success of the party, despite its conservatization and loss of leftist support, in retaining its mass constituencies, specifically its ties to the working class, and where relevant the peasantry, encompassing both electoral support and party-union organizational ties.

Another aspect of the attempts to ensure that a return to, or consolidation of, civilian rule would not lead to a repetition of polarization was the adoption of conflict-limiting mechanisms. One such mechanism, used by the military in Peru and Argentina, was the ongoing ban on the incorporating party, even after civilian rule was restored. Another, adopted by the political parties in Venezuela and Colombia, was a pact or accord through which they agreed to limit political conflict among themselves. A third, found only in Mexico, where alone the incorporating party remained in power, was the strengthening of a one-party dominant system. These differences among the countries point to another: the role of the party in overseeing the political transitions of the aftermath period. This was weakest in Argentina and Peru, strongest in Mexico, and intermediate in Venezuela, Uruguay, and Colombia.

The different experiences in the aftermath of party incorporation are summarized in Table 6.1. In Mexico and Venezuela, the party that had earlier led the incorporation period maintained at least a relatively dominant position in this transition. These parties gave up important parts of their earlier reform programs in exchange for retention of, or renewed access to, power, and they successfully used state resources to retain much of their mass worker and peasant base. A contrasting pattern is found in Peru and Argentina, where the incorporating party played a far more subordinate role in the transition, in the context of some form of ongoing ban of this party. Uruguay and Colombia are in a sense intermediate cases, with the party that led the incorporation period playing a more nearly "coequal" role in the transition with the other traditional party in these two-party systems (or, in the case of Uruguay, a faction of that party).

An Antiunion Variant of Populism

In introducing the cases of party incorporation, we wish to call attention to an additional theme that emerged in the aftermath period. We have noted that the military presidents who led this period of conservative reaction in part carried out a "negative" political project, attempting to undo the reforms, popular mobilization, and populist coalition that derived from the incorporation period. In addition, in the late 1940s and early 1950s Rojas in Colombia, Pérez-Jiménez in Venezuela, and Odría in Peru had a "positive" political project, through which they sought to build their own base of working-class support.[2]

The nature of these three projects merits particular attention here because they were shaped by an important international conjuncture in a way that represents an interesting cross-fertilization between the incorporation period in Argentina and the aftermath period in the other three countries. In the 1940s and early 1950s, Peronism posed a dramatic model of the methods that could be used by a military leader to generate working-class support, and Peronism's salience for Pérez-Jiménez, Rojas Pinilla, and Odría was reinforced to some degree by Perón's deliberate efforts to export the model. However, what was absolutely essential to the original was missing in the copies: the underlying political logic and the method of achieving power in the first place.

Perón had come to power in Argentina on the basis of the vigorous mobilization of working-class and trade-union support in exchange for major policy concessions. By contrast, the military-leaders-turned-president who imitated Perón had come to power on the basis of precisely the opposite relationship to the popular sector: the demobilization of the organized working class and the systematic destruction of its trade-union organizations. Thus, within the framework of our larger study, Peronism enjoyed the historical advantage of constituting the initial incorporation period in Argentina. By contrast, these imitators adopted elements of Peronism in the context of the conservative reaction to incorporation, and by and large they failed. However, some variation appears among the three cases in the success of these efforts, with Odría in Peru being somewhat more successful.

[2] An even briefer experiment along these lines was undertaken in Chile by Carlos Ibáñez when he returned to power in 1952 (see Chapter 7).

TABLE 6.1
Aftermath of Party Incorporation: Transformation of Party that Led Incorporation Period

	Mexico	*Venezuela*	*Uruguay*	*Colombia*	*Peru*	*Argentina*
Party that led incorporation period	PRM/PRI	AD	Colorados	Liberals	APRA	Peronist
1. Role of party in transition to new regime	Dominant	Strong	Substantial[a]	Coequal[b]	Subordinate	None
2. Pact, accord, or other conflict-limiting mechanisms	Strengthening of one-party dominant system	Punto Fijo and other pacts	Effort to prevent loss of Colorado support to the left	Pact of Sitges and National Front, 1957–58	Partial electoral exclusion of APRA, Pact of Monterrico, and *convivencia*, 1956	Electoral exclusion of Peronism, aborted pact with Frondizi, 1957–58
3. Programmatic shift toward the center	Yes	Yes	No[c]	Yes	Yes[d]	Some[e]
4. Expulsion or departure of left	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes[f]	No
5a. Retention of workers' electoral support	Yes	Yes	Substantial	Yes[g]	Yes[h]	Yes
5b. Retention of union-party link	Yes	Yes	No[i]	Greatly weakened	Yes[j]	Yes[k]
6. Retention of electoral support of peasants and links to peasant organizations	Yes	Yes	No[l]	Defections in some areas[o]	Minimal[m]	No[n]

[a] In collaboration with President Baldomir and the Independent Nationalists.
[b] In collaboration with Conservatives.
[c] Reform renewed in 1940s and 1950s.
[d] Move to center-right.
[e] Fact of being out of power reduced pressure for programmatic homogenization of Peronism and helps explain its relative heterogeneity.
[f] Occurred after failure of APRA insurrection in 1948, then subsequently in 1959.
[g] Transferred to National Front.
[h] With some erosion in the 1960s.
[i] Never existed.
[j] But with significant challenges beginning in the 1960s.
[k] Within framework of poorly institutionalized party. The main organizational locus of Peronism was the CGT.
[l] Rural workers voted mainly for Blancos.
[m] Mainly in vicinity of modern enclaves.
[n] Absence of large peasant sector. Perón had support of rural workers.
[o] Vote largely transferred to National Front.