Linkage versus Leverage

Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way

Studies of regime change since the cold war have drawn considerable attention to the "international dimension" of democratization.[1] Scholars have pointed to diverse forms of external influence, including diffusion, promotion of western democracy, multilateral conditionality, and the spread of new communications technologies and transnational human rights networks.[2] Nevertheless, the relationship between the post-cold-war international environment and regime outcomes remains poorly understood. Recent evidence suggests that many of the most widely studied forms of international influence, including conditionality, U.S. policy, and democracy assistance programs, have not had a consistent democratizing impact. Moreover, international effects vary considerably across regions. They are stronger in Central Europe and Latin America than in Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union.

A new framework for analyzing the international dimension of regime change can help explain these patterns. The post-cold-war international environment, in this framework, operates along two dimensions: western leverage, or the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure, and linkage to the West, or the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and western-led multilateral institutions.[3] Leverage in the absence of linkage has rarely been sufficient to induce democratization since the end of the cold war. Although external pressure at times succeeded in forcing elections or blocking authoritarian regressions, the more diffuse effects of linkage have contributed more consistently to democratization. Linkage has raised the cost of autocratic abuses by increasing their international salience and the likelihood of external response, enhancing the power and prestige of opposition forces, and expanding the number of domestic actors with a political, economic, or professional stake in adhering to international norms

Cross-national variation in international influence on democratization is rooted in differences in degree of linkage and leverage. Where linkage is extensive, as in much of Central Europe and Latin America, international pressure is intense and consistent, at times contributing to democratization even in countries with unfavorable domestic conditions. Lower levels of linkage create a more permissive international

environment. Where both linkage and leverage are low, as in much of the Middle East, former Soviet Union, and East Asia, the degree and effectiveness of external pressure is limited. As a result, domestic factors predominate in shaping regime outcomes.Where linkage is low but leverage is high, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, international pressure is intermittent and only partially effective. It may weaken authoritarianism, but it is rarely sufficient to produce democratization.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, democratic institutions exist and are meaningful in that they are viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but fraud, civil liberties violations, and other abuses skew the political playing field heavily in favor of incumbents.[4] Competitive authoritarian regime trajectories have varied considerably since the end of the cold war. In high linkage regions, such as Central Europe and the Americas, nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. Where linkage was less extensive, as in most of Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union, few of them democratized.

Four countries illustrate how varying levels of linkage and leverage shape regime outcomes. In Mexico and Slovakia extensive linkage contributed in an important way to democratization, even though leverage was limited in Mexico. In Russia, where leverage and linkage are relatively low, the impact of external democratizing pressure was limited. Hence there were few external checks on authoritarian rule. In Zambia, where high leverage was combined with low linkage, external pressure weakened authoritarian rule but was insufficient to induce democratization. In the absence of a strong domestic push for democracy, the result was unstable competitive authoritarianism. These four cases do not constitute a test of the argument but rather serve to illustrate the causal mechanisms at work. The objective is to present a new theoretical framework, generate hypotheses, and make an initial case for their plausibility. More rigorous testing of these propositions is left to future work.[5]

The Post-Cold-War International Environment and Democratization: The Scope and Limits of External Influence

The post-cold-war international environment challenged overt authoritarianism—and to a lesser extent, encouraged democratization—to an unprecedented degree. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a precipitous decline in military and economic assistance for Soviet- and U.S-backed dictatorships in much of the developing world, weakening many to the point of collapse. The post-cold-war realignment encouraged the diffusion of formal democratic institutions, as the disappearance of internationally legitimate regime alternatives, combined with the West's unparalleled military and economic power, induced elites throughout the developing world to adopt western-style institutions.[6]

The disappearance of the Soviet threat also elevated the status of the promotion of

democracy on western foreign policy agendas. Western powers stepped up efforts to promote democracy through diplomatic and occasionally military pressure, and both governments and multilateral institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding of elections and respect for human rights.[7] This new political conditionality was complemented by efforts to create permanent legal frameworks for the collective defense of democracy, such as the European Union's rigorous membership conditionality and the emerging mechanisms of collective sanction in the Organization of American States.[8]

Finally, a transnational infrastructure of organizations and networks, including international organizations, party foundations, election monitoring agencies, and a burgeoning community of nongovernmental organizations, has emerged since the end of the cold war, committed to the promotion of human rights and democracy.[9] Where these networks were effective, state abuses triggered a "boomerang effect," in which abuses were widely reported by international media and human rights groups, inducing western governments to take punitive action.[10] In some cases, international criticism set in motion a "spiral effect" in which norm-violating states were induced to make democratic concessions from which they could not easily extricate themselves.[11]

Nevertheless, the democratizing effects of the post-cold-war international environment should not be overstated. In 2001, a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a majority of regimes in the world remained nondemocratic.[12] Although these outcomes are explained largely by the absence of a strong domestic push for democracy, the pull of international democratizing forces was also limited in important ways. First, outside of the EU and its potential member states, promotion of western democracy was inconsistent. Political conditionality was applied in a selective manner, targeting poor, aid-dependent countries in which western powers had no competing strategic or economic interests.[13] Second, again with the exception of the EU, promotion of democracy was markedly "electoralist," in that it focused almost exclusively on the holding of multiparty elections while downplaying issues such as civil liberties.[14] Indeed, western pressure often eased up after elections, even if they did not result in democratization (for example, in Kenya, Peru, and Zambia during the 1990s). Electoralism was exacerbated by problems of monitoring and enforcement. Although external pressure may be effective for easily monitored, single processes such as the holding of elections, it is less effective in sustaining civil liberties and a level playing field.[15] Outside the EU, the international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms needed to impose the full package of democracy are largely absent. Even in internationally monitored elections, incumbents routinely get away with harassing opponents, monopolizing media access, and manipulating electoral results.[16]

External pressure has thus proved to be a relatively blunt instrument in promoting democracy since the end of the cold war. Although blatant authoritarian regressions

(military coups, cancellation of elections) often triggered strong international responses, a variety of other abuses, including electoral manipulation and attacks on the media and opposition, have been routinely ignored. Consequently, electoral nondemocracies or regimes in which elections coexisted with varying degrees of autocratic abuse have proliferated.[17]

The democratizing impact of the post-cold-war international environment has also varied considerably across regions. Democratic ideas and institutions did not diffuse evenly across the globe, but rather were contingent upon geographic and cultural proximity.[18] Thus, democratic diffusion was more extensive in Central Europe and Latin America than in Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union. The impact of new information technologies and transnational human rights networks also varied by region: both the internet and human rights organizations spread more rapidly and exerted greater influence in Central Europe and Latin America than in other developing areas.[19] Regional variation was also manifest in the promotion of western democracy. Whereas the U.S. and EU member states actively and consistently promoted democracy in the Americas and postcommunist Europe during the 1990s, democratization was frequently trumped by economic and security objectives in the Middle East and East Asia. In Africa, U.S. policy was characterized primarily by "indifference and neglect."[20]

In sum, although external pressure played a major role in undermining authoritarian regimes, its impact on democratization was more limited, and the international dimension of democratization was "thicker" in some regions (Central Europe, Latin America) than in others (Africa, the former Soviet Union).

Leverage and Linkage

An alternative framework for analyzing international influences can capture and explain this variation in external pressure for democratization. The international environment operates along two dimensions: western leverage and linkage to the West. Both leverage and linkage raise the cost of autocratic abuses, but they do so in different ways and with different effects.

Western Leverage Western leverage refers to incumbent governments' vulnerability to external pressure for democratization. Such pressure may be exerted in a variety of ways, including positive conditionality (for example, EU membership), punitive sanctions (aid withdrawal, trade sanctions), diplomatic persuasion, and military force. Leverage is rooted primarily in the size and strength of countries' states and economies. Governments of weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (as in much of sub-Saharan Africa) are more vulnerable to external pressure than those in

larger countries with substantial military and/or economic power (such as China, India, and Russia).

Western leverage may be limited by two additional factors. The first is the existence of a regional power that can provide alternative sources of economic, military, and/or diplomatic support. Regional powers in Asia (China, Japan), the former Soviet Union (Russia), and sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, France) at times provide critical financial, military, or diplomatic support to neighboring autocracies, thereby mitigating the impact of the western influence.[21] In Central Europe and the Americas, by contrast, no alternative regional power existed during the 1990s to the EU and the U.S. Second, western leverage may be limited by competing foreign policy objectives. In countries where western powers have important economic or security interests at stake, autocratic governments may ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves—and regime stability—as the best means of protecting those interests. In this context, issues of democracy are more likely to divide western powers, thereby limiting their capacity to carry out effective punitive action.[22]

Leverage raises the cost of authoritarian abuse. During the post-cold-war period, autocratic governments in weak, aid-dependent, and strategically unimportant states were most likely to be targets of western democratizing pressure, and among cases in which noncompliance triggered punitive action by western powers (for example, Haiti, Kenya), they suffered the most severe consequences.[23]

Nevertheless, the overall democratizing impact of leverage has been limited. Western powers employed leverage inconsistently during the post-cold-war period, allowing many autocrats to escape sanction. Moreover, because mechanisms of international monitoring and sanction were insufficiently rigorous to impose the full package of democracy, autocrats routinely got away with minimal reforms, such as holding elections without ensuring civil liberties or a level playing field, that fall short of democracy. Indeed, one study of conditionality during the 1990s found that it made a "significant contribution" to democratization in only two of twenty-nine cases.[24] Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where external vulnerability is highest, scholars have found no positive relationship between conditionality and democratization.[25]

Linkage to the West Linkage can be defined as the density of ties and cross-border flows between a particular country and the U.S., the EU, and western-dominated multilateral institutions.[26] It can be broken down into five dimensions. Economic linkage includes trade, investment, credit, and bilateral and multilateral aid flows. Geopolitical linkage includes ties to western governments and participation in western-led alliances, treaties, and international organizations. Social linkage, or the flow of people across borders, includes migration, tourism, refugees, and diaspora communities, as well as elite education in the West. Communication linkage, or the flow

of information, includes cross-border telecommunications, internet connections, and the degree of western radio and television penetration and coverage. Transnational civil society linkage includes local ties to western-based nongovernmental organizations, religious groups, and party organizations.

The most important source of western linkage is geographic proximity. Countries in regions that are geographically proximate to the U.S. and the EU, such as Latin America and Central Europe, tend to have closer economic ties, more extensive intergovernmental contact, and higher cross-border flows of people, organizations, and information than countries in less proximate areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union. However, linkage may also be a product of colonial heritage, military occupation, or long-standing geopolitical alliances, and it may be enhanced by ethnic and cultural similarities. Linkage is also enhanced by socioeconomic development, which tends to increase cross-border economic activity, communication, and travel.

Linkage generates several sources of antiauthoritarian pressure. First, it heightens the international salience of autocratic abuse. Heavy penetration of media and nongovernmental organizations, dense flows of people and communication, and widespread elite contacts increase the likelihood that government abuses will become "news" in western capitals. Extensive media coverage and the activities of transnational advocacy networks have an amplifying effect, capable of transforming a reported abuse into an international outcry. Consequently, even relatively minor violations (such as electoral irregularities or harassment of journalists) may generate substantial attention in the West. Indeed, abuses in Mexico, Romania, and Slovakia during the 1990s received far greater attention in western media and policymaking circles than more severe human rights violations in countries with lower linkage like Belarus, Cambodia, Kenya, and Zambia.

Second, linkage increases the likelihood that western governments will take action in response to abuses. Greater media coverage and lobbying by nongovernmental organizations, exile groups, and their western allies increase the pressure on western governments to act. For example, intense lobbying by Haitian refugee organizations, human rights groups, and the Congressional Black Caucus successfully pushed Clinton's administration to act against Haiti's military regime in 1994.[27] By contrast, due to the weakness of western-based Africa lobbies, western governments felt little domestic pressure to take action against human rights abuses in that region.[28] Western governments are also more likely to take action in high linkage cases because they are more likely to perceive that they have interests at stake. Thus, the potential social, political, and economic effects of instability (for example, refugee flows) in the Caribbean Basin (for the U.S.) and Central and Southern Europe (for EU members) are far greater than those of instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Third, linkage shifts domestic preferences in a prodemocratic direction by expanding the number of domestic actors with a stake in their country's international standing. Where linkage is extensive, myriad individuals, firms, and organizations maintain personal, financial, and professional ties to the West. Because isolation from the western democratic community would put valued markets, investment flows, grants, job prospects, and reputations at risk, these actors will be wary of government actions that threaten such an outcome. Thus, because economic linkage increases the number of firms for whom a sudden shift in trade or investment flows would be costly, business leaders in such a context often develop an interest in adhering to regional democratic norms.[29] Similarly, linkage increases the number of western-educated elites—many of whom maintain ties to western universities and international organizations—for whom association with a norm-violating government could bring future professional costs. Linkage thus creates an "intermestic" constituency for adherence to democratic norms. When numerous political, economic, and technocratic elites perceive they have something to lose from international isolation, it is difficult to sustain a coalition behind authoritarian rule. For example, when Alberto Fujimori's presidential coup threatened to disrupt Peru's reintegration into the international financial system, technocrats and business allies convinced him to abandon plans for dictatorship and call early elections.[30]

Finally, linkage reshapes the domestic balance of power within authoritarian regimes. For one, a large-scale presence of international media and nongovernmental organizations often helps protect vulnerable opposition groups from state repression, as occurred with the Zapatista movement in Mexico. Opposition ties to western governments, parties, and nongovernmental organizations also yield critical sources of finance and organizational support. In Serbia, for example, U.S. and European assistance in 2000 helped level the playing field against Milosevic's government by financing independent media, opposition activists' salaries, and a massive get-out-the-vote campaign.[31] Linkage may also enhance domestic public support for democratic forces. Thus, in Croatia, Nicaragua, and Slovakia, where nondemocratic governments were perceived to threaten their country's access to the western democratic community, opposition parties' ties to the West and credible promise to improve relations with western powers proved to be valuable electoral assets. Finally, linkage may strengthen reformist tendencies within autocratic parties. In Croatia, for example, widespread frustration with international isolation helped reformists to wrest control of the governing Croatian Democratic Union from radical nationalists after the death of Franjo Tudjman.[32]

Unlike mechanisms of leverage such as military force, diplomatic pressure, and conditionality, the effects of linkage tend to be subtle and diffuse. Linkage generates "soft power," or the ability to "shape preferences" and "get others to want what you want."[33] It influences a range of nonstate actors, generating decentralized forms of pressure that frequently operate below the radar screens of international observers.

To a significant extent, then, linkage blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international expectations into domestic demands. By heightening domestic actors' sensitivity to shifts in a regime's international image, it creates multiple pressure points that, if ignored, may be far more threatening to incumbents than punitive measures meted out by foreign powers.

Linkage enhances the effectiveness of leverage. Although it may at times reduce leverage by placing competing bilateral issues on western foreign policy agendas, it nevertheless increases the consistency, scope, and force of external pressure.[34] Linkage extends the sources of monitoring and pressure beyond governments and multilateral institutions to include a vast infrastructure of international media, human rights groups, and other transnational actors. The pressure generated by this infrastructure tends to be permanent, rather than focused on election cycles, and it extends beyond "electoralism" to include the protection of human rights, press freedom, and other civil liberties. And crucially, linkage increases the likelihood that punitive action (or threatened action) by western powers will trigger broad domestic opposition among politicians, technocrats, entrepreneurs, and voters who view international isolation as costly. Such a dynamic could be observed, for example, after Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano's closure of congress in 1993, when the specter of U.S.-led sanctions triggered such widespread business, military, and technocratic opposition that Serrano was forced to resign.[35]

The relationship between leverage and linkage has important implications for the "boomerang" and "spiral" effects discussed by scholars of transnational networks (see Figure 1).[36] Where linkage is extensive, boomerang effects are likely to be stronger and broader in scope. They are stronger because even minor abuses are more likely to reverberate in western capitals. They are broader in scope because international reactions impose heavy costs not only on governments, but also on myriad domestic political and economic actors. Norm-violating governments thus confront a double boomerang effect, as abuses are likely to trigger hostile reactions on both the international and domestic fronts.

Leverage, Linkage, and Variation in International Democratizing Pressure

Different levels of leverage and linkage are critical in understanding cross-national variation in international pressure for democratization. In effect, different combinations of leverage and linkage create distinct external environments. Across these environments, the relative influence of domestic and international forces over regime outcomes varies considerably. Where leverage and linkage are high, international factors may be decisive, contributing to democratization even where domestic conditions are unfavorable. Where leverage and linkage are low, domestic factors are far more likely to predominate.

Table 1 shows four ideal-typical configurations of linkage and leverage and their

Figure 1 Linkage and the Boomerang Effect



hypothesized effects. Where linkage and leverage are high, as in much of Central Europe and the Americas, external democratizing pressure will be consistent and intense. Autocratic abuses are likely to gain international attention and trigger costly punitive action, which is often magnified by opposition among internationally oriented domestic constituencies. In such a context, autocracies are unlikely to survive. Because opposition forces usually maintain close ties to the West, and because linkage-based pressure tends to be permanent rather than elections-centered, the fall of autocratic governments is likely to result in democratization. Hence it is in a high linkage/high leverage context that international influences are most pronounced. In such an environment, democratization is likely even in countries with relatively unfavorable domestic conditions for democracy (for example, Nicaragua and Romania).

Where linkage is high but leverage is relatively low, external democratizing pressure will be diffuse, indirect, and slow-moving, but it may nevertheless be substantial.[37] Notwithstanding the absence of direct external pressure, governments face intense scrutiny from international media, transnational human rights networks, and internationally oriented domestic constituencies. Moreover, due to the predominance of western-educated technocrats, governments will be particularly sensitive to international opinion. Hence, even if autocratic governments face little external pressure to leave power, they have an incentive to avoid large-scale abuses, and to maintain themselves in power through internationally credible political institutions. When

Table 1 How Variation in Linkage and Leverage Shapes External Pressure for Democratization

	High Linkage	**Low Linkage**
High Leverage	Consistent and effective democratizing pressure	Intermittent and limited democratizing pressure
Low Leverage	Consistent but diffuse, indirect democratizing pressure	Weak external democratizing pressure

serious opposition challenges arise, these governments may be trapped by these efforts to maintain international credibility. Unwilling to pay the external and domestic costs of a large-scale crackdown, they are likely to leave power peacefully in the event of an opposition victory. Again, opposition ties to the West and the permanent nature of linkage-based pressure make it likely that turnover will result in democratization.

Where leverage is high but linkage is low, international democratizing pressure will be intermittent and only partially effective. In a context of high external vulnerability, full-scale authoritarianism will be difficult to sustain. Governments that fail to meet minimal international standards with respect to elections and human rights may confront debilitating sanctions or cuts in external assistance. However, many autocrats will escape sanction, often remaining in power by combining internationally acceptable elections with restrictions on civil liberties and an uneven political playing field. Even when autocrats fall, regimes may not democratize. In the absence of extensive linkage, international pressure often ceases after an electoral turnover, which may allow successor governments to violate democratic norms at low external cost. Hence, although a high leverage/low linkage environment may undermine full-scale authoritarianism, it is not propitious for democratization. In such an environment, democratization requires a strong domestic push.

Finally, where both linkage and leverage are low, international democratizing pressure will be minimal. In such a context, even serious abuses may fail to trigger a strong international reaction, and even when punitive action is undertaken, it is unlikely to have a significant impact. Incumbent governments will thus have greater room to maneuver in building or maintaining authoritarian regimes. In these cases, regime outcomes will hinge largely on domestic factors. For this reason, both authoritarian breakdown and democratization will require a stronger domestic "push" than in the other scenarios discussed above.

The International Environment and Competitive Authoritarian Regime Change, 1990–2004

Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian electoral regimes in which democratic institutions exist and are viewed as the primary means of gaining power but in which incumbent abuses, including civil liberties violations, media restrictions, and electoral manipulation, tilt the playing field so heavily that the regime can not be labeled a democracy.[38] At least thirty-five regimes either were or became competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995.[39] These regimes diverged considerably over the following decade. Fourteen of them democratized. Elections were free, and civil liberties were protected.[40] Nine remained stable competitive authoritarian regimes. Autocratic incumbents or their chosen successors remained in power through 2005.[41] In eleven autocrats fell, but regimes did not democratize. In most cases, they remained competitive authoritarian.[42]

These outcomes show a striking regional variation. In the regions generally characterized by the highest levels of linkage, Latin America/Caribbean and Central Europe, democratization was widespread. Of twelve cases, nine democratized after 1990. (Two others, Albania and Macedonia, were nearly democratic by 2005.) Equally striking was the failure of authoritarianism in the two regions. In none of the twelve Latin American and Central European cases did an autocratic government or chosen successor survive through 2005. The only case of thoroughly failed democratization, Haiti, lies at an extreme in terms of unfavorable structural conditions. Yet even there autocrats failed to consolidate power.

In Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union, which are characterized by medium to low levels of linkage, democratization was far less frequent. Of twenty-three cases, only five democratized during the 1990–2005 period, and one of them, Taiwan, is characterized by substantial linkage to the United States.[43] Seventeen regimes remained nondemocratic. Nine of them remained stable and authoritarian, and eight others experienced turnover but did not democratize. Stable competitive authoritarianism was most likely where both linkage and leverage are relatively low, as in Malaysia, Russia, Zimbabwe, and post-1994 Belarus.

These patterns are obviously not only a product of international forces. Domestic factors such as socioeconomic development and strength of civil society are critical in explaining why democratization was more widespread in Central Europe and Latin America than in Africa. However, these outcomes can not be explained by domestic variables alone. In high linkage regions democratization (or near democratization) occurred even where domestic conditions were highly unfavorable (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Romania, Albania). In low linkage regions, by contrast, competitive authoritarianism persisted not only in very poor countries but also in relatively developed ones (Belarus, Malaysia, Russia).

Four cases illustrate the mechanisms through which linkage and leverage shape

regime outcomes: Slovakia, with high linkage and leverage; Mexico, with high linkage and low leverage; Zambia, with low linkage and high leverage; and Russia, with low linkage and leverage.

Slovakia Slovakia's strong ties to and dependence on the EU make it a case of high linkage and high leverage. EU membership conditionality differs from political conditionality elsewhere in the world in three important respects. First, unlike other western forms of conditionality, the EU demands the full democratic package, including "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law."[44] Second, EU conditionality is accompanied by extensive—and institutionalized—monitoring. Detailed annual reviews of compliance with democratic conditionality were reinforced by a dense network of regional and international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and NATO. Thus, "political monitoring of applicant countries is really perpetual."[45] Finally, the (real and perceived) benefits of ties to the European core are sufficiently large to induce far-reaching concessions on the part of prospective members. Unlike negative political conditionality imposed elsewhere (withdrawal of aid if certain conditions are not met), the EU's positive conditionality has led integration to be broadly embraced at both the elite and mass levels. As a result, autocratic abuses tend to produce a double boomerang effect that includes both international sanction and domestic opposition.

Slovakia's relationship with the EU and its general proximity to western Europe have also created extensive linkage. Even during Slovakia's relative political isolation in the mid 1990s, social, communication, and civil society ties to Europe were substantial, and Slovaks enjoyed widespread access to European media. In addition, EU countries provided substantial funding and training to civic groups, and Slovak politicians were closely connected to western politicians and party networks.[46]

Slovakia emerged as a case of competitive authoritarianism in 1994 when Vladimir Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) regained control of the government and rapidly sought to eliminate major sources of opposition. Meciar took firm control of Slovak television, used the secret police to harass and detain opposition leaders (in one case, kidnapping the son of a rival), ignored several unfavorable constitutional court rulings, and in 1997 refused to carry out a legally constituted referendum that would have limited his power.[47] Efforts to oppose Meciar faced serious obstacles. The prime minister's popularity, a relatively healthy economy, and a powerful mass-based governing party placed him in a strong position vis-à-vis a weak, underfinanced, and divided opposition.[48] Hence, in the absence of extensive linkage to the West, Meciar's autocratic government might well have consolidated power.

The EU intervened heavily in Slovak politics during the 1990s. In addition to

constant diplomatic pressure, it employed conditionality in 1997 by rejecting Slovakia's request to begin accession negotiations due to a failure to meet democratic criteria. Although EU leverage generally failed to gain Meciar's compliance to specific demands, the European presence shifted the balance of power toward the opposition in at least three ways. First, European party support and EU finance and training provided the opposition with far greater resources than it could otherwise have mobilized. In 1998 the EU's heavy investment in voter turnout and electoral observation programs played a major role in leveling the playing field.[49]

Second, Slovakia's failure to move towards EU membership, for which the EU directly (and very publicly) blamed Meciar, created a salient electoral issue that benefited the opposition. Fear of being left out of the EU appears to have tilted some voters against Meciar (and motivated many erstwhile nonvoters to vote) in the 1998 parliamentary elections, in which Meciar lost power.[50]

Third, EU ties and pressure isolated Meciar from potential allies. Constant contact with EU and other western actors persuaded many governing officials in Slovakia to defect to the opposition in the mid 1990s.[51] Further, because of Meciar's pariah status, opposition leaders who cooperated with him risked international isolation. Thus, although Meciar's party remained the largest in the country after 1998, all major parties refused to enter into a coalition with it, and Meciar was consequently forced from power.

Ties to Europe contributed in an important way to Slovakia's post-1998 democratization. Because of their weakness and external dependence, anti-Meciar forces, once in power, had a strong motivation to maintain good relations with the EU. Mikulas Dzurinda, who replaced Meciar as prime minister, viewed successful negotiations with the EU as critical to his political success. It was thus much easier for the EU to impose democratic conditionality, and Slovakia has remained solidly democratic since 1998.

Mexico Mexico is a case of high linkage but relatively low leverage. Although U.S-Mexican relations have been characterized by complex interdependence, bilateral ties were extended and deepened after 1982 by economic integration, culminating in the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993.[52] NAFTA quadrupled U.S. investment in Mexico and transformed Mexico into the U.S.'s second largest trading partner.[53] Immigration, transportation, communication, and media ties expanded, and political interaction between the two countries "multiplied at all levels."[54] Linkage was also seen in the rise of U.S.-educated technocrats within the Mexican state. Presidents Miguel De la Madrid (1982–88), Carlos Salinas (1988–94), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) all attended Ivy League universities, and U.S.-educated technocrats predominated in each administration. These technocrats maintained close ties to U.S. academic, business, and policy circles and closely followed global intellectual and ideological trends.[55] Finally, extensive

transnational democracy and human rights networks provided resources, protection, and access to the U.S. media and Congress, which "strengthened the clout of Mexican opposition organizations" and helped "magnify domestic demands for democracy."[56]

At the same time, western leverage was relatively low. The size and importance of the Mexican economy limited its vulnerability to external democratizing pressure. Although the U.S-Mexican relationship was highly asymmetric, extreme interdependence limited the U.S.'s "ability to bring the full range of its overall power capabilities to bear against Mexico."[57] Thus, issues such as trade, drugs, immigration, and security weakened U.S. incentives to employ political conditionality.

During the 1980s Mexico underwent a transition from hegemonic to competitive authoritarianism. Although the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) faced increasing competition from the National Action Party (PAN) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), due to continued civil liberties violations, abuse of media and state resources, and fraud the electoral playing field remained skewed. Civic and opposition forces strengthened considerably during the 1990s, but the vast power resources of the party-state and ideological divisions within the opposition limited its capacity to dislodge the PRI from power.

International pressure played a fundamental but indirect role in Mexico's democratization. At no time did the U.S. impose political conditionality. Successive U.S. administrations backed the PRI governments and explicitly excluded democracy from NAFTA negotiations.[58] Nevertheless, NAFTA increased Mexico's salience in the U.S. political arena, forcing the PRI to "accept the scrutiny of the U.S. Congress, public interest groups, and a myriad of committees and commissions."[59] Expanded international media coverage and the growing presence of transnational human rights networks increased the potential reverberation of even minor abuses. Having bet Mexico's future on integration, the PRI's technocratic leadership was "greatly concerned with the international image of Mexico and the damage done...by widespread reports of human rights violations and democratic failings."[60]

In this context, the PRI was induced to make a series of liberalizing concessions that eventually undermined its grip on power. This dynamic was first manifest in the aftermath of the fraud-ridden 1988 election, which tarnished the Salinas government's international image at a time when it sought to advance integration with the U.S. As NAFTA negotiations began, the PRI was subjected to intense international scrutiny, including unprecedented media coverage of electoral scandals and U.S. congressional hearings on Mexican human rights.[61] In response, Salinas launched a campaign to improve Mexico's image in the United States that included the creation of the National Commission on Human Rights, and English-language reports were sent to U.S. human rights organizations.[62] Although the PRI initially responded with force to the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, repression "spurred international concern and led to an influx of human rights organizations from abroad."[63]

Concerned that repression would "frighten away investors" and "create a backlash that could destroy NAFTA," the government abandoned the military option.[64]

On the electoral front, when a string of local election scandals gained international attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PRI began, for the first time, to concede state-level elections.[65] Concerned about international credibility in the 1994 presidential election, the PRI undertook "a series of unprecedented measures to limit fraud," including the presence of vast numbers of international observers and foreign funded domestic monitors.[66]

By the late 1990s opposition forces had strengthened to the point where they could win national elections. Preventing such an outcome would have required large-scale fraud or repression, which, given Mexico's international position, would have been extremely costly. In 1996 the PRI "reluctantly and grudgingly" negotiated a set of reforms that, by creating a level playing field and an independent electoral authority, fully democratized Mexico.[67] PAN candidate Vicente Fox won the heavily monitored 2000 presidential election, and the PRI left power peacefully.

Zambia Zambia illustrates many of the limitations of conditionality in the absence of linkage. One of the poorest and most aid-dependent countries in the world, Zambia is a clear case of high leverage.[68] In the absence of competing foreign policy issues or support from a regional power, the country's vulnerability to external democratizing pressure is extremely high. At the same time, linkages to the West are weak. Geographically distant from Europe and the U.S., Zambia's economic ties to the West are minimal. Penetration by western media and nongovernmental organizations is low; relatively few Zambian elites have been educated abroad; and only a tiny elite has regular access to western news and ideas.[69] Moreover, the business community's dependence on government connections limits the number of intermestic pressure points available to the West.

Zambia received substantial international attention in 1991, when Kenneth Kaunda became one of the region's first long-standing autocrats to hold multiparty elections. The 1991 election attracted a large number of western observers. When Kaunda lost and ceded power to the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), Zambia was cited as a "model for democratic change."[70] Yet the country did not democratize. New President Frederick Chiluba quickly cracked down on the media and the opposition. In 1993 the MMD government declared a state of emergency and prior to the 1996 presidential election manipulated constitutional rules to bar Kaunda, Chiluba's main rival, from running. The 1996 election was marred by fraud, intimidation of journalists and opposition figures, unfair media access, and harassment of observers.[71] In December 1997 the government arrested Kaunda, and, although he was released early in 1998, he was forced to retire from politics in exchange for an end to harassment. Chiluba stepped down after completing his sec-

ond term in 2001, but the MMD used electoral rigging to ensure his successor's victory in the 2001 presidential race.[72]

External democratizing pressure on Zambian governments was sporadic and of limited effectiveness. Although international pressure and relatively extensive monitoring of the 1991 elections contributed to the collapse of one party rule and to Chiluba's victory, subsequent abuses rarely triggered broad international sanction. Western powers never attempted to isolate or stigmatize Chiluba, as they did Meciar, even though violations of democratic norms in Zambia were far more serious. Although international actors reacted strongly to some of the government's most egregious abuses, such as Kaunda's imprisonment, western intervention lacked consistency, focus, and breadth. Thus, although some bilateral donors froze aid after Kaunda was banned from the 1996 election, the IMF and World Bank continued to provide much needed support. In 2001 the international community broadly condemned the flawed elections but took little punitive action.[73] Zambia is thus an excellent example of the international community's short attention span in low linkage cases. In a context of limited and sporadic international pressure, Chiluba was able to carry out abuses, such as torturing and exiling opposition leaders, that were virtually absent in Central Europe and Latin America during the 1990s.

It is clear, then, that the boomerang effect in Zambia was both weaker and more intermittent than in Latin America or Central Europe. While this result was partly due to Chiluba's reputation as an economic reformer, it was also a product of weak linkage. Government abuses rarely reverberated in western capitals, and the paucity of intermestic actors limited the available pressure points for western powers. [74] Because business and technocratic ties to the West were weak, external pressure was concentrated on the government rather than on a broad range of interests. Thus, although punitive measures such as the reduction in bilateral aid in 1996 had serious financial consequences, it did not trigger significant domestic opposition. [75]

Russia Russia is a case of low leverage and low to moderate linkage. Although the profound economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union increased Russia's external dependence, forcing it to seek western aid, the country's vulnerability to external democratizing pressure was offset by several factors, including its sheer size, its possession of key oil and gas reserves, and, most important, its continued military and geostrategic significance. During the 1990s the potential revival of the arms race and the threat of Russia's spread of nuclear capabilities abroad made western powers highly dependent on Russian security cooperation.[76] For most western governments, then, security far outweighed democracy as a foreign policy priority.[77]

Russia's linkage to the West is also relatively weak, due to a combination of geographical distance and more than seventy years of closed Soviet rule. Russia remains weakly integrated into the global economy, with its exports limited primarily to com-

modities such as gas, oil, and timber. Although Russia trades extensively with the EU, it has not participated in EU expansion and thus is subject to few of the mechanisms of political integration and democratic promotion that were so influential in countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. Social and communication linkages are also less extensive than in Central Europe.[78] Russian travel remains restricted in much of the West, and although there are large Russian communities in the U.S. and Europe, they are relatively disorganized. Finally, the closed nature of the Soviet regime resulted in a dearth of technocratic linkage. Because travel to the West and access to western publications were strictly limited in the Soviet era, most of Russia's elite had virtually no exposure to the West until late in their professional careers. Consequently, during the 1990s western influence on Russian politics depended on ties to a small handful of prowestern elites, such as economists Anatolii Chubais and Yegor Gaidar. Combined with Russia's importance for security, this situation gave the reformist government of Boris Yeltsin vast leverage, as Yeltsin and his allies could credibly claim that Russia's prowestern orientation hinged on their political survival.

Notwithstanding its relative openness during the 1990s, Russia under Yeltsin is best characterized as competitive authoritarian. During his first presidential term Yeltsin closed down parliament through a violent coup. The independent media was systematically harassed, at times violently, and Yeltsin's reelection in 1996 was marred by fraud.[79] After 1999, when Yeltsin handed power to a handpicked successor, Vladimir Putin, authoritarianism became increasingly institutionalized. By 2003 Putin had shut down all independent television stations and arrested, exiled, or bullied into submission the leading business magnates capable of financing opposition parties. In 2003 Putin's Unified Russia party obtained more than two-thirds of the seats in the legislature, which transformed the body into a virtual rubber stamp. Having effectively done away with almost all viable opposition, Putin faced no serious contender in the 2004 presidential election, and he won with 71 percent of the vote.

Although the roots of authoritarianism in postcommunist Russia are mostly domestic, this outcome was reinforced by the heavy insulation of Yeltsin's and Putin's governments from external democratizing pressures. The Clinton administration supported Yeltsin throughout the 1990s, never putting other bilateral issues at risk by demanding full democratization. Yeltsin used the specter of Communist resurgence to gain western backing for his 1993 attack on parliament and his flawed 1996 reelection.[80] The U.S. also did little in response to large-scale human rights violations in Chechnya.[81] Western powers later acquiesced in Putin's increasing authoritarianism, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S. Indeed, U.S. dependence on Russia's cooperation in Afghanistan and willingness to permit U.S. military bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia further reduced its leverage over Putin's government.[82] Hence Putin faced very few serious external obstacles to autocratic rule.

Conclusion: Linkage and the Study of Regime Change

Although it is widely believed that the international environment had a significant impact on democratization after 1989, studies have shown that most direct forms of western intervention, including military force, diplomatic persuasion, conditionality, and democracy assistance programs, have not consistently produced democratic outcomes. In explaining this pattern, this analysis has focused less on direct state-to-state or multilateral promotion of democracy (the use of leverage) than on the economic, social, communication, intergovernmental, and transnational civil society relationships that tie countries to the West (the effects of linkage). Extensive linkage raises the cost of autocratic behavior by heightening the salience of abuse, increasing the likelihood of a western response and creating a broad domestic constituency for international norm-abiding behavior. In this way, linkage blurs the distinctions between international and domestic pressure for democracy, transforming international or regional democratic expectations into powerful domestic demands.

This analysis has important implications for scholarly debates over the relative importance of domestic versus international factors in explaining democratization.[83] It is not a substitute for domestic-oriented explanations. Domestic variables, such as socioeconomic development, economic performance, and the strength of civil society, are critical in explaining regime outcomes.[84] This analysis suggests, however, that the relative weight of domestic and international factors varies across cases and regions. Where linkage is extensive, intense international pressure at times outweighed unfavorable structural conditions during the post-cold-war period (for example, in Romania and Nicaragua). Where linkage is low, domestic variables were more likely to predominate.

These findings also complement modernization theory by adding another causal mechanism linking development and democracy. Economic development creates linkage, in the form of greater economic integration, cross-border communication, education, and travel, and more extensive ties to transnational civil society, which appears, increasingly, to contribute to democratization.

Linkage-centered explanations are more structuralist than the institutional design-centered approaches that have predominated in recent studies of democratization. With the partial exception of EU-related integration, linkage to the West is less the product of specific elite decisions than of geography, economic development, colonialism, and long-standing geostrategic alliances. It is therefore less malleable or amenable to short-term foreign policy goals than are individual leaders or constitutions. Nevertheless, the multiple, decentralized, "soft," and often difficult-to-measure effects of linkage may be the most important international cause of democratization in the post-cold-war era.

NOTES

The authors thank Richard Deeg, Jorge Domínguez, M. Steven Fish, Axel Hadenius, Marc Howard, Nahomi Ichino, Lisa Martin, Marc Plattner, Mark Pollack, Andreas Schedler, and Susan Stokes for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Laurence Whitehead, ed., *The International Dimension of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds., *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe* (London: Leicester University Press, 1997); Jean Grugel, ed., *Democracy without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies* (London: Routledge, 1999).

2. See Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35 (June 1991), 356–81; Jeffrey S. Kopstein, and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," *World Politics*, 53 (October 2000), 1–37; Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1995); Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, *Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992); Gordon Crawford, *Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Judith Kelley, "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership, Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions," *International Organization*, 58 (2004), 459; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ann M. Florini, ed., *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

3. This framework builds on Geoffrey Pridham, "International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991); Barbara Stallings, "International Influences on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform," in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Whitehead, ed.; Kopstein and Reilly.

4. See Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (April 2002), 51–65.

5. We are undertaking such testing as part of a larger research project on post-cold-war competitive authoritarian regimes.

6. Richard Joseph, "The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa," in Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

7. Nelson and Eglinton.

8. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Kelley; Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

9. Diamond; Carothers; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds.

10. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

11. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds., pp 18–32.

12. Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (April 2002), 30–31.

13. Carothers; Crawford.
14. Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 55–56. The term "electoralism" was coined by Terry Lynn Karl, "Imposing Consent: Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador," in Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–85* (La Jolla: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, 1986).
15. Nelson and Eglinton, p. 35.
16. Thomas Carothers, "The Observers Observed," *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (July 1997), 17–31.
17. Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes"; Levitsky and Way.
18. Kopstein and Reilly; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. David, Jr., "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review*, 2 (Spring 2000), 73–74.
19. Javier Corrales, "Lessons from Latin America," in Leslie David Simon, ed., *Democracy and the Internet: Allies or Adversaries*? (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), pp. 38–39; Ann M. Florini, "Lessons Learned," in Ann M. Florini, ed., *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 221; Kathryn A. Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization*, 47 (Summer 1993), 435–36; Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp, "International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: Conclusion," in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds.; Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, "What the World Needs Now?," in Florini, ed., p. 7.
20. Chris Alden, "From Neglect to 'Virtual Engagement': The United States and Its New Paradigm for Africa," *African Affairs*, 99 (2000), 355.
21. Examples include France's role in Cameroon and Gabon, Russia's role in Armenia and Belarus, and South Africa's role in Zimbabwe.
22. Nelson and Eglinton, p. 20.
23. Crawford, pp. 210–27.
24. Gordon Crawford, "Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency," *Democratization*, 4 (Autumn 1997), 73–80.
25. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
26. This definition builds on Pridham, "International Influences and Democratic Transition"; Whitehead; and Kopstein and Reilly. This conceptualization differs from Rosenau's; he defines linkage as "any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another." James N. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 45.
27. Chetan Kumar, "Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy," in Florini, ed.
28. Jeffrey Herbst, "The United States and Africa: Issues for the Future," in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 165–66.
29. Geoffrey Pridham, "The Politics of the European Community, Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern Europe," in Pridham, ed., *Encouraging Democracy*, pp. 220–25.
30. Philip Mauceri, *State under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 89.
31. Thomas Carothers, "Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia," *Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief*, vol. 1 (2001).
32. See M. Steven Fish and and Andrej Krickovic, "Out of the Brown and into the Blue? The Tentative 'Christian-Democratization' of the Croatian Democratic Union," *East European Constitutional Review*, 12 (Spring-Summer 2003), 104–12.
33. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, 105 (1990), 181.
34. Crawford, pp. 203–4.

35. Maxwell A. Cameron, "Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia," *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (January 1998), 125–39.
36. Keck and Sikkink; Risse and Sikkink.
37. Few authoritarian regimes existed in such countries during the 1990s. Mexico and Taiwan may most closely approximate such conditions.
38. Levitsky and Way.
39. They are Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
40. Benin, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, and Taiwan. All cases scored as democracies are rated "free" by Freedom House in 2004.
41. Cambodia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Russia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
42. Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Haiti, Kenya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, and Zambia. Ukraine, which was competitive authoritarian between 1991 and 2004, is scored as an ambiguous case, as the 2004–5 transition was too recent to score it with any confidence.
43. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992: Uncertain Friendships* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994).
44. Geoffrey Pridham, "The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: The Meciar and Dzurinda Governments Compared," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54 (2002), 206.
45. Ibid., p. 207.
46. Geoffrey Pridham, "Complying with the European Union's Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993–1998," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51 (1999), 1229–30.
47. Karen Henderson, "Slovakia and the Democratic Criteria for EU Accession" in Karen Henderson, ed., *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union* (London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 221–40.
48. Kevin Deegan-Krause, "Accountability and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic" (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2000).
49. Pridham, "Complying with the European Union's Democratic Conditionality," pp. 1229–30.
50. Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "The Impact of EU Political Conditionality," in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, p. 70.
51. Milada Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism* (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 162–72.
52. Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2001).
53. Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 70.
54. Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, p. 75.
55. Miguel Ángel Centeno, *Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 125–26.
56. Denise Dresser, "Treading Lightly and without a Stick: International Actors and the Promotion of Democracy in Mexico," in Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 329.
57. Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, "Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S.-Latin American Drug Policies," in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds., *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 221.

58. Dresser, pp. 320–21.
59. Centeno, p. 240.
60. Dresser, p. 337.
61. Sikkink, p. 432.
62. Ibid., p. 433.
63. Dresser p. 334.
64. Donald E. Schulz and Edward J. Williams, "Crisis or Transformation? The Struggle for the Soul of Mexico," in Donald E. Schulz and Edward J. Williams, eds., *Mexico Faces the 21st Century* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 12.
65. Dresser, p. 332; Todd A. Eisenstadt, "Thinking outside the (Ballot) Box: Mexico's Informal Electoral Institutions," *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45 (Spring 2003), 25–54.
66. Susan Kaufman Purcell, "The Changing Nature of US-Mexican Relations," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 39 (Spring 1997), 150.
67. Chappell H. Lawson, *Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 20.
68. During the early 1990s foreign aid constituted one-third of Zambia's GDP. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 67.
69. In 2001 Zambia had six and eight times fewer televisions per capita than in Mexico and Slovakia, respectively, and in 2002 it had twenty and thirty-three times fewer internet users than Mexico and Slovakia. World Bank, World Development Indicators Online.
70. Richard Joseph, "Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change," *Current History* (May 1992).
71. C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, "The 1996 Zambian Elections: Still Awaiting Democratic Consolidation," *Review of African Political Economy*, 24 (1997), 113–28.
72. Lise Rakner, *Political and Economic Liberalization in Zambia 1991–2001* (Stockholm: Nordic Africa Institute, 2003), pp. 115–16.
73. Ibid., pp. 150, 153, 162.
74. A Lexis Nexis search found that between 1990 and 2000 the number of *New York Times* and CNN stories on the Mexican Zapatista movement was eight times greater than the number of stories on any topic in Zambia.
75. *Africa Confidential*, June 21, 1996.
76. Strobe Talbott, *Russia Hand* (New York: Knopf, 2002).
77. An estimated 80 percent of U.S. assistance to Russia during the 1990s was security-related, whereas 2.3 percent of USAID funding was aimed at the promotion of democracy. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy towards Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 110, 114.
78. In 2002 there were forty-one internet users in Russia per 1,000 population, compared to ninety-eight in Mexico and 160 in Slovakia. World Bank, World Development Indicators Online.
79. Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, eds., *Politicheskii Almanakh Rossii* (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1998); Michael McFaul, *Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).
80. Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Belka Publications, 1994), p. 135.
81. Svante E. Cornell, "International Reactions to Massive Human Rights Violations: The Case of Chechnya," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51 (January 1999), 85–100.
82. Goldgeier and McFaul, ch. 11.
83. See Whitehead, pp. 3, 9; Bratton and van de Walle, p. 30.
84. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics*, 49 (January 1997), 155–83.