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"This book is an important contribution to the literatures on democratization, parties, and movements. The volume focuses on why democracy sometimes emerges in unlikely places and circumstances. The authors argue persuasively that parties and movements are the primary actors in creating and undermining political regimes, and that these actors' preferences and behaviors are not predictable on the basis of structural variables. The contributors are among the foremost scholars of the developing world."

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"[The contributors] argue convincingly that the social movements and political parties that shape democratic change derive from historical legacies and political choices that cannot be mapped directly to underlying social structure. These arguments are set forth in an excellent framing chapter by the editors, Nancy Bermeo and Deborah J. Yashar, and are pursued in historical detail by noted specialists on India and Southeast Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. Taken as a whole, the volume provides a coherent and sophisticated analysis that updates and extends a perspective pioneered in earlier decades by Dahl, Rustow, and O'Donnell and Schmitter."

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"The chapters in this volume map out the diversity of collective organizations that make up contemporary democratization movements, and they provide new theoretical tools to understand the consequences of that diversity. The chapters take history seriously, showing how the organizational legacies of authoritarian rule and transitions shape subsequent party system and regime trajectories. I learned much from this book. It is required reading for anyone interested in regime change or party systems in the developing world."

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Cover illustration: Crowd celebrating NO vote against dictator Augusto Pinochet during plebiscite vote. (Photo by Cindy Karp / The LIFE Images Collection / Getty Images).

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BERMEO AND
YASHAR

Parties, Movements, and Democracy
in the Developing World



Parties, Movements, and Democracy in the Developing World

EDITED BY NANCY BERMEO
AND DEBORAH J. YASHAR

CAMBRIDGE

Parties, Movements, and Democracy in the Developing World

This volume analyzes regime politics in the developing world. By focusing on the civilian collective actors that forge democracy and sustain it, this book moves beyond materialist arguments focusing on GDP, poverty, and inequality. With case material from four continents, it emphasizes the decisive role played by parties and movements in forging democracy against the odds. These pivotal collectivities are consistently the key civilian collectivities that successfully mobilize for democracy, that help forge enduring democratic institutions, and that shape the quality of the democracies that emerged; they are the ones tasked with mobilizing along a range of social cleavages, confronting seemingly inhospitable conditions, and coordinating the process of regime change. While the presence of parties and movements alone is not sufficient to explain democracy, their absence is detrimental to founding enduring democratic regimes. Thus, this volume refocuses our attention on parties and movements as critical mechanisms of regime change.

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Quality of Democracy*

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TRT advanced a new basis for legitimacy.⁷⁵ When the old elite reacted to TRT's electoral and popular dominance by supporting a putsch, they deepened a social cleavage that saw unprecedented mobilization by the beneficiaries of TRT's populist policies.

The example of Thailand helps to emphasize a third, central point of this chapter regarding legitimacy: that what is being argued here is not just that some authoritarian regimes, such as Singapore, are seen as legitimate, but that the basis for legitimacy resides with political parties that have purposeful agendas. Authoritarian regimes devoid of institutional structures that are needed to respond to the collective interest may lack legitimacy, particularly if their basis for rule is primarily founded on violence. Thus, authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, such as Cambodia and Laos, where weak parties have done very little to pursue socioeconomic development and where coercion has been crucial to regime power, have not built up the kind of legitimacy that sustains the PAP in Singapore. On the other hand, a competitive authoritarian regime like Malaysia's has arguably gained some degree of performance legitimacy given the effectiveness of its dominant party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in successfully pursuing a policy trajectory of growth with redistribution.⁷⁶ As Samuel Huntington argued so forcefully in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, the key distinction among political systems has to do with institutional effectiveness. Ultimately, it is institutional effectiveness – rooted in ideology and organization and born out of political struggle – that underlies performance legitimacy and, to a great extent, regime stability and quality.

⁷⁵ In the Philippines, the Sakdal movement and the Communist Party of the Philippines also sought to inject legitimacy into the polity based on democratic equality and performance, but were unable to gain control of the polity.

⁷⁶ The argument on Malaysia is fleshed out in Kuhonta (2011).

Democratic Divergence and Party Systems in Latin America's Third Wave

Kenneth M. Roberts

As the "third wave" of democratization spread across Latin America in the 1980s, leading scholarly works largely abandoned efforts to theorize the causes or preconditions for democratic governance. Since prevailing structural, cultural, and institutional explanations of political regimes all but precluded democratic outcomes in the region, scholars searching for a ray of hope chose to emphasize the contingent effects of political agency¹ and the possibility of multiple pathways to democracy.² A generation later, the surprising resiliency and virtual universality of democratic governance in the region seemingly attests to the wisdom of this retreat from the search for preconditions or determinants of democracy, at least at the domestic level of analysis. Under the permissive international environment of the post-Cold War era, democratic breakdowns have been few and short-lived since the early 1980s, and political actors on both the right and left have largely eschewed authoritarian alternatives and pursued public office by electoral means.³ If democracy can withstand acute economic crises, extreme socioeconomic inequalities, inchoate party systems, and the gridlock-inducing institutional combination of presidentialism

¹ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

³ Scott P. Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, "Introduction: The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America," in Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring, eds., *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–59.

with proportional representation, how much traction can be provided by theoretical arguments about its causes or preconditions?

Clearly, democratic regimes have been “easier” to establish and sustain in the region than the “transitologists” expected at the onset of the third wave.⁴ As Bermeo and Yashar explain in the introduction to this volume, democratization in the developing world in modern times is not tightly coupled to particular patterns of socioeconomic development or distributive conflict, and spacio-temporal modes of diffusion have clearly engendered a region-wide political shift in Latin America. The diffusion and persistence of democracy, however, do not signify a uniformity of outcomes in the region; equifinality has its limits.⁵ As Dan Slater suggests, democracy in the developing world “is generally outliving expectations, but not outperforming them,” and Latin America is no exception to this generalization.⁶ Democratic regimes have not collapsed in a new wave of authoritarian reversions, but neither have they fully consolidated in much of the region or converged on a singular mode of governance. Instead, according to Slater, many new democracies have “careened” in an unsettled manner “between populist and oligarchic modes of politics,” in the process experiencing temporary breakdowns, periodic institutional overhauls, or transgressions of basic democratic norms that fall short of overt authoritarian reversals.⁷ Such careening, he argues, reflects the inherent tensions between alternative visions of democratic accountability – one vertical, the other horizontal – and chronic conflicts between the political actors who deploy them. The challenge for democratic theorizing, then, is less to account for the installation of democratic regimes – an outcome with little variance in the region beyond the Cuban anomaly – than to explain their varying forms and trajectories. Why do some democratic regimes in Latin America “careen” more than others, and why do those that careen veer off in the directions they do?

This chapter suggests that these questions regarding democratic outcomes – or, more properly, democratic trajectories – are amenable to theoretical generalization. Careening in Latin America is not randomized

⁴ Philippe C. Schmitter, “Reflections on ‘Transitology’: Before and After,” in Daniel Brinks, Marcelo Leiras, and Scott Mainwaring, eds., *Reflections on Uneven Democracies: The Legacy of Guillermo O’Donnell* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 77–78.

⁵ Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” *International Social Science Journal* 128 (May 1991), 269.

⁶ Dan Slater, “Democratic Careening,” *World Politics* 65, 4 (October 2013), 729.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 730–731.

variation; there are, as Slater puts it, “patterns within the everyday chaos.”⁸ These patterns have been conditioned by the explanatory factors emphasized by Bermeo and Yashar in the introduction: party organizations, social movements, and the sociopolitical cleavages that undergird them. The three democratic trajectories analyzed here – institutionalized pluralism, hegemonic popular sovereignty, and oligarchic restoration – were generally crafted by party organizations or the political elites (and counter-elites) who led them, and they were shaped by diverse patterns of social mobilization and different configurations of partisan competition around central political cleavages. With roots in the “dual transitions” to democracy and economic liberalism in the 1980s, these cleavages, mobilizational patterns, and partisan alignments largely determined how democratic regimes would manage the politics of inequality and process societal claims in the aftermath to market-based structural adjustment. In so doing, they heavily influenced whether and how democracy would careen in the post-adjustment era. The explanatory factors highlighted by Bermeo and Yashar, therefore, conditioned not only regime *transitions* in Latin America but also democratic *trajectories* over the course of the third wave.

Simply put, democracy was less likely to careen where the dual transitions aligned party systems along a well-defined left–right axis of competition, or sociopolitical cleavage. Such alignments allowed parties to consolidate their support, channel and contain social mobilization in the post-adjustment era, and construct democracy as a form of institutionalized pluralism with relatively strong horizontal checks and balances on executive authority and popular majorities. Careening was more likely, on the other hand, where the dual transitions did not align party systems programmatically along a left–right axis, either because leftist and labor-based parties were electorally non-competitive, or because they loosened programmatic commitments to popular constituencies by playing a major role in the adoption of market reforms during the critical juncture of structural adjustment. Democratic regimes with de-aligned party systems were susceptible to a wide range of destabilizing patterns, especially in the post-adjustment era that began in the second half of the 1990s. Established parties lost control over electoral and/or policymaking arenas, opposition to market orthodoxy was channeled into anti-systemic forms of social and/or electoral protest, and

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 730.

democracy lurched toward forms of oligarchic restoration⁹ or hegemonic popular sovereignty.

The polar-opposite trajectories of oligarchic restoration and hegemonic popular sovereignty were associated with major institutional discontinuities, including military coups, presidential overthrows, and the plebiscitary re-founding of constitutional orders. They also posed alternative challenges to democratic governance along the two central dimensions identified in Dahl's classic study of polyarchy:¹⁰ whereas oligarchic restoration was contingent on low levels of participation or democratic inclusiveness, particularly of lower-class groups, hegemonic popular sovereignty empowered democratic majorities in ways that threatened to undermine the minority rights and institutional checks and balances required for effective public contestation.

These alternative democratic trajectories crystallized in the region by the first decade of the twenty-first century, but their genesis lay in the dual transitions of the 1980s and the partisan alignments that shaped them. Drawing from the comparative historical work on European democracy in Capoccia and Ziblatt,¹¹ I show how party organizations and partisan competition influenced the construction of democratic regimes in modern Latin America, as well as the transformation of those regimes in response to social and political conflicts. I also show that social conflicts in Latin America were not necessarily organized as class cleavages, even where they were influenced by rival distributive preferences. As Bermeo and Yashar suggest, the political articulation of social conflicts was heavily conditioned by world historic time: the collapse of state-led development in the debt crisis of the 1980s, the global diffusion of both democracy and market liberalism, the generalized weakening of class-based forms of collective action, and growing political mobilization around cultural or territorial claims related to ethnic identities and community autonomy.¹²

⁹ In contrast to Slater, I use "oligarchy" in this chapter to refer not only to "rule by the few" but also to the politics of defending wealth and privilege. See Jeffrey Winters, *Oligarchy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁰ Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 6.

¹¹ Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, 8–9 (August–September 2010), 931–968.

¹² See Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Eduardo Silva, *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Where dual transitions de-aligned (and ultimately de-stabilized) partisan competition, social mobilization and protest were often instrumental to democratic careening in the post-adjustment era, particularly that which led to hegemonic forms of popular sovereignty in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.¹³ Conversely, careening in the direction of oligarchic restoration in Honduras and Paraguay was designed to extinguish (most likely temporarily) populist challenges that were not grounded in extensive social mobilization. Such careening in the post-adjustment era was absent from countries like Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador, where programmatically aligned parties channeled social resistance to market orthodoxy into the conflict-regulating mechanisms of institutionalized pluralism.

The causal pathways that led to these three different trajectories are traced in the comparative analysis that follows. Given that all of these countries turned toward the left politically at some point in the post-adjustment era, it is apparent that alternative democratic trajectories were associated with quite different types of "left turns." Indeed, their leftist parties varied dramatically in their formative experiences, approaches to democratic accountability, and relationships to organized popular constituencies. Ultimately, they represented very different ways of organizing the politics of inequality – an essential starting point for understanding challenges to democratic governance in the world's most inequitable region.

DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY

The breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s was routinely attributed to class and distributive conflicts. These conflicts generated inflationary pressures and severe economic bottlenecks, and they triggered virulent authoritarian reactions by economic and military elites who sought to demobilize labor unions and their affiliated populist or leftist parties.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, studies of regime

¹³ Properly speaking, Venezuela was not a case of dual transition, since the country's democratic transition (1958) long predated its process of market liberalization (starting in 1989). Nevertheless, the latter produced a clear-cut case of programmatic de-alignment that was similar to the patterns found in the dual transition cases of Bolivia and Ecuador.

¹⁴ See Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1973); David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Hector Schamis, "Re-conceptualizing Latin

transitions in the 1980s were shaped by concerns that popular mobilization and distributive conflicts would reemerge to block the installation or consolidation of new democratic regimes. For this reason, leading works emphasized the need to reassure elites that their interests would be protected under democracy, if necessary through the negotiation of pacts between rival actors to share power, narrow the policymaking agenda, and limit mass mobilization – what O'Donnell and Schmitter conceded to be an “undemocratic means” to the construction of democracy.¹⁵ These concerns were magnified by the fact that democratic transitions coincided with the most severe economic crisis that Latin America had seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

In retrospect, such concerns may appear unwarranted, as new democratic regimes – many lacking explicit foundational pacts – rode out the debt crisis and the subsequent process of structural adjustment with remarkably few breakdowns or disruptions. Indeed, the economic crisis may have actually been conducive to democratization, despite the hardships it imposed. As Remmer argued, the economic crisis eroded support for incumbent military rulers and discredited their claims to superior economic management.¹⁶ For regimes that lacked other legitimating mechanisms and relied so heavily on coercive force,¹⁷ the descent into economic crisis left few alternatives other than a return to the barracks.

More fundamentally, perhaps, the debt crisis combined with an internationally leveraged process of market liberalization to impose, by structural means, what O'Donnell and Schmitter thought pacts might do through political agency: contain popular mobilization and foreclose a broad range of statist and redistributive policy alternatives. Economic crisis and structural adjustment weakened organized labor as a political force,¹⁸ at the same time that global market and financial constraints narrowed the policy options of national governments, forcing even historic populist parties to adhere to the “Washington Consensus” for

American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neo-conservatism,” *Comparative Politics* 23, 2 (January 1991), 201–220.

¹⁵ O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 38). See also Terry L. Karl, “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela,” *Latin American Research Review* 22, 1 (1987), 63–94.

¹⁶ Karen L. Remmer, “The Process of Democratization in Latin America,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27, 4 (Winter 1992–1993), 3–24.

¹⁷ O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 15).

¹⁸ Kenneth M. Roberts, “Social Inequalities without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36, 4 (2002), 3–34.

market reform.¹⁹ Under such conditions, democratic threats to elite interests were minimized, and authoritarian rule became increasingly dispensable as a guarantor of economic orthodoxy and a bulwark to defend economic elites against working- and lower-class mobilization. As Carles Boix argues, democratic distributive conflicts could be tempered in a context of heightened global market integration,²⁰ especially where social and economic dislocations had weakened the “union-party hubs” associated with state-led development.²¹

This tempering of democratic threats to elite interests is captured in the causal process observations of regime transitions in Haggard and Kaufman.²² In their data set, only two authoritarian reversions were motivated by elite reactions to distributive conflicts between 1980 and 2000 in Latin America (Bolivia in 1980 and the Dominican Republic in 1994), and both of these reversions were short-lived. Elsewhere, neither popular mobilization nor distributive conflicts generated the types of threats to elite actors that would derail democratization processes during this period of economic crisis and structural adjustment.

As the Haggard and Kaufman study suggests, the capacity of lower-class groups to engage in collective action and politicize inequalities is highly variable. The disarticulation of popular subjects in Latin America endured so long as acute inflationary pressures kept stabilization and structural adjustment at the forefront of the political agenda. Once inflation had been tamed by the middle of the 1990s, however – when Brazil was the last country in the region to vanquish hyperinflation – a new, post-adjustment political era began. Popular sectors increasingly politicized distributive outcomes, challenged market orthodoxy, and pressed claims for social citizenship rights that new democratic regimes had largely

¹⁹ John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in John Williamson, ed., *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 7–20.

²⁰ Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²¹ Ruth Berins Collier and Samuel Handlin, “Logics of Collective Action, State Linkages, and Aggregate Traits: The UP-Hub Versus the A-Net,” in Ruth Berins Collier and Samuel Handlin, eds., *Reorganizing Popular Politics: Participation and the New Interest Regime in Latin America* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 61–94.

²² Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule,” *American Political Science Review* 106, 3 (August 2012), 495–516. For the data set used in this study, see Stephan Haggard, Robert R. Kaufman, and Terrence Teo, “Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset” (http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18276_V1), (2012).

neglected during the period of structural adjustment. This re-politicization of inequality shattered the technocratic consensus for market liberalization, and it spawned or strengthened a plethora of populist and leftist alternatives that had been relegated to the margins of democratic contestation during the heyday of the Washington Consensus.

In contrast to popular mobilizations during the era of state-led development in the middle of the twentieth century,²³ organized labor was generally not a major player in this new politicization of inequality, and political fault lines were not well structured by capital-labor cleavages. Instead, a variety of non-class actors often determined the rhythms of popular mobilization, including indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia,²⁴ unemployed workers and the urban poor in Argentina,²⁵ low-income urban communities in Venezuela, and student organizations in Chile. Similar to historic patterns of labor incorporation, however, the new, post-adjustment mobilization from below – a classic example of a Polanyian “double movement” in response to market insecurities²⁶ – was heavily conditioned by party organizations and partisan competition. Indeed, party politics largely determined the political expression of this double movement, which varied widely across the region, producing very different types of “reactive sequences” to the critical juncture of market reform.²⁷ These reactive sequences assumed three distinct forms: (1) mass social protest, including strikes, riots, demonstrations, occupations, and road blockages; (2) electoral protest, primarily through support for independent, anti-system populist outsiders or new “movement” parties; and (3) electoral support for institutionalized parties of the left. These diverse forms of Polanyian resistance to market society reflected the varying capacity of party systems to channel and process disparate claims for social citizenship rights; how they did so largely determined whether democracy

²³ Ruth B. Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

²⁴ Yashar (2005).

²⁵ Javier Auyero, *Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

²⁶ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944). See also Silva (2009).

²⁷ For a discussion of reactive sequences, see James Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

would careen in the post-adjustment era, and which of Slater's trajectories it would follow.

This variation was indelibly marked by the reconfiguration of party systems during the earlier, dual transitions to democracy and market liberalism in the 1980s. Regime transitions, where they occurred, were “critical antecedents” that predisposed particular alignments of partisan competition around the process of market reform.²⁸ Structural adjustment, in turn, was a critical juncture with institutional legacies that heavily conditioned the reactive sequences of the post-adjustment period – namely, whether societal opposition to market orthodoxy would be channeled into or against established party systems.²⁹ These differences played a decisive role in shaping the alternative democratic trajectories of institutionalized pluralism, hegemonic popular sovereignty, and oligarchic restoration in the aftermath to the critical juncture.

To explain these causal pathways, it is necessary to retrace how political parties constructed new democratic regimes and aligned sociopolitical competition prior to the critical juncture of market reform. The section that follows takes on this task, adopting a comparative historical perspective to identify the antecedent conditions that predisposed democracies to experience the politics of structural adjustment in very different ways. The analysis will focus on cases where these antecedent conditions during regime transitions were especially transparent in shaping partisan alignments during the process of structural adjustment, creating institutional legacies of institutionalized pluralism (Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay), oligarchic restoration (Honduras and Paraguay), or hegemonic popular sovereignty (Bolivia and Ecuador).

ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN THE 1980S

In contrast to many third-wave democracies in developing regions, those in Latin America generally inherited party systems that were at least

²⁸ On critical antecedents, see Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, “Critical Antecedents and Informative Regress,” *Qualitative Methods* 6, 1 (2008), 6–13.

²⁹ The argument suggests that structural adjustment was a critical juncture in political development, whether or not it was preceded by a regime transition. For that reason, I treat regime transitions as critical antecedents rather than components of the critical juncture itself. For an elaboration, see Kenneth M. Roberts, *Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

partially constituted by party organizations founded during earlier periods of democratic contestation. Although relatively “new” party systems were formed at the onset of the third wave in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, in most of the region emerging democracies had at least one major party with prior experience in electoral politics. Whether old or new, parties often played a major role in promoting regime transitions and constructing new democratic institutions, albeit under heavy military tutelage in a number of countries. Parties challenged military rulers, coordinated civic opposition, and often negotiated with regime insiders over the political timing and institutional rules of democratic transitions. Parties also mobilized pressure to advance toward more open and inclusive forms of democratic competition, often blocking the consolidation of hybrid regimes with authoritarian enclaves that would tightly constrain democratic majorities.³⁰

The specific roles played by parties in regime transitions varied widely, however, depending on the character of authoritarian regimes and their linkages, if any, to established parties. Political parties were hardly uniform in their opposition to dictatorship or their support for democratization. Indeed, many new democratic regimes inherited parties that had supported or collaborated with authoritarian rulers – that is, “authoritarian successor” parties.³¹ For such parties, democratic transitions provided new opportunities, but they also posed potential challenges. Democratization could open new channels for public office and enhance the policymaking influence of civilian elites, but they also exposed them to electoral uncertainties and to the specter of popular mobilization from below. As such, authoritarian successor parties often played ambiguous or even grudging roles in regime transitions; they went along with transitions when authoritarian rule and its attendant political repression became too costly, too divisive, or too isolating internationally, but they frequently tried to constrain popular majorities and devise forms of political and institutional continuity with their authoritarian predecessors.

The varied roles played by such successor parties, and by their partisan rivals with more robust democratic credentials, heavily shaped the character of post-transition partisan competition. In the cases analyzed here, three basic patterns can be identified. In the first pattern, democratic

³⁰ Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldier* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

³¹ See James Loxton, *Authoritarian Inheritance and Conservative Party-Building in Latin America* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2014).

transitions took the form of an “oligarchic succession,” whereby military rulers relinquished power to conservative parties with long-standing ties to military institutions, in the absence of widespread social or political mobilization of opposition forces. The paradigmatic examples are Honduras (1981–1982) and Paraguay (1989), where new democratic regimes were thoroughly controlled by elite-based parties with roots in nineteenth-century disputes between rival factions of politically dominant agrarian oligarchies. As depicted by Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo,³² Honduras’ regime transition was largely a preemptive move by military rulers, civilian elites, and the United States in response to fears of a revolutionary contagion from their Central American neighbors. The military remained a major political actor as the oligarchic Liberal (PLH) and National (PNH) parties rotated in office, while political space for popular mobilization was heavily restricted. In Paraguay, the 1989 regime transition was triggered by an internal split within the military and its traditional ally, the Colorado Party of aging dictator Alfredo Stroessner. Dissident military and Colorado elites staged a coup to force a leadership succession and then oversaw a gradual regime transition that ensured “the continuation of Colorado dominance” under more democratic forms.³³

With low levels of economic development, socially and politically dominant agrarian oligarchies, and long traditions of authoritarian rule, labor-based populist and leftist parties had never developed in Honduras and Paraguay, and they had no significant electoral presence following their transitions to democracy. Likewise, distributive conflicts and popular mobilization played little role in their regime transitions. Authoritarian elites withdrew from power and conservative parties supported regime change because they were confident that they could “control the post-transition democratic order in ways that limit democracy’s redistributive impact.”³⁴

Conservative successor parties also played a leading role in a second pattern of democratic transition, but in contrast to the oligarchic successions in Honduras and Paraguay, the leadership of these parties was seriously contested by a major party of the left and its affiliated popular

³² Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo, p. 35.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 51. See also Diego Abente, “A Party System in Transition: The Case of Paraguay,” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 298–320.

³⁴ Haggard and Kaufman (2012, p. 500).

movements. Prominent examples of this pattern of "contested succession" include Brazil, Uruguay, and El Salvador, where diverse forms of labor, peasant, and leftist mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s ensured that conservative elites would be challenged by popular rivals following regime transitions. In Brazil, the military regime founded an allied conservative party that split during a protracted regime transition, but the party's successors led the first new democratic government after 1985 and played a major role in center-right coalition governments thereafter.³⁵ Vigorous opposition was provided by the leftist Workers Party (PT), which emerged from a wave of labor strikes and social protests against the military regime in the late 1970s.³⁶ In Uruguay, factions of the two historic nineteenth-century oligarchic parties – the Colorado (PC) and National (PN) parties – collaborated with the military regime after the 1973 coup, but the parties shifted toward support of a regime transition after the military lost a 1980 referendum to impose an authoritarian constitution.³⁷ The two parties alternated in office after a wave of strikes and protests led to a negotiated regime transition in 1984, while the labor-backed leftist coalition known as the Broad Front (FA) emerged as a major rival to the traditional parties. In El Salvador, dissident military and intelligence officers with links to economic elites and paramilitary death squads founded the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) as the country descended into civil war and the United States pressured a military regime to undertake democratic reforms in the early 1980s. ARENA captured the presidency in four consecutive elections after 1989, while a 1992 peace agreement incorporated the leftist revolutionary movement, the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN), into a more inclusive democratic regime as the leading opposition party.³⁸

In these three countries, regime transitions were shaped by major distributive conflicts and popular mobilization from below that raised the costs of repression and prevented authoritarian incumbents from fully controlling the terms of regime transition. Power was transferred

³⁵ Timothy J. Power, *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).

³⁶ Margaret Keck, *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

³⁷ Charles G. Gillespie, *Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

³⁸ See William Stanley, *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996) and Elizabeth J. Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

to conservative parties with varying ties to authoritarian predecessors, but these successor parties were challenged by well-organized leftist rivals that had been bitter opponents of military rule. In contrast to Honduras and Paraguay, then, partisan competition under new democratic regimes in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay was clearly aligned along a left–right axis that reflected not only programmatic or ideological differences but also a generative "regime cleavage" between parties with rival authoritarian and democratic (or revolutionary) preferences during the period of military rule. As explained below, such partisan alignments shaped the politics of market reform in ways that made democratic regimes less likely to careen in the post-adjustment period.

A third pattern of democratic transition was found in Bolivia (1982) and Ecuador (1978–1979), where military regimes in the 1970s had been plagued by factionalism between conservative and left-leaning tendencies, and where right-wing successor parties were relatively weak (i.e., a coalition of conservative parties led by the Social Christian Party [PSC] in Ecuador, and the National Democratic Action [ADN] of former dictator Hugo Banzer in Bolivia). In the Andean region, economic elites and conservative parties often supported regime transitions during the early stages of the third wave not because they could control democratic outcomes, but rather because they had little confidence in military rulers and limited influence over their policy choices. Indeed, initial post-transition presidential elections were won in Ecuador and Bolivia by populist or leftist forces – the populist Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) in Ecuador and the leftist Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP) coalition in Bolivia. In these countries – in essence, cases of "open succession" – left–right competition existed following democratic transitions, but it was not anchored in strong regime cleavages, and the balance between conservative and populist or leftist parties was not tilted in favor of the right.

These very different alignments of partisan competition during democratic transitions weighed heavily on the politics of economic crisis and market reform in the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, they were critical antecedents that predisposed countries to experience the critical juncture of market liberalization in strikingly different ways, with major consequences for the resiliency of both party systems and democratic institutions in the third wave. The collapse of state-led development in the debt crisis of the 1980s forced new democratic regimes throughout the region to grapple with the challenge of market-based structural adjustment, but the political impact of the shift in development models was far more likely to produce democratic careening in some countries than others. This

variation depended largely on the competitive alignment and balance of power within national party systems – factors that influenced who would lead the process of market reform and whether or not a major party of the left was available to channel opposition to market orthodoxy.

Simply put, regime transitions that bequeathed democratic institutions dominated by conservative parties – that is, the cases of oligarchic and contested succession – were more likely to experience conservative-led patterns of market reform. These cases differed, however, in the strength of institutionalized leftist opposition to market liberalization. Alternatively, regime transitions that left conservative parties in a weakened position relative to populist or leftist rivals were more likely – in contexts of severe economic crisis and heightened global market constraints – to experience “bait-and-switch” market reforms led by actors that traditionally supported more heterodox or statist policies and campaigned against orthodox structural adjustment. In short, the three different types of regime transition were associated with distinct partisan alignments during the critical juncture of market liberalization; although these alignments did not fully determine the political outcomes of market liberalization and its regime effects, they weighed heavily on subsequent trajectories of political development. The implications of these alignments for the democratic trajectories of institutionalized pluralism, hegemonic popular sovereignty, and oligarchic restoration are explained below.

CRITICAL JUNCTURES, REACTIVE SEQUENCES, AND DEMOCRATIC TRAJECTORIES

Although new democratic regimes in Latin America's third wave demonstrated surprising resiliency during the period of economic crisis and structural adjustment, democratic careening in the post-adjustment era was widespread and often unexpected. In general, careening was rooted in the post-adjustment revival of distributive conflicts as popular sectors re-politicized inequalities and pressed claims for social citizenship rights. But if this re-politicization occurred throughout the region, democratic careening did not; it was most prevalent in countries where party systems were not programmatically aligned along a left–right axis by regime transitions and the politics of structural adjustment. Where party systems had been programmatically aligned, societal resistance to market orthodoxy was channeled toward established parties of the left, and democratic regimes consolidated relatively stable forms of institutionalized pluralism

even as they turned to the left in the aftermath period. Where party systems were not programmatically aligned by the dual transitions, however, democratic regimes tended to careen toward oligarchic restoration or hegemonic popular sovereignty in the aftermath to the critical juncture. These alternative trajectories, the contingent outcomes of divergent critical junctures, are depicted in Figure 4.1.

From Contested Successions to Institutionalized Pluralism in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay

The hallmarks of institutionalized pluralism are relatively stable rules of the game, robust horizontal checks and balances on executive authority, and institutionalized competition between partisan rivals that have meaningful opportunities to alternate in office. Institutionalized pluralism signifies that diverse social and political forces have the right to engage in collective action, to articulate claims in the public sphere, and to compete on a reasonably level playing field to influence collective decision-making processes. Reasonable approximations of this democratic trajectory clearly emerged during the third wave in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay despite, it could be argued, less than propitious beginnings in their respective regime transitions. All three countries experienced highly repressive military rule prior to the onset of the third wave, and new democratic regimes inherited legacies of severe human rights violations, restrictions on lower-class social and political organization, and military tutelage of domestic political institutions. Transitions typically began under institutional rules that proscribed or marginalized some of the military's opponents, limited the range and authority of government positions filled through democratic elections, and tilted the playing field to the advantage of conservative successor parties with varying ties to authoritarian rulers.

Nevertheless, vigorous partisan competition and popular mobilization from below eventually whittled away at electoral proscriptions, military prerogatives, and other constraints on civic participation. As discussed by Bermeo and Yashar, social movements played major roles in the opening of democratic spaces, culminating in the construction of new democratic regimes that were more inclusive and pluralistic than those envisioned by military rulers and their civilian collaborators at the outset of regime transitions. In Brazil's protracted and tightly scripted regime transition, the military allowed for national legislative and gubernatorial elections in 1982 under a restrictive electoral formula

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


FIGURE 4.1 Dual Transitions and Democratic Outcomes

that favored the two “official” parties. It subsequently ignored massive protests for direct presidential elections, insisting on the election of a civilian president by the conservative-dominated congress in 1985. Nevertheless, military tutelage eroded with the fracturing of the pro-military bloc during the transition process, while electoral reforms and a new constitution laid the foundations for open and inclusive democratic contestation. Direct presidential elections were finally held in 1989, with the PT emerging as the primary rival to politically dominant but organizationally fragmented conservative forces.³⁹

In Uruguay, the military proscribed leading opposition figures from running in the first new presidential election, but otherwise conceded on institutional reforms and was forced to accept the incorporation of the leftist FA into the democratic arena. The first democratic government led by the conservative Colorados quickly asserted its authority and signaled the onset of unrestrained competition by ending proscriptions and declaring an amnesty for political prisoners. Included in the latter were prisoners from the *Tupamaros* guerrilla movement,⁴⁰ the remnants of which were incorporated into the FA.

Finally, in El Salvador a military stalemate between the armed forces and the FMLN eventually led to a peace accord that transformed both military and civilian institutions and incorporated the revolutionary movement into a new democratic regime. Institutional reforms dissolved the repressive National Guard, Treasury Police, and civil defense patrols; established civilian control over the army and a new civilian police force that included former guerrillas; created governing bodies to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses; strengthened judicial independence; and established a new electoral tribunal with representation from different parties to oversee elections and voter registration. As stated by Wood, the peace agreement “also mandated the legalization of the FMLN as a political party, recognizing its right to meet, to mobilize, to publish, and to hold licenses for communication” for its clandestine radio stations.⁴¹

Although some of the leftist currents that congealed in the PT, FA, and FMLN had revolutionary backgrounds, lengthy struggles to defend human rights and secure basic democratic freedoms – in contexts of

³⁹ Scott P. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 89–100.

⁴⁰ Luis E. González, “Continuity and Change in the Uruguayan Party System,” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 138–163.

⁴¹ Wood (2000, p. 87).

violent and traumatizing repression – encouraged leftist parties to treat new democratic regimes as popular conquests, whatever these regimes' origins and defects. Even where regime transitions empowered conservative successor parties, they opened new political and organizational space for leftist parties and their affiliated popular movements. In post-authoritarian settings, such space was seen by leftist parties as a precondition for their efforts to build popular support for socialist alternatives. Indeed, such alternatives were increasingly conceptualized in terms of an open-ended and pluralistic process of “deepening” democracy,⁴² a paradigmatic example of the pro-democratic ideational shifts discussed by Bermeo and Yashar. Meanwhile, for conservative elites who had a vested interest in asserting the authority of civilian governments and scaling back military prerogatives,⁴³ mobilization from below created pressures to tolerate more open competition and politically incorporate an institutionalized leftist opposition that agreed to play by the democratic rules of the game. Those rules allowed leftist parties to gain a foothold – and even become stakeholders – in new democratic regimes, as they quickly won significant blocs of legislative seats along with mayoral and (in Brazil) gubernatorial positions. These electoral gains encouraged a long-term strategy of accumulating forces at the subnational level, demonstrating a capacity for effective and responsible governance, and progressively enhancing national-level political competitiveness.

The viability of such a strategy was buttressed by the political dynamics of economic crisis and market reform in these three countries. Following the onset of the 1982 debt crisis, conservative dominance of post-transition regimes virtually assured that rightist parties would have to assume responsibilities to manage economic crises and administer structural adjustment policies. That was the case for the conservative administrations of José Sarney (1985–1990) and Fernando Collor (1990–1992) in Brazil, along with the center-right coalition governments led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). In Uruguay, the National Party government of Luís Alberto Lacalle (1990–1995) implemented the deepest reforms, while the first ARENA government of Alfredo Cristiani (1989–1994) took the lead in El Salvador. In all three countries, the major

⁴² See Kenneth M. Roberts, *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998) and Benjamin Goldfrank, *Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America: Participation, Decentralization, and the Left* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011).

⁴³ See Hunter (1997).

party of the left remained in opposition throughout the decisive period of structural adjustment, providing an institutionalized channel for societal dissent from the neoliberal model. As such, the critical juncture of structural adjustment was conditioned by the partisan alignments of regime transitions, but it also reinforced them; left–right regime cleavages mapped closely onto left–right programmatic alignments during the process of market reform.

Such aligning critical junctures produced relatively stable institutional equilibria for both party systems and democratic regimes in the post-adjustment era, despite an initial high level of turbulence in the Brazilian party system during the period of economic crisis. Indeed, aligning critical junctures moderated and institutionally contained the reactive sequences of the aftermath period. The PT and FA spearheaded labor and popular resistance to structural adjustment measures, but levels of social protest were relatively moderate, and much societal dissent was channeled into electoral outlets by the partisan left. Established leftist parties, therefore, progressively strengthened in all three countries, finally breaking through to capture the presidency in Brazil in 2002, Uruguay in 2004, and El Salvador in 2009.

Leftist victories, however, represented an alternation in office within the basic parameters of institutionalized pluralism, rather than a careening away from it. Established conservative and centrist parties did not break down; they remained major power contenders with large blocs of legislative seats, and along with conservative judiciaries they provided horizontal checks on executive authority. Neither the PT nor the FMLN elected a legislative majority from their own ranks, and the PT depended on a series of multiparty coalitions with politically diverse allies in order to legislate – a basic institutional constraint that reinforced the party's moderation in office. Given the presence of major opposition parties, tenuous legislative coalitions, and conservative judicial institutions, none of these leftist parties made any attempt to alter the constitutional order by circumventing congress and making plebiscitary appeals to popular sovereignty – that is, to shift from horizontal to vertical forms of accountability. They sometimes created new participatory and consultative spaces for a variety of labor unions, community organizations, and social movements, but these fell well short of the direct forms of participatory democracy they had once promised, and they supplemented rather than supplanted the core institutions of representative democracy.

Having been key players in the construction of institutionalized pluralism during the third wave, as well as major beneficiaries of it, the PT, FA,

and FMLN were not about to transgress its norms after gaining access to national executive office. Democratic regimes turned to the left under their watch, but they did not careen toward alternative institutional forms. The legacies of contested successions and aligning critical junctures, then, were relatively stable forms of electoral competition and institutionalized alternation in public office between parties of the left and right. To be sure, electoral stability provided no guarantee of clean and responsive government; as the corruption scandal against the PT demonstrated, electoral success and extended periods of rule could taint even the most principled of parties, and presidential democracies offered few correctives short of a presidential impeachment. In general, however, the legacies of contested successions and aligning critical junctures have been a far cry from those of the dual transitions analyzed below.

Oligarchic Succession and Restoration in Honduras and Paraguay

If conservative-led regime transitions in the cases of contested succession culminated in relatively stable forms of institutionalized pluralism, transitions characterized by oligarchic succession had a very different fate in Honduras and Paraguay. Nineteenth-century oligarchic party systems weathered the regime transition and the critical juncture of market reform in both countries, but they proved to be an unstable institutional equilibrium in the aftermath period as societal pressures politicized inequalities and spawned new political alternatives to market orthodoxy. Democratic careening occurred in both countries when oligarchic parties broke with democratic norms – though not entirely with the democratic rules of the game in Paraguay – in order to remove left-leaning presidents and restore the traditional order. Oligarchic restoration occurred by means of a military coup in Honduras in 2009, and by means of a presidential impeachment – arguably, an ill-disguised legislative coup – in Paraguay in 2012. In both countries, then, the parties that constructed new democratic regimes in the 1980s eventually violated regime norms when they lost control of executive office and confronted new popular challenges in the early 2000s.

In both countries, conservative successor parties backed by military allies fully controlled the democratic arena following regime transitions in the 1980s, as the opening to partisan and electoral competition did not lead to the rise of a major populist or leftist party. In Honduras, the military remained a powerful actor behind the scenes but allowed for the election of a constitutional assembly in 1980 and a civilian (Liberal) president in 1981. The Liberals were victorious once again in 1985 as

electoral reforms helped to institutionalize the new political order, and thereafter rotated in office with the National Party.⁴⁴ In Paraguay, Colorado military and civilian dissidents who launched the 1989 coup against Stroessner lifted the country's de facto state of siege, dissolved Stroessner's compliant congress, and quickly organized new elections that delivered the presidency to Lieutenant General Andrés Rodríguez. The Rodríguez government passed a new constitution in 1992 and relaxed restrictions on non-communist parties, including the major center-right opposition party, the descendent of the nineteenth-century Liberal Party known as the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA). The Colorados, however, captured the presidency in the first four national elections of the democratic period, remaining in office from 1989 until 2008.

In a context of oligarchic succession, conservative parties led the process of market reform by default. Structural adjustment, however, did not align partisan competition programmatically between conservative supporters and leftist critics of the neoliberal model. With the left side of the political spectrum all but vacant, the two major traditional parties in both countries supported the general course of market liberalization at the height of the region-wide Washington Consensus. The major push for reforms occurred in the early 1990s under the National government of Rafael Callejas in Honduras and the Colorado government of Rodríguez in Paraguay. Although labor strikes and other forms of social protest greeted some of the reforms, labor and popular movements in both countries were too weak to seriously challenge national governments that imposed structural adjustment policies.

Nevertheless, the political control of traditional conservative forces eventually broke down in the aftermath period as destabilizing reactive sequences detached voters from established parties and spawned new leftist alternatives. Honduras experienced a sharp decline in electoral participation, while public opinion surveys demonstrated that civil society organizations had weak ties to traditional parties,⁴⁵ that citizens ranked

⁴⁴ See Natalia Ajeno Fresno, "Honduras," in Manuel Alcántara and Flavia Freidenberg, eds., *Partidos Políticos de América Latina: Centroamérica, México y República Dominicana* (Mexico City: Instituto Federal Electoral and Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003), 181–273, and Mark J. Ruhl, "Honduras: Problems of Democratic Consolidation," in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., *Latin America: Politics and Development*, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 519–533.

⁴⁵ Sara Dewachter and Nadia Molenaers, "Who Takes a Seat at the Pro-Poor Table? Civil Society Participation in the Honduran Poverty Reduction Strategy," *Latin American Research Review* 46, 3 (2011), 112–132.

Honduran democratic institutions the lowest in the Central American region on basic indicators of political legitimacy,⁴⁶ and that nearly a quarter of citizens placed themselves in a left-of-center ideological space that was devoid of organized partisan representation.⁴⁷ In this context, Liberal president Manuel Zelaya, a business leader who had run for office on a law-and-order platform, unexpectedly veered in a populist direction after his election in 2005. Zelaya decreed a sharp increase in the minimum wage, launched a wide range of new social programs, and steered Honduras into an alignment with a Venezuela-led regional trade bloc and oil assistance program. Zelaya's about-face fractured his Liberal Party and ultimately provoked a military coup – backed by congress and the supreme court – when the maverick president tried to schedule a non-binding poll on a referendum to convoke a constituent assembly. Although the 2009 coup was followed by new elections that restored the National Party to office, the rupture in the constitutional order was indicative of the increasingly tenuous ability of democratic institutions to reproduce traditional forms of oligarchic rule. Indeed, following a period of exile, Zelaya returned to Honduras and founded a new leftist party that sponsored the candidacy of his wife, Xiomara Castro de Zelaya, for the presidency in closely fought November 2013 elections. Although the National Party retained the presidency by capturing a narrow plurality of votes amid widespread charges of electoral fraud, the election posed the most formidable challenge to oligarchic domination in Honduran political history.

Likewise, oligarchic rule broke down in Paraguay when the Colorado Party lost control of the electoral arena and Fernando Lugo, an independent leftist Catholic bishop with ties to peasant land struggles, was elected president in 2008. Lugo ran at the head of a multiparty sociopolitical coalition that included the PLRA and social movement organizations. President Lugo was abandoned by the PLRA and abruptly impeached by congress in 2012, however, when a peasant land occupation led to a violent clash with police forces. Lugo was given a mere two hours to defend his actions in a swift one-day impeachment hearing before being removed on grounds of “poor performance of duties.” The impeachment,

⁴⁶ Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, *Predicting Coups? Democratic Vulnerabilities, the Americas Barometer, and the 2009 Honduran Crisis*. Americas Barometer Insights Series, Vanderbilt University (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2009) (www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/10821en.pdf).

⁴⁷ *Informe Latinobarómetro 2006* (Santiago, Chile: Latinobarómetro, 2006), 84.

while constitutionally legal, was clearly used “as a political weapon,”⁴⁸ and it paved the way for the Colorado Party to return to power in 2013 elections. As in Honduras, this oligarchic restoration involved a considerable transgression of democratic norms, and appears likely to be contested by a new party of the left founded by Lugo's supporters.

In both Honduras and Paraguay, then, regime transitions by means of oligarchic succession bequeathed conservative-dominated democratic orders that did not provide institutionalized outlets for societal dissent in the aftermath to structural adjustment. Left-leaning presidents eventually took office in the aftermath period with little institutionalized partisan support, and democracy careened toward tenuous forms of oligarchic restoration that entailed significant institutional disruptions. In both countries, oligarchic restoration is challenged by unprecedented social and political mobilization from below, as popular sectors pressure traditional elites to accept – in Dahl's terms⁴⁹ – more inclusionary and participatory forms of democratic governance. Political conditions would appear to be ripe in both countries, therefore, for iterative and highly unpredictable patterns of democratic careening.

Party System De-Alignment and Hegemonic Popular Sovereignty in Bolivia and Ecuador

If conservative-led market reforms failed to align party systems programmatically in Honduras and Paraguay, bait-and-switch reforms were manifestly de-aligning in Bolivia and Ecuador. Critical junctures in these countries generated powerful reactive sequences that thoroughly transformed both party systems and democratic regimes in the post-adjustment period. Both countries experienced mass, indigenous-led protest movements that toppled multiple elected presidents, while traditional party systems broke down and were outflanked on the left by more radical populist or “movement” parties that relied on plebiscitary expressions of popular sovereignty to re-found constitutional orders. Although political dynamics in both countries were shaped by partisan alignments during periods of democratic transition, it is important to note that their pattern of democratic careening was not strictly dependent on such transitions; Venezuela experienced a very similar careening dynamic without

⁴⁸ Leiv Marsteintredet, Mariana Llanos, and Detlef Nolte, “Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment,” *Journal of Democracy* 24, 4 (October 2013), 111.

⁴⁹ Dahl (1971).

undergoing a transition from military rule at the outset of the third wave. What these three cases shared in common was a de-aligning, bait-and-switch process of market reform during the critical juncture of structural adjustment – a process that led all major parties to converge on the neoliberal model and channel societal resistance toward anti-systemic forms of social and electoral protest.

As mentioned above, internally fractious military regimes in the 1970s did not empower conservative successor parties during democratic transitions in Bolivia and Ecuador. Consequently, as in Venezuela, conservative parties did not take the lead in the process of market liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s.⁵⁰ In Bolivia, structural adjustment was imposed in a hyperinflationary context in 1985 by the historic populist party that led the 1952 Revolution – the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR). Market liberalization continued under the MNR's successor, the left-leaning Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), with support from the conservative ADN – what Slater and Simmons have called a form of “promiscuous powersharing.”⁵¹ All of Bolivia's major parties thus converged on variants of market orthodoxy, leaving no institutionalized party of the left in opposition, despite widespread labor and social protest.

In Ecuador, very partial market-based austerity measures were adopted in the mid-1980s by the conservative PSC during its only term in office, as well as by the independent conservative president Sixto Durán Ballén in the early 1990s.⁵² Major liberalization initiatives were also adopted, however, by presidents from the country's leading leftist (Rodrigo Borja of the Democratic Left) and populist parties (Abdalá Bucaram of the Ecuadorean Roldosista Party). Likewise, independent populist figure Lucio Gutiérrez shifted in an orthodox direction after being elected in 2002 with the support of the left-leaning indigenous party *Pachakutik*. A consistent pattern of bait-and-switch reform by parties and presidents that ran for office as opponents of the neoliberal model thus deprived voters of a reliable partisan outlet for dissent from market orthodoxy.

⁵⁰ In Venezuela, structural adjustment was initially imposed by Carlos Andres Pérez of the labor-based center-left party Democratic Action (AD) in 1989. Market reforms were also adopted in a bait-and-switch manner by President Rafael Caldera and his leftist planning minister Teodoro Petkoff in the mid-1990s.

⁵¹ Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, “Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia,” *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 11 (November 2013), 1339–1365.

⁵² Catherine M. Conaghan and James Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).

In neither country, then, did the critical juncture of structural adjustment align the party system programmatically between supporters and opponents of the neoliberal model. Instead, patterns of “neoliberal convergence” and programmatic de-alignment prevailed.⁵³ In the absence of a reliable partisan outlet, societal resistance to market liberalization was more likely to be channeled into extra-systemic forms of social and/or electoral protest – far different types of reactive sequences than the progressive strengthening of established leftist parties that followed the aligning critical junctures in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay. In Ecuador, an indigenous movement that staunchly opposed the neoliberal model gathered steam over the course of the 1990s, eventually joining forces with other popular actors in a series of mass protests that directly or indirectly toppled three consecutive elected presidents in 1997, 2000, and 2005.⁵⁴ After 2000 – when a popular uprising triggered a short-lived military coup – established parties were displaced by independent populist figures, culminating in the election of the left populist outsider Rafael Correa in 2006. Likewise, in Bolivia indigenous movements, coca growers, labor unions, and community organizations converged in a series of mass protests – the so-called water wars in 2000 and the gas wars in 2003 – that challenged market reforms, forced two presidents to resign, and led to the collapse of the established party system. Bolivia's reactive sequences culminated in the election of coca union leader Evo Morales to the presidency in 2005 at the head of a new, heavily indigenous “movement party,” the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS).⁵⁵

In both countries, then, as in Venezuela, mass social protest was followed by mass electoral protest – that is, the transfer of votes *en masse* from established or “systemic” parties on both the left and the right to new “outsider” parties, movements, or independent personalities. As Morgan and Lupu suggest,⁵⁶ parties that lost their programmatic linkages to voters or diluted their “brands” paid a steep price at the ballot box. Indeed, the vote for independent figures or new parties formed after

⁵³ Kenneth M. Roberts, “Market Reform, Programmatic (De)alignment, and Party System Stability in Latin America,” *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 11 (November 2013), 1422–1452.

⁵⁴ See Yashar (2005) and Silva (2009).

⁵⁵ Raul Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁵⁶ See Jana Morgan, *Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011) and Noam Lupu, *Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America* (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2011).

1990 – roughly, the midpoint of the critical juncture – reached 100 percent in presidential elections in Venezuela after 2000 and in Ecuador and Bolivia in 2009. This was in striking contrast to the programmatically aligned party systems in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay, where established parties closed off the electoral marketplace to new competitors, and the vote for parties or movements formed after 1990 was virtually non-existent.

The societal backlash against traditional parties in Bolivia and Ecuador had even larger regime-level consequences, as democracy careened toward hegemonic expressions of popular sovereignty. In contrast to the PT in Brazil, the FMLN in El Salvador, and the FA in Uruguay – leftist parties that were forged in high-risk struggles to bring down dictators and establish basic democratic rights – the new populist and movement lefts that came to power in Bolivia and Ecuador (as in Venezuela) were shaped by more recent cycles of popular rebellion against ineffectual and unrepresentative democratic regimes. Such rebellions were, in essence, manifestations of a crisis of democratic representation,⁵⁷ and they spawned broader struggles to exercise popular sovereignty and escape the “self-limiting” constraints on democratic majorities imposed by the horizontal checks and balances of institutionalized pluralism.⁵⁸ Like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Correa and Morales ran for office on the basis of pledges to convoke constituent assemblies, and they did so immediately after taking office by means of plebiscitary appeals to a sovereign *pueblo* (people) – a more vertical form of democratic accountability, in Slater’s terms (2013). They bypassed or dismissed sitting legislatures, elected new constituent assemblies with the authority to rewrite the rules of the democratic game, approved those rules through popular referendums, reorganized judiciaries, and re-founded regime institutions with enhanced executive powers and new spaces for popular participation.⁵⁹

The plebiscitary re-founding of regime institutions created “constituent moments”⁶⁰ in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and they reflected highly majoritarian approaches to democratic governance. As such, they

⁵⁷ Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro, eds., *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

⁵⁸ Karl and Schmitter (1991, p. 274).

⁵⁹ Maxwell A. Cameron, Eric Hershberg, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, eds., *New Institutions for Participatory Democracy in Latin America: Voice and Consequence* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁶⁰ Jason Frank, *Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Post-revolutionary America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

depended on exceptional capacities for civic and political mobilization, which only increased as commodity prices rose after 2003 and provided windfall revenues to these rentier states. Chávez, Correa, and Morales all shattered national records for the highest first-round presidential vote share in the post-1980 period, with Morales reaching 64.2 percent in 2009, Chávez 62.8 percent in 2006, and Correa 57.2 percent in 2013. The capacity to mobilize such broad popular majorities behind a common political project was especially unusual in Ecuador and Bolivia, where previous third-wave presidents had averaged less than 30 percent of the first-round vote, and none had ever surpassed 40 percent. In each case, new popular majorities were constructed in contexts where traditional parties of the right, center, and left had lost any capacity to enforce institutional checks and balances.

On its own, broad electoral appeal is hardly incompatible with democracy as a form of institutionalized pluralism. The latter, however, requires the presence of institutional checks on the behavior and prerogatives of democratic majorities and the executives they empower, along with institutional protections of the rights and voice of political minorities. Such institutional restraints and protections, however, are inevitably in tension with the ability of popular majorities to govern, and in contexts of institutional crisis – such as those found in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures in Latin America – they can be easily overwhelmed or neutralized by the mobilization of new popular majorities. Returning to Dahl’s formulation,⁶¹ this mobilization undoubtedly created more inclusionary and participatory democratic institutions that responded in significant ways to long-neglected popular demands. It also, however, narrowed the institutional spaces that allowed opposition forces to contest public authority. Indeed, opposition parties weakened, and their ability to fill the institutional spaces that still existed for the representation of minority interests progressively declined. The challenge to institutionalized pluralism in these countries, therefore, was not a simple function of hegemonic majorities; it also reflected the disorganization of minorities, given the failure of centrist and conservative forces to rebuild anything more than fluid electoral fronts once traditional parties collapsed. Consequently, even if the end of the commodity boom weakens left populist alternatives in these rentier states, opposition forces are not well positioned to construct democracy as a form of institutionalized pluralism.

⁶¹ Dahl (1971).

CONCLUSION

The study of democracy in Latin America's third wave is necessarily a study in contrasts, given the diverging paths of democratic development in the region. This divergence is rooted in the alternative ways that political parties and social movements constructed – and sometimes deconstructed – democratic orders. Party systems that were programmatically aligned from left to right by democratic transitions and market liberalization have been more stable than those that were de-aligned by the dual transitions of the 1980s and 1990s. They also moderated social mobilization by channeling opposition to market orthodoxy into institutionalized outlets of partisan representation and electoral competition. In the process, parties constructed democracy as a form of institutionalized pluralism with relatively stable rules to regulate competition, protect political minorities, restrain popular majorities, and check executive authority. Where party systems were de-aligned by the dual transitions, however, they failed to provide institutional outlets for societal opposition to the neoliberal model, allowing dissent to be channeled into extra-systemic forms of social or electoral protest. Under such conditions, democracy tended to careen toward forms of oligarchic restoration or hegemonic popular sovereignty that entailed major institutional discontinuities, ranging from military coups to presidential overthrows and the plebiscitary re-founding of constitutional orders.

Although all of the countries analyzed here turned to the left politically at some point in the post-adjustment era, their democratic regimes did not all careen institutionally. Aligning and de-aligning critical junctures produced very different kinds of lefts, and their aftermath periods spawned different types of “left turns” – not to mention distinct conservative reactions to them. Whereas some turns to the left both reflected and reinforced institutionalized pluralism, others were embedded in highly disruptive reactive sequences that caused democracy to careen toward oligarchic restoration on the right, or hegemonic popular sovereignty on the left. Whether democracy careened, and what direction it took, were thus divergent outcomes of the partisan alignments that shaped the construction of democratic regimes in Latin America's third wave.

In comparative perspective, dual transitions to democracy and market liberalism and the left-right structuring of partisan competition appear more central to the Latin American experience during the third wave than in the other regions covered in this book. To be sure, authoritarian legacies and regime transitions heavily conditioned party systems in

other parts of the developing world, as seen in the chapters by Kuhonta, Beatty Riedl, and Lust and Waldner. The intersection of these legacies with partisan alignments during the process of structural adjustment, however, was more decisive in shaping democratic outcomes in Latin America, where competitive party systems under new democratic regimes – rather than single-party or military regimes – had to manage the debt crisis of the 1980s, and where market liberalization was often deeper, more comprehensive, and highly contentious politically.

Likewise, although left-right programmatic structuring of political competition has ebbed and flowed in Latin America, it has been more prevalent in the region than in other parts of the developing world during the third wave, especially in the post-adjustment era. The depth of structural adjustments – in countries with historic traditions of state-led industrialization and labor-based forms of populist and corporatist representation – made some sort of left-right programmatic structuring very likely in Latin America once hyperinflation had been defeated, social mobilization intensified, and democratic competition became institutionalized in the world's most unequal region. In contrast to other parts of the developing world, religious, ethnic, and nationalist divides play little role in the structuring of partisan competition in Latin America, and where they do – as in Bolivia and Ecuador – they largely reinforce rather than cross-cut cleavages based on class distinctions and left-right ideological preferences. Furthermore, the ability of conservative, elite-based parties to use patron-clientelism to control lower-class political behavior clearly eroded in the post-adjustment phase of the third wave in Latin America. Although the region's left-right competitive alignments will undoubtedly be challenged by the narrowing of programmatic space with the end of the commodity boom, they have shaped Latin America's democratic experience in fundamental ways that are not clearly replicated in other parts of the developing world.