

## The Inclusionary Turn in Latin American Democracies

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Diana Kapiszewski is Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University. She studies legal institutions in comparative perspective, and field and qualitative methods, and has authored, coauthored, or coedited five books and multiple articles on these topics. Her first book won the American Political Science Association (APSA) Law and Courts Section's C. Herman Pritchett Award.

Steven Levitsky is David Rockefeller Professor of Latin American Studies and Professor of Government at Harvard University. He studies democratization and authoritarianism, political parties, and weak and informal institutions. He is currently writing a book on the durability of revolutionary regimes. Levitsky is co-author (with Daniel Ziblatt) of *How Democracies Die* (2018), a *New York Times* bestseller published in twenty-two languages.

Deborah J. Yashar is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Editor of *World Politics*. She studies democracy and authoritarianism, citizenship, ethnic politics, violence, and immigration. Her latest book, *Homicidal Ecologies: Illicit Economies and Complicit States in Latin America* (Cambridge, 2018), received the 2019 best book prize from APSA's Comparative Democratization section.



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We dedicate this book to them.

David and Ruth taught us the power and the purpose of big ideas. They taught us the importance of thinking, reasoning, and writing rigorously. They taught us that it is possible – indeed, essential – to combine deep normative commitments with exacting research and analysis. They taught us the value of intellectual generosity and the importance of intellectual friendship. They taught us the meaning of treating students as colleagues. Year after year, generation after generation of students, David and Ruth fostered an intellectual family – a group of people committed to understanding the politics of a region we all love. Thanks to their ongoing commitment to this community, generations of Collier students now form a large network of scholars and friends who continue to write together, look after one another, and enjoy each other's company.

David and Ruth taught us all these things through unending and patient guidance and comments on our work – but more importantly, they taught us these things by example. They deeply inspired us as

teachers, mentors, colleagues, and friends. We think it is fair to say that no one has had as significant an effect on what we do, and how we do it, than have these mentors – and thus this volume bears their intellectual imprint. We believe we speak for all of the volume’s contributors, and for the dozens and dozens of other students whose lives David and Ruth have touched, when we say how fortunate we feel to have landed at Berkeley, to have worked with them, learned with them, laughed with them, and struggled and celebrated beside them.

This volume is a testament to the Colliers’ intellectual impact. Each chapter was written by a scholar who trained with them. That so many of David and Ruth’s students work on issues broadly related to democratic inclusion is no accident: most of us share the belief that, in a region as deeply unequal as Latin America, inclusionary processes are both normatively important and analytically consequential. We are deeply grateful to all who have contributed to this project, and humbled by what we have learned from their work. However, the Berkeley Latin Americanist community stretches far beyond this volume, and its influence is visible in these pages – reflecting many conversations that began in Barrows Hall and continued at universities and conferences far beyond. We extend our deepest gratitude to that broader community for their insight and friendship over the years.

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This volume went to press in a year filled with unexpected and world-changing events. We submitted the manuscript for the volume in late 2019, as protest and contestation were erupting throughout Latin America. Citizens were demanding greater recognition, access, and resources. They were fighting to defend democratic institutions while also demanding greater voice and equity. These struggles were an important reminder that inclusion is not finite or final. It requires ongoing vision, struggle, and vigilance.

By June 2020, when we were copyediting and proofing the manuscript, the world had fundamentally changed. As we go to press, we are now living through a global pandemic, with a devastating and rising death toll, especially for the world's most vulnerable populations. A profound economic crisis is unfolding around the globe, and it is likely to have a significant and enduring impact on Latin America's poor. Global protests, sparked by police violence in the USA, have amplified longstanding demands to address systemic racism and racial injustice. We may be at an inflection point. Yet, domestic policy responses to address these overlapping crises vary greatly, and will likely have divergent consequences for citizens of different countries.

These challenges underscore the underlying need for capable states and inclusionary policies. We hope this volume contributes to our understanding of Latin America's inclusionary turn and the need to defend and deepen it.





# Prologue: Reflections on Two Episodes of Popular Inclusion

## *Structuring and Restructuring Arenas of Participation*

Ruth Berins Collier

### INTRODUCTION

This book seeks to examine new patterns of popular inclusion. The idea of “new” patterns of popular inclusion invites comparisons with older patterns. What follows are some reflections on the macro-historical comparison of the two major episodes of popular – or lower-class – inclusion. The earlier episode, which occurred in the first part of the twentieth century, represented the advent of mass participation and was targeted at the formal working class. Indeed, the first inclusion created the formal working class with the passage of a labor code that legalized labor organizations, thereby separating out and privileging a segment of the popular sectors. The first inclusion was analyzed in *Shaping the Political Arena* (SPA) as labor incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991). The second inclusion is the recent episode, which is the focus of this volume and which I, with colleagues, began to explore in *Reorganizing Popular Politics* (Collier and Handlin 2009). In this essay I offer some reflections on this comparison, unabashedly drawing on my work.

On the one hand, one can view the first inclusion as “unfinished” or “incomplete” in that it was not all-inclusive but rather left some groups out. Whereas the first inclusion created and targeted the formal working class, the second extended recognition, political relevance, organization, policy attention, and rights to additional groups, particularly informal workers, peasants, and indigenous groups. On the other hand, the second inclusion should not be seen as “additive,” completing the unfinished business of the first. Rather it involved substantial changes in the structures of inclusion. Specifically, these inclusionary episodes initially structured and then restructured two arenas of participation: the

party-electoral arena and the interest arena. These remarks will focus on those two arenas.

The party-electoral arena is the site where recruitment to democratic government is contested. This arena is one of formal institutions in which political parties serve as the primary structures of representation of individual citizens. However party–organization linkage makes this arena a site also for collective representation and access to policymaking. The popular interest arena, that is, the interest arena for popular sector participation is the site of both state-targeted claim making (such as lobbying and protesting) and society-oriented problem-solving (through collective projects or negotiation with private actors, such as collective bargaining). It is the arena in which organizations represent citizens, although citizens can also act individually.

In this essay I compare the two episodes of inclusion by focusing on the economically most advanced countries of Latin America. I begin by situating these inclusionary episodes in world historical time – emphasizing that these were periods of momentous transition in the international economy, class formation, ideologies, patterns of organizing, and state restructuring. These factors had an impact on the structures of representation, specifically on the structures of the two political arenas of participation, on which I focus this essay.

I look at the way the initial incorporation founded and structured these two arenas and then raise some considerations and questions for analyzing the way these arenas are being restructured in the contemporary period. For each inclusionary episode, I consider four features of the nature of popular participation across the two arenas: (1) the form of popular organizations, (2) problems of collective action, (3) salient cleavages and issues, and (4) the nature of access to policymaking.

These comparative reflections highlight the fundamental changes and restructuring that the second inclusion represents – a move from popular sector participation structured around unions, corporatism, and productionist economic issues to a structure of participation that is more fragmented and pluralist, with multiple cleavages and a set of issues that now include a range of identity-based rights and consumption-based demands. An important question is the degree to which the changing structures of participation have effectively demobilized the popular sectors on important macro- and microeconomic issues, which remain salient in the politics of the elite. These are important areas of policymaking, with consequential economic, distributional, and political consequences. I conclude by engaging with the editors' paradox of participation as a means to reflect

on the ongoing limitations on popular representation despite the gains achieved by the second inclusion.

## THE FIRST INCLUSION: THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

### **World Historical Context: Industrialism and Its Political Implications**

The inclusionary episodes were shaped by the world historic time in which they occurred. A number of features characterize those distinct eras, particularly the nature of the world economy, the “invention” and diffusion of organizational forms, the changing nature of the state, and domestic social structure.<sup>1</sup>

The first inclusion occurred in the first part of the twentieth century at a time of economic industrialism, social class formation, and political innovation. With industrialization came the emergence of a proletarian working class, which asserted new claims along with cycles of protest and frames of political action based in socialist ideology. The period witnessed the transition to mass politics through the innovation of unions and of the mass party to which unions became affiliated as a core base of party support. Though spearheaded in Europe, these innovations developed counterparts in Latin America. The first inclusion was thus part of a much larger socioeconomic-political transition, also involving the transition to a new type of more interventionist state.

The period of economic growth starting in the last decades of the nineteenth century brought change in Latin American social structure. We can think of this change, in stylized form, as a shift from a two-class to a four-class social structure. Hitherto, social structure consisted primarily of an upper class of landlords, who held political power in the “oligarchic state,” and a popular class of peasants. With economic growth came the emergence of two new “classes” in the urban and export economy: an upper strata of “middle sectors,” who were owners, managers, and professionals and who challenged the dominance of the landed oligarchy, and a class of employed workers. As the new emerging classes had been excluded from the oligarchic state, both made new claims for power.

The political response to these claims came when political representatives of the middle sectors managed to come to power and oversaw labor incorporation. The new middle-sector governments introduced the

<sup>1</sup> Cameron (this volume) also discusses world historical time and its implications for different episodes of inclusion.

modern reformed state. The “new state,” as it was literally called in the case of Brazil, took on new responsibilities and interventions in the economy to develop the new and growing economic sectors. However, it also took on a new more interventionist role toward society. Particularly important for present purposes is the policy toward the often radical working classes, who had been influenced by anarchist and communist movements in Europe. The new governments saw the working class from two perspectives. On the one hand, they all sought to control the activism and demands of the working class. On the other, some of the new governments also sought to mobilize its political support in an ongoing political struggle against the rural elite. The result of combinations of these two goals was the policy of labor incorporation and the structuring of both the party and interest arenas to accomplish it.

### Shaping the Political Arena: Unions and Labor-Based Parties in the First Inclusion

*Shaping the Political Arena* analyzed labor incorporation as a corporatist form of inclusion that introduced mass politics and was based on the participation and representation of the working class through legalized and formally recognized unions. The politics of labor incorporation founded the two political arenas of popular participation, and “shaped” those arenas by creating structures in each that were sticky and would endure (see also Collier and Chambers-Ju 2012).

*Popular Interest Arena.* In legalizing and even sponsoring unions, the state structured an interest regime of popular sector organizations that privileged unions as the predominant organizations of lower-class interest intermediation (Collier and Handlin 2009). When they arrived in power, one of the very first actions of governments that oversaw the first inclusion was the promulgation of new labor laws that officially recognized unions as legal organizations of workers, and thereby as legitimate political actors. This recognition was the common feature of the first inclusion across all cases. Other popular organizations of various types existed, such as neighborhood associations, but these were politically weak compared to state-recognized unions, which were legally granted a number of rights of representation. In particular, labor law established an industrial relations system and granted unions the right to bargain collectively and represent workers vis-à-vis employers, although in doing this the state shaped and limited the nature of their representation to different degrees, which ranged from little state structuring in Uruguay to highly structured

and constrained unions in Brazil and Chile (Collier and Collier 1979). Unions also represented workers vis-à-vis the state in advocating policies affecting workers, including broad economic policy.

*Party-Electoral Arena.* The first inclusion also structured the party-electoral arena. It did not so much affect suffrage extension, which followed a different political dynamic, but it did shape the nature of the party system. Specifically, it had three important consequences for the type of party system: (1) it affected the effective number of parties, (2) it determined the partisan affiliation of unions and workers, and (3) it thereby also affected the position of unions as allied to either the government or the opposition. These outcomes shaped the nature of workers' representation in the party-electoral arena.

The critical juncture of labor incorporation was the historical moment in which populist parties were founded (notably in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). They were founded by political leaders who sought to mobilize support and who in most cases held power. Thus, where this mobilizational strategy was followed, the incorporating government oversaw the affiliation of the working class to the new populist party through the newly legalized unions. Furthermore, the populist party became the largest party in a party system that crystallized around a small number of one or two predominant parties. Through the populist party, the working class generally became part of a multiclass coalition. It was often subordinated within the party but nevertheless achieved some degree of representation and political influence through its attachment to the governing party and through its mobilizational capacity in electoral campaigns, voter turnout, and demonstrations for the party. This political position afforded unions access to policymaking; however, again to different degrees, their autonomy was compromised, often through leadership co-optation as well as more coercive forms of state intervention. A variant was seen in Colombia and Uruguay, where a traditional party of the nineteenth century, rather than a new populist party, undertook labor incorporation and appealed to working-class voters.

In other cases, where the incorporation period was not part of a strategy of political mobilization (mostly notably in Brazil and Chile among the cases analyzed in SPA), the working class and unions were not mobilized from above. Instead they "were left" to become affiliated to more classist parties, which were small but which grew in strength with industrialization. Without the formation of a large multiclass populist party, a more fractionalized, multiparty system developed, with a more classist, polarizing political dynamic. These classist union-affiliated

parties represented workers as a minority party in the opposition. If these parties eventually gained enough electoral strength to govern, they were overturned through military interventions.

*Features of Popular Participation.* The politics of labor incorporation in the first inclusion was thus the political founding moment in which both arenas of participation were structured: a union-predominant interest regime and a union-affiliated party system. Workers were recognized as legitimate political actors, and their interests were intermediated through unions in both arenas. Unions acted in the interest arena vis-à-vis both employers and state, and they were important organizations in establishing the partisanship of workers and representing them in the party-electoral arena. Four features of popular participation across the two arenas may be highlighted: the types of organizations that predominated among the popular sectors (unions), their repertoires of collective action, the issues they took up, and their access to policymaking.

*Types of Organizations.* Unions are particular kinds of organizations with a number of advantages over other kinds of organizations. They have both members and dues, and thus important and stable personnel and monetary resources. Further, organization is centered in the workplace, where workers have face-to-face interactions, common conditions, and a shared target of grievances in the form of a common employer. At the same time, unions are hierarchically ordered and scale up to form peak organizations of national confederations. These features have facilitated collective action both among individuals within a union and across unions.

*Collective Action.* With these organizational advantages, unions have typically been able to engage in a wide repertoire of action. Their regular funding and a relatively permanent membership allow them to undertake many types of collective action, including costly strikes with the sanctioning power of shutting down productive activities, petitioning, lobbying, protesting, and, given their organic linkages to political parties, electoral campaigning. They can thus engage in collective action at all levels, from the firm to the national level, since they share many common interests concerning economic policy and where peak associations could coordinate collective action across locals.

*Cleavages and Issues.* The primary cleavage in the industrial era was a class cleavage, and economic issues were predominant. The primacy of this cleavage can be seen in the way political scientists typically modeled a single left–right, economic issue dimension. This model is consistent with the predominance of unions among popular sector organizations, and the

construction of citizens primarily in their productive capacity. It is reflected in the class labels analysts adopted for components of the popular sectors as formal workers, informal workers, or peasants. Unions emerged with a common framing around workers engaged in class struggle. Even when both class identity and the original notion of struggle or conflict are attenuated, unions act in opposition to employers. Their orientation is toward materialist issues, specifically productionist issues. That is, they are primarily focused on materialist gains at the point of production – vis-à-vis both employers in the workplace and public policies concerning wages and the benefits (such as pensions and health care) that accompany employment. They have also advocated positions on economic policy more generally because of its impact on workers, especially real wages, employment levels, and spending. They are thus centrally oriented toward both micro- and macroeconomic issues. Unions provided formal sector workers with a voice on the major issues of economic policy and distribution, although, again, with different degrees of effectiveness, given their varying levels of influence and autonomy.

*Access.* With the first inclusion, unions achieved policymaking access in both the interest and party-electoral arena. Further, union access or participation in policymaking was formally or informally institutionalized in both arenas. In the interest arena it occurred through corporatist structures defined in labor law that gave unions representational rights in mandated collective bargaining. In the electoral arena access occurred through the organic ties unions had with a political party, whether populist or classist. Unions delivered votes to candidates in exchange for some, though varying, influence in the party and sometimes for recruitment of unionists as party candidates or to appointed positions in the government. Access, of course, is voice and does not necessarily translate into influence. The downside of these arrangements has been well documented. In the interest arena, corporatist structures were often mechanisms of co-optation and control. In the party-electoral arena, populist parties often moved to subordinate unions within the party structure; and classist parties had limited influence because they typically did not govern and were also presented with the usual issue of balancing the interests of their core worker constituency vs. their power-political/electoral goals. Thus, these structures in both the party and interest arena must be seen as double-edged: they afforded some degree of access and voice as well as control or co-optation. The balance varied across countries and time.

## THE SECOND INCLUSION: THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

**World Historical Context: Postindustrialism and Its Legacies**

If the early twentieth century can be characterized as one of industrialism, the late twentieth century in some ways can be characterized as postindustrialism. The terms are both evocative of important trends and misleading. They are misleading as global trends, of course, because only a part of the world industrialized in the early twentieth century, just as only a part can be said to be “postindustrial” in the current period. Nevertheless, those trends, which characterize the most economically advanced countries, gave rise to phenomena that either diffused to Latin America or had a significant impact on the region by changing the global socioeconomic pattern to which countries in the region had to adjust. It is in this sense that the label may be appropriate as a characterization of the historical period. Just as “ideologies,” or frames of action, and organizational forms, for instance, diffused from the economically advanced countries to Latin America in the early twentieth century, so did they also at the end of the century. Similarly, just as industrialization in Europe stimulated the export of primary products in Latin America and, in turn, incipient industrialization in the region, so did the reorganization of capital and economic opening in the advanced countries at the end of the century affect economies and policy throughout the world. At the same time, of course, many important trends late in the century occurred according to an internal dynamic in Latin American countries. One might point to four shifts, which occurred on both international and domestic levels.

The first change in Latin America was in social structure. If the early twentieth century saw a transition from a two-class to a four-class structure, by the end of the twentieth century social structure had become, through slow and incremental change, more complex and fragmented. The process of white collarization that has been widely noted in the advanced economies also occurred in Latin America. A heterogeneous “middle class” – as distinct from the “middle sectors” as urban business interests that had challenged the hegemony of landed interests – emerged and increased substantially with economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century. Similarly, and during the same period, the informal sector grew in size and in many countries has overtaken proletarian employees as components of the now more heterogeneous working



classes. The greater array of groups in this more fragmented class structure has less cohesion and has been less able to construct a common set of interests. These changes have had an impact on the pluralization of groups and interests that were newly included, the kinds of organizations through which they make claims, and way the two political arenas were restructured.

The second change is the globalization of the economy. Again, this change has both domestic and international aspects. Internationally, the global economy changed starting in the 1970s, with the end of certain Bretton Woods institutions like fixed exchange rates and the inability of the US economy to continue to support the postwar international arrangements. The response was a more globally integrated international economy, including trade, finance, investment, and a new international division of labor and location of production, as well as a change in the economic models away from state intervention and Keynesian demand-side models toward privatization and deregulation (or reregulation).

In Latin America, economic change responded to the incentives provided by the restructured global economy as well as to the more coercive or punitive constraints of the debt crisis and IMF conditionality that followed it in the 1980s. Change in Latin America was also seen as a response to the “exhaustion” of the easy phase of import substitution industrialization (ISI; O’Donnell 1973), which ran into problems of inflation and uneven growth. The result was a new economic model oriented to trade opening, widespread privatization, and the marketizing reforms of neoliberalism. This change has, perhaps, received the greatest attention, and Roberts (2014) has suggested that neoliberalism constitutes a new critical juncture in Latin American politics. The new models were more dependent on and sensitive to international finance and investment. Whereas the logic of ISI was compatible with class compromise, since labor represented both a cost and also a market for local production, the new model was more zero-sum given a globalized economy with foreign markets for domestic production, international competition, and export emphasis: labor became more uniformly viewed in a more one-sided way as only a cost to capital. The economic change led to a decline in union density, weakened unions vis-à-vis capital, and challenged their position as core constituencies of political parties.

Importantly, the change in economic model meant a change in the role of the state. Economically, the new role involved withdrawal from state industrial ownership (and employment in those sectors), subsidies, and promotion. The new, more market-oriented economic model produced a

shift in the weight of the union movement from the weakened industrial sector to the public sector. It also implied a market-friendly approach to social policy (favoring policies targeting the poor and labor flexibility rather than the market “rigidities” that stem from union power), and to some extent outsourcing social policy implementation to societal organizations. In this context, popular sector organizing and demand-making reflected this new approach to welfare and consumptionist, rather than productionist issues.

A third change, emphasized by the editors, is in the political regime. The domestic dynamic was the democratic transitions that brought an end to the military regimes characteristic of the region from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Internationally, the end of the Soviet Union signaled the hegemony and relative stability of electoral democracy, a development that eased the earlier tendency toward polarization rooted in the opposition between economic elites and the anti-capitalist or even reformist positions advocated on the Left. These developments opened space for popular participation and underlay the move in many countries to new types of participatory structures, openness to popular demands, and even the willingness to tolerate governments of the Left. The hegemony of international norms concerning both markets and democracy also led to an emphasis on issues of governance and anticorruption, to some extent replacing the left–right economic issues that had been salient in the previous historical epoch.

A fourth change is the emergence and growth of new types of interest organizations beyond labor unions. The change can be analyzed in two phases. The first began in the 1960s in the advanced economies, when social movement organizations (SMOs) were formed around quite a different set of noneconomic, “postmaterialist” issues related to rights and risks. These rights issues concerned civil rights; human rights; women’s rights; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) rights; disability rights; animal rights; and so forth. Prominent among the risks were nuclear and environmental risks. As with the earlier diffusion of labor unions, these rights and risk organizations also diffused to Latin America. But perhaps the most important of these social movements in the region were specific to the Latin American agenda: those concerned with human rights, democratic regime transitions, and indigenous rights.

A second phase in the transformation of popular organizations started in the 1980s, when the major economic transitions of liberalization and globalization began. In Latin America, especially with the debt crisis and the so-called lost decade of no growth in the 1980s, the result was the

appearance of many kinds of materialist subsistence organizations in lower-class neighborhoods – such as communal kitchens and associations concerned with food distribution, neighborhood infrastructure, or development projects. Even beyond the immediate response to crisis, Latin America, like many world regions, saw a proliferation of new organizations. This international upsurge in organizing was consistent with market liberalizing orientations on the Right as well as with notions of deepening democracy on the Left. An orientation toward “civil society” – corresponding to a preoccupation with non-state actors on both the Right and the Left – was widely adopted, and such organizing was advanced by activists as well as international financial institutions. Civil society organizations (CSOs) proliferated widely – from professionalized NGOs, acting both domestically and internationally, to grassroots community organizations. These were more oriented toward providing or delivering services, such as health, education or information, and security.

### **Reshaping the Political Arena: Pluralization and Fragmentation of Interests, Organizations, and Parties**

With these changes the second inclusion took a very different form relative to the first inclusion. It was not merely additive, in that additional popular sector groups – those left out of the first inclusion – were included. Rather, both the interest and party-electoral arenas were restructured. Primarily, the changes involved the inclusion of new groups under terms quite different from the corporatist structures that characterized the first inclusion. At the same time, some alteration of union corporatism also occurred. Thus, the major changes had to do with a pluralization of organizations, interests, and identities; a changing relationship between organizations and the state; and changes in linkages between popular organizations and political parties, which generally became looser and more instrumental. With this pluralization and fragmentation, the pattern of inclusion has become lumpy, or segmented (Etchemendy and Collier 2007; Silva 2017, 313), with many structures of inclusion coexisting.

**Popular Interest Arena.** The most obvious change is a pluralization of organizations and issues in the interest arena. Unions are no longer the predominant organizations for the popular classes, as a great variety of other kinds of groups have been organized around differently framed interests. The pluralization of organizations with different kinds of interests and demands has presented political leaders with alternative – even

competing – sources of allies and support constituencies. Etchemendy (this volume) and Schipani (2019) have analyzed the ways in which different kinds of coalitions can be constructed on the Left, and pluralization has given presidents more room for maneuver not only in constructing coalitions but also in playing one group against another.

As for the union sector itself, in some countries the benefits of unionization have been extended to new groups: for instance, in some countries domestic and rural workers have been included and new union rights have been granted to some previously excluded categories of workers, such as some civil servants. In general, however, unions have been weakened in most countries, as changes in economic policy led to a decline in union encompassingness in the private sector and to an economic model that no longer supports a class compromise to the same extent. Within this general pattern of weakening, there is some variation, with some strength still evident in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent certain sectors in Brazil and Mexico. Across the region, the labor movement has come to be centered in the public rather than the private sector, with teachers emerging as the largest organized group in Latin America (Cook 1996; Chambers-Ju 2017). In many countries the formation of rival national confederations has meant greater organizational fragmentation. At the same time, some of the newer confederations are potentially more oriented toward the formation of alliances with the new types of organizations that have proliferated in the popular interest arena. Further, in a few cases the inherited corporatist patterns have shifted in favor of unions vis-à-vis the state, with the loosening of state control in several countries, a particularly interesting pattern of neo-corporatism in Uruguay and Argentina (Etchemendy and Collier 2007, Etchemendy 2019).

The relationships between the state and the new organizations remains an important area for research. These relationships do not replicate the corporatist structures of the first inclusion, or even the more recently altered state–union structures. In some cases the newer organizations have been state-supported, and many deliver state social programs. While these arrangements create some dependency on the state and therefore also a potential threat to their autonomy, in general there is no legal framework analogous to the labor code to constrain their structure, operation, and activities.

The result is a shift to an interest regime that is more pluralistic and fragmented in terms of interests and issues and types of “base

organizations” with different capacities for collective action and scaling, as well as different repertoires of actions.<sup>2</sup>

**Party-Electoral Arena.** The change in the party-electoral arena has also been quite dramatic, with change in both the parties themselves and the nature of linkages to organizations.<sup>3</sup>

The disruption of party systems in Latin America has been quite astounding. Although many “traditional” parties – those that had dominated the party system since the first incorporation – survived the military repression of the 1960–1980s, they fared less well in subsequent years. Increased electoral volatility, challenges to traditional parties, and the entry of new parties have become common themes in many world regions, even in well-institutionalized party systems, such as those in Western Europe. However, the trend started earlier in Latin America as a reaction to the austerity and neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s, even though some of the anti-party, so-called neo-populist presidents of the 1990s (Collor and Fujimori) failed to alleviate the economic crisis or themselves pursued economic adjustment policies. By 2007, Lupu (2014, 561) reports, a quarter of the region’s traditional parties had broken down.

A continual process of new party formation has accompanied the breakdown of traditional parties. New parties gained significant support in all of the countries included in SPA except Uruguay.<sup>4</sup> Since the 1980s, new parties – that is, new relative to entry in *any prior* election (not relative to “traditional” parties) – won at least 20 percent of the vote in three presidential elections in Argentina, two in Chile, five in Colombia (with two new parties in one of those elections), two in Mexico, four in Peru (with two new parties in one election), and three in Venezuela (again, with two new parties in one election).<sup>5</sup>

It should be noted that in these calculations, I used a definition of “new” that vastly understates the degree of new party formation. It excludes name changes, which are often indicative of some degree of organizational turmoil, and it includes as “new” only a party that passes

<sup>2</sup> See Collier and Handlin (2009) chap. 3, where the restructured interest regime was conceptualized as a shift from the Union Party Hub (UP Hub), where hierarchically organized, party affiliated unions predominated, to the Associational Network (A Net).

<sup>3</sup> See Pop Eleches, Dunning and Novaes, Handlin, Palmer Rubin, and Boas (this volume) for a discussion of parties and party linkages in the current period.

<sup>4</sup> For present purposes, I consider the Frente Amplio, founded in the 1970s before the military regime, a traditional party.

<sup>5</sup> I am grateful to Scott Mainwaring for sharing his electoral data.

the 20 percent threshold the *first* time it presents *any* candidate. That is, it excludes a party that presented a candidate for some other office in a prior election and/or one that in a previous election won a small percent of the vote. With this definition in mind, it is noteworthy that presidential candidates of new parties were successful three times in Peru, twice in Colombia and Venezuela, and once in Mexico. Though technically excluded from this measure of new parties, to this tally could be added the Social Liberal Party of Bolsonaro, who won in Brazil as a candidate of a party that was formed in 1994 but received less than 1 percent of the vote in the prior legislative and the one presidential election in which it ran.

Mainwaring (2018) suggests that party fluidity is associated with negative outcomes such as shorter time horizons and accountability. Further research should elaborate the implications – for individual participation, for the stability of a party’s core support base, and for organizational politics – of party fluidity and its effects on the nature of representation. Two features of Latin America’s new party systems are important for the nature of popular inclusion: party linkages and the governing potential of those parties to which popular organizations have links. Needless to say, these linkages have changed dramatically. After the first incorporation, labor unions were essentially the only popular sector organizations that had linkages to parties, with the notable exceptions of party linkages of peasant unions in Mexico, Venezuela, and Bolivia. These were organic linkages to two types of labor-based parties, either populist parties or classist parties. With the second inclusion, this scenario has changed substantially. The organic linkages between unions and populist parties have generally loosened. This distancing has occurred even in Argentina, where the new linkage pattern of the CGT has been characterized as neo-corporatist (Etchemendy and Collier 2007), and in Mexico, where the CTM developed more instrumental linkages with the PRI once the party lost the presidency (De la Garza 2006). Nevertheless, substantial variation of party–union linkages exists, as laid out by Etchemendy (this volume). They range from particularly close ties in Uruguay to distant ties in Chile, often oppositional in Ecuador, and having substantial state-sponsorship and mobilization from above in Venezuela. In addition, some degree of fragmentation of peak labor confederations has occurred as new or dissident labor confederations have gained in strength in many countries and have often divided the partisan support of the union sector or aspired to avoid party linkages.

The proliferating types of newer popular sector organizations also have diverse types of linkages to a variety of parties. Most do not replicate the earlier organic linkages of unions, but instead have links that are contingent, instrumental, and strategic, or they have no links at all. Some support party-electoral candidates. Some primarily deliver services, often through government programs, a situation that facilitates a dependency on the government with potential implications for political action and representation (Collier and Handlin 2009, Palmer-Rubin 2019). However, a few associations have developed significant party linkages. In his chapter, Etchemendy points to various associations of urban informal workers in Argentina, community associations in Venezuela, and both urban and rural associations in Bolivia and Brazil (see also Schipani 2019).

These changes suggest a rich research agenda. What kinds of linkage strategies are pursued by different types of organizations, and what are the implications for political representation? To what extent are parties that appeal to the different types of popular sector constituencies “niche” parties in a fractionalized system and to what extent are they mass parties with majoritarian potential? What are the implications for organizational autonomy or dependence and for popular representation of newer types of linkages – for more strategic and shifting organizational support by organizations and for the increasing ability of candidates to cyber-connect with voters directly? These are the kinds of questions that were important for understanding the position of the formal working class in the first inclusion. They arise again in the second inclusion, not only for the newly included groups, but also for unions, for which these questions are being posed anew in the restructured party-electoral arena. In exploring these questions, it is interesting to keep in mind the suggestion of Mair (2013) that the representative function of parties may be in decline.

**Features of Popular Participation.** The lumpy or segmented structuration of the arenas of participation can in part be viewed in terms of multiple combinations of different (1) interests, (2) organizational types with different relations to both the state and popular sector constituencies, (3) access, and (4) repertoires of collective action.

*Types of Organizations.* As mentioned above, popular sector organizations have proliferated, and unions are no longer the predominant type of organization. Our survey of popular sector individuals in four Latin American capitals in 2002–2003 indicates that a large percentage has participated to some degree in the new associations that can be considered problem-solving (those that make demands on the state or may engage in

collective self-help activities, sometimes with government support), ranging from the lowest at about a quarter and up to two thirds of those surveyed (Collier and Handlin 2009, 79). These associations are very different organizational types compared to unions. Popular sector associations take a variety of organizational forms. Some are organizations of the popular sectors; others act on their behalf. Grassroots associations have participants rather than members, and participation may be irregular, episodic, or temporary. NGOs are staff-centered and may involve popular sector constituents as beneficiaries or perhaps followers rather than “participants.” Funding of both types is sought externally, rather than internally through dues; it is less reliable and gives the association an external constituency, in addition to one based in those it seeks to serve. Associations tend to be more horizontally interrelated in a network.

*Collective Action.* The organizational features of popular associations have implications for the capacity for collective action. On the one hand, organizational traits of popular associations, compared to unions, would suggest that they confront greater problems of collective action. They can't rely on a stable membership or funding to support collective action. Because they are interrelated through networks, they do not have the same degree of coordinating and scaling capacity of the peak associations formed by unions (Collier and Handlin 2009, chap. 3). A typical problem, particularly of neighborhood associations, is that they make local distributive demands that make it hard to coordinate because, in a sense, they compete for resources. On the other hand, in earlier work we found that not only demand-making activities but also protest is a perhaps surprisingly common activity, even for those associations that provide distributions from state programs or receive state funding (Kapiszewski 2009, chap. 6). Patterns of collective action vary substantially across different types of associations and different countries, and further research on this topic is needed.

Occasionally, some impressive, large-scale protests have been mounted and coordinated across cities and types of organizations. Often, unions have played a prominent role in these. Many have been in reaction to shocks – particularly neoliberal policies, often price hikes, or “IMF riots” – or, more recently, to particular events (like the World Cup in Brazil) or scandals. Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil are notable for the high mobilizational capacity of popular sector groups, often involving coordination of both unions and other types of popular sector associations. In addition to these reactive mobilizations, Brazilian associations have engaged in proactive mobilization around quite different issues,



particularly at the time of the constitutional assembly, in an effort to establish formal provisions for social and institutional components of inclusion.

Also in need of further study is the role of online, cyber-coordinated collective action. Assessments have been divided, but relatively little systematic research on this topic exists. Social media may be effective tools for activities such as protesting, signing petitions, and fundraising, but they also may undermine organization by circumventing it. No doubt, these cyber-recruited demonstrations vary in the role of organizations. When organizations play a substantial role, the advantage of social media is to diffuse the protest beyond the organized constituency. In cases where organizations play a lesser role, there may be a trade-off, in which the very ease of coordinating individuals remotely, online, by sidestepping the need for organization in the initial stages, may lead to a politics of protest with little follow-up or capacity for engaging in a subsequent and sustained policymaking process.

Social media seem occasionally effective in convoking large numbers in *opposition* to often diffusely framed targets, such as, the system, the regime, leaders, and corruption. Large protests, augmented and intensified by social media, can even bring down governments, as they have in Bolivia, and massive demonstrations may have played a role in bringing down Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. These movements have at least raised some materialist issues of inequality, jobs, and economic regulation. They have also opposed specific policies, such as price increases and pension reform in Brazil. At the same time, they are an infrequent tool and we know little about the conditions of their convocatory success. In nearly all cases they are episodic and then disappear.

*Access.* As noted in the introductory chapter of this volume, some states have expanded formal access in the party-electoral arena by extending the suffrage or making it more effective. Similarly, a greater array of parties, particularly those on the Left, have been legalized and even allowed to win and retain the presidency for the first time in Latin American history. In addition to the individual vote, is the question of the access to policymaking afforded by party–organization linkages. The new panorama of popular sector associations with diverse party linkages have implications for the type of access to the policy process. What kinds of linkages grant policymaking influence and under what conditions do linkages lead to subordination? And to what extent do parties provide access to making venues for different kinds of popular sector interests and types of organizations? In his chapter, Palmer-Rubin offers a nice

typology of the new kinds of linkages and the quite different types of access they afford (see also Garay 2009, Poertner 2018). It would also be interesting to explore the variation that occurs across types of constituencies and issues; types of political parties; and types of party systems.

Access in the interest arena has also changed. Union rights that were abrogated under the military or under emergency powers of governments undertaking economic reform, have generally been restored. However, the effectiveness of this institutionalized access in the form of the right of collective bargaining has weakened with the change in economic model from ISI to neoliberalism and with economic cycles. In addition, there have been attempts to change the labor law in a negative way for union power. Despite these attempts, in most cases relatively little has happened in terms of retreats on collective rights, although adverse regulations promoting worker flexibility have been broadly adopted. It was widely recognized that the structures of the first inclusion could not only provide access but also control and subordinate unions. Nevertheless, the value of this access became more appreciated when it was abridged or weakened in the period of economic reform. Even the left governments of the 2000s displayed substantial variation in whether or not they empowered unions or even addressed their material demands (Schipani 2019).

Channels of access of the new associations can take a variety of forms. In his chapter in this volume, Etchemendy analyzes the more traditional type of access achieved – or granted – through appointments of both union and association leaders to ministerial or other key positions, as does Schipani (2019). The new innovation in access for the new associations has been participatory policy councils, which institutionalize the participation of popular organizations. These have been widely initiated but have proved to be only rarely effective. They seem most effective in Brazil and in certain policy areas, particularly local budgeting, “recognition policies,” oversight functions, and distributive policy areas rather than in redistributive or regulatory areas (see Goldfrank, this volume, Mayka and Rich, this volume, and Mayka 2019). Another interesting type of access is “state-sponsored activism” (Rich 2019), that is, access that may be advanced by actors in the state bureaucracy attempting to implement policy in a particular area. Both of these types of access deserve further study across countries, across types of constituencies, and also across policy areas, since these vary according to how costly they are both economically and politically – how zero-sum they are and the extent to which they generate opposition. Participatory budgeting, for instance, may be the “easiest” case, since it involves divvying up a given pot of

funding for one-shot distributive goods, a pattern in which losers in one round can be winners in the next.

*Cleavages and Issues.* There is no longer a dominant cleavage that is salient in the interest arena, which is now characterized by multiple, at least partly cross-cutting cleavages, identities, and issues. Nevertheless, parties continue to be arrayed broadly on a right–left economic dimension, reflecting the ongoing importance of materialist issues. Indeed the subject of this volume is the “popular sectors,” a category of marginalization that the editors have defined in economic terms (see introductory chapter). It does not, for instance, include identity or rights groups (such as LGBT or feminist groups) *unless* they are also materially marginalized, as is the case for indigenous groups. To a substantial extent, then, the new popular sector organizations have tended to frame issues in two ways: as rights-based issues and as materialist issues that are largely consumptionist rather than productionist.

Issues related to identity and rights have become one of the hallmarks of the second inclusion, as is emphasized in the introductory chapter. Among the popular sectors, issues of indigenous rights have been the most prominent of these in several countries (Yashar 2005). These are multifaceted claims that include, *inter alia*, official cultural recognition, claims for political autonomy and representation, and bilingual education.

Unlike unions, the new popular sector associations tend to present materialist demands as consumptionist issues, that is, those having to do with programs that distribute income or in-kind services, such as health and education. Occasionally, they are expressed in a larger frame of inequality and have been presented most dramatically around specific events, such as price hikes or “moments” that have framed inequality in sharp relief. An example of the latter was the mobilization against the 2014 World Cup preparations in Brazil and the extravagant spending for projects that favored elite interests and rode roughshod over those of the poor. Although some Latin American countries made some headway against inequality, which had risen during neoliberal reform, it is a salient issue in countries throughout the world, and its importance cannot be underestimated. The key question is how this more macro framing can be presented politically in Latin America given the changing structure of the two arenas of participation.

More typically, consumptionist demands come in a more disaggregated form. Most of the new popular sector associations do not organize around inequality as such but around more specific demands. Organizations present policy-specific distributive claims, whether they

are disaggregated neighborhood claims, or health, nutrition, education, and so on. Their distributive, rather than redistributive and zero-sum nature, is a political advantage, as such demands are generally compatible with orientations on both the both Left and the Right. Indeed, consumptionist programs, most prominently conditional cash transfers (CCTs), have been introduced by governments of both the Right and the Left (see Hunter, this volume; Garay, this volume).

An important question is the degree to which productionist issues have been demobilized for the popular sectors. They continue to be important issues at both the microlevel of the workplace and the macro-level of economic policy. Unions, of course, continue to mobilize around productionist issues at both levels. But in most countries unions are weaker than they used to be. Peasant organizations have also traditionally made productionist claims and continue to do so (see Palmer-Rubin 2019), but, like unions, they have often suffered under economic reform, as land policies have often atomized peasants and marketization has to some extent removed the state as an object of policy claims (Snyder 2001; Kurtz 2004).

A few types of organizations that are part of the second inclusion have also made productionist claims. In the rural sector, examples include, perhaps most prominently: the MST in Brazil; the cocaleros in the CSUTCB in Bolivia; and the colonizer peasants also in Bolivia. In addition, the demands of indigenous organizations typically include the productionist claims of property rights and control of land. In the urban economy too some groups have made productionist demands. For example, street vendors have associations in many countries, though those organizations tend to be very local, even street-based, but sometimes scale to the city level. Argentina has perhaps seen the most active pattern of productionist demand-making. Most active have been the *piqueteros*, who, along with other groups of informal workers such as the *cartoneros*, or recyclers, have formed the CTEP. Another interesting development in Argentina is the formation of worker cooperatives.

The politics of materialist issues, which continue to be critical, remain a key issue for research. There is an important asymmetry in productionist issues: they constitute the main interests and demands of the elite and capitalist classes, who pursued market reforms and have emerged from them in a stronger position, while the power of workers has been weakened. The popular sectors were always at a disadvantage in productionist issues; but, even relative to the first inclusion, it is worth asking to

what extent they have been demobilized on these critical issues, which affect their life conditions: income and work conditions, as well as national economic policy that affect them as workers. Other types of issues are certainly important, and consumptionist issues have certainly been a crucial approach to materialist demands, especially for the informal sectors. Nevertheless, the engagement and input of the popular sectors on economic issues remains important.

#### CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: THE PARADOX OF PARTICIPATION

In these reflections comparing the two inclusions, I have taken a somewhat different perspective from that of the editors in the introductory chapter, which focuses on state policies that provide rights, resources, and access to the popular sectors. Instead of state policy, I have focused on the changing infrastructure of participation available to the popular sectors for presenting claims. This emphasis on the structures of participation highlights the paradox of participation discussed by the editors: the expanded structures for participation that have been introduced in the second inclusion may not in fact increase the relative political weight of the popular sectors. Future research should elucidate three issues the editors raise in connection with this paradox of participation: class bias in institutional participation, the role of protest, and the problem of autonomy.

First, it is important to push further the idea that even as popular sector participation has increased in the second inclusion in terms both of who participates and the types of demands made, class bias in participatory behavior may not increase the relative weight or influence of the popular sectors. Class disparity in resources certainly affects the rate of participation to the disadvantage of the popular sectors. The resources are material (money), social (networks), and human (information, know-how, and time). Seawright (2009) has examined the representational distortion related to several forms of participation and demand-making. It may be interesting to consider the consequences of the fact that class bias in participation rates may not be uniform across institutions, and those in which it may be more pronounced are not necessarily those that are more central to policies important to popular sector interests. Indeed, a suggestion above is that differential class bias in institutions may favor local,

immediate, consumptionist, and relatively costless demands. At the same time, in assessing the effect of class bias, it is important to examine some countervailing forces: Rich (2019), for example, has elucidated a pattern of “state-sponsored activism,” in which bureaucrats within the state act to solve the collective action problems of popular sector groups and counteract their relative deficit in social and human capital. And Roberts (this volume) highlights the political limitations of the contemporary inclusionary turn.

Second, the role of protest as a form of popular sector participation and demand-making should be further examined. The editors suggest that protest may decline as an important form of demand-making as participation in the second inclusion becomes routinized and regularized. However, the role and types of protest may have changed. On the one hand, protest itself has, in a sense, become routinized. There is some evidence that many popular sector organizations engage in protest as a fairly regular activity in their repertoire of participation (Kapiszewski 2009, chap. 7). On the other hand, very large, even multicity protests have also emerged in a much less routinized and disruptive way, with new networks and forms of coordination being forged and created anew each time. Whereas the former may be quite specific in demands, the latter are often diffuse and multifaceted. The role for and effect of different types of protest is another interesting area for further research.

Third, as part of the paradox of participation, the editors raise the issue already discussed above: the greater pluralism that characterizes the second inclusion does not escape the dilemma of the challenge to autonomy, which had been posed by the corporatism that was characteristic of the first inclusion. As with unions, state benefits to the new types of organizations run the risk of dependence that can compromise their autonomy (see Collier and Collier 1991; and Collier and Handlin 2009, 88–91 and chap. 9). The new organizations may depend on the state for funding, for their basic activity of partnering with the state to deliver services, and for other forms of assistance. Similarly, organizational ties to political parties have sometimes become more distant, but variation in these ties exists. The issue of organizational dependence on both the state and parties and how forms of dependence may constrain organizations or shape their representational role are important issues that deserve more systematic attention.

Class representational distortion in participation, the role and use of different forms of protest, and forms of dependence are important themes

for further research. The changes reinforce the asymmetry in production-ist issues, which in many cases have been substantially diluted in popular sector participation but remain central to capitalists, who have other channels of influence including structural power (Fairfield 2015). These issues are central in evaluating the nature of the second inclusion.

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# Inequality, Democracy, and the Inclusionary Turn in Latin America

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## INTRODUCTION

Latin America experienced an inclusionary turn beginning in the 1990s and accelerating as the twenty-first century dawned. Governments across the region created institutions and policies aimed at including previously excluded groups and expanding the boundaries of citizenship. Movement toward greater inclusion occurred in three major areas. First, states took unprecedented steps to recognize indigenous peoples, Afro-Latin communities, and multicultural and plurinational societies.<sup>1</sup> Second, governments established new channels of access to policymaking and created or broadened participatory governance institutions,<sup>2</sup> triggering what has been described as an “explosion of participation” in the region (Cameron and Sharpe 2012, 231). Finally, governments throughout Latin America invested heavily in redistributive social policies: welfare states expanded, providing unprecedented coverage to historically excluded sectors such as women, the unemployed, and the rural and informal poor.<sup>3</sup> Partly as a result of these policies, poverty rates declined markedly, and in much of the region, levels of socioeconomic inequality fell for the first time in

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<sup>1</sup> Stavenhagen (1992); Brysk (2000); Sieder (2002); Van Cott (2005); Yashar (2005); Lucero (2008).

<sup>2</sup> Van Cott (2008); Avritzer (2009); Selee and Peruzzotti (2009); Wampler (2009); Goldfrank (2011); Mayka (2019).

<sup>3</sup> Lomelí (2008); Pribble (2013); De la O (2015); Diaz Cayeros et al. (2016); Garay (2016).

decades.<sup>4</sup> Underlying, and to some degree constitutive of, these changes was stronger enforcement of the rights that had been enshrined in many new Latin American constitutions.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, as Holland and Schneider (2017, 988) write, “[i]t is not much of an exaggeration to say that the 2000s was one of the best decades in history for the poor in Latin America.”

The emergence of a more inclusive politics across Latin America marks a significant – and in many ways, unexpected – break with the past. Latin America has long been characterized by extreme inequality and social exclusion; even today, it is the most unequal region on earth. Historically, efforts to combat social and economic inequality – by left-leaning governments, social movements, or armed guerrillas – have almost invariably triggered harsh conservative reactions, usually culminating in military coups. Even after democracy returned in the 1980s, economic crisis and far-reaching neoliberal reforms appeared to demobilize and depoliticize citizens.<sup>6</sup> Corporatist structures broke down, labor movements weakened, and leftist and labor-based parties collapsed or shifted to the Right. Emerging civil society organizations lacked the national reach of political parties, and unions did not provide comparable access to the national state.<sup>7</sup> Neoliberal reforms reinforced these processes, atomizing and demobilizing class-based popular sectors.<sup>8</sup> The dismantling of already weakened state institutions appeared to condemn many Latin Americans to “low-intensity citizenship.”<sup>9</sup> In this context, Roberts (2002) even wrote of a “re-oligarchization” of politics.

Yet recent decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of citizenship. Even in the context of the neoliberal 1990s, Latin American governments began to experiment with new forms of inclusion – extending recognition to previously marginalized peoples (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005), creating new channels for local political access (Goldfrank, this volume), and in some cases extending material benefits to more citizens (Garay, this volume). In the 2000s, the region experienced a repoliticization of long-standing socioeconomic issues (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Roberts 2008, 2015; Silva 2009), and popular mobilization also placed new issues and demands on the political agenda. Some

<sup>4</sup> López Calva and Lustig (2010); Birdsall et al. (2012).

<sup>5</sup> Bejarano and Segura (2004); Segura and Bejarano (2004); Hartlyn and Luna (2009).

<sup>6</sup> Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998); Roberts (1998); Kurtz (2004).

<sup>7</sup> Chalmers et al. (1997); Roberts (1998); Yashar (2005); Collier and Handlin (2009).

<sup>8</sup> Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998); Roberts (1998); Kurtz (2004).

<sup>9</sup> O’Donnell (1993); Kurtz (2004).

parties and governments responded to these demands, creating new rights, institutions, and policies aimed at traditionally marginalized groups. In short, politics and policies became more *inclusive*, allowing for the more effective practice of citizenship by individuals who previously had been excluded on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference.

These developments have engendered exciting new research agendas. For instance, recent scholarship has examined the extension of new social and cultural rights,<sup>10</sup> the spread of participatory institutions,<sup>11</sup> and the expansion of redistributive social policies in Latin America.<sup>12</sup> For the most part, however, scholars have studied these developments in isolation. This volume adopts a different approach. We treat the combination of state efforts to include previously excluded popular sectors (by enhancing recognition, increasing access to political power, and augmenting resource flows) as a broad regional syndrome – a confluence of processes that may be described as an “inclusionary turn.” Examining these changes holistically offers greater insight into the way they interact, and an opportunity to evaluate whether and how they may be jointly transforming democratic Latin America.

In the next three sections of this introductory chapter, we conceptualize inclusion, describe Latin America’s most recent inclusionary turn, and place it in historical context. We then offer an explanation of the inclusionary turn and some hypotheses about the sources of cross-national variation *within* the turn. Our explanation of the overall turn highlights the cumulative effects of democratic endurance in a context of deep social inequality. Democratic endurance is a contemporary phenomenon. Historically in Latin America, efforts to mobilize the poor, elect leftist, or populist governments, or redistribute wealth under democracy, frequently triggered conservative reactions and, in many cases, military coups. By the 1990s, however, due to a more favorable post–Cold War regional environment and the absence of legitimate regime alternatives, even relatively weak democracies survived. Democratic survival encouraged, and created unprecedented and extended opportunities for, popular sector movements and their partisan allies to organize and make

<sup>10</sup> Van Cott (2005); Yashar (2005); Gauri and Brinks (2008); Brinks and Gauri (2014).

<sup>11</sup> Van Cott (2008); Avritzer (2009); Selee and Peruzzotti (2009); Wampler (2009); Goldfrank (2011); Cameron et al. (2013); Mayka (2019).

<sup>12</sup> Lomeli (2008); Huber and Stephens (2012); Pribble (2013); De la O (2015); Díaz Cayeros et al. (2016); Garay (2016).

demands; simultaneously, sustained electoral competition in a context of jarring social inequality created incentives for parties from across the political spectrum to appeal to low-income and marginalized voters through multifaceted efforts at inclusion. For the first time in Latin American history, these developments did not trigger a significant authoritarian backlash, allowing such inclusionary efforts to unfold and accumulate over time.

The social and political gains made during the inclusionary turn should not be overstated, however. First, ground-level advances in popular sector recognition, access, and resources have been slower and less consequential than legal innovations and parchment-level changes might suggest. Moreover, movement toward inclusion is never unidirectional; it always activates resistance and reaction. Inclusionary advances in some areas may coexist with exclusionary movements in other areas. The chapter's penultimate section examines some of these "paradoxes of inclusion," surveying its limits and limitations, its problems and pathologies. In the chapter's conclusion, we broaden our discussion to consider the uneven implementation of the parchment reforms on which much of the chapter focuses. We also consider the sustainability of the phenomenon after the Left turn, asking how the ascent of more right-wing governments in several Latin American countries, as well as the catastrophic COVID-19 pandemic, might affect inclusionary politics in the region.

#### CONCEPTUALIZING INCLUSION

We understand "inclusion" to be a multidimensional process through which previously marginalized actors gain more meaningful and effective citizenship. Citizenship entails civic, political, and socioeconomic membership in a polity. All polities establish institutions defining who has membership; what rights and duties are associated with it; and how members are represented in and gain access to the state. That is, all states establish citizenship regimes that institutionalize which members of a polity are considered to be insiders and which members are outsiders.<sup>13</sup> Since the boundaries between these groups are politically constructed, elected officials and bureaucrats can shift them by creating new rules about who is included, which rights are extended, and how people are represented. Inclusion thus involves political actions to move boundaries

<sup>13</sup> For a discussion of citizenship regimes, see Jenson and Philips (1996); Yashar (2005); and Vink (2017).

between groups in a way that broadens membership in a polity, turning “outsiders” into “insiders.”<sup>14</sup>

We conceptualize inclusion along three dimensions: recognition, access, and resources. By *recognition*, we mean promising a group full status as a legitimate actor in society. This may include, but is not limited to, legalizing previously banned or repressed organizations (such as unions, peasant associations, or leftist political parties); constitutionalizing multicultural and pluricultural states; acknowledging the equal (or sometimes distinct) rights of people previously targeted by discrimination (because of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and/or on other bases); and stating a commitment to protect and uphold these rights.

By *access*, we mean the creation of new institutional channels to influence political decision-making or policymaking. Reforms that augment access might, for instance, facilitate or guarantee certain groups representation in established positions of state authority (i.e. the national executive or legislature); extend suffrage to new groups; reduce clientelism or otherwise facilitate sincere voting; or legalize parties representing excluded groups. In the third wave of democracy, region-wide institutional reforms have also included decentralization, and the establishment of corporatist, consultative, participatory, deliberative and/or governing institutions, all of which may lead to greater access for previously excluded groups.

By *resources*, we mean the distribution of material, financial, and legal assets to members of previously marginalized groups to enhance their opportunities as citizens. This includes, for example, creating or expanding redistributive social policies (e.g. land reform, minimum wage, family allowances); developing affirmative action policies for historically excluded groups; and introducing policies that facilitate equal access to the law (such as those that mandate legal aid and public defenders).

Implicit in (and constitutive of) all three dimensions of inclusion is the enhancement of citizens’ *rights*. In Latin America, a significant (albeit not universal) extension of civil, political, and socioeconomic rights occurred decades ago. As the inclusionary turn accelerated in the 1990s, these rights were extended further, and in many countries, new social and cultural rights were introduced (Gargarella 2014, 13–16). Inclusionary

<sup>14</sup> We use these terms to describe broader swaths of the population than does Garay (this volume), who defines “insiders” as formal sector workers who were included through mid century labor incorporation, and “outsiders” as workers who were not included through that process, e.g. the urban informal sector, rural workers, and the unemployed.

“action” has involved state-led initiatives that permit the more effective exercise of both rights that already existed on paper, and of new rights. For example, courts’ more expansive interpretation and more energetic enforcement of constitutional rights can induce elected leaders to design new inclusionary policies.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, as the chapters by Garay and Hunter show, the introduction of universalistic social policies can advance both social and political rights by eroding clientelism. More broadly, as Marshall (1950), Sen (1999), and others have so compellingly argued, the resources gained through socioeconomic redistribution facilitate the effective exercise of citizenship rights.

Meaningful inclusion thus requires both *parchment* changes aimed at enhancing inclusion (i.e. the creation of formal institutions, policies, and legislation) and changes in *practice* (i.e. the implementation of those innovations). In many Latin American countries, there remains a significant gap between the two – between what policies, laws, and institutions promise, and what government actually delivers. This volume takes seriously the notion – advanced by Marshall (1950), O’Donnell (1993), Sen (1999), and others – that parchment rights are substantively important, but are only made universally meaningful through practice. We consider the parchment–practice gap in more depth in this chapter’s final section and our contributors remain attentive to it throughout.

Inclusion thus involves diverse sociopolitical actors and processes. It occurs under different kinds of regimes, takes multiple forms, and can be used for good and ill. Pressure for inclusion may emanate from below (through social mobilization and activism) or above (through political entrepreneurship and electoral competition). Inclusion does not imply any mode or mechanism, nor is it a particular form of interest intermediation, such as pluralism or corporatism. Rather, different types of interest intermediation or interest regime (e.g. state or societal corporatism, pluralism) may be more or less inclusionary.

Given inclusion’s capacious nature, it is important to demarcate the specific aspects of inclusion covered in this chapter. First, we focus primarily on formal or “parchment” measures – the creation of formal institutions, laws, and policies by state officials. This focus presumes that

<sup>15</sup> One striking example is the Colombian Constitutional Court’s 2008 decision (T 760), in which it found that the Colombian government had failed to satisfy its constitutional obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health, and ordered state leaders to progressively realize universal health coverage by 2010, leading to significant health care reform (Merhof 2015, 724).

institutional design matters. Formal institutions are prerequisites for meaningful inclusion. They do not determine, but certainly encourage and constrain, political behavior. How inclusionary policies, laws, and programs are designed affects their implementation, operation, and impact. For instance, how open to (political and judicial) interpretation and contestation laws and policies are, how difficult they are to implement, how much authority institutions are granted, and how broadly programs are designed, all affect how consequential they are. It is for this reason that politicians fight pitched battles over the specific design of inclusionary initiatives. Formal institutions also provide a baseline. We can only accurately evaluate (and effectively explain) the gap between parchment and practice if we fully understand how relevant policies, reforms, and institutions were designed to work (see Brinks et al. 2019). We explore some of the limitations of an analytic approach that solely employs formal measures in the chapter's conclusion.

Second, we focus, in particular, on materially disadvantaged groups, or what are commonly referred to in Latin America as the “popular sectors.” In defining the popular sectors, we follow Collier and Handlin (2009, 4 n. 1), for whom these sectors comprise “groups within the lower strata of the income hierarchy.”<sup>16</sup> Given the tight link between race and ethnicity, and class, in Latin America, steps toward racial inclusion are also inherently steps toward the inclusion of the socioeconomically disadvantaged. By contrast, the volume does not focus specifically on other marginalized groups, such as women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) communities.<sup>17</sup> While there may be a common explanation for increasing inclusion of all lower-income groups (which are territorially concentrated, household-based, and intergenerational), more research is needed to ascertain if our explanation about popular sector inclusion extends to other marginalized groups.

Table 1.1 offers some examples of formal inclusion, that is, official reforms introduced to include the popular sectors in a more meaningful

<sup>16</sup> Whereas Collier and Handlin focus only on the urban working classes, we understand indigenous people and the peasantry to form part of the popular sectors as well.

<sup>17</sup> Of course, some reforms directed at the popular sectors benefit members of these other types of marginalized groups; moreover, some reforms meant to include groups such as women and LGBTQ communities are actually directed toward the popular sectors. For instance, initiatives that aim to prevent the commercial sexual exploitation of children (primarily designed to help poor girls and transgender or gay boys who have been victims of abuse) often do so by seeking to expand their core social and citizenship rights. We thank Lindsay Mayka for highlighting this point.

TABLE 1.1 *Examples of formal inclusionary reform across three dimensions<sup>a</sup>*

Dimension of Inclusion	Examples of State Action
<i>Recognition</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Constitutional recognition of multiculturalism or plurinationalism.</i></li> <li>• <i>Introduction of policies that recognize multiple languages (or establish them as official languages) in state institutions (e.g. courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and in educational instruction.</i></li> <li>• <i>Signing of international conventions that recognize the rights of historically oppressed or excluded groups (e.g. ILO Convention 169) or government endorsement of related international declarations (e.g. those generated by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance).</i></li> <li>• <i>Legal or constitutional extension of collective rights (e.g. legalization of unions and collective bargaining).</i></li> <li>• <i>Changes in the design and implementation of the census implying the right to be counted, recognized, and represented.</i></li> <li>• <i>Symbolic changes such as displaying the flags or images of indigenous peoples; or constructing museums.</i></li> </ul>
<i>Access</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Creation of new (mainly national) bodies, ministries, agencies for and staffed by members of popular sector organizations that guarantee access to the governing or policymaking process for representatives of popular sector groups.</i></li> <li>• <i>Decentralizing reforms that devolve power to the local level or create new municipalities.</i></li> <li>• <i>Creation of participatory democratic institutions or other deliberative bodies.</i></li> <li>• <i>Creation of new mechanisms of consultation of previously marginalized groups, such as consulta previa for local communities affected by extractive industries.</i></li> <li>• <i>Extension of the right to vote.</i></li> <li>• <i>Introduction of measures that make nominal voting rights more effective in practice by eliminating formal and informal barriers to electoral participation (such as discriminatory electoral laws and practices), combating clientelism and vote buying, and easing voter registration and access to the ballot box.</i></li> <li>• <i>Elimination of bans on political parties that represent historically excluded groups.</i></li> <li>• <i>Reforms that guarantee representatives of previously marginal groups access to the executive or legislative branches (e.g. formal/informal legislative or cabinet quotas); creation of new ministries (e.g. labor or indigenous ministries) or cabinet posts dealing specifically with issues of relevance to the popular sectors.</i></li> </ul>
<i>Resources</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Introduction, expansion, or “universalization” of social policies to provide more generous pensions, wages, health care, or family incomes (e.g. conditional cash transfer programs).</i></li> <li>• <i>Land reform.</i></li> <li>• <i>Labor law reform/legal changes that affect individual level labor/work site issues.</i></li> <li>• <i>Labor law reform/legal changes that affect workers as a collective.</i></li> <li>• <i>Progressive tax reform.</i></li> <li>• <i>Development of affirmative action programs for historically oppressed or excluded minorities.</i></li> <li>• <i>Introduction of legal aid, public defenders, and other institutions that ease use of the legal system.</i></li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup> Italicized items are measured in Figure 1.1.



way – on each of our three dimensions of inclusion. Although we have associated each example with one particular dimension of inclusion, many of the actions included in the table may enhance inclusion in more than one respect. For instance, policies that allow multiple languages to be used in educational settings (*recognition*) could well mean better education (*resources*) for students who lack proficiency in the national language.

It bears noting that inclusionary behavior on the part of the state may be either sincere or strategic: state officials may act with the sole normative intent of augmenting inclusion, may seek to enhance inclusion with the strategic goal of winning elections by increasing a party's electoral base, and/or may aim to preempt further radicalization of popular sectors, for instance. Moreover, state officials' actions may unwittingly have an inclusionary effect. For our analysis, all of these actions comprise inclusion; inclusion is defined by the content and impact of state action, rather than the intent of state actors.

#### THE INCLUSIONARY TURN IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

How, then, do we identify an inclusionary *turn*? One can find important instances of inclusionary reform and shifting boundaries of citizenship across history. Indeed, the 1980s and early 1990s, a period that is generally *not* viewed as inclusionary in Latin America, witnessed important reforms broadening recognition of indigenous rights, region-wide decentralization, and the creation of local-level participatory institutions (see Garay, Mayka and Rich, Hunter, Goldfrank, and Cameron, this volume). But isolated instances of inclusionary change do not necessarily constitute an inclusionary *turn*. We understand an inclusionary turn to have occurred in a particular world region when, over a relatively concentrated period of time, significant and sustained movement occurs on all three dimensions of inclusion in a large number of countries. While movement along our three dimensions began at different moments and accelerated at different paces in different Latin American countries, important reforms have been introduced across the region on all three dimensions since the 1990s.

In order to better illustrate the contemporary inclusionary turn in Latin America – to date its onset and trace its acceleration and arc – we identified and tallied, for a subset of the types of reforms listed in Table 1.1 (those in italics), major reforms adopted between 1980 and 2016 across nineteen Latin American countries. We selected three

categories of recognition-enhancing reform, and four categories each of access- and resource-enhancing reform.<sup>18</sup> We chose reform types that were both prominent and easily measurable (for which we were confident that we could find data). We counted only *formal* reforms (i.e. found in constitutions, laws, international treaties, executive orders, and regulations). Overall incidence is presented in Figure 1.1 (Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the Appendix provide individual country data). These data allow us to date government action associated with the inclusionary turn and to cautiously identify some trends. However, as our data only capture formal or parchment changes, and as some of the reforms we document are quite recent, we cannot comment on the implementation, effects, or long-term consequences of the inclusionary reforms we identify.<sup>19</sup> Whether these contemporary parchment reforms ultimately generate meaningful, sustained inclusion remains an open – and critical – question.

Latin America's most recent inclusionary turn began slowly around 1989–1990, when we observe an initial uptick in inclusionary reforms in various countries of the region along each of our three dimensions; the turn then accelerated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, continued into the new millennium, and then gradually attenuated after 2012. Initially, Latin American governments adopted more recognition-related reforms. By the mid-1990s, however, reform along each of our three dimensions began to increase moderately. In the early 2000s, we see an acceleration of overall reforms, with resource-related reforms outpacing reforms along the other two dimensions by mid-decade.

Several additional and important observations about the timing of the inclusionary turn may also be drawn from these data. First, the

<sup>18</sup> Data were compiled from a wide range of sources, including government data/documents; nongovernmental organization or intergovernmental agency databases/reports; news paper articles from major national outlets; and academic databases/studies. We are extremely grateful to Jared Abbott for his role in collecting these data and creating the attendant figures.

<sup>19</sup> A few additional points about the data bear noting: (1) When a single document embodied multiple distinct substantive reforms (as often occurred with constitutions, for instance) we coded each reform separately despite their being codified in the same document. (2) The data do not reflect the quality, depth, breadth, or relative political/economic/social/cultural importance or potential impact of reforms; substantively important changes in countries' inclusionary regimes and minor reforms are represented in the data in the same way. (3) Though we sought to carry out a comprehensive survey of available data sources for each reform area in each country, there may be undercounting at the start and end of the time frame analyzed, given a) the lower incidence of digitized editions of Latin American newspapers in the earlier years versus later years, and b) the lower likelihood of very recent reforms being registered in academic work.

I I




FIGURE I.1 Subset of inclusionary reforms for Latin America (1983–2016)  
(includes reforms italicized in Table I.1)

inclusionary turn both predates and extends beyond Latin America's Left turn. As is well known, beginning in 1998 and accelerating in the early and mid-2000s, Latin America experienced an unprecedented wave of left-wing electoral victories (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). However, as these data make clear, the movement toward greater inclusion was not merely a product of shifting political winds. While the Left's ascent to power across the region undoubtedly hastened the pace of the inclusionary turn, the turn starts before the wave of Left victories. Moreover, inclusionary reform did not end with the ascent of more right-leaning governments, including Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Sebastián Piñera in Chile, and Iván Duque in Colombia beginning in 2015: thus far, right-wing governments have not systematically rolled back inclusionary reforms introduced by their predecessors (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017),<sup>20</sup> and some of these governments have continued inclusionary reforms (Fairfield and Garay 2017). It is important, therefore, that we not conflate the inclusionary turn with the Left turn. The former is substantively broader and temporally longer.

Second, the inclusionary turn also clearly predates the region's post-2002 commodities boom. While financial windfalls no doubt facilitated inclusionary reform in some countries, the dramatic expansion of such reforms, including social policies, cannot simply be attributed to the revenue generated by booming commodity prices (see Garay 2016, this volume).

Third, the inclusionary turn began at the height of the neoliberal era, when governments across the region were carrying out radical market-oriented reforms that are widely considered exclusionary. It appears, then, that the 1990s saw somewhat contradictory forces at work: at the same time that the formal working class lost access to material resources and union-based participatory channels, inclusionary reforms provided unprecedented recognition to indigenous and other identity-based groups, and decentralization created new forms of local institutional access.

Finally, the timing of the inclusionary turn corresponds closely to the spread of democracy across Latin America. Inclusionary reforms began to appear around 1990, the first year in which the entire region was free of direct military rule.<sup>21</sup> This timing, we will argue below, is by no means coincidental.

<sup>20</sup> Brazil and Bolivia, discussed below, may be important exceptions.

<sup>21</sup> Military leaders left power in Chile, Panama, and Paraguay in 1989.

As the data suggest, inclusionary turns are not unilinear processes. Rather, they often proceed incrementally, through slow accretion, comprising a series of political reforms layered one upon the other. Inclusionary turns may entail expansions and enhancements of previously existing policies and expansions of citizenship in new areas. They may involve both reversals and contradictions – steps forward and backward. As the neoliberal decade of the 1990s demonstrates, the introduction of inclusionary reforms in one area may coincide with the adoption of exclusionary policies in other areas. Finally, inclusionary movement is hardly inevitable, nor are advances necessarily permanent. Indeed, as recent actions taken by Presidents Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Bolivian interim-President Jeanine Áñez Chávez remind us, they may be halted and even reversed.

#### COMPARING INCLUSIONARY TURNS

Latin America's recent inclusionary turn is not the first instance of large-scale movement toward greater inclusion in the region. The process of labor incorporation in early and mid-twentieth century Latin America, so brilliantly analyzed by Collier and Collier (1991), represents an earlier inclusionary turn. In her Prologue to this volume, Ruth Collier compares the contemporary period of inclusion to the labor incorporation period, highlighting various ways in which the “infrastructure of participation” available to the popular sectors has changed. In this section, we likewise examine some of the similarities and differences between the two periods, albeit with a focus on state action to enhance inclusion. In order to structure our discussion, we adopt the framework outlined by Collier and Collier (1977) for studying corporatism in comparative perspective. Drawing on Lasswell's depiction of the study of politics as an examination of “who gets what, when, how” (1936), the Colliers suggested that a nuanced study of corporatism must consider “who does what, to whom, and how.” Although on most of these points differences between the two inclusionary turns are a matter of degree, the two processes nevertheless diverge in intriguing ways.

#### Who

Following Collier and Collier (1977), one concern is *who* makes inclusionary appeals: Who are the actors initiating inclusion “from above”? Whereas mid-century labor incorporation entailed both “state incorporation” (initiated by dictatorships) and “party incorporation” (initiated by

elected governments) (Collier and Collier 1991), in the more recent period the central players are almost exclusively democratically elected, civilian governments. Thus, while political parties were active in both periods of inclusion, they are the primary drivers during the contemporary period: there are no recent instances, for example, of military-led inclusion.

As in the labor incorporation period, reforms in the contemporary turn have been undertaken by a diverse set of parties (see Etchemendy, Handlin, and Pop-Eleches, this volume). Some of the parties initiating contemporary inclusionary reform have their origins in the earlier incorporation period (for instance, Peronism in Argentina and the Socialist Party in Chile). Others are third wave-era parties that are nonetheless now well-established, such as the PT (Workers Party) in Brazil. Still others are new political forces. In Ecuador (Rafael Correa) and Venezuela (Hugo Chávez), inclusionary reforms have been led by populist outsiders; in Bolivia, they have been introduced by a new movement-based party (the MAS, “Movement for Socialism”). Finally, as in the earlier era, the governments that have advanced inclusionary measures are ideologically diverse. While many have been left-of-center, in Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and elsewhere, important inclusionary reforms have also been undertaken under right-of-center governments (Garay 2016; Fairfield and Garay 2017).

### What

Inclusion across both periods has entailed formal *recognition* of popular sector actors who were previously viewed as peripheral to the political system. In the first period, recognition of the urban working class (and in some cases the rural peasantry) was central to the inclusionary project. Collier and Collier (1977, 1991) emphasized the importance of labor codes, associated social policies, and labor ministries as mechanisms for inclusion. In the contemporary period, recognition has been granted to a broader range of groups, including informal and rural workers, indigenous people, and racial minorities. We point to the constitutional recognition of indigenous people, the creation of state institutions targeting ethnic and racial groups (e.g. in Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia); and the recognition of undocumented, unemployed, and informal sectors (e.g. *piqueteros* in Argentina). The politicization of ethnic and racial cleavages has had a range of consequences. For example, Seawright and Barrenechea (this volume) find that the egalitarian discourse used by populist governments in two cases, Venezuela and Bolivia, encouraged

citizens to identify as brown-skinned (*moreno*) rather than mixed (*mestizo*) in Venezuela, and as *mestizo* rather than white in Bolivia. While we emphasize the popular sectors, recognition has also expanded along other (cross-cutting) cleavages such as gender and sexual orientation. The politicization of these cleavages has pressured governments to formally recognize the political importance of these newly activated “outsiders” by modifying constitutions, amending other legal frameworks, and creating new political institutions.

State actors also took steps to expand *access* in both periods, offering citizens and groups new institutional channels to influence political decisions and policymaking. Again, however, they did so in different ways. In the earlier period, the formal extension of suffrage was an important aspect of expanded access in several cases (although limitations remained, such as literacy restrictions in many countries). Moreover, access tended to be expanded through centralized, corporatist mechanisms that sought to, and often did, monopolize the space between citizens and the state. The contemporary period is marked by greater variation in mechanisms of access. For example, decentralization has become an underlying logic of access to political decision-making, with reforms that institutionalize local elections and grant municipalities new forms of administrative and fiscal authority. Governments have also created or expanded participatory institutions, ranging from local-level participatory budgeting, health councils, and community councils to national conferences (see Mayka and Rich, and Goldfrank, this volume). Finally, judicial review has been democratized in many countries, as mechanisms to file cases have multiplied and standing has been broadened through constitutional reform (e.g. Colombia 1991). These reforms have been complemented by the creation or strengthening of accountability mechanisms such as public prosecutor’s offices, ombudsmen, and *comités de vigilancia*. A shared characteristic of most of these new institutions is that access is (largely) voluntary, rather than compulsory or conditioned on political support.

With regard to *resource* allocation, governments in both periods pursued regulation (mandating certain types of behavior), distribution (awarding government resources), and redistribution (shifting resources from one class or group to another) (see Lowi 1964). However, the balance among the three, as well as the targets of policy, differed across the two periods. Mid-century labor incorporation entailed group-targeted *regulation* as well as significant *redistribution*, including major instances of land reform (e.g. in Mexico and Venezuela). The redistribution of resources was channeled primarily through corporatist institutions, which made for a truncated and hierarchical system. The main logics of the more

recent period, by contrast, are *regulation* and *distribution* – with far less emphasis on the redistribution of private property. We have not seen dramatic instances of land reform in the recent period (although some reform was undertaken, for example, in Bolivia and Venezuela), and there have been few significant shifts in labor’s share of income. Instead, we observe policies such as the redistribution of *state* lands (with subsoil minerals remaining under the control of the state) and social policies based on means-tested *individual* targeting.<sup>22</sup> Thus, in contrast to the redistribution that took place in some of the early labor incorporation cases, most contemporary social policies take the form of what Holland and Schneider (2017) call “easy” redistribution, in that they are fiscally cheap and do not threaten powerful interests or entail substantial institutional disruption (also see Roberts, this volume).

Given these varying logics, the resource dimension of inclusion was far more contentious in the earlier period, as redistribution generates higher-stakes conflict than does distribution (Lowi 1964). The mid-twentieth-century inclusionary period challenged oligarchies and antagonized elites, often inducing them to call on their military allies to halt inclusionary processes. Contemporary distributive policies have generated contention, but in the 2000s in particular have been facilitated by the availability of government rents from the commodities boom (see Mazzuca, and Hunter, this volume). Moreover, to date, they have been largely bounded by and directed through electoral politics (rather than focused on upending the political system itself).

### To Whom

Which groups or actors were targeted in each period? Although new actors were drawn into the political arena in both periods,<sup>23</sup> there are significant differences between the two. At mid-century, leaders passed reforms to enhance inclusion with the working class foremost in mind. The earlier period thus witnessed the mobilization of a set of organized and structured collective actors (e.g. unions), leading to the formal incorporation of labor into politics. As such, a truncated part of the popular sectors benefited from these earlier inclusionary policies. Further,

<sup>22</sup> An important exception is the distribution of resources to indigenous and Afro Latin communities.

<sup>23</sup> Collier and Collier’s (1991) work on the earlier period had a particular center of gravity labor – due to the nature of their analytic question. The present volume, by contrast, does not privilege a particular actor, though its focus is on the popular sectors.



beneficiaries were targeted as members of class-based (and class-identified) groups rather than as individuals.

In the contemporary period, by contrast, leaders have targeted a broader range of popular sector actors (Collier, this volume). Among the historically excluded popular sector groups that were newly mobilized during the contemporary period are informal sector workers (Garay 2016, this volume), indigenous groups (Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005), and evangelical Christians (Boas, this volume). Further, while in some countries ethnic, racial, and religious groups have been targeted as collectives in the recent inclusionary turn, more often citizens have been targeted *as individuals* (e.g. through conditional cash transfer –CCT– programs; see again Garay, and Hunter, this volume). Inclusion has thus benefited a more diffuse, fragmented, less organized set of actors, often with weak political leverage (see Mazzuca, and Roberts, this volume), rather than mobilizing and incorporating new social classes. In short, the recent inclusionary turn has targeted more diverse actors who are more difficult to mobilize, are defined by cross-cutting cleavages, and often have unclear partisan ties (Collier and Handlin 2009; Collier, this volume). The mixed composition of the newly included makes any resulting alliances among them more fluid and unstable, which as Roberts argues in the concluding chapter, could make the more recent inclusionary turn less robust than its mid-century predecessor.

### How

The two inclusionary turns also occurred in quite distinct ways, in large part because the different political regimes in place engendered different forms of interest intermediation, and a different balance between inducements and constraints (Collier and Collier 1979). With regard to interest intermediation, as Collier and Collier (1991) depict, mid-century incorporation was corporatist (and generally more top-down, compulsory, and repressive). This corporatist inclusion offered substantive benefits but also compromised labor union autonomy. The contemporary inclusionary turn has been marked by a more pluralist logic. The individual-focused inclusion that characterizes pluralism does not necessarily pose the same trade-offs (as it neither privileges popular sector organizations nor compromises their autonomy).

The two periods also entail a different balance between “inducements and constraints” (Collier and Collier 1979), with the contemporary period featuring fewer institutional (and coercive) constraints. Of course, in line

with our previous discussion, some of the policy advances in this latest inclusionary turn entail “low-hanging fruit.” For instance, the most common social policy reforms across the region were comparatively inexpensive and thus more politically palatable (e.g. the introduction of CCTs); by contrast, truly significant, programmatic advances that would have required much greater social expenditure, planning, and infrastructure – for instance, reforming health care systems – have been less common. Similarly, while numerous countries launched participatory initiatives at the local level, not all scaled to the national level. Nonetheless, a shifting balance *away* from coercive constraints is significant.

### Summing Up: A Second Incorporation?

In sum, in both the mid-twentieth century and contemporary inclusionary turns, reform occurred on each of our three dimensions, albeit to varying degrees. Mid-century incorporation was in the main a transition to mass politics involving the incorporation of organized labor as a legitimate actor, structured by the state primarily via hierarchical and corporatist institutions. The more recent turn is less repressive and more pluralist. It is also more expansive in scope, entailing more varied institutional mechanisms and structures of inclusion and reaching a greater diversity of people, while simultaneously involving less expensive reforms, minimizing institutional disruption, and empowering actors who possess less aggregate political power.

Similarities between the labor incorporation period and the contemporary period of inclusion have led some scholars to characterize the contemporary period as a “second incorporation” (Roberts 2008, 329–330 and 2014; Luna and Filgueira 2009; Rossi 2015; Rossi and Silva 2018). We agree that the 1990s and 2000s brought both an important expansion of substantive rights and the creation of new “institutional mechanisms that link popular sector organizations to the political arena” (Rossi and Silva 2018, 8), especially for indigenous people.<sup>24</sup>

Nonetheless, we do not view these contemporary developments as a “second incorporation” for two reasons. First, we conceptualize incorporation as a classical subtype of inclusion (i.e. the former has more defining attributes and fits a narrower range of cases).<sup>25</sup> “Incorporation” – as conceptualized by Collier and Collier (1991) – describes a *one-time-only event* with *enduring consequences*: The

<sup>24</sup> See also Cameron (this volume); Van Cott (2005, 2008); Yashar (2005).

<sup>25</sup> On classical subtypes, see Sartori (1970) and Collier and Levitsky (2009).

incorporation of the working class led to the rise of mass politics, permanently reshaping politics in ways and to degrees that have no *region-wide* parallel in the contemporary period (although indigenous incorporation in the Andes – Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia – arguably comes close).

Second, the inclusionary turn that began in the late twentieth century was not unambiguously a new, region-wide incorporation of previously marginalized groups (as with mid-twentieth-century labor incorporation): it combines a *new incorporation* of some groups (e.g. indigenous movements, evangelical Christians, informal sector workers) with a *return and reorganization* of inclusion for other popular sectors – including a wide range of reforms removing barriers to the exercise and defense of preexisting rights and practices. Indeed, with redemocratization in the 1980s and 1990s, most popular sector groups had regained the vote and basic civil rights, and their institutional access was increasing via decentralization and other participatory institutions. In this sense, the popular sectors *returned* to politics in the more recent inclusionary turn.

Third and finally, while the poor were unquestionably disadvantaged by harsh neoliberal reforms, they were not “disincorporated” economically as much as left to fend for themselves in highly unequal democracies. Thus, there was no basis for (newly) “incorporating” them – although there were certainly ways to restructure the terms of their inclusion. In short, important advances in popular sector recognition, access, and resources since the late 1990s can best be understood as a second inclusionary turn, not a second period of incorporation.

#### EXPLAINING THE INCLUSIONARY TURN

The acceleration of the inclusionary turn in the late 1990s and early 2000s took many scholars by surprise. For much of the 1990s, the combination of elite neoliberal consensus and labor demobilization – reinforced by union decline and the expansion of the informal sector – led many scholars to conclude that “low-intensity” citizenship and democracy were likely to persist (O’Donnell 1993; Roberts 1998; Kurtz 2004). Yet this singular focus on how democracy was privileging market logics over popular sector needs, and the negative effects of neoliberal reforms on organized labor and peasant unions, overshadowed the simultaneous adoption of inclusionary reforms expanding recognition and access for other citizens. Many scholars only began to focus on this inclusionary movement when it started to gather speed as the twentieth century drew to a close.

### Why Now? Explaining Latin America's Movement toward Greater Inclusion

What, then, has driven Latin America's inclusionary turn? The prevailing explanation focuses on neoliberal reforms and the social mobilization they triggered (see Silva 2009; Simmons 2016; Rossi and Silva 2018). For example, drawing on the classic work of Karl Polanyi (1944), Silva argues that free market reforms "necessarily generate a protectionist countermovement within society" (2009, 17). Because the commodification of land and labor "disrupts the ability of people to fulfill vital needs, such as personal and family economic stability," individuals and groups "invariably seek to protect themselves from the impersonal, unpredictable, ever-changing, and frequently destructive powers of the market" (Silva 2009, 17). Silva argues that neoliberal reforms in Latin America "threatened a wide range of popular sector and middle-class groups," and over time, "a great variety of social groups mobilized to defend against the threat of 'neoliberal' policies" (2012, 11). For Silva, then, a "Polanyi-like defensive mobilization to challenge neoliberalism" (Silva 2009, 43; also Rossi and Silva 2018) led to the Left turn and the introduction of inclusionary policies in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – what they call a "second incorporation" (see also Cameron, this volume).

This demand-side account points to the importance of disruption and demand-making by mobilized constituencies in explaining political inclusion, and we concur that opposition to neoliberal reforms contributed to the Left turn. Yet, this account's causal emphasis on neoliberal reforms has some analytic weaknesses. First, the argument mainly focuses on one aspect of inclusion (resources), proving less able to account for the other elements of the inclusionary turn (i.e. enhanced recognition and access). Second, as noted above, the beginning of the inclusionary turn coincided with, or even preceded, the initiation of neoliberal reform, meaning that economic restructuring cannot be the (only) cause of inclusionary reform. Third, the relationship between market reform and societal response is far from clear. Indeed, some of the strongest inclusionary demands took place in countries that underwent the least neoliberal reform (e.g. Ecuador, Venezuela), while some of the most radical neoliberal reforms (e.g. Peru) triggered only minimal defensive demands. Fourth, the relationship between the proximate cause highlighted in this account – social mobilization – and inclusion likewise presents analytic challenges. On the one hand, social mobilization has been erratic and uneven in Latin America, which limits its ability to catalyze a broad and ongoing region-wide phenomenon. On the

other hand, while Latin America has clearly witnessed important instances of popular mobilization (e.g. Argentina and Bolivia in the early 2000s, and Chile in 2011 and 2019) leading to inclusionary reform, societal demands for inclusion do not *always* lead to state responses. The prevailing explanation thus begs the theoretical question of when and why social mobilization spawns inclusionary policymaking.

We offer an alternative explanation. We argue that the principal impetus behind the region's inclusionary turn lies in the sustained interaction between two broader phenomena: inequality and enduring democracy. Latin America has long been the most unequal region in the world.<sup>26</sup> Unequal landholding and unequal incomes, alongside poverty rates that remain higher than countries of comparable levels of development, have defined the region as a whole. Although neoliberal reforms may have exacerbated economic inequalities in the region, social inequality and exclusion predate neoliberalism by centuries. And even though inequality rates have declined in the 2000s, their absolute levels continue to outpace those in other regions (Lustig 2015, 14). Further, inequality is not only economic: it manifests along multiple dimensions. Its effects are particularly stark when material inequality aligns with other cleavages such as race and ethnicity, gender, and geography (urban/rural) (Hoffman and Centeno 2003; Karl 2003; Lustig 2015).

Latin America's deep, persistent, and multifaceted inequality *holds the potential* to spur inclusionary reform by shaping the incentives of key actors. While inequality alone clearly does not produce mobilization, it can motivate disadvantaged citizens to demand greater recognition, access and/or resources,<sup>27</sup> and to vote for politicians who might campaign on these issues. Mobilization, in turn, may encourage politicians – including those for whom inclusionary policies are ideologically anathema – to (proactively or preemptively) advance inclusionary measures.<sup>28</sup>

Yet while inequality has repeatedly given rise to popular demands for greater inclusion in the region, it has rarely triggered sustained

<sup>26</sup> Hoffman and Centeno (2003); Portes and Hoffman (2003).

<sup>27</sup> Of course, as the social movement and collective action literature highlights, structural conditions do not automatically generate mobilization. The process of mobilization is a political activity that requires additional explanation.

<sup>28</sup> There is an extensive literature on the role of inequality and politics. Marshall (1950) long ago noted that the tension between capitalism (which generates economic inequalities) and democracy (which assumes political equality) generates the impulse to extend a series of rights, including the social welfare state. Sen (1999) has noted that inequalities prevent development as freedom; that democracies are better than authoritarian regimes at mitigating these inequalities; but that reform is much easier when addressing crises rather than endemic and structural inequalities.

inclusionary responses from the state. Quite often, the opposite has occurred. Throughout most of the twentieth century, efforts to mobilize the poor, expand rights, or redistribute wealth under democracy almost invariably triggered destabilizing conservative reactions, polarization, and, in many cases, military coups (O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1979; and Collier and Collier 1991). Prior to the 1980s, leftist and other political movements that advanced inclusionary projects in Latin America were often inhibited by some combination of repression, proscription, and restricted suffrage. During the Cold War in particular (when the Right associated the Left with communism), conservative forces and militaries were often quick to overturn democracy whenever such inclusion-demanding movements ascended (or threatened to ascend) to power.

The third wave of democracy fundamentally transformed the political environment in which social inequality was embedded. For the first time in Latin American history, democracy has been both widespread and enduring. This democratic opening and its continuity – that is, three decades of pluralist and competitive electoral regimes – have created unprecedented opportunities for subaltern groups and their partisan allies to organize, mobilize, and pursue political power. These dynamics, which accelerated and deepened from the late 1990s forward, both culminated in and catalyzed the inclusionary turn.

Democracy facilitates inclusion in several important ways. Freedom of expression and association provide space for marginalized sectors to organize and make demands, including via mobilization and protest, with less fear of repression. Several scholars have highlighted the role of pluralism and associational freedom in facilitating popular organization, mobilization, and protest in Latin America (Yashar 2005; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011). Second, political contestation and institutionalized electoral competition (both constitutive of democracy) incentivize politicians and political parties to engage in policymaking that will capture votes. Scholars have long argued that competitive politics in a context of extreme inequality should give rise to left-leaning governments that target marginalized sectors and favor redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012),<sup>29</sup> or right-leaning governments that mimic this behavior in order to capture the broad constituencies needed to win elections (Chartock 2013; Fairfield and Garay 2017). In order to maintain old constituencies and/

<sup>29</sup> Of course, the poor do not always vote for the Left and redistribution in unequal societies (Kaufman 2009; Cramer and Kaufman 2011).

or attract new supporters, politicians need to engage in innovative and creative policymaking of just the type that we see in the inclusionary turn – and democracy allows and incentivizes that ingenuity. Recent work by Chartock (2013) and Garay (2016, this volume) highlight the role of electoral competition in generating incentives for governments to expand social policy to include outsiders, such as indigenous people and informal sector workers. Thus, strategic, electoral incentives for political elites to promote inclusion appeared the moment Latin American societies transitioned to democracy, and they remained in place through the first two decades of the twenty-first century, as democracy has endured.

Democratic institutions, however, do not automatically or inevitably give rise to inclusionary policies. In unequal societies, political and economic elites also have incentives to defend their privilege and power. They deploy a range of practices – including clientelism, campaign contributions, bribes, and other (licit and illicit) means – to influence governments, legislatures, and courts to prevent low-income citizens from translating their numbers into electoral power or effective redistributive pressure.<sup>30</sup> In Latin America, moreover, many elected governments were constrained by the legacies of authoritarianism (e.g. military prerogatives, appointed senators) and suffered from other political pathologies (e.g. severe malapportionment; weak rule of law, the uneven protection of civil liberties) well into the twenty-first century (O'Donnell 1993; Samuels and Snyder 2001; Giraudy 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2018). Over time, however, enduring democratic regimes create more consistent opportunities for popular mobilization and pressure to enact redistributive reforms, and more incentives to respond to them, than do other regime types.

What is novel and consequential about the last three decades, then, is the unprecedented *persistence* of democracy in Latin America. That persistence, in turn, was greatly facilitated by the marked improvement in the regional and international conditions for democratic survival beginning in the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2010; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 2014). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Marxism, the perceived threat associated with leftist movements declined, and a broad international consensus on the virtues of democracy emerged. Under these new conditions, and in an increasingly networked world, the cost of overthrowing democracy rose considerably. Thus, the frequency of military intervention plummeted, and in the few instances where coups

<sup>30</sup> See O'Donnell (1993); Hagopian (1996); Kaufman (2009); Helmke and Debs (2010); Stokes et al. (2013); Albertus (2015); Albertus and Menaldo (2018); Nichter (2018).

occurred, they triggered strong regional and international pressure to return to electoral rule (e.g. Peru 1992, Guatemala 1993, Ecuador 2000, Venezuela 2002, and Honduras 2009). As with mid-century incorporation, then, timing and world historical time play important roles.

Thus, Latin America experienced few democratic reversals in the contemporary period, despite challenges that in earlier periods would plausibly have led to polarization and breakdown, such as the economic crisis and radical reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and the ascent of left-wing governments and popular mobilization during the 2000s. In particular, the extraordinary regional turn to the Left of the early twenty-first century, which broadened and accelerated inclusionary reforms without triggering regime-changing backlash, was only possible in the context of unprecedented democratic stability (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). The idea that leftist political movements – some of them quite radical – might compete freely in elections, win power across much of the region, boldly introduce inclusionary reforms and, in many cases, *remain in power for more than a decade* was virtually inconceivable in earlier eras.<sup>31</sup> We thus contend that it is democracy's resilience, in the context of unyielding inequality, that is both new and critical for explaining the scope and depth of the contemporary inclusionary turn.

At least three features of the international environment reinforced domestic incentives to adopt inclusionary reforms. One was the influence of international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Labor Organization (ILO). Although international organizations at times pushed exclusionary measures (e.g. the harsh neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s), some of them also encouraged the diffusion of policies we consider to be inclusionary. The World Bank, for example, actively promoted decentralization reforms in the 1990s (Goldfrank, this volume), while the ILO's Indigenous and

<sup>31</sup> It is worth noting that this democratic path to inclusionary politics was foreshadowed by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), at a time when that path seemed far less viable. O'Donnell and Schmitter argued that the ascent to power of right of center parties in the initial post transition period might facilitate democratic consolidation by demonstrating to conservative elites that their interests can be protected under democracy. Once democracy was consolidated, however, the Left could be expected to win (1986, 44–45), perhaps even ushering in a period of "socialization" (1986, 11–13). Although the sequence may not have led to socialization, the Left's eventual ascent to power in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, and, in its own way, Argentina and Bolivia, arguably approximated the path these authors outlined more than three decades ago.



Tribal People's Convention 169 set a standard for the widespread adoption of recognition, access, and resource reforms related to indigenous people in the 1990s. Second, the emergence and strengthening of transnational advocacy networks provided valuable resources to organizations representing indigenous and other historically marginalized groups, which strengthened social movements pushing for inclusionary reform (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Brysk 2000, Bob 2005). Third, as both Hunter and Goldfrank (this volume) show, the widespread adoption of certain inclusionary policies – for example, CCT programs and participatory budgeting – was driven in part by processes of international diffusion.

In sum, democratic endurance and persistent inequality are the critical macro-conditions underlying the recent inclusionary turn in Latin America. In all cases, movement toward inclusion was marked by internal contradictions, opposition and conflict, and important setbacks. Viewed from a regional and long-term perspective, however, it is clear that three decades of democracy and inequality created both political space for some societal demands to bubble up and gain momentum and political incentives for some democratic leaders to address them over time. While inclusionary moves might have *begun* in the absence of enduring democracy, the inclusionary turn almost certainly would not have continued and accelerated in Latin America's highly unequal polities had democracy not become (and remained) "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991, 26; Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). Yet it did, and in that context, electoral politics gave rise to precisely the kinds of demands for inclusion and redistribution that would be expected in unequal societies. For the first time in Latin American history, democracy persisted long enough (and grew sufficiently robust) for such dynamics to unfold, take root, and lead to sustained state responses rather than being aborted – even as alternation in power led to advances and setbacks for inclusionary policy. The international and regional environment supported democracy's endurance in the region, allowing the Left and encouraging the Right to design and implement reforms aimed at empowering popular sector actors in what would ultimately culminate in the inclusionary turn.

### Explaining Cross-National Variation within the Inclusionary Turn

Although movement toward greater inclusion can be observed in most polities in Latin America since the early 1990s, such movement has hardly been homogeneous across the region. As the chapters in this volume show, the timing, pace, and scope of inclusionary reforms vary

considerably, both across cases and within cases over time. Our data on parchment reforms in nineteen Latin American countries (see Appendix) show that while inclusionary reforms were introduced at more or less the same time in each country, the sequencing and vigor of the reforms vary across countries. The overall pace of reform appears quicker in South America and Mexico than most of Central America. Within South America, Bolivia (until 2019) and Brazil (until 2016) stood out for the cumulative pace and scope of reforms across the three dimensions.<sup>32</sup> If enduring democracy amid social inequality accounts for the inclusionary turn as a cumulative, region-wide phenomenon, what explains the considerable variation in the timing, pace, and scope of inclusionary reform across countries and within countries over time? Drawing on the broader comparative politics literature, and with an eye toward encouraging future research, we discuss some initial hypotheses.

**Partisanship and Left Government.** We noted earlier that the inclusionary turn predated the Left turn, and thus cannot be explained by it. However, partisanship, and particularly the role of left governments, may help to account for intra-regional variation in the *intensity* of inclusionary reform. Between 1998 and 2014, left-of-center parties won the presidency in eleven Latin American countries. Many of them were reelected at least once. Notwithstanding considerable programmatic differences (Weyland et al. 2010; Flores-Macías 2012), left-of-center parties are more likely than non-left parties to champion policies and reforms that we have characterized as inclusionary (particularly reforms targeting the popular sectors). For instance, an established body of research has shown a strong correlation between left government and redistributive social spending in advanced industrialized democracies (Garrett and Lange 1995; Garrett 1998) and, to a lesser degree, in Latin America (López-Calva and Lustig 2010; Huber and Stephens 2012). Scholars have also associated left government in Latin America with reforms aimed at expanding recognition and access to previously marginalized groups (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Cameron and Sharpe 2012; Goldfrank, this volume).

<sup>32</sup> We again emphasize that our data capture only parchment reforms and do not address the substantive import, implementation, and impact of these reforms. Moreover, the sheer number of reforms and their impact are not necessarily correlated. For instance, Brazil's CCTs and participatory budgeting might each be counted as a single reform, but their impact has been extensive. Finally, our data do not reflect vast differences in the inclusionary baseline before reforms were introduced. For example, Costa Rica and Uruguay were considerably more inclusive than Guatemala and Paraguay at reform's onset (see Cameron, this volume).

Thus, years of left government should theoretically be positively associated with the degree and scope of inclusionary reform, and resource-related reform in particular.

Yet the relationship between left governments and inclusion may be more complex than is often argued. First, the advent or persistence of left government cannot explain *all* of the cross-national variation in inclusion: left government is neither necessary nor sufficient for national leaders to introduce inclusionary reforms. As we noted previously, inclusionary policies predate Latin America's Left turn. For example, many decentralizing and participatory reforms that enhanced access, and processes of constitutional recognition of indigenous and other historically excluded groups in various countries, were introduced during the 1990s by non-leftist governments (see Mayka and Rich, and Goldfrank, this volume). Also, although left governments promoted important resource-related initiatives throughout the region (Huber and Stephens 2012), similar initiatives, including CCT programs and the expansion of health insurance, were undertaken by non-leftist governments (Fairfield and Garay 2017; Garay, and Hunter, this volume). Furthermore, left governments' efforts to expand recognition, access, and resources vary (Goldfrank, this volume): different types of left-leaning governments – from the more populist (e.g. Chávez) to the more pragmatic (e.g. Ricardo Lagos) – advance inclusion in different ways. Thus, more work needs to be done to understand the strength and nature of the relationship between types of left government and inclusion – a challenge taken up by the contributors to this volume.

**Social Mobilization.** Another plausible source of variation in the quantity or type of inclusionary measures is social mobilization. Substantial inclusionary reforms are rarely undertaken in the absence of mobilized constituencies (or at least the threat of such mobilization). Labor was not incorporated prior to working-class mobilization. Suffrage was rarely extended – to workers or women – in the absence of suffrage movements. Thus, scholars have suggested that inclusionary reforms benefiting historically disadvantaged groups such as indigenous people, peasants, or informal and unemployed workers, are less likely to occur, or will be more limited in nature, in the absence of social movements and organized groups seeking to advance their interests (Silva 2009). Indeed, Garay (2016, this volume) argues that reforms to expand social policy to cover previously excluded informal sector and rural workers are both more generous (resources) and more likely to be accompanied by new participatory institutions (access) where governments confront large-scale

popular mobilization (e.g. Argentina and Brazil) than where they do not (e.g. Chile and Mexico). Likewise, large-scale indigenous mobilization contributed to the introduction of constitutional and other reforms extending more robust recognition of indigenous communities in Bolivia and Ecuador, compared to Peru where less mobilization occurred (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005).

The notion that the degree or type of social mobilization affects the content and scope of inclusionary reform is compatible with the market-reform countermobilization argument for inclusion offered by Silva (2009), but still leaves many unanswered questions. More work on protest events and event analysis would enable us to further assess when, why, and where mobilization affects inclusionary reforms. It seems clear that far-reaching inclusionary reform is less likely without mobilization, but more research is needed to understand precisely if and how mobilization is tied to the timing, scope, and pace of reforms. For instance, how might the more diffuse patterns of civil society organizing in the contemporary period affect how mobilization influences inclusion (see Collier, and Roberts, this volume)?

**Electoral Competition.** Patterns of electoral competition and the structure of party systems may also drive variation in the timing and scope of inclusionary policies. Close elections might lead parties to introduce more, or more vigorous, inclusionary reforms, especially where there are uncaptured popular constituencies and/or social mobilization. Garay (2016, this volume), for example, argues that social policy expansion (i.e. inclusion related to resources) tends to be greatest where parties compete intensely for the “outsider” (i.e. informal sector and rural poor) vote. Although party weakness and high levels of electoral volatility might suggest that competition for the outsider vote should be relatively fierce across the region, Garay also demonstrates that where parties are weak and reelection is banned, as in Guatemala and Peru, governments have a far *weaker* incentive to engage in vigorous social policy expansion.<sup>33</sup>

This argument could also help explain variation in the other dimensions of inclusion. Research on decentralization, for example, suggests that decentralizing reforms might occur precisely where dominant parties facing close elections fear losing national office but still have local strongholds; under these circumstances, elected officials might promote decentralization to maintain their local electoral edge (see O’Neill 2005). At the

<sup>33</sup> Focusing on an electoral logic, de la O (2015) also argues that the adoption and design of CCTs is related to the antagonistic relationship between executives and legislatures.

same time, however, Boas's study of the political inclusion of evangelical Christians (this volume) suggests that electoral incentives are not always the principal driver of the mobilization and politicization of previously excluded groups. More attention to politicians' electoral incentives should nevertheless provide further insight into the timing, and perhaps the scope, of inclusionary reforms.

**Commodity Rents.** Another plausible source of variation in the adoption of inclusionary policy is the availability of commodity export rents and, relatedly, revenue streams. This factor has been pinpointed to explain variation in the resource dimension of reforms (Richardson 2009; Weyland 2009; Mazzuca 2013, this volume; Campello 2015). The post-2002 commodities boom increased revenue flows to Latin American governments, thus decreasing their dependence on international financial organizations and providing them with the autonomy and funds to pursue distributive policies that had been virtually unthinkable in previous decades. As Mazzuca's chapter (this volume) makes clear, Latin American states varied considerably in terms of how much they benefited from the post-2002 commodities boom – and thus in how much commodity rents *could* fuel inclusion. Whereas major mineral producers such as Venezuela and Bolivia enjoyed extraordinary windfall rents, countries more focused on manufacturing exports, such as Mexico, experienced a more modest boost in revenue.

However, as with the Left turn, the relationship between the dramatic increase in state revenue generated by historically high commodity prices, and the acceleration of inclusionary policies in the 2000s, is neither straightforward nor necessarily direct. As Mazzuca (this volume) posits, the positive relationship between natural resource rents and social spending during the commodities boom was mediated by political and economic institutions. Left-leaning populist governments that faced weaker horizontal accountability (as in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) used revenue generated by natural resource exports to engage in massive distributive spending to build robust inclusionary coalitions based on unemployed and informal sector workers. In contrast, where political parties and institutions of horizontal accountability have been strong (Chile), or where a high international investment grade raised the cost of a statist turn (Peru), unbridled “rentier populism” was less likely.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Of course, commodity rents could plausibly facilitate access and recognition oriented reforms as well; for instance, costs also attach to the infrastructure needed for greater access and representation.

**Historical Pathways.** Cameron (this volume) raises the possibility that variation in the depth and scope of reforms within the contemporary inclusionary turn may have deeper historical roots given earlier inclusionary periods' varying legacies. Cameron links the intensity of the original labor incorporation period of the 1930s and 1940s to the contemporary inclusionary turn. He argues that countries that experienced more limited labor and popular incorporation at mid-century (in turn related to incomplete or contested periods of nation and state building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), such as those in the Andes, had, in effect, further to go in the contemporary period. These institutional legacies – or “unfinished business” (Cameron 2016) – in terms of both recognition and resources may help to explain why the Andes witnessed more radical or contestatory populist projects entailing more extensive inclusionary moves than did countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. As noted earlier, Latin American countries differed markedly with regard to their inclusionary “point of departure,” contrasts that could not help but shape the scope and emphasis of national inclusionary politics.<sup>35</sup>

We close this section by noting that what drives cross-national and over-time variation in inclusionary reform almost certainly differs across the dimensions of inclusion. For example, macroeconomic conditions – whether or not governments confront economic crises or benefit from commodity booms – should have a greater impact on resource-based inclusion than on recognition or access. Likewise, partisanship – and specifically the presence of a strong Left in power – had a strong impact in the adoption of access-related reforms (Goldfrank, this volume), but surprisingly little impact on the adoption of certain resource-based reforms (Garay, and Hunter, this volume). We hope that future scholarship draws out these causal contrasts, while continuing to appreciate each dimension of inclusion as part of a larger phenomenon.

#### TRADE-OFFS AND LIMITATIONS: THREE PARADOXES OF INCLUSION

Against a historical backdrop of authoritarian rule, democratization, and neoliberal reform, most Latin American regimes moved toward greater inclusion during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Yet even after almost three decades of inclusionary reforms, Latin America

<sup>35</sup> For a parallel argument, see Berrios et al. (2011).

continues to be marked by extreme social stratification, uneven citizenship, and widespread popular discontent with political parties, including parties that championed and sponsored inclusionary reforms. In many cases, popular sector actors have experienced inclusionary advances as partial: changes were slower, less transformative, and less celebrated than promised and hoped. These dynamics beg key questions. What are the limits of, and obstacles to, inclusionary reform? What tensions and trade-offs does inclusionary reform entail? In this section, we discuss three political paradoxes that contribute to the uneven advancement of inclusionary initiatives: the potentially double-edged character of democracy; the way in which state weakness both induces the adoption of, and inhibits the implementation of, inclusionary reforms; and the complicated relationship between participation and inclusion.

### The Paradoxes of Democracy

We have argued for the centrality of democratic endurance to Latin America's recent inclusionary turn. Three or four decades of pluralism and competitive elections provided popular sector groups with the associational space to mobilize and press inclusionary demands from below and created incentives for vote-seeking parties to make inclusionary appeals from above.

Democracy, however, does not inevitably open the door for inclusionary politics. Since most inclusionary reforms have distributional consequences (i.e. they create winners and losers), they almost invariably trigger opposition. This is particularly true in societies marked by extreme inequality, where inclusionary reforms may challenge long-standing social hierarchies and thus catalyze intense resistance among historically privileged groups, who wield power both behind the scenes and through democratic institutions.

Democratic institutions create various opportunities for conservative forces to hamper inclusion directly. Indeed, liberal democratic institutions were designed to protect minorities from popular majorities. Originally, as Adam Smith keenly observed, they were "instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor,"<sup>36</sup> and indeed the rich have always and everywhere used them for such purposes (Schattsneider 1960; Lindblom 1977). Even in Latin America, where liberal checks and balances are often weak

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Albertus (2015, 19).

(O'Donnell 1994) and the wealthy are few in number, their resources and political connections generally leave them well-positioned to defend their interests – in this case, to dilute or derail inclusionary reforms through these institutions (Albertus 2015).

Conservative forces can also pursue their interests by designing or manipulating democratic institutions to reinforce and advantage conservative representation. Thanks to a combination of malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder 2001) and clientelism, conservative forces dominated many Latin American legislatures throughout much of the twentieth century, sometimes to the point of wielding an effective veto over redistributive reforms proposed by more-progressive executives (Collier and Collier 1991; Hagopian 1996; Albertus 2015). Reformist governments in Chile in the 1930s and 1940s, Brazil in the 1950s and early 1960s, and Peru in the 1960s were all stymied by conservative legislatures (Collier and Collier 1991). Similar dynamics may be observed in the contemporary era. In post-transition Brazil, for example, even mild land and labor reform initiatives sponsored by the José Sarney government were blocked by Congress (Hagopian 1996). And in Chile, right-wing parties in Congress – their strength magnified by a distortionary electoral system and appointed senators – blocked or watered down many of the redistributive reforms proposed by Socialist presidents Lagos and Michelle Bachelet. More recently, as Garay (2016, this volume) shows, the Chilean and Mexican legislatures scaled back universalistic health care and pension initiatives, resulting in programs that were both less generous and less participatory. In extreme cases, such as Paraguay in 2012 and Brazil in 2016, conservative forces have used legislative institutions to impeach inclusionary presidents (in both cases, on dubious grounds).

The judiciary represents another form of horizontal constraint. In Latin America, courts – particularly those higher in the judicial hierarchy – have also tended to have a broadly elite (and conservative) bias, both in terms of the judges who compose them and the litigants who approach them.<sup>37</sup> To be sure, high courts in some countries have been relatively consistent in enforcing civil and political rights (e.g. in Brazil), and in a few cases high courts have made a name for themselves through vindicating the social and economic rights of vulnerable populations (e.g. the constitutional chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court and

<sup>37</sup> Hilbink (2008) offers an alternative view. Also, in some countries lower instance courts appear more likely to support the claims of the poor; the “alternative law” movement in Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil is one prominent example (Ingram 2016, 298).



Colombia's Constitutional Court, see Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero 2006; Wilson 2009). Nonetheless, such behavior is certainly more the exception than the rule – in part because elected leaders have at their disposal (and have frequently employed) multiple mechanisms to retaliate against courts that issue challenging decisions (see, e.g. Kapiszewski 2012 on inter-branch relations in Argentina). Moreover, judges are hardly immune from bribery and corruption, in which conservative forces may more often have the resources to engage. In short, for multiple reasons, political forces are more likely to use high courts to challenge progressive action than to endorse it, and high courts more likely to strike down progressive policies than to uphold them.

Wealthy elites also influence policy through more informal channels, including campaign finance, bribery, and the media. Election campaigns and other forms of democratic competition open a conduit of influence for those with the means to wield it. The control that conservative, pro-business forces wielded over leading private media outlets in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and other democracies during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries almost certainly influenced both electoral outcomes and policy debates. In addition, clientelistic practices continue to limit inclusionary reform in Latin America (Stokes 1991, 2005; Hagopian 1996; Debs and Helmke 2010). Clientelist vote-buying can undermine poor citizens' capacity to translate their preferences into policy – and in many cases, steers their votes toward more conservative parties. Clientelism also affects interest group politics. As Palmer-Rubin (this volume) shows, clientelist linkages between parties and popular sector interest groups dampen programmatic demands, thereby weakening pressure for inclusionary reform. Finally, clientelism undermines the implementation of inclusionary social policies (see Garay, Hunter, and Dunning and Novaes, this volume). Indeed, as Dunning and Novaes show, even ambitious inclusionary policies adopted by programmatic left-wing governments may be seriously hindered by clientelism.

Thus, while democratic persistence empowers popular sector actors and creates incentives for politicians to make inclusionary appeals, opponents may use the same channels to block or hinder inclusion. They may also deploy their often-considerable resources in defense of the status quo. These efforts are frequently successful – so much so that Albertus, in his comparative study of land reform processes across Latin America, concluded that “democracies are less likely to implement redistributive reform programs than autocracies” (2015, 20).

Indeed, conservative opposition to inclusion has at times generated a somewhat paradoxical outcome. In an effort to circumvent conservative obstacles to inclusionary reform (or in response to threats of conservative reaction), some democratically elected governments took steps to weaken and/or dismantle basic democratic institutions and norms. Chapters by Elkins, Handlin, and Mazzuca (this volume), for instance, all illustrate how the inclusionary forces released by democratic politics have, in some cases, encouraged authoritarian behavior. Elkins's chapter highlights the incentives that inclusionary governments may have to rewrite the rules of the game in an effort to weaken or sideline their opponents – as occurred, to varying degrees, through constitutional replacement and amendment in Bolivia under Evo Morales, Ecuador under Correa, and Venezuela under Chávez. He also points out how the obstacles posed by democratic institutions may create incentives for governments seeking to advance an inclusionary agenda to *concentrate* power by circumventing or weakening institutional constraints (see also Madrid et al. 2010 and Weyland 2013).

Whereas the aforementioned examples speak to ways in which democracy can engender a *desire* among inclusionary leaders to move in an authoritarian direction, Mazzuca's chapter highlights how the commodities boom lent some governments the *capacity* to do so. Specifically, commodity rents allowed inclusionary governments in weakly institutionalized regimes to use social spending to build electorally dominant “rentier populist” coalitions that gave them the support needed to employ plebiscitary strategies to undermine constitutional checks and concentrate power. The commodities boom may thus also have had a double-edged effect on democracy, with consequences for inclusion: the revenue it generated permitted unprecedented social spending while simultaneously empowering some governments to rule in an increasingly despotic manner. This relationship highlights an interesting contrast: the regimes that have emerged in the Andes in the last two decades bear a resemblance to the “delegative democracies” that O'Donnell (1994) posited emerged in the 1990s in certain Latin American countries. However, while O'Donnell argued that the latter emerged during economic crisis, Mazzuca's observation suggests that the former have emerged in part due to economic abundance.

In sum, even as we argue that enduring democracy facilitates the emergence of inclusionary politics and policymaking, democracy itself also creates opportunities for well-endowed conservative forces to mobilize against inclusionary reforms. To some degree, these dynamics simply

represent the expected push and pull of democracy. Yet paradoxically, opposition to inclusion *also* creates incentives for some inclusionary governments to weaken the very democratic institutions that enabled their rise in the first place.

### The Paradox of State Weakness

State weakness may also create obstacles to inclusion. Indeed, if deep inequality and sustained democratization are the principal impetus behind the inclusionary turn of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, persistent state weakness may be the principal obstacle to its effective implementation.<sup>38</sup> Where such weakness is pervasive, constitutionalized recognition is less likely to be respected, new participatory institutions are less likely to be effective, and redistributive social policies are less likely to reach targeted beneficiaries.

State weakness almost invariably has *exclusionary* consequences (O'Donnell 1993, 2001; Caldeira 2000; Brinks 2007). The wealthy can thrive with a weak state, for they have alternatives: they can rely on private schools, private doctors, and private security; when they must deal with the state, they can turn to well-connected friends and, if necessary, bribes. The poor generally lack these options. Consequently, they must rely on public schools, public hospitals and health clinics, and public security, and often have no alternative to depending on inept, corrupt, abusive, and even complicit state bureaucrats.

Moreover, as O'Donnell (1993) so compellingly observed, in large swaths of territory in Latin America, because of state weakness, the legal system (e.g. law, courts, police, prosecutors, and so on) is experienced unequally across classes or territory, often leading to the egregious victimization of the poor and trampling of their rights.<sup>39</sup> States' inability – or unwillingness – to protect citizens, especially the poor, from skyrocketing homicide rates in multiple Latin American countries (including Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil) is arguably the most chilling example of how weak and complicit states (especially the police and military) undermine the regional inclusionary turn by

<sup>38</sup> See Centeno (2002); O'Donnell (1993); Soifer (2015); Centeno et al. (2017); Handlin (2017).

<sup>39</sup> See O'Donnell (1993, 1999); Caldeira (2000); Yashar (2005), 2018; Brinks (2007); Giraudy and Luna (2017).

disempowering individuals and atomizing society.<sup>40</sup> In short, weak states are almost always associated with low-quality citizenship for the poor.

As a result, state deficiencies are associated with lower levels of public trust in political parties and other democratic institutions, and higher levels of public disaffection with the status quo. It is thus in weak states such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, that crises of democratic representation are particularly severe and populist anti-system appeals are most likely to succeed (Mainwaring 2006; Handlin 2017, this volume). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that politicians touting the most radical inclusionary projects have had the greatest electoral success in the Andean region (Cameron, and Handlin, this volume). Empowered by electoral support, radical populists such as Chávez, Correa, and Morales, took office with ambitious inclusionary agendas: they promised “revolutions” or new foundations aimed at “Twenty-First-Century Socialism” or an end to 500 years of exclusion.

Precisely because they inherited weak states, however, Andean populists have been poorly equipped to *actually implement* inclusionary reforms (see Cameron, and Handlin, this volume). The ability to create and sustain new participatory institutions and deliver new social benefits and services requires basic infrastructural power (Mann 1984). Yet this kind of infrastructural power has been in short supply in many parts of Latin America, and in particular in the Andes and Central America. Moreover, revolutionary proclamations notwithstanding, enhancing state capacity is a difficult, complicated project on which radical governments could make little progress in the short term. Thus, although the Bolivian, Ecuadorean, and Venezuelan governments benefited from soaring commodities exports, enabling them to dramatically expand social welfare programs, the weak state infrastructures they inherited limited the effectiveness of service delivery (Vazquez-D’Elia 2014). The result was often *more* inclusionary “parchment” but not necessarily better effects. State deficiency has become especially pronounced in Venezuela, where the Bolivarian state is less and less able to deliver basic social services or protect its citizens from violent crime. State underperformance, in turn, generated public discontent, particularly after the end of the commodities boom, and especially in Venezuela, where the Maduro government used increasingly authoritarian means to stay in power.

<sup>40</sup> See also Brinks (2007); Magaloni et al. (2015); Durán Martínez (2015, 2018); Lessing (2015, 2017); Yashar (2018).

In sum, state weakness simultaneously creates demands for and inhibits greater inclusion. Inclusionary projects built upon weak states face distinctive problems of political and practical sustainability. Over time, ineffective and/or coercive implementation of inclusionary reforms can generate widespread frustration and perceptions of injustice among the very citizens who are expected – and who expect – to benefit from those reforms (Mainwaring 2006). That discontent, in turn, can erode public support for inclusionary projects and for the parties that sponsor them, undermining inclusionary electoral coalitions and thus hampering further reform. For radical inclusionary movements, then, state weakness can be cruelly double-edged: it can both fuel their rise and speed their demise.

### The Paradox of Participation

Finally, reforms aimed at fostering political inclusion via the creation of new participatory institutions may also prove double-edged. The opening of new channels for participation does not guarantee an increase in *popular* participation. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that, in a pluralist context (i.e. one without state intervention to subsidize participation), wealthier and better educated citizens are disproportionately likely to participate in politics (Schattsneider 1960, 35; Verba et al. 1995). By and large, elites and middle-class citizens possess more time, resources, and skills to participate than do low-income citizens. Unless steps are taken to encourage popular participation (e.g. some form of state subsidy), the risk of new participatory institutions being dominated by wealthier citizens – what Collier (this volume) calls “class representational distortion” – will be high.<sup>41</sup> In such contexts, even if participatory institutions raise the absolute level of popular participation, they may actually *reduce* the share of popular participation relative to the rest of society. Indeed, studies of who actually engages with new participatory institutions in Latin America suggests that the record has been quite mixed (Avritzer 2009; Mayka and Rich, and Goldfrank, this volume).

Moreover, the more inclusionary politics become, the narrower, more routine, and more regularized participation may become. That is, participation may be more likely to be channeled through electoral and partisan avenues than street protests; voting levels may be sustained only where it

<sup>41</sup> We thank Jason Seawright for emphasizing this point.

is mandated; and the very social movements that successfully demanded inclusion might lose their convocatory powers once inclusionary reforms are passed and implemented. In short, the institutionalization of participation may paradoxically lead to its normalization and attenuation – a point made by scholars writing from very different political persuasions (see Almond and Verba 1965; Huntington 1968; Piven and Cloward 1977; and Alvarez and Escobar 1992, for example).

The only way to sustain popular participation may be to subsidize or mandate it. Yet, if states heavily subsidize participation, as in the case of state corporatism in mid-twentieth-century Latin America (Collier and Collier 1979, 1991), a different dilemma emerges. Access to state benefits (or what Collier and Collier 1979 call “inducements”) may encourage the mobilization and participation of the popular sectors but may also provide governments with tools to manipulate and control popular sector actors. Inevitably, state-led initiatives aimed at mobilizing popular sectors simultaneously enhance state control over those actors.

To be sure, Latin American polities are far more democratic today than they were seventy years ago: politicians depend heavily on popular sector constituencies for electoral support, and are unlikely to employ the coercive tools used by earlier populist leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas, Juan Perón, and Getúlio Vargas. Yet as we suggested previously, and the chapters by Goldfrank, Mayka and Rich, and Palmer-Rubin all highlight, there are important parallels between the corporatist structures that mediated state and popular sector relations during the twentieth century and the nominally participatory or deliberative institutions in contemporary Latin America. Current state–society relations still entail *both* inducement and constraints, despite the balance being tilted more heavily toward the former than was true in the past (Collier and Collier 1979). And participation in the form of popular mobilization still creates a trade-off for popular sectors and political elites alike: popular sectors need to balance the lure of increased access against the possibility of increased cooptation (or loss of autonomy); political elites may view emergent social actors at once as potential allies and potential threats (to social order, to governability, or to powerful economic interests).

#### CONCLUSION: SUSTAINING AND CONSOLIDATING CITIZENSHIP

This chapter has grappled with a set of profound sociopolitical changes that began in Latin America as the twentieth century ended and

accelerated as the twenty-first century began. We conceptualized inclusion broadly and then concentrated on state policies and reforms that enhanced recognition, access, and resources of previously marginalized groups (with a focus on the popular sectors, in particular). We described the general contours of, and identified some trends in, the region's contemporary inclusionary turn. We argued that the turn was made possible by the unprecedented endurance of democracy in the context of deep and persistent inequality, and we identified some hypotheses that may help to account for intra-regional variation in inclusionary reforms. Finally, we highlighted several paradoxes that attend and complicate inclusionary politics.

In this brief conclusion, we turn to the sustainability and meaningfulness of inclusionary reform in contemporary Latin America. Movement toward greater inclusion is neither inevitable nor irreversible, even under democracy. Democracy may facilitate inclusionary politics in the long run, but in the short-to-medium term, the vagaries of politics invariably yield diverse outcomes. The simultaneous introduction of reforms both promoting and limiting inclusion (as with the adoption in the 1990s of reforms aimed at augmenting recognition and access alongside exclusionary neoliberal reforms), and episodes of conservative pushback following periods of inclusionary progress (as in post-2016 Brazil and post-2019 Bolivia), are to be expected.

Inclusionary outcomes are also shaped by the economic context. The commodities boom arguably accelerated the process of inclusion, particularly resource-related reforms. So too, falling commodity prices and lower growth rates – in particular, in the dire economic context of the Covid-19 pandemic – could provide leaders a justification to limit social and economic programs, likely exacerbating distributive conflict.

The sustainability of inclusionary reforms will also hinge, in part, on the international landscape. The unprecedented coexistence of inclusion and liberal democracy in the 1990s and 2000s was facilitated by highly favorable international conditions, including the end of the Cold War and the absence of viable regional alternatives to democracy. Even under these distinctively auspicious conditions, however, signs of tension emerged. In Honduras and Paraguay, elites used undemocratic means to abort mild inclusionary projects. In Bolivia and Venezuela, inclusionary projects triggered intense and violent polarization that threw democratic regimes into serious crisis. Partly as a result, inclusionary governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Bolivia, concluded that the success of their political and socioeconomic projects required a

concentration of power that threatened liberal rights and institutions of horizontal accountability. If parts of the international environment have had the positive effect on inclusion that we posit, and if these sort of tensions and paradoxes emerged even under these favorable international circumstances, the recent global turn toward illiberalism could bode poorly for the longevity of the region's inclusionary reforms. The rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil and the 2019 overthrow of Evo Morales in Bolivia are especially troubling developments in this regard.

Nonetheless, as long as democratic institutions predominate in Latin America, extant inclusionary reforms may endure. Inclusionary social welfare policies are often sticky (Pierson 1994) as their rollback tends to be unpopular and politically difficult. Rights that have been formally extended are rarely withdrawn formally under democracy. Thus, while democracy persists, there may be limits to the degree to which even the most powerful conservative movements can put the inclusionary genie back in the bottle. Indeed, most of the conservative administrations that have followed inclusion-oriented governments in Latin America in recent years – Macri in Argentina, Piñera in Chile – have been reluctant to roll back inclusionary reforms (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017). The Bolsonaro government in Brazil, however, represents a stark exception. Within days of taking office in January 2019, Brazil's new leader had already threatened to dismantle a range of inclusionary reforms, particularly those that provide recognition, access, and resources to racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. To what degree democratic norms will constrain Bolsonaro from rolling back inclusionary reforms, and to what extent his exclusionary politics will diffuse across the region, remain to be seen.

Even if the inclusionary reforms of the last quarter century manage to survive, at least on parchment, the more fundamental question of whether these reforms will consolidate into meaningful citizenship remains open. The answer will depend upon the degree to which parchment promises are put into practice. The formal instantiation of inclusionary aspirations has already had a profound impact in Latin America. However, as is well known, a vast gap often exists between reforming constitutions and institutions declaring rights, designing policies and programs, and passing laws, on the one hand, and the implementation and enforcement of those norms on the other.<sup>42</sup> A persistent gap between parchment innovations and their practical effects could inhibit the inclusionary turn from

<sup>42</sup> This dichotomy is nicely captured by the distinction the law and society literature draws between “law on the books” and “law in action” (Pound 1910).



generating more meaningful citizenship in contemporary Latin America.<sup>43</sup> It is thus critical that we assess the size and content of the parchment–practice gaps that materialize and seek to explain why the implementation and effect of inclusionary reforms varies across the region.

States will play a crucial role. State strength and state capacity can significantly affect the speed, scope, and degree of implementation of inclusionary reforms, as the chapters by Cameron, Handlin, Mazzuca, and Elkins all highlight. Without a doubt, state strength and capacity vary across Latin America and within countries. Yet the issue is even more complicated. The various goals that states set out to achieve – order, development, inclusion – often require different kinds of state capacity (and governing coalitions); achieving some goals requires control at the center; achieving others requires infrastructural power throughout the country (Centeno et al. 2017, chap. 1).

Politics also matters. While effective state institutions are essential for inclusion, they only matter to the degree that political actors deploy them for inclusionary ends (Centeno et al. 2017, chaps. 1 and 15). The relationship between state capacity and inclusion is mediated by political actors' will and capacity to wield state power in ways that augment inclusion. As such, social movements, parties, and the coalitions they construct strongly influence how inclusionary politics develop and if inclusionary reforms are implemented.

Focusing on politics raises another important issue, one that Roberts insightfully highlights in the volume's concluding chapter: while Latin America has grown more inclusionary, the class-based actors with a capacity to mobilize collectively and scale up to the national level, such as organized labor and labor-based parties, have weakened across the region. The diverse movements and organizations that have emerged in their place are more diffuse, fragmented, and decentralized, with more limited capacity for scaling up and sustaining collective mobilization (see Collier and Handlin 2009; and Collier, this volume).

Uncertainties over the future of inclusionary politics have been exacerbated by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. In Latin

<sup>43</sup> Even if reforms are effectively implemented, societal attitudes and behaviors may be slow to adapt. The introduction of constitutional reforms recognizing indigenous people does not mean that nonindigenous citizens will treat them equally. Decentralization and establishing participatory institutions are important first steps, but they do not automatically generate more participatory politics.

America, it is clear that the pandemic's massive human and economic toll will fall disproportionately on the poor, including Afro-Latin and indigenous communities, and that the associated fiscal crisis will likely strain redistributive social policy initiatives. The crisis may also weaken, at least temporarily, efforts at popular sector organization and mobilization. Indeed, the cycle of mobilization that the region witnessed in late 2019 and early 2020 was quashed by the outbreak. At the same time, the enormous state and policy deficiencies exposed by the public health crisis may also strengthen demands for a more activist state to provide broader social protection.

Overall, the contemporary inclusionary turn has deepened citizenship for millions of Latin Americans who had previously lacked recognition, access, and resources. Yet whether this inclusionary turn will consolidate into broad and effective citizenship across the region is anything but clear. There are theoretical reasons for both pessimism and optimism. We hope this volume energizes and accelerates an emerging debate about these and related issues, which could prove so consequential for politics, and the popular sectors, in contemporary Latin America.

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# Appendix




FIGURE I. 2 Total yearly and cumulative inclusionary reforms for each country in Latin America




FIGURE 1.3 Cumulative yearly inclusionary reforms by type for each country in Latin America




FIGURE I.3 (cont.)




FIGURE I.3 (cont.)





PART I

EXTENDING SOCIAL POLICY AND  
PARTICIPATION



## Including Outsiders in Latin America

Candelaria Garay

### INTRODUCTION

Labor representation has been one of the central political issues shaping the formation of party systems and regime dynamics in Latin America throughout much of the twentieth century. As shown by Ruth and David Collier in *Shaping the Political Arena* (SPA), in the first half of the twentieth century, states led by middle-class reformist movements recognized labor unions as legitimate actors, established institutions of negotiation for labor unions and the state, and launched labor and social policies that benefited workers. In some cases, state leaders created political parties that affiliated labor unions and mobilized workers as a support base on a massive scale, spawning enduring loyalties.

Despite their centrality, these processes of labor incorporation left large swaths of popular sectors excluded from labor and social security legislation as well as from structures of interest representation. I refer to these marginalized groups collectively as “outsiders” in order to distinguish them from “insiders” or protected formal-sector workers. Throughout much of the twentieth century, outsiders, which comprised rural workers, the unemployed, and the urban informal sector, remained unprotected or underserved by social policy. Far from being a small fraction of the population, by 1990 outsiders and their dependents represented between 40 and 80 percent of the total population in the eight countries analyzed in SPA, and a large share of this group lived in poverty.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Estimates from Garay (2016).

Early in the third wave of democracy, scholars were pessimistic about the likelihood that the exclusion of outsiders would be addressed through state policy, or that these sectors would be capable of achieving stronger representation. Much of the literature saw inclusion as being constrained by the exhaustion of inward-oriented industrialization and the financial scarcity brought about by the debt crisis and ensuing market reforms.<sup>2</sup> The extension of clientelistic linkages to the poor by parties seeking the low-income vote further reinforced these expectations.<sup>3</sup> Yet starting in the 1990s, several countries began to include outsiders by launching unprecedented social policy initiatives. By 2010, virtually all of the cases studied in SPA had established significant social programs, particularly in policy areas previously characterized by a sharp divide between insiders and outsiders – pensions, health care, and income support. Across countries, moreover, there was important variation along critical features of these programs – concerning the scope of the benefits, whether implementation was participatory (i.e. involving outsider organizations), and whether the benefits were discretionary or not.

The goal of this chapter is to characterize and explain the expansion of social policy to outsiders in the countries analyzed in SPA. I will show that expansion has been propelled by different political dynamics and has resulted in different patterns of social policy across countries. One of these patterns consists of the expansion of large-scale nondiscretionary social policy, which was a critical tool that national incumbents in democratic regimes used to secure continuity when they faced electoral competition for outsider voters. Expansion was also a response to social movements and labor union allies demanding broad social-policy protections. If social movements were involved in policy design, larger and more generous programs, which I call *inclusive*, were launched. This was the case in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. If conservatives had influence over policy design and no social movements participated in policymaking, *restrictive* social policies were launched. This is what occurred in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. In contrast, incumbents in (semi) authoritarian regimes used politicized or *discretionary* social policy expansion to mobilize outsiders behind their projects when they faced threats to their continuity, as in Venezuela in the 2000s. In other cases, incentives for expansion were attenuated or nonexistent, and *limited* social policy or

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Kurtz (2004).

<sup>3</sup> For example, Roberts (1995); Levitsky (2003); Magaloni (2006).

no policy initiatives took shape, as exemplified by the case of Peru after the fall of Fujimori and the beginning of a new democracy in 2000.

In the next sections, I analyze attempts to *include outsiders*, or extend social policy protections for outsiders, since the beginning of the third wave of democracy in the late 1970s. I first discuss the situation of outsiders during the period of labor incorporation and the legacy of this experience. I then present the different patterns of social policy established in the eight cases analyzed in SPA, discuss alternative explanations, and introduce the proposed explanatory framework to account for these patterns. The final part of this chapter analyzes four cases that each correspond to a different pattern of social policy for outsiders: Argentina (inclusive), Mexico (restrictive), Venezuela (discretionary), and Peru (limited).

## INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

### Labor Incorporation and Its Legacy

As analyzed by Collier and Collier (1991), labor incorporation in the first half of the twentieth century shaped party systems and regime stability in Latin America's middle-income countries for decades. Incorporation consisted of "the first attempt of the state to shape an institutionalized labor movement" (p. 783). It involved the creation of institutions that would link labor unions to the state as well as the extension of state policy for workers. Although labor incorporation involved top-down processes initiated by state leaders, two major types of incorporation took shape: *state incorporation*, which was carried out under authoritarian regimes by leaders who sought to depoliticize the labor movement in alliance with traditional elites, and *party incorporation*, which was mediated by pre-existing parties or new populist parties that sought the loyalty of labor unions.

Labor protections, state-sanctioned forms of representation, and the social benefits extended to insiders – often on a group-by-group basis at first, and later on within broader, more homogeneous systems of social protection – were out of reach for outsiders and their dependents in the countries analyzed in SPA.<sup>4</sup> In Argentina and Uruguay, the countries with the largest urban populations, health care services and social security

<sup>4</sup> See Mesa Lago (1978, 1989), Malloy (1979), and Borzutzky (2002).

programs for outsiders were launched during labor incorporation, but the latter were generally not implemented.

Although institutions regulating and organizing rural labor were established in several countries, for many years they were poorly enforced or not enforced at all (ILO 1960). For example, rural unions in Chile were authorized by law but banned by administrative fiat until the 1960s (Loveman 1976; Kurtz 2004). Large swaths of outsiders were also marginalized from the vote in some countries. In Brazil, Chile, and Peru, literacy requirements resulted not only in the exclusion but also the manipulation of low-income voters, especially in rural areas.<sup>5</sup> In these cases, existing populist parties or the parties that emerged after incorporation to represent the working classes could not mobilize the popular sectors electorally at a large scale.

During democratic regimes prior to the third wave, outsiders primarily supported the populist parties that emerged in the context of labor incorporation. Outsiders were loyal supporters of the Peronist Party (PJ) in Argentina and of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. In cases of incorporation by traditional parties, which cleaved the electorate vertically and geographically, outsiders supported these elite parties along regional divides. This was the case in Uruguay, where low-income sectors voted for the Colorados in the cities and the Blancos in the countryside.<sup>6</sup>

The legacy of labor incorporation, as Collier and Collier demonstrate, was the formation of party systems that were more or less capable of channeling and moderating social and political conflict during the 1960s, when economic internationalization on the one hand, and the radicalization of the left on the other, challenged existing power arrangements. During this period, there were attempts to include outsiders. As noted in SPA, both social and rural movements as well as political parties sought to mobilize outsiders in their quest for social transformation or for power. Rising centrist parties, such as the Christian Democrats in Chile, as well as church-based movements and left-wing parties competed to build strong support among outsiders.<sup>7</sup> An important expansion of health care services took place during these years in Chile. This period also saw the activation of some of the institutions of representation that had long

<sup>5</sup> See Oxhorn (1995) and Malloy (1979).

<sup>6</sup> See Collier and Collier (1991) and Luna (2007).

<sup>7</sup> See Oxhorn (1995) and Houtzager (1998).

existed on paper but had not been enforced – such as rural unions (Kurtz 2004).

In countries that witnessed regime collapse amid intense conflict, military dictatorships repressed social organizations and sometimes extended social programs to outsiders. These initiatives sought to co-opt outsiders' organizations and/or to dampen contention while selectively repressing their leadership.<sup>8</sup> In Brazil, rural pensions and health services were selectively extended to contain and co-opt the rural unions established under the João Goulart administration in 1963–1964.<sup>9</sup> In Chile, the military dictatorship (1973–1990) launched benefits for outsiders at a time of economic crisis in order to dampen protests, and it selectively excluded and repressed the communities that were involved in contention.<sup>10</sup>

Labor incorporation and its legacy marginalized large swaths of outsiders. Coalitions between insiders and outsiders were not common, since labor incorporation was a top-down project that limited horizontal ties across unions and organizations that attempted to represent outsiders, as in the case of Mexico, where workers and peasants were organized separately. Although some social policy initiatives were extended for outsiders, the beginning of the third wave of democracy saw the persistence of a deep divide separating insiders and outsiders. This divide was caused not only by differences in job security and stability, as in advanced democracies,<sup>11</sup> but also by outsiders' dramatic lack of social protections.

### The Third Wave of Democracy

In contrast with the prior period of incorporation and its legacy analyzed by Collier and Collier (1991), outsiders gained political influence during the third wave of democracy. Not only did outsiders claim large numbers, which made them particularly relevant in competitive elections, but institutional changes that established full suffrage were introduced in countries that lacked inclusive elections, further increasing outsiders' importance (e.g. Peru and Brazil). Migration to urban areas decisively increased political parties' ability to mobilize outsiders, as well as outsiders' ability to engage in collective action. In contrast with the period stretching from the 1920s to 1960, the average outsider in most of the countries studied in SPA was no longer rural but was now an urban

<sup>8</sup> See Oxhorn (1995) and Houtzager (1998). <sup>9</sup> See Garay (2016, 96–100).

<sup>10</sup> Hunneus (2000); Etchemendy (2011). <sup>11</sup> Esping Andersen (1999).

dweller. It was within this environment that incumbents set out to include outsiders through social policy.

#### PATTERNS OF SOCIAL POLICY FOR OUTSIDERS

All the countries studied in SPA launched social programs during the 1990s and 2000s and did so across three policy areas that previously showed deep insider–outsider divides: health care, pensions, and income support (comprising family allowances and/or other conditional and unconditional transfers for households with children). By 2010, when these countries had all experienced democratic politics – sometimes interrupted by competitive, semi-authoritarian, or full authoritarian regimes (as in Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) – we can identify four patterns of social policy for outsiders. What differentiates these patterns is the extent to which policies were expanded and whether or not the resulting benefits were nondiscretionary, meaning governed by clear eligibility rules and treating everyone who qualified equally (see Lieberman 1998).

One pattern – the most common among the SPA countries – entails the adoption of *large-scale nondiscretionary benefits*.<sup>12</sup> Two alternatives exist between this outcome and one in which no benefits are created. One, which I call *limited social policy*, is characterized by reduced benefits that reached less than 35 percent of the relevant outsider population across most or all of the key policy areas. The other consists of the establishment of broad social benefits that are *discretionary* in all or some of the key policy areas.

Only large-scale nondiscretionary expansion constitutes a stable pattern of inclusion and a novel set of social policy initiatives. Discretionary social benefits are likely to be unstable and easily reversed due to their politicized and weakly institutionalized nature. In the cases of no expansion and of limited social policy, (further) expansion affecting the scope and level of benefits may take place in the future.

Two social policy models emerged among cases of large-scale nondiscretionary expansion: one model, which I call *inclusive*, entails generous benefits that are nearly universal and involves some social participation in their implementation.<sup>13</sup> A second model, which I call

<sup>12</sup> A program is considered *large scale* if it reaches at least 35 percent of the relevant outsider population (e.g. outsider seniors in the case of pensions). See Garay (2016, 340).

<sup>13</sup> Inclusive programs cover at least 70% of outsiders with benefits and services similar or equal to those of low income insiders. See Garay (2016, 340–341 and chap. 2).



*restrictive*, reaches a smaller share of the outsider population and provides less generous benefits.<sup>14</sup>

Across the eight cases analyzed in SPA, different cross-national patterns of social policy for outsiders took shape by 2010. Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay developed *inclusive* social programs that covered the vast majority of outsiders across select policy areas with benefits similar to those of low-income insiders; some of these benefits also allowed for participatory implementation. Chile, Colombia, and Mexico extended *restrictive* social programs that reached a smaller though still significant share of outsiders with more modest benefits. Finally, Venezuela launched broad-reaching *discretionary* benefits, with allocation subject to political considerations, while Peru is marked by the absence of significant social policy initiatives, or *limited social policy*, with less than one-third of outsiders receiving benefits by 2010.

#### ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

What accounts for the expansion of large-scale nondiscretionary benefits in Latin America? Why are some social policies inclusive and others restrictive? And under what conditions do governments adopt discretionary or limited social policies?

Existing literature suggests that the commodities boom that hit Latin America in the first decade of the twenty-first century propelled or made possible the expansion of social policy for outsiders. Another argument, elaborated in Wendy Hunter's chapter in this volume, contends that international diffusion explains why outsiders became the target of the large-scale social investments addressed here. As I argue below, these arguments do not adequately account for the motivations underlying the expansion of social policy, the timing of expansion, and the varied policy models that were adopted across policy areas.

#### The Commodities Boom

Whereas some studies suggest that export-driven growth during the commodities boom of the 2000s allowed left-leaning politicians to implement redistributive agendas (Levitsky and Roberts 2011), others build on the *rentier state theory* and highlight the emergence of "rentier populist" regimes in which governments utilized massive export-driven revenues

<sup>14</sup> Restrictive programs cover between 35 and 70% of outsiders with benefits and services that are much more limited than those of insiders. See Garay (2016, 340–341 and chap. 2).

to build a coalition with the informal sector through the expansion of conditional cash transfers (CCTs).<sup>15</sup>

The argument that during times of abundance leaders in highly unequal societies channel resources to the historically excluded, or that leaders in rentier states will seek to retain power through the massive expansion of CCTs to the poor, faces both empirical and theoretical challenges. Empirically, the timing of social policy adoption does not neatly fit the expectations in these arguments, as governments launched large-scale social programs during times of recession, modest growth, and commodity windfalls (Garay 2016). Furthermore, theories based on resource-led growth fail to explain why politicians created strikingly different social programs across countries. For example, the social policies launched during Venezuela's commodity boom by Hugo Chávez (1998–2013), the paradigmatic case of “rentier populism” (Mazzuca 2013), comprised discretionary benefits and only established a very small cash transfer program in Chávez's final year in office. In Peru, which was one of the world's fastest-growing economies in the early twenty-first century, governments did not launch significant social policy initiatives for outsiders.

The question of why leaders would channel high export-led revenues toward outsiders remains unexplained by these arguments. Why would state authorities channel benefits to outsiders and not to other sectors or to other policy areas, such as infrastructure investments or employment creation? Resources may facilitate expansion on the part of leaders who are already determined to extend benefits to millions of outsiders, but resources in and of themselves do not drive expansion. In addition, they are not good predictors of why some countries, such as Chile, created less encompassing social policies than others, such as Uruguay or Brazil.

### Diffusion of Social Policy

Another potential explanation for expansion emphasizes the diffusion of social protection models (see Hunter, this volume). In this framework, policy *principles* (e.g. universality) or policy *models* (e.g. social security, CCTs) spread over time from one geographically proximate place to another, gradually resulting in policy change (see Weyland 2006, 19–21). Diffusion typically occurs either through international entities

<sup>15</sup> Also see Mazzuca (2013) and this volume.

that exert pressure on governments to expand protections and/or promote specific blueprints, or through policymakers' adoption of models or policy blueprints that seem appropriate for a particular problem.

By itself, however, diffusion does not adequately account for the patterns of expansion of pensions, income support, and health care services for outsiders in the eight cases examined here. A diffusion-based explanation is limited in at least three ways. First, evidence for the role of diffusion mechanisms in policy adoption is thin. Studies of the policy-making processes leading up to expansion across the country cases and policy areas under study reveal little evidence of emulation or of international agencies guiding policy decisions (see Garay 2016). Cash transfers, for example, were initiated domestically by some of the early adopters – such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico – without international agencies or cross-country emulation playing a relevant role. Second, the diffusion approach understates the diversity of policies adopted across the region. The policy models adopted by Latin American governments do not converge on a particular blueprint. Rather, different types of social programs – in terms of coverage, generosity, mechanisms of implementation, and funding – may be observed in different policy areas and country cases. Finally, it is also difficult to establish the source of diffusion, as several countries adopted large-scale benefits at roughly the same time. Moreover, neither specific programs, such as cash transfers and old-age pensions, nor the policy principles of fighting poverty and improving child welfare were new to the region in the 1990s.

#### EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF SOCIAL POLICY FOR OUTSIDERS

What explains incumbents' decisions to expand pensions, health care, and income programs for outsiders? And what accounts for the different patterns of social policy adopted across cases? I argue that both the political regime type and the presence of electoral competition for outsider voters and/or social mobilization from below create different incentives for states to include or exclude outsiders in social policy. These factors help explain whether social policy is extended to outsiders, and which kinds of social programs are established. Large-scale nondiscretionary benefits are established in democratic regimes with electoral competition for outsiders and/or social mobilization for policy expansion. Limited social policy occurs in democracies without competition or mobilization, or in which incentives are attenuated by institutional factors that depress incumbents' chances of continuity in power. Broad

discretionary benefits emerge in (semi) authoritarian regimes in which incumbents fear losing their continuity in power due to electoral challenges or broad mobilization. Finally, no expansion occurs in authoritarian regimes that lack these incentives to reach out to outsiders for support. I lay out the argument below.

### Democracy

In democratic regimes in which there is a social policy divide, incumbents are likely to expand large-scale nondiscretionary social policies for outsiders when they face high levels of electoral competition for these voters and/or large-scale social mobilization pushing for social policy expansion through protest, institutional channels, or alliances with the governing party.<sup>16</sup> In the face of these pressures, incumbents will consider social policy expansion to be (1) a powerful instrument to elicit outsiders' electoral support when a credible challenger threatens to defeat the incumbent party by courting outsider voters, and (2) a necessary measure to mitigate intense pressure that can seriously reduce the incumbent's popularity and/or destabilize their administration.

*Electoral competition for outsiders* is understood as the existence of a party that can defeat the incumbent by gaining significant electoral support among outsiders. Electoral competition may occur when outsider voters either (1) are not aligned with any particular party and thus are ready to be mobilized by different parties or (2) constitute the electoral bastion of a given party but encounter a credible challenger who seeks to gain their support. The dynamics characterized here thus entail a situation in which outsiders are not the stable constituency of any party competing for the presidency.

The importance of electoral competition is based on the premise that incumbents care about their or their parties' continuity in power. Continuity is uncertain in democratic regimes in which parties compete in free and fair elections. The rise of a challenger who vigorously appeals to outsiders to win office may undermine incumbents' continuity, especially when outsiders constitute a significant portion of the electorate. When incumbents face electoral competition for outsiders, they have a strong incentive to appeal to them and secure their support.

<sup>16</sup> On the political regime and social policy, see Lake and Baum (2001) among others.

These incentives, however, may be severely undercut by institutional environments that reduce incumbents' time horizons. Specifically, incumbents expect continuity under at least one of two conditions: when they can be reelected and when their political parties are minimally stable organizations. The absence of both reelection provisions and stable party organization restricts the possibility of continuity in power, and undermines the incentives for embarking on social policy expansion. Given the unlikelihood of continuity, incumbents may simply create small benefits that show concern for the poor, without embarking on the taxing process of expansion.

For incumbents facing electoral competition for outsiders, social policy expansion provides an opportunity to reach out to voters that are heterogeneous (including, for example, rural workers, the unemployed, and/or the urban informal sectors) with badly needed tangible benefits. Provisions that all outsiders value include health care services that alleviate high medical costs, increase access to treatments, or transfers that provide often modest but stable income for young children and seniors. Unlike investments, production-related credits, and employment programs, social benefits can reach millions of beneficiaries simultaneously and throughout the country, which is what incumbents facing intense competition hope to accomplish.

The second incentive for large-scale nondiscretionary expansion is *social mobilization from below*, here defined as a sustained process launched by a coalition of social movements and labor unions making demands on the state for social benefits for outsiders. As I discuss elsewhere, these coalitions of social movements and labor unions may resort to protest or may work through institutional channels or an allied party in office to advance their demands (Garay 2016).

Social movement coalitions demand specific kinds of provisions and often develop proposals that they submit to incumbents for consideration. These demands and proposals are generally inspired by existing benefits for insiders. What outsiders generally want when they mobilize is to obtain provisions that are comparable to those of a low-income formal worker.

Incumbents and opposition parties competing for outsider voters, as well as social movements, prefer social programs to be nondiscretionary. Incumbents worry that if there is bias in the distribution of benefits, this will undermine their reputation vis-à-vis challengers, who in turn worry that incumbents will use benefits selectively to their advantage to ensure continuity in office (see De la O 2015). Social movements in turn fear

exclusion from social programs or the strengthening of party machines – which they generally oppose – if benefits are not transparent. Incumbents in turn seek to dampen pressure from social movements and avoid perceptions of clientelism in large-scale programs, and thus strive to make benefits nondiscretionary. The strategic interests of these different actors in the context of intense competition and/or large social mobilization lead to efforts to create nondiscretionary benefits.

The dynamics of the expansion of large-scale nondiscretionary benefits within democratic regimes therefore feature two politically-driven processes: one “from above,” motivated by electoral competition for outsider voters that credibly threatens incumbents’ continuity, and one “from below,” propelled by social mobilization.

When democracies lack electoral competition for outsiders and social mobilization from below, incumbents are less likely to embark on the expansion of large-scale, nondiscretionary social benefits. Rather, they are more likely to establish small programmatic or discretionary benefits to show some concern for the poor. This situation has been characteristic of some democratic administrations during the third wave. It describes the case of Peru today, where electoral competition is attenuated by politicians’ limited time horizons in the absence of a stable party system and consecutive reelection. Social policy initiatives in this case have been extended across policy areas but reach only modest coverage, as analyzed below.

### **Authoritarian Regimes**

In authoritarian regimes, the main incentives to initiate social policy expansion for outsiders are typically not present, and therefore incumbents are unlikely to embark on any innovations. In these settings, electoral competition is either nonexistent or severely constrained, and outsiders are less likely to mobilize and press for benefits, due to the absence of democratic freedoms.<sup>17</sup> However, social mobilization and electoral competition – even if it is less intense – may take shape, especially in competitive authoritarian regimes, which may be characterized by power abuses, intimidation, and restrictions of the opposition, but not by massive civil rights violations (See Levitsky and Way

<sup>17</sup> See Magaloni (2006) and Yashar (2005).

TABLE 2.1 *Regime type, political incentives for expansion, and social policy for outsiders*

		Regime Type	
		Democratic	Authoritarian/ Semi Authoritarian
Electoral Competition for Outsiders/Social Mobilization?	Yes	Large, nondiscretionary	Discretionary, often large
	No	Limited social policy (discretionary or not)	No significant initiatives

Source: based on Garay (2016).

2010). Within regimes marked by intense social conflict and deteriorated democratic institutions, or in competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents are likely to initiate social programs that are discretionary and often large if they face high electoral competition, social mobilization, or a mobilized opposition that challenges the incumbent's hold on power.

Incumbents are likely to use policy benefits as a form of patronage to undermine the opposition or to mobilize supporters behind their projects. As shown in the next section, in Venezuela in the 2000s, President Hugo Chávez, facing intense anti-government protests, set out to mobilize low-income voters through participatory social policy provisions in order to secure their support and underpin his continuity in power. In other cases, rising electoral competition led the incumbent to expand benefits to mobilize outsiders' votes, undercut support for the opposition, and strengthen the incumbent's connection with the poor – as in the Salinas administration during Mexico's transition to democracy (see Magaloni et al. 2007; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2016). Incumbents are also likely to combine policy expansion with repression and intimidation of opposition politicians or social movements. In all cases, the resulting policies are likely to be broad and discretionary, tailored to incumbents' political needs.

Combinations of regime type and the presence or absence of these two mechanisms yield four social policy outcomes, displayed in Table 2.1. State leaders within (semi)authoritarian regimes launch broad, discretionary benefits in their quest for continuity when they face rising challengers competing for outsider votes or potentially destabilizing social

mobilization from below (top, right quadrant). In all cases, expansion is combined with some form of repression of challenger parties or social movements. Authoritarian incumbents facing none of these pressures do not expand social policy, as they have no incentive to reach out to outsider voters or dampen pressure from below. Several of the dictatorships that were in place before the third wave of democracy (e.g. Argentina 1976–1983) fit this pattern (bottom, right quadrant).

State leaders in democracies launch large-scale, nondiscretionary policy expansion to secure or consolidate outsiders' votes when they face close electoral competition for these voters (top, left quadrant). Finally, incumbents in democracies who do not face any of these incentives establish social programs that are small scale and generally nondiscretionary (bottom, left quadrant). Examples include Chile in the 1990s, and Peru in the 2000s.

### Restrictive vs. Inclusive Social Policy

The expansion of large-scale nondiscretionary social policy, which constitutes the most important attempt to include outsiders during the third wave, features variations in program design that result in two distinct policy models. Looking at the scope of coverage, benefit levels, and the presence of participatory or state-centric implementation, I identify two distinct models and refer to them as *inclusive* and *restrictive*. The inclusive model features policies that provide relatively generous benefits – comparable to those received by low-income insiders – to all or a large pool of outsiders and tend to involve some level of social participation in policy implementation. The restrictive model, by contrast, involves policies that provide fewer benefits to a more limited pool of outsiders and are implemented in a nonparticipatory way.

Schematically, incumbents negotiate policy design either (1) with political parties in Congress or (2) with social movements in addition to, or instead of, parties in Congress. In a context of social mobilization for policy expansion, it is likely that incumbents will negotiate with movements or respond strategically to their demands.

Policy expansion that results from negotiations in Congress is more likely to reflect the policy preferences of the different parties involved. Parties' influence over policy design, in turn, is shaped by their institutional power. When conservative and center-right parties (whose core constituencies tend to be higher-income) are strong, resultant policies are generally restrictive, reflecting conservatives' preferences for modest benefits and smaller coverage for outsiders. This was the case in Mexico



and Chile in the 2000s, where the policy design process occurred in the context of high electoral competition and strong conservative power and resulted in restrictive policy models.

Incumbents are more likely to adopt an inclusive model when the process of policy design involves negotiations with social movements or strategic responses to movement demands. Social movements and their union allies tend to demand broad benefits comparable to those of insiders as well as participatory implementation. Social movements gain access to negotiations through protests, institutional channels, or building alliances with the governing coalition. Inclusive policies tend to be more participatory when the social movements pressing for policy expansion are not allied with the government. As discussed later, this was the case in Argentina, where social movements and labor allies advanced social policy proposals through protest as well as through institutional channels and negotiations with policymakers.

#### INCLUDING OUTSIDERS: THE CASES

The eight countries analyzed in SPA reveal some variation over time in incumbents' efforts to include outsiders during the third wave of democracy. By 2010, different cross-national patterns of social policy expansion for outsiders across policy areas – health care, pensions, and income support – had taken shape (Table 2.2). In some cases, social policies were launched in response to pressure from social movement coalitions. Social movements then influenced the policy design process. In these cases, *inclusive programs* were created (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay). In others, incumbents launched programs to secure outsiders' electoral support when another party courted these voters in its quest for national office. If social movements were not involved in the policy design process, politicians in office and Congress defined the features of these new policies. In these cases, *restrictive benefits* were extended (Chile, Mexico, Colombia), reflecting the power of conservative parties. In yet other cases, *discretionary social programs* were extended to mobilize outsiders behind a leader's project in the context of a deteriorated democracy or a nondemocratic regime (Venezuela). The case of Peru features *limited social policy* initiatives across policy areas due to attenuated incentives for expansion. Even though electoral competition for outsiders did take shape, the absence of stable parties and/or consecutive reelection provisions reduced the incumbent's (or incumbent party's) chances of continuity, mitigating incentives for expansion.

Below, I analyze one example of each pattern, focusing on Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

TABLE 2.2 *Patterns of social policy c. 2010: Regime type, incentives for social policy expansion, and selected cases*

Regime Type	Authoritarian/Semi Democratic	Authoritarian/Semi Democratic	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
<b>Incentives for expansion</b>	Electoral competition, social mobilization, anti incumbent mobilization	Not present	Visibility of poverty/ Attenuated incentives from competition and mobilization	Electoral competition for outsiders	Social mobilization
<b>Goals of incumbents</b>	Top down mobilization of outsiders, connect outsiders with incumbent, undermine opposition	No goal concerning expansion	Show concern for the poor	Secure outsiders electoral support to ensure continuity in office	Dampen pressures to stabilize government
<b>Social actors representing outsiders in policymaking?</b>	No	No	No	No	Yes
<b>Social policy adopted</b>	Discretionary, broad benefits	No	Limited benefits	Large scale, nondiscretionary (restrictive)	Large scale, nondiscretionary (inclusive)
<b>Selected cases<sup>a</sup></b>	Venezuela 2002 2013	Peru 1990 2000	Peru 2000 2010	Mexico 2001 2010; Chile 2000 2010; Colombia 2000 2010; Uruguay 1999 2006	Argentina 2002 2009; Brazil 1988 1996; Brazil 2002 2010; Uruguay 2006 2010

<sup>a</sup> There is some variation over time in the types of social programs adopted, as discussed in the case studies. Here I only include some cases to illustrate the argument.

### **Inclusive Social Policy in Argentina**

Argentina is a case of inclusive social policy expansion propelled by social mobilization. Large-scale social policy expansion began in 2002 and constitutes one of the most comprehensive attempts to include outsiders in the region. By 2010, over 90 percent of outsider seniors received pensions and over 70 percent of outsider children accessed both income transfers and health care services comparable to those of low-income insiders.<sup>18</sup> Between the return of democracy in 1983 and 2002, no significant social programs for outsiders were launched. The lack of both electoral competition for outsiders<sup>19</sup> and mobilization from below explains why incumbents neglected the social needs of outsiders despite high unemployment and growing poverty in the 1990s.

The emergence of social mobilization from below, primarily led by unemployed workers' movements and allied labor unions demanding social benefits and jobs, helps account for the expansion of social policy. In turn, negotiations between the government and social movements and labor union allies explain the inclusive nature of the resultant benefits. Social movements demanded expansion and often negotiated policy adoption and design with government officials in exchange for reducing protest. They also pressed for expansion and participated in policy design when they could access institutional channels and policymaking councils. And, if they allied with the incumbent coalition, they pressed for and negotiated expansion in exchange for maintaining their support for the government.

These social movement coalitions primarily included unemployed workers' movements that had emerged in the late 1990s, as well as labor unions that had split from the long-standing labor confederation, the CGT (Confederación General de Trabajo), when the latter supported market reforms during Peronist (PJ) Carlos Menem's first presidential administration (1989–1995). These unions formed the CTA (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos), which sought to construct a broad workers' movement by unifying demands of insiders and outsiders around universal benefits.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See data in Garay (2016, 165–166).

<sup>19</sup> Gibson (1997), Dataset of Elections, Argentina 1983–2011.

<sup>20</sup> Svampa and Pereyra (2003) and Garay (2007, 2018). On social movement unions, see Seidman (1994).

These unemployed workers' movements emerged at the end of Menem's second term (1995–1999) and grew throughout the short-lived administration of Fernando de la Rúa of the Alliance (1999–2001), a coalition of the Radical Party (UCR) and the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO), in a context of economic hardship, minimal social policy responses, and failed attempts at expansion. De la Rúa's ill-fated decisions amid a deep financial crisis propelled massive popular demonstrations that led to his resignation, a succession of three interim presidents, and Congress's subsequent appointment of the PJ's Eduardo Duhalde to the presidency in 2002.

Facing large-scale protest and hoping to stabilize his administration, Duhalde expanded social policy for outsiders in unprecedented ways. The CTA and social movements of the unemployed, as well as health-related NGOs and health care worker unions, voiced demands for income transfers and health care services, especially access to prescription drugs, as well as the extension of pension benefits for outsiders.<sup>21</sup> In response, Duhalde created a massive workfare benefit for households headed by low-income outsiders with children, launched universal access to free prescription drugs for users of public health care services, and created a modest pension program for unemployed seniors. Duhalde opened up several arenas of policy negotiation and deliberation in order to reduce contention and respond to social movement demands. In addition to holding formal and informal meetings with movement and labor leaders, he incorporated social organizations into both a national policy council and municipal-level councils overseeing the implementation of the workfare program.

The government feared that if benefits were manipulated or implemented selectively, discontent would fuel protests against clientelism and would discredit the program, thwarting the goal of attaining social peace. This led the president to establish and enforce multiple mechanisms to limit discretion in benefit allocation and to increase transparency by publicizing the benefits, their eligibility conditions, and the database of beneficiaries.<sup>22</sup>

Social policy expansion helped curb protest, which nonetheless remained high.<sup>23</sup> Movements of the unemployed had grown significantly;

<sup>21</sup> Author's Dataset of Protest 1996–2010.

<sup>22</sup> Extensive newspaper searches, government documents, and interviews with key informants provide evidence of the fear of allegations of clientelism and the measures adopted.

<sup>23</sup> Author's Dataset of Protest 1996–2010.

in 2003 there were fourteen federations of unemployed workers, encompassing hundreds of social organizations, which mobilized at least one hundred thousand beneficiaries of social programs in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires alone.<sup>24</sup> Although incumbents could use repression or a combination of repression and concessions to dampen protest, this strategy typically backfired against the government. For example, after stabilizing the economy and achieving some reduction in protest, Duhalde had to call early elections after a police killing of two unemployed protesters triggered massive protest in June 2002.

In an environment of high levels of contention, President Néstor Kirchner of the PJ (2003–2007) extended linkages with unemployed organizations and their labor union allies shortly after winning the 2003 elections. When he took office, there were on average two large protest events per week (including roadblocks, marches, and encampments). In order to stabilize his administration by “controlling the streets,” Kirchner and his ministers met with unemployed workers’ leaders on several occasions.<sup>25</sup> The president further sought to limit protests to gain control of the PJ for his Victory Front (FV) faction within the party. By 2004, a few of the largest social movement organizations allied with the incumbent coalition, reducing contention against the government, which had in turn launched policies oriented at expanding employment, controlling prices, and providing subsidies for energy and foodstuffs (Etchemendy and Garay 2011).

In response to demands by social movements and the CTA, the Kirchner administration continued to expand social policy. Aside from continuing the expansion of primary care services initiated by Duhalde, the government addressed another issue left over from the previous administration: the expansion of pensions. Beginning in 2005, changes were introduced to include all outsider seniors in the existing system for formal workers. A combination of new laws passed by Congress and resolutions from the social security and tax agencies provided outsider seniors with access to a basic pension, health care coverage, and health insurance. By 2007, at least two million outsider seniors were incorporated into the social security system, which attained virtually universal coverage of people aged 65 and older.<sup>26</sup>

In 2007, Kirchner’s wife and successor, Cristina Kirchner, won the presidential election comfortably, facing a weakened opposition and no

<sup>24</sup> Author’s Dataset of Protest 1996–2010.

<sup>25</sup> Author’s Dataset of Protest 1996–2010.

<sup>26</sup> See Garay (2016, chap. 5).

electoral competition for outsiders. With declining approval ratings due to large-scale conflict with agricultural producers, the Cristina Kirchner administration faced a new wave of protest by labor unions and unemployed workers in 2009. In the context of the 2008 international financial crisis, demonstrations began to grow in demand for a “social shield” that would protect workers from dismissals and provide unemployed and informal workers with family allowances.<sup>27</sup> This was a historic demand for social movements and the CTA. Protest mounted when the administration launched a highly discretionary workfare program targeting the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires to consolidate the Kirchners’ grip over a fragmenting PJ coalition. Fearing escalating conflict and facing low approval ratings, Cristina Kirchner extended family allowances by decree, reaching over 70 percent of outsider children with benefits equal to those given to children of formal sector workers.<sup>28</sup> This program replaced the workfare transfers extended by Duhalde in 2002 as well as a small CCT program to which many beneficiaries of the workfare program had transferred starting in 2005.

The inclusion of outsiders in Argentina thus began in 2002 through large-scale transfers, pensions, and health services that were launched in response to pressure from below. These provisions were funded in part with resources from the social security system for formal workers. The mobilization of outsiders and outsiders’ alliances with unions were key to the inclusive nature of the resulting policies, which involved benefits comparable to those of lower-income insiders. When social movements were not allied with the government, the benefits featured participatory implementation. These initiatives were launched at times of both high growth and crisis. Rather than follow a policy blueprint, their features were designed or strongly influenced by the coalition proposing them, which demanded benefits similar to those of formal workers.

### Restrictive Social Policy in Mexico

The expansion of *restrictive* social policy took place in Mexico as a result of intense electoral competition for outsiders in a democratic regime. Accordingly, incumbents embarked on social policy expansion to consolidate the support of outsiders and to offset the appeals of credible

<sup>27</sup> See *La Nación*, August 8, 2009.

<sup>28</sup> Author’s estimates with government data (Garay 2016, 212–217).

competitors. Without reelection in place, the ultimate goal was the continuation of the incumbent party in office.

The Vicente Fox administration (2000–2006) of the center-right National Action Party (PAN), which defeated the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) after seventy years of consecutive rule, launched large-scale programs beginning in 2001 to consolidate the support of outsiders. By 2010, over one-third of school-aged outsider children received income transfers, medical benefits reached about half of the outsider population, and a similar share of outsiders aged sixty-five and older received pensions (Garay 2016: 222–3).

Previous administrations had launched social programs for outsiders, but no incumbent had expanded benefits on such a large scale across policy areas. Beginning in the late 1980s, when the PRI experienced some electoral competition from the center-left Party for the Democratic Revolution (PRD), the Carlos Salinas administration used a highly discretionary social policy initiative, PRONASOL, which included community participation and was strongly identified with the president himself, to solidify electoral support at the expense of the PRD.<sup>29</sup>

The Ernesto Zedillo administration (1994–2000) in turn dismantled PRONASOL due to the discrediting of the program (and of Salinas himself after evidence of corruption and of the program's manipulation came to light). At the time, electoral competition was growing, and this empowered opposition politicians, who vociferously demanded an end to the discretionary allocation of social policy resources. In response, Zedillo initiated PROGRESA (a small-scale CCT), which was partly inspired by one of Salinas's discretionary benefits, Children in Solidarity.

Faced with the need to mobilize outsiders in order to win the 2000 election, Fox campaigned in low-income and rural areas – previously dominated by the PRI – and promised to expand existing social programs. Social policy gained ground in the campaign agenda as competition intensified, with both PRI and PAN candidates promising further provisions.<sup>30</sup>

Fox transformed PROGRESA into a large-scale, nondiscretionary program and established a health insurance program for outsiders. The PAN faced the dilemma of needing to solidify outsiders' support through social policy appeals while simultaneously catering to its

<sup>29</sup> On PRONASOL, see Magaloni et al. (2007); and Cornelius et al. (1994).

<sup>30</sup> Quoted in *Reforma* May 26, 2000.

constituency in the economic elite, which preferred modest government intervention. When proposing and negotiating social policy for outsiders, PAN politicians therefore advocated large-scale, albeit restrictive, social programs that reach a relatively small pool of beneficiaries with modest benefits.

As in other cases in which social policy expansion was propelled by electoral competition for outsider voters, the new policies and their funding required negotiations among parties in Congress. The shape of the resulting policies depended on these parties' social policy preferences and their balance of power. Under Fox, social programs were negotiated in a conservative-dominated Congress in which the PAN lacked a majority, as power in the lower chamber was split between the PAN and PRI and the latter had a plurality in the upper chamber. These negotiations among the PAN and PRI, which had embraced pro-market policies in the 1990s, resulted in restrictive benefits consistent with the incumbent's preferences.

With the rise of Mexico City mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), who promised social policy expansion in an attempt to reach out to low-income voters on a national scale, electoral competition for outsiders intensified between the PAN and the PRD. As the 2006 presidential elections approached, AMLO promised to extend universal pensions if elected – increasing pressure on the incumbent party to expand pensions or to promise to do so if reelected. In response, a few months before the election, Fox launched a small pension program for seniors in indigent households to offset AMLO's appeals. The PAN was reelected by a razor-thin margin in a disputed election. When the new Congress was seated in 2006, the PRD-led coalition had greater institutional power and could negotiate the creation of a larger pension program in exchange for supporting the PAN's 2007 budget. However, the resulting pension benefit was restrictive due to the influence of conservative PAN and PRI legislators on the program's design.

Overall, under PAN governments, large-scale social policy innovations for outsiders were launched to gain and consolidate these sectors' electoral support. Inclusion was a project from above in the context of democratization, in which the opposition, first the PAN and then the PRD, could credibly win office by mobilizing outsiders' support. This expansion took place at a time of modest or limited growth and when Mexico's politics were largely dominated by conservatives, providing a clear example of inclusion when neither a left-wing government nor a commodity boom were present (see Fairfield and Garay 2017).



### Limited Social Policy in Peru

Peru did not launch meaningful social policy innovations for outsiders following the return of democracy. Despite high economic growth in the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s, which was driven by mineral exports, Peru experienced only *limited social policy* expansion. Incumbents initiated small-scale cash transfers, health care programs, and pension schemes that cumulatively resulted in modest but growing policy coverage. Health care expansion was the only initiative that eventually resulted in a *restrictive* program.

The main factors identified as creating incentives for incumbents to expand large-scale nondiscretionary social policy were not strong in Peru during this period. An authoritarian reversal in the 1990s led by Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), as well as the decomposition of the party system (Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Levitsky 2013), did not create incentives for incumbents to embark on large-scale expansion. With the return of democracy, the absence of consecutive reelection and the lack of meaningful party organizations made the prospect of continuity in power unlikely, and attenuated the incentives for reaching outsiders through large-scale social policy, even if candidates competed for outsiders' support in presidential elections and promised policy expansion if elected.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, social movements pressing for policies did not take shape, and thus incumbents did not find strong incentives to engage in large-scale expansion to respond to mobilized demands.

The Popular Action Party (AP) led the first democratic government after defeating the labor-based American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) by a large margin in 1980. During the AP's administration, annual inflation reached three digits and GDP fell by 12 percent in 1983, which shattered the AP's chances of reelection. Alan García of APRA won the presidential election by a landslide in 1985. García did not adopt meaningful social programs for outsiders. His government established a modest temporary workfare program (PAIT) that reached only a small number of low-income outsiders. As the economy worsened, PAIT was defunded due to vocal allegations of political manipulation (Graham 1992, 182).

<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that given the size of the outsider population in Peru (from 75% to 80% of the population), electoral competition for outsiders was present in every election with high competition.

Between 1988 and 1990, the country's GDP fell by 25 percent. Such dramatic economic deterioration, coupled with the government's inability to effectively address the mounting security crisis, severely weakened established parties (Levitsky 2013). In this context, Fujimori, a political outsider promising redistributive policies, won the presidency in 1990.

Once in office, Fujimori launched market-oriented reforms and adopted relatively small discretionary social programs, especially for the urban poor. With the goal of mobilizing electoral support, he created a social investment fund – FONCODES – that targeted discretionary allocations to districts where the opposition was strong (Roberts 1995), as well as primary care initiatives, whose coverage was fairly small (Ewig 2010).

Arguing that the opposition created obstacles for his reform program, Fujimori closed down Congress with a military-backed self-coup in 1992 and called for legislative elections to reform the constitution, inaugurating an authoritarian regime (see Conaghan 2005). After his second reelection, which many considered unconstitutional, the disclosure of Fujimori's participation in a deep web of corruption propelled his resignation.

Fujimori's ten years in power were marked by the existence of an authoritarian regime, party system decomposition, a war against the Shining Path guerrilla movement that resulted in thousands of deaths, and strong popular support for Fujimori until his government's collapse. These factors impeded democratic competition and the emergence of social mobilization, playing against the expansion of nondiscretionary policies for outsiders.

With the return of democracy, the inclusion of outsiders through social policy did not take shape, and only limited social provisions were initiated. The absence of party organizations and immediate reelection diluted incentives for continuity in power. In an increasingly personalistic and fragmented political system, incumbents only launched small-scale benefits or increased the coverage of preexisting social benefits, without seriously committing their administrations to the laborious and costly process of large-scale expansion.

The development of limited social policy is evident during the administration of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), who reached office backed by a personalistic party. Toledo launched the Integrated Health Insurance (SIS) plan in his first year in office, which extended health care services to children, pregnant women, and indigent adults, and promised to

achieve universal coverage by the end of his tenure.<sup>32</sup> However, SIS only enrolled about 24.2 percent of the outsider population by 2007. Toledo also launched JUNTOS, a CCT program for children in rural areas, which also reached very limited coverage.

Alan García returned to power in 2006, winning the runoff election against former military officer Ollanta Humala, who campaigned on a redistributive platform. In his tenure, García increased coverage of JUNTOS, which remained small, and initiated Gratitude, a pilot pension program for indigent seniors seventy-five and older, which was expected to reach a very small number of beneficiaries with modest provisions.

García transformed the SIS into a broader health system. In 2005, political activists, doctors, and major NGOs had promoted health policy expansion (Ewig 2010, 185). Peru's health coverage and health care expenditure were shockingly limited in regional terms. NGOs and think tanks further persuaded political parties and presidential candidates to commit to expanding health services,<sup>33</sup> and they continued to lobby García for approval of necessary legislation. In 2009, Congress passed a law to guarantee health access and funding for every Peruvian, which allowed the SIS to reach between 40 and 50 percent of outsiders in 2010.<sup>34</sup>

The Humala administration (2011–2016) featured similar dynamics of minor improvements in existing benefits and the initiation of small-scale programs. Despite being a left-wing politician and enjoying high levels of economic growth, and even though several existing initiatives could have been expanded, Humala only inaugurated Pension 65 in 2011 (an important but small-scale benefit that reached 23 percent of outsider seniors in 2013) and extended coverage of JUNTOS (reaching only 17.5 percent of outsider children in 2013) (see Garay 2016, 321).

Overall, since 2000, a dynamic of inaugurating or improving modest social programs resulted in limited expansion, despite high levels of economic growth. Only health care cumulatively passed the threshold of expansion. The absence of stable parties and reelection attenuated leaders' expectations of reelection and thus reduced their incentives to secure electoral support by offering expanded programs for outsiders. Under authoritarian rule in the 1990s, in turn, discretionary and politically targeted resources as well as modest health care initiatives were launched for outsiders. The inclusion of outsiders through large-scale social policy was not accomplished during this period.

<sup>32</sup> *El Comercio* January 28, 2002.      <sup>33</sup> *El Comercio* May 16, 2006.

<sup>34</sup> See Garay (2016, 320).

### Discretionary Social Policy in Venezuela

Unlike the other cases under study, Venezuela was a democracy since the late 1950s until its two-party system collapsed in the 1990s and an authoritarian regime took shape in the 2000s. Conditional cash transfers were inaugurated in 1990, in a context of profound popular discontent in which politicians struggled to hold on to power. Broader social programs for outsiders were launched across policy areas in the 2000s. This expansion resulted in social programs that were discretionary, participatory and, despite being substantial, less generous than those observable in cases of large-scale nondiscretionary expansion. Cash transfers for children were eliminated in the late 1990s and a very small family allowances program was developed only in 2012, at the end of Hugo Chávez's presidency (1998–2013). Primary health care services reached a large share of outsiders and about 40 percent of outsider seniors received pension benefits by 2012 (Garay 2016, 315).

The deterioration of democracy and the emergence of a competitive authoritarian regime with high levels of polarization and conflict between incumbent and opposing elite sectors help explain why the incumbent extended broad and discretionary social policies that mobilized outsiders behind his project. These policies were not launched in response to bottom-up mobilization pressing for benefits or to court voters in an electorally competitive environment. Discretionary and participatory social programs were used to entrench support and mobilize supporters so that the incumbent could better resist and confront strong polarization and anti-government protests within an increasingly nondemocratic regime.

The deterioration of Venezuela's two parties – Democratic Action (AD), which was allied to the labor movement, and the Committee of Independent Political Electoral Organizations (COPEI) – in the context of severe economic troubles that began in the 1980s, resulted in the erosion of both the party system and democracy (see Roberts 2014). In 1989, after stabilization plans failed, the administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–1993) of the AD announced a drastic package of market reforms. Spontaneous protests against these measures intensified following sharp increases in gas prices and public transit fares, triggering a wave of lootings known as the *Caracazo* (see Stephany 2006). Police and military repression resulted in hundreds being killed in the popular neighborhoods of Caracas (Stephany 2006: 82) and in the profound discrediting of the AD and COPEI, which operated as a party cartel (Coppedge 1994),

eroding support for the political system as a whole (López-Maya 2011: 219).

Facing dramatically declining popularity, and hoping to prevent further protests, Pérez initiated a package of temporary social programs for outsiders known as the Plan to Combat Poverty (PEP). The most important benefit in terms of scope and funding was the Food Grant (*Beca Alimentaria*, or BA), later called Single Family Subsidy, which provided allowances for up to three children (aged six to eleven) per family, conditional on school attendance. The BA attained broad coverage in the early 1990s, reaching an estimated 60 percent of outsider children.<sup>35</sup> Despite some economic recovery, Pérez's legitimacy crumbled throughout his tenure; he faced two military coup attempts, one of them led by Hugo Chávez, and was eventually removed from office in 1993 amid a corruption scandal.

Pérez's successor, Rafael Caldera, who had broken with COPEI, won the 1993 elections by a small margin. Despite campaigning on a pro-state discourse, he implemented orthodox adjustment measures after the 1995 financial crisis. To preempt instability, Caldera strengthened social programs (see Briceño 1999). Yet, rather than support growing for his administration or for existing political parties, discontent deepened.

Given their tarnished reputations, the traditional parties did not field candidates for the 1998 presidential election. The Bolivarian Movement, led by Hugo Chávez in alliance with small left-wing parties, won a landslide victory in 1998 (López-Maya 2005, 229) and in 2000 (under a new constitution), with strong support from low-income outsiders.

During his first year in office, Chávez convened a Constituent Assembly – his main campaign promise – that wrote a new constitution with mechanisms of direct democracy and reelection provisions. Chávez initially launched very few social policy innovations for outsiders (Penfold-Becerra 2007, 70) and cut back existing transfers. Yet political conflict escalated in the early 2000s, weakening the regime and prompting a shift in Chávez's agenda. Strong reactions from the agricultural and business elite sectors and organized labor – in response to increasing state control over the oil company and land regulations – culminated in a coup in 2002 (Roberts 2006, 142). After Chávez's removal by coup leaders, he was reinstated in office by his supporters in the military and in lower-income neighborhoods (López-Maya 2005; Roberts 2006, 142).

<sup>35</sup> Demographic data from INE and BA data from Lima (1995) and Carvalho (1999).

Following the regime crisis, a two-month general strike and lockouts by business associations and labor unions (each demanding Chávez's resignation) produced sharp economic decline and deprivation, with GDP shrinking 8 and 9 percent in 2002 and 2003, respectively.

In response to this conflict, Chávez launched the Bolivarian Missions, a number of ambitious social funds for low-income populations. Missions were created parallel to the existing bureaucracy and funded land reform, health care services, and education programs. These schemes promoted the formation of local councils, encouraged high levels of participation in program implementation, and were strongly identified with the president. Missions helped address deteriorating social conditions and also provided the incumbent with the means to organize and mobilize his base in support of his political project, especially in the face of elite and middle-class challenges to his legitimacy and continuity in power.

Lacking a party in the context of intense political conflict, and thus needing to organize a support base, Chávez set out to form new popular organizations, and increasingly relied on active and retired military members to govern. The Bolivarian Circles formed part of the Chavista movement and were critical to the formation of these organizations, which participated in some of the missions and operated as sources of mass support (Roberts 2006, 142–143).

Aside from establishing the missions, the government extended pension benefits through a number of temporary decrees in 2006 and 2007. Noncontributory benefits were offered to specific categories of workers, according to a quota and for a limited time, and the social security agency itself was in charge of identifying qualifying beneficiaries.<sup>36</sup> This method of expansion resulted in discretionary access.

In this competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Loxton 2013), in which growing polarization led to violent clashes between the president's partisans and the opposition, Chávez enjoyed broad support among the outsider population. The government launched family allowances for low-income households, covering about 14 percent of outsider children in 2013, and introduced a new, noncontributory pension that increased coverage of outsider seniors to 40 percent. These new benefits remained, as before, nontransparent and selective.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Garay (2016, 314).

<sup>37</sup> Author's estimates and analysis of program characteristics using government data and documents (See Garay 2016, 315).

As the chapter's theoretical framework proposes, regime context matters. Incumbents facing growing electoral contestation or large-scale anti-incumbent mobilization in nondemocratic regimes use different tools (e.g. discretionary deployment of state resources and intimidation of opposition) to ensure their own continuity. Unlike their counterparts in democracies, incumbents in these contexts are likely to create benefits for outsiders that are more strongly identified with them, their projects, or their political organizations. Benefits are politically targeted in order to better mobilize supporters and connect them to the incumbent.

In an environment of intense political conflict, an incumbent may seek to discourage the opposition from disputing outsider voters and mobilize outsiders' support to counterbalance the opposition's attempts to destabilize the government. The main goal of these social programs is to help guarantee the continuity of the incumbent in power. The extension of social policy to outsiders in this context is discretionary and unstable (dependent on the incumbent's ability to continue in power and their needs for that end). The discrediting of the incumbent and their exit from power may result in the transformation of these benefits and their replacement with new ones, as the creation of social policy for outsiders remains an unsettled issue, despite the importance of the social policy resources already channeled to them.

#### CONCLUSION

Throughout most of the twentieth century, middle-income countries in Latin America showed a marked divide between insiders and outsiders in terms of labor and social policy as well as structures of representation. While workers in the formal sector enjoyed structures of interest representation as well as labor and social policy, outsiders and their dependents remained unprotected and without significant organizations or channels for expressing their interests.

Social policy expansion for outsiders took shape in the last decades of the twentieth century in several countries, including several of the cases analyzed in SPA. This expansion mitigated the social policy divide separating insiders and outsiders in different ways across countries. While broad-reaching, nearly universal, nondiscretionary programs were established in some cases, more limited provisions were created in others. In some countries, social policy initiatives were established as discretionary provisions and were strongly associated with a political leader or project.

While some scholars claim that policy expansion resulted from export-driven growth during the commodity boom of the 2000s or from the spread of particular policy models or principles, I argue that neither the timing of the boom nor the diffusion of social policy had enough traction to account for the expansion of social policy for outsiders across select policy areas. Instead, I have shown that policy expansion is better explained by the political regime, as well as the presence of electoral competition for outsiders and/or mobilization demanding expansion. Under democratic regimes, incumbents set out to temper the social policy divide through large-scale nondiscretionary benefits only when they faced electoral competition and/or social mobilization. Where democracies did not experience either electoral competition or social mobilization, incumbents created small, sometimes temporary benefits or limited social policy to show concern for the plight of the poor.

Under (semi-)authoritarian regimes, incumbents did not face incentives for expansion and thus social policy for outsiders did not undergo significant changes. However, when incumbents faced growing electoral competition or social mobilization challenging the regime, they were likely to create rather large but discretionary benefits to undermine the opposition, consolidate support, or disarticulate protest from below. The resulting benefits were more unstable, smaller in scope, and discretionary relative to the large-scale nondiscretionary expansions under democracies experiencing mobilization and/or electoral competition. The cases of Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela reveal significant variation in terms of the timing of policy adoption and types of social policies adopted, and these patterns are obscured in arguments highlighting rentier populism or diffusion as the key explanatory factors behind adoption.

The inclusion of outsiders in social policy raises a number of questions. First, despite expansion, disparities in welfare access persist, and the segmentation of labor markets excludes outsiders from several benefits. How will the inclusion of outsiders unfold in the future? In some countries, as noted, major social policy benefits (health care, pensions, and income support) have reached comparable levels across low-income insiders and outsiders, while in other countries, differences continue to be stark. One might expect that while inclusive policy expansion will be subject to pressures to reduce the scope or benefit levels of provisions and find new sources of revenue to ensure long-term stability, more restrictive or limited social programs might be subject to pressures to expand their reach and benefits.



Discretionary benefits will probably witness the largest changes in the future, as they are inherently unstable and sensitive to whether the incumbent retains power. Across the cases of large-scale expansion, now decades after expansion began, policies have remained quite stable, with innovations and debates over policy reforms occurring along the lines argued in this chapter.

Second, in some cases coalitions of insiders and outsiders formed during or before the processes of expansion discussed here, and have played significant roles in these social policy innovations. Further attention should be paid to how these coalitions formed and how they will evolve in the future (see Etchemendy, this volume). Will labor movements become more encompassing and incorporate outsiders in their organizations (Garay 2018)? Will issue-based coalitions and the sharing of common policy agendas become the main avenues for integrating insiders and outsiders? In the cases in which no meaningful organizations representing outsiders exist, how will outsiders gain political influence, and how will political parties relate to them? Will outsiders remain loyal to parties mobilizing unions and the poor, as in Uruguay and Bolivia, or will they become volatile, as in Mexico? (See Pop-Eleches, this volume; Novaes and Dunning, this volume).

Finally, and relatedly, after a period in which important and varied efforts of inclusion took shape, a fundamental question concerns the political dynamics that may contribute to higher levels of income equality and more substantive representation in the region. As party structures become more fluid and social organizations channeling the interests of those at the bottom of the social ladder remain poorly developed in several countries, the question of outsiders' political representation and their connections, if any, to the formal sector, remains a fundamental issue for future research.

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## Diffusion Dynamics

### *Shaping Social Policy in Latin America's Inclusionary Turn*

Wendy Hunter

#### INTRODUCTION

Innovations in social policy have been a central feature of the turn toward greater social inclusion in Latin America. Since the mid-1990s, governments across the region have adopted and implemented welfare state policies that have reached large numbers of poor people, many of whom had sporadic or little institutionalized connection to their governments previously. The rural poor, urban shantytown dwellers, informal sector workers, and the chronically unemployed have been prominent among them. People of indigenous and African origins, who overlap in large measure with these groups, now enjoy greater institutionalized social protection. Cash transfers to families with children represent a policy innovation that has put historically marginalized actors under greater state protection. Noncontributory in nature, they embody the new and expanded social assistance (as opposed to social insurance) dimension of welfare states in Latin America.<sup>1</sup> For all family entitlements, poverty alleviation is the main immediate goal. In the conditional version (conditional cash transfers or CCTs), where receiving the grant depends on children attending school regularly and using public health services, a longer-term goal of human capital development also exists. Notwithstanding the different sizes and shapes that family grants have assumed from country to country, some basic form of cash entitlements to

<sup>1</sup> On the distinction between social assistance and social insurance, see Lloyd Sherlock (2008). Noncontributory pensions for the elderly and disabled are of crucial importance in the social assistance package of recent Latin American governments as well, but go beyond the scope of this chapter.

low-income families with children has spread to most Latin American countries in the last two decades.

What accounts for such spatial and temporal policy clustering? This chapter highlights the role of diffusion in Latin America's turn toward greater social inclusion as represented by family entitlements. A comprehensive account of social policy's contribution to greater inclusion requires attention to the phenomenon of diffusion and its attendant analytical framework. Drawing a clear distinction between the *adoption* of the new inclusionary policies and their *implementation*, the present analysis argues that diffusion dynamics were a crucial explanatory factor in the adoption phase and grants that a host of other factors entered into the equation at the implementation phase, in part explaining the variation among entitlements.

I do not claim that diffusion or external influences are the only explanation for policy adoption within the region. In other words, it is not simply that Latin American governments imitated one another or followed the directives of an international organization. Domestic factors condition whether and how governments look abroad for solutions and to whom they look. In the case of family entitlements, such mediating factors include structural conditions of informality, economic crisis, and political competition.<sup>2</sup> If the basic preconditions for incentivizing family entitlements and making them appropriate and viable had been absent, it is doubtful that they would have spread.

At the same time, the domestic diversity among the countries that adopted CCTs is sufficiently striking (e.g. in ideological range, state capacity differences, poverty and human development levels) to render an explanation based on diffusion highly plausible. In other words, one has to wonder why governments on the political left and right, of high and low state capacity, middle- and low-income levels all converged on the adoption of some form of a family entitlement policy within the span of fifteen years. It is highly unlikely that they all came up with the idea independently of one another.

A policy need not be replicated in exact form for a diffusion framework to hold and have explanatory strength. Diffusion is equipped to explain how successive countries can "emulate a new guideline but enact it in various concrete incarnations" (Weyland 2006, 17). Given their vari-

<sup>2</sup> With respect to incentives to cultivate the poor under democracy, research by Alberto Diaz Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni suggests that the more years since the democratic transition, the higher the probability a government will adopt a CCT (2009).

ation, family entitlements come closer to exemplifying “principle diffusion” more than “model diffusion.”<sup>3</sup> As far as distinctions in the design of family entitlements go, the new social programs do differ from one another in their generosity, criteria for eligibility, and the degree of discretion they give to politicians. Also, some are conditional upon beneficiaries meeting certain requirements and others are not. Some go beyond stipulating conditionalities for children and even require that parents meet certain requirements, including prenatal care for mothers and attendance at workshops on matters such as childhood health and nutrition.<sup>4</sup>

No doubt CCTs come in different shapes and sizes, as Garay's chapter in this volume highlights well, yet the present chapter is focused on understanding why they were adopted at all. In taking a step back and focusing on the issue of policy adoption, the present chapter serves as a counterpoint to Garay's. In her view, diffusion is not a compelling explanatory framework for social policy expansion.<sup>5</sup> These are her reasons: because no international actor was associated with powerful enough pressures or incentives to propel the spread of reforms (or provide a mechanism for it); insufficient policy convergence occurred in outcomes among countries; and there were some cases of non-adoption (2016, 14–15). Downplaying the role of international diffusion, Garay focuses on explaining variation in policy coverage with almost exclusive reference to domestic forces.<sup>6</sup>

My account agrees with Garay's contention that no powerful international actor led the charge, but it makes a case for diffusion nonetheless. The present account emphasizes that the “first-mover” cases of Mexico and Brazil commanded the attention of policy makers from other countries within the region without needing a global organization like the

<sup>3</sup> See Weyland (2006) on this distinction.

<sup>4</sup> See Osorio (2018, 43) for a classification of family entitlements according to levels and kinds of conditionality.

<sup>5</sup> Two other major works on CCTs allow somewhat more room for diffusion. De la O (2015, 67) acknowledges that the general idea of transferring money to poor households was spread through a diffusion dynamic, but that the specific designs that countries settled on reflected domestic factors. Diaz Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni concede that “(t)he process of diffusion of this policy innovation across Latin America is evident,” but politics plays an important role in shaping the *timing* of adoption, the program's details, and whether it is insulated from political shenanigans (2016, 29).

<sup>6</sup> In Garay's view, the more robust CCTs unfolded in democratic regimes with high electoral competition for outsiders and/or large scale social mobilization from below (Argentina and Brazil). More restrictive models came about when conservative political forces had strong institutional power and social movements were not involved in policy design (Chile and Mexico).

World Bank to play an instigating or commanding role. It was these early innovators themselves that engaged leading international organizations. When the international banks came on board, they helped to accelerate the diffusion of CCTs within the region, and eventually extend the policy idea to other regions like Africa. The present chapter, while recognizing variation, maintains the existence of policy convergence in terms of the basic principles embodied by the family entitlements adopted across the region (again, the notion of “principle diffusion” as opposed to “model diffusion”). Finally, it maintains that cases of non-adoption were so exceptional as to be insufficient to challenge a diffusion framework.

A secondary yet related goal of the present chapter is to highlight the differences between the diffusion of CCTs in the contemporary era and that of the major social policy reform, old age pensions, that marked the earlier phase of labor incorporation analyzed by Collier and Collier in *Shaping the Political Arena* (1991). In short, although diffusion played a significant role in the adoption of CCTs across the region, the dynamic differed significantly from the spread of social security reforms analyzed by Collier and Messick (1975), Collier and Collier (1991), and Orenstein (2003). In making this comparison, the present chapter compares the signature program of the first welfare states in Latin America to the signature program of the most recent era of social inclusion. Whereas the previous welfare state model was corporatist (occupationally based) in nature, provided different benefits for different groups, focused on the formal sector in urban areas, especially in old age, and portrayed benefits as a privilege (subject to control), contemporary welfare states in Latin America are more apt to target benefits to individuals and families, be universalist in nature (providing similar benefits for everyone who qualifies), extend their reach to the informal sector in rural areas, explicitly include children, and portray benefits as a right to be extended through bureaucratic provisioning rather than patronage.

The chapter proceeds as follows. It first establishes the broad social policy distinctions between the initial incorporation analyzed by Collier and Collier (1991) and recent efforts to include more citizens under the umbrella of the welfare state. It then turns to a key policy innovation, CCTs, which have embodied and institutionalized the new inclusion. After establishing the plausibility of a diffusion framework – based on a wavelike “S” pattern, geographical clustering, and similarity amid diversity – the chapter explores the factors that caused these social assistance policies to gain initial traction and later spread within the region. Painting with broad strokes, it focuses on the core ideas embodied by this widely



adopted policy, not on the finer distinctions in their design and implementation across countries. Distinctions are drawn between the process by which social security reforms spread in the first wave of incorporation and that of CCTs in the contemporary period.

#### THE TRUNCATED WELFARE STATES OF THE INITIAL INCORPORATION

The incorporation that is the subject of *Shaping the Political Arena* was largely driven by the state in response to the threat posed by organized labor. Those privileged enough to be part of the formal sector received the benefits of a “truncated welfare state,” which paid out benefits to groups or categories of workers rather than to individuals and families.<sup>7</sup> The link between formal employment and the receipt of health care services and retirement pensions was through contributions paid by employers and to some extent by employees themselves.<sup>8</sup> One’s occupational status was a crucial determinant of being in or out of the system. In addition to being accorded to members of the civilian and military bureaucracy, state benefits (expensive curative health care and robust old age pensions) were granted to organized and strategic sectors of the working class, those who were best positioned to engage in labor strife. A paramount goal was to preempt the development of an autonomous and militant working class (e.g. Collier and Collier 1991; Huber 1996; Haggard and Kaufman 2008).

A crucial problem with these corporatist schemes, which were universal in principle, was the small minority of people who benefited from them. If one was in the system (disproportionately unionized workers and the urban middle class), the benefits were substantial. Hence, social policy coverage could be characterized as “narrow and deep.” This was in no small measure the result of Latin American countries having adopted a

<sup>7</sup> The Latin American countries with such welfare states lasted from roughly 1920 to 1980, the time period generally considered to be the first era of Latin American social policy (McGuire 2012, 202). Notably, Huber and Stephens (2012, 77) use 1980 as the cutoff point for import substitution industrialization (ISI). They identify the early welfare state leaders as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay (2012, 7).

<sup>8</sup> As reported in McGuire (2012, 202), Carmelo Mesa Lago distinguishes three phases of the introduction of contributory retirement and health insurance: pre 1940 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Uruguay); 1940–60 (Mexico, Panama, and the five Andean countries), and then 1960–80: the rest of Central America, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Paraguay.

social policy model that came from Western Europe, where rates of formal sector employment were far higher. Even with the growth of Latin American economies over the course of the twentieth century, high rates of informal sector employment remained and hence the inappropriateness of the European model of social policy persisted. Informality in the labor market translated into exclusion from social protection, with the state providing little in the way of benefits on a routine, systematic, and widespread basis. Most elders outside the strictly drawn boundaries of the formal sector lacked anything resembling an old age pension.

State and local governments provided health care, food subsidies, emergency public employment, and tuition subsidies but in a spotty fashion that left many gaps (McGuire 2012, 203). Charitable organizations sometimes stepped in, as did the Catholic Church and First Ladies, providing food and other “in-kind” goods on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis. Landlords and local politicians supplied informal modes of social protection yet frequently with political strings attached. In short, social protection lacked a unified governmental mandate, strategy, and structure. The sheer spending devoted to social assistance also paled in comparison to the amount spent on social insurance (McGuire 2012, 203). To the extent that women without formal sector jobs and children were protected, it was as dependents of formal sector male workers (Huber and Stephens 2012, 76). Those unconnected to a formal sector “bread winner” experienced considerable vulnerability and risk.

The formal vs. informal cleavage overlapped partially with an urban/rural divide. Most of those who worked in the formal sector lived in urban areas, although cities were also teeming with informal workers who were excluded from corporatist welfare provisions. With few exceptions, such as under radical populism in Mexico and Venezuela where the peasantry was included in the incorporation project (Collier and Collier 1991, 196–270), poor people living in rural areas were disproportionately excluded. To various degrees in different countries, the basic “deal” behind labor incorporation was one of “inducements and constraints” (Collier and Collier 1991). Political quiescence and obedience were expected of organized labor in exchange for being among the privileged few who received modernizing benefits and reforms.

For those outside the corporatist citizenship regime, benefits were doled out on an intermittent and discretionary basis. Many of the programs operated by states and municipalities became grist for the

machinations of patronage-oriented politicians. It was not a “rights-based” regime committed to universal principles. In fact, “For most of the twentieth century, truncated (that is, poorly targeted) welfare states coexisted with an array of clientelist transfers that did reach the poor but were subject to immense government discretion” (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009, 41).

The dynamic responsible for the spread of social insurance reforms in the previous period of labor incorporation differed rather markedly from that of CCTs in the present era – differences obtained regarding the origins of the policy that spread, the appropriateness of the policy for the context in which it was adopted, the significance of a leading international organization in inducing countries to pay attention to the policy innovation, and the speed of adoption. Regarding origins, whereas social insurance pensions were born in the developed world (Western Europe) and were later transported to the developing world, CCTs were a policy innovation that hatched in Latin America itself.<sup>9</sup> Relatedly, while regressive pension schemes that benefit a privileged minority of Latin Americans are the legacy of the former process, the signature inclusion policy of the current era fits the structural realities of many Latin American countries better. The social insurance reforms that were designed in Western Europe were based on the illusion that the same conditions that made them appropriate for Europe would unfold in Latin America (namely, a large formal sector), which has not turned out to be true. The “home-grown” aspect of CCTs arguably gives them more stability and staying power. Moreover, whereas there was a more hierarchical pattern to diffusion in the previous era, with a major international organization, the International Labour Organization (ILO), playing a leading role in pension innovations, country-to-country interactions within Latin America were prominent in making CCTs first known within the region. Finally, whereas the diffusion rate of social security reforms in the early part of the twentieth century spanned several decades, within fifteen years, the vast majority of countries in the region had signed onto a cash transfer program for families. It took at least twice that amount of time for pensions to spread earlier in the region.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Apparently, this dynamic has begun to be witnessed in various other areas, such as legal reforms, which have spread among “peripheral” countries and sometimes even moved outward to “core” countries (Langer 2007).

<sup>10</sup> This discussion of the spread of pension reforms in the era of labor incorporation relies on Collier and Messick (1975), Collier and Collier (1991), and Orenstein (2003).

BROADENED SOCIAL PROVISIONING IN THE RECENT TURN  
TO INCLUSION

This picture has changed in significant ways. Even without a major formalization of labor markets, countries across Latin America have adopted social policies that have systematized and extended welfare provisioning to the poor. The fact that these policies were forged by Latin American policy makers rather than copied from a different region helped render them more appropriate for the context. In fact, some of the innovations, including CCTs, helped to make up for some of the notable gaps left by the previous model. If coverage provided by the previous model was “narrow and deep” the new additions to the social policy landscape provide coverage that is “broad and thin.” Although they advance social inclusion, they are not a panacea to structural poverty and inequality by any means. Nor have they reshaped the political arena in most countries to the extent that the reforms of the initial incorporation did. It should also be emphasized that these innovations are layered upon the old model but do not displace it. In other words, they have begun to address the needs of poorer segments of society but generally not at the expense of the occupational categories privileged by the old system (Hunter and Sugiyama 2009; Holland and Schneider 2017). Current struggles in various Latin American countries to increase the age of retirement and reduce the regressive nature of preexisting pension systems are testimony to their persistence.<sup>11</sup>

Notwithstanding the variation among cash entitlements in the region, there are certain broad features that are fairly constant from country to country. To this extent, we can consider the adoption of cash transfer

<sup>11</sup> Other criticisms include the following. Although CCTs often increase the demand for social services, namely in education and health, they do little or nothing to improve the quantity and quality of the services provided. A lack of concomitant investment in education and health infrastructure is problematic. Family grants can also be seen as shortsighted insofar as they rarely come with job training for parents, which would help boost their incomes in the long term. It should also be emphasized that a certain degree of state capacity and infrastructure is necessary to operate a CCT well in the first place. For example, it is crucial to be able to correctly identify the target population, input them into a national registry (which itself depends on prospective beneficiaries having identity documents), and provide widespread access to banking facilities such that they can retrieve their funds, even in remote regions of the country. The state capacity it takes to fulfill these and related requirements should not be underestimated. Thus, although some interventions require even greater state capacity, CCTs are difficult to manage where such conditions do not exist.

programs in the region to be an example of “principle diffusion.” The first feature common to all family entitlements in the region is that they are intended to serve the informal sector poor at the beginning of the life cycle. Their primary objective is to reduce immediate poverty among low-income children. Most also seek to break the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic marginality. Therefore, nearly all programs in the region require regular school attendance among recipient children. Many but fewer demand that they get regular medical checkups and engage in preventative health care.<sup>12</sup> This “child-centered” policy agenda (Brooks 2015, 555) departs from the previous focus on old age and is consistent with the heightened concerns of international organizations since the 1990s with problems that perpetuate intergenerational poverty. Although similar policies in developed countries are sometimes dismissed as “residual” to the core social insurance policies of welfare states (Lavinás 2013), they represent a significant advance for people who previously enjoyed minimal social protection and in some cases lacked any systematic connection to the state. Some global actors, such as the ILO, even see such transfers as a potential floor for citizens (Deacon 2013).

Besides being child focused, a second major feature of the region's family entitlements is that they target mothers as the designated recipient of the funds. This too represents a departure from past policies. The reasoning behind this choice is based on evidence suggesting that mothers tend to use the money in ways beneficial for their children, such as buying food, school supplies, shoes, and even medicine. Although cash transfers to women may have the effect of empowering them within the family and in society, gender empowerment per se was not an overriding concern for most program designers.<sup>13</sup>

A third and related feature is that nearly all the income transfers to families involve direct payments. Transferring cash expresses governments' faith that recipients will use the money judiciously, namely, to further the well-being of the children in the family. A recognized advantage of cash transfers is that they are more regular, stable, and systematic than most in-kind programs. On the whole, cash transfers are judged to

<sup>12</sup> See Osorio (2018, 34) for a list of cash transfers in the region and their stipulations.

<sup>13</sup> Whether or not cash transfers empower women recipients is debated. Some authors criticize such programs as being “maternalist,” putting an undue burden on mothers to carry out specified conditionalities. For an extensive review of literature on this topic, see Hagen Zanker et al. (2017).

be more efficient and effective in reducing poverty than their in-kind counterparts.<sup>14</sup> Channeling the money through a direct transfer from the national government to the designated parent (generally the mother) reduces the chance that local politicians can manipulate the program for political ends. In many (but not all) cases, the direct payment resulted from a deliberate technocratic choice based on the desire to give ordinary citizens autonomy from local politicians.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time, important variations exist among family entitlements, as many authors are quick to recognize. Indeed, there is much at stake in the specific design and implementation of cash transfer programs. What are some of these differences? An important distinction is that family grants can be conditional or unconditional. The former (CCTs) make continued receipt of the funds contingent upon fulfilling co-responsibilities intended to make child beneficiaries less poor in the long run, such as attending school and engaging in preventative health care. The latter (unconditional cash transfers or UCTs) carry no behavioral demands. Because CCTs depend on having education and health services in place and require coordination by multiple government agencies, they are more likely to be found in middle-income than in very poor countries. The program in Bolivia, for example, has an education requirement but not a health requirement. Chile's program has multiple conditionalities (Osorio 2018, 34).

Another major distinction in family grants concerns whether they are means-tested or universal. Countries with more developed bureaucracies are no doubt better able to implement a means-tested program (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009). A universal program makes more sense if most people are poor and the country lacks bureaucratic capacity. Bolivia, for instance, has an unconditional grant (*Bono Juancito Pinto*) that is not means-tested per se. Yet the fact that it goes only to children in public primary and secondary schools (in a country where middle- and upper-class children attend private schools, by and large) is a practical substitute for means testing.

Family grants also differ significantly in how "clean" they are. Having precise and enforced bureaucratic guidelines minimizes opportunities for politicians to engage in corruption, fraud, and patronage. Among the hallmarks of a well-run CCT are clear rules of eligibility, bureaucratic

<sup>14</sup> [www.adb.org/features/small\\_idea\\_big\\_results\\_conditional\\_cash\\_transfer\\_programs](http://www.adb.org/features/small_idea_big_results_conditional_cash_transfer_programs)

<sup>15</sup> Analysts have identified Brazil's *Bolsa Família* as a prominent case in point (Fenwick 2009; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013).

rather than politically-brokered methods of assistance, and strict rules against expanding benefits in the period before elections. The well-done programs also require official identification among all recipients, including birth certificates for all children enrolled. If official ID is lacking, the stronger programs facilitate documentation among applicants. If well designed and implemented, cash transfer programs can bypass local political authorities and are not as likely as more informal systems to exclude people for particularistic reasons. They can even build a sense of personal autonomy and citizenship rights (Hunter and Sugiyama 2014). Their significance goes well beyond the resources they entail. They are also more likely to obtain broad support among the population. Conversely, cash transfers that leave open the possibility of political brokerage and exchange often leak precious resources to the non-poor and generate ill will and criticism, especially from middle-class sectors, thereby undermining their chance of renewal.

#### DIFFUSION DYNAMICS AND THE SPREAD OF CCTS

This section presents an analysis of the adoption of CCTs in Latin America through the lens of diffusion. Diffusion is best understood as a *process* whose various mechanisms are characterized by “uncoordinated interdependence.” In this conceptualization, “governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent insofar as they factor in the choices of other governments” (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 35).<sup>16</sup> This is well captured by defining diffusion as a process by which the “prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 1991, cited in Elkins and Simmons 2005, 38). The burden of the present analysis is to show that the

<sup>16</sup> Elkins and Simmons (2005) raise two possible alternative routes to similar outcomes. Countries that experience similar stimuli could act independently and arrive at the same solutions. Or, they could be subject to coordination by a hegemonic power, international organization, or group of countries. To briefly address (and dismiss) these explanations: although many of the countries profiled here experienced comparable challenges, not all did. The “exhaustion” of ISI and the deficits of the social insurance model were more relevant to some than to others. Moreover, that each of them independently would have come upon similar reforms is rather unlikely. There is no evidence that supports the second possibility; although numerous international organizations became proponents of CCTs, none orchestrated a collective response.

appearance and growing prevalence of CCTs in the region was due to “interdependence without coordination.”

Notwithstanding the commitment to understanding diffusion as a process and not an outcome, it is safe to say that the process does yield some characteristic outcomes. Three features mark the spread of innovations (Weyland 2006, 18–19). First, diffusion generally occurs in waves. After a slow start in which one or two countries experiment with a model, the pace of adoption picks up as more countries join in, and then tapers off as many of the countries that are likely to endorse the reform have already done so. Second, diffusion often results in pronounced geographical clustering. This is because policies adopted in one country are much more likely to be emulated by a close-by country than by one much further away. Third, diffusion produces the spread of similar policies among a group of adopting countries with diverse socioeconomic and political characteristics, causing convergence to occur. While countries may adapt a foreign import to their specific situation, they nonetheless reproduce its fundamental features. As illustrated below, all three of these features are present in the case of family cash transfers in Latin America.

In a nutshell, nearly all countries in the region have joined the trend toward adopting policies that put a safety net, however minimal, under the poorest citizens. Given the rapid enactment of CCTs across Latin American countries of different modernization levels and governments of different political complexions, these policies are not specific to a given level of development. Nor are they a consequence of Latin America’s “Left turn.” Like Garay, who maintains that “incumbents on both the left and right of the political spectrum launched significant policy innovations for outsiders” (2016, 13), I question the weight that some analysts give to left-party strength as an explanation for such reforms (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2012; Lavinas 2013). (The prominent case of a right-wing government in Mexico sponsoring *Oportunidades* should alone give pause to such a view.) In my account, learning and emulation on the part of policy makers, discussed below, explains in important measure the convergence that has taken place among a range of countries.

It is also the case that most innovations that eventually travel across borders have at their core simple and bold ideas that are attractive to a range of key actors (Walt 2009). Embodying a novel combination of immediate poverty reduction and human capital development (to promote long-term poverty reduction), CCTs promise to kill two birds with one stone. Rather than simply provide a safety net for families with children, they generally include behavioral requirements that are intended



to make children healthier and more productive in the long run. Among these are compulsory school attendance, medical checkups, and immunization. To skeptics of mere “handouts,” CCTs at least encourage “good habits” among low-income children, who are generally viewed as a vulnerable and deserving population. And in line with the neoliberal notion of individual (consumer) choice, CCT programs allow beneficiaries to decide how they want to spend the money, assuming that they will “maximize utility.” Designating the mother as the direct beneficiary of the grant maximizes the chance that these choices bode well for the children. The advantage of assigning the mother a central role is not only supported by research but aligns well with cultural norms in the region. CCTs also fit well with the market reforms of the 1990s and 2000s because of their cost effectiveness and (mostly) targeted nature.<sup>17</sup> Stated well by Sarah Brooks, “Even though they are progressive and redistributive in nature and thus appeal to the partisan left, the conditional nature of cash benefits holds greater appeal to conservative politicians who resist handing out cash to the poor without strings attached” (2015, 553).

Cash transfers to families started in Latin America in the mid-1990s. What set off the initial adoption of these policies? Given the long history of exclusion and the unmet needs of poverty alleviation and equity-enhancement, why did Latin American policy makers champion and adopt CCTs when they did? New policies are often born in moments of crisis and conjunctures of broader change. The confluence of a major economic development (structural adjustment and reform in the wake of debt problems) with a major political development (democratization) opened up space for anti-poverty innovations to emerge and later travel. The debt crisis of the 1980s was crucial in the transition from the model of truncated welfare states (roughly 1920–1980) to the post-1990s’ reforms to costly social insurance and the new emphasis on pro-poor social policies. Although the previous model had done little to aid the informal poor sector, governments deemed it necessary to begin to reach out to them. As unemployment rose and revenues fell, any notion of expanding existing social insurance schemes to the informal poor sector became increasingly untenable.

In this juncture, policymakers and politicians went in search of new models. The new social assistance focus, of which CCTs are an important

<sup>17</sup> The larger programs cost about 0.4% of GDP, a small fraction of what is spent on pensions for upper income people. See Osorio (2018, 38) for a list of family entitlements in Latin America and their cost in relation to social spending and to GDP.

component, were in part designed to remedy the gaps in coverage left by the previous truncated schemes. Market reforms to social insurance schemes (privatization) took place alongside a new focus on anti-poverty policies intended to lay down a safety net during the difficult economic times of the 1990s. States would assist their poorest citizens but at a far lower cost and arguably shorter time span in the life cycle than entailed in the previous social insurance schemes.

The coincidence of economic rethinking with democratization led political elites of wide-ranging persuasions to fear the loss of electoral support should they be perceived as inattentive to pressing social problems. Preventing social unrest was clearly desired by political leaders, but electoral considerations seemed to loom larger than fears of widespread insurrection from below, which had motivated many leaders of the first incorporation in significant ways (Collier and Collier 1991).

To enhance their credibility with electorates, politicians of all stripes sought to enact policies featuring visible signs of their commitment to change.<sup>18</sup> Yet Latin American governments did not engage in a process of comprehensive, rational and independent study of all available options to arrive at unique solutions that fit their own situations. Instead, they learned from one another and from the examples that technocratic experts from the region made readily available to them. The rationality in which they engaged was “bounded” and resulted in the spread of core models that were subsequently tweaked in line with domestic differences in the adopting countries.

The following table and figure suggest a diffusion process. Table 3.1 lists the region’s CCT adoptions by date and country, and provides the basis for Figure 3.1. The three features that suggest diffusion are readily apparent: a wave and accompanying “S” curve, geographical clustering, and similarity amid diversity. Twenty Latin American countries now have some form of family cash stipend. In other words, there are almost no cases of non-adoption.<sup>19</sup> Cases of non-adoption are so exceptional that they do not, in my view, warrant a dismissal of the framework.

As the above information suggests, CCTs spread quickly within the region. In less than ten years, the overwhelming majority of countries in

<sup>18</sup> Indeed, a growing number of studies show that social assistance programs did eventually increase voter turnout and make people more likely to vote for incumbents who had overseen such programs (Zucco 2013; Layton and Smith 2015).

<sup>19</sup> Venezuela and Cuba do not have cash transfer programs. Guyana does not appear to have a program either. This is a minor number in relation to those that do have such programs.

TABLE 3.1 CCT adoption

Year	Country
1997	Mexico
1998	Honduras
2000	Colombia Costa Rica Nicaragua
2001	Brazil Jamaica
2002	Chile
2003	Ecuador
2004	Argentina
2005	Dominican Republic El Salvador Paraguay Peru Uruguay
2006	Bolivia Panama Trinidad and Tobago
2008	Guatemala
2012	Haiti <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> This list comes from Sugiyama (2011, 256) yet with my addition of Haiti in 2012. Osorio (2018) includes Belize (2001) and Haiti (2012) among the countries with CCTs. There are slight discrepancies among authors as to when various countries adopted their programs. One reason for this is that some programs began on the local level. Others began as pilot projects. See also Bosch and Manacorda (2012, 17–20) for a list of CCTs, their dates of adoption, targeting mechanisms, conditions, and costs.




FIGURE 3.1 Diffusion of CCTs in Latin America

Latin America adopted them, ushering in what one author has called “the quiet transformation” in policies to reduce poverty (De la O, 2015). Notably, in contrast to what some authors suggest (e.g. Lavinás 2013, 13), it was not just, or even primarily, governments of the left that championed them. The CCTs were adopted by countries across the political spectrum, suggesting that diffusion was at work in propelling Latin America to adopt CCTs in the turn toward greater inclusion, the subject of this edited volume.

How did “uncoordinated interdependence” result in the spread of CCTs? In the literature’s classification of how diffusion takes place – by coercion, competition, learning, and emulation (Simmons et al. 2008) – the latter two processes apply well. “Learning” entails looking to the experiences of other countries as policy laboratories for useful information on program models and their likely consequences (Simmons et al. 2008, 25–31). This is about drawing lessons from the experiences of others and incorporating them accordingly. Policymakers rely on reports and studies carried out by international technocratic communities and/or visits by delegations from other countries. These reports and visits tend to reflect a systematic bias toward positive experiences. As such, “learning” can but does not necessarily mean making correct or valid attributions from previous experiences. Strong evidence suggests that policymakers are more likely to consider adopting a program if it was successful elsewhere, apparently even somewhere in the Global South (Weyland 2006, Simmons et al. 2008, 29). The tendency of policymakers to overgeneralize from early successful cases contributes to the sharp spike upward rather than a gradual climb, creating the middle section of the “S” pattern characteristic of diffusion. As this is the pattern for CCTs, we can infer that learning happened.

The dynamic of emulation also applies to the spread of cash transfers for families. Emulation describes when countries mimic the policies of their neighbors, partly for reasons that fit a constructivist lens (Simmons et al. 2008, 31–40). This mechanism of diffusion suggests that the normative features and meanings of policies matter a lot, perhaps even more than their concrete consequences. As Fabrizio Gilardi (2012) explains, emulation is more about actors adopting a policy out of “appropriateness” than “consequences.” In this regard, having a CCT, even one that falls short of efficiency or effectiveness, is better than not having one at all. This aspect of emulation is especially helpful in explaining commonality amid diversity (Weyland 2006, 40). It also sheds light on rapid cases of adoption, where insufficient time would have elapsed for a full cost-benefit analysis to be carried out on previous cases.

Although emulation is essentially about norm diffusion, it can act as a complement to learning.<sup>20</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) sketch out a three-stage process for the trajectory of norms, namely, norm emergence, cascade, and internalization. With respect to the last phase, if a norm becomes strong enough, it becomes accepted as the only appropriate type of behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 85) raise this point in relation to granting female suffrage, outlawing slavery, and giving immunity to medical personnel during war. Banning smoking in public places is a modern example that Gilardi (2012) adds to the mix. Taking Finnemore and Sikkink a step further, Gilardi formulates this notion in terms of the burden of proof shifting over time. It moves away from those who want to see a policy implemented (maintained or expanded) to those who object to a given type of policy. Such a shift constitutes evidence that the norm has taken hold and is “sticking.” In short, the spread of CCTs likely resulted from both learning and emulation, principles that will be highlighted in the description below.

The largest and best known programs unfolded early on in Mexico (first called PROGRESA, then *Oportunidades*, and later *Prospera*) and somewhat later in Brazil (*Bolsa Família*). These programs, which now service roughly a quarter of the Mexican and Brazilian populations, received ample attention outside the borders of these countries. Notably, in order to emphasize that PROGRESA/*Oportunidades* was a domestic initiative, President Ernesto Zedillo did not initially want World Bank funding (Sugiyama 2011, 254). Subsequently, partly to enhance the credibility of its positive domestic evaluations and “sell” the program within the country, the Mexican government contracted assessments and impact studies from outside agencies, such as the International Food and Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Later reports by organizations like the World Bank went so far as to call Mexico’s program “A model for the world.”<sup>21</sup> As for the *Bolsa Família*, because an earlier pilot program was carried out in Brasília, it was easy for international organizations with offices in the nation’s capital to accompany it and fund evaluations on it, which were later disseminated (Sugiyama 2011, 254). Notably, it was not that these international organizations pushed the policy reform on either

<sup>20</sup> Note, however, that not all governments are equally prone to engage in emulation. Shipan and Volden (2014, 382), on the adoption of anti smoking laws, report that states with high policy expertise are less likely to emulate in the absence of evidence of policy success.

<sup>21</sup> [www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo)

Mexico or Brazil. Rather, as early innovators both countries advertised their programs directly to neighboring countries as well as to leading international organizations, which later helped to export the model within and beyond Latin America (Brooks 2015, 557–558).

The CCTs in Mexico and Brazil drew countless visits by foreign delegations. For example, since the *Bolsa Família*'s creation, more than sixty-three countries have sent experts to Brazil to study the model. Within just a few years of the *Bolsa*'s inception, the ministry that houses the program (Ministry of Social Development) was receiving so many foreign requests for advice that it began holding twice-yearly seminars on how to launch similar programs elsewhere (Tepperman 2016, 47). In 2012 alone, more than 120 delegations visited Brasília to learn about the *Bolsa Família*, widely recognized for its accurate targeting, clean functioning, and efficient use of resources.<sup>22</sup> The fact that these early experiences were well managed and received high praise from various international organizations encouraged other governments in Latin America to consider adopting the policy.<sup>23</sup>

In the two decades between 1990 and 2010, policymakers in Latin America did not have to travel very far to attend seminars and workshops on social assistance held in the region or search very long to find publications on the topic of cash transfers for families. Cecilia Osorio provides a comprehensive listing of the conferences, seminars, and workshops held in various Latin American countries in this time period, and of the main publications on the topic (2014, 266–268; and 268–270), many of which were sponsored by international organizations like the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Notably, it was also the case that many of the individuals within Latin America who took the lead in promoting CCTs in their countries enjoyed a close professional connection with an epistemic network that emanated from these organizations.<sup>24</sup> Given the importance of

<sup>22</sup> [www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-brazil-quiet-revolution](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-brazil-quiet-revolution)

<sup>23</sup> Cash transfers for families have also unfolded in various countries of East Asia, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Brooks 2015, 553–554). By 2011, cash transfer programs of one kind or another were estimated to cover between 750 million and one billion people in the developing world (Arnold et al. 2011, 10).

<sup>24</sup> See Osorio (2018, 172) for a list of these leading actors and their relevant organizational connection.

technocratic decision-making in key (executive) ministries in Latin America, and the fact that many policies need not even gain congressional approval, “learning” on the part of select individuals can result in the rapid adoption of important policy changes.

In short, policy specialists have had the benefit of an extraordinary number of evaluations and impact studies done on CCTs. One analyst claims that they have been among the most extensively studied social programs ever (Lindert 2013, 14). The virtual cottage industry of media reports and studies about them has no doubt helped to support an important mechanism or cognitive shortcut: the “availability heuristic” (e.g. Weyland 2006). Having “bounded rationality,” policymakers do not consider all information equally. Instead, they look to their immediate environment, their regional neighborhood, and the ready accessibility of reports about experiences from close-by countries. This helps explain why diffusion often consolidates within a region before moving out to others, which was definitely the case with CCTs in their original home of Latin America.

Beyond serving as vehicles for the transmission of knowledge, international development organizations offered partial funding and technical support of various kinds for family transfers. For example, the World Bank alone lent \$2.4 billion to finance the adoption or expansion of CCTs globally in the late 2000s (De la O 2015, 8). It is crucial to repeat, however, that funding by major external organizations by and large *postdated* the earliest cases of the adoption of cash transfers in the Latin America region. In short, domestic explanations or diffusion via international organizations is not a dichotomous choice. Partly through funding but also by serving as centers of research with outreach potential to governments, international banks can accelerate and consolidate what is already underway.

It is important to ask at some point what precisely politicians as well as policymakers learned from all of the studies and reports widely available to them. From a technocrat’s point of view, one of the clearest messages was that CCTs offer a “high bang for the buck” and are not difficult to get through and maintain politically. In other words, for a small amount of money and little political resistance, family entitlements are a good investment for reducing extreme poverty and improving basic indicators like the nutritional intake of children. As far as politicians are concerned, there has likely been another important element of learning: that CCTs are a way to gain political support and win elections. According to Matthew Layton and Amy Erica Smith, “case studies in Brazil,

Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay provide compelling evidence that the new wave of CCT programs has helped incumbent executives maintain or build electoral support” (2015, 855). For a modest amount of money (on average less than half of one percent of GDP), family entitlements make recipients more likely to turn out at the polls and vote for incumbent executives.

As far as emulation goes, many aspects suggest that it too has influenced the diffusion of family entitlements. Some countries adopted CCTs even in the absence of evidence that they “worked” or were appropriate for their own country. This mainly applies to those (e.g. Honduras and Nicaragua) that did so before much real evidence was even available on the program in Mexico. In other words, there wasn’t time for learning, and hence social construction was probably influential.<sup>25</sup> The fact that a middle-income country (Mexico) was the first-mover country to which Honduras and Nicaragua looked also suggests that emulation (imitating more successful countries overall) might have been operative in these cases. Finally, the fact that no Latin American politician or “technopol” has stood up and made a public argument for the elimination of cash transfers for low-income families (or noncontributory pensions for poor elders, for that matter) suggests that norm development, a crucial sign of emulation, has occurred.

#### CONCLUSION

In decades past, many more Latin Americans lived in abject poverty and marginalization than do today. Children were prominent among them. Today, governments in the region offer at least minimal protection to many of the kinds of people who previously would have fallen below the poverty line and into utter destitution. These populations mainly involve people living in rural areas, those working in the informal sector (whether urban or rural), and the chronically or temporarily unemployed. In some countries, people of indigenous and African origins make up a significant share of individuals in these categories. What explains the process whereby so many governments moved from having truncated welfare states that left huge gaps in coverage to having welfare states that take seriously the extension of social assistance to those most in need? My analysis draws attention to the contribution of diffusion processes. The

<sup>25</sup> This reasoning for emulation is articulated by Simmons et al. (2008, 35).



wave of social assistance reforms that has swept over the region and placed a safety net under the poor has rendered Latin American countries more alike in their social policy profiles than previously. In short, it has caused a certain convergence among otherwise very different countries within a relatively short period of time.

While acknowledging the differences among family transfers, this chapter focuses on the prior fact that family cash transfers were adopted at all. They are identifiable as a group in that they are child-centered (primarily concerned with bringing children out of poverty), tend to designate mothers as the primary recipients of the grant, and generally involve a direct payment of cash through a banking system. Before they could be designed and implemented in different ways (beyond these shared traits), they first needed to be considered and adopted by governments at all. It was in their specific design as well as process of implementation that they began to diverge from one another in important ways. Regardless of their precise composition, they are indeed identifiable as a policy type that has spread throughout the region. The end of the commodities boom may restrict spending on them, and may even lead to a tightening or modification of some of their provisions and conditions. Yet they are now part of Latin America's social policy landscape and are unlikely to disappear any time soon.

Recent efforts to put a broader swath of Latin Americans under welfare state protection involve much more than the resources involved. Bringing previously marginalized people into contact with the state through inclusive social policy encourages other steps that aid in human development and citizenship formation. There are many positive downstream effects of cash transfers that need to be recognized. Going to school and receiving health care, along with acquiring the identity documents that allow for engaging with the modern world more generally, are all part of the package that the new inclusion has helped to deliver.

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## Inclusion Without Power?

### *Limits of Participatory Institutions*

Benjamin Goldfrank

#### INTRODUCTION

In the early twenty-first century, to different degrees across countries, Latin America became a center for experiments with participatory institutions. Political parties and leaders on the Left called for deepening democracy by adopting new venues for citizen participation beyond traditional representative institutions. More centrist or conservative technocratic incumbents advocated for participatory institutions as a means to improve government efficiency and reduce corruption. International development organizations offered encouragement and funding for governments of varied ideological hues to implement participatory institutions, especially at the local level. By one count, 1,889 “participatory innovations” appeared in sixteen Latin American countries between 1990 and 2015, making it the world’s leading laboratory for creating deliberative councils, popular consultations, citizen oversight commissions, participatory budgeting (PB), and policy conferences, among other institutions (Pogrebinschi 2017a). While many observers applauded the growth of possibilities for popular sector participation, a recent wave of skeptical scholarship highlights the profound differences across such experiments and cautions against overly sanguine evaluations of the degree of popular sector inclusion.

Indeed, as the introductory chapter notes, although inclusionary reforms have spread across Latin America on paper, questions remain about their application in practice. Heterogeneity in design and implementation of participatory institutions over time, across countries, and across levels of government makes macro-comparative analysis and

identification of patterns difficult. Explaining why participatory institutions are adopted, why they vary, and what limits their ability to foster meaningful citizenship is a formidable research agenda, one that this chapter only begins to address with three sets of arguments.

The first set of arguments complements and complicates the introductory chapter's claim that Latin America's inclusionary turn can be traced to the enduring democracy-persistent inequalities nexus. The notion that regular elections encouraged political parties to compete for voters demanding more recognition, access, and resources in unequal societies is not wrong, but is incomplete as an account of the rise of participatory institutions. It misses that many participatory institutions were drafted during periods of political uncertainty or instability – transitions (Brazil, Peru), civil war (Colombia), party system collapse (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) – or, in some cases, simply readopted after dictatorships ended (Brazil, Uruguay). It also misses the important role of leftist activists inspired by the ideas of participatory democracy to try new forms of political access. Without the Left's ideological transformation (Goldfrank 2011a), it is unlikely that a *participatory* inclusionary turn would have occurred. Perhaps most significantly, this account misses how international actors encouraged adoption of participatory institutions. In aid-reliant poor countries, donors pushed for participation mechanisms alongside decentralization since the 1980s as a means to achieve efficient government and poverty reduction. These international pressures affected much of the region around the same time that left parties began winning city governments in newly democratized or decentralized countries. One of their autochthonous innovations in the 1990s – PB – gained acclaim in the 2000s, becoming a policy instrument promoted by the leftist activists who invented it and by international development organizations. Participatory budgeting has now been adopted by thousands of cities rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, governed by mayors left and right. As Hunter (this volume) stresses for conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, and as the section below on PB illustrates, to account for the adoption of inclusionary institutions in Latin America, one must acknowledge the role of international actors and policy diffusion. Unlike Hunter's account of CCTs, this chapter also emphasizes the importance of the Left.

Second, despite the widespread experimentation with new or revived forms of participation and a tangible increase in access for popular sectors, the degree of meaningful inclusion remains limited, even in countries where participatory institutions are most prevalent. The limitations differ. As suggested in the introductory chapter, a parchment–practice

gap exists in several countries, where participatory reforms written into laws and constitutions are rarely if ever implemented. This gap is important, but there is a long history of laws being written in Latin America “just for the English to see” (*só para inglês ver*), as Brazilians say. More interesting are the facts that many countries actually implemented dozens of participatory institutions involving millions of citizens and that, nonetheless, their inclusionary impact *in practice* has been “partial and tentative” (Roberts, this volume). Their limitations vary. In some cases, the number of participants is small or mostly not from the popular sector. In other cases, the number of participants is relatively large and lower-income, but they either have minimal consultative roles or they decide over a restricted range of microlevel or narrowly focused issues involving minimal resources. A further, cross-cutting limitation in some cases is that effective participation is conditioned by partisan loyalty, rendering inclusion for some and exclusion for others. For participatory institutions to foster meaningful inclusion, they would need not only to increase access for popular sectors but also to offer some degree of decision-making power over significant resources and policies without reinforcing clientelism (see Kapiszewski, Levitsky and Yashar, this volume). While participatory institutions have generated meaningful inclusion in certain locales or for specific sectors at times, in no country except for perhaps Uruguay has inclusion been sustained nationwide. Instead, the reach of participatory institutions remains limited. This underscores the editors’ point in the introductory chapter that establishing participatory institutions does not necessarily or automatically translate into effective practice of citizenship.

Third, this chapter lays out one set of hypotheses to explain why some countries have implemented broad-based participatory institutions more than others, and another set to explain why, even in those countries that most use such institutions, they vary so much and their impact remains limited. In brief, the section below on the participatory boom suggests that the varying degree of implementation of participatory institutions is related to the strength and ideological preferences of the Left, the stability of the political system, international influence, and country-specific historical legacies. The section on the limits and legacies of participation offers reasons behind the varying design and impact of participatory institutions, including the ideological preferences, social bases, and continuity of governing coalitions and the strength of conservative opposition. A more general hypothesis, applicable to all cases, is that participatory institutions are constrained because incumbents of all stripes fear genuine power-sharing mechanisms, especially with the

popular sector. Not surprisingly, incumbents prefer to retain decision-making authority over the lion's share of resources and important policies to help them stay in power. Electoral competition may spur efforts at inclusion, particularly social policy expansion (Garay, this volume), but it also may limit the scope of participatory institutions as incumbents seek to maintain control over which constituents gain recognition, access, and resources. As political parties ascend from local to national government, the stakes increase. The need to retain authority to make compromises, cement alliances, and appease powerful interests increases as well, which heightens incumbents' fear of unconstrained popular participation. Yet politicians address the risk that newly included groups gain too much power (Cameron, this volume) in different ways, some by restricting participatory institutions and others by conditioning inclusion on partisan loyalty.

To account for the varying trajectories and limitations of participatory institutions, this chapter proceeds in three sections. The next section reviews the main theoretical approaches employed to understand the new participatory institutions. The chapter then looks for meaningful inclusion in the most likely cases, starting with a sketch of the diffusion of a single institution, PB, the most heralded of Latin America's recent experiments in participatory democracy. This section argues that while PB began as part of an inclusionary project of the Left, as PB spread to new locales it tended to lose its inclusionary potential. The last section examines the countries that arguably advanced furthest in bringing a panoply of participatory institutions from parchment to practice at multiple levels of government – Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay – where one might expect to see the greatest degree of inclusion. Nonetheless, participatory institutions remain limited in Peru, have been rolled back in Brazil, and have been converted into blatant clientelism in Venezuela. Uruguay's array of participatory institutions is limited in some ways as well, but, all combined, offers more access to decision-making over important policies for the popular sector than other countries in this group and the wider region.

#### ANALYZING THE PARTICIPATORY BOOM

The academic literature on Latin America's institutionalized citizen participation beyond elections is rich in detail and brimming with insights drawn mostly from local-level case studies. Systematic macro-comparative analysis remains rare, especially across multiple countries,



types of institutions, and levels of government.<sup>1</sup> This gap reflects not only the intrinsic difficulty of such analyses, but the established notion in political science scholarship that scaling up participation to the national level is essentially impossible (see, Dahl 1998; Przeworski 2010; Mainwaring 2012) as well as the attention and resources provided to the local level by international development organizations; the World Bank alone allotted roughly \$85 billion to “local participatory development” in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Mansuri and Rao 2013, 1). This section focuses on the more prominent approaches to understanding the region’s participatory boom, highlighting contrasts and points of near consensus.

Radically simplifying, one way to divide comparative studies of Latin America’s participatory experiments is into “political projects” and “democratic innovations” approaches. These approaches correspond roughly to the debate in this volume’s introductory chapter between, respectively, what the editors call a demand-side account of the “second incorporation” and their own account stressing democratic endurance and persistent inequality. The two approaches focus on the same gamut of institutions – those that involve citizens, individually or in groups, in public decision-making processes, project implementation, or government oversight – and share some basic assumptions. Most scholars include PB; public policy and planning councils, conferences, forums, dialogs, and roundtables; oversight commissions and public audits; communal councils; and direct democracy mechanisms like recall referendums, prior consultations, citizen initiatives, and policy referendums. Some include corporatist institutions like wage commissions or indigenous self-governance institutions. While scholars following either kind of approach recognize tensions between participatory and representative institutions, most implicitly or explicitly view them as at least potentially complementary and recognize that many participatory institutions themselves involve some degree of representation.

The political projects approach views participatory experiments as continuations of counter-hegemonic struggles from below against authoritarian rule and against neoliberalism (Santos and Avritzer 2002; Dagnino et al. 2006; Cannon and Kirby 2012). Originally, the main

<sup>1</sup> Scholars focusing on “mechanisms of direct democracy” alone, especially referendums, plebiscites, and consultations, have produced interesting national level comparative analyses, but usually separately from those studying other participatory mechanisms or other levels of government; see Altman (2011) and Ruth et al. (2017).

project was creating an alternative participatory model in order to deepen democracy. Evelina Dagnino, Alberto Olvera, and Aldo Panfichi (2006), for example, describe Latin America in the 2000s as a confrontation between three political projects – authoritarianism, neoliberalism, and participatory democracy. Participatory democracy does not mean rejecting representative institutions. Rather, it involves the “amplification of the concept of politics through citizen participation and deliberation in public spaces,” where democracy is conceived “as an articulated system of processes of citizen intervention in the decisions that concern them and in vigilance over the exercise of government” (Dagnino et al. 2006, 17). This kind of participation is considered to be “an instrument for building greater equality, insofar as it would contribute to the formulation of public policies oriented toward that goal” and “would contribute to a deprivatization of the State, which would become more permeable to the public interest formulated through societal participation, and, therefore, less subordinated to the private appropriation of its resources” (Dagnino et al. 2006, 48). Though they recognize challenges of participatory institutions, scholars within the political projects approach tend to display a normative preference for participatory democracy, identify participatory democracy with the Left, and have high expectations, using the language of emancipation, empowerment, and transformation. Like the demand-side account described by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume), this approach emphasizes the role of social movement activists in demanding greater participation, in inventing participatory mechanisms, or in implementing them alongside or within governments.

The democratic innovations approaches differ in several ways. With regards to the origins of the participatory boom, rather than grand projects demanded and pursued by subaltern actors, the democratic innovations scholars – like the editors’ chapter (this volume) – tend to emphasize politicians in general responding creatively to constituent demands that emanate at least partly from persistent inequality. However, the democratic innovations approach is also broader than that of the editors. They view the creation of new institutions as responding not only to citizen discontent with unequal societies but to increasingly fragmented societies with multiple social cleavages and new interests (Lissidini et al. 2014, 1–5), and to dissatisfaction with representative institutions (Cameron and Sharpe 2012, 321; Pogrebinschi 2017a, 57). As Zarembeg et al. (2017, 2) put it: “In the last few decades, classic channels of representation centered on political parties and unions have been profoundly transformed, to the point where some have emphasized

the existence of a generalized crisis of political representation.” In these accounts, the role of the Left or social movements is usually noted, but not stressed, normative preferences are downplayed, and expectations of participation are tempered. For Cameron and Sharpe (2012, 321, 330): “New participatory practices have the potential to improve the performance and legitimacy of democracy, increase accountability and responsiveness, and foster more active and engaged citizenship,” but at the same time, “innovations in one area of democratic governance may damage the performance of democracy in another.” Instead of viewing democratic innovations as collectively pointing to a single larger goal of building participatory democracy, scholars in this vein see multiple, distinct goals: fixing deficiencies of traditional representative institutions, redressing inequality, and enhancing political inclusion (Pogrebinschi 2016, 3, 14, 17); restoring trust in democracy (Lissidini et al. 2014, 5); or providing new forms of political intermediation (Zarembeg et al. 2017, 4).

Both approaches help illuminate the proliferation of participatory institutions and complement each other well. Arguably, the political projects approach, with its emphasis on actors and ideas, better explains the origins of the participatory turn while the democratic innovations approaches, with their emphasis on regular competition over how to address structural and institutional mismatches, better explain its continuation. Notably absent from either, however, is the role of diffusion. Regardless of approach, scholars of both single- and multi-country studies reach several nearly consensual conclusions. These start with the notions that Latin America is a global leader in creating participatory institutions and that these institutions face limitations and differ in important ways across countries.

The most frequently cited and documented limitation is the “extractivist” development model operating throughout most of the region irrespective of ideological orientation. Devotion to extractivism has made participatory institutions related to natural resources, like prior consultations (*consultas previas*) and tripartite roundtables, toothless at best. While prior consultation is “probably the single most important tool that local communities currently possess to legally resist extractive projects in their habitats,” this tool is ineffective, as it typically either remains only on paper or is manipulated or ignored by business or government conveners (Schilling-Vacaflor and Vollrath 2012, 127; see also Cannon and Kirby 2012, 190, 192; Arsel et al. 2016; Federación 2018, 55). Whether in Brazil (Castro and Motta 2015), Colombia (McNeish 2017), Ecuador (Lalander 2014), Peru (Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor 2016), Venezuela

(Lander 2016), or even Bolivia,<sup>2</sup> governments consistently fail to implement, respect, or enforce consultation rights regarding potentially destructive development projects. Instead, Latin America has become the world's "most dangerous" region for environmental activists, "with indigenous groups being the most vulnerable for violations ranging from threats, attacks and torture to disappearances and killings" as states prosecute environmentalists and indigenous groups or fail to defend them (Arsel et al. 2016, 886). Absence of effective participatory institutions in the critical extractive sector is telling. It reinforces the key point that incumbents avoid sharing decision-making power over the most important policies. It also shows how different dimensions of inclusion – access and resources – can be in tension. After all, for governments relying on revenues from extraction in order to increase social spending, creating meaningful participatory institutions could undermine a crucial pillar for maintaining popularity.

While Latin America has a uniformly weak record of effective participation regarding the environment, scholars consistently conclude that the type and scope of other participatory institutions differ significantly across the region, even in countries often grouped together. Despite the parallels in their constitutions (Elkins, this volume) and in their reliance on the commodity boom (Mazzuca, this volume), among other similarities, diverse scholars agree that the Bolivarian countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela vary considerably in designing and implementing participatory institutions aimed at the popular sector (Cannon and Kirby 2012; Balderacchi 2017; De la Torre 2017; Silva 2017). Though leaders in each country use direct democracy mechanisms like referendums more than most other countries in the region, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez went further than Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and Bolivian President Evo Morales in promoting local-level institutions nationwide that allowed for ongoing mass participation. Under

<sup>2</sup> The Bolivian case is disputed. While Falleti and Riofrancos (2018) present the use of prior consultations there as exemplifying a strong participatory institution, pointing out how frequently it is employed there compared to elsewhere, others emphasize the fact that the consultations in Bolivia always end with allowing mining operations to go forward (Zaremborg and Torres Wong 2018). Many scholars stress how the Morales government prioritized extraction over participation rights and undermined indigenous activists while empowering transnational mining firms (Lalander 2016; Andreucci and Radhuber 2017; see also Farthing 2019). The Ibero American Federation of Ombudsmen (Federación 2018, 55) lists Bolivia alongside six other South American states in which mining harms indigenous peoples' rights and where "States omit or poorly implement consultation processes."

Morales, in fact, the municipal monitoring committees (*comités de vigilancia*) established in the 1990s were abolished (Zuazo 2017, 100) as he focused more on informal channels for social movement allies than on institutionalized public participation. Correa neither promoted the constitution's new participatory institutions nor established informal alliances with social movements; instead, technocrats dominated policymaking and citizen participation was primarily electoral. Balderacchi (2017), de la Torre (2017), and Silva (2017) use similar, though not identical, explanations for these differences, stressing the comparative weakness of Ecuadorian social movements, the dispersed nature of Venezuelan social movements, and the reliance by Chávez and Morales on popular sector allies to mobilize against strong opposition reactions.

Though the comparative case study literature emphasizes diversity, one pioneering scholar of participatory institutions, Pogrebinschi (2016, 4; 2017a, 58) underscores the commonality of highly institutionalized deliberative forms of citizen participation across the region. Pogrebinschi's (2017b) impressive dataset of Latin American innovations for democracy (LATINNO) includes over 2,400 examples in eighteen countries from 1990 to 2016, coded according to forty-three indicators. One reason for differences between the comparative case studies and Pogrebinschi's broad quantitative analysis may be that thus far she has used individual innovations as the unit of analysis. When Pogrebinschi compares countries, she adds together each individual innovation, regardless of how long it lasted, how many citizens participated, at what level of government it took place (local, provincial, national), and whether or not it had an impact on policy outcomes.<sup>3</sup> When the nationwide system encompassing thousands of communal councils in Venezuela, which has lasted over a decade, influenced millions of dollars in local spending, and engaged roughly a third of the country's adult population, takes the same value as a three-day "Smart Cities Hackathon" involving seventy people in Caracas in 2015, the relative importance and meaning of different "participatory" innovations disappear.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The counting rules have other complications. If an institution exists in every city – such as Brazil's municipal health councils – it counts in the dataset only once, while each of Brazil's national policy conferences count separately if they are on different topics. Furthermore, data is missing or inaccurate for some of the forty three indicators, including, crucially, number of participants.

<sup>4</sup> See the descriptions of these innovations on the LATINNO data project website here: [www.latinno.net/en/case/19001/](http://www.latinno.net/en/case/19001/) and here: [www.latinno.net/en/case/19091/](http://www.latinno.net/en/case/19091/)

Recognizing the difficulties of macro-comparison of participatory institutions, this chapter triangulates between the counting efforts in LATINNO and in this volume (see Figure 1.3, showing legal adoption of access reforms), and the qualitative evaluations of participatory institutions in case study literature to assess the extent to which broad-based participatory institutions have been implemented in practice across sectors and levels of government. Focusing on formal participatory institutions that offer access to citizens generally (including the popular sector), not those aimed at professionals or technocrats, and including direct democracy mechanisms, major countries in the region divide into three groups. The highly participatory group is comprised of Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, and Uruguay. As detailed in the section below on limits and legacies of participation, each of these countries has created multiple venues for popular sector participation at different levels of government involving millions of citizens. Until recently, Brazil and Venezuela had often been held up – by separate scholars – as examples for the region (cf. Cameron and Sharpe 2012, 244; Webber and Carr 2013, 6, 22), while Peru is the world’s leading user of recall referendums and Uruguay is Latin America’s most prolific user of citizen-initiated popular consultations. At the lower end of the participatory spectrum are Chile, Mexico, and Argentina. While citizen participation is often prominent in the discourse of Chilean and Mexican politicians, who have implemented advisory councils with fanfare, in practice policymaking at all levels generally remains elite-driven.<sup>5</sup> In Argentina, participatory discourse has remained limited and “elected officials neglected to adopt sweeping participatory reforms” (Risley 2015, 128), even under the Kirchner administrations, when the emphasis lay on rebuilding corporatism (Wylde 2012, 46) and partisan social organizations (Ostiguy and Schneider 2018). The middle group is comprised of Bolivia and Ecuador (described above), as well as Colombia. Like their Northern Andean counterparts in this group, Colombian leaders advanced new participatory institutions like recall referendums and local policy councils when they revised the constitution in the 1990s, and have written several new laws on paper since then to promote citizen participation, but have similarly failed to institutionalize widespread popular sector

<sup>5</sup> For Chile, see Jara Reyes (2012), Cameron and Sharpe (2012), and Delamaza (2015); for Mexico, see, Cabrero and Díaz Aldret (2012), Cameron and Sharpe (2012), and Olvera (2015).

participation in practice (Rampf and Chavarro 2014; Vargas Reina 2014; Mayka 2019).

How can one explain this variation in the implementation of broad-based participatory institutions? As exploratory hypotheses, two factors in combination seem especially pertinent. First, the role of a strong left party or movement with a historical ideological commitment to participatory democracy helps distinguish Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela from the other countries. The Workers' Party and the Broad Front had experience implementing participatory experiments at the local level in Brazil and Uruguay, respectively, in the 1990s before winning national power in the 2000s, and many of their social movement allies espoused participatory ideals as well. The coalition supporting Hugo Chávez in Venezuela also included parties that had advocated and practiced participatory democracy in the past. Even in Peru, where the Left was debilitated, the remnants of the United Left held participatory ideals and experience. Left and center-left parties in the other countries were weaker and/or excluded from power (Colombia, Mexico), not ideologically committed to participatory democracy (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador), or focused on indigenous rights to communal autonomy (Bolivia). Second, countries in the medium to high range (except Brazil and Uruguay) experienced marked political instability in the 1990s or early 2000s, in the form of party system collapse or civil war, while those in the low range did not (even Argentina's severe economic crisis in 2001 only led to a brief presidential shuffling, after which the same party continued to dominate). Instability often led to constitutional assemblies, opening the way for social movements and parties to place new participatory ideas on the agenda. In Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, by contrast, party system stability remained intact (at least until 2015) and policymaking was gradual, even throughout Mexico's transition away from one-party rule. More tentatively, international influences may have been stronger in several of the medium to high cases, especially in aid recipient countries such as Peru (see section on limits and legacies of participation). An additional trait that Brazil and Uruguay share is their prior history of greater use of participatory institutions, a corporatist tradition that preceded the inclusionary turn by decades and likely facilitated it (for Brazil, see Mayka and Rich, this volume).

This chapter adopts the perspective that the rise of participatory institutions in Latin America stems both from ideologically motivated political projects and from the continual attempts by politicians at all levels of government to innovate in order to respond to constituents, which

democratic competition allows and encourages, and which international organizations often promote. Understanding what these institutions mean for inclusion in practice requires more than an accumulation of snapshots from a bird's-eye view. More contextualized, longitudinal analyses of participatory institutions are needed to illuminate their origins, evolution, and limitations. The next two empirical sections try to provide this kind of analysis in different ways, first by following the trajectory of one of the most widely implemented new institutions in the region – PB – and then by examining the multiple and varied participatory institutions implemented in Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Each section demonstrates the importance of both leftist political projects and international actors in the creation, diffusion, and implementation of participatory institutions. Both sections also emphasize that, even when participatory institutions make the leap from parchment to practice, and even when they seem ideally suited to maximize inclusion, how they are designed and implemented by those fearful of losing power can inhibit the effective practice of citizenship.

#### TRAVELS AND TRAVAILS OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

When leftist mayors began implementing PB in the early 1990s in Porto Alegre and other cities where it had other names, including Ciudad Guayana, Caracas, and Montevideo, inclusion was a principal goal of their project of developing local-level participatory democracy (Goldfrank 2011a). By allowing all residents to voluntarily and regularly contribute to decision-making over a significant part of the municipal budget in repeated interactions with government authorities, PB granted *recognition* to previously excluded groups (those living in informal or peripheral neighborhoods) and provided them *access* to a new institution that influenced local *resources*. Participants disproportionately drew from the popular sectors and government spending through PB-favored popular sector neighborhoods. By the 2010s, PB had spread to thousands of cities in Latin America and throughout the world. However, the form and importance of PB differ considerably across locations, and examples of PB generating meaningful citizenship are now rare in Latin America and beyond (Peck and Theodore 2015; Goldfrank 2017; Baiocchi and Ganuza 2017). How and why did PB globalize and, eventually, lose its more inclusionary attributes in most cases?

To answer these questions, this section offers an account of the facilitated diffusion of PB. The globalization of PB follows many traits



highlighted by Hunter's (this volume) explanation of the diffusion of CCTs. The main difference between the two is that PB was adopted both by local governments on their own in an uncoordinated but interdependent fashion *and* by local governments either mandated to do so by national governments or, in Brazil in the 1990s, strongly encouraged to do so by the Workers' Party. This makes the globalization of PB a hybrid of uncoordinated interdependence and coordination from above, unlike the spread of CCTs, which shows "interdependence without coordination" (Hunter, this volume). Nonetheless, as with CCTs, the spread of PB bears all the hallmarks of diffusion – geographical clustering, adoption by highly disparate cities and countries in short time periods following a forward-leaning "S" wavelike pattern, dense networks of experts and politicians, a simple and bold core idea that appeals to multiple actors across ideological lines, and research and financial support from international organizations.<sup>6</sup> This section briefly describes the original Porto Alegre model of PB, explains how and why it attracted international attention and began to spread, and analyzes how translations of it elsewhere differ such that its original citizenship-enhancing traits are often lost.

In the early years, when the Workers' Party launched it, PB in Porto Alegre generally worked as follows (Goldfrank 2017). At the start of each annual cycle, citizens met in open public assemblies at the local level to evaluate government performance, discussed their most pressing needs, and established investment priorities for their neighborhoods, districts, and city. Participants voted on which social policies and infrastructure projects should be prioritized and elected district-level (or thematic) delegates, as well as councilors for the city-wide budget council. The delegates and councilors met throughout the year to negotiate technical details of projects and the final budget with city officials, monitor implementation of the prior year's plan, and deliberate over potential rule changes. City officials aggregated the priorities to develop an investment and service plan, typically representing 5–15 percent of the budget. Allocation of projects across districts corresponded to a formula including population size, lack of infrastructure or services, and the selected priorities. Once the final budget was passed by the municipal legislature, the investment and service plan was distributed to PB participants as the cycle renewed so

<sup>6</sup> This section draws on Goldfrank (2012) and three books on the diffusion of PB (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2017; Oliveira 2017) or what they prefer to call "translation" of PB *and* CCTs (Peck and Theodore 2015).

that they could monitor government performance. In the 1990s, Porto Alegre allocated between US\$30 million and US\$120 million annually through PB, roughly equivalent to US\$20 to US\$80 per inhabitant per year, and participation levels grew from several hundred to fifteen thousand residents (Goldfrank 2011a, 210–211).

This model of PB became a modular template that spread in wavelike patterns first in Brazil, then throughout Latin America, and ultimately the rest of the world. Participatory budgeting gained notice within the Workers' Party because Porto Alegre was one of the few cities in which the party continually won reelection, governing from 1989 to 2004. The Workers' Party mandated its mayors of large cities to implement PB, which partially explains its rise from a handful of cases in the early 1990s to adoption by over 100 Brazilian municipalities over the decade. Widespread diffusion beyond Brazil occurred after Porto Alegre's PB earned a UN-Habitat award in 1996 and the subsequent publication of several influential books and articles that highlighted PB as a sort of magic bullet to help solve numerous democratic and development deficits. The simple idea of giving citizens direct input over how to spend government resources appealed to diverse activists and policymakers. PB was touted (or at least perceived) as a way to give voice to the excluded, encourage the growth of civil society organizations (CSOs), make infrastructure and service delivery more equitable, and enhance transparency while reducing corruption. Key publications promoting PB included, *Orçamento participativo: A experiência de Porto Alegre* (Genro and de Souza 1997), co-authored by a former mayor and implementer of PB, an article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Cassen 1998), the World Bank's annual World Development Reports starting in 1997 (World Bank 1997, 122), and a PB guidebook from UN-Habitat (2004).

The article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* – written by its director, Bernard Cassen, president of ATTAC in France – helped Porto Alegre secure its place as host of the first World Social Forum (WSF), the gathering of anti-neoliberal globalization activists. The prominence of PB at the WSF in turn aided the creation of a left-leaning channel for PB diffusion. Overlapping networks of politicians and experts – starting with the original “ambassadors of participation” (Oliveira 2017, 6) from Porto Alegre's City Hall and aided by international organizations – promoted PB through workshops, site visits, conferences, research reports, and, in some cases, financial support to start pilot projects. The most important organizations supporting PB's expansion include the United Nations, the European Union through its URB-AL program, United States

Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank, which provided roughly \$280 million in loans or grants to support PB in fifteen countries from 2002 to 2012.<sup>7</sup> Horizontal networks such as the International Observatory on Participatory Democracy, United Cities and Local Governments, and the World Bank- and UN-supported Cities Alliance also advocated for PB, as have national networks of cities with PB in Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia.

As a result of these diffusion efforts, by 2013 conservative estimates indicated that PB had spread to well over 2,000 locales in more than forty countries, including rural towns and major cities in all world regions, from Mexico, New York, Paris, and Gdansk to Maputo, Chengdu, Seoul, and Melbourne (Sintomer et al. 2014, 30; Cabannes and Lipietz 2017; Oliveira 2017). More recent studies point to over 7,000 local, provincial, or regional governments using PB, with over 2,500 in Latin America alone (Dias and Júlio 2018, 19–20), suggesting that the upward slope of the global “S” curve has not yet peaked. There is clear evidence of diversity of adopters and of at least initial geographical clustering. Local governments in Latin America were early adopters, mostly but not only of their own volition. National governments passed laws mandating local governments to adopt PB in Peru in 2003, the Dominican Republic in 2007, and Colombia in 2015.

The hybrid form of diffusion, with some cities learning from and emulating Porto Alegre while others were cajoled by international actors or mandated from above to implement PB, may help explain PB’s heterogeneous and frequently disappointing outcomes as it spreads and evolves. In many cases, what was once a leftist project to deepen democracy became a technocratic and sometimes empty tool of “good governance.” In part this is because the left-leaning channel of PB diffusion, with its ideological commitments to participatory democracy and redistribution, lost clout to the better resourced international donor channels, where motives were mixed (Peck and Theodore 2015, 214, 231; Goldfrank 2012). The Workers’ Party’s loss to a center-right coalition in Porto Alegre in 2004 not only led to the hollowing out (and in 2017, suspension) of PB there, but to the weakening of the left diffusion channel. In addition, whether or not later implementers of PB did so of their own accord or were mandated, they faced the dilemma of power sharing, and

<sup>7</sup> This amount represented less than one tenth of 1% of IBRD loans (see Goldfrank 2012, 3, 8).

many opted to share as little as possible. As PB traveled the globe, adopters often kept its format for allowing regular expression of popular demands but ignored the crucial accompanying administrative reforms that allowed decision-making power over important public resources and policies (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2017, 142–152). The simple core idea of PB became detached from the broader leftist political project that initiated it.

By contrast with CCTs, which because of their targeted nature and low resource burden already make for “easy” adoption (Holland and Schneider 2017; Hunter, this volume), the diffusion of PB ultimately entailed the watering down of PB’s inclusionary potential through technocratic hijacking and power-holder pushback. Later adopters tended to modify the Porto Alegre model in ways that inhibited the effective practice of citizenship by limiting access and/or resources. As cities in Latin America and beyond began implementing PB, frequent changes included restricting participation to CSOs or to specific neighborhoods rather than opening to all, adding government or partisan budget councilors, restricting citizen input to infrastructure projects only, failing to include an allocation formula to benefit poorly served or low-income communities, and forgoing city-wide citizen budget councils and district oversight bodies. Peru’s PB law, for example, adopts all of the restrictions above except for the last one. Many cities, including Mexico City, New York, and Paris, settled on a modified version of PB that operates like an election. Montevideo’s renewed PB process starting in 2006 offers a good example of this version. At the start of the cycle, the city government sets a specific amount of funding for PB, allocating an equal amount to each district and specifying a maximum for individual public infrastructure and service projects that citizens or civic associations may propose in person or via the internet. Local government officials review the proposals and place technically viable ones on a ballot for a general election. The government commits to implement those projects winning the most votes, up to the established limit, over the course of the subsequent two years. In 2016, the government of Montevideo allocated roughly US\$600,000 through PB to each of its eight municipal districts, with a maximum of US\$100,000 per project, to be implemented in 2017 and 2018; at concurrent exchange rates, this would come out to about US\$1.80 per inhabitant per year decided on through PB (see Goldfrank 2017, 116).

In the heyday of PB in Porto Alegre in the 1990s, spending through PB was up to forty times higher than in Montevideo’s PB now. Many if not most Latin American PB processes outside of Brazil suffer from

insufficient funding, whether because local finances are woeful or because city officials choose – on paper or in practice – to dedicate a small percentage of revenues to PB. In addition to the design modifications of PB described above, the varying amount of spending through PB means that the extent to which PB provides access and influence over resources to the popular sector is highly heterogeneous. Moreover, in some Andean and Central American cases where participation was restricted to specific groups, PB served to reinforce clientelism rather than enhance effective citizenship (Goldfrank 2017, 120–121). Even in cases where politicians' intentions are worthy, negative results may occur. In Medellín, for example, criminal armed groups intruded into PB, threatening civic associations in attempts to capture resources and increase their power (Moncada 2016, 241–242). Finally, in countries where PB is not federally mandated, it is frequently abandoned after a mayoral term or two (Goldfrank 2017, 122). This variation in PB outcomes as it diffused underscores the importance of paying attention to local context and of not assuming democratizing or inclusionary effects of participatory institutions. Scholars should be particularly wary as PB spreads to subnational governments in authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, but even in some Latin American countries the local or national contexts feature high levels of violence or autocratic tendencies that change the meaning of participation, whether through PB or other mechanisms.

#### LIMITS AND LEGACIES OF PARTICIPATION IN BRAZIL, PERU, URUGUAY, AND VENEZUELA

Analyzing this unlikely grouping of these four countries with the most widespread implementation and regular use of participatory institutions echoes lessons similar to those from the preceding look at the diffusion of PB. First, leftist political projects have been crucial to the ideation and implementation of participatory institutions. The Left's role, in the form of the Workers' Party (PT), the Broad Front (FA), and Hugo Chávez and his allied political parties, was more important to the spread of participatory institutions in Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela than it was in Peru, where international organizations played key roles. Second, more than a parchment-to-practice gap, examination of these four countries with the most extensive implementation of participatory institutions reveals considerable variation in their design such that meaningful popular sector inclusion is not guaranteed. Democratic (non-clientelistic) popular sector inclusion through participatory institutions advanced most in Uruguay

and Brazil, though more fleetingly in the latter. Inclusion remained comparatively limited in Peru, while initially democratic participatory institutions in Venezuela devolved into clientelistic vehicles for maintaining increasingly authoritarian control.

While the rest of this section focuses on narrating the origins and evolution of participatory institutions in these four countries, on describing the access they provide to policymaking, and on evaluating their inclusionary impact, it begins with hypotheses to explain the variation in the general outcomes. First, the greater impact of participatory institutions in Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela compared to Peru is partially due to the long periods of left-led government in the former countries. The PT, FA, and Chavismo, respectively, each stayed in national office for over a dozen years in the 2000s, while in Peru the Left has never won the presidency and no political party – regardless of ideology – has been reelected even once since democratization in 1980. Continuity granted the Left the opportunity to design participatory experiments that could provide decision-making power (rather than consultation) to the popular sector over important local, sectoral, and national policies. Second, the higher degree of partisan bias within Peruvian and especially Venezuelan participatory institutions relates back to the nature of the governing coalitions, which were broader and steadier in Brazil and Uruguay than in Peru, where they constantly changed amid hyper-competition, and Venezuela, where one party dominated. Finally, the varying strength of conservative opposition forces helps explain the evolution of participatory institutions in all cases. Opposition parties had more congressional seats in Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay than in Venezuela, which they often used to delay, water down, sabotage, or block the most far-reaching participatory institutions, and which governing coalitions took into account when they designed or revived such institutions, limiting their scope, decision-making power, or types of participants (individuals, CSOs, government officials). The weaker opposition in Venezuela destroyed its democratic credibility and its ability to influence Chavista participatory institutions by engaging in civil–military coups d'état and electoral boycotts that left it without congressional representation during key periods.

### Peru

The origins of Peru's highly regulated, nationwide, multilevel set of participatory institutions – including but not limited to PB – are complicated.

Multiple actors were involved, including politicians from across the ideological spectrum, the Catholic Church, and international aid organizations. The genesis of today's institutions date back to the experiments in local-level participation by a few United Left (IU) mayors after military rule ended in 1980, and to the autocratic period following Alberto Fujimori's *auto-golpe* in 1992, when former IU members joined NGOs and other CSOs in creating initiatives for public dialog, including the first "concertation roundtables" (*mesas de concertación*), often with the support of Catholic or Evangelical religious groups (Panfichi and Dammert 2006, 232–239). After the coup, the Organization of American States pressured the Fujimori regime to return to democracy, and international financial institutions, led by the World Bank, called for policies to reduce poverty and inequality with support from civil society (Panfichi and Dammert 2006, 236–239). This combination of pressures is likely related to the inclusion in the 1993 constitution of two key participation provisions: the recall referendum for local elections (Welp 2016a, 1165) and the right of citizen participation in administration of public resources. As Panfichi and Dammert (2006, 236) argue: "citizen participation during fujimorismo was added in the framework of a process of negotiations with external actors." The pressure continued when donor organizations pushed Fujimori to create a working group on fighting poverty that gathered representatives of the government, business, civil society, and international organizations (Panfichi and Dammert 2006, 238–239). When Fujimori was forced out in 2000, Caritas-Peru presented the multi-party transition government with a proposal to build on the local concertation roundtables experience to create a national system of dialog on social policies and development plans to reduce poverty (Panfichi and Dammert 2006, 241; Meltzer 2013, 278). Thus was born the Mesa de Concertación para la Lucha Contra Pobreza (Roundtable for the Fight Against Poverty; MCLCP) in January 2001.

The MCLCP consists of representatives from government, CSOs, business, labor, and religious groups, and is now present at each level of government, including all twenty-six regions, most of the 195 provinces, and most of the 1,838 municipal districts. At the national level, the MCLCP includes representatives from international aid organizations as well.<sup>8</sup> The MCLCP also sends representatives to the National Accord Forum (Foro del Acuerdo Nacional), another state–society organ created

<sup>8</sup> See [www.mesadeconcertacion.org.pe/directorio nacional](http://www.mesadeconcertacion.org.pe/directorio_nacional) (accessed February 13, 2018) for a list of organizations represented.

during the post-Fujimori transition to strengthen democracy and reduce poverty by, among other things, promoting citizen participation and developing state policies on a consensual basis.<sup>9</sup> The head of the MCLCP's executive committee is designated by Peru's president; the first was a Catholic priest who had been the pastoral advisor to Caritas (Panfichi and Dammert 2006, 242). Supported from the start by international aid organizations, including the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) and the World Bank (Meltzer 2013, 278), one of the MCLCP's main goals has been to: "Institutionalize citizen participation in the design, decision making, and oversight of the State's social policies."<sup>10</sup> During Alejandro Toledo's administration starting in 2001, the MCLCP began working with the Ministry of Finance (MEF) to create PB throughout Peru to provide continuity to local development plans. Again, international organizations, including the World Bank, UN agencies, and especially USAID, played a pivotal role. USAID provided training to municipal governments (Baiocchi 2015, 123) and co-sponsored an international conference on PB in Peru's Congress, with presentations by former IU mayors who had previously implemented PB and by representatives from Workers' Party governments in Porto Alegre and Santo André (Oliveira 2017, 180–181).

The unlikely alliance (of locally-based CSOs, Church representatives, international agencies, the MEF, and Toledo government officials with roots in the IU) faced resistance from opposition parties in the legislature when the former pushed to mandate PB in all regional, provincial, and municipal governments in 2003. Traditional parties, especially the Aprista Party (formerly APRA), claimed that citizen planning and budget councils undermined representative democracy. Eventually, a compromise, hybrid bill passed. It restricted involvement to official "participating agents" – those representing legally registered organizations (public or private) – who developed PB proposals, and it gave authority to approve those proposals to coordination councils with 60 percent of the seats reserved for local government officials. Over the next few years, virtually all subnational governments began creating local MCLCPs and coordination councils and began implementing PB, and, after stops and starts,

<sup>9</sup> For details, see Meltzer (2013), Iguñiz (2015), and <http://acuerdonacional.pe/> (accessed February 13, 2018).

<sup>10</sup> See [www.mesadecconcertacion.org.pe/objetivos-y-funciones](http://www.mesadecconcertacion.org.pe/objetivos-y-funciones) (accessed February 13 2018).



both the national MCLCP and the National Accord Forum had created working groups and were holding regular meetings.

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, CSOs throughout Peru had access to policy and budget decision-making processes, at least through representatives, at all levels of government. About 150,000 Peruvians were involved in PB every year by the late 2000s, or roughly 1 percent of the adult population (Goldfrank 2017, 121), and thousands more participated in the MCLCPs, coordination councils, and several other policy councils and committees. In addition, individual citizens had the right to recall elected authorities (mayors and city councilors) at the municipal and provincial levels and the rights to several mechanisms of direct democracy at the national level, including citizen legislative initiatives. As in other Andean countries, the latter have been used only sporadically, including successfully by an oil workers' union to prevent the privatization of PetroPeru and unsuccessfully by the federation of water workers opposing privatization of water companies (Lissidini 2015; Welp 2008, 124–125). Local recall referendums, however, have been attempted more than 20,000 times, activated over 5,000 times, and successful over 1,500 times since 1993, making Peru “the most intense user of recall referendums worldwide” (Welp 2016a, 1164, 1162). Whether or not Peru “has more institutionalized mechanisms for citizen participation than anywhere else in Latin America” (Meltzer 2013, 20), it certainly stands out.

Nonetheless, the degree to which Peru's participatory institutions provide meaningful popular sector inclusion is questionable. Other than the direct democracy mechanisms, the main participatory institutions require membership in officially registered CSOs, which excludes those who are not already (legally) organized, and they often give an equal or greater number of seats to government officials, who may drown out citizen voices. Furthermore, many CSOs involved are not from the popular sector. On the MCLCP's national directorate, for example, civil society is represented not only by the labor confederation (CGTP) and a women's movement (CONAMOVIDI), but by Caritas, two business federations (CONFIEP and SNI), UNICEF and the UNDP, and the Coordinator of Foreign Entities of International Aid (COEECI). The civil society groups playing the most important roles on the coordination councils and in PB are not membership-based grassroots social organizations but professional NGOs; and women and women's organizations are underrepresented in both the coordination councils and PB, leading McNulty (2013, 82) to “suspect that other less empowered constituencies are not

attending these meetings either.” The main participatory institutions also allow only limited influence over policy and resources. The National Accord Forum and the MCLCPs operate by consensus, leading to broad nonbinding policy guidelines whose impact is difficult to gauge (Panfichi and Dammert 2006, 255; Iguñiz 2015). And while by law PB should affect the capital investment budget for subnational governments, in practice funding dedicated to PB projects tends to be minimal. Only about half the approved projects are implemented on average (McNulty 2019, 137). In the recent four-year term of Lima’s mayor, Susana Villarán, only 16 PB projects were completed, which was one-fifth the number of technically viable projects, and about 2 percent of all projects presented, leading to widespread participant frustration (Desenzi 2017, 130). Finally, Welp’s (2016a, 1172–1173) exhaustive analysis of recall referendums demonstrates that rather than promote inclusive citizenship, constant activation of recalls resulted in “polarization of politics and a growing lack of civility in the political arena.”

### **Brazil**

The rise of participatory institutions in Brazil best exemplifies the political projects approach described earlier, in which anti-authoritarian social movements and political parties, in this case the PT especially, began advocating for and experimenting locally with a more participatory form of democracy while the country was under military rule. Their mobilization efforts paid off during the writing of the 1988 constitution, which enshrined the municipal autonomy and citizen participation rights that allowed for further growth of participatory institutions once democracy returned. Scholars typically tout the importance of urban social movements and PT administrations in large cities in the development of the participatory democracy project, but one should remember the roles of Catholic activists influenced by liberation theology and of reformist politicians from the Movement for Democracy (MDB, and later PMDB), especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Tranjan 2016; Baiocchi 2017). While Mayka and Rich (this volume) are correct that several participatory initiatives advanced somewhat under centrist governments of the 1990s, it is undeniable that the PT became the party most associated with the advance of participatory institutions aimed at the popular sector. Not only was the PT responsible for the spread of PB in the 1990s, during four consecutive terms in the presidency starting in 2003, it revived, created, or encouraged multiple participatory initiatives at all levels of government.

Most importantly, the PT “reengineered” seventeen existing national policy councils in order to include CSO representatives and established twenty-two new national policy councils, stimulated the creation of tens of thousands of municipal public policy management councils through federal funding, and held dozens of multitiered national public policy conferences involving millions of participants at the municipal, state, and federal levels (Pogrebinschi and Tanscheit 2017; see also Avritzer 2012, 7–8, 12, and Wampler 2015, 264). The PT’s commitment to participatory democracy culminated in its (ultimately failed) attempt to establish a National System of Social Participation in 2014 that would have served to articulate the various participatory institutions with each other and with the government.

By 2015, Brazil’s “vast participatory architecture” (Wampler 2015, 267) provided a wide array of opportunities for citizens to participate, and relatively large numbers of them did so. In Brazil’s 5,570 municipalities there are altogether somewhere between 30,000 and 65,000 policy councils with at least 300,000 members (cf. Wampler 2015, 264, 3; Romão et al. 2017, 35). Each of Brazil’s twenty-seven states has roughly thirteen councils covering different policy sectors (Pires 2015, 28). Some 7 million Brazilians participated in at least one of the fifty-eight national public policy conferences held between 2003 and 2011, representing about 5 percent of the adult population (Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014, 320–321). Survey research indicates that 3 percent of Brazilians have taken part in PB and 2 percent in municipal or regional policy councils (Avritzer 2012, 11).

The extension of participatory institutions and their intensive use by millions of Brazilians offer a strong case for their role in enhancing democratic citizenship and inclusion (Cameron and Sharpe 2012; Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014; Wampler 2015; Avritzer 2017; Mayka and Rich, this volume). However, this author and many others question the importance of Brazil’s multilevel participatory institutions, pointing to a range of limitations on their effectiveness and inclusiveness (Goldfrank 2011b; Dagnino and Teixeira 2014; Gómez Bruera 2015; Pires 2015; Romão 2015; Baiocchi 2017). The core critiques are that participants tend not to hail from the popular sectors but are frequently professionals or CSO leaders who are steps removed from their movement bases, that the institutions are consultative with limited decision-making power at best, and that crucial policy issues – development projects, macroeconomic policy, and budgetary decisions – remain unaffected. Baiocchi (2017, 42), for example, emphasizes that “time and again, conference

resolutions that went directly against government policy or powerful economic interests did not get adopted as policy” and that “the anticrisis economic measures of 2008 did *not* go through participatory spaces and ignored more progressive alternatives.” The PT’s most important social program – *Bolsa Família* (see Hunter, this volume) – involves no participatory mechanisms. This is despite Lula’s original intentions when he invited a leading liberation theologian and a WSF leader to mobilize support for the Zero Hunger committees, which were later discarded in favor of the more technical *Bolsa Família* program (Bruera 2015, 9, 10–12). Of note for comparison is that, once in the presidency, the PT never scaled PB up to the national level nor attempted to mandate or encourage it subnationally (Goldfrank 2011b; Gómez Bruera 2015). The percentage of both all large municipalities (50,000 or more inhabitants) and all large PT-governed municipalities implementing PB declined after Lula was elected president. The number of Brazilian cities using PB – perhaps 200 at one time – was never large, and in most cities it only lasts one or two terms at best (Goldfrank 2012, 2–3; 2017, 122; Wampler 2015, 262).

Strengthening the skeptical interpretation of Brazil’s participatory institutions are the facts that many PT government officials questioned their impact and that a wave of protests began in 2013 involving millions of citizens that were the country’s largest since mobilizations for direct elections thirty years earlier. Responding to civil society and internal government doubts, the Lula administration’s Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) created a special unit in 2010 to evaluate the effectiveness of participatory institutions and develop proposals to improve them (Romão 2015, 48–49). After the 2013 protests, in part in response to them and in part building on the IPEA’s research and on a segment of the PT’s long-standing interest in creating a participatory system, President Dilma Rousseff (Lula’s successor) instituted the National System of Social Participation by decree in May 2014. Yet the PT could not convince its congressional coalition partners to make the decree permanent, as many legislators and a good part of the press (especially *Veja*) viewed Rousseff’s decree as a threat to representative democracy, dubbing it “Bolivarian” and claiming it aimed at creating “soviets.” The decree died in the Senate in 2015, a precursor to Rousseff’s ousting the following year and to the rise of a pair of anti-participatory conservative presidents, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. As even champions of Brazil’s participatory institutions recognize, Temer and Bolsonaro dramatically weakened them, removing civil society members,

cutting funding and staffing, and holding only the few national conferences that are legally required (Pogrebinschi and Tanscheit 2017, 4–5; Lima 2020, 25–26).

### Venezuela

The origins of the first wave of participatory institutions under Hugo Chávez in the early 2000s bear some resemblance to those in Brazil – a leftist project for participatory democracy based in part on prior local-level experiments and aided by a constituent assembly – but differ in that this constituent assembly followed not a twenty-one-year military dictatorship but nearly four decades of democracy. Furthermore, Venezuela’s constituent assembly in 1999 and subsequent governments were dominated by Chávez and his allies, whereas the PT played a minor role in Brazil’s constituent assembly and did not win the presidency until fourteen years later, and then only in coalition with centrist parties. More importantly, Venezuela’s first wave of participatory institutions was short-lived and overtaken in 2006 by a second wave based not on the ideas of the participatory democracy project described earlier but on notions of popular power and twenty-first-century socialism (Goldfrank 2011b, 177–179; Silva 2017, 109–110). While first-wave participatory institutions like the Water Planning Boards (Mesas Técnicas de Água; MTAs), Urban Land Committees (Comités de Tierra Urbana; CTUs), and Local Public Planning Councils (Comités Locales de Planificación Pública; CLPPs), generally resembled participatory institutions in the region, second-wave institutions did not. To understand the significance of these second-wave institutions – the Communal Councils (Consejos Comunales; CCs), Communes (Comunas), and, later, Local Supply and Production Committees (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción; CLAPs) – one must take into account that they developed under and contributed to an increasingly illiberal political context. Accordingly, the key questions are: how do first- and second-wave participatory institutions differ, why did *Chavismo* change models, and to what degree are Venezuela’s participatory institutions inclusionary?

To be clear, distinctions between earlier and later participatory institutions are not absolute. And some institutions, such as occasional use of referendums and PB in several cities, or the more widespread health committees, spanned both periods. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between the key first- and second-wave participatory institutions. The neighborhood-level MTAs and CTUs, which numbered in

the thousands by the early 2000s, and the city-level CLPPs, which, as mandated in the 1999 constitution, should have functioned in all of Venezuela's 335 municipalities, operated with local government agencies and within the framework of a pluralistic, representative democracy (Goldfrank 2011b, 177–178). The CLPPs, for example, should include the mayor, city councilors, and representatives of CSOs, the latter of whom hold 50 percent of the seats plus one and are elected in public assemblies. The CLPPs are intended to organize assemblies for direct participation in municipal planning and budgeting as well. Second-wave participatory institutions, by contrast, operate parallel to and in competition with local representative governments, and have become increasingly linked to the national government and the ruling party (the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela; PSUV) (Silva 2017, 110). CCs can be formed by between 150 and 400 families in cities and by smaller numbers of families in rural and indigenous areas; their main purposes are proposing, planning, implementing, and monitoring community projects. Communes, which link CCs with one another and with, in some cases, “productive units known as social property enterprises,” are explicitly aimed at building a new communal state to replace the existing state and facilitate a transition to socialism (Ciccariello-Maher 2016, 20–21; see also Azzellini 2016).

There are at least three main reasons why the Chávez administration moved away from the first-wave participatory institutions like the CLPPs and began focusing on the communal councils and eventually communes instead. First, CLPPs faced severe challenges. Chavista and opposition mayors often failed to create them or obstructed their functioning. Some Chávez sympathizers argued that existing representative institutions and bureaucracies were corrupt and inefficient and needed to be replaced (Goldfrank 2011b, 179). Second, creating new institutions – the CCs – offered Chávez an avenue that was potentially free of opposition interference to build a clientelist network in preparation for the 2006 presidential election and for the establishment of a new political party, the PSUV, in 2007 (Goldfrank 2011b, 179). Finally, the change to CCs and communes coincided with the radicalization of Chavista ideology toward explicitly proclaiming a socialist revolution (Silva 2017, 109–110). This radicalization followed the opposition's repeated attempts to remove Chávez from power: the failed coup d'état in 2002, oil strike in 2003, and recall referendum in 2004. After the opposition abstained from congressional elections in 2005, Chavista legislators passed a law delinking the CCs from CLPPs, and thus from municipal governments; instead, Chávez

created a national-level commission to register CCs and provide funding (Goldfrank 2011b, 179).

As Chávez used increased oil revenues to sponsor their projects, the number of communal councils skyrocketed. By the late 2000s, the CCs had received over four billion dollars, official figures indicated that 33,549 CCs had formed, involving more than 8 million participants, and independent surveys confirmed that roughly a third of Venezuelan adults had participated in at least one CC meeting (Goldfrank 2011b, 177–178; Azzellini 2016, 102–103). In 2010, the government passed the Law of Communes, and 1,195 communes had registered by 2015 (Azzellini 2016, 243–245). Later, as oil revenues plummeted and the economy entered a deep recession, President Nicolás Maduro created another “participatory” initiative in 2016, the Local Committees for Supply and Production (CLAPs), which distribute subsidized food baskets. By 2017, over 29,000 CLAPs had formed, according to the program’s director (CNN 2017). The CLAPs have their own webpage on the vice-president’s site ([www.vicepresidencia.gob.ve/index.php/category/clap/](http://www.vicepresidencia.gob.ve/index.php/category/clap/)) and a magazine suggestively titled, *Todo el Poder para los CLAP* (All Power to the CLAPs), featuring Maduro on the editorial board.

Opportunities for popular sector participation have been numerous in Venezuela, and a higher percentage of the population has participated regularly in the new institutions than anywhere else in Latin America, but it is hard to sustain that this participation signifies meaningful citizenship. Well before Venezuela’s economic collapse and the creation of the blatantly clientelistic CLAPs, which tie popular sector food consumption to official party membership in a context of severe shortages, scholars had identified profound problems with the CCs. Even many observers sympathetic to participatory ideals recognize that CCs suffer from corruption, lack of transparency, co-optation and subordination of social movements, exclusion of those not aligned with the PSUV, and electoral manipulation, and that they often end up sowing or deepening distrust within communities and ultimately delegitimizing participation (Briceño 2014; Rhodes-Purdy 2015; Silva 2017; García-Guadilla 2018; Hanson 2018). The overlapping roles CCs play means that they mix society, the ruling party, and the state in such a way that access to participation in decision-making over public goods is conditioned by partisanship. Even if some CCs have served to include the popular sector without political manipulation, the CCs operate at the microlevel; opportunities for sector-based or state- and national-level participation have been virtually nonexistent, as the

constitutionally prescribed state- and national-level planning councils never materialized (Silva 2017, 111). The only major exceptions to the lack of national participatory institutions were the recall referendums in 2004 and constitutional referendums in 2007 and 2009. Yet the 2007 referendums ultimately proved meaningless; when a majority rejected dozens of constitutional changes that Chávez proposed, Congress passed many of the same reforms anyway (Welp 2016b). And when Maduro's opponents tried to use the constitutionally-sanctioned path for a recall referendum against him in 2017, the National Electoral Council rejected it, and later prohibited major opposition parties from fielding candidates in the 2018 presidential election. Such actions obviously inhibit citizenship rights and make a mockery of Chavista claims that Venezuela remains a democracy, participatory or otherwise.

### Uruguay

Unlike the other countries examined here, and uniquely in Latin America, Uruguay's recent embrace of participatory institutions does not coincide with the rewriting of constitutions nor with dissatisfaction with democracy and representative institutions such as elections, parliaments, and parties.<sup>11</sup> Instead, the Uruguayan case demonstrates a mix of the persistence and revival of prior participatory institutions with a leftist participatory democracy project promoted by the Broad Front (Frente Amplio, FA) and its social movement allies. Well before the rest of Latin America began amending constitutions to add participatory institutions, and particularly mechanisms of direct democracy, Uruguay had pioneered popular consultations, holding its first in 1917 and adding citizen-initiated consultations to the constitution in 1967 (Lissidini 2015, 161; Altman 2011, 142). From then until the dictatorship of the 1970s, and again after the 1985 transition to democracy, Uruguay has been "the most prodigious user" of citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy not only in Latin America but in the global South (Altman 2011, 140). It is the sole country in the region to regularly use binding citizen-initiated popular consultations not only to propose laws and constitutional amendments

<sup>11</sup> Uruguayans have the highest rates of satisfaction with democracy (70% in 2015), sense of representation by congress (45% in 2015), and party identification (72% in 2015) in Latin America; they vote at higher rates (an average of 95% turnout compared to the 67% regional average from 1995 to 2015) and believe their elections are clean at higher rates than regional peers (82% versus the region's 47% average in 2015) (Latinobarómetro 2015).



but to overturn laws as well (Lissidini 2015, 143–144). This combination gives citizens power directly over critical issues and also indirectly by affecting how parliaments and presidents consider potential bills before they become law (Altman 2011, 147, 184–185). At the same time, since democratization, FA-allied social movements have been the most frequent and most successful users of citizen-initiated popular consultations. These consultations addressed crucial economic issues, including votes to raise and protect pensions in 1989 and 1994, and to revoke or prevent privatization of state enterprises in 1992, 2000, and 2004 (Bidegain and Tricot 2017, 141, 147–151). The FA, moreover, has been a consistent champion of participatory democracy beyond the popular consultations. Since the 1980s, the FA regularly campaigned on deepening democracy by creating citizen participation initiatives, launched important participatory reforms while at the helm of Montevideo – the capital city where nearly half of Uruguay’s population resides – starting in 1990, and introduced new or revived old participatory institutions at the national level after ascending to the presidency in 2005.

With this combination of long-standing direct democracy mechanisms and new participatory institutions created by the FA at multiple levels of government, Uruguay now offers broad access to policymaking processes for the popular sectors. At the national level, in addition to popular consultations, which continued occasionally during the FA’s three presidential terms (Bidegain and Tricot 2017, 151–152), the FA created dozens of public policy councils, roundtables, and working groups that bring together state officials and civil society representatives, held sectoral dialogues or conferences with a wider public, and, distinctively, reintroduced and expanded corporatist wage councils (Goldfrank 2011b, 174–177; Vecinday 2017). The latter are tripartite salary bargaining mechanisms originally introduced in 1943, abandoned during the dictatorship, briefly reintroduced after the transition, and then left dormant for fifteen years until the FA’s first presidency. What makes the wage councils notable is that the FA expanded them to include rural, domestic service, and public service workers. At the provincial level, the FA continued its decentralized participatory system and reorganized its PB process in Montevideo and implemented PB in other provinces where it won elections as well. Finally, in 2010 the FA passed the Decentralization and Citizen Participation Law, creating a new municipal level of government with new representative bodies – city councils and mayors. By 2015, in addition to its nineteen provincial governments, Uruguay had 112 municipal governments.

The quality of participation and the degree of inclusion vary across institutions, sectors, and locales. Overall, however, Uruguay's participatory institutions offer greater access to decision-making over more important issues to a greater percentage of the population than elsewhere in the region. The citizen-initiated popular consultations, for example, offer the "real possibility of exercising direct influence on important public policies" and give citizens incentives to organize to propose laws that help them or to prevent policies that hurt them (Bidegain and Tricot 2017, 143). The FA's expanded wage councils present a clear case of enhancing meaningful citizenship. They provide *recognition* to previously excluded groups, rural workers and domestic servants (mostly women), *access* to decision-making processes, and *resources* in the form of higher wages. Scholars link the wage councils to rising unionization rates, declining labor informality rates, and consistent gains in real wages (Bidegain and Tricot 2017, 153; Vecinday 2017, 248). By contrast, the policy councils, roundtables, and national dialogs in various sectors (welfare, rural development, security) receive many of the same critiques and show many of the same limitations as similar institutions in Brazil and Peru. To wit, while they provide some degree of access, they are mostly consultative, they fail to reach the popular sectors by focusing on existing CSOs, and they often produce citizen frustration as a result (Noboa and Bisio 2016; Fuentes et al. 2016; Vecinday 2017). At the provincial level, PB varies across cases and affects a relatively small percentage of the budget but tends to involve a comparatively high percentage of the population (between 5 percent and 10 percent in Montevideo) and generates higher participation rates in lower-income neighborhoods (Veneziano 2017). With regard to the new municipalities, the picture is also mixed. Their creation alone opened new channels of access, and nearly three-quarters of the mayors implemented some type of participatory institution, including PB and open assemblies, but their significance is limited because they lack resources and responsibilities (Freigedo 2015, 18, 111–116). One striking absence is any effort by the FA to scale up PB to the national level, which is especially notable given Uruguay's small population and the fact that its two-term president, Tabaré Vázquez, introduced a version of PB as Montevideo's mayor thirty years ago.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has advanced several arguments. The first is double-sided. The dramatic increase in the number of participatory institutions in Latin

America can indeed be conceptualized as part of the inclusionary turn, as this volume's editors suggest, but a complete understanding of the initial rise of participatory institutions and their subsequent diffusion requires acknowledgment of the role of the Left and of international actors. At the same time, certain participatory innovations born in Latin America have contributed to the global rush to expand citizen participation, as diffusion of PB illustrates. This chapter also explored the limits of participatory institutions. Even when they made the leap from paper to practice, they frequently provided inclusion without power. That is, they tended to offer access through low-quality channels of participation entailing consultation rather than effective decision-making (as seen in the various councils and conferences in all countries), focused on issues or resources of lesser magnitude (as was frequently the case with PB), or restricted involvement to a limited public (not necessarily drawing from the popular sectors). In some cases, participation did not signify enhancing citizenship but reinforcing clientelism instead, particularly in Venezuela.

Finally, this chapter showed the futility of a simplified approach to Latin America's participatory turn. The development of participatory institutions diverges considerably across the countries associated with the Left turn, even within the conventional Bolivarian and social-democratic categories. Ideology and ideas more broadly matter, but country-specific historical legacies, system stability, the varying strength of conservative threats, and the social bases of incumbent governments all play a role in explaining variation in the types of participatory institutions adopted and the degree of inclusion generated. Indeed, not all participatory innovations have a positive impact on citizenship. As the case of Uruguay shows, sometimes older participatory institutions offer greater promise of meaningful inclusion.

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## Brazil's Participatory Infrastructure

### *Opportunities and Limitations for Inclusion*

Lindsay Mayka and Jessica A. J. Rich

#### INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, participatory policymaking has become an inclusionary norm to which politicians on both the Right and the Left must at least pay lip-service. With the exception of Panama, every democratic country in Latin America has passed national mandates that create new participatory institutions. As noted in the introductory chapter by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume), participatory institutions promise inclusion by opening up political access for previously excluded groups to shape public policy. In theory, participatory institutions incorporate citizens and civic organizations directly into the policymaking process by having them discuss and even vote on specific policy decisions. Moreover, these formal institutional channels can reduce the costs of collective action, making them particularly relevant for popular sector inclusion.

While the spread of participatory institutions throughout the region is undeniable, the capacity of participatory institutions to amplify inclusion remains less clear. Some studies suggest that participatory institutions can increase the voice of the poor and marginalized groups, and thus can counteract structural social and political inequalities that block these groups from having a say in politics (Fung and Wright 2003; Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014; Wampler 2007, 2015; Avritzer 2009; World Bank 2010). Yet, as seen in the previous chapter by Goldfrank, there are many reasons to question whether participatory institutions will deliver on their inclusionary promise. Some scholars have noted that many participatory institutions fail to offer truly autonomous spaces for citizens to participate and apply pressure on the government (Cortés

2011, Herrera 2017). Others find that participatory institutions simply replicate existing social and economic hierarchies that limit the voice of excluded groups (Gerschman 2004; Altschuler and Corrales 2012; McNulty 2013). Still others have noted that nationally mandated participatory institutions have a mixed record in their implementation, undercutting their ability to channel popular sector interests into the policymaking process in a meaningful way (McNulty 2011; Zarembek 2012; Mayka 2019a). It is perhaps unsurprising that participatory institutions in Latin America have struggled in the perennial challenges of clientelism, social exclusion, and institutional weakness that characterize Latin American democracies, as documented in the previous chapter.

While we agree with Goldfrank's (this volume) analysis that participatory institutions have fallen short in advancing inclusion in many Latin American countries, this chapter explores a distinct and prior question: *Can* participatory institutions work together to deepen inclusion? To address this question, we examine the inclusionary potential of Brazil's system of participatory institutions, a "most likely" scenario for inclusion due to their expansive institutional design and ample political and material support for participatory policymaking. National laws in Brazil mandate citizen participation in policymaking across many policy areas and at all levels of government. Large amounts of government funding have been dedicated to supporting their development. Moreover, rates of implementation are high, meaning that Brazil's participatory infrastructure does not merely exist on the books, but operates in practice. Brazil is thus an analytically useful case for exploring the ultimate capacity of participatory institutions to foster popular sector inclusion in a propitious environment. We expect the limitations to participatory policymaking that we observe in Brazil to be even more daunting in countries with weaker institutional frameworks, lower rates of implementation, and greater use of participatory institutions to distribute patronage (as explained by Goldfrank, in this volume). If participatory institutions do not enhance inclusion in Brazil, it is unlikely that they will do so anywhere.

To address the inclusionary potential of participatory governance in Brazil, we go beyond analyzing each participatory institution in isolation, instead exploring how Brazil's different types of participatory institutions work together to create what we call a national participatory infrastructure. Brazil's national participatory infrastructure consists of two broad categories of institutions: councils and conferences. Councils are permanent spaces for a small number of civil society leaders to collaborate with state actors in debating policy priorities, developing proposals, and

monitoring policy implementation. Conferences are sites for large numbers of civil society activists to come together periodically to articulate their demands in a policy sector. The councils and conferences operate across all levels of government and in diverse policy areas to incorporate the interests of popular sector interests into the policymaking process. We take a macro-level focus, which enables us to consider which societal groups can channel their demands into participatory institutions and which groups are excluded, and to what degree these venues can influence policy. Our macro-level focus enables us to analyze the ways that participatory institutions operate together to structure interest representation, much as previous scholars viewed interconnected corporatist institutions as a system of interest intermediation (Schmitter 1974; Collier and Collier 1977; Malloy 1977).

We argue that, in comparison to the corporatist system of the past, Brazil's participatory infrastructure has opened up important institutional channels for the inclusion of the popular sectors into the policymaking process. When taken together, Brazil's participatory institutions create important new access points for groups in society to engage with the state on policy, at all stages of the policymaking process. The scope of interests incorporated through these new channels extends to a wide array of popular sector actors, with a particular focus on those mobilized around social policy and the rights of marginalized groups, such as women and ethnic minorities. This is important because, as the introductory chapter to this volume emphasizes, institutional design matters. Formal institutions are a necessary condition for meaningful inclusion, and how those institutions are designed and implemented determines their inclusionary potential.

Like Goldfrank (in this volume), we also argue that there are limits to this inclusion: participatory institutions provide popular sector interests with greater access in social rights policies than in other policy areas, including economic policy. Moreover, interests that challenge state priorities are excluded from these spaces. This chapter suggests that throughout the region, participatory institutions *can* offer important opportunities for popular sector inclusion, but will face many of the challenges experienced by traditional institutions of representative democracy.

Below, we explore the origins and the trajectory of participatory institutions over time, followed by an overview of the institutions that comprise Brazil's national participatory infrastructure. We then assess the extent to which the Brazilian participatory infrastructure deepens the

inclusion of popular sector interests, focusing on two dimensions: the access they provide to the policymaking process, and which interests gain access to the state through these channels. Through this discussion, we show that participatory institutions can deepen inclusion, yet face important limitations in incorporating popular sector interests.

#### THE TRAJECTORY OF PARTICIPATORY POLICYMAKING IN BRAZIL

##### **The Corporatist Origins of Councils and Conferences**

Brazil's councils and conferences first emerged as an essential component of the corporatist system. In some ways, these early councils and conferences were the precursors of current participatory institutions in that they engaged non-state actors in debating public policy. However, they served a very different political purpose than their contemporary counterparts. Whereas participatory institutions today aim to incorporate popular sector voices into the policymaking process, the original "participatory" institutions served as technocratic channels to amplify the access of elite interest groups, while demobilizing the popular sectors.

Fitting with the underlying logic of Brazilian corporatism, many of these early participatory institutions were councils found in economic policy sectors. Some of these institutions offered a small set of officially sanctioned labor unions and employers associations an official vote over policy proposals. Others included labor and employer representatives as consultants, offering them a voice in policy deliberations without extending them a formal vote over the resulting policy decisions. Examples of this type of institution include Brazil's National Economic Planning Commission and the National Council of Industrial and Commercial Policy (Schmitter 1971, 125). Such councils granted a small subset of working-class groups access to the political arena, while excluding the majority of popular sector voices. Moreover, state actors used the policy access they offered to unions as levers of control. These councils divided the interests of the included sectors of the labor movement from the interests of excluded sectors, and co-opted labor leadership through individual perquisites linked to their special status in government (Schmitter 1971, 340–344; Mericle 1977, 313).

Councils and conferences in the realm of social policy also channeled elite interests, rather than popular sector demands, into the policymaking process. Law 378 of 1937 created the National Education Council and

the National Health Council, and it established policymaking conferences in these policy areas as well. Prior to democratization in the 1980s, these social policy councils did not serve as sites to incorporate societal interests, but rather as technical bodies that brought together representatives from state agencies and policy experts to advise federal policy (Cortês et al. 2011, 43–44).<sup>1</sup> Similarly, prior to democratization, social policy conferences had three objectives: to increase technical knowledge of the federal government on health and education initiatives, to enhance government capacity for policy implementation, and to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of different governments within the federal system (Leite de Souza et al. 2013, 27). Popular sector organizations – including program beneficiaries and workers – did not participate in either the councils or conferences during this period. Thus, even in social policy areas, participatory institutions did not serve as vehicles of inclusion prior to democratization.<sup>2</sup>

### Democratization, Social Rights, and Participatory Reforms

In the 1980s, Brazil's prodemocracy activists reinvented participatory institutions as a core element of their strategy for building a new, more inclusive model of democracy. These activists advocated for an expansive definition of citizenship that encompasses political, civil, *and* social rights, including the right to employment, health care, and nutrition (Fleury 1987, Dagnino 1998). According to their vision, participatory institutions would advance the inclusion of the popular sectors in two ways. First, participatory institutions would expand *political* inclusion by establishing new sites for citizens to gain access to the state. Second, participatory institutions would deepen *social* and *economic* inclusion: by amplifying the voices of previously excluded groups, the reinvented participatory institutions would limit the ability of political elites to use clientelist practices and corruption to undermine new social rights reforms (Mayka 2019a, 79–80).

<sup>1</sup> On the National Health Council prior to its reformulation in 1990, see Cortes et al. (2011, 43–47). On the trajectory of the health conferences, see Escorel and Bloch (2005).

<sup>2</sup> During the 1970s, other participatory institutions emerged at the local level that *did* include popular sector voices in decision making, known as the popular councils. These councils were an important development in granting subnational governments experience with participatory experiments, and building popular sector capacity for participatory policymaking (Gohn 2001, Tranjan 2016).

During democratization in the 1980s, activists achieved two key advances in promoting participatory policymaking. First, civil society groups and activist bureaucrats cooperated to introduce a variety of new (or reinvented) participatory institutions. In 1986, for example, right-to-health activists working within the Ministry of Health convoked the first national conference open to broad participation from everyday citizens and civil society groups representing workers and beneficiaries. In 1987, actors in the federal government created the National Council for the Rights of Women (Saffioti 1987). At the state level, mayors and governors active in the democratization movement experimented with participatory policymaking councils – most of which were later adopted at the national level as well. Governors in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Espírito Santo created councils in the policy areas of the environment, disability rights, education, health, security, rights of Afro-Brazilians, and rights of women (Gohn 2001, González 2019). The mayor of São Paulo, Mario Covas, installed councils in areas such as housing and adult education (Tranjan 2016, 189).

Second, activists secured a mandate in the new 1988 constitution that established participatory democracy as a fundamental principle of the Brazilian state. Articles in Brazil's 1988 constitution mandate citizen participation across a range of policy sectors, including urban planning (Article 29, section XII); agricultural policy (Article 187); health (Article 198); and social assistance (Article 204). While the 1988 constitution does not develop a concrete institutional design for participatory policymaking, it establishes a clear normative foundation for participatory policymaking.

### **Expansion of Participatory Policymaking**

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, state officials translated these broad constitutional mandates into enabling legislation that established participatory institutions at all levels of government and across an array of policy sectors. Some of these government actors, mostly state and local politicians on the Left, were driven to support participatory policymaking because it directly supported their policy and partisan goals (see, for example, Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2003, Chavez and Goldfrank 2004). However, contrary to the popular attribution of participatory governance to leftist rule by the Workers' Party, the expansion of Brazil's national participatory infrastructure began during right-wing and centrist administrations in the 1990s. This supra-partisan origin suggests that



participatory policymaking has deep roots in Brazil, creating favorable conditions for these institutions to create durable openings for inclusion.

During the early to mid-1990s, under the right-wing and centrist Presidents Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco, Brazil's participatory infrastructure expanded along a path that reflected the broader trend toward social policy expansion and rights recognition for marginalized groups (see chapters by Garay and Hunter in this volume). For instance, national laws mandated the establishment of participatory councils for all national, state, and municipal governments as part of major sectoral reforms in the areas of health (1990), the rights of children and adolescents (1991), social assistance (1993), and education (1995). Government officials also created new councils that operate at the national level, including the Human Rights Council in 1990, and the National Culture Policy Council in 1991. By the late 1990s, under centrist President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, government officials had established participatory councils that extended beyond social policy and the rights of marginalized groups to include economic policy. Key examples include the National Energy Policy Council, established in 1997, and the National Tourism Council, created in 2001. The range of participatory policymaking conferences also expanded during the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2002, twenty-three national participatory conferences were held in areas including health, social assistance, food and nutrition, rights of children and adolescents, and human rights. Conferences often played a crucial agenda-setting role during struggles over the implementation of major social rights reforms (Escorel and Bloch 2005, Avritzer and Leite de Souza 2013).

After ascending to the presidency in 2003, politicians from the leftist Workers' Party (PT) expanded the participatory policymaking infrastructure even further. By the end of the Lula presidency in 2010, there were fifty-nine national participatory councils, covering 83 percent of ministries (Mayka 2013, 31). Under Lula, national policymaking councils reached into diverse new policy sectors, such as urban policy with the Cities Council, crime and justice with the National Public Security Council, and foreign trade with the Brazilian Social and Participatory Council on Mercosul. The number of conferences also ballooned during PT rule, to an even greater degree than seen with the councils. During Lula's terms in office from 2003 to 2010, fifty-nine participatory conferences were held – more than triple the number that had been held during the presidency of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). As with the councils, conferences extended beyond social

policy and the rights of marginalized groups into policy sectors such as the environment, urban management, culture, and sports. Brazil's participatory infrastructure certainly expanded under the PT – but did so on a foundation constructed during non-left governments in the 1980s and 1990s.

In sum, Brazil's participatory infrastructure has expanded considerably over the past thirty years. The institutional model for participatory councils and conferences stemmed from decidedly un-participatory origins in corporatism and technocratic administration. During the process of democratic transition, social rights activists reinvented the councils and conferences as part of their calls to make social citizenship in Brazil more inclusive of popular sector interests. Governments across the political spectrum translated these demands into dozens of councils and conferences that span a range of policy areas.

#### AN OVERVIEW OF BRAZIL'S PARTICIPATORY INFRASTRUCTURE

The two sets of institutions that comprise Brazil's national participatory infrastructure, participatory councils and conferences, are designed to incorporate new sectors of society into the policy arena. Yet the councils and conferences do so according to different logics of participation. Whereas councils are permanent bodies for a small number of participants, conferences occur only periodically and are open to many more individuals.<sup>3</sup> In this section, we outline the design features and logic of inclusion of the councils and conferences separately. Later in the chapter, we will analyze the ways that these two sets of institutions complement each other – each offering unique advantages for inclusion, and even compensating for the other's inherent limitations.

#### Councils

Councils engage a small group of civil society activists to represent broad sectors of society in government policy decisions. Each council participant serves as the representative of an officially designated societal group. For instance, Brazil's National Health Council includes representatives from disabled people's organizations, the national AIDS movement, health workers' unions, and hospitals associations, among others. Some of these

<sup>3</sup> For a similar analysis that compares the logics of participation and representation behind councils and conferences, see Teixeira et al. (2012).

civil society councilors, such as the representative from the Brazilian Nursing Association, speak directly on behalf of the rank-and-file members of their organizations. Other councilors represent non-membership advocacy organizations that speak on behalf of another group in society, such as the representative from the Catholic Church's Pastoral da Criança (Ministry for Children).

Councils are granted a formal role in policy decisions across all stages of the policy life cycle: from setting priorities, to developing and approving specific policies that address these priorities, to monitoring and evaluating the implementation of these policies. The deep involvement of councilors in policy decisions is partly a function of the sustained nature of civil society participation in these spaces. Councils often meet several times a year, sometimes even multiple times a month, and councilors serve for a prolonged period of two or more years.

### Conferences

In contrast to councils, conferences are convoked periodically to elicit input from grassroots activists about the top problems and priorities in a policy sector. The entire process – submunicipal conferences, then municipal conferences, then state conferences, and then a national conference – can span nearly a year. Participation is intense for the duration of the conference, particularly for those who are selected to participate in the national-level conference. However, conferences are isolated events: they are convoked and then closed once the national conference produces its final report. While conferences are often repeated every two to four years, each is standalone.

Unlike councils, which engage only a small number of participants, conferences engage large numbers of activists. For instance, while Brazil's National Health Council involves approximately forty councilors from civil society, the 2011 National Health Conference engaged 3,212 official civil society representatives. Aggregating across the municipal, state, and national levels, a total of 600,000 members of civil society participated in the 2011 round of health conferences (Conselho Nacional de Saúde 2012, 159).

Conferences provide a mix of direct participation and representation of group interests. At the municipal level, individuals participate (although those who participate are typically members of some sort of civil society organization). Conferences are then scaled up to the state level, and finally to the national level, through a voting system in which participants select

representatives to represent their territorial districts. As conferences are scaled up to higher levels, civil society involvement becomes more and more representative, and less centered on direct participation. Similar to the councils, civil society participants in national conferences speak on behalf of a societal group. Due to the much larger number of participants, however, conferences incorporate a greater diversity of more narrow interests than the councils. For example, multiple members of a single union can participate in the same conference – thus giving voice to diverse union interests rather than the aggregated “union interest” that would be represented in a policymaking council. There is also more room for territorial interests in conferences than in councils.

Conferences play a major part in setting the policy agenda and developing the broad outlines of policy proposals, while being sidelined from more sustained processes of policy design and implementation. For example, the 1992 National Health Conference identified decentralization as the top priority in health, and it diagnosed numerous problems that emerged from the incomplete decentralization of the sector. The 1992 National Health Conference suggested institutional changes in financing and division of responsibilities among each level of government in the health sector (Ministério da Saúde 1993). In turn, the National Health Council then used the broad principles developed in the 1992 National Health Conference as a guideline as it developed more specific proposals for fiscal and administrative decentralization (Mayka 2019a, 126–128, 130–131).

In sum, the councils and conferences follow different logics of political inclusion and participation in the policymaking process: the councils rely on a more corporatist structure that confers sustained participation throughout the policy process, while the conferences open up opportunities for a range of societal interests to engage in agenda-setting. To consider the degree to which participatory institutions enhance inclusion of the popular sectors, we must consider the ways that these different participatory institutions operate together as a system. The following section takes a macro-level view to analyze the degree to which Brazil’s participatory infrastructure creates opportunities for inclusion, and its limitations in doing so.

#### DOES BRAZIL’S PARTICIPATORY INFRASTRUCTURE FOSTER INCLUSION?

Among the three dimensions of inclusion presented in the introduction to this volume – recognition, access, and resources – Brazil’s participatory infrastructure promises to advance inclusion primarily by enhancing

access to the policymaking process. Yet what is Brazil's record in translating this promise into a real expansion in access? Borrowing from Collier and Handlin (2009), we divide access into two main dimensions: *degree of access to the state* and *scope of societal interests* granted this access. "Access to the state" refers to how much space participatory institutions open for individuals to influence public policy. As citizens gain opportunities to influence more types of policy and more stages of the policymaking process, we consider citizen access to have increased. Conversely, if participatory institutions only cover a narrow slice of policymaking, we consider access to be limited. We define the "scope of societal interests" as the range of individuals in a society who are incorporated into Brazil's participatory infrastructure. As more societal interests are included into the participatory infrastructure, the broader the scope of inclusion is. Conversely, if participatory institutions are closed off to most interests in society, we consider their scope to be limited. In line with the other chapters in this volume, we are particularly concerned with the extent to which the participatory infrastructure incorporates popular sector interests, given the historical barriers to representation of the poor.

We argue that Brazil's participatory infrastructure has in fact deepened inclusion, both by increasing access to the state and by expanding the scope of societal interests that engage in the policy process. Brazil's participatory institutions have been particularly impressive in fostering inclusion in the realm of social policy and the rights of marginalized groups. Yet there are also clear limits to inclusion: certain realms of the state are off-limits, and participatory institutions channel only some popular sector voices, while sidelining those that challenge the priorities of the state.

### Degree of Access to the State

Brazil's participatory infrastructure has opened up considerable access to the state. First, Brazil's participatory councils and conferences exist not just on paper, but also operate in practice. The vast majority of Brazil's 5,570 municipalities have implemented the mandatory councils in health, social assistance, education, and the rights of children and adolescents – the main councils mandated in national law for subnational governments. As Figure 5.1 shows, around 95 percent of health and social assistance councils met in 2009, as well as nearly 90 percent of children's and adolescent's rights councils and over 70 percent of education councils. Moreover, the vast majority of these councils also meet their primary




FIGURE 5.1 Municipal compliance with mandatory features of participatory councils (2009)

Source: IBGE Perfil dos Municípios database, 2009

prerogatives of overseeing the budgetary process.<sup>4</sup> For instance, the municipal social assistance council must review and approve the budget proposed by the local social assistance secretariat; if the government bypasses the council, or if the council does not consent to the budget, federal transfers from the National Social Assistance Fund will be halted. While it remains rare for participatory councils to exercise this power, it is not simply an empty threat: the federal government halted transfers to São Paulo in the mid-1990s because then-mayor Paulo Maluf excluded the municipal health council from decision-making. Furthermore, these councils also have formal rulemaking authority, meaning that their resolutions have legal standing and are considered to be policy, similar to decrees made by state agencies.

Second, studies have shown that Brazil's participatory institutions exert influence over policy. Various studies of national conferences have

<sup>4</sup> This requirement holds for health, social assistance, and rights of children and adolescents councils, but not for education. This disparity in the legal prerogatives is a key reason for the lower levels of formal authority seen for the education councils in Figure 5.1.

shown that these institutions play a key agenda-setting role, even if they do not have formal policymaking authority. Across a wide array of policy areas, ranging from women's rights to fishing and aquaculture to health, scholars have traced new policy initiatives back to directives approved during national conferences (Pogrebinschi and Santos 2011; Petinelli 2013; Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014).

Likewise, councils have played a significant role in the policy process, particularly at the national level. For instance, members of the National Health Council were involved in designing major policies such as the national system of health care financing and the decentralization of health care management, as well as identifying challenges with decentralization on the ground and developing new policies to enhance implementation (Mayka 2019a, 126–128, 2019b). Today, the National Health Council is involved in more microlevel issues of program management than in the large questions of health system design (Cortês et al. 2011), but it still plays a notable role in the policymaking process. Likewise, Rich (2019a, b) shows how participatory institutions connected to HIV/AIDS policy provided advocacy groups considerable influence over policy through consultation and persuasion. AIDS activists used their participation in councils, commissions, committees, and working groups to point out flaws in existing AIDS policies and, sometimes, to demand their reform. Frequently, AIDS-sector bureaucrats immediately addressed the problems that civic advocacy groups raised during these discussions. Participatory institutions also boosted activists' capacity to influence AIDS policy via back channels. Through their participation in these institutions, AIDS activists had the names and phone numbers of bureaucrats to contact with political concerns, or for clarification about new policy decisions or issues. Bureaucrats also called activist leaders for advice and technical assistance in developing new policies and even to engage activists in drafting national AIDS policy legislation and guidelines.

Inevitably, the influence of councils and conferences varies across policy sectors, and across locales for those mandated at the state and municipal level.<sup>5</sup> Gurza Lavalle et al. (2016) find that the municipal councils with a more developed formal institutional framework – including health, social assistance, and the rights of children councils – have a greater policymaking role than councils in other areas. Yet even for the voluntary councils that lack a strong legal foundation, Touchton et al.

<sup>5</sup> For critiques of the shortcoming of councils in shaping policy agendas, see Almeida and Tatabiba (2012) and Cortês (2011).

(2017) demonstrate that councils advance pro-poor policy outcomes. Other scholars have highlighted the importance of supportive local governments and prior civil society mobilization in shaping the policymaking role of participatory institutions (Fuks, Perissinotto, and Souza 2004; Wampler 2008; Avritzer 2009). In our view, the question is not whether Brazil's participatory institutions *always* have a significant impact on the policy process, but rather whether they have proven to be a viable institutional tool that *can* be used to channel societal input into the policy process. In this regard, the expansion of participatory institutions represents the emergence of an important new institutional channel for civil society to engage the state.

Third, Brazil's councils and conferences work together to open citizen access to all stages of the policymaking process. As we described above, conferences open access to the agenda-setting stage of policy, while councils focus on the longer-term work of crafting specific policy proposals and overseeing policy implementation. For example, the National Health Conference brings together government and civil society actors every two years to discuss broad national priorities and potential improvements to the health system. By contrast, the National Health Council brings together government and civil society actors on a monthly basis to debate the top policy concerns regarding the implementation of the country's health system. The National Health Council advises on the creation, management, and oversight of specific programs, such as the Popular Pharmacy program, which provides essential medicines at low or no cost to the public. The council also approves the annual health budget of the Ministry of Health. Moreover, the National Health Council is charged with supporting the operation of state and municipal health councils throughout the country. In this way, the design of Brazil's councils and conferences complement one another to cover major stages of policymaking.

Fourth, Brazil's participatory infrastructure spans a wide range of policy areas and operates at all levels of government, and is most concentrated in policy areas related to social rights. These policy areas include social policy (e.g. health, social assistance, education, nutrition) and the rights of marginalized groups (e.g. children and adolescents, women, people with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities). As seen in Figure 5.2, the concentration in social policy and the rights of marginalized groups is particularly striking for the conferences; between 1990 and 2010, 77 percent of all conferences were in these social rights focused areas of policy. At the national level, policymaking councils tend to be concentrated in areas






FIGURE 5.2 National level councils and conferences by policy area (1990–2010)  
 Source: Authors' elaboration

related to social rights, though they do have presence across a greater variety of policy areas, in comparison with the conferences.

In addition to the national-level participatory institutions described above, councils and conferences have been instituted at the municipal and state levels. Councils are mandated in national law for state and municipal governments in a number of policy areas, including health, social assistance, education, and the rights of children and adolescents.<sup>6</sup> Rates of compliance with these national mandates are high, including essentially 100 percent compliance in health and social assistance, 94 percent compliance in the rights of children and adolescents, and 85 percent in education. Thousands of subnational governments also have *voluntarily* established participatory councils in other policy areas that are not mandated by the federal government. For example, as of 2012, 64 percent of municipalities had an environmental council, 32.3 percent of municipalities had an cultural policy council, and 20 percent had a disability rights council (IBGE 2012). Moreover, councils are implemented even more frequently in cities and towns with at least 50,000 residents, which cover the vast majority of Brazil's population. For instance, 80.9 percent

<sup>6</sup> National mandates for subnational governments to implement participatory councils in these policy areas emerged as part of broader policy reforms to foster inclusion in the 1990s. The federal government requires that subnational governments install functioning participatory councils in order to receive federal transfers for that policy area.

of these municipalities have an environment council, 75 percent have a housing council, and 40.2 percent have a women's rights council.

Despite these important openings, many important policy issues that directly affect the lives of the poor are closed off to participatory policy-making. Economic policy – including macroeconomic policy, as well as industrial policy in different sectors of the economy – influence patterns of employment for low-skilled workers, wages, rates of economic growth, and inflation, and thus shape the overall advancement and resources of the poor. There have been only a handful of conferences tied to economic policy, although there *are* a number of national-level economic policy councils. Nevertheless, these councils – such as the National Agricultural Policy Council and the National Energy Policy Council – are less visible, less influential, and receive fewer resources from the state, compared to those tied to social rights. Moreover, a number of vital state agencies have *no* affiliated participatory institutions – for example, the National Development Bank and the Central Bank. There are few opportunities for popular sector groups to shape the policies that determine their potential for economic advancement.

In addition to these gaps in economic policy, Brazil's participatory infrastructure does not cover issue areas that cannot be neatly matched to a policy sector with an associated bureaucratic apparatus. Participatory institutions have emerged in areas that can be mapped onto the bureaucracy's organizational chart – often overseeing a specific fund, or branch of a ministry. Yet some issues are not connected to a specific agency, meaning that there are no institutional opportunities for participation in these areas. For example, there was little way for the millions of Brazilians with concerns about the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to use participatory institutions to voice their concerns. In a July 2016 poll, 63 percent of Brazilians believed that the Olympics would bring more harm than good to the country. These people turned to protest rather than participatory policymaking to signal their discontent.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, councils and conferences provide little opportunity to address the systemic political corruption that has ravaged Brazil in recent years. There is no council or conference that deals with Petrobras, the parastatal oil industry that was at the center of the Lava Jato scandal, and informal and illicit corruption extends far beyond the scope of participatory institutions that focus on strategic planning and policymaking in the

<sup>7</sup> Paulo Roberto Conde. “Para 63% dos brasileiros, Olimpíada vai trazer mais prejuízos do que benefícios.” *Folha de São Paulo*. July 19, 2016.

realm of *formal* state activities. Participatory councils and conferences cannot offer the tools to address some of the most pressing political reform issues facing Brazil today, limiting the potential for meaningful inclusion. This gap in inclusion helps to explain recent evidence of widespread skepticism of democratic government, such as from the 2014 LAPOP survey, in which 23 percent of Brazilian respondents strongly disagreed that the government cared what they thought or that it was open to their participation (LAPOP 2014).

Finally, recent steps taken by Brazil's right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro, call into question the sustainability of state access offered by the participatory infrastructure. In April 2019, Bolsonaro issued a sweeping decree to eliminate over fifty participatory councils. While Brazil's Supreme Court struck down important parts of the decree, Bolsonaro's government has continued to undercut participatory institutions by halting funding, restricting their operations, and canceling national conferences.<sup>8</sup> As of the time of publication, Brazil's participatory infrastructure remains mostly intact, yet the degree of access that the councils and conferences will offer in the future remains uncertain. Bolsonaro's government raises questions about the degree of state access that participatory institutions can provide in the face of hostility from elected leaders.

### Scope of Societal Interests

Which civil society voices are incorporated into policymaking through the Brazilian participatory infrastructure? Overall, we find that Brazil's councils and conferences have engaged a diverse array of societal interests, particularly those representing the poor, while also replicating old inequalities to some degree. Millions of individuals participate in Brazil's participatory institutions, providing an impressive initial measure of societal inclusion. Between 2005 and 2010, approximately six million Brazilian adults (and four million Brazilian children) participated in at least one conference (Avritzer 2012, 12). While the policy councils engage fewer individuals than conferences, the number of councilors is still quite impressive; roughly 300,000 individuals serve on policy councils (Wampler 2015, 264).

By including *both* participatory councils and conferences, Brazil's participatory infrastructure engages both highly involved activists and

<sup>8</sup> Carla Bezerra and Lindsay Mayka. "Brazil's Supreme Court Pushed Back against an Attempt to Cancel Participatory Councils." *Vox*. July 8, 2019.

concerned citizens with less interest or fewer resources to commit to sustained civic engagement. Given their permanent nature and frequent meetings, councils only are open to a small number of activists that develop expertise in substantive issues of public policy. Compared to councils, conferences are more open to rank-and-file members of organizations to engage in participatory policymaking in a more flexible and ad hoc basis, dedicating a couple of hours or perhaps several weekends. Thus, Brazil's participatory infrastructure creates openings for civic actors with varying levels of commitment and abilities to participate.

Evidence shows that Brazil's participatory institutions are open to a great diversity of popular sector interests, particularly in comparison to the corporatist system of the past. Under state corporatism, labor unions (and sometimes peasants unions) served as the primary representatives of popular sector concerns. Those without an official union representative, including workers in the informal sector, were left without a voice. Concerns that did not map onto union priorities – such as issues related to gender, the environment, or human rights – were excluded from corporatist venues (Collier and Handlin 2009, 70–71). In contrast, Brazil's participatory institutions provide ample opportunities for a range of interests to be heard. Lower-income individuals may participate in health councils or conferences as unionists, or as advocates of LGBTQ+ rights, or as members of their local neighborhood association. In other words, the Brazilian participatory infrastructure incorporates both territorial interests and an array of different functional interests. For example, Vera Schattan Coelho (2006) shows that local health councils include diverse popular sector interests – ranging from popular health associations, to unions, to homeless people's movements, to religious organizations. Brazil's participatory infrastructure enhances the inclusion of the popular sectors by recognizing the inherent diversity of interests within the popular sectors.

Even though participatory institutions create opportunities for diverse groups to participate, it is possible that in practice, the costs involved in participation could limit the involvement of the poor, as noted in the introductory chapter. On the one hand, initial studies of councils and conferences have suggested some degree of bias in favor of the middle class. Compared to the community average, participants in policymaking councils and conferences are likely to be more educated and to have a higher income (Fuks et al. 2004; Gerschman 2004; Almeida 2013; Cunha 2013). On the policymaking councils, the poor that do participate are more limited in effectively advocating their positions, compared to their

middle-class counterparts (Gerschman 2004; Cunha 2009). On the other hand, other work demonstrates that the class bias is lower than we might expect. As Gurza Lavalle et al. (2005) note, participatory councils incorporate civil society organizations, not individuals, and Brazilian cities have a greater density of popular sector associations than groups representing elite interests. Moreover, councils include seats for representatives of low-income groups, including community associations or women's groups from poor neighborhoods. These institutional design features act against the tendency to exclude the poor (Coelho 2006, 658–659), particularly in comparison to a more pluralist system that does not explicitly prioritize the incorporation of popular sector voices.

One reason for these surprisingly high levels of popular sector inclusion is that participatory institutions are concentrated in policy areas of particular interest to the popular sectors (Wampler 2015). As mentioned earlier, participatory councils and conferences are most prevalent in policy areas central to the expansion of social rights for the poor: social policy and the rights of marginalized groups. The poor have more of a stake in these policy areas than middle-class or upper-class Brazilians do. Lower-income Brazilians are more likely to depend on Brazil's public health system than wealthier Brazilians, who tend to use private insurance. Similarly, poorer Brazilians are more likely to depend on public education than those of a higher socioeconomic status, who have abandoned public schools. Consequently, poorer Brazilians have a greater stake in health and education policy than those in the upper- or even middle class, creating an incentive for their participation in health and education councils and conferences.

Furthermore, the Brazilian government subsidizes the costs of participation, which opens access to popular sector voices. In 2009, for instance, Brazil's federal government spent US\$1.6 million to support the logistics of social assistance councils operations and US\$5.5 million to support participatory institutions and civil society engagement in health. Across all policy sectors, US\$2.3 million more was earmarked for the "amplification of participatory management practices," and US\$500,000 for the "amplification and strengthening of participation and societal mobilization" (Presidência da República 2012). This money is in addition to resources provided by state and municipal governments to support participatory policymaking. The federal government has covered travel costs and provides per diems for national councilors, which reduces the financial barriers to participation. As Rich's research has shown, some bureaucrats have invested in reducing the costs of collective action for popular

sector groups – paying for regular workshops and other network-building activities that allow civil society leaders to develop skills and expertise, and subsidizing travel so that the poor can participate (Rich 2013). State officials also have proactively encouraged low-income beneficiaries to participate in national councils; for example, bureaucrats from the Ministry of Social Development recruited a leader from the National Homeless Population Movement to serve as a councilor on the National Social Assistance Council.<sup>9</sup> These state supports reduce the barriers to popular sector participation.

However, efforts to mobilize the poor have centered on councils and conferences connected to social policy and the rights of marginalized groups, rather than participatory institutions linked to economic policy. In economic policy areas, council composition more closely resembles the corporatist institutions of the past: participants primarily include representatives from business associations, unions, and the state; other popular sector groups are largely excluded. As such, these participatory institutions do little to deepen inclusion for the popular sectors.

While the scope of societal interests incorporated into the policymaking arena has expanded with the introduction of Brazil's participatory infrastructure, it is important to note that certain interests are excluded from this system. Individuals who are not connected to civil society organizations are underrepresented in Brazil's participatory institutions. The council model presumes that individuals can connect to the representative of their "sector," who will advocate on their behalf. Those individuals who do not fit within a clearly defined societal sector remain disconnected. Moreover, there are no accountability mechanisms to ensure that councilors truly represent the concerns of those they claim to represent (Gurza Lavalle et al. 2006). The conference model opens up participation to a broader array of actors, including those not affiliated with a civil society organization, at the subnational level. Nonetheless, most people who participate in conferences are connected to organizations, which play a role in mobilizing people into the conference and coordinating interests to produce a coherent set of demands at the conference (Cunha 2013).

Overall, the evidence shows that participatory institutions have expanded the scope of societal interests included in the policymaking

<sup>9</sup> Interview by Lindsay Mayka with Samuel Rodrigues, Movimento Nacional da População da Rua, Brasília, March 2, 2009.

process, particularly in comparison with corporatist models of the past. Brazil's participatory infrastructure has mobilized an impressive number of diverse interests, reflecting the increasing political salience of postmaterialist and intersectional identities and grievances that has emerged in recent decades. While the Brazilian councils and conferences channel middle-class interests, they also serve as important vehicles for popular sector mobilization and inclusion in policymaking.

#### CONCLUSION

Since democratization, Brazil has established an elaborate participatory infrastructure that operates across diverse policy areas and at all levels of government. The Brazilian experience suggests that participatory institutions can serve as a powerful instrument of popular sector inclusion in the policymaking process. Particularly in comparison with the corporatist institutions of the past, Brazil's participatory infrastructure has opened new points of access to the state for diverse popular sectors interests. Nevertheless, there are important limits to inclusion. While participatory institutions provide access to many parts of the state, especially those related to the expansion of social rights, other parts of the state, such as those related to economic policy, remain closed off. Moreover, participatory institutions favor interests mobilized into civil society organizations, leaving out many individuals with pressing concerns.

What implications does the Brazilian case hold for the inclusionary potential of participatory institutions across other Latin American countries? While nearly every country in Latin America has adopted a national legal framework for participatory policymaking, these participatory infrastructures differ considerably in the degree to which they provide access to the state and the scope of societal interests involved, and thus vary in their records of inclusion (see Goldfrank, this volume). The Brazilian case offers three important lessons for how and when participatory institutions can foster popular sector inclusion.

First, and most immediately, participatory institutions that are not implemented cannot offer channels for inclusion. State officials in Brazil took various steps to ensure that the elaborate national legal framework behind participatory policymaking was constructed on the ground – investing considerable material, human, and political resources in guiding implementation. Yet in other countries, participatory institutions exist only as parchment institutions. For example, Colombia's local health councils only exist in 1 percent of municipalities, and receive negligible

support from the national government (Mayka 2019a, 226). Other participatory institutions, such as Chile's Municipal Civil Society Councils, are weakly implemented and operate in only some parts of the country (Fundación Multitudes 2015). Moreover, the steps taken in 2019 by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to dismantle various participatory institutions, to cut their funding, and to otherwise restrict their operation signal that the inclusionary advances of Brazil's participatory institutions can also be reversed.

Second, we should consider not only the implementation of individual participatory institutions, but also how different participatory institutions work together to create policy access within different parts of the state. Brazil's participatory infrastructure created ample access to the state and engaged a broad array of interests within the popular sectors precisely because it was not limited to just one participatory institution. The mix of councils and conferences across many policy sectors stands to address diverse grievances among popular sector groups. By operating at many different levels of government, Brazil's participatory institutions produce a range of potential access points and routes to political influence for each of these interests – thereby remediating Goldfrank's criticism that many participatory institutions only address a limited range of issues involving small budgets. The inclusionary effects of participatory governance are multiplied when we analyze Brazil's participatory infrastructure in the aggregate versus when we analyze the effects of a single institution. By the same token, the Brazilian experience suggests that countries relying on a single form of participatory governance, such as participatory budgeting, will not capture the diversity of interests of the popular sectors and will leave the vast majority of the state outside the realm of participatory oversight.

Third, as the introductory chapter by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) notes, participatory institutions do not inherently amplify popular sector voices. Material resources and time are required to participate in such institutions and to advocate effectively from within them – resources that are more available to the middle classes than to the popular sectors. The chapter shows that the bias toward wealthier participants can be counteracted by creating seats for popular sector interests, subsidizing the costs of participation, and recruiting popular sector activists. The Brazilian experience thus suggests that individuals and civic associations representing the poor are best able to engage in these new spaces when government actors, NGOs, and/or international donors make investments to ensure their participation.



Rather than thinking of participatory institutions as a solution to the endemic problem of popular sector exclusion, this chapter suggests that we should consider them to be a potential tool that can be used to enhance inclusion. Ultimately, participatory institutions are subject to many of the same shortcomings as representative democratic institutions: they may be crippled by institutional weakness, and they may overrepresent elite interests while excluding important voices. Participatory institutions are not a silver bullet, yet they *can* serve to channel the demands of the popular sectors into the state. In the end, participatory institutions have the potential to deepen inclusion by offering tools for voice and access – even if these tools sometimes fall short.

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PART II

INCLUSION AND PARTISAN REPRESENTATION





## Changing Patterns of Ideology and Partisanship in Latin America

Grigore Pop Eleches

### INTRODUCTION

Most contributions to this volume analyze the inclusionary turn in Latin America from the perspective of what governments in the region have done (or failed to do) to expand or implement *de jure* rights to benefit a range of previously marginalized and underserved groups. This chapter focuses on a slightly different set of questions: to what extent has this inclusionary turn been accompanied by a growing congruence between the ideological platforms of parties and the social bases of their political support? Applied more specifically to leftist political parties, this question can be reformulated as follows: to what extent have leftist parties managed to secure a relative electoral advantage among their “natural” allies from the poor and marginalized sectors of society? And relatedly, how can we explain the variation in the ability of leftist parties to attract poor and marginalized voters?

These questions are potentially important complements to the discussions of the patterns and drivers of particular policy changes that have characterized the inclusionary turn of the last three decades, such as the expansion of participatory opportunities (Goldfrank, Mayka, and Rich, this volume) and the extension of social policy spending (Garay, this volume). From the perspective of the outcomes that are the main focus of this chapter – the congruence between leftist ideological appeals and electoral support from socioeconomically disadvantaged groups – the chapters in this book offer a rich set of hypotheses for explaining cross-national and cross-temporal variations in the extent to which the poor in Latin America support leftist parties. While the analysis in this chapter

can offer at best a preliminary test of different explanations, in the last part of the chapter I outline the logic of the link between several inclusionary policies and the changing patterns of electoral representation I document in the third section of this chapter. The links between inclusionary policies and electoral outcomes are important for the broader discussion about the nature and mechanisms of democratic representation in Latin America (Collier and Handlin 2009, Johannessen 2019) and beyond (Achen and Bartels 2017). Which types of inclusionary policies trigger changes in partisan support patterns, and how lasting are such partisan reorientations?

Conversely, understanding when and where particular marginalized groups become core constituencies of leftist parties is also important for assessing the continued political feasibility of the inclusionary policies discussed in this volume. If the poor, informal sector workers, and other marginalized groups do not electorally reward the typically (though not necessarily) left-leaning political parties driving these inclusionary policies, then the political feasibility of the inclusionary project may be jeopardized by electoral turnovers that bring to power parties and politicians with different ideological commitments and/or core constituencies. Even if and where leftist parties manage to stay in power, their policy choices are likely to be affected by their perceptions about the types of policies that voters reward at the polls.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the nature of the link between inclusionary policies and the evolution of partisan support patterns in Latin America has implications for the likely legacies of this inclusionary turn for the politics of the region in the context in which, electorally at least, the Left wave appears to have crested in much of the region. To the extent that more inclusive participatory institutions and social policies have produced strong partisan attachments between the poor and leftist parties, we should expect the legacies of the Left wave of the past fifteen to twenty years to leave a strong imprint on Latin American party systems and societies along the lines of the first wave of labor incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991). If, on the other hand, the region's Left turn and the adoption by many left-leaning governments (among others) of pro-poor policies just happened to occur simultaneously,

<sup>1</sup> For example, Johannessen (2019) shows that PT mayors in Brazil shift from participatory and redistributive policies to more visible types of public spending (typically infrastructure) once they realize that such projects are more effective in securing electoral support than health care or education spending, despite the fact that voters claim to prefer the latter to the former.

then the political legacies of the inclusionary turn discussed in this volume may have much shorter half-lives once the Left loses power.

To answer these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows: first, I briefly discuss the significant data and measurement challenges inherent in creating cross-nationally and cross-temporally comparable indicators of ideology and partisan attachments. In the following section I trace the changes in ideology–partisanship congruence for various potential socio-economic constituencies of leftist parties in ten Latin American countries: the eight political party systems from Collier and Collier (1991) and two Andean cases (Bolivia and Ecuador). In the fourth section I identify and evaluate a number of hypotheses that may explain the significant cross-national variation in the extent to which leftist parties have been able to secure the support of poor/marginalized voters. The final section concludes.

Overall, the chapter shows that the Latin American Left wave has resulted in a significant realignment of poor/marginalized voters with ideologically left-leaning parties in most of the ten countries analyzed in this chapter. However, the extent of this realignment differed considerably by sector: whereas leftist parties made significant inroads among the poor and informal sector workers, we observe no comparable congruence increases among the more traditional leftist power bases (the formal working-class and public sector employees.) Among the possible explanations for the cross-country differences in realignment, I found weak support for the role of structural factors (such as inequality and natural resources) but at least tentative evidence of the importance of leftist governance reinforced by patronage-based appeals. Taken together, these findings call into question the durability of the leftist realignment of the poor in the context of the electoral resurgence of the Right in some recent Latin American elections.

#### IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN SUPPORT: MEASUREMENT AND INTERPRETATION CONSIDERATIONS

The most important empirical challenge for broad cross-national comparisons of ideological and partisan realignment patterns lies in the difficulty of constructing cross-nationally and cross-temporally valid and reliable indicators of party ideological orientations and partisan support patterns. In this section I briefly discuss a few key sources of data on party orientation in Latin America, followed by a discussion of the methodological challenges and trade-offs inherent in constructing and interpreting this data. Next I propose an approach and a series of indicators for measuring the partisan support base of different parties along a series of socioeconomic dimensions.

### Measuring Party Orientation

Analyzing party orientation is a significant challenge for cross-national and cross-temporal studies due to the scarcity of comparable data and the differences in countries' party systems and economic orthodoxy. Since most cross-national sources of data on party orientation are regional in scope, the problems are particularly acute for cross-regional studies (Pop-Eleches 2008). But even if we limit our scope to Latin America, we run into a variety of problems with the coverage, quality, and comparability of different data sources (see Table 6.1).

While there are a number of sources that can be used for coding political parties in Latin America, to the best of my knowledge, the party orientation measure used in this chapter is the first effort to code by combining three different types of information. The first type of data consists of a series of expert-based ratings, typically (but not always) in the form of expert surveys. The second source is the Party Elites in Latin America (PELA) project coordinated by the University of Salamanca, which has surveyed MPs in a large and growing number of Latin American legislatures since 1994. Since the surveys include questions about how respondents evaluate the left–right position of their own party and of other legislative parties in their country, the answers can be used to calculate party positions for a given legislative period (Alcántara Sáez and Rivas 2006; Saiegh 2009). The third source is public opinion surveys, such as the Latinobarómetro survey series. Since most of the surveys include questions about party preferences (vote intention/partisan affiliation) as well as questions about left–right positioning and a variety of social and economic policy preferences, it is possible to aggregate the responses of supporters of different parties and use these aggregates as estimates of where the particular parties stand (see e.g. Colomer 2005).

While these measures differ in both methodology and coverage (see Table 6.1), they nevertheless produce reassuringly similar estimates of party positions. This is particularly true for different types of expert-based ratings (see Figure 6.1).<sup>2</sup> However, Figure 6.2 suggests similar patterns when we compare expert-based ratings to the PELA elite surveys. Thus, to expand the geographic and temporal scope of the analysis I constructed an index that incorporates information from all the different sources available for a party in a given year.

<sup>2</sup> Not surprisingly, correlations were lower for the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) measure (at least in part because it only offers a three point scale) but even there they were around 0.8.

TABLE 6.1 *Temporal coverage of party orientation sources (1980–2012)*

Source	1980	1990	1991	1995	1996	2000	2001	2006	2007	2012
Coppedge		H		H		(H) <sup>a</sup>		(M) <sup>a</sup>		(M) <sup>a</sup>
DPI		M		M		M		M		M
Huber and Inglehart (1995)				L						
Benoit and Wiesehomeier (2009)								M		
Altman et al. (2009)										M
PELA				L		M		M		M
Latinobarómetro				L		M		M		M
LAPOP						L		M		M

*Note:* H = high coverage (most parties/years); M = medium coverage (many parties/years) L = low coverage (a few parties/years). DPI=Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.), PELA= Party Elites in Latin America, LAPOP= Latin American Public Opinion Project.

*a* coverage based on extensions of Coppedge’s (1997) classification scheme by various authors (Lodola and Queirolo 2005; Pop Eleches 2008; Murillo et al. 2010)




FIGURE 6.1 Comparing expert surveys




FIGURE 6.2 Comparing expert and elite surveys

### Measuring Partisan Support

To establish the changing congruence between ideology and partisan support for those parties among citizens are evolving beyond the ideological left–right positions of parties, we also need to capture the partisan bases of support for particular parties. To establish the partisan basis of a party’s political support I focused on two groups that were traditional supporters of leftist parties – formal sector workers and state sector employees – and two groups that had been largely excluded from the initial incorporation but which have featured prominently in the political discourse surrounding the inclusionary turn of the past three decades – the poor and informal sector workers. Specifically, I relied on survey data from the *Latinobarómetro*. My approach was to use the “Sunday vote intention” question to create a set of dummy variables that identified self-declared electoral supporters of particular parties, and then compare the support for these parties among four different social groups.<sup>3</sup> First, I created an objective poverty index on the basis of a battery of questions about the ownership of a broad range of assets (ranging from refrigerators to automobiles and houses),<sup>4</sup> and then differentiated between respondents below and above the median in each country.<sup>5</sup> The remaining groups were defined on the basis of their occupational status based on their responses to the *Latinobarómetro* surveys: informal sector workers, formal sector working-class respondents, and public sector employees (irrespective of job type.)

### Measuring Ideology–Partisanship Congruence

The final methodological challenge is to devise a cross-nationally and cross-temporally comparable indicator of the socioeconomic basis of support for parties with different ideological orientations. To do so, I first used the

<sup>3</sup> Since the purpose of this exercise was to compare parties with each other, this part of the analysis was restricted to respondents who expressed a party choice. However, in future iterations and for the purposes of cross national comparability it may be worth dealing more explicitly with nonvoters/undecided voters. Thus, if in some countries poor voters decide to abstain because the mainstream parties are too far to the right to attract their votes, then excluding these respondents from the analysis might exaggerate the extent of poor support for the mainstream parties.

<sup>4</sup> The indices consistently had alpha statistics above 0.8, suggesting high coherence.

<sup>5</sup> Obviously, the median voters were objectively poorer in some countries than in others. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I was primarily interested in the relative position of different respondents in the country’s economic hierarchy.

Latinobarómetro surveys to calculate the proportion of voters for a given party who belong to a particular socioeconomic group (e.g. informal sector workers). This measure allows me to compare how successful parties were at attracting the support of a particular group in a given country in a given year.<sup>6</sup> The second step is to analyze the relationship between these proportions and the ideological positions of particular parties. This can be done graphically by inspecting the slopes of the bivariate scatterplots of party ideology vs. partisan composition such as in the graphs presented in the following section.

Alternatively, if we are interested in comparisons across countries, time periods or socioeconomic groups, we can calculate regression-based slopes using standardized proportions of different socioeconomic groups.<sup>7</sup> Such an approach allows for a more systematic quantitative comparison of the congruence between party ideology and party-electoral support across countries, time periods, and issues. However, we need to be cognizant of the limitations imposed by the small number of parties per country, as well as by the noise inherent in both the ideology measures and the partisan share measures, which are in some cases based on a relatively small number of survey respondents for the smaller parties.

#### IDEOLOGICAL AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: BROAD PATTERNS

The next five sets of figures illustrate the nature and extent of ideological realignment in Latin America between 1995 and 2010 for the four dimensions of partisan attachment described above.<sup>8</sup> For each figure, the horizontal axis in each country panel captures the left–right

<sup>6</sup> Alternatively, one could analyze the proportion of a given socioeconomic group attracted by different parties. However, I would argue that such an approach would capture primarily the relative popularity of different parties – a party with a 50% vote share should capture more of the poor than a party with a 10% vote share – rather than whether its support comes disproportionately from the poor (or some other marginalized group.) However, given that in most countries discussed in this chapter the vote share of leftist parties increased from 1995 to 2010, the patterns presented in the next section would probably be even stronger using this alternative measure.

<sup>7</sup> For space reasons this approach is only discussed in the electronic appendix. However, the basic idea is to calculate at the country-year (i.e. party system) level the expected change in the share of support from a particular socioeconomic group associated with a one unit change in party ideology and then normalize this change by the standard deviation of the variable identifying that group in the Latinobarómetro surveys for that particular year.

<sup>8</sup> I chose 1995 because it is the earliest year for which the Latinobarómetro had surveys for most of the countries in my sample, and 2010 because it represents the peak of the left wave in the region.



ideological orientation of each party based on the combination of expert and elite surveys discussed in the preceding sections.<sup>9</sup> The vertical axis represents the proportion of that party's supporters who belong to the particular socioeconomic group analyzed in the figure. To reiterate, these proportions, which were calculated using the 1995/96 and 2010 waves of the Latinobarómetro, capture the relative mix of the supporters of different parties rather than the mix of party preferences for different social groups. Therefore, to the extent that poor Latin Americans vote in accordance with their class/occupation-based economic interests, we should expect to see negative correlations (i.e. declining slopes) in these figures, as poor/working-class voters should favor leftist parties. Moreover, steeper negative slopes indicate that voters from the particular socioeconomic group examined in the figure are more responsive to differences in the ideological (left–right) orientation of political parties.

Judging by Figure 6.3(a) during the Washington Consensus of the mid-1990s poor Latin Americans were no more likely to endorse leftist parties and in fact were often more likely to endorse center or center-right parties in most of the countries analyzed in this chapter. For example, in Argentina poor voters were a larger share of voters for center-right clientelist parties like Menem's Peronist party (PJ) than for center-left parties like the Radical Party (UCR), while in Brazil the poor were over-represented among those who voted for the right-of-center Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and Liberal Front Party (PFL) while being underrepresented among supporters of the leftist Workers' Party (PT). Even in Mexico, where the slope is in the "correct" direction, the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) received comparatively less support from the poor than the ruling center-right Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the one case where electoral support conforms to standard economic interest-based expectations was Chile, where the poor were much more important for the leftist Socialist Party (PS) than the right-of-center Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN).

However, Figure 6.3(b) reflects a fairly significant region-wide voter realignment: by 2010 correlations clearly pointed in the "correct" direction in six of the ten countries. The switch was particularly striking in Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela, where leftist parties were able to reverse their erstwhile disadvantage among poor voters. Even in the remaining

<sup>9</sup> I included any parties for which I could find ideological orientation data from any of the expert surveys and data on partisan support from the Latinobarómetro.




FIGURE 6.3(A) Ideology vs. vote by poor (1995)




FIGURE 6.3(B) Ideology vs. electoral support by poor (2010)

outliers – Uruguay and Argentina – the trends were flatter, suggesting that at least a partial reorientation of the poor toward left-leaning parties had taken place. However, it is worth noting that in Chile the tight link between poverty and leftist voting appeared to have weakened considerably by 2010, driven by the PS's declining success among poor voters.

Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 illustrate the electoral realignment of individuals differently placed in the labor market. Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) focus on the electoral choices of informal sector voters. We might have expected significant realignment among these workers given that they had not been included in the first-round of incorporation, and therefore were “up for grabs” during the most recent round of democratization. These expectations are largely borne out by the evidence: in line with the patterns for poor voters, in much of the region informal sector workers were more likely to support rightist parties during the mid-1990s. Two exceptions were once again Chile and Mexico, but the “ideologically correct” pattern was also visible in Uruguay, where the Frente Amplio had a relative electoral advantage among informal workers compared to the two traditional oligarchic parties in 1995. By 2010, the informal sector appears to have been incorporated into the electorate of leftist parties in eight of the ten countries analyzed in this chapter: in addition to Chile and Uruguay, more left-leaning parties also had disproportionate support from the informal sector in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and, somewhat surprisingly, Colombia. The only exceptions were Mexico, where after a decade of controlling the presidency the PAN seems to have made significant inroads among informal workers at the expense of the leftist PRD, and Ecuador, where the right-leaning populist PRIAN was more effective in attracting informal sector support than the leftist governing party PAIS.

Whereas poor and informal sector voters became more prominent constituencies of leftist parties in most Latin American countries as the “neoliberal consensus” of the 1990s weakened and the Left turn accelerated into the first decade of the twenty-first century, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 suggest that the situation is quite different for two of the more traditional constituencies of leftist parties: the formal sector working class and public sector employees. With respect to the former, Figures 6.5(a) and 6.5(b) largely suggest that the partisan ties between leftist parties and the formal sector working class *weakened* from 1995 to 2010. Thus, in Brazil and Mexico the greater formal working-class support for the Left in the mid-1990s had reversed a decade and a half later, while in Uruguay and Venezuela it persisted but appeared to be less pronounced. The remaining six countries had largely unchanged working-class support patterns, but




FIGURE 6.4(A) Ideology vs. informal sector vote (1995)




FIGURE 6.4(B) Ideology vs. informal sector vote (2010)




FIGURE 6.5(A) Ideology vs. formal working class vote (1995)




FIGURE 6.5(B) Ideology vs. formal working class vote (2010)



this meant a clear leftist advantage among formal sector workers only in the case of Chile.

Figures 6.6(a) and 6.6(b) reveal a similar dealignment with respect to public sector employees. Thus, Figure 6.6(a) suggests that in eight of the ten countries under study public sector workers tended to be overrepresented among voters of leftist parties in 1995, with only Argentina and Venezuela deviating from this pattern. However, even as other natural constituencies of leftist parties appeared to experience an electoral realignment that brought their voting patterns more closely into line with income/class-based expectations, public sector employees moved in the opposite direction between the mid-1990s and 2010. According to Figure 6.6(b), by 2010 only in Peru did public sector employees *continue* to be significantly more loyal to leftist parties. In most of the remaining countries the fit lines were virtually flat, perhaps reflecting a dissipation, by 2010, of the political aftershocks of the partisan conflict triggered by the massive privatization drives of the early to mid-1990s. The one notable exception was Venezuela, where we see a significant *increase* in the Left's ability to attract public sector workers. However, in this instance the exception really does prove the rule: after all, Venezuela was the country where the economic importance of the state sector grew most during the last decade.

Overall, the empirical patterns in the figures presented in this section suggest a few main conclusions. First, in broad regional terms, we find fairly strong evidence that the inclusionary turn in Latin America was accompanied by a growing congruence between the ideological platforms of political parties and their political support among groups that had not been included in the previous round of labor incorporation. Thus, compared to the so-called neoliberal consensus of the mid-1990s, by the end of the following decade the poor and informal sector workers represented more prominent electoral constituencies of leftist political parties. However, the growing congruence triggered by this realignment was partially offset by the weakening presence of formal sector workers class and public sector employees among the supporters of the Left.

Second, while acknowledging the complexity of the patterns and the limitations of the data, we can nevertheless identify some fairly clear cross-national differences in the nature and intensity of the electoral realignment of particular socioeconomic groups in the past two decades. To highlight these differences, Table 6.2 summarizes the changes in the correlations between party ideological orientations and partisan support (from different socioeconomic groups) for the two types of socioeconomic




FIGURE 6.6(A) Ideology vs. public sector vote (1995)




FIGURE 6.6(B) Ideology vs. public sector vote (2010)

TABLE 6.2 *Overview of realignment patterns by country and issue*

Country	Ideological Alignment of Poor 1995	Ideological Alignment of Informal Sector 1995	Ideological Alignment of Poor 2010	Ideological Alignment of Informal Sector 2010	Alignment Trend for Poor/ Informal Sector 1995 2010
Peru	None	None	Left strong	Left moderate	Leftist realignment
Bolivia	None	Right moderate	Left strong	Left weak	Leftist realignment
Brazil	Right moderate	None	Left moderate	Left weak	Leftist realignment
Colombia	Right weak	Right moderate	None	Left weak	Partial leftist realignment
Venezuela	Right moderate	Right weak	Left weak	None	Partial leftist realignment
Ecuador	Right strong	Right weak	Left weak	Right weak	Partial leftist realignment
Argentina	Right strong	Right moderate	Right weak	Left weak	Partial leftist realignment
Uruguay	Right strong	None	Right weak	None	Weak leftist realignment
Mexico	Left moderate	None	Left moderate	None	Stagnation
Chile	Left strong	None	None	Left weak	Partial dealignment

cleavages where we do see an overall trend of greater congruence between leftist ideology and the nature of partisan support: poverty and informal sector employment.

Examining the evolution this way offers a basis for sorting the ten countries under study into five groups in terms of the degree of their *ideology–partisanship realignment*. The first group, consisting of Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil experienced a consistent *leftist realignment* along both dimensions, which resulted in leftist parties getting noticeably greater support from the poor and informal sector employees by 2010. The second group, exemplified by Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina also experienced a growing propensity of disadvantaged groups to support left-leaning parties but the alignment patterns by 2010 were less consistent across different cleavage types, and they are therefore classified as having experienced *partial leftist realignment*. The third category, exemplified by Uruguay, exhibits some increase in support for the Left from one group (the poor), but the process was far from complete by 2010: in that year neither the poor nor informal sector workers were overrepresented among those voting for the leftist Frente Amplio. This category will thus be termed *weak leftist realignment*.<sup>10</sup> As discussed above, the last two cases, Mexico and Chile, had exhibited considerably greater ideology–partisanship coherence than in other Latin American countries during the 1990s. However, Mexico made no further progress on either dimension over the next decade and a half, and is therefore labeled as a case of *stagnation*. In Chile, a modest increase in the leftist preferences of the informal sector was outweighed by the significant weakening of the initial overrepresentation of the poor among supporters of leftist parties. Therefore, Chile represents a case of *partial dealignment*.

Given the focus of this book on the region's inclusionary turn, the following section provides a preliminary effort to explain these different trajectories in ideology–partisanship congruence. It is important to keep in mind that the categorization just offered focuses on the nature of alignment changes between the mid-1990s and 2010, rather than on the end point of this transformation. If we focus on the latter, Chile and Mexico would rank ahead of some countries, such as Uruguay, Argentina, or Ecuador, where despite the partial realignment since the

<sup>10</sup> One could also include Uruguay in the *partial leftist realignment* category. However, Uruguay did not end up with either the poor or the informal sector clearly backing the Left. Thus, its end point is sufficiently distinctive to justify separate treatment.

mid-1990s the overall congruence between ideology and partisan support is still fairly modest.

#### EXPLAINING THE REALIGNMENT: SOME PRELIMINARY TESTS

What explains the significant variation in the realignment patterns identified in Table 6.2? In this section I discuss a few possible explanations drawing on the arguments from several other chapters in this book, as well as from other analyses of the Latin American Left turn. The intuition underlying the analysis is that if the introduction of inclusionary policies induces partisan support, we should see greater realignment in countries where leftist parties were better able to engage in inclusion. The analysis considers the importance of three types of explanations: *supply-side* factors that explain variation in the *feasibility* of the inclusionary turn, such as democratic resilience, the existence of horizontal constraints, and the availability of natural resource rents; *demand-side* explanations that focus on varying *incentives* for a more vigorous inclusionary turn, such as prior levels of poverty and inequality, and the nature and extent of the neoliberal reforms preceding the Left turn; and elements of the political *process* through which the inclusionary turn in Latin America developed, including the type of leftist parties, the length of leftist rule and the relative reliance on patronage by different political parties.

I will discuss each of these possible explanations below and also summarize them jointly in Table 6.3. Before proceeding, however, I want to emphasize that this section should be interpreted as an exploratory effort to engage some of the ideas discussed in this book rather than either an exhaustive consideration of all the possible explanations of this realignment or a systematic empirical test of the relative explanatory power of different factors or of the nature of causal processes linking the different factors.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Systematic hypothesis testing is limited by the small number of cases (ten countries) in the current analysis. The nature of causality is likely to be particularly problematic for the *process* variables. For example, it may be that longer periods of being in power allow leftist parties to attract more of the previously excluded groups (like the informal sector); alternatively it could be that leftist parties stay in power longer when they are able to attract more marginalized voters. Therefore, the aim of the discussion of processual variables is largely to uncover certain patterns/correlations, rather than making/testing causal claims.

TABLE 6.3 *Overview of realignment explanations*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Country	Realignment Patterns	Age of Democracy in 1995	Coups 1990–2010	Natural Resources % GDP 1995–2010	Rule of Law 1996	Income Inequality 1995	Poverty 1995	Econ Liberaliz 1995–1997	Econ liberaliz Party Orientation	Left Party Type	Years of Left Gov't 1995–2010	Left in Power 2010	Left Patronage Reliance	Right patronage reliance
Peru	Leftist realignment	0	Yes	4.9	-0.65	54	32	0.63	Populist	Old and new	5	Yes	2.72	2.17
Bolivia	Leftist realignment	13	No	7.1	-0.31	58	31	0.71	Populist	New	5	Yes	3.30	3.11
Brazil	Leftist realignment	10	No	3.2	-0.33	60	26	0.55	R/CR	Old	8	Yes	2.63	3.47
Colombia	Partial leftist realignment	35	No	4.6	-0.89	57	28	0.56	Center	New	0	No	2.30	3.25
Venezuela	Partial leftist realignment	37	Yes	15.8	-0.88	48	18	0.50	L/CL	New	12	Yes	3.76	1.67
Ecuador	Partial leftist realignment	16	Yes	10.3	-0.51	51	32	0.54	Mixed	New	4	Yes	N/A	3.36
Argentina	Partial leftist realignment	12	No	3.1	0.03	49	8	0.61	Populist	Old	9	Yes	3.51	2.33
Uruguay	Weak leftist realignment	10	No	0.8	0.45	42	2	0.46	R/CR	Old	6	Yes	1.84	2.40
Mexico	Stagnation	0	No	3.8	-0.77	48	31	0.53	R/CR	Old	0	No	3.25	2.76
Chile	Partial dealignment	5	No	11.3	1.05	55	11	0.59	R/CR	Old	10	No	2.66	2.59

### Supply-Side Explanations

In line with the theoretical discussion in the introductory chapter to this volume, as a first step I tested whether differences in democratic histories and trajectories could account for the different patterns of electoral realignment. As offered in the volume's introductory chapter, this argument primarily focused on explaining the overall timing of the inclusionary turn at the regional level. However, the logic of the argument nevertheless implies that we should see a more vigorous realignment in countries with longer democratic histories at the outset of the Left wave and/or in countries with fewer recent threats to democratic stability, since in such countries leftist parties could be expected to compete more vigorously to attract previously excluded groups.

To test this logic I coded the length of continuous democratic rule before 1995, as well as whether the country had experienced any coups between 1990 and 2010. The data in Table 6.3 suggest that no clear relationship exists between the length of democratic rule and realignment patterns: countries with more recent authoritarian pasts are represented almost symmetrically at both sides of the "realignment spectrum."<sup>12</sup> Even the more immediate experience of post-1990 coups does not seem to have acted as a deterrent against leftist realignment, as none of the countries with weaker realignment had recent coup experiences, while Peru experienced a significant reorientation despite Fujimori's *autogolpe*.

The next two supply-side factors I address in Table 6.3 represent additional reasons why some Latin American governments may have been more or less constrained in pursuing redistributive strategies to attract poor/disadvantaged voters. First, given the role of the commodity boom in providing the resources for the various economic and social initiatives by leftist regimes in Latin America (Weyland 2013; Campello 2015; Mazzuca this volume), we may expect leftist realignment to have been more intense in countries that experienced larger improvements in the international market for their primary exports. To capture this variation, the fifth column in Table 6.3 presents the average natural resource rents as a share of GDP from 1995 to 2010. These statistics confirm the uneven distribution of these resource rents, which ranged from minimal in

<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, while Chile and Mexico had short democratic track records and witness no further alignment increases from 1995 to 2010, it is worth noting that both countries had fairly strong electoral support for leftist parties among the poor in 1995, which goes against the logic about longer democratic spells facilitating the inclusionary turn.



Uruguay to substantial in Ecuador, Chile, and especially Venezuela. However, there does not seem to be a strong correlation between natural resource rents and leftist realignment, with both resource-rich and relatively resource-poor countries represented on both ends of the realignment spectrum.

The final supply-side factor touches on one of the democratic paradoxes discussed in the volume's introductory chapter, and focuses on Mazzuca's argument about how a weak rule of law facilitates some of the more ambitious populist redistributive schemes in Latin America. Judging by the WGI *rule of law* scores for 1996 in Table 6.3, it does indeed appear as if leftist parties were more successful in attracting poor and informal sector voters in countries with weaker rule of law constraints. While the relationship was not monotonic – Venezuela only experienced a partial realignment despite very weak rule of law in 1996 (and further declines until 2010) – Table 6.3 nevertheless suggests that countries with stronger rule of law (such as Chile and Uruguay) clustered toward the bottom of the realignment spectrum.

### Demand-Side Explanations

With the second set of factors I hope to tap into some of the reasons why demands for greater inclusion – and hence the ability of leftist parties to attract marginalized groups to their redistributive agenda – may have been greater in some countries. One prominent explanation, highlighted in the volume's introductory chapter and building on a rich literature on the political repercussions of Latin America's notoriously unequal income distribution (Portes and Hoffman 2003), is that we may expect a stronger inclusionary turn, and thus leftist realignment, in countries with greater income inequality. For similar reasons, we may expect countries with greater extreme poverty to provide a richer electoral reservoir for leftist parties.<sup>13</sup>

The patterns in Table 6.3 provide moderate support for both of these hypotheses: the three countries with the most significant leftist realignment – Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil – featured inequality and poverty rates that in the mid-1990s were high even by regional standards. Meanwhile, the countries with weak or no leftist realignment – Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay – had lower inequality and/or poverty rates than those of most

<sup>13</sup> I measure extreme poverty as the proportion of the population living on less than \$3.10 per day (using data from the World Development Indicators).

of their regional peers (though Mexico's high poverty and Chile's high inequality fit less well.)

An alternative demand-side explanation traces the roots of the inclusionary pressures and the resulting electoral realignment to political reaction to the massive neoliberal reform push of the early to mid-1990s. While the original arguments along these lines (Silva 2009; Silva and Rossi 2018) focused primarily on explaining the common regional trend toward greater inclusionary pressures, the logic of their arguments nevertheless leads us to predict a stronger reaction and hence more powerful leftist realignment in countries with more extensive neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. Table 6.3 presents the liberal economic reform scores at the peak of these reforms in 1995–1997 based on Lora (2001). As with the other two demand-side explanations, there is moderate support for this hypothesis: the two countries with the most extensive leftist realignments – Peru and Bolivia – had also experienced the most drastic neoliberal reforms before the start of the Left turn, while two of the three countries with weak or no realignment – Mexico and Uruguay – were below the regional average in terms of economic liberalization in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, as in the case of inequality, Chile is an outlier, given that its extensive reforms should have created greater redistributive reactions.

### Process-Based Explanations

While some are important, factors shaping the political constraints on inclusionary politics, and driving the demand for greater inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups, are insufficient for understanding the dynamics of the inclusionary turn and the related process of partisan realignment. After all, many of these factors (such as high inequality and poverty, or variations in rule of law or natural resource rents) had been present well before the inclusionary turn but had largely failed to produce either inclusion or the incorporation of the poor and other marginalized groups by leftist political parties. Therefore, this final empirical section briefly discusses, in a very exploratory way, a few factors that capture the political dynamics of the intertwined processes of inclusion and realignment. The goal of the analysis is simply to identify correlational patterns between the realignment dynamics discussed in the previous section and a few explanations of Latin America's inclusionary turn advanced in this volume and elsewhere in the literature.

The first set of explanations starts where the discussion of demand-side factors ended: the legacies of neoliberal economic reforms in the late

1980s and early to mid-1990s. As Roberts (2013, 2015) has persuasively argued, what mattered for party politics in Latin America was not just the nature and extent of the economic reforms but also the political orientation of the parties initiating/overseeing the reforms. Where such reforms were overseen by right-leaning parties/governments and opposed by leftist oppositions, such as in Brazil or Uruguay, such reforms reinforced the ideological patterns of party competition and thus reinforced the stability of party systems (Roberts 2013). By contrast, where reforms were the result of bait-and-switch tactics of leftist/populist parties that had campaigned on an anti-reform platform (Stokes 2001, Campello 2015), such reforms tended to lead to less coherent party systems, in part by creating political openings for more radical newcomers on the left of the political spectrum (Roberts 2013).

The implications of this argument for the changes in partisanship-ideology congruence discussed in this chapter are somewhat more ambiguous. The straightforward prediction would be that, at least in the short term, we should see more consistent congruence between leftist parties and economically disadvantaged groups in countries where neoliberal reforms were championed by the right (and, thus, where party systems were reinforced). However, given our main focus here on two groups that were not part of the core coalition for the traditional Left in most Latin American countries (the poor and informal sector workers), it is also possible that the political incorporation of these groups by the Left was *facilitated* by the entry of new left-leaning political parties (in cases of party-system dealignment). For a preliminary test of these predictions, I coded the political orientation of the political party overseeing neoliberal economic reforms (based on Roberts 2013, 1437), as well as whether the main leftist party in 2010 was a political newcomer or not (see columns 10 and 11 of Table 6.3).

The patterns in Table 6.3 confirm the close empirical link between “unnatural” neoliberal reforms (implemented by leftist/populist parties) and the rise of successful new leftist parties. However, when looking at the link between these destabilized party systems and subsequent leftist realignments, it appears that by 2010 the region had experienced a “reversal of fortunes”: most countries where economic reforms driven by right-leaning parties had facilitated the survival of traditional leftist parties (Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay) experienced either modest or no leftist realignments among the poor or informal sector workers. Importantly, this lack of realignment was not simply due to the stronger institutional ties between the Left and the formal working class, as only

Chile continues to show a clear pattern in this respect by 2010 (see Figure 6.5(b)). The picture is somewhat less clear at the opposite end of the spectrum: parties responsible for triggering significant leftist realignments included both a newcomer (Evo Morales's MAS in Bolivia), an established leftist party (the Brazilian PT), and a mix of old and new leftist-populist parties in Peru (Alan Garcia's APRA,<sup>14</sup> and the PNP under Ollanta Humala). Nevertheless, the overall trend in Table 6.3 is still clearly one of leftist/populist newcomers being associated with more significant leftist realignments. The precise causal nature of this correlation is beyond the current discussion but should be explored in future work.

Given the overlap between the inclusionary turn and the widely discussed Left turn of Latin America, another important set of process-based potential explanations has to do with cross-national and cross-temporal variations in the extent to which leftist parties have had a chance to govern, and how they governed once in power. As a first step in that direction, I coded the length of left government from 1995 to 2010. To the extent that leftist realignments among the poor and informal sector require extended opportunities to govern (in order to put in place redistributive/participatory institutions), we should expect stronger realignments in countries where the Left was in power longer before 2010. This expectation is not confirmed, however: judging by the patterns in Table 6.3, there is no discernible relationship between the length of left government and the strength of ideological realignment.

This lack of a clear pattern is further confirmed by the fact that several of the mechanisms that should underlie such a relationship do not seem to be very predictive of realignment patterns. While Latin American countries have differed significantly in the magnitude and the nature of their social policy expansions of the past two decades (see Garay 2016, this volume), these social policy differences do not seem to translate straightforwardly into realignment outcomes. For example, countries with inclusionary social policy expansion models, such as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay, exhibit highly varying realignment patterns: while the countries with stagnation/dealignment patterns exhibited restrictive

<sup>14</sup> While Peru is coded as having neoliberal reforms implemented by populists, it is important to note that these reforms happened not under APRA, which had resisted such reforms in both the 1980s and 1990s (Pop Eleches 2008), but under Fujimori's *Cambio 90*. This may also help explain APRA's (and Garcia's) remarkable political comeback despite its disastrous governance record from 1985 to 1990.

models (Mexico and Chile), Peru's very limited social policy expansion is at odds with its significant realignment. A similarly mixed picture emerges for another prominent process that represents an important component of the "access" dimension of the inclusionary turn: the opportunities for and involvement in participatory democratic institutions by formerly marginalized groups (see Goldfrank this volume). While systematic cross-national data on popular involvement in participatory institutions is not available, even a cursory look reveals the lack of a tight correlation. The significant leftist realignment in Brazil was arguably reinforced by its widespread and fairly active participatory institutions, such a perspective has a harder time accounting for the strong realignment in Peru (where popular participation has been low despite ample institutional opportunities) or the more limited realignment in Venezuela, whose municipal councils boast the highest participation rates in the region (Goldfrank, this volume).

Alternatively, it is conceivable that the congruence between the partisan base and the ideological orientation of leftist parties is more responsive to short-term changes in government participation. Considering the data in column 13 in Table 6.3, which reflect whether a leftist party was in power in 2010, the short-term dynamics seem to be more predictive of realignment patterns in Latin America: two of the three cases with right governments in 2010 – Mexico and Chile – are at the bottom of the realignment spectrum, and none of the three had strong leftist realignments. Moreover, the only country to experience dealignment – Chile – is the only one that shifted from a (center-)left to a right government between 1995 and 2010.<sup>15</sup>

Given the small number of non-leftist governments in 2010, and the fact that this chapter only focuses on two years (1995, 2010), the importance of these short-term dynamics needs to be analyzed in greater detail in future work. However, the suggestive evidence from Table 6.3 about the greater importance of short-term (rather than long-term) leftist governance raises interesting questions: what are some possible reasons for this pattern? I briefly discuss one possible factor here: the role of patronage. While the prominent role of patronage and clientelist politics in Latin America has been extensively documented (Stokes et al. 2013), others have suggested that even in notoriously patronage-prone party systems like Brazil, there may be a shift from patronage to programmatic appeals (Hagopian et al. 2009). A coincidence between these changing patterns of patronage and the Left coming to power in Latin America – for example, by shifting

<sup>15</sup> Mexico and Colombia did not have leftist governing parties in 1995 and 2010.

government spending from pork to programmatic purposes – may help explain the greater congruence between leftist ideological appeals and the social bases of leftist parties. Alternatively, however, the Venezuelan case suggests a more cynical perspective, whereby the growing allegiance of poor voters to leftist parties could be buttressed by the Left's ability to reinforce its ideological appeals with a heavy dose of patronage.

While systematic over-time data on the reliance of different Latin American parties on patronage is unfortunately not available, the last two columns in Table 6.3 provide estimates based on the Altman et al. (2009) expert survey of the prominence of patronage-based appeals in the platforms of the main leftist and rightist parties in the ten Latin American countries discussed in this chapter. Three conclusions emerge from these indicators: first, parties' reliance on patronage in the mid-to-late 2000s was largely unrelated to ideology in the region overall, even though in some countries either the Left or the Right were more prone to emphasize patronage. Second, there were significant (though not unexpected) cross-national differences in the salience of patronage, ranging from fairly low (e.g. in Uruguay) to high (e.g. in countries like Bolivia). Third, and most important for our present discussion, Table 6.3 reveals virtually no correlation between the patronage appeals of either leftist or rightist parties and the realignment trajectories of poor and informal sector voters. This lack of a relationship suggests that Hagopian et al.'s (2009) argument about the trade-off between patronage and programmatic appeals does not extend to voters as well.

Of course, the lack of a straightforward relationship between party patronage and realignment patterns does not mean that patronage does not matter for explaining why the poor support some Latin American leftist parties more than others. Indeed, it seems plausible that the interaction between leftist government and the reliance on (and availability of) patronage may help explain these differences: the strong realignment in Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela (all of which had patronage-reliant leftist parties in power in 2010) compared with the weaker realignment in Uruguay (where the Frente Amplio did not resort to patronage) are consistent with this expectation. However, a systematic analysis of this hypothesis is precluded by degrees-of-freedom limitations in the present chapter and would require a more extensive analysis based on a longer time frame.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Preliminary analysis suggests that the realignment effects of having a left party in government are more pronounced where right wing parties do not rely heavily on patronage and where leftist parties use more patronage.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a preliminary “birds-eye view” assessment of the extent to which Latin America’s Left turn at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a fundamental realignment of party politics along a specific – but arguably important – dimension: the extent to which the poor/disadvantaged represent core constituencies of leftist parties. Using a combination of expert-based assessments of party ideological positions and mass-survey based indicators of partisan support patterns, I have found that while on average the fit between ideological platforms and the composition of partisan support bases of Latin American parties improved noticeably after the heyday of the Washington Consensus, this trend was uneven across both socioeconomic groups and countries.

In terms of socioeconomic groups, this chapter documented a significant increase in the alignment between poor and informal sector workers and the leftist parties whose redistributive platforms should present a “natural” fit for their economic interests. On the other hand, among the more traditional constituencies of leftist parties – formal sector workers and public sector employees – the competitive advantage of leftist parties declined during this time period.

There were also significant differences in cross-national trajectories from 1995 to 2010. Thus, whereas Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia, and to a somewhat lesser extent Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela, experienced significant realignments of economically disadvantaged groups toward leftist political parties, the realignment was much more limited in Uruguay, one of the countries where the initial labor incorporation had happened through traditional oligarchic parties (Collier and Collier 1991). Finally, support for left parties in two of the most coherent party systems of the mid-1990s – Chile and Mexico – did not increase among economically disadvantaged groups (and may have even experienced slight declines).

In the final section I explored a few possible explanations for these cross-national differences in realignment patterns. The preliminary evidence suggests relatively weak support for most explanations emphasizing differences in the constraints on inclusionary policies, such as fears of democratic reversals or the availability of natural resource rents (although there was some evidence that the leftist realignment of marginalized groups was more pronounced in countries with weak rule of law). I found stronger support for demand-side explanations: countries with higher poverty and inequality rates, and those in which government had

pursued more aggressive neoliberal reforms by the mid-1990s, tended to experience stronger realignments of poor and informal sector voters with leftist parties, though the patterns were far from consistent.

Among the process-based explanations, realignments were more significant where new leftist parties entered the political sphere, which in turn can be traced back to situations where neoliberal economic reforms had been initiated by traditionally leftist/populist parties, a pattern that represents a reversal of the short-term dealignment trends discussed by Roberts (2013, 2015). Furthermore, neither the length of governance by leftist parties, nor the type of programmatic initiatives they undertook while in office, seemed to explain left parties' varying success in promoting realignment. Instead, what seems to matter more are the short-term dynamics of having leftist parties in power at a given point, possibly in conjunction with the continued use of patronage.

To the extent that these findings are confirmed, they strike a cautionary note about the durability of this leftist realignment over the medium-to-long term, and about whether the Left has induced a second wave of popular sector incorporation (Silva and Rossi 2018). Part of the concern about durability stems from the fact that the realignment between left parties and disadvantaged voters has occurred primarily among informal sector workers, whose support is less institutionally mediated than that of formal sector workers, among whom the Left has been comparatively much less successful in recent years. Furthermore, given that poor voters primarily switched toward leftist parties when these parties were in the position to reinforce their ideological message with access to patronage, we are left with the obvious question about how durable this realignment will be once leftist parties are no longer in office or once the resources available for patronage are reduced with the fading commodity boom. For better or worse, the electoral losses of the Left in Argentina and Brazil in recent years should offer ample opportunities to test these propositions in future research.

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## Brokering Inclusion

### *Intermediaries, Clientelism, and Constraints on Latin America's Left Turn*

Thad Dunning and Lucas M. Novaes

#### INTRODUCTION

The “inclusionary turn” in Latin America followed an unprecedented period of democratic stability in Latin America. Developments such as the end of the Cold War fostered an environment in which, despite some notable exceptions, neither popular mobilization nor the election of leftist governments sparked widespread authoritarian backlash. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) suggest, stability created the conditions under which normal democratic practices could, in unequal societies, empower progressive and redistributive policies.

Yet, important social, economic, and political changes during the period of stabilization also transformed democratic practices in many countries in the region. The period beginning in the 1980s was marked in particular by the erosion of traditional linkages between left parties and unions (Collier and Handlin 2009a), political and fiscal decentralization (Montero and Samuels 2004; Falletti 2010; Goldfrank 2011), and changing modes of popular contestation.<sup>1</sup> Faced with growing economic informality, successful political parties adopted new modes of internal organization and electoral mobilization (Levitsky 2003a). Relative especially to the forms of mass politics in the aftermath of Latin America's labor-based incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991), these changes entailed fresh opportunities for – but also novel constraints on –

<sup>1</sup> On popular mobilization, see in this volume, inter alia, Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar; Boas; Etchemendy; Goldfrank; and Palmer Rubin.

incorporation of popular sectors as durable members of left parties' electoral coalitions.

We suggest in this chapter that these transformations have important implications for the character and sustainability of the inclusionary turn in Latin America – in particular, because of the way they empowered autonomous local intermediaries whose support proved critical for the construction of left-party national power. The weakening of centralized unions and growth of horizontally organized associations gave local leaders of associations new capacities to impact the political behavior of group members (Palmer-Rubin, this volume).<sup>2</sup> Political and fiscal decentralization enhanced the ability of both subnational politicians and informal local patrons to influence their clients to support a particular party or candidate, thereby boosting those intermediaries' leverage in negotiations with national party elites. Such local leaders – whose followers may include members of popular sector associations, as well as more disaggregated networks of clients – often command loyal followings; in some settings, they can offer these networks of supporters to the highest bidder (Camp 2016; Novaes 2018). National left-party leaders have frequently required the support of these local intermediaries: often unable to win majorities through partisan or ideational linkages to citizens alone, national leaders have had to reach out to local authorities to mobilize difficult-to-reach voters. In this way, decentralization and informality provided local agents a new role as “brokers” – that is, political intermediaries who provide linkages between national leaders and mass publics (Stokes et al. 2013). As we show in this chapter, even externally mobilized left parties with clear programmatic agendas have, to a perhaps unappreciated degree, necessarily built coalitions through engagement with brokers.

Such alliances brought substantial electoral advantages for left- and labor-based parties: in the wake of economic changes and neoliberal policies, the actions of formal sector unions may no longer determine elections, yet reaching informal sectors is critical (Roberts 2002; Garay 2007). Given the empowerment of elected subnational politicians through political and fiscal decentralization, and the strengthening of informal local leaders through new forms of associational life, parties must reach down to decentralized nuclei of power to mobilize voters and implement public policy. Moreover, once left leaders gain power, they may face

<sup>2</sup> As discussed later, Collier and Handlin (2009b) describe this movement from what they call the “Union Party Hub” to the “Association Net.”

additional incentives to use their access to state resources to woo local brokers to expand their party's reach. To be sure, the construction of national power has long required negotiations with local elites, from *caudillos* or *coroneis* in postcolonial Latin America to powerful governors in democratic Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere (Sarmiento 1845; Samuels 2003). Yet during the inclusionary turn, political and fiscal decentralization and transformations of associational structures heightened the importance of electoral alliances with local leaders.

However, these alliances also proved fragile. While some intermediaries are motivated ideologically by goals of social inclusion, or are tied to particular associations and have little opportunity to negotiate exit from specific partisan-movement linkages, many brokers have autonomous networks and some are opportunistic. Such intermediaries can change allegiances, and take supporters with them, if left parties cannot match the outside offers they receive from other parties. The terms of exchange between leaders and brokers are thus often, although not always, characterized by forms of clientelism – a quid pro quo exchange of benefits for political support (Stokes et al. 2013). The leaders of left parties in the region have relied on such negotiations to bolster their electoral support, secure national power, and implement policies. This broker-mediated strategy has proved a double-edged sword, however, because brokers are rarely perfect agents of the national parties with whom they contract (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp 2016; Larreguy et al. 2017). Coalitions constructed through such bargains can disappear, for instance, with shifts in incumbency or resource availability. The construction of electoral support through such alliances has other risks too. For example, the incorporation of opportunistic brokers can dilute the left party's "brand," in a manner described by Lupu (2013); and it may antagonize militants at the party's base. Thus, while the broker-mediated strategy carries benefits to national parties, it also entails potential costs. Left-party leaders recognize this dilemma, which is not unlike the general problem engendered by electoral socialism (Przeworski and Sprague 1988) or faced by any party seeking to expand its support beyond its core support base (Roemer 2006). Indeed, the dynamics of broker-mediated strategies that we describe in this chapter could apply equally well to parties of the right; we focus here on left parties in Latin America because of their importance in accelerating and shaping greater inclusion, as analyzed in this volume.

We argue that the prevalence of broker-mediated electoral strategies among left parties has important implications for the nature and

durability of the inclusionary turn. First, the instability inherent in many alliances with local brokers affects the durability of social policies: fragile coalitions and the programs they support can be undone when incumbent left parties lose office or access to resources (Mazzuca, this volume). Even where the election of left parties expanded access to new types of inclusionary social policy (Hunter, this volume; Garay, this volume), reliance on broker-mediated strategies for capturing national office carried implications for the policies' longer-term sustainability. Second and more subtly, left parties not only gain access to power but also exercise power (Mazzuca 2010) with the support of local intermediaries. While the increasing inclusion of popular sectors has been facilitated, as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) suggest, by the "Left turn" in Latin America, the nature of broker-mediated distribution may place constraints on inclusionary policies – including those that would offer greater material resources to popular sectors. Reliance on brokers can also accentuate corruption and rent seeking. In sum, the broker-mediated nature of the Left turn in many Latin American countries has shaped the character, extent, and likely sustainability of the turn toward inclusion (see also Pop-Eleches, this volume).

We thus suggest that negotiations with local brokers played a critical role in shaping the consolidation of left parties – and thus the nature of the inclusionary turn – across Latin America. In cases from Peronism in Argentina (Auyero 2001) and Chavismo in Venezuela (Dunning 2008; Stokes et al. 2013) to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico (Larreguy et al. 2016), left or populist parties seeking to build electoral support in the popular sectors relied on alliances with such local intermediaries. To be sure, "broker-mediated" forms of democratic practice have not been uniform throughout the region; nor have they everywhere shaped the ways in which parties of the Left engage and mobilize popular sectors. In Chile, parties including those of the center-left coalition have arguably relied to a greater extent on personalized electoral campaigns and media-based appeals (Boas 2016), notwithstanding some evidence of clientelist strategies on the part of the conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente (Luna 2010). In Uruguay, left-party–union linkages have been more persistent (Etchemendy, this volume), while in Bolivia, the left party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) relied on organic ties to social movement organizations to generate new, enduring forms of partisan identity (Poertner 2018). Yet, electoral alliances with opportunistic local brokers have played an important role, even in cases where this outcome might seem most unexpected.

In this chapter, we examine such a “least-likely” case for the broker-mediated construction of national power: the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) in Brazil. The PT has been characterized by scholars as an ideological party, one that was both externally mobilized – meaning that key aspects of internal party organization crystallized while the party was out of power (Panebianco 1988; Shefter 1994) – and that pursued clear programmatic goals in office. Of all left parties in contemporary Latin America, the PT arguably has had the most coherent internal organization (Van Dyck 2014a; Van Dyck and Montero 2015), with solid connections to committed activists, base organizations, and organized labor. While party switching may be generally easier for brokers in Brazil than in some other Latin American cases – due inter alia to the weakness of parties and the volatility of the party system – the PT itself presents a case in which we might expect less reliance on opportunistic brokers, in favor of programmatic ideology and organizational coherence. Before and especially after winning important legislative and executive offices, however, the PT faced a problem: it required broadening the geographical reach of its electoral support to cement national power. We show that one important way in which the PT accomplished its expansion was through tactical alliances with local brokers, recruiting intermediaries especially in the country’s North and Northeastern regions who (unlike party activists) tended to be both autonomous and opportunistic. While this strategy reaped substantial rewards for the PT as it constructed its project of national power, it also carried important costs. In particular, we use new data to show that when the party’s approval plummeted during and after the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, and the PT’s access to state and private resources dried up, many such brokers acted instrumentally and left the party. Although the jury is still out, the fragility of the PT’s expansionary strategy may inhibit the sustainability of a range of inclusionary policies, promoted by the PT during its golden age, that fostered greater recognition, access, and resources for the popular sectors (Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume).

Our argument and findings make contributions both to the specific study of the PT’s rise in Brazil, and to the general understanding of the role of brokers in Latin America’s inclusionary turn. For Brazil, they gainsay a prevailing notion about the PT’s trajectory in power, and particularly the causes of its electoral success in the country’s North and Northeast. In one set of accounts, the party replaced and supplanted traditional clientelistic machines in the Northeast with stable popular organizations at the grassroots (Montero 2012; Van Dyck and Montero

2015). Other scholars have instead emphasized the importance of the expansion of social policies such as conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), particularly *Bolsa Família* (Zucco and Power 2013) or pointed to the importance of Lula's popularity in the region. While we would not deny the potential longer-term political implications of such changes – indeed, returns in the presidential elections in 2018 suggest enduring successes for the PT in the Northeast – many arguments understate the importance of alliances with municipal power brokers and especially do not explore the longer-term implications of the broker-mediated construction of power. We thus add here to the emphasis of scholars such as Alves and Hunter (2017) and Alves (2018) on the PT's pragmatic alliances in the Northeast. Yet, we further explore the ways in which the party's expansion led the PT to field mayoral candidates that were very different from the traditional *petista* (PT adherent); and we also show that after the impeachment of a PT president, these nontraditional allies proved very disloyal and rapidly left the party. The party's embrace of heterogeneous coalition members may have tainted the party's brand and facilitated a rapid return of old bosses and machine parties as the PT lost ground nationally.

More generally, we contribute to the literature on party adaptation, focusing on the challenges faced by parties that seek to move outside their traditional programmatic bases. Yet, we focus specifically on the relationship between party elites at higher tiers of government and the autonomous, sometimes opportunistic intermediaries with whom they often must strike alliances. While the autonomy and leverage of local brokers has varied across Latin American party systems, we argue that any general account of how left parties acted when in power during the period of the inclusionary turn must take the relationship of parties with such brokers into account.

In the rest of the chapter, we first develop a conceptualization of brokers that builds on recent scholarship (Stokes et al. 2013; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015) but that emphasizes especially the conditions under which brokers become both relatively autonomous of national leadership, as well as opportunistic. This allows consideration of the conditions under which near-universal developments in Latin America in the last decades of the twentieth century – such as economic transformation and political decentralization – did the most to increase the importance and leverage of local brokers. We then turn to our analysis of the Brazilian case, leveraging new data on the social and political backgrounds of brokers recruited by the Workers' Party to show the ways in



which the expansion of the PT in North and Northeastern regions of the country altered the character of the party's organization. The party's strategy allowed temporary electoral successes that gave it a stronger hold on national power. However, the strategy may have shaped not only the exercise of power and the character of policy during the inclusionary turn; it also proved electorally fragile, as opportunistic brokers abandoned the party as the PT faced scandal and voter discontent. In the Conclusion, we discuss the strategic alternatives to broker-mediated incorporation that have existed for left parties and examine why some parties must negotiate with autonomous brokers while others do not. Finally, we further consider implications for the character and sustainability of novel social policies amidst signs that the inclusionary turn has begun to wane in Brazil and several other countries of the region.

#### INFORMALITY, DECENTRALIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA

The decline of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1980s, economic crises, and the rise of austerity programs substantially eroded the base of formal sector economic organizations that had provided the backbone of what Collier and Handlin (2009a), building on Collier and Collier (1991), call the "Union-Party Hub." That earlier period of popular sector incorporation was characterized by the "central, privileged, and dominant role of unions as organizations of interest intermediation." In that context, unions were "affiliated to and constituted the core support base of different forms of labor-based parties" (Collier and Handlin 2009a, 5). Thus, during the period of the Union-Party Hub, organizational linkages to the formal, organized working class were critical for left parties (Collier and Collier 1991).

However, the waning in size and importance of the formal sector, and the commensurate increase in economic informality, created a new calculus for left parties (Roberts 2002; Garay 2007).<sup>3</sup> In place of unions, various kinds of associations played an increasingly prominent role as the "base units" of what Collier and Handlin (2009a) term the "Association-Net." This implied a reduction in the importance of party links to unions, whose support was arguably no longer determinant of left-party electoral success; and an increasing importance of mobilization

<sup>3</sup> See Feierherd (2017) for an argument that the election of left parties has actually fostered economic informality.

of horizontally organized networks of potential supporters. Thus, relationships of parties and candidates to the leaders of, for example, participatory organizations, neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groups, or rural communities have played an important role in electoral campaigns. Informal leaders and neighborhood problem-solvers with strong social ties, such as *punteros* in Argentina, have also become increasingly important forces for political mobilization (Levitsky 2003b).

Roughly concurrently, a major impulse toward political and fiscal decentralization also transformed the political arena in Latin America (Falleti 2010; Goldfrank 2011). Throughout the period that gave rise to the "inclusionary turn" studied in this volume, elected officials in subnational units such as provinces and municipalities played an ever more important role. From 1980 to 1995, for example, the number of countries in the region allowing the direct election of mayors increased from three to seventeen (Montero and Samuels 2004). Subnational political competition empowered local elected officials to cultivate supporters, sometimes independently of national party organizations. National party leaders increasingly found themselves negotiating with such local officials for support, particularly in unstable party systems, in which local leaders could easily shift alliances from one party to another. Fiscal decentralization in some countries may also have clearly enhanced the power of elected mayors and governors, as well as their leverage with respect to national politicians (Eaton 2011).

While it is difficult to identify the relative causal weight of increased economic informality, weakening party–union linkages, and political and fiscal decentralization, these economic and political changes together implied major transformations in democratic practice in Latin America. Elected subnational officials, associational leaders, and various informal organizers became increasingly important figures in electoral mobilization. Notwithstanding differences in the structures of their networks or their types of positions, such leaders became "brokers" who could influence group members to move voters toward a particular party or candidate; and that leverage has provided political capital that brokers could exploit to their advantage. Such intermediaries can sometimes be patrons of various kinds of clientelistic networks, meaning that they mobilize support from their followers via *quid pro quo* exchanges of resources for political support (Stokes et al. 2013; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015). However, clientelism in the relationship between intermediaries and voters is not necessary for the political importance of transactions between intermediaries and left-party leaders: what is required is simply

that brokers be able to influence or command the vote of citizens in their networks, whether that is through clientelistic or non-clientelistic means. In short, the rise of such brokers often made it impossible for parties to mobilize voters successfully and to implement public policy without reaching down to decentralized nuclei of power, each with its own political networks and respective local leaders.

Before developing this argument further, it is useful to specify the common features of such intermediaries. We conceptualize “brokers” in terms of the political *role* that they play in connecting national leaders to mass publics, especially voters in the popular sectors, rather than in terms of their specific office. Thus, the key feature of brokers, as opposed to other kinds of intermediaries, is that they use their connections and influence over voters in their jurisdictions to mobilize electoral support on behalf of political parties or candidates, usually at higher levels of government.<sup>4</sup> This focus on the functional role of brokers rather than their specific position echoes, for example, Scott’s discussion of terms such as patron and client, which designate “roles and not persons, and thus it is quite possible for a single individual to act both as a broker and a patron” (Scott 1972, 96; see also Scott 1969). While brokers may sometimes be elected governors, state legislators, mayors, and city council members, such elected officials also play other roles; they may not only or always act as brokers between national parties and voters. In addition, not all brokers are elected subnational officials. Thus, when associational leaders or informal intermediaries such as *punteros* in Argentina place themselves between political parties and voters, they assume the role of brokers.

To be sure, not all networks or leaders are equal for purposes of electoral mobilization (Mares and Young 2016; Larreguy et al. 2017). And intermediaries can play an important role in many different systems of interest intermediation. Indeed, brokers – as we conceptualize them here – certainly played critical roles during the period of the Union–Party Hub. What, then, is distinctive about brokers in several Latin American countries during the period of the inclusionary turn?

The answer plausibly lies in the conditions that have tended to make brokers both quite autonomous of national leadership, as well as opportunistic. Thus, relative to the period of the Union–Party Hub, political decentralization has frequently allowed officials and candidates to

<sup>4</sup> Bussell (2018) usefully distinguishes brokers from other sorts of intermediaries, such as middlemen or “fixers,” along these lines.

cultivate independent bases of political support. The horizontal organization of networks in the Association-Net, and in the informal economic sector more generally, has also facilitated autonomous local leadership. Moreover, and perhaps in part as a function of the demise of the Union-Party Hub, many brokers appeared substantially less motivated by programmatic or ideological goals – though distinguishing between program-oriented and opportunistic brokers remains important, as we do in our empirical analysis.

Specifically, brokers can be characterized by the degree to which they are wedded to particular parties or instead are potentially autonomous. This conception to some extent straddles the typology proposed by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015), who distinguish between what they call independent, party, organizational, and hybrid brokers, according to whether such intermediaries are embedded in an organization (e.g. in the case of organizational or hybrid brokers) and whether they mobilize voters for single or multiple parties (e.g. in the case of party vs. independent brokers, respectively). As Holland and Palmer-Rubin describe, organizational brokers may “represent the collective interests of voters in interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles ... Leaders negotiate a price that they will be paid to persuade their members to support the party at the polls or at campaign rallies” (2015, 1187). Yet, there are also ideologically motivated leaders of associations who, especially in party systems with only one party with whom brokers can plausibly form ties, are necessarily linked to that particular party.<sup>5</sup> By the same token, party brokers may or may not be tied to a single machine party, as Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) or Stokes et al. (2013) describe. To the extent that brokers can credibly threaten to leave one party and offer their voters’ support to another party or candidate, they gain leverage in bargaining with party leaders (Camp 2016). Many elected subnational officials can switch parties, meaning they can potentially mobilize voters for multiple parties and therefore can “shop” for the best offer from party leaders. Yet, these are not “independent” brokers as conceptualized by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015), because they mobilize on behalf of specific parties with which they are allied, at least for a given electoral cycle. Thus, the degree of autonomy and the exit options available to brokers are variable.

<sup>5</sup> Holland and Palmer Rubin (2015) call this type a “hybrid broker.”

Brokers may also vary according to their opportunism, as opposed to the extent to which they are ideologically committed or motivated by a programmatic platform. Ideological commitment is subtly different from the extent of autonomy. Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015, 1195) posit that “When a broker cares about a party’s electoral fate for ideological or instrumental reasons, then it may make sense to think of brokers as agents of political parties.” It is possible, however, that brokers have ideological but not partisan preferences; the extent to which they end up serving as agents of a party (and thus diminishing their autonomy) depends *inter alia* on the nature of the party system (e.g. whether there is only one party or instead several parties that intersect with their ideological preferences).

Our central contention, then, is that economic changes such as growing informality, and political changes such as increasing decentralization, contributed to making autonomous, opportunistic brokers more powerful and more prevalent, including in the organizational machinery of left parties. Labor-based parties have faced a trade-off in recruiting brokers. Ideologically motivated brokers with limited autonomy – call these “program-oriented brokers” – are less likely to change parties and possibly cheaper to motivate. If the broker is specific and can only operate under a single banner, or it has only access to clients through party–organization linkages (e.g. through unions), then the broker has very little mobility (Camp 2016). In left parties, these are often class-based brokers, which may be inserted in mass organizations, like unions; but may also appear in smaller, grassroots organizations and associations. Yet, such brokers can be costly to produce, as organizing and training them is costly, and they may have limited reach; especially in times of union decline, if a party wants to appeal to a diverse, heterogeneous group of voters, program-based brokers can become ineffective. Autonomous brokers, by contrast, can incorporate diverse groups of voters. They are also readily recruitable, particularly if they are opportunistic, as long as left parties have resources with which to hire them. However, autonomous and opportunistic brokers are also unreliable in the long term; and if they have “detachable” clienteles, meaning that their voters’ support can potentially be transferred between candidates or parties, they may be ready and willing to sell that support in exchange for the most attractive offer they receive.

It is therefore useful to underscore both the opportunities and limitations of “broker-mediated” strategies through which left parties accessed and exercised power in Latin America. Those parties that were able to adapt to economic and political changes through the construction of

informal, often clientelist, alliances survived (Levitsky 2003a). Yet, for left parties with programmatic orientations toward greater inclusion – such as Brazil’s Workers’ Party, to be considered below – the importance of broker-mediated electoral mobilization created strategic dilemmas, especially as those parties began to win national elections. Without access to state resources, such left parties had often relied only on external, class-based party organizations for voter mobilization, mostly located in large metropolitan areas (Panebianco 1988; Shefter 1994). Once they were in government, however, that was no longer the case: the Left turn implied that left parties gained access to state resources. This created an opportunity: successful left parties could use state resources to embrace clientelistic networks and rapidly expand their reach. This appeared attractive relative to other strategies – such as encouraging other types of local networks to help the party or building new ones from the ground up – since waiting for new mobilization schemes to mature can take substantial time. Yet, while a broker-based strategy can provide rapid returns, clientelistic connections to local leaders are unstable: patrons have autonomous networks and can change allegiances if the left party can no longer counter outside offers these patrons might receive from other parties.

To be sure, the power and extent of autonomous, opportunistic brokers has varied across Latin America’s party systems – as has their role in left parties during the inclusionary turn. For instance, the ability of Argentine brokers to work for various factions within the overall Peronist label has plausibly given brokers substantial autonomy, as well as leverage vis-à-vis party higher-ups (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp 2016). By contrast PRI brokers in Mexico, whose outside options appear to be more limited (Larreguy et al. 2017; Palmer-Rubin, this volume) have substantially less autonomy. In Chávez’s Venezuela, brokers working with the national incumbent included a substantial contingent of ideologically committed activists whose defection to the political opposition appeared unlikely; yet even there, opposition mayors recruited disaffected Chavista brokers, for instance, in the opposition-controlled municipality of Sucre (Stokes et al. 2013, 107). In other contexts, such as Bolivia, the left party’s organic ties to social movements, and the lack of credible partisan exit options for brokers on the Left, may have engendered substantially less autonomy and opportunism. In general, such variation across contexts may surely affect the character of contracts between left parties and local brokers, as well as their centrality to any effort to construct national power.

Among the parties that came to power during Latin America's "Left turn," nonetheless, the Workers' Party in Brazil has been seen as among the least reliant on broker-mediated clientelism. As we detail next, this makes it an especially instructive case for closer examination – since any broker-mediated dynamics we find there may apply even more strongly elsewhere.

#### THE PT AS A LEAST-LIKELY CASE

Over recent decades, the Workers' Party (PT) transformed itself to become the most powerful party in Brazil, winning the presidency four times in a row, and becoming the largest party in the Brazilian Congress. Although it had been the party with the strongest organization beginning in the 1980s, its electoral base was then too small to capture the presidency. A top-down expansion plan we describe in this section would change that. While in government, the PT became the driver of unprecedented social change in Brazil. However, especially in the wake of the impeachment of its sitting president in 2016 and the election of right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, what is now clear is the organizational crisis the party faces. We suggest that the case of the PT may provide a cautionary tale about the dangers left parties face when moving toward the political center and embracing established interests; and how the compromises such parties may choose to make can not only undermine their integrity as political organizations, but also make their inclusionary accomplishments fragile. In particular, with respect to the themes of this chapter, it provides an important lesson in both the benefits and the costs of broker-mediated strategies for constructing national power.

As it rose to power, the PT had a solid organization, with external linkages to mass groups, internal discipline, and a clear programmatic agenda (Keck 1995; Hunter 2010; Samuels and Zucco 2016). This made it a rare case of successful externally mobilized party building in Brazil and in contemporary Latin America (Levitsky et al. 2016) – and plausibly a least-likely case for the alliances with autonomous, opportunistic brokers that we describe in this chapter.<sup>6</sup> In the early 1980s, when Brazil was transitioning from a military regime and experiencing widening inequality caused by exclusionary economic policies and high inflation (Weyland 1996, 11), unions started to mobilize, promoting

<sup>6</sup> Levitsky et al. (2016) cite only two successful cases of externally mobilized parties in Latin America: the PT and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico.

nationwide strikes. In that context, the labor movement gave rise to the PT. Unlike other political organizations in Brazil, the party constructed organic ties to unions and promoted vibrant grassroots movements, while also winning the support of several liberal, middle-class sectors (Van Dyck 2014b, 67). These unprecedented features would allow the PT to sustain a leftist policy platform while being a competitive contender in the country's urban centers. At that point, the party had no access to state resources or connections to large private donors. Much of the party's financing instead depended on its internal structure of voluntary contributions from members, from state bureaucrats with party membership, and elected politicians (Mainwaring 1999). The party also innovated by picking intellectuals, union leaders, blue-collar and rural workers, bureaucrats, and public school teachers, as well as members from ecclesiastical communities set up by progressive Catholic priests (Keck 1995; Meneguello 1989), as activists, brokers, and candidates.

Initial successes in legislative and executive elections, however, revealed an important challenge for the PT: the party needed to broaden its electoral support to attain and strengthen its hold on national power. In particular, the party lacked a substantial presence in large portions of the Brazilian territory, such as the North and Northeastern regions. Although the party accumulated electoral successes in contexts where its allied groups were numerous and mobilized, such as large industrial metropolitan areas, its support among voters was not wide enough nationally to win the presidency. To be sure, as the party evolved, various organized groups also increased in numbers, including landless rural workers and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) communities; and they often allied with the PT and enlarged its base. The party leadership realized that to capture and retain the national executive, however, it would have to moderate part of its economic agenda, thereby mending its relations with the business sector and financial elites.

Perhaps even more importantly, the party would have to partner with practitioners of traditional forms of Brazilian party politics and embrace some of their practices (Hunter 2010, 2). In particular, it would need to expand to areas where patrimonial politics still dominated. To broaden its support in the Brazilian North and Northeast, for example, the PT would need to ally with subnational authorities, including not just governors and state deputies but also mayors, who can influence the vote share of higher officials through their local mobilizational efforts (Novaes 2018). Reflecting Brazil's decentralized, federal context, these authorities



had substantial authority and prestige (Samuels 2003). In addition, their importance as influential intermediaries to voters was augmented both by the PT's insufficient connections to unionized workers in the North and Northeast and especially the relatively small size of the formal sector as a whole (Barbosa Filho and Moura 2015). Not only did unionized workers never surpass 16 percent of the total labor force of the Northern region and 20 percent in the Northeast, these workers were increasingly registered in unions belonging to federations with no partisan attachment to the PT (Rodrigues et al. 2016). Together with political decentralization, the prevalence of economic informality – involving groups of workers that are often small in comparison to unions – empowers sub-national politicians who are proximate to citizens. These structural ingredients gave local authorities the necessary tools and resources to mobilize voters who lacked firm partisan commitments and therefore made the recruitment of numerous autonomous and often opportunistic political intermediaries a critical ingredient in the PT's success as it constructed a larger national coalition. To be sure, as an externally mobilized party whose support often came from small nuclei of grassroots movements, the PT had always depended on intermediaries; yet, before the party's political moderation at the end of the 1990s (Hunter 2010), these agents were in large part recruited from within the party organization and were ideologically committed to the party's programmatic goals. Moreover, since this strong organization made the PT exceptional in Brazil, these brokers had few reasons to relinquish access to the party's strong connections to popular sectors, or risk alienating themselves from the PT's supporters, by switching parties. While such activists indeed largely proved loyal to the PT, the new brokers with whom the PT struck alliances during its phase of national growth tended to be autonomous and opportunistic.

The strategy of alliances with such brokers therefore entailed risks that were understood within the party's national leadership and were actively debated within the party (Ribeiro 2014). Yet, they were weighed against the benefits of national expansion. As former president Lula put it to one of the authors in a personal interview,

The policy of alliances was the subject of much debate in the PT, because various party members argued that we should under no circumstances ally ourselves with some of our traditional adversaries in certain states and municipalities. I always understood their rationale. However, one needs to understand that we didn't invent the system of politics that exists in Brazil . . . After three presidential terms in power, I think that the idea was entrenched in the PT that in executive elections

we needed to expand our range of support and bring to our proposals representatives of different social groups.<sup>7</sup>

In the rest of this section, we document the way in which the PT's expansion indeed altered the background of its brokers; relied on party switching by intermediaries and alliances with traditional adversaries, in the context of large electoral coalitions; yet ultimately proved fragile during the more recent period of the party's crisis. We then turn to implications for the character and durability of the inclusionary turn in Brazil.

### The PT and Its Brokers

Initial electoral successes gave the party a larger repertoire for party building, including an advantage common to any incumbent: access to state resources. After Lula's election to the presidency in 2002, PT leaders had a clear plan of territorial expansion (Hunter 2010; Van Dyck and Montero 2015). In particular, the party deliberately courted allies in those regions of the country where in the past the party had never built a large support base, especially the North and Northeast. Timing was a key concern for the PT, since the Brazilian federal system requires a wide coalition of allies in Congress and at subnational levels (Abranches 1988; Pereira et al. 2008; Gómez Bruera 2015). Expansion strategies requiring time to mature could lead to a dysfunctional government. Without an aggressive policy to reach out to subnational and local allies, the PT's success in obtaining the presidency would not spill over to its congressional candidates; deputies' electoral successes would depend on local brokers including mayors, who in turn would depend on state resources to mobilize votes (Novaes 2018). Moreover, the *petista* government would not be able to build and sustain support in Congress without distributing pork to deputies of other parties, since these politicians rely on patronage for political survival (Pereira and Mueller 2004). Not surprisingly, according to analyses of the process of party building before

<sup>7</sup> Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, email interview with Lucas Novaes, February 2013. In Portuguese, “[P]olítica de alianças era um ponto de muito debate no PT, pois vários companheiros defendiam que não poderíamos em nenhuma conjuntura nos aliar com alguns dos nossos tradicionais adversários em alguns estados e municípios. Eu sempre compreendi esse raciocínio. Entretanto, é preciso entender que não fomos nós que inventamos o sistema político que existe no Brasil... Depois de três mandatos presidenciais acho que o PT consolidou a ideia de que nas eleições para cargos executivos é preciso ampliar o leque de apoios e trazer para nossas propostas diferentes representantes de grupos sociais.”

and after Lula's win in 2002, the expansion to the poorest regions of the country (the North and Northeast) was encompassing and swift (Ribeiro 2014; Van Dyck 2014a). With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the goal of establishing itself as the leading party in the country was accomplished not only by winning and retaining the presidency after 2002 but also by consolidating a pro-government coalition in Congress.

This expansion of the party's frontiers after Lula's electoral success was fundamentally different from the process of party formation during the 1980s (Ribeiro 2014, 123; Van Dyck and Montero 2015). The conditions the party faced in the target territories were also very dissimilar. Unlike those areas where the party had organized and collected victories in its first decade, the areas where the PT's organization was still incipient differed in structural economic terms, and in the nature of class relations. If the party's initial mode of organization during the 1980s depended on a dense civil society in the industrialized South and Southeast, the PT ventured into the "new frontier" during a period of declining unionization and increasing informality – and faced population centers where organized labor had never flourished in any case due to weak industrialization. The party, therefore, would either have to induce new societal groups to organize or rely on local actors with proven electoral promise who might be eager to ally with the party commanding the national executive's resources. Especially given the importance of rapid expansion, the PT chose the latter strategy as its best course of action, at least in the short run. To be sure, the PT's old tactic of fomenting bottom-up social organizations and NGOs, mobilizing activists, and recruiting leaders from these organizations, when employed, remained successful in creating partisan ties (Samuels and Zucco 2015). Yet, the conditions to pursue this alternative were not everywhere available. In the North and Northeast, especially in a period of increasing economic informality and deepening democratic decentralization, it became critical to build relations with local intermediaries.

Access to resources allowed the party to incorporate different kinds of supporters than in the past: the PT's new allies were a far cry from the party's traditional support base. In particular, rapidly expanding the party organization altered its configuration by adding many non-working-class members to it.<sup>8</sup> Hence, it is useful to characterize the

<sup>8</sup> The organization requirements for these new PT outposts also diverged from those of the past. As Ribeiro argues, there was a "weakening of the PT's societal links, primarily as a result of the collapse of the party's base units (*núcleos de base*), one of the main linkages between party and society and an essential mechanism in the processes of legalization and

expansion of the PT in the North and Northeast, where clientelistic practices have dominated the political process, in terms of the background of brokers with whom the party allied. Thus, rather than examining the number of local outposts the PT established during its expansionary wave, here we analyze the type of brokers the party relied upon in that effort. To be sure, empirically examining the economic class or the societal group from which local candidates hail, and upon which they exert influence, is difficult; and although the literature on the PT is extensive, it still lacks a nuanced analysis of regional differences in party building (Do Amaral and Power 2016, 152). To assess the intermediaries the PT relied upon during its expansion, and how different these brokers were from those of the past, we ideally would be able to classify old and new recruits according to the type of group, class, or sector they influence or represent.

To simplify this complex task, we first assume mayoral candidates in Brazil have influence over an electorate and may function as party broker – that is, they work as intermediaries for national and subnational party candidates. While conceptually brokers should be defined by their function, as we noted above, in Brazil we proxy brokers by their position. This apparent tension in our analysis simply reflects the body of evidence that Brazilian mayors very often do in fact play the role of brokers, that is, political intermediaries who provide linkages between higher-level politicians and voters (Novaes 2015, 2018). This function of mayors is likely similar in some Latin American cases (such as Argentina, as documented by Levitsky [2003a] or Stokes et al. [2013]) but not others (say, Chile or Uruguay). We then classify each mayoral candidate in Brazil according to their own previous professional activity. This is possible because when completing their candidacy applications, candidates must state their occupations.<sup>9</sup> We separate local candidates into two different groups: those in occupations linked to the original *petista* base, specifically blue-collar workers, rural workers, bureaucrats, and teachers; and those belonging to other professional categories, such as people who work in retail, own a shop or factory, or are lawyers or physicians. With this approach, we can

establishment of the PT as an organization in the early years... The 2001 party statute ... opened [local groups] as it opened them up to nonmembers and created competing forms of rank and file organization (with no internal representation), set up to provide temporary support around specific issues... The grassroots work of the PT's leaders had become centered instead on the local branches, focused on electoral activities" (Ribeiro 2014, 101).

<sup>9</sup> All data are available at the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) website.




FIGURE 7.1 Shifting the base: working class candidates in mayoral elections

pin down in an admittedly blunt way whether a particular local candidate is connected to a traditional labor-based area of activity or not. We also stratify brokers by party affiliation. Thus, this approach allows us to assess the occupational profile of the PT’s base of brokers, both in the North/Northeast region and elsewhere.

Figure 7.1 shows that after 2002, when Lula was elected president, the PT gradually enlisted brokers from outside its traditional base.<sup>10</sup> Especially in expanding to the North and Northeast region, the party invested in nontraditional brokers. Thus, before winning the presidency in 2002, the PT was very distinct from other parties in the North and Northeast, having more than 40 percent of candidates coming from its traditional base, while others had less than half of that amount. During the following sixteen years, that distance from other parties declined rapidly. The trend in other regions is analogous, just less precipitous.

The PT not only relied on different types of brokers for its expansion to new territory; it also recruited local representatives with diverse political pasts. Figure 7.2 shows that before joining the PT, as much as 30 percent of the party’s most recent mayoral candidates in the North and Northeast

<sup>10</sup> This shift away from the working class support base has also been documented for participation in party conventions. As Ribeiro (2014) demonstrates, over time, the number of white collar delegates increased while the number of blue collar participants decreased.




FIGURE 7.2 Hiring outside help: proportion of PT mayoral candidates who were once in a different party

regions had in the past been a member of another party. Some of these brokers had started their careers in parties whose roots trace back directly to the country's authoritarian past, and whose electoral practices are markedly clientelistic. One notable case is that of Raul Filho, who won the 2004 and the 2008 mayoral elections as a PT candidate in Palmas, the capital of the Northern state of Tocantins. His trajectory as a politician is not that of a typical working-class, rank-and-file *petista*. The son of a powerful local politician, Filho had already been elected mayor of Palmas in 1996, but at that time he ran under the banner of PT's main rival in presidential elections, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). The PSDB, however, was only one of four other parties Filho had been a member of before joining the PT. Actually, his career started in the now-defunct Democratic Social Party (PDS), the continuation of the party that backed the military during the 1964–1985 dictatorship (ARENA). Filho was expelled from the PT in 2011 because he helped national deputies from rival parties get elected. The following year he faced corruption charges and was found guilty of environmental crimes. Although his sentence currently prevents him from running in elections, he is still an active politician, only now with the right-leaning Republican Party (PR).

This trajectory of coming from the traditional political elite is no longer unusual for PT candidates. In 2012, around 80 percent of candidates had previously been a member of a different party that originated from a centrist or right-wing party. Overall, almost a quarter of all PT candidates in that year had a center or right-wing party on their curriculum vitae.

Aside from directly seeking help from local notables by recruiting them to join the party, the PT also approached influential intermediaries to join forces in local electoral coalitions. Electoral coalitions are an important organizing device in the fragmented Brazilian party system, since they allow dozens of parties to coordinate around a few candidates running in first-past-the-post elections – as in mayoral races, where Duverger’s Law appears to be in effect (Fujiwara 2011). In the context of local elections, coalitions gathered different local power brokers at the same table. Electoral coalitions, however, present a trade-off for programmatic parties. In partnering with long-standing local leadership, the PT sometimes allied with traditional, clientelistic elites whose power emanates from privileges granted during the dictatorship, if not before (Hagopian 2007). Voters’ partisan identification may weaken when parties invite others to join their electoral coalition, especially when allies’ brands diverge (Lupu 2013). By inviting many parties to join in coalitions to support mayoral candidates, the PT conceivably damaged its brand.

As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, the PT has embraced other parties in its mayoral bids without much restraint. Here, we measure coalition size of *petistas* and other parties by averaging the absolute number of parties in each mayoral candidate ticket. As the figure shows, the size of coalitions in Brazil has been rising steadily over the years. This can be attributed to the continued and even increasing fragmentation of the Brazilian party system, which in 2016 consisted of more than thirty parties. During the 2000–2016 period, the PT followed an even sharper upward trend in coalition size, but eventually closed the distance to the rest of the parties in the party system. The trend was broken in the 2016 elections in regions outside the North and Northeast; yet the average coalition size continued to increase on the party’s “new frontier,” where in 2016 there is no noticeable difference between the PT and other parties in terms of coalition size.

### The End of the Golden Age?

This strategy of recruiting autonomous and opportunistic brokers to join or ally with the party brought substantial initial rewards, as the PT gained




FIGURE 7.3 Lying with many bedfellows: coalition size in mayoral elections

the broad national support it needed to continue to win the national executive and to control the Brazilian Congress. However, the party's reliance on nonideological brokers outside of its traditional base, and the potential brand dilution stemming from large coalitions, spelled trouble when the party was driven out of the national executive. The party's clear programmatic identity was crucial to the party's survival when resources were scarce. Access to resources during its time in power, and their use in a broker-mediated expansionary strategy, may have damaged this prized party capital. How the increase in alliances with other parties affected its voters' party identification is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, despite the PT's growing support base during the golden years, there is little evidence that its new voters, especially in the Northeast, were actual partisans (Zucco 2008). In sum, the choice of relying on nontraditional brokers and embracing other political parties without much restraint could have harmed the PT's comparative advantages in terms of having a reliable, durable internal organization, and possibly even in terms of having a clear, programmatic party position.

Unfortunately for the party, a stress test came in the form of impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and corruption charges against former president Lula. The once high approval ratings of President Rousseff, who succeeded Lula, suffered a blow in 2013. Thousands of people, from the lower and upper middle classes, took to the streets to protest the political status quo in what was the largest popular demonstration in two decades.



The protests sometimes lacked a clear agenda or target, yet subsequent corruption scandals involving PT politicians and a stagnant economy shifted most of the anger toward the ruling party and its president. At the same time, political support for the administration from economic and political elites started to evaporate. Rousseff nonetheless narrowly secured a second term in 2014. Yet, she was not able to maintain a governing coalition with the Brazilian Democratic Mobilization Party (PMDB), which at the time was the largest party in Congress, the party of the speaker of Congress, speaker of the Senate, and of the vice-president. The PMDB left the ruling coalition in the context of the succession of reports of fiscal wrongdoings, the sequential arrests of high-ranking *petistas*, Lula's indictments for money laundering and corruption, a prolonged recession, and a hostile media. In April 2016, Rousseff was impeached.

The culmination of the PT's fall from grace preceded the 2016 municipal elections, proving disastrous for the party. At that point and for two main reasons, it was already clear that running for local offices with the PT banner was costly. First, what was once an asset for *petistas* in elections – the party brand – was now a cue for political scandals.<sup>11</sup> Second, in comparison to other parties and to previous elections, the PT's capacity to distribute public resources reduced dramatically. Thus, being a PT candidate meant facing voter disapproval and receiving lessened material support. Local politicians with weak linkages to the party could stay loyal to the party and suffer the consequences – or simply switch parties. Many chose the latter, as Figure 7.4 illustrates. Around 35 percent of all PT candidates that had run for mayor in 2012 and also participated in the 2016 mayoral elections switched parties. This represents a 250 percent increase from the PT's disloyalty rate before the first presidency; it puts the PT on par with the average of other parties in the party system.

In sum, the recruitment of brokers from outside the PT's programmatic base, coupled with a severe party crisis, led to a widespread and rapid dismantling of local party organization. To be sure, during the impeachment process, thousands of party activists demonstrated support for the

<sup>11</sup> In that year, several PT mayoral candidates refused to use red, the color associated with the PT, and refused to stamp the party's red star on their campaign materials (Seabra, Catia [2016]: "Petistas escondem partido em materiais de campanha e programas de televisão," *Folha de São Paulo*, August 27, 2016). Their ballot number, thirteen, was the only aspect associating them to their party.




FIGURE 7.4 Party switching over time (includes only mayoral candidates who run in two consecutive local elections)

*petista* government on the streets. Albeit unsuccessful, these pro-government demonstrations showed that the PT still had strong external support from unions, landless movements, homeless movements, and other organized groups (see Etchemendy, this volume). This continued support during the crisis meant the party still had considerable political capital. Moreover, the PT did not turn into another of the many Brazilian parties without programmatic content and lacking solid internal organization. This implied that the party had leverage over brokers embedded in these organizations, as the political influence of these brokers depends on the connections to organized groups.<sup>12</sup> Hence, we should expect a more durable attachment to the party from brokers coming from traditional *petista* sectors. Indeed, Figure 7.5 shows that these brokers present a lower disloyalty rate during the golden age and during the 2016 elections, which we designate as a period of crisis for the PT. Nonetheless, as Hochstetler (2008) notes, the privileged status of the PT vis-à-vis civil society has been eroding. A large portion of unionized workers are no longer under the Central Única dos Trabalhadores union federation – the

<sup>12</sup> For example, local leaders can only operate in unions with party consent.




FIGURE 7.5 Party switching before and after crisis (includes only mayoral candidates who run in two consecutive local elections)

most important external ally of the PT – but belong to others, such as Força Sindical and the União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT), whose control lies in the hands of rival parties. The weakening of the PT’s ties to external organizations and the presence of stronger competitors may also encourage working-class brokers to leave the party, making their loyalty more uncertain than before.

All told, the party crisis has demonstrated that the support base built by the PT in recent years was unreliable. Table 7.1 presents regression results for party switching in Brazil in order to compare descriptively the rates of party disloyalty across different types of brokers, and to assess whether the crisis entailed greater party switching in the PT relative to other parties. We measure party switching by comparing candidates’ affiliations across elections. If a candidate changed parties between one

TABLE 7.1 *Probability of switching parties*

	All Candidates	Working Class	Non Working Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PT	0.176 ( 0.189, 0.163)	0.177 ( 0.199, 0.155)	0.173 ( 0.188, 0.157)
Crisis	0.085 ( 0.093, 0.076)	0.087 ( 0.106, 0.068)	0.084 ( 0.094, 0.075)
PT* Crisis	0.170 (0.146, 0.195)	0.146 (0.099, 0.193)	0.177 (0.148, 0.206)
Baseline	0.272 (0.268, 0.276)	0.260 (0.251, 0.269)	0.275 (0.270, 0.280)
Observations	58,203	12,241	45,962
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.017	0.024	0.015

Note: "PT" is a dummy variable for running as a candidate of the Workers' Party (PT) in the previous election. "Working class candidates" are those who list their occupation as blue collar worker, rural worker, bureaucrat, or teacher. Regressions only include candidates eligible for reelection. In each cell, 95% confidence intervals appear in parentheses.

election and the next, the candidate switched (and the dependent variable is coded as 1); if not, or if the candidate did not run for office in the subsequent election, party switching did not occur (the dependent variable is 0). We find that prior to the party's crisis, PT mayoral candidates were much more loyal than the average, with a rate of party switching that was 17.6 percentage points lower than the baseline rate of party switching of 27.2 percentage points. During the crisis, this PT advantage evaporated. The jump in disloyalty, however, was smaller among working-class brokers who, during the crisis and among *petistas*, presented party switching rates 5.3 percentage points lower than nonworking-class *petista* candidates.

#### CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INCLUSIONARY TURN

Political brokers – whether elected local officials, subnational leaders of associations, or even evangelical politicians (see Boas, this volume) – have an important function in Brazilian politics, as in many other Latin American polities. We have shown in this chapter that to construct a

project of national power, the PT needed to strike alliances with ideologically unaligned intermediaries outside of its programmatic base. The support of these autonomous and often opportunistic brokers was crucial for this left party's ability to hold the national executive, as well as to consolidate legislative power.

In the short run, this strategy allowed the Workers' Party to construct a national coalition – and thereby implement impressive new social policies. As other contributors to this volume show, the party's policy achievements were substantial (see e.g. Hunter, this volume; and Garay, this volume). The PT created or dramatically expanded the scope of signature social policies, perhaps most notably in the form of *Bolsa Família*, Brazil's famed CCT program. Other reforms offering recognition, access, and resources for the popular sectors were equally impressive, for instance, in the form of new affirmative action programs for university access; subsidizing housing and credit for the poor; and deepening participatory institutions (Mayka and Rich, this volume; and Garay, this volume). As we have shown, clientelistic arrangements with local brokers were critical for the PT's electoral success (see also Novaes 2015, 2018; Alves and Hunter 2017); moreover, the PT's local politicians may need to implement non-programmatic policies while in office, even when these candidates run on programmatic platforms (Johannessen 2020). Nonetheless, according to most accounts, social benefit programs were themselves implemented in a remarkably non-clientelistic way vis-à-vis their beneficiaries (see Hunter, this volume).<sup>13</sup>

Yet, this method of constructing power also very plausibly carried implications for both the quality and the sustainability of the inclusionary turn. The mode of politics that the PT practiced to accomplish its expansion in the North and Northeast was transactional. Even in the PT's historical base in the South and Southeast, this transactional strategy considerably replaced the labor-based and grassroots mobilization that had differentiated the party from all other Brazilian parties. In this, the broker-mediated strategy echoed other kinds of "politics as usual" approaches reflected in the PT's exercise of power, most notably the

<sup>13</sup> Other policies, such as subsidized credit for big companies through the National Development Bank (BNDES) or large public projects, benefited important economic and financial actors. These actions should also be taken into account to understand the expansion of the PT; according to court documents in the ongoing *Lava Jato* corruption investigation, the companies targeted by these economic policies reciprocated by making generous campaign donations to the party's electoral campaigns, from the presidential to even council candidates' bids.

acceptance, on the part of at least some party leaders, of corruption; two notable examples are the *Mensalão* involving payments to members of other parties for congressional votes during Lula's presidency, and the *Lava Jato* scandal that contributed to Dilma Rousseff's impeachment and Lula's imprisonment. The shift in the social backgrounds of PT candidates during its tenure, which we have documented in this chapter, could possibly have shaped the kinds of policies for which party members and allies lobbied, that is, the extent to which inclusionary policies were given priority, relative to a counterfactual in which brokers from working-class backgrounds retained their earlier predominance in the PT. In any case, given budget constraints, the distribution of resources to coalitional allies (and the bypassing of local opponents, see Bueno 2018) likely carried an opportunity cost. Resources for pork-barrel projects plausibly came at the expense of more inclusionary social spending. Even during the PT's golden age, then, the integration of opportunistic brokers and alliances into traditional Brazilian parties – which were often held together with various forms of pork – may have shaped and constrained the character and extent of inclusionary policy – that is, its *quality*.

Even more clearly, however, the PT's political strategy limited the *durability* of the left party's hold on power outside the national theater. If in the short term distributing resources induced cooperation from allies, in the long term it failed to create programmatic commitment to cement that cooperation once resources dried up. The lack of programmatic bond among the PT and its coalition members ultimately left the party with an open flank: when at the start of her second term, President Rousseff saw herself forced to implement austerity measures to curb spending, there was little she could do to prevent her coalition from crumbling. The PT experienced the rapid exit of its opportunistic and autonomous brokers, compared to brokers recruited from its programmatic base. To be sure, the PT has suffered the departure of activists committed to its programmatic aims as well; but the departure of newer recruits and allies outside its base has been quicker and more severe. Of course, it may not have been feasible for the PT to recruit more ideologically aligned brokers in the North and Northeast. Those regions are especially notable for the relatively small role of the organized, formal sector working class and the importance of local power brokers. Yet, that is part of our point: it is difficult in a decentralized democracy – with substantial economic informality and an attendant role for horizontal networks, decentralized nuclei of power, and often clientelism at the local level – for parties to claim national power without such compromises. These limitations have important general implications for the inclusionary turn in Latin America.

What are the longer-term implications of the PT's ultimately tenuous hold on power for the sustainability of its inclusive policies in Brazil? On the one hand, there are reasons to think that the PT's social achievements can persist to some degree, especially when it comes to "broad and thin" programs like *Bolsa Família* (Hunter, this volume). De la O (2015) argues that divided governments push for rule-based CCTs as a way to prevent the opposition from taking advantage of the program when their turn in power arrives. Moreover, as Hunter (this volume) emphasizes, CCTs have been promoted by parties of the center-right as well as the Left; consider the PAN's role in expanding *Oportunidades* in Mexico, or in Brazil, the role of the PSDB under Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 1990s in establishing the (smaller) predecessor program to *Bolsa Família*, known as *Bolsa Escola*. Coupled with *Bolsa Família*'s relatively low cost (around 0.5 percent of GDP), these points suggest that the removal of such a policy may be disadvantageous for any party. Social benefits once enacted are often difficult to remove, as many such policies create constituencies for their continuation; CCTs may be similar (see Garay, this volume).

On the other hand, the broader set of inclusionary policies promoted by the PT may be at substantial risk. Indeed, after Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, the Temer government tried to push a market-friendly agenda far from the winning presidential platform without any real opposition from below. A great number of social programs were cut without much resistance, and a broad-reaching labor reform passed, at the same time as Temer dodged an impeachment process in the Congress despite very substantial evidence of malfeasance. Temer's scandals, however, halted further constitutional reforms. Even if *Bolsa Família* itself is not eliminated, benefits offered through the program have already been sharply scaled back.<sup>14</sup> According to most accounts, the ease with which the Temer government was able to promote reforms and escape the impeachment process is due to the distribution of resources to deputies and subnational politicians – many of whom were on the side of the PT a couple of years prior.<sup>15</sup> If the PT had managed to recruit and empower loyal allies to a greater extent, these reversals would have been much more difficult. The 2018 election of right-wing outsider Jair Bolsonaro

<sup>14</sup> "Com redução de 543 mil benefícios em 1 mês, Bolsa Família tem maior corte da história," *Uol Notícias*, August 11, 2017. See <https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2017/08/11/bolsa-familia-reduz-543-mil-beneficios-em-1-mes-programa-tem-maior-corte-da-historia.htm> (accessed August 11, 2017).

<sup>15</sup> "Balcão de negócios com recurso público garante vitória governista," *Folha de São Paulo*, August 3, 2017.

(who assumed the presidency in January 2019) credibly puts inclusionary policies at still greater risk.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, the very foundations of the PT now appear in tatters. First, the party has not promoted a new leadership to circumvent the most severe crisis in its history. While prevented from running, Lula was still the center of the PT's presidential campaign in 2018, and the topic of his imprisonment still monopolizes the PT's leadership attention. At a time when national politics has been swinging right with Bolsonaro's presidency, the lack of an organized opposition from the country's largest left-wing party poses additional risks for the continuation of past inclusionary policies. Second, the party's programmatic brand has clearly been tarnished by the scandals as well as a longer-term dissolution of identity, plausibly due in part to the party's alliances with strange bedfellows at the local level. Finally, with the exodus of many of its opportunistic brokers and without resources to hire new local brokers – and given the failure to create enough partisan, ideological brokers during the bonanza years – the PT experienced a 25 percent reduction in total legislative votes, capturing fourteen fewer seats in 2018 than the sixty-nine it won in 2014. There were many peculiarities during the 2018 election that were not present in any previous election in Brazil, and its results may not present an accurate picture of the political landscape, nor the PT's current strength. It is clear, however, that the PT left in place few countermeasures to protect its inclusionary legacy in the face of the conservative wave and the strong *anti-petista* sentiment that swept Brazil in recent years.

The experience of the PT is more broadly a cautionary tale about the difficulty of building sustainable coalitions for inclusion, even in the setting of democratic durability underscored by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume). To be sure, the tensions and difficulties we have identified between programmatic politics and inclusionary social policy, on the one hand, and the pragmatic realities of capturing national power, on the other, are likely to work out for left parties in different ways in different contexts. Broker-mediated incorporation is not an inevitable path for governing left parties in contemporary Latin America: other contexts have seen perhaps greater reliance on electoral-

<sup>16</sup> Despite serving in multiple legislatures, we classify Bolsonaro as an outsider for his unremarkable past as congressman, his reliance on a party that before his victory was marginal in the Brazilian party system, and for his use of nonpartisan, social network linkages to mobilize voters.



professional, media-based appeals (for example, Chile, see Boas 2010), more persistent left-party–union linkages (as in Uruguay, see Etchemendy this volume), or greater reliance on social movement organizations (for instance Bolivia, see Poertner 2018, also Palmer-Rubin, this volume). From one perspective, Brazil could be seen as something of an outlier, with a fragmented party system that makes party switching easier and gives more autonomy and degrees of freedom to brokers; in cases where parties compete within a more enduring and stable party system, the dynamics we identify in this chapter might be less pronounced. From another perspective, however, we have argued that the PT – an externally mobilized party that historically had focused, ideological goals and offered voters programmatic policies – is a least-likely case for broker-mediated incorporation. The challenges it faced in expanding its support base, and the requirement of negotiating with local brokers in a transactional manner, may indeed be the modal experience for left parties in Latin America.

The role of autonomous and opportunistic brokers is even greater in many other contexts: consider, for instance, the power and leverage of Peronist brokers in Argentina. In most countries of the region, growing economic informality has reduced the importance of linkages to unions in the formal sector. Since informal workers tend to organize at a smaller scale than their formal sector counterparts, if at all, informality may multiply the number of leaders of associations, networks, or simply neighborhood groups with whom party higher-ups need to negotiate. Political decentralization has also given new power to local elected officials, although the extent of political decentralization varies across cases, with much more importance in federal systems and less importance in more unitary ones such as Chile (see, however, Luna and Altman 2011). The extent of economic informality and the erosion of party ties to formal sector unions, along with the extent of political decentralization, may plausibly shape the extent to which strategic alternatives to broker-mediated incorporation existed for left parties. Yet, the tensions we identify appear quite prevalent for left parties in the region.

Thus, to the degree that the Left turn in Latin America facilitated greater inclusion – in the form of more recognition, access, and resources for the popular sectors – the fact that even the primary example of an externally mobilized, programmatic left party negotiated with and offered concessions to opportunistic brokers suggests important limitations on the inclusionary turn. To a great extent, these difficulties have to do with

the nature of democratic practice in much of Latin America; and especially with transformations in that practice during the period we consider. The important achievements of the inclusionary turn thus must also be seen in the context of these limitations on their character, reach, and sustainability.

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## States of Discontent

### *State Crises, Party System Change, and Inclusion in South America*

Samuel Handlin

#### INTRODUCTION

Latin America's recent inclusionary turn centers on changing relationships between the popular sectors and the state, which may adopt and implement policies and institutions that bestow recognition, promote access, and enhance redistribution to popular constituencies. Yet the new inclusion unfolds in a region in which most states are weak and prone to severe pathologies, such as corruption, inefficiency, and particularism. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar note in the introductory chapter of this volume, state weakness conditions the inclusionary turn in several ways. The pathologies of weak states fuel demands for inclusion from popular sector constituencies dissatisfied with poor services and unequal citizenship while the persistence of these pathologies also constrains and hampers the implementation of inclusionary measures. More broadly, the politics of state weakness has powerfully shaped trajectories of political contestation and development in some parts of the region, particularly the nature of the parties and politicians that have emerged on the Left and become principal protagonists in furthering political inclusion. To understand variation within the inclusionary turn, we need to appreciate the role of "states of discontent" in shaping the political trajectories of the inclusionary turn era.

The first part of the chapter outlines an argument, developed at more length elsewhere, regarding how "state crises" helped drive the consolidation of three distinct party system trajectories among the eight South American countries where the Left would eventually win power (Handlin 2017). Highly polarizing party systems consolidated in Bolivia, Ecuador,

and Venezuela, which saw the emergence of radicalized left-wing outsiders combining sharply anti-neoliberal programs with sweeping anties-establishment appeals. Elsewhere on the continent, countries moved on very different paths. In the trio of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the Left turn saw the ascendance of long-established left parties that had evolved over time to embrace a moderate and pragmatic orientation. Their presence anchored weakly polarized party systems. And in a third pattern, evident in Paraguay and Peru, outsiders on the Left emerged to win power but their rise introduced far less polarization into national party systems.

State crises, situations in which states were plagued by inefficiency and corruption while populations lost confidence in basic governmental institutions, drove this party system variation. Where prolonged state crises were avoided, party systems stabilized as political outsiders found little traction and established left parties successfully consolidated strong positions on the center-left, thereby anchoring weakly polarized and largely stable party systems (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay). Where state crises occurred, in contrast, the entrance of political outsiders, including those on the Left, disrupted established party systems. Whether these outsiders took the form of radicals who sharply polarized the political environment (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) or relative pragmatists with modest policy goals willing to work within established institutions (Paraguay and Peru) rested on the options left outsiders faced for building movements and coalitions. Where outsiders could build movements on top of an extant robust infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization, they took radical forms. Where such infrastructure did not exist, outsiders on the Left were forced to recruit centrist allies and political advisors, a coalition-building dynamic that lent itself to greater pragmatism and moderation. In sum, party system change during the Left turn was driven by state crises but conditioned by the infrastructure of left-wing politics in each country in the early days of the post-Cold War era.

These alternative trajectories possessed disparate characteristics along three dimensions that likely conditioned how the concomitant inclusionary turn unfolded in each case: the institutionalization of major left-wing parties, state transformation through constitutional reform, and the level of state performance or capacity. The second part of the chapter discusses variation in these three characteristics, with two broad analytic goals in mind. First, this discussion helps us better consider the deeper roots of variation in the independent variables that might have shaped some of the inclusionary outcomes discussed in this book, particularly with respect to social policy and participatory innovations. To be clear, then, whereas

other chapters in this volume – for example those by Elkins, Garay, Mayka and Rich, and Etchemendy – focus on those inclusionary outcomes themselves, this chapter – much like that by Mazzuca – examines key variables that shaped those inclusionary outcomes and how variation in those key factors was generated. Second, this discussion helps highlight the central role of the state and its pathologies in both driving alternative paths of political development and in conditioning the politics of inclusion. By putting the emphasis on the state and its pathologies in this way, we can better consider not just the sources of sociopolitical exclusion but also the limits of sociopolitical inclusion.

#### PARTY SYSTEM VARIATION DURING SOUTH AMERICA'S LEFT TURN

South America experienced a consequential turn to the Left during the first decade of the twenty-first century, with parties or candidates of the Left winning office in eight of the region's ten largest countries (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Weyland et al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Handlin 2017).<sup>1</sup> The Left turn unfolded quite differently across these eight countries, however, with party systems following three trajectories distinguished by their levels of polarization and whether or not outsiders played a significant role.

I conceptualize polarization as the left–right differentiation between component parties in a party system, viewed in terms of both distance (the spread of the distribution) and intensity (the willingness of opposing parties to compromise).<sup>2</sup> To measure distance, I adopt a commonly utilized approach that combines data on the strength of parties in the lower house of Congress and their ideological position on the left–right

<sup>1</sup> This chapter, like the book to which it relates (Handlin 2017), focuses on these eight countries, leaving aside Argentina and Colombia. As discussed at greater length in that book, the rationale for the case selection was not that party system outcomes in Argentina and Colombia failed to conform to the predictions of the theory (which they largely do). Rather, these two cases possessed highly idiosyncratic features – respectively, the remarkably durable and amorphous Peronist movement and a civil war involving the Left – that powerfully conditioned how the Left turn unfolded, setting them off from the rest of the region. In sum, while these two cases exhibit the outcomes broadly predicted by the theory, they also serve as reminders of its limitations. These sorts of cases, and the limitations they suggest, should be openly acknowledged.

<sup>2</sup> This approach, considering both distance and intensity, follows that of Sartori (1976) and can be found in other works such as Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan (2012).



TABLE 8.1 *Party system polarization in South America (c. 2010–2011)*

Country	Polarization (Distance)	Polarization (Intensity)	Polarization (Combined)	Highly Polarized
Ecuador	4.96	5.56	10.51	Yes
Venezuela	5.09	5.23	10.32	Yes
Bolivia	5.30	4.99	10.29	Yes
Chile	4.05	3.74	7.79	No
Peru	3.64	4.01	7.65	No
Uruguay	4.21	3.41	7.61	No
Paraguay	1.39	4.64	6.03	No
Brazil	2.43	3.54	5.97	No

spectrum.<sup>3</sup> To measure intensity, I draw upon a useful indicator from the Varieties of Democracy project, which captures the degree to which major political actors respect or do not respect the counter-arguments of their opponents.<sup>4</sup> These two dimensions were then rescaled to be of equal weight and added together to produce a combined polarization score. As Table 8.1 suggests, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela came to outpace all others in terms of polarization by the end of the new century's first decade.<sup>5</sup> This trio scored highest on both component measures of distance and intensity. On the aggregate measure, the gap between Bolivia, the third highest scoring country, and Chile, the fourth highest scoring country, was greater than the gap between Chile and Brazil, the lowest scoring country.

Party systems also differed substantially in terms of the rise of political outsiders, both in general and specifically on the Left. By outsiders, I mean viable presidential candidates who either possessed no prior background in politics or who possessed some political experience but ran outside

<sup>3</sup> I draw upon party ideology data from Baker and Greene (2011), who aggregated several previous data sources, leaning most heavily on Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2007). To calculate polarization, I use a common formula which takes the absolute deviation of the seven largest parties from the party system mean, weighs those values by the vote share of each party in the lower house, and sums those weighted values.

<sup>4</sup> To generate these measures, expert coders from the Varieties of Democracy project assign values to each country-year case with reference to an ordinal scale that captures different levels of respect or disrespect for counter arguments in political discourse and contestation. I took those values and rescaled them from 0–6 to match the range of distance scale. For more information and discussion of all these choices, see Handlin (2017, 278–283).

<sup>5</sup> I present data circa 2010–2011 because by this point the Left turn had fully unfolded across the region. In many cases, new left parties and movements did not emerge until the second half of the decade.

TABLE 8.2 *Three party system trajectories*

Country	Highly Polarized	Outsiders Prominent
Ecuador	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	Yes	Yes
Bolivia	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	No	Yes
Peru	No	Yes
Uruguay	No	No
Chile	No	No
Brazil	No	No

established political parties.<sup>6</sup> Party systems in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay were distinguished by the absence of political outsiders during the new century. In the other five countries, outsiders on the Left won the presidency in contexts where outsider candidacies had become an established phenomenon. In Venezuela, Chávez came to power in a 1998 election contested by two other outsiders, former beauty queen Irene Sáez and businessman Henrique Salas Römer. In Bolivia, Morales broke into national politics in the 2002 election and subsequently in 2005, continuing a trend toward outsider politics that had begun with Carlos Palenque and Max Fernández in the 1990s. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa came to power in 2006, following a series of other outsiders such as Abdalá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez. In Peru, Ollanta Humala nearly won the presidency in 2006 and triumphed in 2011, continuing a pattern of outsider politics that had begun with the rise of Alberto Fujimori. And in Paraguay, “Bishop of the Poor” Fernando Lugo won the presidency in 2008, following the breakthrough outsider candidacy of businessman Pedro Fadul in the prior 2003 election.

Putting these two dimensions together, we can see three distinct party system trajectories during the Left turn (see Table 8.2). In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, radical outsiders arose to contest power, raising the intensity of politics and presenting steep challenges to the neoliberal economic model favored by their competitors: With some variation, they implemented highly distributive and statist programs that Mazzuca (this volume) has insightfully termed “rentier populism.” In Paraguay and Peru, pragmatic outsiders arose to contest power, introducing far less polarization into national party systems. And in Brazil, Chile, and

<sup>6</sup> This definition is similar to that employed by Carreras (2012).

Uruguay, long-standing left parties that had moderated their programs came to power in the context of stable party systems.

#### EXPLAINING PARTY SYSTEM DIVERGENCE

The diversity of the Latin American Left in the new century, and attendant variation in party systems, has inspired a large set of research seeking to characterize and explain this variation, with the most prominent body of explanatory research focusing on economic variables related to neoliberalism, such as the success or failure of reforms, patterns of economic voting, the degree of social mobilization against neoliberalism, the effects of natural resource rents and endowments, or the particular political dynamics of market reform (Weyland 2003, 2009; Silva 2009; Madrid 2010; Roberts 2014). This section of the chapter summarizes a new political-institutional explanation for disparate trajectories of party system change, developed at more length elsewhere (Handlin 2017). The theory focuses on the occurrence of state crises and the strength of left-wing political infrastructure in the period between the end of the Cold War and each country's national left turn. State crises undermined established parties, including those on the Left, and created opportunities for political outsiders, particularly on the Left, to enter politics and construct new political movements and majorities. Whether left outsiders built movements that took highly radical and polarizing forms, however, depended on the institutional and political context in which they emerged, especially the existence of a robust infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization.

The section first discusses the two key variables (state crises and left political infrastructure), the scoring of these variables across cases, and their general role in the argument. The discussion then more explicitly shows how different combinations of these variables drove the three different party system trajectories described previously.

#### State Crises

Most South American states have long been plagued by severe pathologies. They struggle to provide basic services and public goods to large portions of their populations. Frequently, state agencies are rife with particularism and corruption, such that officials often prey on the populations they ostensibly serve. And these pathologies are notoriously uneven over both geographic and social terrain, such that the

consequences of state dysfunction are born disproportionately by less advantaged popular sector groups while political and economic elites enjoy privileged relationships with officialdom. As such, state pathologies color the lived experience of citizenship, contribute to various forms of social exclusion, and have been an important underlying driver of the inclusionary turn in the region (as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar note in this volume's introductory chapter).

When these "objective" state pathologies are combined with a more "subjective" deficit of citizen confidence in basic state institutions and government in general, a "state crisis" – a concept borrowed from Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) – occurs. During the period between the late 1980s and the early years of the new century in South America, long-standing state pathologies flared into prolonged "state crises" across much of South America as this subjective element was added to the equation. Several factors were likely responsible for driving this latter subjective dimension of state crisis in the post-Cold War period. Democracy generated high – perhaps unrealistic – citizen expectations regarding what democratic governance could deliver while also opening up channels for shining greater light on the conduct of state officials. Economic hardship and the tumultuous politics of market reform fueled citizen discontent with state institutions and increased the salience of corruption scandals, as citizens experiencing tough times became particularly attuned to the malfeasance of the political class (Seawright 2012).

Five of the eight South American countries explored in this chapter (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela) experienced prolonged state crises in the period between the end of the Cold War and the start of their own national Left turn. Three other countries avoided deep state crises, either possessing highly functioning states throughout the period and therefore never being threatened by crisis (Chile, Uruguay) or falling into crisis during the early 1990s but then experiencing significant improvements over time such that a prolonged crisis was avoided (Brazil). Table 8.3 displays data from two aggregate indices of state crisis, an "objective" measure that aggregates and averages three of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (rule of law, control of corruption, and government effectiveness) and a "subjective" measure that aggregates and averages measures of institutional confidence (in the judiciary, the police, and Congress) from the *Latinobarómetro*.<sup>7</sup> This table

<sup>7</sup> The WGI indicators aggregate a wide variety of data sources on state performance. More information about data sources and aggregation techniques can be found at the WGI web

TABLE 8.3 *State crisis in South America before the Left turn*

Country	State Performance (Pre Left Turn Average)	Confidence in Institutions (Pre Left Turn Average)	Prolonged State Crisis?
Ecuador	0.80	2.67	Yes
Venezuela	0.85	3.18	Yes
Paraguay	1.08	3.33	Yes
Bolivia	0.50	2.76	Yes
Peru	0.41	3.04	Yes
Brazil	0.12	3.75	No
Uruguay	0.59	4.66	No
Chile	1.23	4.73	No

shows each country's average score on these indices in the period between 1995 or 1996 (when data is first available) and the year in which they elected a leftist executive. I then translate these quantitative scores into a more qualitative assessment of whether the country suffered or avoided a prolonged state crisis during this period.<sup>8</sup>

As discussed at greater length below, state crises greatly challenged established political parties and fueled the rise of political outsiders. This argument builds upon a variety of research that has examined aspects of state crisis and their impact on party politics. Scholars show that phenomena like corruption have tended to undermine party identification and lead to voter defection from established parties (Hawkins 2010; Seawright 2012; Chong et al. 2015). Other studies have demonstrated the close connection between the perceived legitimacy of political institutions or “state deficiencies” and the rise of political outsiders

site (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc>) and a more in depth discussion about the usage of this data can be found at Handlin (2017, 271–274).

<sup>8</sup> This translation is largely intuitive. Uruguay and Chile possessed highly capable states and mass publics that expressed high levels of confidence in state institutions. They clearly are nowhere near the threshold for state crisis. On the other side, Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru were characterized by highly incapable states and populations that expressed low levels of confidence in state institutions. The trickiest case is that of Brazil, which lies in the middle of these groups. While this level of detail cannot be presented here, a closer look at the data for Brazil shows substantial change over time, with improvements in both objective levels of state capacity and subjective assessments of confidence in institutions. Brazil is therefore best considered a case in which a state crisis did occur in the late 1980s and early 1990s but, unlike in other countries in the region, the crisis was not prolonged. For a much more extensive discussion, see Handlin (2017, 105–109, 274–275).

(Mainwaring 2006). My work conceptualizes the syndrome more broadly, as a state crisis, and demonstrates how state crisis drove outsider politics on the Left during the early twenty-first century through two primary mechanisms. First, state crises undermined established left parties where they existed (such as LCR and MAS in Venezuela, FADI and PSE in Ecuador, and MIR and IU in Bolivia).<sup>9</sup> Second, state crises fueled the electoral campaigns and shaping the strategic direction of left outsiders.

I also depart from other research on this topic by emphasizing the role of state crisis in enabling political polarization. By their nature, state crises are conducive to high intensity clashes between outsiders promising to shake up the system and members of the political status quo threatened by the entrance of new actors. In fostering clashes along this systemic versus anti-systemic dimension of politics, however, state crisis also can enable polarization along other dimensions of contestation. When the electorate is upset enough with status quo parties and candidates, outsiders capitalizing on such discontent might still win elections while offering radical programmatic platforms that are themselves electorally suboptimal. Strategic choice by outsiders therefore likely depends on the nature of their own ideal points and their appetite for risk. But when would outsiders pick particularly radical and polarizing programs and when would they adopt more pragmatic strategies? Outsider coalition building hinged on a second key variable.

### **Left Infrastructure**

The occurrence (or not) of deep state crisis in the post-Cold War period unfolded in countries that differed greatly in the robustness of the infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization they possessed as the 1990s began. This term primarily refers to political parties of the Left, defined as parties and movements with socialist or Marxist roots (or new parties founded by leaders and activists with those roots) that also possessed a

<sup>9</sup> Importantly, this dynamic held even when left parties were not governing. State crises tended to inflame factional divisions among moderates and radicals within left parties in general, undermining the attempts of the former to decisively consolidate parties around a pragmatic, pro systemic orientation while encouraging the latter to adopt even more hardline postures. Further, state crises often led voters to punish all parties perceived as part of the political status quo, not just those who had joined governing coalitions like Venezuela's MAS. This was especially true for parties that had significant legislative delegations and/or wielded real power by negotiating with coalition partners to hold important legislative posts, such as Venezuela's LCR and Ecuador's PS.

TABLE 8.4 *Left political infrastructure, post-Cold War democratic conditions*

Country	Left Party Vote Share	Very Strong Left Wing Social Movements	Strong Left Wing Infrastructure
Uruguay	25.6	No	Yes
Bolivia	24.7	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	24.3	No	Yes
Chile	22.3	No	Yes
Brazil	15.3	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	14.3	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	2	No	No
Peru (post Fujimori)	<1	No	No

substantial programmatic commitment to the reduction of social and economic inequality.<sup>10</sup> This infrastructure can also be understood to encapsulate strong left-wing social movements that might have been important political actors if not (yet) participants in the electoral arena.

Table 8.4 shows the infrastructure of left-wing politics across the eight countries under study as the post-Cold War era began or, in the partially aberrant case of Peru, during the first extended period of post-Cold War democratic rule, after the Fujimori years (1990–2000), during which the Left was “virtually wiped off the map” (Cameron 2011, 376).<sup>11</sup> Left party vote share reflects the average of the total gained by the Left in the closest lower house elections before and after January 1, 1990. The presence of particularly strong left-wing social movements in the early 1990s is a more qualitative measure drawn from examination of the secondary literature. As we can see, there were six countries that began the post-Cold War era marked by relatively substantial infrastructures of

<sup>10</sup> This definition fuses two common criteria for defining the “Left,” the former emphasizing a historical definition of the Left as possessing a socialist and/or Marxist origin and the latter emphasizing the programmatic content commonly associated with left of center parties. Notably, since we want the definition to encompass both radical and moderate parties of the Left, the extent to which parties emphasize the reduction of inequality can differ significantly within this definition, ranging from those who make huge changes to the status quo a centerpiece of their programs to those committed to only relatively marginal forms of redistribution.

<sup>11</sup> Note that the Peruvian experience was greatly different than that of countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, where established left parties declined or fell apart during the 1990s but, in the context of democratic rule, this infrastructure was quickly reintegrated into new leftist parties and/or movements.

left-wing political mobilization (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela), one country (Paraguay) in which the Left had made almost no inroads, and a final case (Peru) in which the Left was substantial during the 1980s, fell into turmoil by the end of the decade, and then was all but destroyed by a regionally anomalous period of authoritarian rule, such that it was virtually nonexistent once democracy returned and left outsiders could compete for the presidency.

### **Interactive Mechanisms and Trajectories of Change**

The interaction of these two variables (occurrence or not of prolonged state crisis, presence or not of a robust infrastructure of left-wing politics) put into motion two mechanisms that shaped how the political left adapted and was incorporated into politics, setting party systems on different trajectories. The first mechanism related to the prospects of extant major left parties (if they existed) successfully entrenching themselves as major pro-systemic actors in the evolving party systems of the post-Cold War era. Where the political left was weak, major left parties did not exist almost by definition, so this mechanism was not relevant. Where such parties existed, however, the occurrence (or not) of state crises loomed large in determining their fates. Where a prolonged state crisis did not occur, established left parties had easier times consolidating positions as major pro-systemic actors, as they were not punished by the electorate for ownership of the state crisis and as the absence of state crisis tended to favor moderate factions who preferred to work within institutional channels to achieve partisan goals. Where state crisis struck, in contrast, major left parties attempting to consolidate such positions tended to break under the weight of voter rejection and factional strife.

The second mechanism related to whether or not conditions were propitious for political outsiders and the strategic landscape faced by outsiders on the Left. Where state crises did not occur, the political arena was essentially closed to the entrance of outsiders. Where state crises occurred, outsiders of various stripes emerged and challenged for power, including those on the Left. Whether the emergence of left outsiders was highly polarizing, however, rested on the strength of extant left-wing infrastructure and the coalitional logic it spawned. Where a strong infrastructure existed, left outsiders were incentivized to build new movements on the Left: They forged alliances with extant left parties, recruited advisors that were seasoned in left-wing political mobilization, and found allies in anti-neoliberal social movements. This coalitional dynamic



TABLE 8.5 *Mechanisms connecting explanatory variables to party system trajectories*

Explanatory Variable Combination	No State Crisis, Strong Left	State Crisis, Strong Left	State Crisis, Weak Left
Cases	Brazil, Chile, Uruguay	Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela	Paraguay, Peru
Fate of Extant Major Left Parties	Succeed	Fail	Do not exist
Coalitional Logic for Left Outsiders	Outsiders blocked	Build new movements on the Left	Forge alliances with centrist actors
New Party System Trajectory	Weakly polarizing, no outsiders	Highly polarizing, radical outsiders	Weakly polarizing, pragmatic outsiders

incentivized outsiders to embrace more radical economic positions and to take particularly harsh and confrontational anti-systemic stances. In contrast, where left infrastructure was weak, left outsiders had to court centrist parties and advisors in the search for allies and were consequently incentivized to attenuate their anti-systemic rhetoric and adopt more moderate economic policies.

The subsections below discuss briefly how these mechanisms played out more specifically across the three trajectories of party system development, summarized in Table 8.5.

**No State Crisis, Strong Left Infrastructure.** The first group of cases consists of those in which prolonged state crises were avoided and a strong infrastructure of left-wing politics existed as the post-Cold War era began. The complete absence of state crisis in Chile and Uruguay, or the avoidance of a prolonged state crisis in Brazil, put two mechanisms into motion.

A context without state crisis greatly buttressed the attempts of established major left parties – the Partido Socialista (PS) in Chile, the Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay, and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil – to successfully consolidate positions as major pro-systemic actors on the center-left during the period leading up to the Left turn in each country. Unlike elsewhere on the continent, major left parties in these countries were not punished by the electorate in the 1990s for pro-

systemic actions such as participating in governing coalitions or assuming positions of institutional power within legislatures and engaging in horse-trading with opponents. Rather, each party improved its legislative vote share and presidential prospects over time. Further, the absence of state crisis helped each party temper factional disputes and ultimately resolve them decisively in favor of moderate groups. As elsewhere on the continent, left parties entered the post-Cold War era deeply divided between radical factions seeking fundamental transformations to society and harsh confrontations with the neoliberal order, and moderate factions preferring pragmatic solutions and more incremental policy gains. In the absence of state crisis that might lead the electorate to reject status quo politics, moderates were able to win internal partisan battles within the PS, FA, and (more gradually) PT by arguing that pragmatic centrism offered the only viable path to electoral success (Luna 2007; Motta 2008; Hunter 2010).

The avoidance of prolonged state crisis in these three countries also created little room for the entrance of political outsiders. With states relatively functional and populations relatively confident in basic state institutions by regional standards, anti-systemic appeals had little attraction for electorates, depriving outsiders of their most basic strategies of mobilization. In Chile and Uruguay, where state crises never threatened, outsiders were essentially absent in presidential politics in the post-Cold War period. No outsider won enough of the vote to even play the spoiler in a presidential election in either country, much less to challenge for power, during the 1990–2015 period.<sup>12</sup> In Brazil, outsiders played prominent roles in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the country experienced a brief state crisis, but then disappeared from the political landscape after 1994 as institutional performance and public confidence in government improved.

The ascendance of the Left to power in this trio of countries – with the victories of Ricardo Lagos in Chile in 2000, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002, and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2004 – helped consolidate weakly polarizing and relatively stable party systems in which

<sup>12</sup> Marco Enríquez Ominami, a former PS deputy and the son of a famous PS politician, won nearly 20% of the vote in the first round of Chile's 2009–2010 election while running as an independent. I do not count him as an outsider because he spent the first half of 2009 angling to run in the *Concertación* primaries and be the official candidate of the coalition, first under the banner of the PS and then as an independent. As such, his ultimate candidacy was not conducted as an outsider to the status quo but as an insider who had simply failed to secure the nomination he desired.

outsider politics played little role. The presence of these strong center-left parties ensured some level of programmatic competition: Perhaps most notably, in Brazil the PT played an important role in advancing programmatic politics in a context in which competitors were more likely to mobilize voters through clientelism and personalism (Mainwaring and Bizarro 2018). But the blocking of outsiders and the strong position of center-left parties committed to the rules of the game placed substantial limits on the level of polarization.

**State Crisis, Strong Left Infrastructure.** Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela also possessed strong infrastructures of left-wing politics as the Cold War began but experienced prolonged state crises, a combination that put them on a very different trajectory. Once again, two mechanisms were critical.

The occurrence of prolonged state crises severely undermined the attempts of extant left parties in these countries – MAS and LCR in Venezuela, MIR in Bolivia, and FADI and PS in Ecuador – to successfully consolidate positions as major partisan actors on the center-left during the 1990s. In each case, voters harshly punished left parties for pro-systemic activity, such that a familiar pattern emerged. Left parties in the late 1980s and 1990s ascended in popularity while they could credibly frame themselves as challengers to the political status quo. As soon as they became part of that status quo by either joining governing coalitions or wielding legislative power in opposition, however, voters turned on them and their electoral fortunes plummeted. Just as problematically, state crises also tended to inflame factional discord within the Left. Anti-systemic sentiment in the electorate emboldened radical factions, who believed that more confrontational strategies might find an audience, and undercut attempts by moderate pragmatists to consolidate control. In sharp contrast to the fates of left parties in the prior trio of cases, major left parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all imploded under the weight of voter rejection and factional strife during the 1990s.

State crises also drove the rise of political outsiders in all three countries, including those on the Left. In Bolivia, outsider candidates first came to prominence in 1993. Eventually, Evo Morales and the MAS built a left-wing outsider movement that would challenge for power in 2002 and win the presidency in 2005. In Ecuador, presidential elections were dominated by outsiders from the mid-1990s until the victory of Rafael Correa and AP in 2006. And in Venezuela outsiders emerged in 1993 and then dominated the presidential election of 1998, in which Hugo Chávez and the MVR came to power. In all three cases, left outsiders rose to power

while employing a “doubly polarizing” strategy, which combined harsh indictments of the political status quo and calls for state reform (an overt politicization of the state crisis) with radical attacks on the neoliberal economic model.

The programmatic and strategic orientation of left outsiders in each case was shaped by the environment in which they built movements, especially the existence of a strong infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization. Left outsiders forged coalitions with extant left parties, made alliances with (or emerged from) anti-neoliberal social movements, and recruited experienced left-wing politicians and activists to run their campaigns and design their policy programs. In Venezuela, the initial orientation of Chávez and his *Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200* was strongly shaped by their alliances and linkages with radical leftists in the 1980s. Subsequently, Chávez forged a coalition with the radical factions of LCR and MAS that provided his campaign with crucial organizational resources, recruited seasoned leftist politicians like Alberto Müller Rojas to manage his campaign, and relied upon other leftist intellectuals and politicians to design much of the program he presented for public consumption. In Ecuador, Correa recruited many different small leftist parties and social movements into his *Alianza País* coalition, which provided critical sources of organization support during the 2006 campaign (Larrea 2008, 129–130; de la Torre and Conaghan 2009). He also drew upon seasoned leftist advisors such as Alberto Acosta, Fander Falconí, and Ricardo Patiño to develop his program and guide his political strategy. In Bolivia, Evo Morales and the MAS emerged from social movements that themselves were deeply influenced by an influx of seasoned activists with backgrounds in the anti-neoliberal protests and leftist politics of the 1980s (Van Cott 2003a, 2005; Yashar 2005). Building the movement into one capable of winning majoritarian elections then required bringing a variety of other leftist intellectuals and politicians into the fold – perhaps most notably future vice-president Álvaro García Linera – who were given substantial influence over the party’s program and strategy. In all three cases, then, the existence of a robust infrastructure of left-wing politics allowed outsiders to build movements on the Left, obviating the need to strike moderating deals with centrist allies and keeping movements tethered to more extreme policy orientations as radical left intellectuals and activists guided the strategic course.

The Left turn therefore saw the consolidation of highly polarizing party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, with radical outsiders

on the Left coming to power and following through on mandates to transform states through constitutional reform. The arrival of the radical Left to power typically provoked strong reactions from opponents and counter-reactions from the new governments, but party systems eventually stabilized around a central cleavage that pitted the radical insurgents and the parties they constructed against a heterogeneous and often fragmented opposition.

**State Crisis, Weak Left Infrastructure.** The third set of cases featured prolonged state crises and left outsiders building movements in contexts bereft of left-wing political infrastructure. These conditions clearly characterized Paraguay, where left parties were non-factors in the party system that emerged in the 1990s after democratic transition. Peru represents a more complex, and partially aberrant, case. The country began to experience state crisis in the 1980s, a time when the Peruvian left was very strong by regional standards, led by Izquierda Unida (IU). At this point, political dynamics in Peru – including the rise of outsiders and the trouble that state crisis caused for IU – mirrored those in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The harsh authoritarian rule of Alberto Fujimori, however, decimated the Peruvian left and effectively put the country on a different trajectory once democracy was restored, closer to that of Paraguay.

The combination of state crisis and a context bereft of left-wing infrastructure in Paraguay and Peru (post-Fujimori) fostered the rise of political outsiders but created a very different strategic logic of movement and coalition building on the Left. Outsiders first entered politics in Paraguay in 2003, with the emergence of businessman Pedro Fadul and the Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos (UNCE), a Colorado splinter faction led by controversial ex-general Lino Oviedo. The 2008 elections then saw the rise and triumph of Fernando Lugo, the former Bishop of San Pedro, who had risen to national prominence in early 2006 by leading a march of social movements on Asunción to protest the alleged corruption of the Duarte government and who had earned a strong reputation as the “bishop of the poor” owing to his longtime advocacy of land redistribution. In theory, Lugo could have adopted a highly polarizing strategy combining harsh anti-systemic denunciations of the political class and radical anti-neoliberal appeals. Yet the coalitional context strongly shaped and limited his options. Without leftist allies to form coalitions with and recruit into his movement, Lugo was forced to enter an alliance with the center-right PLRA to have a chance to win the 2008 election and to recruit a variety of centrist, established politicians into his government. This pragmatic approach did not prevent Lugo’s enemies from conspiring

against him and eventually removing him from office on trumped-up impeachment charges. But the impeachment controversy should not distract us from the relatively moderate and pragmatic course that Lugo chose to take.

The experience of Ollanta Humala in Peru was ultimately similar. A former military officer from a leftist family background, Humala first emerged as a presidential contender in 2006 and initially tried to copy the Chávez playbook, combining anti-neoliberal politics with denunciations of the status quo and calls for state reform (Cameron 2007). Humala faced favorable conditions, confronting a weak field of opponents and running at a time when the radical Left was on the rise in the Andean region more generally. In a country bereft of left-wing political infrastructure, however, he faced severe limitations in building a political movement. He ended up running a dysfunctional campaign marked by several strategic gaffes, that lacked the support of significant parties beyond the tiny Unión por el Perú (UPP), and which had little articulation with left-wing social movements. At a time when radicals in Bolivia and Ecuador won presidential elections by 13 and 26 points, Humala lost by 5.5 in the second round runoff. In 2011, he learned from this experience and ran a very different campaign. Without leftist allies to draw upon, Humala adopted the pragmatism of Lugo, striking deals with establishment figures such as Alejandro Toledo and Mario Vargas Llosa to win their support and greatly moderating his platform, such that he would promise broad continuities with extant economic policies and give up his call for constitutional reform and state transformation (Cameron 2011; Levitsky 2011; Tanaka 2011).

The ascendance of left outsiders to power in Paraguay and Peru had very different implications for party system change than in the prior trio of cases. Rather than reorienting party systems in a highly polarizing direction along a radical left versus opposition cleavage, the presidencies of Lugo and Humala introduced relatively little change to party systems. Given the near total absence of left-wing alternatives at the presidential level prior to their rise, Lugo and Humala did increase programmatic competition in national party systems. But such polarization was curbed by the relatively pragmatic course taken by the two presidents. Further, dependent upon centrist parties for legislative majorities and pursuing limited goals with short time horizons, neither Lugo nor Humala invested significant resources in party building and institutionalizing their movement. As such, party systems remained relatively fluid and marked by low polarization in the aftermath of their presidencies.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR INCLUSION

These three political trajectories differed in ways that had significant implications for the inclusionary turn in each country. The following discussion does not focus attention on inclusionary measures per se, a subject addressed at length by many other chapters in this volume. Rather, like Cameron's chapter, it highlights how longer-standing trajectories of political development (although much shorter than those considered by Cameron) entailed important characteristics that likely shaped different patterns of inclusion: whether the trajectory involved the emergence or further consolidation of an institutionalized major left-wing political party; whether the trajectory involved state transformation; and the quality of state performance in each country during the new century.

**Left Party Institutionalization**

One important difference across the three case categories involved the presence and institutionalization of major left-of-center parties. In the trio of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, highly institutionalized left parties existed prior to the inclusionary turn and maintained a prominent place in party systems throughout. As such, these cases were marked by the most consistent presence of major left parties and the greatest degree of institutionalization of those parties. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, outsiders came to power and built parties – either from scratch or through consolidating extant but weak partisan vehicles – once in office. The transformational agendas and lengthy time horizons of these left outsiders provided incentives for party building to cement their rule while the intense polarization that attended their arrival also facilitated party building, with such searing conflicts helping forge strong partisan attachments among supporters (Levitsky et al. 2016). In this trio of cases, left parties still lacked high levels of formal institutionalization but came to possess real organizations and attracted high numbers of party identifiers. Finally, in Paraguay and Peru, the arrival of left outsiders to power did not yield meaningfully institutionalized left parties. With modest agendas and short time horizons, outsiders did not make the same investments in party building and lower levels of polarization were not conducive to the formation of such strong partisan attachments.

These differences in the presence and institutionalization of left parties had predictable consequences for the frequency with which the political

Left would hold the presidency during the inclusionary turn. Numerous scholars have pointed to the spread of left-wing government as a key factor in advancing inclusion, through extending social policies (Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013), supporting more generous social policy benefits (Garay 2016), developing participatory innovations promoting access (Goldfrank 2011), and pushing constitutional changes advancing recognition (Elkins, this volume). We should not overstate the case: As pointed out in this volume's introductory chapter, left governments were neither necessary nor sufficient for the introduction of substantively meaningful inclusionary policies. We can find instances of right-of-center governments pushing inclusionary policies and we can find examples of left governments that did little to advance inclusion, or at least certain dimensions of inclusion. Nevertheless, in aggregate, few would argue that left governments have been *more likely* than their competitors to promote inclusionary policies. Therefore, the degree of left government during the inclusionary turn overall – the proportion of years in which the Left governed – clearly bore on the extent of inclusion.

Where strong left parties existed from the start of the inclusionary turn, the Left was best positioned to win and retain power. During the inclusionary turn period (1999–2018), the Left held the presidency for fourteen years in Brazil, fifteen years in Chile, and fourteen years in Uruguay. Where left outsiders took power and invested heavily in institutionalizing their movements, the Left was also well positioned to hold the presidency for extended periods. Left governments ruled for twenty years in Venezuela, thirteen years in Bolivia, and twelve years in Ecuador. Both these political trajectories created conditions for left-wing dominance of presidential politics during the inclusionary turn period and, even where the Left eventually lost power as in Brazil and Chile, positioned the Left to be major players in politics well into the future.

The major contrast is with Paraguay and Peru. In these countries, left outsiders took longer to win power, due partly to the absence of a strong left-wing infrastructure on which they could build their movements. Just as importantly, since outsider presidents had little incentive to build and institutionalize political parties, their arrival to power did not set the Left up for future electoral successes. The Left held power for only four years in Paraguay (until Lugo's ouster) and five years in Peru. While other factors have likely played roles as well (low levels of social mobilization and institutional rules against presidential reelection, for example), the relatively short tenure of the Left in office likely helps explain why these



two countries have experienced less inclusion than the others, whether assessed in terms of resources, access, or recognition.

Needless to say, the absence of stable, reasonably institutionalized left-wing parties in these two countries may also dampen their prospects for future political inclusion. In Peru, Humala's Peruvian Nationalist Party completely collapsed in advance of the 2016 elections. The newly-founded Broad Front, a coalition of small left-wing parties led by Verónica Mendoza, surged to a surprising showing, winning twenty seats in Congress and with Mendoza just missing the runoff in the presidential election. A year later, however, the coalition split in half, with ten of the deputies leaving to form the new Peru party, now lead by Mendoza. The future of these parties and movements remains very much in doubt, especially in the context of Peru's extremely fluid party system. In Paraguay, Lugo's Patriotic Alliance for Change fell apart during his term, such that the Left had less institutionalized partisan representation after his impeachment than it had before his political ascendance. Two alliances of small leftist parties contested the 2013 elections, *Avanza País* and *Frente Guasú*. While the fracture left consolidated into the latter in 2018, its electoral fortunes were meager, winning only six seats in the Senate and none in the Chamber of Deputies. As in Peru, this new left-wing coalition lacks institutionalization and its future in the party system remains very uncertain.

### State Transformation

Another important difference across cases trajectories with implications for inclusion was whether the Left turn involved state transformation. In the Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay trio and the Paraguay and Peru pair, left candidates came to power promising to work within the established institutional landscape. Left governments in all these countries could use common levers of power such as legislation or executive rulemaking to advance political inclusion. More broadly, however, inclusionary responses were bounded by political institutions and, most importantly, constitutions that were inherited by left governments. In contrast, left outsiders in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela came to power seeking sweeping mandates to transform the state. Each made the convocation of constituent assemblies to write new constitutions a centerpiece of their triumphant presidential campaigns. After arriving in power, each then set out to convene these assemblies, to push forward new constitutions, and, in so doing, to remake the institutional architecture of the state and recast

the formal basis of state–society relations. It should be stressed that the concept of state transformation is meant to capture precisely these kind of changes in the institutional design of the state, and the opening of that architecture to some degree of political contestation, not to entail the strengthening or weakening of the state and its capabilities.

Mandates for state transformation were intrinsically linked to outsiders building radical coalitions in the context of prolonged state crises. In each case, the push for a politics of state transformation came from influential advisors within the radical Left, who had developed such ideas in response to the state’s pathologies. In Venezuela, the idea for a constituent process had been pushed since at least the late 1980s by the radical factions of *La Causa R*, as well as radical leftists who played key roles in the formation of Chávez’s political worldview during this period, such as Kléber Ramírez (Ramírez 1991; Medina 1992). In Bolivia, influential MAS theoretician and future vice-president Álvaro García Linera overtly advanced the notion of a “state crisis” that the party needed to address and convoked a working group of MASista intellectuals to develop proposals for a constituent process in the years before Morales won power (Llorenti Soliz 2004; Harten 2011, 138). In Ecuador, the idea of running on a platform of radical constitutional reform was pushed heavily by left-wing advisors to Correa who had been involved with the prior constitutional reform process of the late 1990s (Handlin 2017, 196–197). In sum, these radical processes of state transformation occurred where two conditions coincided: state crises that fueled demand for state reform, and processes of outsider coalition building that privileged radical elements of the Left who were long-standing proponents of the use of constituent assemblies to advance transformative change. Where state crises occurred but outsider coalitions took more pragmatic forms, as in Paraguay and Peru, state transformation did not occur. And where prolonged state crises did not occur at all in the 1990s, as in Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay, constituent assemblies were off the table completely.


State transformation via constitutional reform relaxed the institutional constraints faced by left presidents and created more open-ended possibilities for the pursuit of political inclusion on parchment. Such processes were particularly relevant for advancing two dimensions of inclusion as conceptualized in the introductory chapter in this volume, the recognition of previously underrepresented groups and the granting of new channels of access that enhance popular participation. Regarding recognition, new constitutions recognized the rights of a variety of previously minority groups, most notably women and indigenous populations (Van Cott

2003b; Segura and Bejarano 2004; Cameron and Sharpe 2010). Elkins's (this volume) quantitative comparison of Bolivarian constitutions with past Latin American constitutions demonstrates just how much the new documents expanded their "rights portfolios." In Bolivia and Ecuador, these new constitutions also explicitly characterized the state as plurinational, a major demand of indigenous groups that fundamentally reframed what it meant to be Bolivian or Ecuadorian (Becker 2011). Regarding access, Bolivarian constitutions enshrined new forms of direct democracy, such as referenda, the ability to recall officials, and/or citizen legislative petitions (Elkins, this volume). They also placed emphasis on the importance of participatory democracy, establishing the constitutional basis for the creation of local institutions of participation and governance (García Guadilla and Hurtado 2000; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011; see also Goldfrank, and Mayka and Rich, this volume). Evidence suggests that levels of participatory democracy – at least as captured in indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project – increased in the aftermath of constitution making (Stoyan 2018).

The politics of state transformation also had negative implications for inclusion. In each case, a newly elected government steamrolled its opposition to push through constitutional reform, bending or breaking laws and norms governing constitutional change in the process (Coppedge 2002; Lehoucq 2008; Madrid 2012; Basabe-Serrano and Martínez 2014; De La Torre 2014; Handlin 2017). Therefore, while state transformation created new possibilities for the expansion of inclusion on parchment, it also established precedents of political exclusion in practice. This tension between formally inclusionary politics (particularly vis-à-vis previously under-recognized social and ethnic groups) and informally exclusionary practice (particularly vis-à-vis the political opposition) continued to characterize each of these three cases, with variation across cases in the degree of the latter. The key overall point for present purposes is that state transformation differentiated these three countries from the others in terms of how the inclusionary turn proceeded and was intrinsically tied to state crises occurring in contexts where outsiders were incentivized to build radical coalitions on the Left.

### State Performance

A final consequential difference across the three trajectories involved state performance, or the objective side of state crisis discussed previously in the chapter. As suggested by Figure 8.1, state performance remained



Note: Data for 2001 is not available. Worldwide Governance Indicators produced annual data starting in 2002. Prior to that, data was collected every other year.

FIGURE 8.1 State performance during inclusionary turn

broadly stable across South America during the inclusionary turn, even in those countries where state crises had catalyzed the rise of outsiders promising to refund states and reorder state–society relations. Chile and Uruguay, blessed with the most capable states by far, maintained that status. Brazil retained its position as the next most functional state during the 2000s, and then saw a subsequent decline that under the weight of the corruption scandal the “*Lava Jato*” investigation has been uncovering. Those countries that experienced prolonged state crises prior to the inclusionary turn continued to possess dysfunctional states. There were a few minor changes within this category: State performance plummeted even further in Venezuela and improved somewhat in Ecuador and Paraguay over time. Overall, however, the picture is one of relative stability.<sup>13</sup>

State performance may have multiple and complex implications for inclusion. Poorly functioning states tend to generate mass demand for inclusion. Frustration with poorly functioning states may fuel calls for the advent of participatory innovations in local governance. Treatment by

<sup>13</sup> State performance in Colombia, one of the two major South American countries I do not analyze closely, did improve somewhat over the inclusionary turn, from a score of  $-0.56$  in 2000 to a score of  $0.21$  in 2015.

state officials of minority groups as second-class citizens may drive calls for the constitutional recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities and plurinational communities. And popular demand for at least some redistributive policies may be partially driven by states' ineffectiveness in delivering these services. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that political movements enunciating particularly radical demands for inclusion have tended to emerge in cases where states were highly dysfunctional, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. As the experiences of Paraguay and Peru show, however, state dysfunction is not sufficient for this kind of radical inclusionary politics.

Yet poorly functioning states may also limit or condition the ability of politicians to effectively meet these demands. While political actors may introduce bills or constitutional amendments to advance the recognition of previously marginalized groups, state officials may continue to discriminate against those groups in practice. Politicians may launch initiatives to increase access and foster citizen participation, but those institutional innovations may function poorly and be prone to particularism. Finally, legislatures may allocate resources to enhance social policies and improve infrastructure for the poor, but the impact of such initiatives will be blunted if many of the resources do not reach the intended target populations due to corruption or lack of state capacity. In sum, poor state performance is an important factor maintaining the "parchment–practice gap" that Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar highlight in the introductory chapter of this volume. These harsh realities have been most evident in the case of Venezuela. While initiatives to expand inclusion were particularly ambitious, the most central of them – including both social programs such as the Bolivarian Missions and participatory governance initiatives such as the Communal Councils – have been badly undermined by poor state performance (even before the country's recent economic implosion), which fostered cronyism, inefficiency, and poor policy implementation.

Considered together, these implications of state performance suggest sobering conclusions. Where states are highly functional (Chile and Uruguay, to a lesser degree Brazil), we might imagine the political salience of inclusion fading over time, as state pathologies provide only limited fuel for inclusionary demands and those policies enacted to address inclusionary deficits – such as conditional cash transfer programs and reforms in the health sector – are implemented on sturdy institutional foundations. In the majority of South American countries with much more dysfunctional states, however, battles over inclusion are likely to stretch far into the future: State weakness, which thus far governments

have proven relatively incapable of changing, will continue to fuel exclusionary practices and thus demands for inclusion. Yet policy initiatives to further inclusion will be prone to being undermined by the weak institutional foundations on which they are constructed.

### Summary

We can put these three characteristics together to form a more composite picture of how cases differed along dimensions that might have shaped the politics of inclusion. Since many other variables also plausibly influenced the nature and dynamics of inclusion, we should not expect that cases with similar characteristics would all have the same inclusionary outcomes. Yet examining these different variable constellations may still help us think about variation in inclusion across South America.

Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay were marked by a pattern of steady *technocratic incrementalism*. Highly institutionalized left parties competed vigorously for the presidency from the beginning of the inclusionary turn and dominated presidential politics after their initial victories. The specific degree to which social policies were expanded in terms of resource allocation was conditional on other factors, like the nature of competition for outsiders and degree of social mobilization (Garay 2016). But the presence of a strong institutionalized left party guaranteed that at least some meaningful level of expansion would occur. The extent of inclusionary innovations in terms of access and recognition, on the other hand, was limited by the fact that state transformation and fundamental changes to the institutional environment were never on the table. Finally, in the context of highly functional states (less so in Brazil), inclusionary policies were implemented on relatively strong state foundations and were therefore more likely to operate efficiently.

Paraguay and Peru were marked by a pattern of *limited progress on shaky foundations*. The weakness of the political Left as the inclusionary turn began, and the lack of commitment of left outsiders to investing in party building, meant that the Left would control the presidency for only a handful of years, such that the push for inclusionary measures would be less consistent and more reliant on non-left parties and politicians. While other factors may also have played a role, the brief tenure of left-wing governments in aggregate surely contributed to the relatively low levels of inclusion in terms of resources. Meanwhile, the pragmatism of left outsiders ruled out truly transformative inclusionary measures when they did

hold office. Finally, poorly performing states provided dubious foundations for inclusionary initiatives, threatening their long-term viability.

The last composite pattern, evident in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, might be termed *transformative inclusion on shaky foundations*. Left outsiders invested in party building to better carry out their long-term agendas, such that their victories were followed by long sustained periods of holding the presidency. State transformation through constitutional reform greatly broadened the possibilities for advancing inclusion, especially in the realms of recognition and access. But poor state performance raised threats to the successful implementation of these new inclusionary measures, a dynamic especially evident in Venezuela, such that the parchment–practice gap was likely to become particularly wide in this trio of cases.

#### CONCLUSION

The inclusionary turn in South America unfolded in countries whose party systems were moving on highly variant paths of development. This chapter first summarized an argument, developed at greater length elsewhere, for explaining party system variation in the region during this period. The latter part of the chapter then made the case that divergent party system trajectories possessed characteristics that were likely to be greatly consequential in shaping the dynamics of inclusion. The pathologies of weak states and the political Left represent two common denominators between these discussions. Party system variation was driven by the occurrence (or not) of state crises and the strength of left-wing political infrastructure in each country as the Cold War came to an end, which together conditioned how the Left would be integrated into and transform national party systems. In turn, resultant party system trajectories possessed characteristics likely to condition how inclusion occurred, differing in the institutionalization of left parties (with logical implications for the likelihood of left-wing government), the occurrence of state transformation through constitutional reform, and levels of state capacity.

The complex relationships between state pathologies and the politics of inclusion suggest several general points to draw for this research agenda. As outlined in this volume's introductory chapter, the inclusionary turn was spawned by the coexistence of enduring democracy and deeply exclusionary contextual conditions, especially multidimensional social, political, and economic inequalities. But we should not view the politics of inclusion solely through the simplistic lens of the public voicing

demands that elected officials have incentives to satisfy. Rather, a more realistic – and, admittedly, pessimistic – perspective would emphasize the inability of elected officials to remedy drivers of dissatisfaction like state pathologies, the ways in which these root causes of exclusion often undermine inclusionary initiatives and widen the parchment–practice gap, and the tendency of mass dissatisfaction with state pathologies to disrupt the party-institutional foundations of representation and accountability, arguably making sustainable solutions to social exclusion less likely.

As such, it may not be appropriate to view the inclusionary turn as a delimited epoch in Latin American political development, as scholars often view the neoliberal reform period, the Left turn, or, more distantly, the first incorporation. Rather, the inclusionary turn is marked by an ongoing set of sociopolitical dynamics and processes that are temporally indeterminate. Deep sources of grievance and dysfunctional state institutions are locked in a relationship that is more likely to be self-reinforcing than to end in the elimination or amelioration of the former. It is therefore unclear how, when, or why the inclusionary turn in Latin America might come to a close. But its dynamics and dysfunction will be critical to understanding regional politics well into the twenty-first century.

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PART III

NEW PARTY SOCIETY LINKAGES



## The Politics of Popular Coalitions

### *Unions and Territorial Social Movements in Post-Neoliberal Latin America (2000–2015)*

Sebastián Etchemendy

#### INTRODUCTION

On Friday August 14, 2015 the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), and *Forza Sindical*, the second largest labor organization, issued a statement in the main Brazilian newspapers in which they made a bold call to defend democracy and President Dilma Rousseff "in a context of destabilizing attacks." President Rousseff (of the Workers' Party, PT) had just met that week with some of Brazil's leading social activists, in a formal "*Diálogo com Movimentos Sociais*" oriented to show their support in hard times. That same Friday, Ecuador witnessed one of the wildest strikes waged by portions of the labor movement in recent times. The protest day culminated in Quito with a demonstration of indigenous movements, which erupted into violence and police repression. In turbulent days, Brazil's PT government garnered the support of unions and social movements to thwart an offensive from the mainstream media, the judiciary, and the political opposition that would eventually result in the president's removal. By contrast, in Ecuador, another progressive Latin American government, headed by President Rafael Correa, clashed rhetorically and in the streets with labor unions and indigenous social movements.

Of course, this contrasting picture of working-class politics under the post-neoliberal, Latin American.<sup>1</sup> Left turn, is not limited to Brazil and

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<sup>1</sup> Grugel and Riggirozzi (2018, 3) have argued that, although almost all countries maintained some core aspects of the "Washington Consensus," Latin American development

Ecuador. In Argentina, *Kirchnerismo* boasted the support of a variety of working-class actors, ranging from middle-class and affluent “business unionists” to militants of pauperized community organizations of Greater Buenos Aires’s poorest areas. The Uruguayan *Frente Amplio* set the stage for a union offensive very similar to what their Argentine labor counterparts on the opposite side of the River Plate were experiencing. However, independent or national social movements were absent from the political construction of the Left in Uruguay. Alternative types of community organizations and social movements, on the other hand, had been at the center of the grassroots political mobilization sparked by the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia and initially by *Chavismo*. By contrast, unlike in Argentina and Brazil, the established labor movement in Venezuela not only opposed Chávez’s left-wing populist government but also took part in the attempted coup of 2002.

Thus, progressive Latin American governments exhibited considerable variation in terms of their coalitions with popular actors, notwithstanding broad similarities in their opposition to neoliberalism and embrace of inclusionary social policies.<sup>2</sup> The main goal of this chapter is to conceptualize and explain the varieties of relations between governments and the subaltern sectors during the post-neoliberal period on the continent. In a region in which most popular actors had been widely activated since democratization in the 1980s, why did some left-of-center governments in the 2000s elicit the organizational support of informal sector-based social movements, but not of mainstream labor unions? Why did some include *both* types of working-class actors in governing coalitions? Why did some progressive parties choose not to court *any* organized popular actor in the interest arena,<sup>3</sup> and essentially fostered only electoral popular coalitions? I will contend that the continent witnessed four types of popular sector coalitions in the post-neoliberal period: electoral (Ecuador and Chile); territorial association-based (i.e. formed by informal

policy from 2000 on can be labeled “post neoliberalism,” insofar as it was framed in ways sufficiently distinct from the prevalent orthodoxies of the 1990s.

<sup>2</sup> Following Collier and Handlin (2009a) I consider “popular actors” formal and informal wage earners, as well as self employed individuals in the lower strata, generally also part of the informal sector. Sometimes the literature, especially in Latin America, restricts the term “working class” to the organized formal sector. However, as I am referring in general to the laboring classes as opposed to the propertied, managerial, and professional classes, I use the concepts of “popular sectors” and “working class” interchangeably.

<sup>3</sup> These two dimensions of electoral and interest politics (i.e. direct interaction between economic actors and the state) correspond roughly to the great divide posed by the classic literature on pluralism and corporatism, written in the 1970s and early 1980s.



sector-based organizations, Venezuela and Bolivia); dual (i.e. constituted by *both* unions and territorial associations, Argentina and Brazil); and union/party-based (Uruguay). It is worth stressing from the outset that all left-wing governments constructed electoral popular coalitions; what varied among the four categories was whether they combined their electoral popular appeal with the crafting of interest coalitions in the policy realm with at least *some* segment of the subaltern classes, or with organizations on both sides of the informal/formal divide.

These four trajectories yield a map of popular coalitions in the region that differs from dominant comparative approaches to the period 2000–2015. The study of working-class politics in Latin America under post-neoliberalism has followed two broad paths. One main strand of the literature has analyzed the return of leftist and national-popular parties and leaders to power in the context of a neoliberal backlash beginning in the late 1990s (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Weyland et al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; de la Torre 2013b; Handlin 2017). This first camp has mostly concentrated on policy debates, and on the “radical” vs. “moderate” distinction between left-wing parties and movements. A second group of scholars has theorized the types and institutional features of popular incorporation to the polity in Latin America’s third-wave democracies (Moreno and Figueroa 2015; Silva 2017; Silva and Rossi 2018). As argued below, this second camp of “new incorporation” scholars have focused primarily on the informal sector-based social movements, and have undertheorized unions or labor-based parties, especially in the Latin American Southern Cone.

This chapter proposes a new approach to understand popular mobilization in the region based not on the type or eventual policy radicalization of left-wing parties, or exclusively on the possible incorporation of mostly informal sector-based popular constituencies or “outsiders” (see Garay, this volume), but on the formation of popular governing coalitions that could bridge (or not) the working-class insider/outsider divide. My perspective compares national coalitions in the Southern Cone and Andean Latin American countries, subregions that tend to be analyzed separately. Generally speaking, Southern Cone countries are considered to have more relevant unions and more consolidated welfare states. Andean countries, by contrast, developed larger informal sectors and smaller welfare systems. Yet, all Latin American countries that underwent popular sector (re)activation after 2000 have both formal and informal popular sectors that could be politicized, and therefore a broader comparative exercise may be useful.

Popular coalitions were crafted under what the editors of this volume conceptualize as an “inclusionary turn” in Latin America after the late 1990s. However, I will argue below that the notion of popular coalitions, especially those that include organized interests, is different from the general concept of “inclusion,” as defined by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar in the introductory chapter. Popular coalitions involve proactive crafting of national alliances with organized interests beyond specific concessions. As argued below they involve state appointments, policy inclusion, and active mobilization. This chapter will present a series of conceptual tools to understand the variations in government alliances with alternative popular constituencies in post-neoliberal Latin America. Based on a small-n comparative analysis, I argue that a sizable formal economy seems to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for labor inclusion. Yet, coalitions with informal sector-based territorial social movements emerged in countries with not only large but also relatively small, informal working classes.

Thus, a more thorough explanation should complement class structure with political variables. The first political factor is institutional and relatively straightforward: when the Left turn was led by the main labor-based parties who had historically allied with hegemonic labor confederations, as in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, the contemporary Left crafted durable interest coalitions with the mainstream union movement. The second political factor is more contingent. Interest coalitions with informal sector-based associations and social movements were rooted in the political activation of these labor market “outsiders” during the neoliberal 1990s. Territorial social movements, which would eventually join progressive governments in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela, staged high levels of anti-neoliberal contention in the protest cycles prior to the Left turn, and had largely remained external to the state during the neoliberal period.

The first section situates my study in relation to the “Left/National-Popular turn” and the “Incorporation” approaches that have dominated the literature on the political economy of the popular sectors in the last decade in Latin America. Next, I propose the idea of “variations in popular coalitions” within the framework of the “inclusionary turn” proposed by the editors of this volume. I analyze working-class reactivation in Latin America in the two main dimensions of electoral and interest politics. Next, the chapter maps alternative paths to popular sector mobilization on both sides of the formal/informal divide in Latin America between 2000 and 2015 and offers an explanation for the

different trajectories. In the final section, the chapter explores some implications of these coalitional arrangements for the future of these countries' political economies.

#### THE THEORETICAL SETTING: CRAFTING POPULAR COALITIONS IN POST-NEOLIBERAL LATIN AMERICA

The Left/populist-turn literature in Latin America has had two main vectors. It has tried to identify the type of progressive party or political leadership that was embodying the reaction to neoliberalism (see Lanzaro 2008; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; De la Torre 2013a) and has analyzed the degree of policy moderation or radicalism in each government. In particular, the political economy of the Latin American Left/populist turn has largely been assessed under the general lens of “social democratic vs. populist” (Lanzaro 2008; Weyland 2011; Flores-Macías 2012), the potentials of the commodity boom for redistribution (Murillo et. al 2011; Freytes 2015; Mazzuca, this volume), or the determinants of social policies (Handlin 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013). Other works (Niedzwiecki 2014; Garay 2017, this volume), which employ a historical perspective not restricted to the new Left, have illuminated the role played by unions and social movements in social policy expansion in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. These studies have greatly expanded our knowledge about the more interventionist states and enlarged social policies brought about by the progressive turn. Yet we still lack a general systematic assessment of the origins of different types of left-wing or populist strategies for forming popular interest coalitions – whether composed of formal working-class unions; informal sector-based social movements; or both formal and informal actors.

The new incorporation literature has analyzed the new forms of popular organization in the context of post-neoliberal, fragmented working classes. Some scholars have investigated the new forms of popular participation mainly at the local level (Goldfrank and Schrank 2009; Wampler 2010; Goldfrank 2011; see also Goldfrank this volume). Others have concentrated on national interest politics and on the political inclusion of the newly expanded informal sectors. In a seminal book, Collier and Handlin (2009b) contrast the logic of interest organization in the new community associations that flourished mostly in the informal sector with the traditional, union-based functional representation. These scholars and their collaborators have provided the most comprehensive map of the new “associationalism” in Latin America. Yet they do not

attempt to systematize its connection with national politics or left-wing governing coalitions. Moreno and Figueroa (2015); Silva (2017); and Silva and Rossi (2018), by contrast, focus on national coalitions with organized popular sectors in the post-neoliberal world. Silva conceptualizes “segmented incorporation” as the differential articulation of heterogeneous popular sectors to the political arena, “understood as the state, legislative institutions, political parties and policy” (p. 92). Yet, as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume, see also Palmer-Rubin, this volume) argue, the concept of “incorporation” classically theorized by Collier and Collier (1991, 28–29), essentially denotes the participation of formerly excluded and repressed actors in the political area, that is, “the rise of mass politics.” Silva argues that the “substance” (2017, 97) of incorporation takes place under the new left governments post-2000. However, there are many examples where such overtures were undertaken before the Left came to office. For example, CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), the hegemonic indigenous movement in Ecuador was more “incorporated” during the neoliberal era than after 2005 under the Correa presidency – whether we look at representatives in Congress, participation in policy councils, or national cabinets. Even the most rebellious groups – such as Brazil’s landless movement (MST), or Argentina’s organizations of the unemployed – despite suffering episodes of violent state repression, were, by the early 2000s, recognized as interlocutors by non-left governments, and frequently became parts of policy councils. This is not to mention the labor movement in countries like Venezuela, Argentina, or Mexico that, unlike during the initial incorporation, were established political brokers and sometimes subordinated components of neoliberal coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s (see Murillo 2001; Etchemendy 2011).

#### ASSESSING THE POLITICAL (RE)ACTIVATION OF POPULAR ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA

Thus, this chapter follows Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) in arguing that the recent political activation of the lower strata is better captured by the notion of an “inclusionary turn” that began in the late 1990s rather than viewed under the lens of “incorporation,” a concept more associated to the advent of new actors in the political arena. Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar analyze the inclusionary turn along three “top-down” dimensions: recognition, access, and resources granted to popular actors by the state. Coalitions with subaltern sectors are

obviously more likely when an inclusionary turn has enabled the legal existence of popular actors and fostered in diverse ways their participation in the polity. However, I propose that *popular coalitions* emerge when a political party or movement in government takes the popular sectors as its main, “core” constituency, and actively seeks their support in the electoral arena, and in the domain of interest politics, or in both. As Palmer-Rubin (this volume) reminds us, unlike in the mid-twentieth century, when labor-based parties organized formal workers hierarchically into peak-level confederations, in the contemporary period left-of-center parties built different types of linkages with popular organizations. Yet, it is worth stressing that this chapter studies *governing* coalitions between progressive parties and popular organizations – and more specifically with unions and social movements. As argued below, it is important to causally assess historical organizational/party linkages and subsequent coalitional patterns. I find that contemporary governing alliances do not necessarily reflect previous organizational linkages between subaltern groups and the political movements that embodied the Left turn – as evinced by the cases of *Kirchnerismo* and *Chavismo*.

In a now classic definition, Gibson (1996, 7; see also Luna 2014) identifies a party’s “core constituency” as those sectors of society “that are most important to its political agenda and resources.” Gibson explains that most conservative parties or political movements are multi-class in nature and court diverse groups, and this tends to be the case in the popular parties/movements analyzed in this chapter. Yet, he argues that “the notion of core coalitions recognizes hierarchies” (p. 7). So the first question to ask is, after the neoliberal backlash, for which parties in government did the popular sectors become a *core* coalitional partner or constituency?<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, incumbent parties/movements may look at popular sectors as a constituency in a variety of ways. The popular sectors may emerge as the main social strata on which to base electoral discursive appeals and support. In addition, left-wing parties may engage working-class organizations, such as unions or community-based movements, to negotiate and implement policies, and enhance the prospects for governability. The crucial question here is whether governments take the popular sector mainly as an electoral constituency, or rather they promote the

<sup>4</sup> Gibson’s analysis considers parties in general, that is, no matter whether they are in power or not. Here I restrict my analysis to parties (or less institutionalized political movements) that hold state power.

organization and (some degree of) mobilization of the subaltern beyond elections and in the interest arena. In the first case, in a strict sense, we are talking of electoral rather than governing coalitions.

The most central novelty with respect to the initial incorporation period at the economic-structural level is, however, the demise of import substitution industrialization (ISI), the broad sweep of recent market reforms, and the consequent trends in working-class informalization. Thus, in the interest intermediation arena, if labor unions, often allied with mass parties, were the hegemonic actors in the initial incorporation, now both labor unions *and* informal sector territorial associations may represent popular sector individuals. Collier and Handlin (2009a) and collaborators have studied most comprehensively the massive “associationalism” that has flourished throughout the region. Unlike social movements, which tend to function through single-issue politics (environment, gender, human rights), these popular associations are broader. Crucially, these organizations (be they urban associations of the unemployed or community groups or cooperatives, or indigenous rural movements etc.) are (1) defined by a certain type of *territorial anchor* (characterized by where their activists live, participate, or work), and tend to operate in the informal economy and (2) their demand-making generally involves the allocation of state economic resources, and thus it can be argued that they operate in the domain of “interest politics.” In this chapter, I use the concept of “territorial social movements” (TSMs) to differentiate more clearly those types of associations from traditional, “single-issue driven” social movements in the interest politics realm.

Collier and Handlin (2009a, 2009b) discuss extensively the alternative incentives, logics, and capacities of what they call the Union–Hub and the Association-Net. For our purpose, it is enough to state that both types of actors operate in the popular representation interest arena in post-neoliberal Latin America. Interestingly, these scholars do not restrict the “politics” of these territorial associations to the mediation or “targeting” of the state (2009b, 11). Any problem-solving community organization that engages a collectivity of individuals to bring a solution to social grievances is, in their view, “political.” This chapter seeks to explore further when and how those TSMs can become government coalitional partners.

Finally, for our initial theoretical setting, it is useful to identify the dimensions or indicators of the alternative types of popular coalitions. Electoral coalitions refer to the fact that governments target, both

discursively and practically, the lower strata to obtain their main voting support in presidential and legislative elections. Hence, governments that foster “electoral popular coalitions” should elaborate a sustained political campaign or public opinion narrative in which the popular sectors are conceived to have distinctive and (to some extent) opposed interests to those of elites or more affluent social groups. Second, governments should take a disproportionate share of their votes from the lower strata of the population.

In the realm of interest groups, governments can engage working-class organizations on three dimensions:

- (1) They can grant state positions to militants or leaders of labor unions or TSMs.
- (2) They can foster the involvement of labor unions and TSMs in the design and implementation of (generally social and/or labor) policies that benefit popular organizations or their constituencies, and induce their participation in government-sponsored policy councils.
- (3) They can promote, induce or *actively* tolerate unions and/or TSMs’ collective action. The forms of direct action may vary from public opinion or electoral campaigns or demonstrations supporting the government and confronting elite or right-wing sectors, to measures specific to each sector such as occupations or road blockades in the case of social movements, and strikes in the case of labor.

Before proceeding to the empirical sections of this chapter, some caveats are needed. First, the popular organizing in the electoral and interest arenas analyzed in this chapter is more reformist than revolutionary. Indeed, restraint in terms of direct action is often a key characteristic of governments that have elevated working-class interests relative to the neoliberal period. Second, a general level of government-sponsored class activation does not rule out internal cleavages that operate within the popular sectors. In fact, the tensions between the interests of formal and unregistered workers, or those between tradable and non-tradable sectors in collective bargaining are, in themselves, issues to explore within recent popular governing coalitions in Latin America. Finally, the three dimensions of interest coalitions (state participation, policy inclusion, and joint collective action) should be present to a minimum degree to code a case as positive. Indeed, state participation of class organizations without the dimensions of policy inclusion and collective action might be a symbol of simple co-optation rather than of some degree of mobilization.




FIGURE 9.1 Popular coalitions in post neoliberal Latin America (2000–2015)

#### MAPPING POPULAR COALITIONS IN POST-NEOLIBERAL LATIN AMERICA

Figure 9.1 maps the scope of government-sponsored popular coalitions in Latin America along the theoretical lines just sketched. The figure includes the major countries that embody the Left turn on the continent during the 2000s. At first glance, the resulting popular mobilization map yields counterintuitive results. The grouping of countries diverges from the most common comparisons drawn by the New Left/populist turn literature. For example, Ecuador and Chile, frequently scored as examples of radical and moderate left governments in the 2000s (see Weyland 2011, 74), converge in a purely electoral type of popular progressive coalition. Argentina under *Kirchnerismo* and Brazil under the PT have also been considered as polar examples of radical and more moderate left-wing policies, or populist and “social democratic” approaches (Lanzaro 2008). They present, however, very similar formats of interest group coalitions with the popular sectors. Moreover, if one considers the seminal work of Roberts (2013) on the social basis of party systems, countries with historical labor-mobilizing party systems (Bolivia, Chile) and those with elitist party systems (Venezuela, Ecuador), display very similar



popular interest coalitions in the 2000s, that is, mostly electoral in Chile and Ecuador, and TSM-based in Bolivia and Venezuela. The next sections describe in more detail and try to explain these popular mobilization patterns.

### Electoral Mobilization: Chile and Ecuador

The first group, constituted by Chile under the *Concertación* governments (2000–2010) and Ecuador under Correa (2005–2015), have promoted some degree of popular sector mobilization, but arguably only on the electoral and discursive/public opinion dimensions mentioned above. Both groups of governments have targeted the working class (though clearly in different ways) in the public opinion debate and in their quest to win elections, and in both cases these left-of-center governments tend to get, over time, disproportionately more votes in working-class areas. However, most scholars agree that in Chile the *Concertación* in general, and the Socialist-led governments in particular, have not encouraged further organizational mobilization, and have maintained cold relations with mainstream unions.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, the *Concertación* has not particularly encouraged, or engaged, grassroots organizations at the community level. The unions pressed to reform a notoriously anti-union labor law at the onset of the first Bachelet government without any success. Furthermore, the still-relevant influence of the Communist Party in many unions sowed distrust between the unions and the Socialist governments at least until the Communist Party chose to back the second Bachelet administration (see Garretón and Garretón 2010). Indeed, after 2010 the country witnessed a cycle of protests led by the student organizations, which also harbored labor, social (i.e. the end of the private pension system), and environmental demands. The movement largely outflanked the *Concertación* and its center-left parties. In the words of Roberts (2016, 126), this civil society mobilization has “articulated claims that found little expression in the mainstream party organizations that dominated electoral and policy-making arenas under the post-1990 democratic regime.”

<sup>5</sup> The *Concertación* was a political coalition formed in 1988 that included Christian Democrats and left of center parties. The *Concertación* won four successive presidential races (led by two Christian Democratic presidents and then two Socialist presidents). Here I focus on the *Concertación* governments that were headed by Socialist presidents between 2000 and 2010.

In Ecuador, the Correa government (2007–2017) was notorious for its unfriendly and adversarial relations with the most significant unions and social movements. Tensions between the “productivist” approach of the Correa government and the more participatory and environmentalist stance of the Left and (mostly indigenous) social movements started in the Constitutional Convention (2007–2008), and culminated in the resignation of Alberto Acosta, former a close ally of Correa.<sup>6</sup> Thereafter, the relations between the government and social movements turned sour. By 2010, CONAIE, Ecuador’s most powerful indigenous organization, was joining forces with the right-wing opposition. Its president denounced the criminalization of social protest and the extractive policies in mining and petroleum against the consent of local communities. Becker (2013, 44) argues that “in addition to undercutting existing organizational efforts, Correa has not used his executive power to create new spaces for grassroots social movements.” Unions for the most part contested policy exclusion. In particular, the left-wing teacher’s confederation became one of the most active opposition actors. Correa’s party PAIS remained essentially an electoral tool. De la Torre (2013b) coins the term *tecnopopulismo* to refer to the top-down, technocratic policymaking style of the Ecuadorian left-wing leader. In his words (2013a, 28), Correa’s government did not “organize the subaltern beyond elections.”

### Electoral and Territorial Social Movement Interest Mobilization: Venezuela and Bolivia

The governments of Hugo Chávez (1998–2013) in Venezuela and Evo Morales (2005–2015) in Bolivia not only articulated a general class-based discourse in the public and electoral spheres, but also stimulated the mobilization of a wide array of community organizations and social movements mostly among the informal poor of urban and rural areas. There is no question that the informal poor have been the target of Chávez’s policies and his main constituency for political support, to the point that Collier and Handlin (2009c, 318–322) suggest the possibility of a partisan “Associational Neocorporatism.” Grassroots organization promoted by *Chavismo* witnessed a series of waves and forms, starting with the *Círculos Bolivarianos* early on, and continuing with workers cooperatives, the *Misiones* and *Consejos Comunales*. The regime also

<sup>6</sup> For this period, see the excellent analysis of Ospina Peralta (2009).

TABLE 9.1 *Venezuela: territorial social movement coalitions in the interest arena***1 State participation**

TSM leader Roland Denis as Vice Minister of Planning  
 TSM members linked to the creation of Ministry for the Communal Economy

**2 Policy inclusion/government sponsored councils with organized interests**

Missions in charge of social policy that work closely with TSMs in *barrios*/neighborhoods  
 Program of workers cooperatives carry out community projects  
 Development of communal councils, which scale to the national state (2006), and administer public works and housing at the local level

**3 Collective action (main examples)**

TSMs protagonists of the counter mobilizations to thwart the 2002 coup and the 2002–2003 general strike

sponsored territorial urban associations in specific policy areas such as the Technical Water Roundtables and Urban Land Committees. The *Misiones* provide a variety of social services outside the formal ministries. The communal councils are neighborhood organizations that distribute resources for development projects and public works in communities (see Ellner 2011, 429). Both developed important linkages to TSMs at the local level.<sup>7</sup> Although the local TSMs working with communal councils can be (formally) independent, councils need to follow the *Ley de Consejos Comunales* to get resources and state access. Table 9.1 summarizes informal sector mobilization under the Chávez governments along the dimensions presented above.

Of course, though important preexisting community-based TSMs joined *Chavismo*, over time, mobilization and political organizing largely occurred “from above.” Community organizations mushroomed initially outside the *Chavista* electoral parties (although they were not autonomous from the government), and were progressively aligned with Chávez’s party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). After 2007, more radicalized, “productivist” and statist economic policy (including widespread nationalizations) and the consolidation of the PSUV as the umbrella organization of all *Chavista* groups (Ellner 2008, 2011) together narrowed the space for bottom-up grassroots

<sup>7</sup> These successive waves are well described in Ellner (2008, and specially 2011).

organization. Still, García Guadilla (2018, 61) notes that the ways in which popular organizations and social movements incorporated their demands during the period 1998–2013 “do not always respond to a dynamic strictly from above or below, sometimes they are mixed.” The key general point for my argument is, however, that Chávez promoted popular organization essentially among the *informal* popular sectors, and that this mobilization included (especially circa 1998–2007) territorial, community-group activism that was external to Chávez’s embryonic political party.

Bolivia is the second case in which a post-neoliberal government has built strong coalitions in the informal interest arena. The two main axes of this alliance have been the indigenous movements (in particular the coca growers) and the urban associations of El Alto on the outskirts of La Paz. In other words, unlike in Venezuela and Argentina (and similar to Brazil), interest coalitions with informal popular actors in Bolivia were *both* urban and rural. Despite the obvious concentration of leadership in Morales, organized and territorially-based social movements played a role in government probably unmatched in the Latin American Left turn.<sup>8</sup> The appointments of Abel Mamani, President of the Federation of Neighborhood Councils of El Alto (FEJUVE) as Minister of Water; Nemesia Achacollo from Federation of Peasant Women Bartolina Sisa (FMCBBS), as Minister of Rural Development; and Walter Villarroel from the National Federation of Cooperative Mining (FENCOMIN) as Minister of Mining are just three examples of how leaders of rural unions and social movements initially staffed important areas of government.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the negotiation of state positions, the coalition with informal popular actors crystallized in two defining moments during Morales’s initial years. First, in 2006 the most important indigenous organizations, among them the Unique Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Confederation of Settlers (CSCB), the FMCBBS, and the lowland peasants of CIDOB (Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia) coalesced into the Unity Pact. Their goal was to support the MAS project for constitutional reform. Subsequently, the government sponsored the creation of CONALCAM

<sup>8</sup> In this study I consider rural unions and coca growers that formed the MAS more a social movement than a traditional labor organization of wage earners in a firm, as most peasants are in fact informal and/or self employed workers.

<sup>9</sup> See e.g. Mangini (2007) and Do Alto (2011).

TABLE 9.2 *Bolivia: territorial social movement coalitions in the interest arena***1 State participation (examples)**

Abel Mamani (FEJUVE) Minister of Water  
 Nemesia Achacollo (FMCBBS) Minister of Rural Development  
 Walter Villagra (FENCOMIN) Minister of Mining

**2 Policy inclusion/government sponsored councils with organized interests**

Crafting of the constitutional project in the Pact of Unity  
 Discussion of regional policy and strategies vis à vis secessionist groups in CONALCAM (Coordination for Change)

**3 Collective action (main examples)**

TSMs key in the demonstrations that staged a blockade of the Congress building in order to pressure lawmakers to pass the noncontributory pension program *Renta Dignidad* in 2007  
 TSMs protagonists of the counter mobilizations to pass the new constitution and thwart secessionist groups in the Eastern provinces in 2008 2009

(Coordination for National Change) in 2007, which served to coordinate the interplay of social movements, the Executive, and the MAS legislative branch. Unlike the Unity Pact, which essentially consolidated the alliance with more traditional indigenous movements, in 2008 CONALCAM also incorporated urban territorial associations, such as cooperative workers and neighborhood councils.<sup>10</sup> Mayorga (2011, 28) argues that CONALCAM articulated “diverse sectors around high-aggregation demands,” especially those related to the passing of the new constitution. However, some organizations, such as CSUTCB (the corporatist peasant organization born out of the 1952 revolution) or the coca unions remained more tied to the core of Morales leadership. By contrast, the relation of Evo with the formal sector-based Confederation of Bolivian Workers (COB), essentially formed by miners and teachers, was “fraught with tension” and, unlike mainstream indigenous movements, traditional labor “oscillated back and forth as ally and adversary of the government” (Trujillo and Spronk 2018, 140). No major labor union leader was appointed in a top government position. Table 9.2 summarizes these dynamics.

<sup>10</sup> See Zuazo (2010, 129–130); Mayorga (2011, 25); Anria (2013).

Finally, in both Venezuela and Bolivia social movements were at the forefront of collective action, especially during key political battles – the third dimension of popular sector mobilization. *Chavista* grassroots urban movements and the Bolivarian Circles of the time played a central role in the counter-demonstrations that – along with the decisive support of the military – converged at *Miraflores* government house and brought Chávez back to power in 2002 (Roberts 2006, 142). They also demonstrated an explicit support in the two-month general strike waged by the opposition from December 2002 to January 2003. In Bolivia, in the context of the Unity Pact, indigenous social movements carried out important demonstrations to support the constitutional project and the social policy expansion of *Renta Dignidad* (Anria and Niedzwiecki 2015, 321–322). Likewise, in 2008 the MAS leadership organized a big march of the CONALCAM organizations to the eastern provinces to confront right-wing groups that threatened secession.

### Electoral and Dual (Labor Unions and Territorial Social Movements) Interest Mobilization: Argentina and Brazil

Argentina and Brazil in the 2000s constitute the two cases in which we find not only electoral working-class mobilization, but also interest politics activation of both the formal and informal sectors. *Kirchnerismo* established from the outset an odd, double alliance with mainstream corporatist unions and a significant portion of urban social movements that operated outside the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) machine. The labor movement witnessed an unlikely comeback after its decline in the neoliberal years. A labor lawyer with close ties to the union was named Labor Minister, and union and union-linked officials staffed the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Health in areas where union interests were at stake.<sup>11</sup> Most importantly, the labor movement played a pivotal role in the relaunching of sector-wide, state-oriented, collective bargaining and tripartite minimum-income councils for the private sector in general, and for teachers, rural, and domestic workers (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). This labor market offensive was backed by laws and decrees (drafted in consultation with the labor movement) that established the institutional architecture for a resurgence in centralized

<sup>11</sup> In Argentina, unions control workers' health insurance, the *obras sociales*. Union linked officials were appointed as head of the state office that regulates the system and channels subsidies to unions.

collective bargaining. The government also set up twelve tripartite sectoral councils through which the state, sectoral chambers, and unions provided resources for worker skill formation.

TSM leaders from organizations such as the Federation of Land and Housing (FTV), *Movimiento Evita* (ME), *Barrios de Pie* (BP), the *Túpac Amaru* (TA), National Federation of Work Cooperatives (CNCT), and others were also included in government (see Table 9.3) and participated in the formulation of social policy, especially in the areas of noncontributory pensions, and housing (Garay 2017, 207; Rossi 2017, 204–211). These allied TSMs were beneficiaries, and became part of the boards overseeing implementation, of programs that financed workers' cooperatives in both the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Labor. In sum, defined policy areas served as a main fulcrum in these interest politics coalitions with popular actors: labor policy/collective bargaining with the mainstream unions of the CGT, education policy and the teachers national wage council with the left-wing union confederation CTA (Argentine Workers Central, a group of mostly public sector unions that broke with the CGT in the 1990s), and cooperative programs essentially cemented the alliance of the Peronist government with the organizations of unemployed, informal workers. Table 9.3 summarizes this organizational mobilization under the Kirchners.

In Brazil the PT government also established initial interest coalitions with the largest popular organizations: CUT (Workers Unique Central) and CONTAG (National Confederation of Rural Workers) in the formal sector, and the MST (Landless Workers' Movement), and the Housing Movement mostly based in the informal popular sector. Gómez Bruera (2015) has examined how the PT used state positions and public policy involvement to cement an alliance with these actors. President Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula) appointed prominent leaders of the main workers national confederation, the CUT, as ministers in diverse areas, including labor and social security (Table 9.4). Union-linked labor ministers pushed forward the policy of systematic increase in the minimum wage, a key mechanism for social redistribution under the PT government (Schipani 2018).

CONTAG (national rural union) and MST (landless workers) also occupied several positions in the Ministry of Rural Development and the Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCRA) (see Table 9.4). Both ministries implemented programs that benefited their social movement constituencies, in particular the National Program for the Invigoration of Family Agriculture (PRONAF) delivered by the Minister of Rural

TABLE 9.3 *Argentina: union and territorial social movement coalitions in the interest arena*

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**1 State participation (examples)**

*Unions*

Labor Lawyer Carlos Tomada from union movement, Minister of Labor and Social Security  
 Antonio Luna (Railway Union) Undersecretary of Railway Transport, Ministry of Transport  
 Jorge González (Teamsters Union) Undersecretary of Auto Transport, Ministry of Transport  
 Union linked officials in charge of the Health Services Office, Ministry of Health

*Territorial social movements*

Luis D'Elia (FTV) Undersecretary of Land and Social Habitat, Ministry of Social Development  
 Emilio Pérsico (ME) Undersecretary of Family Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture  
 Jorge Ceballos (BP) Undersecretary of Popular Organization, Ministry of Social Development

**2 Policy inclusion/government sponsored councils with organized interests**

*Unions*

CGT and CTA (national labor confederations) unions participation in:

- (1) Comprehensive sector wide collective bargaining
- (2) Revitalization or creation of minimum wage councils for private and rural workers, and teachers.
- (3) Skill formation sectoral councils

*Territorial social movements*

FTV, *Movimiento Evita*, BP, CNTC, *Túpac Amaru*, involved in implementation and beneficiaries of:

- (1) *Argentina Trabaja* and workers self managed enterprises (programs for cooperatives)
- (2) Noncontributory pension programs
- (3) Housing policy

**3 Collective action (most important examples)**

Both national confederations (CGT and CTA) and TSMs (FTV, CNTC, TA, ME, BP) active in counter demonstrations in the 2008 Farm War, and in 2011 reelection campaign

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Development, which was staffed by CONTAG in key areas (Table 9.4). The expansion of PRONAF under Lula was massive, and scholars argue that it became an important source of funding for the MST (Gómez Bruera 2015, 587; see also Branford 2010, 424). Likewise, an



TABLE 9.4 *Brazil: union and territorial social movement coalitions in the interest arena***1 State appointments (examples)*****Unions***

Jaques Warner (CUT) as Minister of Labor  
 Ricardo Berzoini (CUT) as Minister of Labor  
 Luiz Marinho (CUT) as Minister of Social Security  
 CONTAG Leader Secretary of Technical Assistance, Ministry of Rural Development  
 CONTAG Leader Secretary of Rural Credit, Ministry of Rural Development

***Territorial social movements***

Clarice Dos Santos (MST) Director of Program of Education and Land Reform, National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCRA)  
 MST militants appointed at INCRA  
 MTST members appointed in the Ministries of Cities

**2 Public policy inclusion/government sponsored councils*****Unions***

Minimum wage increases sponsored by CUT labor ministers  
 Unions included in the Economic and Social Council (CDES) and sectoral social policy councils  
 CUT awarded the management of the Worker Assistance Fund (unemployment scheme)

***Territorial social movements***

MST involved in first (*Samapio*) project of Land Reform (2003–2004)  
 MST mediator in program of family agriculture (PRONAF)  
 MST involved and beneficiary of programs of rural cooperatives  
 MTST involved in the creation of Ministry of Cities, and housing program *Minha Casa, Minha Vida*

**3 Participation in demonstrations or public opinion campaigns supporting the government and confronting elite or right wing sectors**

CUT and TSMs involved in the campaign for Lula reelection in 2006 and active in counter demonstrations to defend Dilma Rousseff in 2014–2016

MST-linked official also led the National Program for Education and Land Reform, which had a fivefold budget increase under Lula. The MST was also actively involved in the first version of Lula's land reform project in 2003–2004, crafted by the prestigious agrarian specialist and PT founder Plínio Sampaio in consultation with social movements and

rural unions (Branford 2010, 419–421). Likewise, the MTST (Workers' Homeless Movement), a housing social movement based in São Paulo, participated in the Ministry for Cities and in the housing program *Minha Casa, Minha Vida*. Of course, it is difficult to measure the degree of social movement inclusion in the PT administrations as many activists wear double hats as members of the party, as well as members of unions or social movements (see Gómez Bruera 2015, 508). But there is no question that labor movement and social movement leaders played a relevant and unprecedented role in the national executive in their respective areas, and in policy implementation.

In sum, in both Argentina and Brazil, unions and informal economy-based social movements were included in the government coalition. Social actors used this platform (at least initially) to push mobilization and advance programmatic goals to some extent. In Argentina, the government ostensibly backed union strike mobilization during the collective bargaining resurgence of 2003–2007. Land occupations and strike activity also increased remarkably in the first years of the Lula administration (Branford 2010, 418). Furthermore, as in Bolivia and Venezuela, progressive governments in Argentina and Brazil sought the backing of these organized class actors in electoral contests and major political disputes with right-wing sectors. Major Argentine unions and social movements were active in the pro-government counter-mobilizations against the lockout organized by business rural organizations in 2008. In Brazil, unions and social movements publicly backed Lula's presidential reelection in 2006. They also supported President Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) by taking to the streets between 2014 and 2016 in opposition to the impeachment process.

### Electoral and Union/Party Interest Mobilization: Uruguay

Uruguay is an atypical case. After 2005, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA) governments of Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica set the stage for a union-based labor market offensive only comparable in Latin America to Argentina 2003–2015. Sector-wide bargaining and minimum-wage councils were put in place for private, public sector, and rural workers and the ministries of labor and health were staffed with union-linked officials. As in Argentina, the FA government passed through Congress – in consultation with unions and with strong opposition from the business sector – a new institutional frame for collective bargaining. On the other hand, Frente Amplio, unlike the *Concertación* in Chile, is a mass-organic party

with deep organizational roots and linkages among the informal poor that go beyond electoral campaigns (see Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Luna 2014, 249; Álvarez Rivadulla 2017) and include grassroots alliances with neighborhood and shantytown associations, squatter organizations, and the like. The difference with the countries marked by TSM mobilization is, however, that Uruguay's local associations lack any relevant autonomous voice outside the FA party. In other words, informal popular sector-based "interest" demands in Uruguay are mediated by party-community linkages. Social movements that possess (or once possessed) a certain national impact and *autonomous* demand-making vis-à-vis the government (such as the MST in Brazil, the Tupamaros in Venezuela or the *Piqueteros* in Argentina) are nonexistent in Uruguay.

#### ORIGINS OF ALTERNATIVE POPULAR SECTOR COALITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

The preceding section analyzed alternative patterns of popular coalitions in the largest Latin American countries during the post-neoliberal period. Of course, these alliances were far from stable and mutated frequently – especially given the region's weak tradition of institutionalizing interest politics. In Bolivia, for example, the direct inclusion of social movement leaders at the cabinet level circa 2005–2007 slowly faded as President Morales relied more on MAS political and intellectual cadres. Indeed, CONAMAQ and CIDOB (as opposed to the more traditional indigenous unions and the coca growers) left the formal government alliance in 2011 after the police repressed a march against the construction of a road in a national park. The government also entered into a bitter conflict with the mining cooperatives that culminated in the 2016 assassination of the Vice-Minister of the Interior by protesters. In Venezuela, government alliances with urban TSMs soon took a top-down corporatist form that severely reduced the space for social movement autonomy. In Brazil, relations between Lula and the MST cooled after the original project for land reform drafted in consultation with the rural workers' organizations was largely watered down and implemented very slowly. In Argentina, however, the alliance with TSMs strengthened with time (particularly under President Cristina Kirchner), but the powerful teamsters union broke with the government in 2012.

Overall, progressive governments did not appoint social actors' representatives in general policy areas such as the presidency, ministry of economy or finance, but did do in those more related to the economic

TABLE 9.5 *Explaining popular coalitions comprising government, unions, and TSMs: general economic-structural and political variables*

	Economic Structural	Political Institutional: Labor Legacies (unions)	Politically Contingent: Mobilization Prior to Left Turn (TSMs)		OUTCOME
	Labor market: relative size of formal economy	Main labor based party allied to mainstream union confederation leads Left turn	Contention level / participation in neoliberal governing coalition		Type of popular coalition (2000 2015)
<b>Countries</b>					
<b>Argentina</b>	Large	Yes	High	No	Dual Union TSM
<b>Brazil</b>	Large	Yes	High	No	Dual Union TSM
<b>Uruguay</b>	Large	Yes	Low	No	Union Party
<b>Bolivia</b>	Small	No	High	No	TSM based
<b>Venezuela</b>	Large	No	Medium	No	TSM based
<b>Ecuador</b>	Small	No	High	Yes	Electoral
<b>Chile</b>	Large	No	Low	No	Electoral

roles of specific organizations (i.e. labor, social, housing, or rural policy). In countries in which governments crafted the most solid interest coalitions with unions and/or informal economy-based organizations (Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay), popular economic actors rarely broke with incumbent authorities and passed to the opposition. Most allied unions and TSMs supported the left-wing governments in their first reelection attempts. For the informal economy-based urban and rural organizations (such as the indigenous movements in Bolivia, the MST in Brazil, the organizations of the unemployed in Argentina, or the grassroots community groups in Venezuela), historical victims of policy exclusion and national and local government harassment, the new environment in which repression was absent or weak constituted a considerable payoff.

Table 9.5 summarizes the main factors that help explain the alternative patterns of popular coalitions. I argue that the structure of the labor market influences the potential for alternative working-class coalitions. Comparative analysis suggests that a large formal economy by regional

standards was ultimately a necessary condition for labor coalitions. However, coalitions with outsider organizations emerged *both* in countries with large informal economies (where one would logically expect to see them) and in countries with small ones. Two critical political variables complement this economic-structural factor. One stems from institutional legacies: when the main historical labor-based party (allied with the hegemonic labor confederations) led the Left turn, as in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, interest coalitions with organized labor were the norm. The second political factor is related to the trajectories of informal social movements prior to the Left turn: TSMs that had engaged in high levels of anti-neoliberal mobilization during the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, and had largely remained external to the state, were systematically courted by progressive governments. This is the case of dominant TSMs in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela. These factors also explain why, despite their many differences, the Left in Chile and Ecuador only organized at the electoral level; in Chile, TSMs were weakened during the 1990s, whereas in Ecuador they were seriously tarnished by their participation in neoliberal governments. The next two sections describe these trajectories and elaborate on the causal mechanisms underlying the hypothesized relations.

### **The Structural Dimension of the Working Class: Size of Formal Sector and Unemployment**

Perhaps the most obvious structural factor that may affect the coalitional strategies of progressive governments regarding different working-class actors is the size of the formal/informal sector and the levels of unemployment. A straightforward initial hypothesis would propose that in countries with relatively high levels of working-class formalization (and potentially, of unionization), left-of-center governments need to govern wage-setting and administer labor conflict for this relevant constituency and thus they will reach out to the labor movement. In countries where the formal sector is small (and hence union activation less likely) and “shadow” economies are large, or in which a large part of the working population is unemployed, the Left will turn to TSM-led mobilization.

Figure 9.2 presents data on levels of formalization (left axis, measured as the percentage of the adult population that does not pay social security taxes) and unemployment (right axis) when pro-working-class governments took power.




FIGURE 9.2 Informality and unemployment at the year of Left turn (percentages). Socio Economic database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank, [www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/en/estadisticas/sedlac/](http://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/en/estadisticas/sedlac/), accessed June 23, 2019. )

The figure suggests that the first part of the hypothesis is more plausible: union mobilization is carried out in countries with larger formal economies. Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay display some degree of union mobilization and are countries of moderate informality by regional standards. We find no union mobilization under the Left turn in countries with high levels of informality. These data would also suggest that high initial levels of unemployment (more than 10 percent, for example, in Argentina and Uruguay) does not preclude union mobilization and, conversely, low unemployment (for example in the Andean countries) does not favor it. This is entirely logical: What matters for union mobilization in Latin America is not so much whether workers are employed but whether they are registered in the formal sector and can therefore be more easily organized. Venezuela and Chile, with moderate and low levels of informality are, of course, outliers in this initial explanation. As argued below, political variables should complement class structure for a more thorough account. In brief, a relatively large formal economy seems to be a necessary but insufficient condition for labor coalitions.

The second part of this general structural hypothesis would posit that in countries with large informal economies, left-wing governments have stronger incentives to form alliances with the more important and larger territorially-based community organizations. The data do not lend support to this proposition. Interest coalitions with TSMs occur with both high and moderate levels of informality. Countries with high levels of informality in the region (which also tend to have larger indigenous populations) – which should induce, in principle, coalitions with associations that organize this broad portion of the subaltern class, such as Ecuador – witnessed no government-sponsored TSM activation in the 2000s. Conversely, we find TSM coalitions in countries with moderate levels of informality, such as Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina. Informal sector-based social movement mobilization (either rural or urban) is, I argue, unrelated to this more structural variable, and driven by more political and historical factors.

### **The Political Dimension: Labor Institutional Legacies and the Trajectory of TSMs in the Anti-Neoliberal Struggle**

**Government–Union Interest Coalitions and Labor-Based Parties.** Where the main traditional labor-based party led the Left turn, as in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, governments crafted interest coalitions with the mainstream union movement, denoted by state participation, policy

inclusion, and joint collective action. In these three cases party-labor alliances were forged before the neoliberal period. The hegemonic or main labor confederation in each country, the CGT in Argentina, the CUT in Brazil, and the PIT-CNT in Uruguay had been historical allies of the Peronist Party, the PT, and the FA, respectively. Although the labor movement had grown more autonomous from the party during the 1990s, especially in Argentina and Uruguay (see Levitsky 2003; Luna 2014, 234), important institutional ties and ideological identifications remained in place. In Brazil, the PT grew out of union militants (who would eventually form the CUT) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the leadership of both organizations overlapped (Keck 1992). In both Brazil and Uruguay, the bonds between the labor movement and the party solidified in opposition to neoliberalism during the 1990s. In Argentina, mainstream unions had far less weight than they had once enjoyed in the Peronist party. Yet most CGT and CTA leaders identified themselves as Peronists, and unions are still part of the life of the Peronist party at the local/district level. In sum, only the main and traditional labor-based parties that headed the Left turn also consolidated national coalitions with formal sector unions in the 2000s.

Thus, unlike in the case of TSMs who build government alliances with both established (Peronism or the PT) or new political movements (*Chavismo* or the MAS, see Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 12–13), in the case of labor unions the type of party that commanded the Left turn is more decisive. Historically more institutionalized alliances between a populist party and the labor movement better explain the emergence of government–union coalitions than a prior period of political activation (as is the case with informal social movements). Typically, anti-neoliberal contention in Latin America was led by social movements, not by mainstream (especially private sector) unions, despite the fact that they were the main victims of deregulation, formal sector shrinking and layoffs. However, in nations where the formal sector is still moderately large, registered workers became a central constituency. Plus, where the labor movement had historical roots in the Left turn parties, mainstream unions became important coalition partners to achieve governability. Argentina and Uruguay established neo-corporatist, state-oriented, and centralized income policies. Their economic and monetary policy were more expansive than in Chile, Bolivia, or Brazil, for which union cooperation was essential. In Brazil the PT–CUT coalition sponsored systematic increases in the minimum wage as its main, union-backed income policy (see Schipani 2018).



Neither in Chile nor in Venezuela (two countries with a history of union mobilization) did the main labor-based party aligned with a hegemonic worker's confederation lead the Left turn. In Chile, the Socialist Party, which headed the *Concertación* governments in the 2000s, could no longer be labeled a labor-based party. For one, Chile's main labor-backed party was the Communists, which increased its influence in the CUT during the 2000s (Schipani 2018) but remained out of the center-left coalition. Second, the absence of union mobilization under the *Concertación*, even in the context of a small informal labor force, cannot be understood without considering the Pinochet dictatorship's massive assault on the labor movement and its legacy of institutional and market weakness (Etchemendy 2011). Unlike in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, Pinochet-era reforms (deregulating employment protection, banning collective bargaining beyond the plant-level, and allowing for worker's replacements in strikes) severed all of the institutional legacies of the pre-neoliberal order. The labor movement was just too fragmented and detached from center-left parties to become an attractive coalitional partner for the *Concertación*.

Likewise, in Venezuela, the mainstream union movement was entirely tied to the *Punto Fijo* system and was therefore from the outset an unlikely partner for an outsider like Chávez. Indeed, progressive forces such as the MAS in Bolivia, Alianza PAIS in Ecuador, or *Chavismo* in Venezuela, had to construct union ties "from scratch," and even when they tried, as in the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, they faced important political and institutional barriers. The absence of national labor coalitions is understandable in this context.

**TSMs: Political Activation in the Anti-Neoliberal Struggle.** A more systematic explanation of popular coalitions in the post-neoliberal period should complement the structure of the labor market and the institutional legacies of labor parties just analyzed with a more contingent political dimension. This chapter argues that the trajectory of informal sector-based organizations in the neoliberal era, in particular the political activation of important social movements prior to the Left turn, are key to explaining the eventual TSM interest coalitions with progressive governments. All the countries in which new Left-turn leaders ultimately formed alliances with TSMs are also cases that had witnessed in the 1990s high levels of anti-neoliberal activism by either informal popular sectors or the unemployed. This mobilization largely sidelined the established party system and manifested in diverse types of "contentious politics" (marches, road blockades, riots) typical of popular sectors that operate outside the formal economy, and often on the margins of the political system.

Unfortunately, there are no regional or global institutional data on “contention” comparable to the statistics that measure strike activity for the formal sector. Yet, few comparative social movement analysts or scholars of Latin America would dispute that in Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Brazil, informal sector-based TSMs were key in the waves of anti-neoliberal protests prior to the Left turn. In perhaps the most comprehensive empirical analyses on the subject, Almeida (2007, 128) argues that a wave of anti-neoliberal forms of collective action swept Latin America between 1995 and 2001. In his dataset, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia (in that order) are the top-ranked countries in South America in terms of number of “anti-neoliberal protest campaigns” during this period (Almeida 2007, 133). Although Almeida does not clearly distinguish between working-class groups, and union-led and social movement-led contention, he argues that most protests are organized by public employees, students, peasants, and “community, neighborhood and indigenous groups” (2007, 129). In the most ambitious study of anti-neoliberal contention in the region, Silva (2009) codes Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador as countries of high contention in which various organized informal sector-based groups confronted neoliberalism in the streets during the 1990s and early 2000s, as opposed to the no-conflict cases of Uruguay and Chile.

My argument, illustrated in Figure 9.3, is that though contention is the starting point, the paths that shaped eventual TSM coalitions in the post-neoliberal period were essentially two. In the cases of Argentina and Venezuela, urban social movements independent of political parties mushroomed and became politically active in the second part of the 1990s as pro-market governments lost legitimacy. In the cases of Brazil and Bolivia, rural and urban social movements converged under the umbrella of progressive electoral parties before the left took power. This trajectory echoes what Garay (2017, this volume) has called “social movement coalitions” (i.e. alliances between outsider social movements, parties, and sometimes unions), which often predate the Left turn of the 2000s. In both the “independent” and “party alliance” roads to informal sector-based popular coalitions, progressive governments needed the support of social movements that had gained broad legitimacy in their fight against repression, and both bolstered and eventually threatened their own capacity to govern.

In Argentina, the social movements of the unemployed, the most important of which would join the Kirchners’ governments, were active in the unrest that led to the fall of the governments of De La Rúa (1999–2001) and Duhalde (2000–2002) (see Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Garay 2007; Rossi 2017). Likewise, Silva (2009, 221) notes that, after the




FIGURE 9.3 Political activation of territorial social movements and trajectories under neoliberalism (1990–2000/5)

urban rebellion known as the *Caracazo* (1989) and its reverberations, “a second wave of anti-neoliberal contention gripped Venezuela during the Caldera (1994–98) presidency,” embodied by public sector unions, students, and “neighborhood associations.” In the same vein, López Maya (2005, 98) points out that contention in Venezuela was high throughout the 1990s. However, “confrontational” protests increased dramatically in the second half of the 1990s, and the overwhelming majority of them were motivated by socioeconomic concerns. Unlike in Argentina (and Bolivia and Brazil), where contention was clearly staged by larger organized social movements with a broader territorial reach, in Venezuela smaller groups, generally restricted to a group of urban *barrios* or neighborhoods (such as the *Tupamaros* of western Caracas), were an important, but not unique, ingredient of these general anti-neoliberal protests.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The convergence of the community urban movements with *Chavismo* since the mid to late 1990s is well described in Ciccariello’s (2013) *We Created Chavez* and Fernandes’s (2010) *Who can stop the Drums?*

In Bolivia, the MAS rode the cycle of popular protests led by indigenous movements and urban-based TSMs that swept the country after 2000, and resulted in the resignation of two presidents: Sánchez de Lozada in the Gas War of 2003, and Carlos Mesa in the turmoil of June–July 2005 (Stefanoni and Do Alto 2006, 9; Zuazo 2010, 125; Anria 2013, 27). Originating as a “regional” party of the coca growers’ Federation of the Chapare region in 1998–1999, the MAS soon reached out to other indigenous movements to form a party of peasant organizations (Madrid 2012, 54). After 2002, and in the midst of the social dislocations that began with the “Water War” in 2000 in Cochabamba, the MAS sought to penetrate the cities through a new discursive appeal (more nationalist and less “ethnic”) and a formal alliance with urban popular organizations, especially those of El Alto in the outskirts of La Paz (Anria 2013, 32). Both the original peasant unions and new (more recent and less organic) urban grassroots associations of El Alto such as FEJUVE and Regional Workers Central (COR) would form the backbone of the government-sponsored interest coalitions after 2005 described above.

In Brazil, the informal sector-based landless movement, the MST, launched the most important contention cycle in its history in the 1995–2000 period, largely triggered by the violent state repression and massacres of Corumbiara (1995) and Eldorado dos Carajás (1996). For the first time the MST, born in Rio Grande do Sul, became active in the Northeast. CONTAG, the massive union that also organizes informal rural workers, supported many of these struggles. Land invasions increased markedly in this period (Ondetti 2006, 47–48; Carter 2010, 194–195). The Cardoso government responded by stepping up its land reform program. Although the MST was founded separately from the PT – unlike the CUT, whose leaders were core party cadres – they shared base-level electoral and social activism with the party, which backed these struggles for agrarian reform (Carter 2010, 205).

In sum, in the “party alliance” path of Brazil and Bolivia, coalitions of electoral parties and social movements formed or consolidated prior to the Left turn in contexts in which the informal popular sector was very politicized. By contrast, in Venezuela and Argentina, largely urban TSMs mobilized with a discourse of neoliberal repudiation; they did so independently of electoral parties and emerging political leaders. Yet, these TSMs ultimately converged decisively with *Kirchnerismo* and *Chavismo* when these governments took office. Still, both in the independent and in the party alliance paths, contention shaped the increasing political

prominence and legitimacy of TSMs in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. Left incumbents knew that interest coalitions with activated informal sector-based social movements were important to (1) secure governability in contexts of high prior mobilization and (2) garner support for future political battles against the economic elite and the mainstream media.

Ecuador stands out as a deviant case in this trajectory. From the massive upheaval that blocked roads and commercial transport in the early 1990s, to the riots that ousted Ecuadorian presidents Abdalá Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2000, the indigenous movement led by CONAIE became a key player in the cycles of contention between 1990 and 2002. At the same time, however, in 1996 CONAIE launched its political party, Pachakutik, which enjoyed considerable success. Thus, the indigenous movement in Ecuador was arguably the most powerful and institutionalized of the indigenous/informal sector-based movements analyzed in this study during the neoliberal 1990s (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). It was represented in national councils for development (Bowen 2011) and Congress, appointed ministers early in the Bucaram government, and participated actively in the Constitutional Convention of 1998 (Van Cott 2005, 125–126). However, its political alliances would jeopardize its future as a viable coalitional partner in the post-neoliberal era. First, CONAIE leaders participated in the coup against Mahuad in January 2000 in coalition with a sector of army officials, which for many stained the democratic credentials of the indigenous movement. Second, and most crucially, in 2002 CONAIE-Pachakutik established an electoral front with Lucio Gutiérrez (their prior ally in the 2000 coup) and became a central part of his government. CONAIE-Pachakutik negotiated key cabinet positions – the ministers of interior, agriculture, education, foreign relations and tourism (Van Cott 2005, 136). The alliance lasted only six months and Pachakutik left the government when the first austerity measures were introduced. However, by the time Gutiérrez himself was toppled by popular protests in 2006 (which now largely *sidelined* the indigenous movement) CONAIE's legitimacy has been seriously tarnished. The damage to CONAIE-Pachakutik provoked by its tainted participation in governments during the neoliberal era, in particular under Gutiérrez, cannot be overstated. Ramírez Gallegos (2010, 87) writes that CONAIE “was the hegemonic actor in the popular camp until its participation in the government of Gutiérrez” (see also Ospina Peralta 2009).

In short, seen through a comparative lens, two factors help explain the absence of a left government–TSM interest coalition in Ecuador, despite

the centrality of the informal sector-based CONAIE in the cycles of anti-neoliberal contention. First, unlike the rural social movements in Brazil and Bolivia, CONAIE never built an enduring alliance with an urban-based progressive political party or important TSM – indeed by 2002 it fell back to an “ethnic public agenda,” which hindered its prospects in the coastal provinces (Ramírez Gallegos 2010, 88; see also Madrid 2012; 103–104). TSMs in Argentina were urban from their origins. In Brazil and Bolivia, rural TSMs formed enduring alliances, or coalesced, with urban parties. In all these cases the urban influence enhanced the political clout of social movements. Second, and more important for my general argument, unlike politically activated TSMs in Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil, which largely remained *external actors* to the state prior to the Left turn, CONAIE became part of national alliances and governments during the neoliberal era. Thus, it was largely seen as part of the discredited political class in Ecuador after the fall of Gutiérrez and was associated with the years of political and economic instability.<sup>13</sup> In brief, TSMs that joined progressive governments had been active in the anti-neoliberal cycles of protest and had largely remained external to governing coalitions prior to the Left turn.

Finally, informal sector-based, anti-neoliberal contention was absent in the cases of Chile and Uruguay in the 1990s, where no TSM–government interest coalitions would take shape under the Left turn. There is an abundant literature about Chile that describes how a robust social movement of the urban poor, which led the protests against Pinochet in the 1980s, was later encapsulated and demobilized by the *Concertación* during the 1990s (see Hipsher 1994; Schneider 1995, among others). This urban poor movement was just not a relevant actor in the 2000s, including when the Socialists assumed the presidency for the first time. Likewise, popular organizational atomization was even more pronounced in the Chilean rural sector after radical neoliberal reforms (Kurtz 2004).

In Uruguay, independent national social movements never coalesced outside the networks of the left-wing FA during the neoliberal 1990s. A large informal sector-based squatter movement did unfold in the Montevideo area during that period and peaked in 1990 and 1994–1995 amid a wave of land invasions. In the most comprehensive study on the topic, Álvarez Rivadulla (2017) shows that the squatter

<sup>13</sup> In the words of a leader of a rival organization FEINE, people were dissatisfied with CONAIE’s “ethnocentrism” (i.e. incapacity to reach urban sectors) and “alliance with neoliberal parties” (quoted in Van Cott 2005, 138).

movement was in fact channeled and mediated by political parties, especially the FA. She argues that the fact that FA started to compete for the informal poor vote and won the city of Montevideo after 1989, catalyzed the wave of land seizures. Most of these invasions were, however, brokered by activists of the FA factions, especially the MPP,<sup>14</sup> Communists, and Socialists, who actually negotiated the land settlements with the city government. The movement had largely waned when the FA took office in 2005 (Álvarez Rivadulla 2017, 13, 39, 140–145). Unlike in Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, or Bolivia, these TSMs never challenged the neoliberal order at a national level or bypassed the party system.

#### POPULAR COALITIONS: ASSESSING MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

The primary goals of this chapter have been (1) to conceptualize alternative forms of popular coalitions among Latin America's progressive governments in the 2000s and (2) to offer a plausible set of factors that help explain these different trajectories. A further question becomes, what were the consequences of these alternative interest and electoral alliances for the countries' political economies? I point to three implications that may constitute avenues for future research.

#### **Bridging the Insider/Outsider Divide**

A burgeoning comparative political economy literature for developed countries (e.g. Rueda 2007; Thelen 2014) argues that popular parties often advance the interests of the "insiders" (formal working class) that have high political clout against those of the atomized outsiders, that is, part-time, informal, or unemployed workers. In Latin America, in the "dual" cases of Argentina and Brazil, plus Uruguay, formal and informal sectors' popular organizations converged into progressive governing coalitions. One could argue that these cases present combined benefits for the working class *across* the formal and informal divide in a way unmatched in other Left-turn cases. In these cases, economic and institutional improvements for the formal unionized sector were introduced, for example, state-oriented centralized collective bargaining in Argentina

<sup>14</sup> The MPP, the most radical faction of the FA, was formed by former members of the Tupamaros. Its leader, Jorge Zabalza was particularly active in the squatter movement. See Álvarez Rivadulla (2017, 141–142).

and Uruguay, and through the increase in the minimum wage in Brazil. They have also developed quite expansive policies catered to the informal sector, such as the flagship conditional cash transfer programs of *Bolsa Familia* (Brazil), *Asignación Universal por Hijo* (Argentina), and *Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social* – PANES (Uruguay), plus other antipoverty programs such as noncontributory pensions and those directed at workers cooperatives (see Garay 2017, this volume; Hunter, this volume). The issue is worth exploring, but it seems that in dual and union–party interest intermediation, governing coalitions have countered popular sector fragmentation and the insider–outsider dilemma to an important degree.

### Political Survival: The Importance of Institutionalizing Social Embeddedness

What are the consequences of electoral and interest coalitions for the political sustainability of new left projects? After 2015, the Left wave receded in the continent: center-right or non-left parties won elections in Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador, and President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in Brazil. It could be argued that the three “survivors,” left parties in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Venezuela (though this latter case is more problematic, as after 2015 the country slipped out of the democratic frame) are cases of socially-embedded political organizations, well beyond the purely electoral sphere. In addition, interest organizations (i.e. territorial community movements and/or unions) are well integrated in diverse ways into these popular electoral parties. As shown above, in Chile and Ecuador incumbent left-wing parties rejected social mobilization, and the PT has mutated into a model of electoral party (see Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Hunter 2015) that downplayed social mobilization once in government. In Argentina, *Kirchnerismo*, on the other hand, never institutionalized (even when it was hegemonic) its relation with unions and social movements. Organized popular actors, while mostly still under the (broad) umbrella of Peronism, are far from tied to the left-wing Kirchner faction. In sum, although political survival has many dimensions, one could speculate that social embeddedness (including social coalitions operating under the aegis of broad electoral parties or fronts, as with the PSUV, FA, and MAS, and to a lesser extent Peronism) offers an important asset to resist challenging political times. Conversely, in the cases in which left-wing governments rejected popular interest coalitions (Ecuador and Chile) or failed to consolidate them well under



the aegis of a governing party (Brazil), the right found more fertile terrain in the lower classes to stage its counterattack after 2015.

### Policy Performance

What are the consequences of the inclusion of organized popular actors for public policy? In some areas, notably social and labor policy, the inclusion of organized interests, both formal and informal, frequently enhanced the reach, efficiency, and enforcement of government programs and income policies (Etchemendy and Collier 2007; Garay 2017). In other cases, policy inclusion may have had less positive effects. Transport policy in Argentina and mining policy in Bolivia are examples in this respect: the state inclusion of representatives of sectoral unions in Argentina and of the mining cooperatives in Bolivia occasionally produced erratic government initiatives and policy capture by private interests. Thus, a more systematic analysis across different policy areas is needed to sort out vices and virtues of the inclusion of organized interests in popular coalitions.

### CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to systematize and explain the origins of alternative types of governmental coalitions with working-class actors – both formal and informal – in a particular stage of what Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) conceptualize as the inclusionary turn in Latin America. I have assessed the occurrence of government-sponsored popular coalitions in the electoral sphere and in the interest arena (which entailed both formal and informal actors in the subdimensions of state participation, public policy inclusion, and joint collective action). Overall, a structural factor (the enduring importance of the formal economy) and institutional legacies (where labor-based parties traditionally allied with hegemonic labor confederations) largely explain union–party interest coalitions in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In the case of TSMs more contingent political factors are at stake. The TSMs that were active in the struggle against economic liberalization, and had *not* participated in the neoliberal governments of the 1990s, eventually turned into attractive coalitional partners for progressive forces; this was true both of TSMs that operated independently from electoral forces (Argentina, Venezuela) and those that were included in party alliances (Bolivia, Brazil).

After 2015, non-left parties in Argentina, Chile and Ecuador, plus different types of democratic reversals in Venezuela and Brazil, threatened the social policy improvements and working-class empowerment experienced during the 2000s. In Argentina, a new center-right government implemented a harsh monetary policy adjustment, and has undermined some of the financial basis of the welfare state rebuilt in the 2000s. The initially “moderate” approach of the Macri government (elected in 2015) soon mutated in outright right-wing policies. In Brazil, the slide to the right has been even more pronounced. Temer’s government (2016–2018) passed regressive social and labor reforms in the areas of subcontracting and union finances. Furthermore, Lula’s dubious imprisonment in 2018 paved the way for the election of a right-wing extremist, Jair Bolsonaro. While popular organizations anchored in both the formal and informal sectors are still active in Brazil and Argentina (extracting some policy concessions from the Macri government in Argentina), social regression was evident in both countries.

In Uruguay and Bolivia, by contrast, popular interest coalitions became more institutionalized in left-wing parties and have been more successful in navigating hostile times under democratic regimes. Mainstream indigenous social movements in Bolivia, and a powerful, unified labor movement in Uruguay, are still part of functioning, left-wing party coalitions – although in Bolivia both party and movements have been unable to find an alternative to the leadership of Evo Morales.

Viewed comparatively, even in cases where there have been challenges for the Left and its organized social base, it is hard to imagine a demobilization and disarticulation of popular sector actors and coalitions established in the 2000s. In most cases unions and TSMs, empowered in the popular coalitions between 2000 and 2015, are likely to be an important part of the political landscape in the years to come.

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## After Corporatism

### *Party Linkages with Popular Sector Organizations in Neoliberal Latin America*

Brian Palmer Rubin

#### INTRODUCTION

Democratic representation is fundamentally shaped by linkages between political parties and interest organizations. In mid-twentieth-century Latin America, the major innovation in party–organization linkages was corporatism, a system that incorporated peak-level labor confederations into political parties. As corporatism has decayed in recent decades, efforts by new left-wing parties to broaden organizational linkages have redefined who has a voice in policymaking. The most successful leftist parties formed since 1970 innovated in the types of linkages that they built with interest organizations, including labor and other corporatist “insiders,” as well as populations that were excluded from earlier corporatist institutions. For instance, the PT (Workers Party) in Brazil built a novel coalition between a dissident labor movement and a spectrum of urban associations and NGOs that emerged in the later years of this country’s military dictatorship. And the Bolivian MAS (Movement for Socialism) swept to power in the 2000s during a cycle of protest combining indigenous movements, neighborhood associations, and organized labor.<sup>1</sup>

The linkages constructed by these late-twentieth-century parties – as well as other successful leftist parties in Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela – contrast with the ways that the organized popular sectors had been incorporated into mid-twentieth-century mass parties. The earlier labor-mobilizing parties in Argentina, Peru, Mexico, and

<sup>1</sup> For expansions of the many acronyms used in this chapter, see chapter appendix.

Venezuela built ties with labor-market insiders that were hierarchically organized into peak-level confederations, and with similarly structured peasant confederations in the latter two cases. These linkages conferred extensive “inducements” to the organizations through mandatory membership requirements, state subsidies, preferential access to welfare state benefits and, most centrally, a voice in economic policy – yet also introduced important “constraints” over organizations’ activities (Collier and Collier 1979). In contrast, contemporary parties of the Left built ties with a wider variety of organizations, including economic interests that were excluded from corporatism, such as landless peasants, informal sector workers, and the unemployed, as well as identity and territorially rooted groups like squatters’ associations and indigenous movements. Further, linkages today tend to be decentralized, intermittent, and transactional compared with the complex and intimate institutional arrangements under mid-twentieth-century state corporatism (Collier and Handlin 2009).

Given this transformation, what degree of political influence is afforded to today’s popular sector organizations through party linkages? A skeptic may point out that even the most highly “linked” contemporary parties, such as the PT and MAS, do not rely on these organizations to the same degree as mid-twentieth-century mass parties depended on organized labor. Campaigns are increasingly driven by mass media appeals and direct clientelistic ties between parties and voters rather than mass mobilization through party-incorporated organizations (Roberts 2002; Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Perhaps today’s left-wing parties rely less on popular sector organizations than they did half a century ago and thus offer minimal resources and policy access in return?

A central premise in this chapter is that contemporary interest organizations continue to offer important electoral resources to political parties. Organizations coordinate networks of politically active citizens, capable of mobilizing voters and organizing ground campaigns. And organizational ties can lend ideological coherence and programmatic commitments to a party seeking to establish a “brand” (Lupu 2014) as a representative of specific class interests. At the same time, organizational linkages can be (and sometimes have been) mechanisms of inclusion for marginalized groups, offering representatives of previous outsider populations a sustainable voice in the policies that shape the well-being of the popular classes. The very fact of being recognized as constituencies and coming into regular contact with party operatives lends legitimacy to groups that had previously taken a backseat to labor-market insiders.



Crucially, these linkages shape organizations' potential to hold party allies to policy commitments. Thus, these party linkages are potential explanatory factors for the expansion of the welfare state (Garay 2016, this volume; Pribble 2013), the recognition of indigenous autonomy regimes (Yashar 2005; Eisenstadt 2011) and the adoption of novel institutions for local and sectoral policy participation (Goldfrank, this volume; Mayka and Rich, this volume).

The potential for popular sector organizations to capitalize on party linkages in this way, however, depends on the character of the linkage itself. Party–organization linkages further inclusion when they not only generate benefits for specific organizations, but also promote policies that produce “recognition, access, or resources” (Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume) for the broader populations that organizations purport to represent. I label such linkages *programmatic*. In contrast, *patronage-based* linkages, wherein the main benefits accruing to the organization are excludable private goods for members, do not further inclusion.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter probes the explanations for the emergence of programmatic and patronage-based party linkages in two distinct empirical terrains. First, I build a typology of party–organization linkages around the universe of successfully consolidated left-wing parties in Latin America since the 1970s (Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution], Uruguay's FA [Broad Front], and Venezuela's PSUV [United Socialist Party of Venezuela]) and inductively identify patterns of party traits that potentially shape linkage type. This exercise suggests that parties with bureaucratized structures including formal rules for incorporating organizational allies in party leadership at their founding were most successful at sustaining inclusive ties. Further, the availability of a major segment of the labor movement in the party's founding coalition bodes well for the institutionalization of spaces for programmatic influence.

In the remainder of the chapter, I analyze Mexico's PRD, a party that has achieved electoral success over its three-decade existence, despite having been formed without access to a significant segment of the labor

<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere in this volume, contributors discuss *patronage* arrangements between left wing governments and popular sector populations or organizations as facets of the inclusionary turn (Dunning and Novaes, this volume; Mazzuca, this volume, Pop Eleches, this volume). Concurring with a history of scholarship on clientelism, however, I consider patronage exchange at least as fundamentally a tactic of top down coercion and demobilization as one of securing welfare for society's worse off (Scott 1969; Fox 1994; Auyero 1999).

movement. The PRD thus stands as a hard case for left-wing party building, as it relied disproportionately on outsider popular sector organizations, such as urban popular movements, peasant organizations, and indigenous organizations. I observe significant *subnational* and *over-time* variation in the patterns of linkages that the PRD has formed with these organizations, ranging from intermittent patronage-based mobilization to neo-corporatist linkages offering lasting programmatic influence.<sup>3</sup> I find that the emergence of durable programmatic linkages between the PRD and peasant organizations in the state of Michoacán can, in fact, be explained by the same factors associated with the “neo-corporatist” party–organization linkage type present in Brazil and Uruguay.

#### VARIETIES OF POPULAR SECTOR LINKAGES IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA

Collier and Collier (1991, 7) defined labor incorporation – which took place between the 1920s and 1940s in most Latin American countries – as “the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement.” Incorporation had two dimensions (1991, 161): the development of state institutions for mediating labor relations, and the adoption of new modes of articulating labor into party systems. Both the involvement of the state in representing popular sector productionist interests and the formal politicization of the popular classes were novel for Latin American states, emerging from oligarchic regimes that had offered little formal representation of the popular sectors.

It is difficult to envision a comparable phenomenon today. The devotion of Latin American states to a market-led economic model compromises their ability to offer the same level and type of inducements to the organized popular sectors. And the popular sector organizations that have ascended in importance since the late twentieth century are more

<sup>3</sup> The presence of multiple linkage types by the same political party has previously been limited to studies of right wing parties (Luna 2014; Thachil 2014), which have an advantage in that they tend to sustain durable programmatic ties to “resource rich yet vote poor” (Kitschelt 2000, 849) core constituencies (i.e. the middle and upper classes), allowing them to appeal to non core popular sector constituencies with clientelist linkages. My analysis of the PRD varies in three ways: first, this is a left wing party; second, I observe linkages to interest organizations rather than to individual voters; and third, the focus is on this party’s multiple linkage types across subnational units rather than across segments of the electorate.

diverse and locally rooted, offering challenges to higher-level interest aggregation. Scholars have thus depicted a decline in corporatist interest representation (the “Union–Party Hub” or UP-Hub), and the emergence of a new “interest regime.” Referred to as “associational networks” (or A-Net) by Collier and Handlin (2009), the new pattern consists of a diverse array of interest organizations that are organized less hierarchically than union confederations and execute a wider variety of functions independent of the state or political parties. A-Net organizations typically represent economic groups that were outsiders under corporatism (e.g. informal sector workers, landless peasants), or geographic (neighborhood) or other groups built around non-materialist identities (indigenous, women, human rights).

While the disengagement of peak-level organizations from often-stifling corporatist ties provides greater *autonomy* over demands and strategy, the cessation of state subsidies and compulsory membership have left organizations more *precarious* (Kurtz 2004; Collier and Handlin 2009). Organizations – both those that have carried over from the corporatist period and A-Net groups – have struggled to secure financial resources, sustain ample membership rolls, and coordinate in collective activities to pressure the state. Facing these challenges, many organizations turn to external actors – quite often political parties – that offer material benefits in exchange for campaign support. When dependency on political parties reaches an extreme, the organization may convert into a clientelist machine, abandoning its programmatic goals.

Thus, party–organization linkages in contemporary Latin American democracies contain two quite distinct dynamics: programmatic interest representation and patronage exchange. Organizations further their *programmatic* goals through parties by consulting on party platforms, engaging in state consultative institutions established by party allies, and by lobbying for policies that stand to benefit not only their members, but broader populations such as small-scale farmers or citizens living in informal housing. Organizational clientelism, on the other hand, secures a source of *patronage* benefits – disaggregable distributive programs, jobs, or handouts – that the leader delivers to members as selective benefits (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015). This brokerage may ensure organizational survival, but often at the expense of the organization’s programmatic influence.

Left-wing parties in Latin America today vary significantly both in the *degree* of organizational incorporation and in *type* of policy access – accentuating either programmatic influence or patronage brokerage.

*Main Benefits to Organizations*

		<i>Programmatic Influence</i>	<i>Patronage Brokerage</i>
<i>Organizational Embeddedness</i>	<i>High</i>	Neo Corporatist <i>PT (Brazil)</i> <i>FA (Uruguay)</i>	Organizational Machine <i>PSUV (Venezuela)</i>
	<i>Low</i>	Movement Party <i>MAS (Bolivia)</i>	Contingent Support <i>PRD (Mexico)</i>

FIGURE 10.1 Varieties of party organization linkages

Figure 10.1 lays out a typology of party–organization linkages, varying along two dimensions. First is the *main type of benefit* that accrues to the organization through the exchange. Organizations may primarily receive patronage benefits, acting as intermediaries for discretionary distributive programs, government contracts, or jobs for members. In this way, organization leaders serve as the electoral brokers discussed in Stokes et al. (2013) and Dunning and Novaes (this volume). Parties may also open space for the organization to wield programmatic influence over broader economic policies. It is common for organizations to combine programmatic participation with patronage brokerage. To the degree that programmatic participation is sustained, a linkage is classified in the latter category. Second is the degree of *organizational embeddedness*, which entails how much the organization is subsumed into the party apparatus. Embeddedness increases when organizational membership confers automatic party membership or when the party–organization linkage endures long enough to acquire a “taken-for-granted” quality.

Party–organization linkages are mechanisms of social inclusion when they afford programmatic influence to the organization involved. Thus, the two subtypes represented on the left side of Figure 10.1 – neo-corporatist and movement-party – offer the promise of inclusion. The distinction between these two models lies in the degree of embeddedness of the organization in the party structure, with an important trade-off. Neo-corporatist linkages assure the organization a position in the party and in policymaking over a longer time frame, yet come at the risk of co-optation and the concomitant limits on the organization’s ability to

mobilize outside the party linkage, such as through protest or support for other parties. Movement-party linkages preserve organizational autonomy, but do not guarantee programmatic representation over the long term.

The two types of linkages that principally deliver patronage benefits – represented on the right side of Figure 10.1 – do not promote social inclusion. While these patronage linkages may inject much-needed economic resources to vulnerable communities, they do so in a way that is unequal – favoring party allies – and potentially undermining programmatic representation of popular sector interests by causing organizations to specialize in patronage brokerage (Palmer-Rubin 2019).

This variation aligns with a broader typology of Latin American left parties laid out in Levitsky and Roberts (2011). “Institutionalized partisan left” parties – with mature party organizations and clear ideological positions – have historically developed with organic ties to labor and other popular sector organizations around shared programmatic goals. Brazil’s PT and Uruguay’s FA exhibit this *neo-corporatist* linkage type. Both parties were founded by dissident union movements, dissatisfied with the preexisting insular party structures. And these union leaders, along with allied “A-Net” organizations such as neighborhood associations and social movements, have persisted in importance both in defining party platforms and in sustaining a territorial organization.

Brazil’s PT can be credited for building a new mode of corporatism for the neoliberal period. Founded in 1979 by labor leaders from the dissident CUT (Unified Workers’ Central), the PT’s choice to incorporate a wider swath of interest organizations was initially a party-building strategy for a party that was building from scratch in the aftermath of a military regime (Keck 1992, 90–94). As a result, the PT exhibits high organizational embeddedness, with a party structure that grants electoral posts to leaders of allied unions, social movements, rural associations, and NGOs. These institutions have persisted, albeit in a diluted form given the parallel territorial organization that that party has built and the proliferation of professional politicians during this party’s thirteen years in the presidency (Hunter 2010; Gómez Bruera 2013). The PT has also been at the vanguard of programmatically incorporating popular sector organizations; this party’s welfare policies build on ideas articulated by union and organizational allies (Garay 2016). And PT governments have preserved institutions for consultation with civil society leaders in policies across many sectors – including health, education, rural development, and security (see Mayka and Rich, this volume). Patronage

politics certainly also proliferates among PT allies – as these serve as intermediaries for the discretionary use of state benefits for electoral purposes (Bueno 2018). But party institutions are designed in a way to prevent patronage politics from crowding out programmatic engagement.

Uruguay's FA similarly displays a neo-corporatist linkage model – combining long-standing embeddedness of popular sector organizations in the party apparatus with functional institutions that guarantee their voice in economic policy. As with the PT, the FA was formed by an autonomous labor movement that expanded to construct durable programmatic linkages with associations of lower-class outsiders that had long been mobilized clientelistically by traditional dominant parties (Luna 2007). Also similarly to the PT, the FA innovated in participatory structures for organized civil society on the subnational level during Tabaré Vázquez's terms as mayor of Montevideo, expanding to the national level when Vázquez assumed the presidency in 2005 (Luna 2014). While the FA has certainly undergone a process of programmatic moderation and developed career politicians outside the organizational base, formal rules guaranteeing organizational participation in policy matters have forestalled a transition to an electoral machine or contingent support model (Pribble 2013; Bentancur et al. 2019).

The MAS in Bolivia emphasizes informal yet programmatically meaningful ties to a wide swath of popular sector organizations through a *movement-party* model. Among the “new political movements” highlighted by Levitsky and Roberts (2011), the MAS is unique in its origins as a bottom-up structure, in contrast to the personalistic vehicles constructed by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Lucío Gutiérrez in Ecuador. The MAS emerged from a novel coalition of post-corporatist organizations (e.g. neighborhood and indigenous movements) and traditional labor and peasant confederations (Anria 2016; Anria and Cyr 2017). Organizational allies were pivotal to the party's rise to power, organizing protests from 2000 to 2005 that led to the resignation of previous presidents, and mobilizing voters in the 2005 election that brought Evo Morales to the presidency. The MAS emphasized organizational autonomy, however, linking with these allied organizations in a more decentralized and informal mode than the FA or PT. During Morales' time in office (2006–2019), the MAS sustained spaces for core allies to shape economic policy, particularly in the rural sector. However, the party has resisted adopting formal party mechanisms to ensure their place in party leadership (Silva 2017, 99–103), leaving the organizations in a subordinate position within the party, which became increasingly driven by Morales' personal authority and discretionary pork-barrel spending.

Like the MAS, the Chavista vehicle in Venezuela has exercised “rentier populism” (Mazzuca, this volume) relying on primary resource-funded patronage and infrastructure investments in poor communities to build and maintain ties with its popular sector base. However, the PSUV features an *organizational machine* mode of linkage, typified by top-down control of *misiones* that offer services to the urban poor and a captive labor movement tied to the party through *Bolivarian Circles* (Hawkins and Hansen 2006; Penfold-Becerra 2007). In the absence of well-organized interest organizations outside the party apparatus and with the dominant labor confederation loyal to anti-Chavista currents, the PSUV’s predominant popular sector linkages are to those organizations created and controlled by the party (Silva 2017, 107–11). In this way, the deployment of party-embedded urban organizations as clientelistic machines bears resemblance to an older labor-based party, the Argentine Peronist party (Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2005; Szwarcberg 2013). While these territorial organizations are deeply embedded in the party, they are afforded little space for party leadership or voice in the party platform.

Finally, the Mexican PRD exhibits an approach to popular sector organization linkages that is neither durable nor programmatic – what I have labeled *contingent support*. While the party was founded with the support of urban popular movements in the capital and has worked to build linkages with dissident labor and peasant organizations, it has neither sustained a space for these organizations in the leadership, nor offered a sustainable model for them to secure a voice influencing policy at the national level (Bruhn 1997, 214–215). These organizations remain organizationally distinct from the party, either at the behest of autonomy-preserving organizational norms or the party’s disinterest or inability to integrate organizational representatives into party leadership (Wuhs 2008, chap. 6). When neighborhood organizations, peasant associations, and other popular sector organizations offer electoral support to PRD candidates, they tend to receive patronage benefits in return – preferential access to discretionary social programs and subsidies – rather than a voice in setting the party’s programmatic platform.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps owing to the lack of embeddedness, these ties are often fragile, as organizations may throw

<sup>4</sup> This organizational patronage constitutes a subset of broader clientelist electoral practices. While the use of clientelism as a mobilization tactic is most strongly associated with the formerly dominant PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), the PRD has replicated this practice in areas where it counts on sufficient base level distribution networks (Hilgers 2008; Nichter and Palmer Rubin 2015).

their support to a different party as the PRD's electoral prospects diminish.

What explains the variation in these five parties' approaches to popular sector linkages? More broadly, why do parties sometimes promote programmatic inclusion of popular sector interest organizations and other times employ these organizations for patronage exchange? Existing research on left-wing party organizations in Latin America points to several factors that might explain this outcome (Table 10.1). While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to test competing causal arguments, some patterns can be detected among the parties whose organizational linkages exhibit distinct degrees of embeddedness and programmatic influence.

First, successful parties of the Left appear to benefit from an outside-in path to power, in line with classic principles (Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988), and more recent findings that illustrate the effect of having been founded in adverse conditions (Levitsky et al. 2016; Van Dyck 2017). Successful new leftist parties in Latin America were those formed outside government, and particularly during periods of restricted competition where the parties were forced to rely on committed activists and an autonomously built base organization to remain alive. The five parties in Table 10.1 – all successful parties of the Left in Latin America founded since 1970 – emerged from such conditions. This factor appears not to tell us much about the *variation* in these parties' linkage models, however.<sup>5</sup>

Second, the type of *party system* from which the new party emerged also appears not to be associated with linkage outcomes, counter to a suggestion made by Handlin and Collier (2011). Neo-corporatist linkage types emerged from both a consolidated oligarchic two-party system (Uruguay) and a fragmented inchoate party system (Brazil). A commonality among these five cases, however, is that they emerged in

<sup>5</sup> The PRD is the partial exception that proves the rule, having been led by defectors from the ruling PRI in coalition with minor outsider parties in a scenario highly adverse to opposition parties. The PRD is the least successful of the five, never having won the presidency and having achieved much of its electoral success either by “lending their jersey” to PRI defectors in the run up to subnational elections or by forming coalitions with the older and more bureaucratized PAN (National Action Party). The 2018 Mexican election seemed to mark the collapse of the PRD into a minor coalition party, eclipsed by MORENA (National Regeneration Movement), the electoral vehicle of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. “Internally mobilized” leftist parties in the region formed through splits in traditional parties have failed to consolidate. Examples include FREPASO (Front for a Country in Solidarity) in Argentina and Peru's United Left (Van Dyck 2017).



TABLE 10.1 *Potential explanations for variations in organizational linkage models*

Party	Current Linkage Model	Party Founding Trajectory	Party System at Founding	Party Founding Structure	Available Insider Org. Allies	Available Outsider Org. Allies
<i>PT</i> <i>(Brazil)</i>	Neo corporatist	External	Fragmented	Bureaucratic, mass organic	Large autonomous labor movement	Active urban movements
<i>FA</i> <i>(Uruguay)</i>	Neo corporatist	External	2 party dominant	Bureaucratic, mass organic	Dominant labor movement	Inactive urban associations
<i>MAS</i> <i>(Bolivia)</i>	Movement party	External	Collapsed	Movement party	Dominant labor, peasant movements	Active urban and rural movements
<i>PSUV</i> <i>(Venezuela)</i>	Org. Machine	External	2 party dominant, then collapsed	Personalistic vehicle	Fragmented dissident labor	Fragmented urban movements
<i>PRD</i> <i>(Mexico)</i>	Contingent support	Hybrid: internal and external	1 party dominant	Hybrid: movement party and personalistic	Ancillary dissident labor and peasant movements	Active urban movements

party systems with a vacuum on the Left, either because former labor-based parties had embraced neoliberalism (Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela) or because they emerged from military regimes that outlawed left parties (Brazil, Uruguay).

Two factors that do appear to be conducive to programmatic and durable party–organization linkages, however, are party founding structures and available insider organizational allies. First, mass-organic parties that were founded with bureaucratized party structures to integrate organizational allies appear better positioned to sustain organic organizational ties than organizations founded with an informal movement-party orientation. As Anria (2018, chap. 5) shows, the FA and PT adopted party rules guaranteeing representation for popular sector allies in party leadership and nomination to elected office. These significant inducements were perhaps necessary to secure the ongoing support of organizations whose resources were crucial during authoritarian periods that prevented the fledgling parties from developing their own autonomous territorial bases.

In contrast, while the MAS and PRD competed in early elections with a strong presence of organizations as their campaign base, these parties failed to institutionalize a role for organizations in party leadership structures. Instead, these parties relied on contingent alliances between organizations and parties that were strongly associated with indispensable electoral figureheads – Evo Morales (in Bolivia) and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (in Mexico). For both parties, the inability to formalize organizational alliances has increased tension between a growing electoral-professional faction and organizations that are finding fewer opportunities to influence policy or have leaders elected to office.

Second, the availability of a predominant labor faction at the party's founding appears to be associated with programmatic incorporation of popular sector allies. As Etchemendy (this volume) discusses, left-wing parties have varied in how they balance ties to organized labor and outsider organizations. These distinctions have implications for the *type* of linkages that they form. The three parties that incorporate popular sector organizations programmatically – FA, PT, and MAS – were all founded with the central participation of a major faction of the labor movement. In contrast, both the PRD and PSUV were founded in the presence of a lingering twentieth-century labor-mobilizing party that retained control over the dominant factions of organized labor and peasants (Collier 1992; Roberts 2003). For the FA, PT, and MAS, these traditional corporatist allies lend a set of well-defined demands related

to development models and redistributive policy that may be adopted by outsider organizations. Labor and peasant confederations with a history of corporatist organizing also serve as organizing “hubs” (Garay 2009), lending a set of institutions for ongoing engagement with the political party.

Interestingly, the degree of activation by outsider organizations during a party’s founding or rise to power appears to have less to do with the types of linkages that it builds with these organizations. The PT, MAS, and PRD were all formed during periods of high mobilization by interest organizations corresponding to political and economic crisis, yet these three established quite distinct linkage models. In contrast, the FA rose to power during a period of relative quiescence for urban interest organizations, yet built some of the more durable and successful institutions for organizational programmatic participation. Perhaps beyond a certain minimum organizational presence among outsider populations, the strength or activity level of these organizations matters less than the presence of insider organization allies and an appropriately structured party. This finding adds a caveat to Etchemendy’s (this volume) contention that high levels of protest by territorial (i.e. outsider) organizations during the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s determine whether these organizations are included in parties’ “interest coalitions.” My argument goes a step further in predicting when these ties to popular sector organizations confer programmatic representation, which did occur in the Bolivian and Brazilian cases, but not in Venezuela or Mexico, even though all four of these featured high levels of outsider activism in the neoliberal period.

Ultimately, the trait shared by the three new left-wing parties that managed to construct programmatic linkages in the late twentieth century (PT, FA, and MAS) were their ties to traditional insider groups – labor and peasants. In a sense, therefore, the success of these parties is more attributable to traditional mobilizing structures and offers few clues about left-wing linkages in an A-Net-dominated interest arena. In contrast, the PRD serves as an illustrative test case for the plausibility of a twenty-first-century mass-based party.<sup>6</sup> This case allows us to observe the prospects for the construction of an organizationally rooted left-wing party in the

<sup>6</sup> The PSUV certainly classifies as another exceptional case, but one that emerged under quite distinct conditions, including party system collapse and military coup. In stark contrast to the PRD, however, the Venezuelan party’s top down organization building was made possible by its control of government and an oil boom that funded previously unheard of levels of distributive spending (Mazzuca, this volume).

absence of a labor base. In the remainder of this chapter, I analyze the PRD, applying findings from this cross-national comparison to explain subnational variation in this party's approach to linkages with organizations representing popular sector outsiders.

THE MEXICAN PRD: A PARTIAL AND UNEVEN APPROACH  
TO ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES

While the PRD appears to be in decline today, it is unique in the region as a successfully consolidated left-wing party formed in the presence of a persistently competitive labor-based party from the initial incorporation period.<sup>7</sup> When the PRD was launched, the PRI had held the presidency continuously for over sixty years and had yet to lose so much as a gubernatorial election. The leftist upstart was formally registered in 1989, after its predecessor – the FDN (National Democratic Front) – was defeated in the surprisingly close 1988 presidential election.<sup>8</sup> The new party was composed of three types of actors: a group of defecting PRIistas, headlined by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the 1988 presidential candidate; four previously uncompetitive leftist political parties; and social movements and minor dissident labor and peasant associations with a left-wing orientation and opposition to the PRI's hegemonic regime. The vast majority of labor and peasant unions remained firmly entrenched in the PRI's sectoral structure.

Nonetheless, PRD founders did not set out to build a noncompetitive protest party, an apt description of the right-wing PAN at that point, which had failed to pose a significant electoral threat in its five-decade history. Rather the PRD challenged for national power from the start and prioritized vote maximization over the slow process of building a territorial organization and establishing party rules to share power between party founders and organizational allies. The rapid rise to electoral relevance would take a toll, however. Over two decades after the founding of the PRD, Cárdenas lamented “maybe the error was not to work enough in the states to consolidate the (party) organization, not to dedicate enough time to organizing before other things. The electoral question

<sup>7</sup> Argentina's FREPASO also was formed in the presence of the resilient Peronist party, but only survived seven years (Van Dyck 2017).

<sup>8</sup> The official tally counted 31% of the vote for the PRD, compared to 51% for the PRI, although the election was roundly criticized for fraud by the PRI loyal electoral authorities. See Cantú (2019) for a forensic calculation of the fraud's magnitude.

was a big distraction.”<sup>9</sup> The original project combining Cárdenas’s personal attraction with social movement backing proved unsustainable. Cárdenas lost the presidency for the second time in 1994, garnering only 17 percent of the vote, and the party failed to secure any gubernatorial victories in its first eight years of existence (Bruhn 1997, 3).

A failure to formally incorporate organizational allies was not only the result of expediency; it was also a deliberate choice for a party seeking to distinguish itself from the PRI. In a departure from the dominant party’s authoritarian corporatism, party founders insisted on individual rather than corporate membership (Bruhn 1997, 173–174). In the words of Cárdenas, the goal was to “look for people to approach the party, but each person on their own. Since there is a rejection of the way that (the PRI’s) corporatism was corrupted, any mode of collective membership was rejected.”<sup>10</sup> While this decision was based on an interest in preserving autonomy for affiliated organizations, leaders of these groups were often frustrated that they had no effective voice in their party, despite the size of their organizational following (Bruhn 1997, 214–215).

The PRD’s post-1997 rebirth – which led to gubernatorial victories in ten states and another close call for the presidency in 2006 – was instigated by recasting the party as an electoral-professional operation; and privileging career politicians over societal backers in party leadership, candidate selection, and territorial organization. In Kitschelt’s (1989, 48–55) terms, the goals of party *pragmatists* – seeking electoral victory – were prioritized over those of party *ideologues*. This tendency was illustrated in the embracing as candidates of opportunistic PRI defectors who brought name recognition, cadres of politicians and patronage networks, if not a commitment to the PRD’s ideological principles or promise to recast state–society relations.<sup>11</sup> If the PRD began as a hybrid of a personalistic vehicle for Cárdenas’s electoral ambitions and a

<sup>9</sup> Interview by author, April 26, 2010. “Quizá el error fue no trabajar suficientemente en los estados para consolidar la organización, no dedicar tiempo a organizar antes que a otras cosas. La cuestión electoral distrajo mucho.”

<sup>10</sup> Interview by author, April 26, 2010. “buscar que la gente se acerque al partido pero igual cada quien por su lado. Como hay además un rechazo por cómo se corrompió también en la parte corporativa (el PRI), se rechaza cualquier adhesión colectiva.”

<sup>11</sup> Fourteen of the nineteen PRD governors elected prior to 2018 had held office under PRI administrations prior to running with the PRD, including Cárdenas himself. Six of these held elected office with the PRI immediately before assuming the governorship, including the first four states where the PRD won the governorship after Cárdenas’s victory in the Distrito Federal – Baja California Sur, Chiapas, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas. These four candidates were selected during López Obrador’s contentious term at the head of the party. In several cases, these candidates were chosen over others favored by state level

movement-party alliance with programmatically aligned yet organizationally autonomous social movements, the post-1997 reboot produced a shift to a contingent support model of organizational linkage. Organizational ties came to be based primarily on the exchange of electoral support for preferential access to discretionarily allocated distributive programs.<sup>12</sup> Linkages are renegotiated or ruptured from election to election, depending on the short-term calculus of the organizations and party leadership.

Furthermore, PRD governments have not made it a priority to institutionalize spaces for affiliated organization participation in policymaking. PAN and PRI administrations have been at least as active in establishing participatory institutions – although these have been extremely limited in their durability and efficacy compared with experiments elsewhere in the region. Municipal development councils – designed as spaces for individual participation in budgeting and rural development policy – were short-lived and lacked resources or mandates (Caire Martínez 2009; Zarembeg 2012). And while consultative councils proliferate at all levels of government, these more often take the form of nonfunctional rubber stamp bodies or window dressing for clientelistic mobilization (Hevia de la Jara and Isunza Vera 2012). An important exception is Michoacán's Peasant Consultative Council, discussed in detail below.

This preference for short-term patronage mobilization is not equally dominant in all states, however. In fact, the linkages this party has established with state-level organizations reflect each of the four distinct linkage types laid out in Figure 10.1. As the case studies in the next section illustrate, distinct models of organizational linkages have emerged in PRD-controlled states that also vary in terms of their available linkage partners and the initial choices made about party structure.

#### STATE-LEVEL VARIATION IN PRD LINKAGES

This section engages in subnational analysis to illustrate the importance of party leadership and the availability of labor organizing hubs for

party organizations and social organizations (Cazarín Martínez 2013, 401–404; García Aguilar 2013, 444–446; Solano Ramírez 2013, 365–369). In Chiapas and Guerrero, the *second* PRD governors were immediate PRI defectors, demonstrating that after holding the governorship for six years, the PRD was still unable to find gubernatorial candidates from among party ranks.

<sup>12</sup> In Mexico, the discretionary allocation of distributive programs – such as anti poverty transfers, subsidies for agricultural or microenterprise development, and housing – is commonplace at the federal and state levels and often mediated by interest organizations (Palmer Rubin 2016; Palmer Rubin et al. 2020).

		Main Benefits to Organizations	
		Programmatic Influence	Patronage Brokerage
Organizational Embeddedness	High	Neo Corporatist <i>Michoacán</i>	Organizational Machine <i>Late Mexico City (2000 2018)</i>
	Low	Movement Party <i>Early Mexico City (1988 1999)</i>	Contingent Support <i>Chiapas</i>

FIGURE 10.2 Varieties of party organization linkages, Mexican states under the PRD

popular sector linkage models. The subnational approach offers two advantages for examining the origins of distinct organizational linkage models. First, as in all subnational comparative work, comparing units within the same polity permits the analyst to control for a host of institutional and historical factors (Snyder 2001). In Mexico, all states share roughly similar electoral institutions and have passed through the PRI’s one-party dominant regime. Second, the state level of government is the most relevant for A-Net organizations. Unlike labor unions, outsider popular sector interest organizations typically do not scale up beyond the local or state level: only the rarest cases belong to national-level networks or confederations with offices in Mexico City. State and municipal politics thus constitute the main target for mobilization of peasant, indigenous, and neighborhood organizations, be it in negotiations for patronage benefits or programmatic influence.

Of the six states in which the PRD has won consecutive gubernatorial elections at some point since its founding – Mexico City, Chiapas, Michoacán, Baja California Sur, Guerrero, and Zacatecas – I analyze the first three. The PRD held office for multiple terms in each of these three, and they also demonstrate the range of variation in the PRD’s founding trajectory and relationship to interest organizations (Figure 10.2). In the national capital, an unorganized coalition of urban popular movements lent organizing capacity and ideological heft to Cárdenas’s 1988 presidential campaign. This initial movement-party coalition eventually morphed into an organizational machine as the

PRD came to dominate electorally in the 2000s and urban social movements transformed into patronage intermediaries linked to rival party factions. In the southern state of Chiapas, innovative strategies used by the first PRD governor to integrate indigenous organizations into the party paid electoral dividends, but these ties failed to generate programmatic representation or a lasting role in the party apparatus due to short-term electoral pragmatism by the PRD, generating a contingent support linkage model. Finally, Michoacán, the epicenter of *cardenismo*, exhibits a neo-corporatist linkage model. This state's Peasant Consultative Council achieved modest success in fostering a shared vision for rural development policy between the PRD and dissident peasant organizations. The Michoacán case illustrates that organic linkages with popular sector organizations are achievable where the party establishes formal mechanisms for organizational leadership and the party and organization can capitalize on organizational models inherited from party-aligned unions.

### Urban Popular Organizations in Mexico City

The PRD in Mexico City began with a movement-party orientation, but transitioned to an organizational machine once the party came to dominate electoral politics in the 2000s. Relationships between the new party in 1989 and urban social movements played a key role in establishing a party platform and in organizing campaign events for Cárdenas. However, organizational influence in the party and structures for participatory policymaking were never consolidated. These shortcomings can be connected to the party's neglect of formal rules for organizational allies, which it instead deployed in campaigns through ad hoc agreements. Furthermore, traditional corporatist organizations in the capital were absent from the PRD's coalition, remaining firmly in the PRI's sectoral structure.<sup>13</sup> Once the PRD established electoral dominance in Mexico City, surviving urban popular organizations converted into clientelistic

<sup>13</sup> Labor unions concentrated in Mexico City eventually broke from the PRI affiliated labor sector, but not until the PRD had already consolidated. The most prominent examples include the unions representing telephone workers (STRM), electoral workers (SME), and social security workers (SNTSS), headliners of the UNT labor confederation formed in 1997, the same year that Cárdenas became the first democratically elected executive for Mexico City (De la Garza 2006). Further, these labor unions opted for a stance of partisan autonomy rather than organic ties with the PRD.



networks for the party, distributing public housing and other selective goods in exchange for electoral support.

The nation's capital was central to Cárdenas's territorial base in the 1988 presidential election campaign. When Cárdenas launched his campaign, he counted on the support of roughly fifty popular sector social movements, neighborhood associations, and student groups, which also presented candidates for local office under the FDN (Tavera Fenoloso 2013, 106–107). Since the 1968 *Tlatelolco* student movement, Mexico City had been a locus of activism against the authoritarian PRI regime, and urban popular movements (MUP) revived to protest the state's failure to provide needed services to displaced residents following the 1985 earthquake.<sup>14</sup> These social movement structures, which in 1985 had reached a consensus to stay outside of electoral politics, found an electoral ally in Cárdenas – a major politician who shared their rebuke of the PRI's neoliberal turn. An initial rapprochement between the MUP and Cárdenas occurred during late-1987 protests against the Economic Solidarity Pact, an agreement between the ruling de la Madrid administration and corporatist organizations to institute fiscal austerity as a measure to pay Mexico's foreign debt (López Leyva 2007, 185–186). Without committing to formal party affiliation, these groups endorsed Cárdenas's economic vision of *nacionalismo revolucionario* and in the months before the July 1988 election mobilized their communities in rallies on behalf of the FDN, Cárdenas's electoral vehicle.

After this initial collaboration in the 1988 campaign, factions of the MUP and the PRD agreed to sustain a loose movement-party linkage designed to protect organizational autonomy. PRD candidacies for neighborhood leadership posts were granted to several MUP leaders as

<sup>14</sup> Prominent groups included the Asamblea de Barrios, Unión Popular Nueva Tenochtitlán, Unión Popular Revolucionaria Emiliano Zapata, Organización Independiente Revolucionaria Línea de Masas, and Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, all of which are often referred to jointly as the MUP. For a longer list of MUP members and other social movements that participated in the 1988 Cárdenas campaign see López Leyva (2007, 34). The Asamblea de Barrios is a transformation of the Coordinadora Única de Damnificados, an organization formed in the aftermath of the 1985 earthquake – participated in the creation of the PRD's predecessor, the FDN, but the majority of others were nonpartisan, only joining the electoral realm in the 1988 election (Tavera Fenoloso 2013). The Frente Popular Francisco Villa (FPFV), a radical alliance of UNAM students and squatters, opted to preserve its autonomy, refusing to support Cárdenas in 1988. In the following years, however, the FPFV broke into two factions over the question of whether to participate in Cárdenas's 1997 bid for the head of government of Mexico City. Fragmentation was a common fate for MUP organizations; at last count the Asamblea de Barrios had broken into nine separate structures (Bruhn 2013, 141–144).

“external” candidates, who saw in the party a route to power without abandoning their nonpartisan commitments. A minority of MUP organizations declared exclusive alliances with the PRD and others realigned with the PRI, which continued to control the federal and Mexico City governments (Bruhn 2013, 138–142). As the 1985–1988 cycle of protest drew to a close, most Mexico City-based social movements either disintegrated or transformed into neighborhood associations with the mandate of *gestión*, negotiating with the government for housing and services.<sup>15</sup>

By the time Cárdenas won his first election with the PRD, becoming Mexico City’s head of government in 1997, the party had taken on a highly factionalized internal structure. The Cárdenas (1997–2000) and López Obrador administrations (2000–2005) set up novel participatory structures and democratic leadership selection rules, but these were short-lived, owing to dissatisfaction by faction leaders over control of candidacies and public resources (Hilgers 2008, 135–136). Ties based on the exchange of patronage for electoral support proved more durable. PRD governments have consistently granted MUP leaders control over public housing and other subsidies in exchange for candidacies and party leadership posts. This authority proved indispensable for solidifying brokerage roles; leaders typically grant housing only to organization members who have proven active in meetings and protests (Hilgers 2008, 142–147; Bruhn 2013, 150–152).

### Indigenous Organizations in Chiapas

In Chiapas, the prevailing mode of linkages between the PRD and popular sector organizations is contingent support, the norm for the PRD nationwide. This state reflects an even less coherent approach to establishing programmatic linkages with popular sector organizations than does Mexico City owing to the former’s nomination of consecutive gubernatorial candidates from outside the party. A lack of organizational stability undercut party structures that offered a path to influence for party-aligned rural organizations.

While dissident peasant and indigenous organizations who supported Cárdenas’s 1988 presidential candidacy played a role in the PRD’s founding, the party only posed a serious threat for the governorship with

<sup>15</sup> While protest declined significantly when the PRD came into power in Mexico City, organizations still would turn periodically to demonstrations, usually to pressure the state to deliver benefits (Bruhn 2008, 123–135).

the successful campaign of Pablo Salazar in 2000. Like PRD governors who had penetrated PRI rule before him in Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Tlaxcala, Salazar had defected from the PRI immediately before running with the PRD. Salazar's main base of support was in Chiapas's three largest cities, where he won 65 percent of the vote in the 2000 election (García Aguilar 2013). In a highly rural state with an indigenous population of over 40 percent, the PRI candidate won over 54 percent of votes in indigenous regions. Thus, while the Chiapas PRD may have been rooted in ideologically committed rural organizations for its first dozen years, this organization was quickly swept aside by the political machine brought over from the PRI. And much like when the PRD took office in Mexico City in 1997, by the time this party won the Chiapas governorship, its linkage partners had already wound down their cycle of protest – launched around the Zapatista rebellion in 1994 – and were eager for state support to keep the organizations active. The pattern of relating to dissident rural peasant and indigenous groups through instrumental patronage accords continued with Chiapas's second PRD governor, Juan Sabines, elected in 2006, who also defected from the PRI immediately before running for governor with the PRD.

The PRD's ties to dissident indigenous organizations in Chiapas took on a contingent character – as opposed to the sustainable machine politics model in Mexico City – because the party itself failed to project a consistent approach to these organizations. Neither PRD governor had much experience working with these groups prior to reaching office and they formed linkages with rival factions of rural organizations. Furthermore, PRD rule in Chiapas was never as certain as in Mexico City. In the former, PRD gubernatorial victories came with vote margins of 5.8 and 9.7 percentage points, compared to an average vote margin of 22.5 percentage points in the four consecutive executive elections won by the PRD in Mexico City since 1997. Thus, rural organizations in Chiapas, dependent on state benefits for survival, shrewdly kept options open to support another party if the electoral winds shifted.

Once in office, Salazar embarked on a strategy to attract indigenous support by nominating local indigenous leaders for elected office and government posts. The PRD penetrated communities that had previously voted overwhelmingly for the PRI by forming alliances with leaders of indigenous associations, who often wield substantial power in their communities as brokers in patronage networks and kingmakers in local elections. These organizations – such as ARIC (Rural Collective Interest Association), CIOAC (Independent Workers and Peasants Central), and

UNORCA (National Union of Regional Autonomous Peasant Organizations) – originated in land invasions in the 1970s and were reinvigorated during the 1994 Zapatista movement.<sup>16</sup> Chiapas's broad spectrum of rural organizations that existed outside the PRI's sectoral structure became channels through which the state government provided patronage benefits, including agricultural subsidies, social programs, and infrastructure investments.

While indigenous organizations found an administration eager to enlist them in patronage-based electoral mobilization, Salazar proved less willing to modify state institutions to open space for institutions of indigenous governance, as the neighboring state of Oaxaca had done by adopting the *usos y costumbres* system. A former president of CIOAC and PRD congressman in the 1990s attested that the Salazar administration refused to participate in a roundtable discussion organized by indigenous leaders and the state legislature to discuss modifying the state constitution.<sup>17</sup> Electoral involvement also prompted a shift in the orientation of the indigenous organizations. A local PRD committee president lamented that the CIOAC – the most prominent of Chiapas's indigenous associations – lost its representative character when it became immersed in the party alliance: “Before 2000, CIOAC was a bastion of the social struggle, for social groups and leaders of the Left in Chiapas. It initiated the defense of indigenous issues and all that. But once they became part of the government the leaders became corrupt, they turned into functionaries, they were granted government positions . . . So they forget about the indigenous struggle.”<sup>18</sup>

PRD linkages with these organizations failed to institutionalize during Salazar's term, owing largely to a power struggle over control of the party's state-level organization and internal divisions in the organizations over candidacies and control of patronage benefits. Fragmentation was exacerbated under the party's second governor, Juan Sabines, who like Salazar defected from the PRI immediately before running with the PRD

<sup>16</sup> The organization that spearheaded the Zapatista rebellion, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) withheld from forming party alliances.

<sup>17</sup> Interview by author, Margarito Ruíz Hernández, ex President, CIOAC, July 4, 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Interview by author, Mariano Medina López, President of PRD Municipal Committee, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, July 6, 2012. “*Antes del 2000 la CIOAC era un bastión de luchas sociales, de grupos sociales y de líderes sociales de la izquierda en Chiapas. Abrió la defensa de las cuestiones indígenas y todo eso. Pero a raíz de que se hacen del gobierno los líderes se corrompen, los hacen funcionarios, les dan puestos en gobierno . . . Entonces ellos se olvidan de la lucha indígena.*”

in 2006. A political rival of Salazar, Sabines cleaned house upon assuming the governorship, favoring alternate factions of rural organizations. Party factionalism has taken a toll on organizational integrity. For instance, CIOAC has splintered into at least four factions “(with adjectives differentiating them, such as CIOAC-Histórico, CIOAC-Independiente, and CIOAC-Regional), each linked to a different faction of the PRD or other parties. The weakness of PRD incorporation of the indigenous came back to haunt the party in 2012, when Sabines – still in office – urged his allies to support the successful gubernatorial bid of Manuel Velasco, a candidate running with the Mexico’s Green Party, a PRI coalition partner.<sup>19</sup>

### Dissident Peasants in Michoacán

In contrast to Chiapas and Mexico City, Michoacán presented conditions more conducive to consolidating durable programmatic ties to organized popular sector interests. In this state, the PRD arguably had the longest and most stable period of organization building outside of office. Unlike in many states where the first PRD governors were last-minute PRI defectors without ties to the organizational base, the first two PRD governors in Michoacán were closely linked to Cárdenas himself and had thus spent twelve years building a party organization from the formation of the PRD in 1989 until this party first won the governorship in 2001. Furthermore, the supply of traditional corporatist (labor and peasant) organizations to the PRD operation in Michoacán was superior to that in any other state. Given these advantages, Michoacán represents the PRD’s most successful effort to form neo-corporatist ties with popular sector organizations, in this case with dissident peasant organizations.

The PRD won the governorship in 2001 with the candidacy of Lázaro Cárdenas Batel – son of Cuauhtémoc – after two highly contested elections in 1990s when it came in second place to the PRI. Michoacán featured a diverse array of rural organizations, many of which had campaigned on behalf of PRD candidates over the preceding decade.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, a prominent faction within the party infrastructure was led by former leaders of the PRI’s CNC (National Peasant

<sup>19</sup> Interview by author, Gabriel Gutiérrez Ávila, PRD State Council member, July 9, 2012.

<sup>20</sup> Some of these groups predated by decades the formation of the PRD, such as UNORCA and CNPA (National Plan de Ayala Confederation). Others, such as the CCC (Cardenista Peasant Central) and UCD (Democratic Peasant Union) were founded in the late 1980s, when the emergence of the PRD offered a new interlocutor.

Confederation), loyal to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas from his years as PRI governor of Michoacán in the 1980s (Gledhill 1995, 73–78; Ramírez Sevilla 1997, 106–110). The PRD also had ties to an unusually large dissident labor coalition, including the state-level body of the CNTE (National Education Workers' Coordinator), the dissident teachers' union. Cárdenas Batel and his successor named persons with connections to these dissident organizations to the ministries of rural development and education.

PRD rule in Michoacán continued with the 2007 election of Leonel Godoy, a longtime associate of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Facing a plethora of dissident peasant organizations, linked to different degrees to varying factions of his party and prone to disruptive protest, Godoy took steps to institutionalize the participation of rural interest organizations in agricultural policy, by forming the Michoacán COCOCAM (Peasant Consultative Council). This body brought together more than thirty organizations in the state, mostly favoring the PRD, but also including the Michoacán affiliate of the CNC, the PRI's peasant sector. COCOCAM's mandate was to “promote actions to analyze and construct, with the three levels of government and the congress, the budget and public policy to promote sustainable rural development from a peasant's perspective.”<sup>21</sup> In addition, the COCOCAM served as a site for routinized negotiation between state rural development authorities and leaders of member organizations regarding their share of yearly subsidies.

According to interviewed organization representatives in COCOCAM, the availability of this formal structure to make demands on the state reduced the need to turn to protest. As one leader explained the decline in protest activities during the Godoy administration:

It's not that we've stopped being combative. I think that instead it's that COCOCAM has allowed us to establish a closer working relationship with the government, where we've been able to reach agreements and where there hasn't been so much of a need for protest because there has been permanent, open, frank, and transparent communication. From the moment (that COCOCAM was formed), we have worked with the government on the budget for the countryside.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> COCOCAM, Fichas Informativas. “*promover acciones para analizar y construir con los tres niveles de Gobierno y el Congreso, el presupuesto y las políticas públicas que impulsen el desarrollo rural sostenible desde la visión campesina.*”

<sup>22</sup> Interview by author, Carlos González López, Secretary General, CCC Michoacán, December 14, 2011. “*No es que hayamos dejado de ser más combativas. Yo más bien*

Shared electoral goals have certainly paved the way to this harmony. Of the thirty-two initial members of the COCOCAM, only the CNC and the CODUC (Coalition of Democratic Urban and Peasant Organizations) were PRI-affiliated.<sup>23</sup> Other organizations were either openly supportive of the PRD or eschewed party affiliation. However, even organizations in the latter group were open to establishing a working relationship with the Cárdenas Batel and Godoy administrations. Moreover, many organizations had played an active role in the 2001 and 2007 elections that brought these PRD governors into office by hosting campaign events in their villages, encouraging members to vote for the PRD, and running for local office under this party's banner.

COCOCAM was granted a formal role in several government processes, albeit without official voting or veto powers. Council statutes established that COCOCAM would analyze yearly rural development budgets for the state and suggest modifications to congress. From its first year, the practice was established that representatives of each of COCOCAM's committees – on finance, commercialization, infrastructure, and other policy areas – would hold meetings at least yearly with the top ministers in the rural development, economic development, and social development ministries. Through such outlets, council members lobbied for larger rural development budgets, more funds for small-scale farmers, and the allocation of programs to the organizations themselves. Citing the precarious nature of the peasant sector, they pushed for a crop insurance program, subsidized fertilizer, and the promotion of smallholder participation in the state's *Cruzada por el Maíz* (Crusade for Corn) program.<sup>24</sup>

The terms of peasant linkages with the Michoacán PRD were not exclusively programmatic by any means. COCOCAM member organizations also took advantage of the access afforded by this body to press for a larger share of distributive programs. The Godoy administration initiated a practice that became known as “the carousel,” where representatives of

*creo que, que el COCOCAM nos ha permitido establecer una relación de trabajo más estrecha con el gobierno donde hemos construido acuerdos y en donde no ha habido necesidad de la manifestación, porque ha habido una comunicación permanente, abierta, franca, transparente, eso, eso lo creo. Incluso desde el momento mismo (que se formó COCOCAM) junto con el gobierno hemos construido el presupuesto para el campo.”*

<sup>23</sup> Interviews by author: Omar Lando Estaño, General Director, REDCCAM, December 9, 2011; Marco Rodríguez, Technical Secretary of COCOCAM, January 25, 2012.

<sup>24</sup> This 82 million peso (about US\$6 million) program was focused on improving production yields for corn farmers through subsidies for seeds and other inputs and training programs (Alonso Cruz, Carlos. “Contará el programa Cruzada por el Maíz en Michoacán con 82mdp,” *Cambio de Michoacán*, March 6, 2009).

each of the organizations in COCOCAM would be granted yearly meetings with the minister or a subminister of Michoacán's Rural Development Ministry, at the beginning of the fiscal year when this ministry was developing program budgets. Organization leaders reported that these meetings were straightforward negotiations for the subsidies that they receive from the state government.<sup>25</sup>

While during the period of PRD rule the CNC was one of only two PRI-affiliated organizations in COCOCAM, in the lead up to the 2011 governor's race (in which the PRI's candidate, Fausto Vallejo was favored) the electoral composition of COCOCAM changed markedly. In the months prior to the 2011 election, several organizations switched affiliations from the PRD to the PRI. Interviewed leaders cited Godoy's poor administration or the quality of the PRI's candidate, but they also acknowledged that the PRI's victory was likely and that they were promised distributive benefits from the Vallejo's administration if they supported his campaign.<sup>26</sup> One year into Vallejo's term, the council split roughly evenly among PRD- and PRI-affiliated organizations and was wrought with infighting as each of these factions sought to take control, which would grant them the power to designate committee leaders who would regularly meet with government ministry personnel. Because many of the organizations in COCOCAM depended on state subsidies to sustain collective action, their ties to the PRD were revealed to be contingent on this party's control of the state government. Other organizations proved to have a more durable, neo-corporatist model of linkage, as they sustained ties to the PRD throughout the PRI's term in power.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has analyzed the process of linkage formation between popular sector organizations and new parties of the Left in Latin

<sup>25</sup> Interviews by author, Primitivo Ávalos, Coordinator of El Surco Michoacán, November 8, 2012; Valerio Celaya, Adviser for Productive Projects for UGOCM Jacinto López Michoacán, August 16, 2012; Vicente Estrada Torres, Secretary of Political Operations for CNC Michoacán, January 26, 2012; Carlos González, Secretary General of CCC Michoacán, December 14, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> Interviews by author: Primitivo Avalos Pérez, Director, Coordinator of Agricultural Producers El Surco, November 8, 2012; Valerio Celaya, Project Consultant, Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México Jacinto López, August 16, 2012; Gilberto González, Dirigente, Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas y Urbanas y Campesinas, January 25, 2012.



America, with additional focus on Mexico's PRD. This party faced a particular challenge of constructing a competitive coalition on the Left without a labor base, instead relying on ties to organizations representing populations that had been excluded from Mexico's twentieth-century corporatist institutions, including urban popular movements, indigenous associations, and dissident peasant organizations. The overall picture of PRD alliances with these organizations is one of electoral pragmatism winning out over the desire to construct durable ties based on a shared programmatic orientation. The Mexican case supports my findings from a cross-national comparison of left-wing parties, which revealed that two party traits predict the formation of sustainable programmatic linkages with interest organizations: the establishment of formal rules to incorporate organization representatives in party leadership prior to the party's ascendancy as a serious electoral competitor; and the availability of a significant portion of the labor movement as a linkage partner.

While these two traits were lacking overall in the Mexican case, state-level trajectories display subtle variations. In Mexico City, the PRD's stronghold, an initial "movement-party" arrangement emerged, wherein autonomous protest groups enthusiastically channeled their support behind the ideologically driven candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. This linkage model quickly decayed, however, and was replaced by an "organizational machine" linkage model, wherein neighborhood associations allied with rival factions of the party mediated patronage benefits to mobilize their bases electorally. In Chiapas, consecutive PRD governors mobilized indigenous organizations through patronage appeals, opening space for indigenous mayoralties, but offering little potential to integrate more transformative demands into the state policy agenda. Indigenous organization ties to these competing factions served to deradicalize the movements, and ultimately failed to institutionalize as a support base for the PRD when the latter governor deployed his patronage networks on behalf of a rival party.

Finally, the state of Michoacán approximated a neo-corporatist linkage model, where dissident peasant organizations were embedded in durable linkages based on shared programmatic goals. In this state, the PRD counted on the support of dynamic dissident labor and peasant organizations. The party organization was also least factionalized in Michoacán, where Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had governed in the 1980s and exercised control over party factions to present a more cohesive electoral project. Michoacán's PRD administrations adopted an innovative consultative council to routinize contact between the state

government and the mostly PRD-allied peasant associations. This council offered a venue through which the organizations could voice demands related to rural spending priorities and the design of sectoral support programs.

The fate of Mexico's PRD holds lessons for left-wing parties seeking to consolidate in newly competitive electoral systems. If the initial incorporation under labor-mobilizing parties such as Mexico's PRI produced a dual dilemma, demonstrating a tension between the goals of both mobilizing and deradicalizing the popular sectors, the PRD's predicament reflects a distinct dilemma for parties of the Left in the neoliberal age. As these parties transition from an ideological movement orientation to electoral-professional parties, core popular sector organizations offer organizational resources that can be effective at mobilizing voters through patronage appeals. However, by deploying organizations in this way, the party risks undermining the organizations' programmatic orientation and thus their utility for projecting the party's ideological brand and promoting its policy goals. Furthermore, patronage mobilization catalyzes an instrumental orientation that often leads organizations to jump ship to a competitor if it offers a better chance at patronage benefits down the road.

This class of dilemma is not unique to neoliberal Latin America. Classic research has documented the moderating effects of party incorporation on popular sector actors that demand structural transformations to exploitative economic systems (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Collier and Collier 1991). However, the trade-off between loyalty to programmatic goals and electoral expediency may be more pronounced in a post-corporatist era where the bulk of popular sector organizing is directed by fragmented and localized neighborhood and rural organizations. Under such conditions, organizations are so vulnerable to co-optation that parties must exercise great care in building linkages that capitalize on organizations' electoral resources without undermining their transformative ambitions.

Outside of Mexico, the parties that have innovated the most in constructing and sustaining programmatic linkages with popular sector organizations – Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, and Uruguay's FA – have struggled consistently over their histories to sustain this balance as well. Their relative success in doing so, however, may help explain both why these parties have been able to remain electorally competitive over an extended period and why they arguably have gone the furthest in the region to promote the social inclusion of marginalized groups.

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## Appendix: List of Acronyms

ARIC	Asociación Rural de Interés Colectivo (Rural Collective Interest Association, Mexico)
CCC	Central Campesina Cardenista (Cardenista Peasant Central, Mexico)
CIOAC	Central Independiente de Obreros and Campesinos (Independent Workers and Peasants Central, Mexico)
CNC	Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation, Mexico)
CNPA	Confederación Nacional “Plan de Ayala” (National Confederation “Plan de Ayala,” Mexico)
CNTE	Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (National Education Workers’ Coordinator, Mexico)
COCOCAM	Consejo Consultivo de Organizaciones Campesinas de Michoacán (Consultative Council of Michoacán Peasant Organizations, Mexico)
CODUC	Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas Urbanas y Campesinas (Coalition of Democratic Urban and Peasant Organizations, Mexico)
CUT	Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central, Brazil)
EZLN	Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, Mexico)
FA	Frente Amplio (Broad Front, Uruguay)
FDN	Frente Democrático Nacional (National Democratic Front, Mexico)



PPFV	Frente Popular Francisco Villa (Francisco Villa Popular Front, Mexico)
FREPASO	Frente País Solidario (Front for a Country in Solidarity, Argentina)
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism, Bolivia)
MUP	Movimiento Urbano Popular (Popular Urban Movement, Mexico)
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, Mexico)
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution, Mexico)
PRI	Partido de la Revolución Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, Mexico)
PSUV	Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, Brazil)
REDCCAM	Red de Empresas Comercializadoras Campesinas de Michoacán (Network of Peasant Commercializing Firms of Michoacán, Mexico)
SME	Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (Mexican Electricians' Union, Mexico)
SNTSS	Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Seguro Social (National Social Security Workers' Union, Mexico)
STRM	Sindicato de Telefonistas de la República Mexicana (Union of Telephone Operators of the Mexican Republic)
UCD	Unión Campesina Democrática (Democratic Peasant Union, Mexico)
UGOCM	Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico)
UNORCA	Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas (National Union of Regional Autonomous Peasant Organizations, Mexico)

## Expanding the Public Square

### *Evangelicals and Electoral Politics in Latin America*

Taylor C. Boas

#### INTRODUCTION

In 1956, Manoel de Mello founded the Brazil for Christ Church, the first native-born Brazilian denomination associated with Pentecostalism, a charismatic branch of evangelical Christianity. The practice of non-Catholic religion had been formally legal since 1890, yet Mello's efforts to expand his new church faced opposition at every turn. Politicians and state agencies blocked his attempts to purchase radio stations to reach out to the faithful. Permits to hold outdoor tent revivals or construct new church buildings were routinely denied. Mello's practice of faith healing, an integral component of Pentecostalism, prompted legal charges of medical malpractice. In 1958, Mello struck a deal with São Paulo mayor Adhemar de Barros, promising votes for Barros's gubernatorial candidacy in exchange for a piece of land for a new church building. Yet after the land was delivered and the sanctuary was built, pressure from the Catholic Church convinced Barros to tear down the building and reallocate the property for a different use (Read 1965; Freston 1993; Gaskill 2002).

A half-century later, the political position of another prominent Pentecostal leader in Brazil, Edir Macedo of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD), could not have been more different. In the early 1990s, Macedo acquired a national television network, Rede Record, which has since grown into one of the country's largest broadcasters. The IURD's massive headquarters in São Paulo was granted a legally questionable permit by the municipal government that exempted it from paying taxes on new construction (UOL Notícias 2014). Brazil's most

prominent politicians attended its inauguration in 2014, including the president, vice-president, and the governor and mayor of São Paulo. Present as well were many of the eighty-three members of the “evangelical caucus” in Brazil’s Congress, including those from the Brazilian Republican Party, the political wing of the IURD. Once political and social outcasts, Brazil’s evangelicals had effectively become power brokers, eagerly pursued as allies by elected officials across the political spectrum.

The political transformation of Latin America’s evangelicals – from a small minority routinely suffering *de jure* and *de facto* harassment and discrimination, to full citizens whose rights are protected and whose support is sought by politicians – constitutes one of the most significant components of Latin America’s “inclusionary turn.” Indeed, this process meets the definition of “incorporation” (Collier and Collier 1991), especially if one takes a long-term view. The practice of non-Catholic religion was specifically prohibited in most of nineteenth-century Latin America. After the separation of church and state in the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century, Latin America’s non-Catholic Christians enjoyed a constitutional right to worship as they chose. Yet as highlighted by the example of Manoel de Mello, evangelicals were often treated as second-class citizens, suffering political and legal discrimination at the hands of local, state, and national officials. Only in recent decades has this religious minority become a constituency whose support politicians seek by offering material and policy benefits. In this sense, the political inclusion of evangelicals is directly parallel to labor incorporation, in which worker activism was transformed from an illegal activity repressed by force into the bedrock of political support for populist politicians.

Just as labor incorporation responded to the swelling ranks of industrial workers in twentieth-century Latin America, the political inclusion of evangelicals has been driven by their growing weight in the electorate. In the 2016–2017 AmericasBarometer surveys, 21 percent of all Latin Americans identified as evangelical. A sheer growth in numbers could partially explain the different political fortunes of Manoel de Mello and Edir Macedo. In Brazil’s 2010 census, there were more members of Macedo’s church – itself only the fourth largest evangelical denomination in Brazil – than there were non-Catholic Christians of any sort back in 1950.

Yet parallel to the situation with labor incorporation, the growing numerical strength of evangelicals has had very different political implications across countries. Chile presents a stark contrast with Brazil in this




FIGURE 11.1 Legislative seat shares for evangelicals in Brazil and Chile

respect. While Brazilian evangelicals have maintained a steady and growing legislative presence since the transition to democracy, Chile has had, on average, only two evangelical representatives in Congress (Figure 11.1). Few evangelicals run for elected office, and those who do meet with limited success. Like their Brazilian counterparts, Chile's evangelicals have gained inclusion: they enjoy legal equality with Catholics in nearly every respect, they do not suffer from arbitrary discrimination or harassment by authorities, and they are treated as an important interest group by mainstream politicians. Yet inclusion has taken very different forms in the two countries. In Brazil, evangelicals have sought and achieved influence within the halls of power, whereas in Chile, they have remained primarily on the sidelines.

Brazil and Chile stand out as a natural paired comparison for examining cross-national differences in evangelicals' engagement and success with electoral politics. First, in percentage terms, they have sizable evangelical populations. In the 2016–2017 AmericasBarometer surveys, 31 percent of Brazilians identified as evangelical, the largest share in South America; Chile and Bolivia were tied for second, at 21 percent. While not ensuring electoral ambitions or success, numbers certainly generate the possibility. Second, evangelicalism was largely a homegrown phenomenon in both countries, and it has deep historical roots (Freston 2001). While missionaries and immigrants established the first Protestant churches, Brazilian and Chilean pastors who founded their own churches or broke away from foreign ones have had the most success with evangelization. The question of electoral ambitions is thus more likely to depend

on domestic political variables in these countries than in Central America, where evangelicals are a larger share of the population – as high as 41 percent in Guatemala – but have been more greatly influenced by missionaries from the United States (Freston 2001).

The present chapter examines why the inclusion of evangelicals has taken such different forms in Brazil, where evangelicals are engaged and successful with electoral politics, versus Chile, where they have been substantially less motivated and successful. Existing explanations, which I argue have limited purchase, have focused on barriers posed by the social or political system, such as social class or party and electoral systems that are inhospitable to new entrants. The explanation I develop in this chapter focuses instead on the motivations that might lead evangelicals to enter the electoral sphere in the first place. Echoing work on other underrepresented minorities in Latin American politics, such as indigenous groups (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Madrid 2012), I argue that the politicization of a social identity is a necessary first step for it to translate into concerted action.

Given a theological focus on the afterlife, Latin America's evangelicals, and especially Pentecostals, have traditionally kept their distance from the worldly pursuit of politics. Where they have overcome this reluctance and thrust themselves into the electoral sphere, it has been to fight legislative battles in two areas at the core of evangelical interests and identities: legal equality with the Catholic Church, and "values issues" such as abortion and same-sex marriage. In Brazil, where the Catholic Church recouped legal privileges during the twentieth century, evangelicals were motivated to elect representatives to defend their citizenship rights. In Chile, where Catholic legal privileges have been more significantly curtailed, there were fewer incentives of this sort. In exploring the implications of the Catholic threat for evangelicals' electoral ambitions, this chapter contributes to a growing literature on the political consequences of interdenominational religious competition in Latin America (Gill 1998; Hagopian 2008; Trejo 2012; Smith 2019).

Legal equality with the Catholic Church dominated the evangelical political agenda for most of Latin American history. Over the past decade, however, values issues have become a more significant concern. Here, the key factors are the timing of progressive legislative initiatives and the potential for evangelical leadership in the struggle against them. In Brazil, values issues landed on the political agenda at an early stage, and evangelicals have been better positioned than Catholics to defend the socially conservative position from within Congress. Hence, values issues

have served as a continued motivator for evangelical political involvement after the struggle for religious liberty largely subsided. In Chile, serious debate on values issues came to the fore much later, and a strong conservative Catholic contingent in Congress has been better positioned to lead the charge against progressive legislation in this area; both factors have limited evangelicals' electoral ambitions.

Electoral ambitions are necessary but not sufficient for electoral success; politicians and parties must also win votes. Given space constraints and data limitations, this chapter focuses on evangelicals' decisions to run for office rather than voters' decisions to support them. The politicization of evangelical identity is likely relevant to voting behavior as well as the strategies of churches and politicians, but I leave this demand-side analysis as a task for future research.

#### A CONTRADICTION OR COMPLEMENTARY FORM OF INCLUSION?

Evangelicals' presence in Latin America has grown from a handful of foreign missionaries in the 1800s to around a fifth of the population today. Over time, the composition and meaning of the "evangelical" category have shifted as well. Following Latin American usage, I apply the term "evangelical" to all Protestants, in contrast to its English-language meaning as a form of Protestantism that stresses personal salvation and a literal interpretation of the Bible. In the nineteenth century, nearly all of Latin America's evangelicals were members of mainline denominations, such as the Anglican, Lutheran, and Presbyterian churches. Many early communities were founded by European immigrants; others grew up around isolated missionary settlements. While European origins gave early evangelicals a relatively privileged social status, the category soon came to overlap much more with the popular sectors, due to both the successful evangelization of lower-class communities (often in indigenous areas) and the arrival of Pentecostalism in the twentieth century.

Pentecostalism, a branch of evangelicalism that emphasizes mystical gifts of the Holy Spirit such as speaking in tongues and faith healing, spread rapidly to Latin America following its founding in the United States in the early 1900s. It has been particularly attractive to lower-class communities because of its emphasis on oral tradition, which makes it more accessible to illiterates, and its informal route to becoming a pastor, which relies on street preaching rather than seminary training

(Cleary and Sepúlveda 1997). Today, about two thirds of all Latin American Protestants are Pentecostal. In terms of theology and practice, Pentecostals fit comfortably within the standard English-language definition of evangelical.

While evangelicals have had a presence in Latin American countries since independence, they clearly meet the definition of an “excluded” social group for most of this period. Latin America’s first post-independence constitutions generally established Roman Catholicism as the official state-sanctioned religion and forbade the public practice of any other (Mecham 1966). Prior to the establishment of civil registries and state-run cemeteries, the Catholic Church held a monopoly over the recording of births, the celebration of marriages, and the burial of the dead. At best, non-Catholic Christians were treated as second-class citizens in early Latin America; at worst, they were closer to outlaws, subject to arrest for the practice of their faith.

The *de jure* situation for Latin American evangelicals improved around the turn of the century, with constitutional guarantees of the freedom to worship and the formal separation of church and state in many countries. Yet as highlighted by the example of Manoel de Mello in Brazil, *de facto* discrimination and harassment by authorities often continued. Moreover, in some countries, evangelicals’ legal rights actually deteriorated as the Catholic Church succeeded in recouping lost privileges. In Peru, three decades after the constitutional reform that established freedom of worship, a 1945 decree prohibited public proselytizing (i.e. outside of church buildings) by non-Catholics in an effort to limit competition with the dominant religion (Armas Asín 2008). Less egregious forms of discrimination, such as preferential access for Catholic clergy in prisons and hospitals and as military chaplains, continue to this day in many countries.

Given their historical treatment as second-class citizens, evangelicals’ transformation into a politically influential constituency meets the definition of inclusion offered in this volume’s introductory chapter: “a multi-dimensional process through which previously marginalized actors gain more meaningful and effective citizenship.” Yet when one thinks about the concept of “inclusion” in Latin America, evangelical Christians are probably not the first group that comes to mind. For many scholars, the present-day political agenda of evangelicals is explicitly *exclusionary* in terms of policies toward women and sexual minorities – a reactionary response to the progressive social and political trends that are more readily associated with inclusion. Evangelicals may constitute a new

pressure group that has gained influence and, in some countries, achieved electoral success. But does their *entrée* into electoral politics really deserve to be grouped with other developments that fit under the inclusion label, including the rise of indigenous parties and the expansion of redistributive social policies?

I argue that the electoral success of evangelicals in Latin America has more synergies with progressive forms of inclusion than might be obvious at first glance. For evangelicals, “meaningful and effective citizenship” has come first and foremost through the defense of religious freedom, a quest in which they historically enjoyed substantial support from the Left. During early battles over the separation of church and state, evangelicals formed political alliances with the most progressive forces in society – anti-clerical Liberals and Radicals – against the conservatism of the Catholic Church. Only in recent decades, as values issues have become a priority, have evangelicals shifted more definitively toward the conservative camp, pushing causes that are exclusionary toward sexual minorities. Yet inclusive attitudes toward all marginalized actors is hardly a requirement that we impose when applying the inclusion label to other groups – such as organized labor, whose historical gains often served to reinforce traditional social roles for women.

Evangelicalism in Latin America also overlaps demographically with a number of marginalized groups, and it may serve to further their social and political inclusion in specific ways. In the 2016–2017 AmericasBarometer surveys, evangelicals were significantly less white than non-evangelicals in three out of eighteen countries, significantly less male in another three out of eighteen, and significantly less wealthy in seven out of eighteen. Nowhere were they significantly more white or more male, and in only one, Honduras, were they significantly more wealthy. Pentecostalism, in particular, has been disproportionately attractive to women in Latin America because it helps them confront domestic violence, alcoholism, and other forms of machismo (Chesnut 1997; Hallum 2003). Women often convert first, in the hopes that their male partners will follow them and be influenced by norms of good behavior. Women are also often attracted to evangelical churches because there are fewer barriers to becoming clergy, in terms of either doctrine or required seminary training (Silva 2010). Empowerment in the home and leadership positions in the church both facilitate other forms of political activity and help to engender meaningful and effective citizenship (Hallum 2003).






FIGURE 11.2 Attitudes of evangelical legislators in Latin America  
 NOTE: Data are from the fourth wave, except for Panama (third wave), and include all countries where five or more evangelical legislators responded.

Furthermore, while few observers would place Latin American evangelicals on the political Left, it would be a mistake to characterize them as an exclusively right-wing movement. On values issues, evangelical politicians tend to hold reliably conservative positions. However, reflecting the lower-class demographics of their membership, they are not particularly pro-market on economic issues. Figure 11.2, based on data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) surveys from the University of Salamanca, plots the mean issue positions of evangelical legislators in several countries, compared with those legislators who place themselves on the Left (ideological self-identification of 1–3 on a 10-point scale) or the Right (8–10). Evangelical politicians are staunchly opposed

to abortion, typically holding even more conservative opinions than those who self-identify as right-wing. Yet on the economy, they hold attitudes that, on average, fall in between those of the Left and the Right.

In some countries, evangelicals' openness to economic redistribution and state-led development has allowed them to form important alliances with the partisan Left. In Brazil, the IURD supported Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for president in 2002, beginning a long partnership with the Workers' Party (PT) government that lasted until 2016, when Edir Macedo finally broke with Dilma Rousseff amidst the effort to impeach her. The PT's partnership with evangelicals was an important element of Lula's shift to the center in 2002; his running mate, businessman José Alencar, came from the Liberal Party, which at the time was closely tied to the IURD and other evangelical churches.

Finally, evangelicals have played an important role in the provision of state-funded social services for the informal sector and other marginalized groups – an important aspect of the inclusionary turn. In Rio de Janeiro, the *Cheque Cidadão* program, which provides food vouchers for the poor, was introduced under the governorship of Anthony Garotinho, an evangelical, and coordinated by Everaldo Dias, an evangelical pastor (Machado 2006a, 2012). In Chile, interdenominational evangelical groups known as *Unidades Pastorales* have formed partnerships with local governments to provide state-funded services such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation and low-income schools and orphanages (Fediakova 2004). Certainly, evangelicals stand to benefit politically from these partnerships, and patterns of benefit distribution may suggest clientelism or other *quid pro quos*. In Rio's *Cheque Cidadão* program, the distribution of benefits was outsourced to churches – 82 percent of them evangelical, and only 11 percent Catholic (Machado 2006a). Yet evangelicals are hardly unique in this respect; clientelism and political benefits from the distribution of social services are arguably the bread and butter of Latin American politics.

One major difference between the inclusion of evangelicals and that of other groups such as the indigenous or the informal sector is that citizens can choose their religion much more readily than their ethnicity or employment status. If one can freely convert into or out of a historically excluded category, does inclusion “count” in the same way as it does for groups whose membership is heavily influenced by genetics or the economy? I argue that “meaningful and effective citizenship” implies that citizens do not suffer a loss of recognition, access, or resources merely on the basis of legitimate choices about their lifestyle, including their

religious affiliation. Certainly we apply the same standard in other realms. While indigenous ancestry is determined by birth, inclusionary policies toward the indigenous are often about supporting a lifestyle – including education in indigenous languages and traditional forms of self-government – that members of this group might otherwise opt out of via assimilation into mainstream society. An inclusive society implies that one should not be forced to abandon one's beliefs, customs, or practices in order to gain rights, political representation, or material benefits.

#### EXPLAINING EVANGELICALS' ELECTORAL SUCCESS

While evangelicals have benefited from an inclusionary turn in both Chile and Brazil – in the sense of legal equality, a decline in arbitrary harassment, and being taken seriously as an interest group – inclusion has taken substantially different forms in each country. As religious minorities, Latin America's evangelicals have had no basis for claiming to represent the national interest in their countries, so the behind-the-scenes, supra-partisan influence sometimes enjoyed by the Catholic Church is off-limits to them (Grzymała-Busse 2015). Their best bet for political influence is putting themselves in positions of power where they can shape policy outcomes directly. In Brazil, evangelicals have established a strong presence in the national legislature since the 1980s, forming a bloc in Congress that holds around 14 percent of seats and has been influential in policies related to religious freedom and values issues. In Chile, evangelicals have had minimal representation in Congress over the same period – even counting the 2017 election, which saw an increase in evangelical candidacies – and their much less successful efforts to influence legislation have mostly taken place outside the halls of power. What explains these differences in engagement and success with electoral politics in two of South America's most heavily evangelical countries?

Existing explanations for evangelicals' electoral accomplishments in Chile and Brazil have focused on the presence or absence of barriers posed by the social or political system. A first factor is social class. Throughout Latin America, evangelicalism has been particularly attractive among lower-class communities; on average, evangelicals are less wealthy than Catholics. However, the class structure of this religious minority differs cross-nationally; evangelicals are overwhelmingly lower-class in some countries and more on par with Catholics in others. Social class matters in numerous ways for success with electoral politics (Carnes 2018). A better educated community is more likely to produce leaders




FIGURE 11.3 Evangelical income distribution

who have the volition to enter electoral politics and who stand a chance of succeeding. Higher average incomes mean more lucrative sources of campaign donations and other financial resources for incipient political movements. Discrimination may also hinder the political ambitions of communities that are perceived as lower-class, even when individual leaders are wealthier or better educated.

Social class is often mentioned as an explanation for evangelicals' limited electoral success in Chile. Chilean evangelicalism was traditionally seen as providing an apolitical haven or refuge from the difficulties of everyday life, with ties between pastors and the faithful reproducing the relationship between peasants and landlord on a rural estate (Lalive D'Epina 1969). Both census and survey data have shown the movement to be of humble origins; in a 2007–2008 survey of evangelicals, 97 percent were from the middle- or lower-income categories (Fediakova and Parker 2009). In particular, scholars have pointed to Chile's rigid social structure as a barrier to the electoral success of this primarily lower-class movement (Freston 2001).

Yet as underscored by survey data from both countries, evangelicals are as much if not more of a lower-class movement in Brazil as they are in Chile. Figure 11.3 plots the income distribution of evangelicals in each country from the 2016–2017 AmericasBarometer. In both cases, the mode of the distribution is the lowest nonzero income category. In Brazil, evangelicals' median monthly income falls into the sixth out of seventeen categories; in Chile, the median category is the seventh out of

seventeen. While comparisons should be made with caution since we cannot be sure of the equivalency of income brackets across countries, these data suggest that Brazilian evangelicals are slightly poorer, relatively speaking, than their Chilean counterparts.

Moreover, in comparative perspective, social class seems an unconvincing explanation for evangelicals' limited electoral success in any country. Lower levels of income or education may pose challenges to electoral success, but they can also convey advantages – for example, producing candidates whose more humble demographic background gives them a common touch. Given the general correlation between measures of class and of partisanship or political participation in Latin America (Carlin and Love 2015; Lupu 2015), a lower-class evangelical community might be less likely to have firm preexisting political loyalties, leaving it more available for mobilization by politically ambitious evangelical leaders. If social class were such an impediment to electoral victory, it would be difficult to explain the historical success of labor-based parties in any country or of indigenous movements in the Andes in recent years.

A second common explanation for the contrasting political achievements of evangelicals in Chile and Brazil focuses on political institutions and their implications for evangelicals' entry into electoral politics. Electoral systems matter for minorities' chances of winning office, as the literature on indigenous political parties in Latin America has made clear (Van Cott 2005). In contrast to indigenous groups, which are often concentrated geographically and may benefit from single member district systems, evangelical Christians tend to be distributed throughout the country, not (yet) constituting a plurality in any one region. Proportional representation (PR) is thus more likely to help them win office.

In particular, open-list PR with high district magnitude has been identified as an electoral system that is particularly favorable to evangelicals' electoral prospects (Freston 2008). This electoral system facilitates evangelicals' access to the ballot by giving party leaders incentives to diversify their lists and generating numerous slots to offer candidates from different social groups. If identity voting outweighs party voting for evangelicals (Boas and Smith 2015), party or coalition leaders can bring in additional votes for the party list by featuring an evangelical candidate.

The different forms of PR used in Chile versus Brazil are often mentioned as an explanation for differences in evangelicals' electoral success. Both countries use open-list PR for their lower electoral chambers, but Brazil's districts are much larger, with a magnitude ranging from 8 to 70 –

an arrangement that is thought to be particularly favorable for evangelicals' ballot access (Freston 2001). In Chile, from 1989 to 2013, district magnitude was fixed at two (the binomial system); since 2017, it ranges from three to eight. In particular, the binomial system's low district magnitude has been considered a barrier to evangelicals getting on the ballot (Freston 2001; Fediakova and Parker 2006).

Apart from the influence of electoral systems, party systems also matter for evangelicals' electoral prospects (Freston 2001). Fragmented party systems imply numerous legislative lists in each election and more opportunities to get on the ballot with established parties. Fragmentation may also make it easier for evangelicals to form new, viable parties themselves, either because of permissive registration requirements (strictly speaking, a cause rather than an effect of fragmentation) or because the effective threshold for winning office is lower.

Given this logic, Brazil's fragmented party system would seem highly favorable to evangelical candidates. Brazilian evangelicals have diversified their bets over time, electing representatives from an increasing number of parties. In the 1986 election, they gained office with six different parties; by 2010, the number had nearly tripled, to seventeen. Evangelicals have also founded their own successful parties. In 2003, the IURD organized the new Municipal Renewalist Party (PMR), later renamed the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB); in 2010, all of the IURD-affiliated elected deputies came from this party. Finally, party switching, though restricted by recent legislation, has traditionally been rampant among evangelical legislators, who generally have institutional loyalty to their churches and treat party affiliation in a purely instrumental fashion (Freston 2001).

In contrast, Chile's more institutionalized party system has been considered much less hospitable to evangelical candidates (Freston 2001). There are many fewer parties in Chile than in Brazil, and major parties have traditionally been grouped into two blocs, the center-left *Convergencia Progresista* (first known as the *Concertación* and then the *Nueva Mayoría*) and the center-right *Chile Vamos* (formerly known as the *Alianza*). Non-bloc parties and independents form their own lists to run for Congress, though they tend to fare poorly. Electoral system reform and the splintering of the center-left coalition helped open up this party system in 2017, with a new bloc, *Broad Front*, winning 13 percent of lower-house seats. Three new evangelical parties attempted to register in 2017 but did not complete the process prior to the election; their ultimate success remains to be seen.

Electoral and party system openness certainly correlates with evangelicals' electoral success in Brazil and Chile. Moreover, ballot access – the hypothesized mechanism linking institutional variables to electoral success – covaries in the expected direction as well. Drawing on secondary, news, and interview sources, I compiled a list of twenty-six evangelical politicians in Chile who ran for Congress thirty-eight times across seven elections from 1989 to 2013. A comparable list does not exist for Brazil and would be nearly impossible to construct given the large number of candidates. However, the number of Brazilian evangelicals who have been elected to Congress dwarfs the number who have even attempted to run in Chile. From a variety of secondary and news sources, I identified 212 Brazilian evangelical politicians who were elected to office 374 times in seven elections from 1986 to 2010. Even accounting for differences in the size of each country's legislature, it is clear that evangelicals have been much more successful in getting on candidate lists in Brazil than in Chile.

Yet it is difficult to attribute causality to the relationship between institutional openness and ballot access in Chile and Brazil. Many other factors differ between the two countries as well, so this correlation could easily be spurious. For a better controlled comparison, we can exploit subnational variation in Brazil, holding constant all national-level variables. Brazil's twenty-seven states vary widely in terms of district magnitude for lower chamber elections. They also have distinct political party configurations – some operate essentially as two-party or even dominant-party systems, whereas others are highly fragmented, mirroring the national political scene. If permissive electoral and party systems matter for evangelical ballot access in the ways that have been hypothesized, we would expect evangelicals to constitute a greater share of candidates in states with higher district magnitude or more legislative lists.

To identify evangelical candidates in Brazil, I use a combination of candidates' self-declared occupations and official electoral names for the 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 elections. Candidates are required to state their occupation when registering to run for office, and one of the options is “priest or member of a religious order or sect.” Few Catholic clergy run for office, due to Vatican prohibitions, so this category is composed almost entirely of evangelicals. Brazilian candidates also have broad leeway to choose how their names will appear on the electronic ballot, and many evangelicals include church-related titles or qualifiers, such as “Pastor,” “Brother,” or “of Jesus” (Boas 2014). This measurement strategy certainly undercounts evangelical candidates, and it is more likely to identify clergy than laypersons. However, I cannot think of any





institutional barriers explain their limited electoral success. In every interview, I asked subjects why evangelicals were 16 percent of the population but only about 1–2 percent of the candidates for Congress. None spontaneously mentioned discrimination by party leaders. When I asked specifically about discrimination in a follow-up question, most subjects denied that it was a factor; more commonly, they blamed the evangelical community itself for a reluctance to engage with politics. In the words of one evangelical staff member to a (non-evangelical) senator: “there is no discrimination toward evangelicals, but rather the reverse: the evangelical world discriminates against politicians” (author’s interview, Valenzuela). Moreover, when those running in 2017 were asked why there had been a boost in candidacies, none spontaneously mentioned the new electoral system. Rather, they argued that evangelicals were spurred to action to oppose new, progressive legislation on values issues introduced or passed under the Bachelet government.

#### THE POLITICIZATION OF EVANGELICAL IDENTITY

While prior research has focused on external barriers that might limit evangelicals’ electoral success in Latin America, I argue that these explanations err in assuming a politicized movement that wants electoral representation in the first place. Studies of religion and party politics in other parts of the world have focused centrally on this question of politicization. In Europe, threats posed to the Catholic Church by anti-clerical Liberal reformers helped create a politicized Catholic identity and, eventually, Christian Democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996). Research on the political representation of indigenous groups in Latin America has also paid closer attention to the politicization of a social identity. In Van Cott’s (2005) analysis, organizational resources and favorable party and electoral systems all play an important role in the success of indigenous parties in Latin America, but the politicization of ethnic cleavages is a necessary first step to transform a standoffish or disinterested stance toward electoral politics into active engagement.

I argue that what is true of Catholics in Europe and indigenous groups in the Andes is also true of evangelicals in South America. Whether the evangelical community overcame an initial reluctance to engage with the worldly pursuit of politics is the most important factor explaining variation in evangelical electoral success between Chile and Brazil.

To understand evangelical attitudes toward electoral politics, it is necessary to first gain an appreciation for Pentecostalism, the dominant

form of Protestantism among Latin American evangelicals. In Chile, the first Pentecostal denomination, the Methodist Pentecostal Church, was founded in 1909; by 1920, it was Chile's largest non-Catholic denomination (Lalive d'Épinay 1969, 22, 35). By the end of the century, 75–90 percent of Chilean evangelicals belonged to Pentecostal churches (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1997; Freston 2001). In Brazil, Pentecostalism arrived in 1910–1911; by 1964, it accounted for an estimated 65 percent of all Protestants (Read 1965), increasing to 77 percent in the 2010 census. Thus, the question of evangelical involvement in Brazilian and Chilean electoral politics is largely a question of Pentecostal involvement.

As a religious tradition with a theological focus on the afterlife, Pentecostalism has traditionally been skeptical of political activity. Max Weber (1993) drew a distinction between other-worldly religions, which serve to discourage active engagement in public life, and worldly religions, which promote it. Pentecostalism, with its mysticism-filled worship practices and emphasis on heavenly rewards for earthly suffering, falls squarely into the other-worldly camp, at least in its original formulations (Gaskill 2002). Given this orientation, the initial inclination of most evangelicals in Brazil and Chile was to maintain their distance from the political world. In the 1950s–1960s, conservative reactions to the rise of Catholic Liberation Theology also reinforced Pentecostals' apolitical stance (Campos 2010). Brazil's largest Pentecostal denomination, the Assemblies of God, long promoted a position of "believers don't mess with politics" (Freston 1993). Likewise, in the first decades of their presence in Chile, Pentecostals accepted "participation in political battles only when it was necessary to defend the interests of evangelical churches" (Ortiz 2012, 8).

A crucial first question for explaining evangelical involvement in electoral politics – logically prior to the question of social or political barriers that might hold them back – is whether the evangelical community overcomes this standoffish attitude. In Brazil, they successfully did so. In 1986, an Assemblies of God leader published a book, "Brother Votes for Brother" (Sylvestre 1986), which symbolically abandoned the "believers don't mess with politics" stance. The church promoted a slate of candidates in the 1986 Constituent Assembly election and successfully elected fourteen of them, nearly double the size of the next largest church contingent. It has continued this practice more recently, publishing an official list of church-sponsored candidates in its magazine in 2010, for example (Mensajeiro da Paz 2010). The IURD has been even more electorally ambitious. It takes a census of church members

prior to each election and identifies specific church-affiliated candidates to run in each district. It provides institutional support for their campaigns, via sermons and church-owned media, and it carefully instructs church members on how to vote (Machado 2006b; Oro 2006a).

In contrast, evangelical politicians in Chile have struggled to convince their broader faith community that running for office is an appropriate endeavor. Jaime Barrientos (author's interview), an evangelical candidate for Valparaíso city council in 2008 and Congress in 2013, purchased a series of five-minute advertisements on a local evangelical television station for both elections, largely to make the case to other evangelicals that participating in elections was legitimate. Topics included "What is a Christian doing in politics?" – a question that would be unnecessary to ask in Brazil.<sup>1</sup> When Salvador Pino Bustos, a radio evangelist and Pentecostal pastor, launched an independent bid for the presidency in 1999, he failed to attract the support of most evangelical leaders (Fonseca 1999; Fediakova 2004).

Evangelical politicians and leaders often attribute their community's limited politicization to the continued influence of the notion that politics is not appropriate for believers. In the words of Anglican priest Alfred Cooper (author's interview), former evangelical chaplain of the presidential palace La Moneda, evangelicals have had little interest in running for office because of "the pietistic idea that was part of our revival here: you do not get involved in worldly affairs, and politics is a worldly affair." As discussed below, some church leaders abandoned this traditional standoffish attitude in the 2017 election, endorsing a slate of evangelical candidates, though the results of the election suggest that voters may still be reluctant to support them.

What explains why Brazilian evangelicals have set aside the "believers don't mess with politics" attitude in favor of active political engagement, while a suspicious attitude toward electoral politics persists in Chile? In the sections that follow, I argue that two sets of legislative battles account for the differential politicization of evangelical identity in Brazil and Chile. The first concerns opportunities and incentives to defend legal equality with the Catholic Church through electoral means, principally elections to constituent assemblies. The second battle concerns the newly relevant "values issues" – primarily abortion and same-sex marriage – that have largely replaced religious liberty as the dominant political concerns for evangelicals in the 2000s.

<sup>1</sup> [www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9Xhl7AySeM](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9Xhl7AySeM) (accessed July 8, 2019).




FIGURE 11.5 Evangelical population growth in Brazil and Chile

### STRUGGLES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Throughout Latin American history, the primary issue that has motivated evangelical participation in electoral politics has been the right to practice their religion as freely as Roman Catholics. In the nineteenth century, prior to the formal separation of church and state, the struggle for religious liberty drove evangelical participation in politics and public life. Yet nineteenth-century battles with the Catholic Church happened too early in the growth of the evangelical population to serve as a major stimulus for sustained political participation. As shown in Figure 11.5, evangelicals were only 1 percent of the population in Brazil's 1890 census; in Chile, they were 0.55 percent in 1895. Moreover, Pentecostalism, the now-dominant strain of evangelicalism, did not arrive until 1909–1910.

The question of relevance for evangelical participation in present-day electoral politics is thus a somewhat more contemporary one. During the period of evangelical, and especially Pentecostal, growth – roughly speaking, from the 1920s onward – what struggles related to religious liberty might have served to politicize this faith community, overcoming an initial disinclination to participate in politics and public life?

While the struggle for legal equality with the Catholic Church has been a major factor driving evangelical political activity, mere competition for believers has not prompted the same sort of incursion into electoral politics. Historically, evangelicalism has posed a threat to membership in the Catholic Church, rather than the other way around. Following the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II, 1962–1965), the Church implemented a series of progressive reforms that sought to stem the loss of

members and bring it closer to the people. These reforms, such as the introduction of Ecclesial Base Communities, went furthest in those countries where the battle for souls was most intense, including Chile and, especially, Brazil (Mainwaring and Wilde 1989; Gill 1998). Yet the progressive Church reforms of mid-century never succeeded in posing a serious threat to the effectiveness of evangelical proselytizing, as underscored by the growth curves in Figure 11.5. Only the specter of Catholic influence over state policy, which might serve to tilt the playing field of competition for believers, has served to mobilize evangelical political projects.

### **Brazil: Catholic Offensives and Constituent Assemblies**

In Brazil, the formal, constitutional separation of church and state happened early on, when evangelicals were a tiny share of the population. Yet in the decades that followed, the Catholic Church regained significant privileges, leading to a sense that early gains in the area of religious liberty were under assault. Meanwhile, during the twentieth century, Brazil held several elections for constituent assemblies to write new constitutions, providing the opportunity for evangelicals to organize politically to defend the separation of church and state and the rights of religious minorities. The most recent of these Constituent Assembly elections, in 1986, marked a surge in evangelical electoral success.

Brazil's Republican movement was anti-clerical, and following the successful coup against Emperor Pedro II in 1889, the first act of the provisional government was ending the status of Catholicism as the official, state-sanctioned religion. The constitution of 1891 formalized this separation of church and state, instituting freedom of religion, civil marriage, and secular education (Oro 2006b). Thus, one of the major political objectives of evangelicals in Latin America was achieved early on in Brazil, without their participation as protagonists or even significant allies, and well before it could serve to mobilize a large number of evangelicals.

Yet the Catholic Church put up substantial resistance to its loss of privileges, and for decades after the formal separation of church and state, it organized electorally in an attempt to regain them. While efforts in the early 1900s were of limited success, the political scenario took a positive turn for the Catholic Church, and a negative one for religious minorities, after the 1930 coup that brought Getúlio Vargas to power. Vargas sought closer relations with the Church in order to bolster his nationalist image;

one of his first acts as president was a decree reestablishing Catholic education in public schools (Williams 1974).

In the lead-up to the 1933 Constituent Assembly elections, the supra-partisan Catholic Electoral League (LEC) was established for the purpose of elaborating a Catholic platform for the new constitution, endorsing candidates who pledged to support it, registering Catholics to vote, and offering them advice on whom to support. The LEC succeeded in electing the majority of candidates it endorsed, and it achieved most of its aims for the new constitution: state recognition of Catholic marriages, prohibition of divorce, religious holidays, the possibility of state financial support of Church activities, and a reaffirmation of Catholic education in public schools (Williams 1974; Mainwaring 1986).

Evangelicals perceived a clear threat to secularism in the Catholic Church's political efforts – Protestant leaders protested that “the return of compulsory religion” would bring about a reprise of the Inquisition (Williams 1974, 308) – and the activities of the LEC prompted evangelicals to organize politically for the first time. The lead-up to the 1933 Constituent Assembly elections saw the formation of a new evangelical political association, the São Paulo Evangelical Civic Union (*União Cívica Evangélica Paulista*), and several evangelical candidates, one of them successful (Freston 1993; Campos 2006). Churches organized voter registration drives, pastors urged the faithful to vote, and denominational publications engaged in “an unprecedented job of raising political awareness” (Freston 1993, 154). One open letter to Brazilian evangelicals in 1932 expresses the motivation quite clearly:

Let's abandon, once and for all, the attitude of mere observers, of hoping, of apparent well being, of indifference and comfort . . . We urge that the voice of evangelicals in all Brazil be heard by those who will make up the Constituent Assembly, who will decide on the problems that affect spiritual and social life . . . Do not by any means vote for candidates or parties who support measures that compromise the secular nature of the State, introduce or permit religious instruction in public schools.

(Sylvestre 1986, 93, 96)

The end of the Vargas regime and the calling of another Constituent Assembly election for 1945 prompted another round of electoral mobilization by both Catholics and evangelicals. The LEC, which had disbanded after Vargas suspended elections in 1937, was resurrected in the lead-up to the 1945 elections. The Christian Democratic Party was also founded during that year and ran candidates in the Constituent Assembly elections (Coelho 2003). In response, evangelicals tried to unify around a

common electoral platform, and there were calls for supporting designated candidates and coordinating the vote (Campos 2006).

The LEC model of Catholic Church-endorsed candidacies was used through the 1950s and 1960s (Bruneau 1974, 101), and evangelicals continued to express support for political involvement to defend their own interests. In interviews conducted in 1959–1960, Willems (1967, 222) found that twenty-seven out of thirty-six pastors favored political action to protect freedom of religion.

During the 1964–1985 period of military rule, a rift between the Catholic Church and the government generated opportunities for pro-regime evangelicals. Friendly pastors were invited to take courses at the Superior War College, and authorities offered appointments, jobs, and partnerships for church leaders (Cavalcanti 1988; Chesnut 1997). Yet benefits for evangelicals during this period were individualistic and potentially tenuous, and with redemocratization, there was a sense of unease among many evangelical leaders about what a new situation – one with the potential for rapprochement between the state and Catholic Church – would bring (Cavalcanti 1988, 208).

Given the uncertainty of the transition and a concern about another Catholic offensive during constitutional deliberations, the 1986 Constituent Assembly election prompted a major surge in evangelical candidacies and the successful election of thirty-three representatives. Moreover, for the first time, a Pentecostal church, the Assemblies of God, was leading the effort, including publication of the “Brother Votes for Brother” volume mentioned above. In subsequent interviews, Assemblies of God leaders mentioned the Catholic Church’s constitutional agenda – including a supposed effort to have Catholicism declared the official religion for the first time since 1891 – as the factor that led the church to abandon its traditionally apolitical stance (Mariano and Pierucci 1996, 209; Freston 1993, 213). Articles in the church’s official magazine sounded a similar line in the lead-up to the election (Freston 1993, 213–214).

### **Chile: Catholic Détente and Authoritarian Constitutions**

Chile differs from Brazil in terms of evangelical incentives to defend religious equality as well as opportunities to do so via electoral politics. The constitutional separation of church and state went largely uncontested by the Catholic Church, which did not seek to recoup lost privileges in the decades that followed, either electorally or through other means.

Moreover, Chile's twentieth-century constitutions were written by appointed committees and approved by referenda rather than elected constituent assemblies, limiting evangelicals' opportunities to elect representatives to debate fundamental questions of religious freedom. Smaller-scale efforts to gain legal equality with the Catholic Church have failed to mobilize evangelical electoral participation.

The formal separation of church and state came later in Chile than in Brazil – the 1925 constitution passed during the presidency of Arturo Alessandri – but it was similarly pushed by Liberal reformers without significant involvement of the evangelical community. Alessandri was strongly committed to separating church and state, a position included in his 1920 campaign platform for pragmatic reasons – to deprive the Conservative Party of the ability to win votes as a defender of Church interests (Smith 1982, 72).

Yet Chile's constitutional separation of church and state differed starkly from Brazil's in terms of the Catholic reaction and the threat that it posed to evangelical interests. Alessandri negotiated the terms of separation directly with the Vatican, which agreed not to oppose the new constitution, and to communicate this stance to Chilean bishops, in exchange for guaranteed legal status for the Catholic Church, the right to own property and administer its educational system, and the right to manage its internal affairs via Canon Law (Mecham 1966, 218–219; Smith 1982, 72, 78). In contrast to the overt politicization of Brazil's Catholic Electoral League, Santiago Archbishop Crescente Errázuriz issued a pastoral letter in 1922 forbidding priests' active involvement in party and electoral politics. Evangelicals were thus much less likely to perceive an aggrieved Catholic Church that wanted to regain lost privileges.

Chile's 1925 constitution, as well as its present 1980 constitution, also differ from the majority of Brazil's charters in terms of the opportunities they afforded for evangelical electoral mobilization. In 1925, there was no electoral process to choose representatives specifically charged with writing, and voting to approve or disapprove, the constitutional separation of church and state and the guarantee of religious equality. Rather, the proposed constitutional text was drafted by a committee appointed by the president and approved by popular referendum. Chile's present constitution, which dates from the Pinochet regime, was similarly written by an appointed committee and approved in a (particularly undemocratic) referendum; subsequent changes have come only through amendments.



In the nearly 100 years since 1925, Chile's evangelicals rarely experienced any perceived threat to the separation of church and state that might prompt political organizing. In the view of Mecham (1966, 222), "the tolerance of Chileans and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion have been favorable to the Evangelical movement." The only major attempt during this period to recoup the Catholic Church's legal privileges, a 1944 bill that would have required public servants to take Catholic religion classes, was defeated in the Chamber of Deputies after evangelicals took to the streets in protest; direct representation in Congress was unnecessary (Canales Guevara 2000, 61).

Chile is a case of unusually successful Catholic electoral initiatives throughout the twentieth century, yet these were unlikely to generate a perceived threat to evangelicals. The Falange Nacional, established in 1938, had elected one senator and fourteen deputies by 1957, and the Christian Democratic Party, founded that year, dominated Chilean politics during the 1960s (Smith 1982; Huneeus 2003). Yet both parties emerged out of left-leaning Catholic student movements and emphasized progressive social policy rather than recouping Catholic legal privileges, which might serve to stimulate evangelical political activity. Meanwhile, new conservative Catholic groups, such as Opus Dei and the *gremialismo* movement that emerged in Chile's Catholic University during the 1970s, did not find expression within the party system until the founding of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in 1983 (Berrier Sharim 1989), so they were also unlikely to generate a perceived electoral threat for much of this period.

During the Pinochet dictatorship, strained relations between the government and Catholic Church created an opening for a conservative faction of the evangelical movement, which embraced the regime in exchange for public recognition and benefits (Lagos Schuffenegger 1988; Boas 2016). Given these cozy relations, the magazine of the Methodist Pentecostal Church, Chile's largest Protestant denomination, expressed no anxieties about any loss of privileges in Chile's 1980 constitution (Vieyra 1980), a stark contrast to the position of the Assemblies of God in Brazil.

Since the formal separation of church and state, the only religious freedom-related issue that prompted notable mobilization by Chile's evangelicals concerns the legal status of religious organizations. The Chilean Catholic Church is considered an entity under public law whose legal status can only be dissolved via constitutional amendment. Prior to 1999, nearly all other religious entities were considered nonprofit

corporations under private law, meaning that their legal status could be canceled by either administrative action of the Ministry of Justice or a court sentence (Cortínez Castro 1998; Salinas Aranedo 1999; Orrego et al. 2003).

With the return to democracy in 1990, a number of evangelical leaders began to advocate for legislation that would give all churches public law juridical personality – a reform that was eventually implemented via the 1999 Religious Worship Law. Yet the effort ultimately generated little opposition from the Catholic Church. The Church’s main demand was that it be effectively “grandfathered” in terms of its constitutionally recognized juridical personality; once this provision was included in the final text, the Church offered its support for the bill, which was approved almost unanimously (Salinas Aranedo 1999; Orrego et al. 2003).

Given the limited sense of threat to evangelicals’ core interests during the 1990s, the push to resolve their churches’ legal status ultimately failed to stimulate significant participation in electoral politics. The Religious Worship Law effort did not significantly boost the number of evangelicals running for Congress, even though those elected in 1993 and 1997 would be in a position to shape and vote on the new legislation. The one political project that sought to elect candidates for this purpose ultimately collapsed. In 1995, a group of young lay evangelicals organized the National Christian Alliance (ANC), which tried unsuccessfully to register as a political party and also failed to negotiate a slate of candidates with established right-wing parties. Many of Chile’s senior evangelical leaders opposed the project due to generational, lay-pastoral, and partisan divides (Fediakova 2004; author’s interview, Larrondo).

#### VALUES ISSUES: THE QUESTION OF TIMING AND ALLIANCES

In recent years, the quest for religious liberty, the major issue inspiring evangelicals’ political activism for most of Latin American history, has taken a backseat to new battles over values issues, including same-sex marriage and abortion (Corrales 2017). Blocking progressive legislation on these issues constitutes a new struggle that can potentially politicize evangelical identity, prompting an initial entrée into the electoral sphere or maintaining evangelicals’ involvement once questions of religious liberty have largely been settled. One important feature of the struggle over values issues distinguishes it from these earlier battles. On same-sex marriage, abortion, and related issues, conservative Catholics generally

TABLE 11.1 *Liberalization on values issues*

	Date of Legalization	
	Brazil	Chile
Limited abortion <sup>a</sup>	1940	2017
Divorce	1977	2004
Same sex civil unions	2011	2015
Same sex marriage	2013	

<sup>a</sup> Abortion in the case of anencephaly was not legal in Brazil until 2012. Therapeutic abortion was legal in Chile from 1931 to 1989.

adopt the same positions as evangelicals; for the first time, they are potential allies rather than adversaries.

I argue that both the timing and the question of alliances on battles over values issues have been much more favorable to evangelical electoral participation in Brazil than in Chile. Brazil was an early adopter of progressive legislation on values issues, while Chile was a comparative laggard, as summarized in Table 11.1. Abortion and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) rights were up for debate during Brazil's 1987–1988 Constituent Assembly, engaging an evangelical caucus that was initially focused on defending religious liberty. In contrast, similar issues did not mobilize evangelical candidates in Chile until 2017. Moreover, the socially conservative Catholic presence in Chile's Congress is much stronger than in Brazil's. In the 2010 PELA surveys in each country, 45 percent of Chilean legislators both identified as Catholic and were strongly opposed to same-sex marriage and abortion (self-placement of 1 or 2 on a 10-point scale); only 13 percent of Brazilian legislators fell into the same category. As a result, Chilean evangelicals have been able to oppose progressive values legislation by supporting existing conservative Catholic legislators, whereas Brazil's evangelicals have needed to take the lead in these same battles.

### **Brazil: Leading the Charge against an Early Progressive Turn**

In Brazil, evangelical politicians who initially entered the fray to defend religious liberty in the Constituent Assembly instead found themselves defending conservative positions on values issues, which were very much up for debate during deliberations. Evangelicals dominated the Subcommittee on the Family, Minors, and the Elderly, which was

responsible for drafting relevant portions of the constitutional text, and their proposal initially banned abortion, which had been permitted under limited circumstances since 1940. When the abortion ban was stripped from the text that went to a floor vote, evangelical legislators introduced two amendments that sought (unsuccessfully) to reinstate it. Another evangelical representative proposed to broaden the constitutional grounds for state censorship to allow the censoring of pornography. Evangelicals also helped vote down an amendment that would have included sexual orientation in the list of conditions protected from discrimination (Sylvestre 1988, 33–34; Freston 1993).

In the 2000s, as LGBTQ rights became a more central issue in the political debate, evangelical representatives took the lead in opposing liberalizing proposals in this area. One of the major cases involved a school curriculum designed to combat anti-LGBTQ bullying, known colloquially as the “gay kit.” The newly inaugurated Dilma Rousseff government was planning to roll out this curriculum in early 2011 when the evangelical caucus began to mobilize against it. Though public school curricula were an executive branch responsibility and did not require legislative approval, evangelicals controlled 14 percent of seats in Congress and were able to exercise pressure in other areas. Evangelical legislators and their conservative Catholic allies threatened to block all future legislation and to support a corruption investigation against the president’s chief of staff unless the curriculum was withdrawn. The government soon backed down, and the educational campaign was canceled (Vital and Lopes 2013).

Defending conservative positions on values issues was not the main reason for evangelicals’ initial entrée into electoral politics in Brazil, but it quickly became the major motivation for their continued presence. While Sylvestre’s (1986) argument for evangelical participation in the Constituent Assembly had focused on religious freedom, in his subsequent review of that experience and call for continued political involvement, values issues were a much more important justification (Sylvestre 1988, 33). By the 2000s, they had become the primary motivation. In interviews conducted in 2011–2012, Machado and Burity (2014) found that, when asked about their attitudes toward electoral politics, evangelical leaders and politicians frequently mentioned the importance of defending traditional religious values against secularizing, liberal political projects.

Moreover, while evangelicals and conservative Catholics largely coincide in their stance on values issues, Brazil’s evangelicals have a stronger

presence in Congress, putting them in a position to lead the charge against progressive legislation. While most legislators are nominally Catholic, the group with strong institutional loyalty to the Catholic Church is much smaller. Serious Catholic organizing within the Brazilian Congress began only in the 1990s, in response to evangelicals' electoral success. The Pastoral Parlamentar Católica, the main vehicle for conservative Catholic representation, was formed in 1997, ten years after the entrée of evangelicals. In the 2011–2014 legislature, it had only twenty-four members, versus seventy who belonged to the evangelical equivalent, the Frente Parlamentar Evangélica. Evangelicals also had a stronger presence in the large Frente Parlamentar Mista em Defesa da Vida e Contra o Aborto (Joint Parliamentary Front in Defense of Life and Against Abortion) – twelve of the Catholic caucus members belonged, versus forty-two from the evangelical caucus (Vital and Lopes 2013).

### **Chile: Delayed Mobilization Amid Conservative Catholic Leadership**

In Chile, values issues did not present a perceived threat to evangelicals' way of life until much more recently, despite continued center-left government from 1990 to 2009. The return to democracy did not begin with a constitutional convention where every issue was on the table; rather, the governing Concertación had to choose which reforms it would pursue through the normal legislative process. Chile's first two post-Pinochet presidents were from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) – a centrist party overall, but one that clusters with the right on values issues (Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Raymond and Felch 2014). Right-wing parties also retained a strong presence in Congress. As a result, there were no serious attempts to liberalize values legislation in the 1990s. A 1991 bill to relegalize therapeutic abortion made little headway; the only abortion bill that went to a floor vote was sponsored by a right-wing senator and sought to increase criminal penalties for offenders (Blofield 2006).

Not until the issue of civil unions – initially proposed by Sebastián Piñera in 2011, and finally approved and signed into law by Michelle Bachelet in 2015 – did evangelicals worry about new legislation on values issues posing any major threat to their conservative worldview. According to Eddy Roldán, an evangelical political organizer and candidate for Congress in 2017, “until the year 2010, the church was comfortable. We kept on doing our work as a church, preaching the Gospel, and in politics, it ultimately did not matter that much who governed” (author's interview).

During Bachelet's second term (2014–2018) however, a series of progressive laws on values issues jolted this comfortable position for evangelicals and prompted a rethinking of their traditional political quiescence. In addition to the civil unions law in 2015, the Bachelet government legalized abortion under limited circumstances in September 2017, two months before the general election, and it introduced bills to allow same-sex marriage and adoption and strengthen transgender rights. In interviews with six evangelical candidates during the 2017 campaign, nearly all of them mentioned the Bachelet government's values agenda as the primary impulse for evangelicals' political activity in that election, characterizing it as an "awakening," an "earthquake," or a "bubble bursting" (author's interviews, Roldán, Contreras, Gómez, Pérez, and Durán Sepúlveda).

The evangelical political awakening of 2017 took the form of a surge in candidacies and the first organized efforts to promote a slate. As noted above, at least thirty-two evangelical candidates ran for Congress in 2017, compared to ten in the previous election. There were also three efforts to found new evangelical parties, though none successfully completed the process before the election. Moreover, a group tied to several prominent pastors, *Por un Chile para Cristo* (For a Chile for Christ), promoted a slate of fourteen of the most conservative evangelical candidates, holding press conferences, handing out fliers at Christian events, and circulating their names on social media. Organizers of these efforts cited the Bachelet government's values agenda as the impetus for their electoral offensive (Emol 2016; Cosmovisión 2017).

Yet the fruits of evangelical electoral organizing in 2017 were relatively modest. Only four evangelical candidates were elected, far fewer than organizers were hoping for. All were on the lists of a major party, National Renewal (RN), and had previously held elected office or gained prior campaign experience running for Congress in 2009 or 2013. Thus, neither the political scenario nor the new electoral system seems to have helped true newcomers or outsiders win office. Combined with two evangelicals already in the Senate, these victories brought the evangelical presence in Congress to 3 percent of seats, slightly better than the best results from the 1990s (Figure 11.1).

Beyond the later stage at which values issues have come to the fore, a second reason for evangelicals' limited electoral ambitions in Chile is the strong, socially conservative Catholic presence in Congress, which has encouraged evangelicals to align with existing legislators. In addition to Chile's Christian Democratic Party, the two major right-wing parties have

strong conservative Catholic contingents; this is especially true for UDI, many of whose leaders belong to conservative Catholic societies such as Opus Dei. Conservative Catholic legislators have long led the battle on values issues; Hernán Larraín of UDI sponsored a bill to increase criminal penalties for illegal abortions that was only narrowly defeated in 1998 (Blofield 2006).

Amidst the struggle over values issues, some conservative Catholic legislators have received enthusiastic backing from evangelicals. Manuel José Ossandón, an RN senator, was featured on the cover of the publication *Prensa Evangélica* in 2014, criticizing same-sex parenting; several evangelical politicians helped organize his 2017 bid for the right-wing coalition's presidential nomination. After Ossandón lost the presidential primary, a number of evangelicals, including the party-in-formation Unidos en la Fe, threw their support behind former UDI senator and far-right independent candidate José Antonio Kast.

Given the option to build alliances with conservative Catholic legislators who have experience and seniority, electing their own representatives has historically been less of a priority for Chile's evangelicals. As Alfred Cooper, former chaplain of La Moneda, stated in 2015, "evangelicals have a kind of a blockage, that this is the way life is. You find the friendliest senators and deputies . . . and you get alongside them. There's very little movement to actually become parliamentarians" (author's interview). This attitude changed in 2017, in part thanks to Cooper's own support for the Por un Chile para Cristo effort; relying on conservative Catholics in Congress was no longer considered sufficient. Yet even if such electoral offensives bear more fruit in the future, evangelical legislators will likely be a long way from leading the charge on values issues as they do in Brazil.

Moreover, those evangelicals who do run for office on a values platform have difficulty distinguishing themselves from conservative Catholic competitors. For example, Francesca Muñoz of RN built her 2013 campaign for deputy from the Concepción region around a conservative stance on values issues. But during the main candidates' debate, incumbent Enrique Van Rysselberghe of UDI stole her thunder, attacking President Bachelet's stance on abortion and same-sex marriage before Muñoz had a chance to raise the issue. While voting behavior is beyond the scope of this chapter, it seems plausible that evangelical voters motivated by values issues, the natural support base for a candidate like Muñoz, might instead opt for someone like Van Rysselberghe, who had more legislative experience and strong ties to the right-wing political

establishment and was arguably better positioned to defend their concerns in Congress.

#### CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have argued that increases in “meaningful and effective citizenship” for evangelical Christians constitute an important part of Latin America’s contemporary inclusionary turn. Evangelical Christianity is a core component of the lives of a growing number of Latin American citizens, in particular those who are poor, female, and nonwhite. The recognition, access, and resources that they have gained over the past century – the legal right to practice their religion on the same footing as Roman Catholics, the political influence that has allowed them to be taken seriously as citizens, voters, and candidates, and the material benefits, such as state partnerships for social service delivery, that they have been able to negotiate – are themselves important elements of inclusion. To the extent that they have gained office or organized as pressure groups in recent years, evangelicals have tended to promote socially conservative policies that are exclusionary toward sexual minorities and, in some ways, women as well. Yet they also often serve to empower women in the home and through leadership opportunities; to support, and even help implement, redistributive social policies; and to form political partnerships with the Left as well as the Right. In all of these ways, their entrée into the political sphere is part and parcel of Latin America’s inclusionary turn, writ large.

While gains in meaningful and effective citizenship for evangelicals have been a common trend throughout the region, political inclusion has taken different forms cross-nationally, with evangelicals gaining substantial electoral presence in some countries and remaining nearly devoid of descriptive representation in others. I argue that cross-national differences in evangelicals’ ambitions and success with electoral politics depend on whether this religious identity is transformed into a political identity. In Brazil, two sets of legislative battles served to draw evangelicals into the electoral arena – the struggle for equal rights and privileges with the Catholic Church, particularly in constitutions written by elected assemblies, and the defense of conservative positions on values issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, where evangelicals took an early lead. In Chile, the limited threat from the Catholic Church, lack of electoral opportunities for influencing constitution-writing, the later date at which values issues came to the fore, and protagonism of conservative Catholics



have all inhibited the politicization of evangelical identity in a way that could mobilize electoral participation. This scenario began to change in 2017 after a flurry of progressive legislation, but it is still too soon to tell whether it will bear fruit.

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PART IV

INCLUSION, POPULISM, AND DEMOCRACY





## Pathways to Inclusion in Latin America

Maxwell A. Cameron

### INTRODUCTION

Historical change is often driven by demands for inclusion by previously marginalized groups. From the rise of the urban bourgeoisie during the early stages of capitalism, to the organization of workers in the twentieth century, to the contemporary mobilizations of indigenous peoples, struggles for political inclusion have disrupted constituted power, reshaped institutions, and altered prevailing habits and attitudes. Latin America is no exception. Its most recent inclusionary turn was characterized by a “new constitutionalism” (Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor 2012), an explosion of democratic participation (Cameron and Luna 2010), and a renewed emphasis on social policies that empowered and lifted millions of people out of poverty (United Nations Development Programme 2016, 3).

Practices of citizenship are at the heart of contemporary struggles for inclusion. As noted by this volume’s editors, Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, inclusion is a “multi-dimensional process through which previously marginalized actors gain more meaningful and effective citizenship.” Since inclusionary turns involve changes in patterns of recognition, access to influence, and the distribution of resources, they have profound implications for the relationship between citizens and democracy. The motivation of this chapter is to better understand the

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conditions under which inclusionary turns contribute to the emergence of a democracy based on inclusive citizenship (O'Donnell 2010).

To address this, I focus on how logics of inclusion and structural-historical conditions have shaped *pathways* to inclusion. The chapter is organized into six sections. The first section outlines political logics of inclusion. The second describes how these logics have changed over discrete historical periods. The third analyzes the structural-historical conditions that shape whether inclusion threatens the interests of powerful actors. The fourth sketches alternative pathways to inclusion. The fifth discusses inclusionary outcomes and the challenges of building a citizens' democracy. The final section concludes.

### POLITICAL LOGICS OF INCLUSION

Inclusionary turns involve subtle and complex dilemmas, tensions, and trade-offs. They often entail an acute political dilemma for those in power: whether to allow previously marginalized groups a say in public decision-making or perpetuate their exclusion. Inclusion can enhance the capacity of powerful actors to mobilize new bases of support, while undercutting opposition; it may even enhance the overall capacity of the political system to generate collective action. But it can also entail the risk that newly included groups will use their voice to transform politics at the expense of constituted powers. Previously marginalized groups struggling for inclusion also face a dilemma: in addition to seeking a place at the table they may also want a new menu. Since organized popular sectors typically seek to transform political institutions as well as occupy them, they often fear that their demands will be met with half-measures, with efforts to co-opt and control them, or with concessions that weaken their autonomy and neutralize their capacity to mobilize. This "dual dilemma" was noted by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier in their work on the incorporation of labor in the twentieth century (1991, 48–50).

Inclusion can generate tensions between newly empowered actors and established elites who perceive threats to their interest. Expanding the political arena may provoke a crisis of social domination (O'Donnell 1973, 1988, 24–27). Wherever inclusion threatens to fundamentally transform the political system, expanding the political arena in ways that destabilize the underlying pact of domination, opposition is most likely from those actors who stand to lose privileges and influence.<sup>1</sup> As a general

<sup>1</sup> See Rueschemeyer et al. (1992).

rule, the greater the perception of threat, the more the response of the state, as the guarantor of social relations of domination, is likely to involve exclusion and repression (Collier 1979a, 389; O'Donnell 1988, 28–31). Active exclusionary measures may forestall political change, but they can also lead to the radicalization of demands by marginalized groups, and thereby set in motion costly reactive sequences of mobilization and repression that can take decades to work themselves out (Mahoney 2001). A central claim of this volume is that persistent democracy has opened the doors to inclusion in Latin America's inegalitarian societies in part because it limits the exercise of repression. This is not to say that violence does not remain part of the repertoire at the disposal of powerful actors, particularly in the context of weak states, but state violence is constrained by the emerging norms of rights and citizenship (Etchemendy, this volume).

Finally, inclusion may involve complex trade-offs because each inclusionary turn shifts the boundary between insiders and outsiders. This can create *unfinished business*: an agenda for the future inclusion of those excluded by the last inclusionary turn. For example, the extension of the franchise to men, including workers, made the exclusion of women, especially in the middle class, more politically salient. The incorporation of the organized urban working class created an aristocracy of labor in relation to unorganized workers, thereby creating opportunities for the mobilization of more precarious workers by partisan actors of both the Left and the Right. Twentieth- and twenty-first-century attempts at republican "refounding" seek to redress the imbalance created by nineteenth-century republics that liberated *criollo* elites without decolonizing the state.

Given the complexity of these dilemmas, tensions, and trade-offs, inclusionary turns are often limited or constrained such that full citizenship cannot be attained. For example, inclusionary turns may be *limited* to particular groups of beneficiaries, specific territories, or to policy issue areas. They may also be *constrained* by budgets, prior policy choices that restrict the scope of popular participation, and elite resistance. There are also forms of inclusion – such as clientelism, or partisan co-optation – that are undesirable from the perspective of democratic citizenship. Inclusion is always a balancing act, not an absolute value.

#### HISTORICAL PERIODS AND CHANGING LOGICS

Since independence Latin American political systems have become less exclusionary and oligarchical and more inclusive and democratic, but the process is neither unilinear nor irreversible, and it is never complete.

TABLE 12.1 *Periods of Latin American politics*

<b>Agro-export economy</b>	<b>Import Substitution industrialization (ISI)</b>	<b>Neoliberalism</b>
<b>1820–1930</b>	<b>1930–1980</b>	<b>1980–present</b>
I. Critical juncture: Independence	I. Critical juncture: Labor incorporation	I. Critical juncture: International debt crisis
II. Outcome: Consolidation of oligarchic states	I. Outcome: National-popular projects	II. Outcome: Market reforms and democratization
III. Crisis: The social question (1900–1930)	II. Crisis: Mobilization and repression (1960–1980)	III. Crisis: Left turns and back- lashes (2000–present)

Logics of inclusion have varied across historical time periods, entailing significant shifts, backsliding, and persistent deficits. Each period has begun with a critical juncture. New periods are typically generated by a crisis (see Table 12.1).<sup>2</sup> Historical periods are defined primarily in terms of the systemic effects produced by the mode of insertion into the global capitalist system.

### Oligarchic States, 1820–1930

Independence was a critical juncture marking an inclusionary turn in which *criollo* elites asserted their right to self-determination against Spanish and Portuguese imperialism. Generally speaking, however, *criollo* elites were as hostile to the indigenous peoples of the Americas as they were to European colonizers. By the end of the nineteenth century, most Latin American nations had consolidated states dominated by *criollo* oligarchs and sustained by export-oriented development heavily reliant on labor-repressive agriculture. In this “period of outward expansion” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 28–73), agro-export and mineral enclave economies were integrated into the global system in response to external demand, mainly from industrializing Europe. Since growth was stimulated by external demand, the material basis for popular inclusion was narrow. Citizenship was generally restricted to literate and property-owning males. However, the incipient industrialization that this process generated resulted in the initial activation of organized labor. The “social

<sup>2</sup> This periodization draws on diverse sources, including O’Donnell (1973, 1978), Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Collier (1979a), Collier and Collier (1991), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Isbester (2011b), and Roberts (2014).

question” precipitated a crisis of oligarchic modes of domination. The emergence of the popular sectors as a collective actor reflected a broad nationalist and populist rejection of repressive and exclusionary oligarchical rule (Laclau 1977; O’Donnell 2010).<sup>3</sup> Oligarchic rule had been justified by the need to defend civilization against barbarism.<sup>4</sup> By excluding the majority of the population from the national “we” of civilized *gente*, oligarchic states contributed to their antithesis: the emergence of “the people” as a collective identity.<sup>5</sup>

### Labor Incorporation, 1930–1980

The initial incorporation of the labor movement in Latin America marked the second critical juncture in the region’s political development,<sup>6</sup> one that occurred as organized labor emerged as a major political force and a threat to oligarchic domination during the early stages of industrialization (Collier and Collier 1991).<sup>7</sup> The populism of leaders like Vargas, Perón, and Cárdenas took shape in reaction to oligarchic exclusion, while corporatist institutions were designed to contain class conflict. The incorporation of labor facilitated peripheral capitalist development in four ways: (1) it supported the economic strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI), which required employment in factories and an expanding

<sup>3</sup> On “The People and Lo Popular,” see O’Donnell (2010, 86–89). O’Donnell (1979, 287) argued that the separation between state and civil society gave rise to linkages or “mediations” in which the state, to guarantee and organize forms of coercion that are both encompassed and concealed by consensus, presents itself as the public agent of the general interest of a political community. Such mediations include the nation, citizenship, and the *pueblo* or *lo popular*. These are collective identities that provide the basis for the coercive exercise of power. *Lo popular*, in particular, involves claims for “substantive justice which form the basis for the obligations of the state toward to less favored segments of the population.”

<sup>4</sup> See Gargarella (2010, 170).

<sup>5</sup> For an intriguing discussion of populism, see Seawright and Barrenechea’s chapter in this volume.

<sup>6</sup> Labor incorporation was “the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement” (Collier and Collier 1991, 7, 783). With the growth of the urban working class, the “social question” could no longer be confronted as a simple police matter. Labor was incorporated—meaning that it was “legalized” and “institutionalized” (Collier and Collier 1991, 3)—either by the state or parties, and often in ways that led to the construction of more or less enduring corporatist and other organizations such as mass based or populist parties.

<sup>7</sup> Cardoso and Faletto (1979) emphasized the incorporation of the middle classes, while Collier and Collier (1991) emphasized organized labor, both of which were associated with the process of industrial transformation under import substitution industrialization.

consumer market based on rising wages; (2) it sustained a variety of national-popular political projects involving redistribution and political inclusion (Garay, this volume); (3) it (partially) fostered national integration (Stepan 1978); and (4) it (partially) enhanced national autonomy within an unequal global capitalist system (Cardoso and Falleto 1979).

In the era of ISI, the nation was redefined in more inclusive terms, but this was “accomplished much more through the mediation of *lo popular* than through that of citizenship” (O’Donnell 1979, 289–290).<sup>8</sup> Incorporation was partial and segmental: and it did not encompass the totality of urban workers in both the formal and informal sectors, plantation workers, peasants, or indigenous communities (what Garay calls “outsiders”). Corporatist states extended rights, channels of organizational influence, and opportunities for redistribution, typically along functional lines, through state and party mechanisms that would be officially sanctioned, compulsory, and noncompetitive (Schmitter 1974; Stepan 1978; Collier and Collier 1991; Goenaga Orrego 2015). Inclusion was accompanied by major expansions of social policy coverage for specific categories of workers and employees, who benefited from investments in pensions, healthcare, and other subsidies. Investments were made in education, communications, and public infrastructure (Mesa-Lago 1978; Pribble 2013). However, inclusion was limited. As Remmer (1985, 75) notes, Latin American political systems at the mid-twentieth century retained exclusionary features – for example, women were not enfranchised until after the 1940s, voter turnout was low, especially in rural areas, and in some countries illiterates were denied the vote until the 1970s.

### Neoliberalism, 1980–present

The end of ISI occurred when the international debt crisis compelled Latin American governments to return to an export-oriented strategy (Gereffi and Wyman 1990). This was a regional symptom of a shift in the global capitalist system from the postwar Keynesian compromise to neoliberalism. Under neoliberalism, organized labor lost much of its strategic economic importance, political influence, and capacity to mobilize and organize the popular sectors (see Roberts’s conclusion to this volume).

<sup>8</sup> O’Donnell goes on to say that such appeals involved claims for “substantive justice which form the basis for the obligations of the state toward less favored segments of the population” (O’Donnell 1979, 289–290).

Neoliberalism required a low-cost, flexible workforce to service the globally-integrated supply chains of transnational corporations. For globally competitive firms, any form of redistribution, even if it expanded the local market, represented a cost of business, since production was aimed at a single global market rather than a variety of local markets. Neoliberals expected that redistributive conflict would be avoided, not through corporatist bargaining or class compromise, but through the promotion of competition in all spheres of life.<sup>9</sup> However, neoliberal restructuring did not end the pendular swings in Latin American politics: instead, it provoked new cycles of popular mobilization and elite reaction that coincided with contractionary and expansionary trends in global markets (see Silva 2009).

Neoliberal policies undercut corporatism and populism while encouraging the shift toward a market society. But instead of sustained prosperity and the triumph of technocratic rationality, the “lost decade” of the 1980s and the restructuring of the early 1990s led to grievances that mobilized new pro-inclusionary alliances among popular sector groups.<sup>10</sup> Austerity measures, privatization of land, and the opening of natural resources to foreign investment provoked contentious social movements and protests – like the *Caracazo* and *Causa Y* in Venezuela, the Zapatista uprising in Mexico, the water and gas wars in Bolivia, and the struggles of the *piqueteros* in Argentina – which in turn created conditions favorable to electoral Left turns in the 2000s (Stahler-Sholk 2007; Panizza 2009; Silva 2009; Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Rossi 2017). The new electoral Left used rents from the commodities boom of 2003–2013 to finance inclusionary policies (Mazucca, this volume), foster new participatory mechanisms (Cameron et al. 2012), and, in some cases, advance a multicultural and plurinational agenda to transform the postcolonial state itself (Yashar 1999, 2005).<sup>11</sup> The end of the commodity boom coincided with a return to economic orthodoxy and

<sup>9</sup> See Foucault (2004).

<sup>10</sup> Neoliberal technocrats embraced conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, the democratization of shareholder participation, strategies of local participatory development, democratizing credit, and consultations and dialogue within the framework of corporate social responsibility. As Hunter notes (this volume), CCT programs emerged in response to the need to provide “broad and thin” protection for workers – unlike the “narrow but deep” benefits of incorporation – in the context of the persistence of informality, a key feature of neoliberalism.

<sup>11</sup> With respect to gender inclusion and equity, the left was largely reactive (Blofield et al. 2017).

right-wing backlashes in much of the region – which in turn generated new waves of protests in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile.

#### STRUCTURAL-HISTORICAL CONDITIONS

Having reviewed stylized patterns of inclusion over time, we can now turn our attention to variation across cases. James Mahoney makes a crucial distinction: “Those colonial territories that constituted the economic, political, and social centers of the mid-17th-century Spanish colonial empire tended to become the region’s poorest countries after independence; by contrast, backwater territories that were peripheral in the mid-17th century tended to become the region’s wealthiest countries” (Mahoney 2003, 51). What holds for economic performance is also true of inclusion and democracy. Those regions that were economic, political, and social centers under colonial rule tended to become the most exclusionary societies after independence; while areas peripheral to the colonial enterprise became the most inclusionary. This is explained by the political logic of inclusion outlined in the first section: the task of inclusion is likely to generate a lower level of threat perception among powerful political actors in a small, egalitarian, and culturally homogeneous society than in a large, unequal, and culturally heterogeneous society. Three structural-historical conditions – which tend to be closely interconnected across the region – shape the degree to which inclusion is perceived to be a threat to the core interest of powerful political actors: (1) colonial legacies; (2) indigenous peoples; and (3) the type of agricultural and mining economy.

Although my analysis of historical pathways will begin with independence, the cases are initially sorted based on their position in the colonial system. Table 12.2 ranks Latin American national states, chosen to maximize variance in outcomes, from those that were sites of the highest to lowest importance to the colonial enterprise, which roughly corresponds to the order of importance of indigenous cultures, of repressive forms of agriculture and extractivism, as well as levels of mass violence and repression. A number of inferences can be made from the observed patterns.

First, as suggested by Mahoney, colonial legacies endure in countries and regions that were centers of administrative and political power in the colonial era. These legacies include habits of discrimination and exclusion based on race or ethnicity, class and occupation, gender, family, and ancestry, as well as reluctance, not only to accept the redistribution of resources necessary to overcome these legacies, but also to make the kinds



TABLE 12.2 *Modern Latin America: structural-historical conditions*

Countries	Importance to the Colonial Administration	Significance of Indigenous Peoples and Culture	Repression in Agriculture or Mines	Frequency of Mass Violence, War, Intervention
Guatemala	High <sup>1</sup>	High <sup>2</sup>	High <sup>3</sup>	High <sup>4</sup>
Peru	High <sup>5</sup>	High <sup>6</sup>	High <sup>7</sup>	High <sup>8</sup>
Mexico	High <sup>9</sup>	High <sup>10</sup>	High <sup>11</sup>	High <sup>12</sup>
Bolivia	High <sup>13</sup>	High <sup>14</sup>	High <sup>15</sup>	Medium <sup>16</sup>
Venezuela	Medium <sup>17</sup>	Low <sup>18</sup>	Low <sup>19</sup>	High <sup>20</sup>
Colombia	Medium <sup>21</sup>	Low <sup>22</sup>	High <sup>23</sup>	High <sup>24</sup>
Argentina	Medium <sup>25</sup>	Low <sup>26</sup>	Low <sup>27</sup>	High <sup>28</sup>
Brazil	Medium <sup>29</sup>	Low <sup>30</sup>	High <sup>31</sup>	Low <sup>32</sup>
Chile	Low	Low <sup>33</sup>	Medium <sup>34</sup>	Low <sup>35</sup>
Uruguay	Low	Low	Low	Low
Costa Rica	Low <sup>36</sup>	Low	Low <sup>37</sup>	Low <sup>38</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Guatemala was a viceroyalty.

<sup>2</sup> Large indigenous population at time of conquest, reduced by disease and conquest.

<sup>3</sup> Highly coercive plantation economy emerges in nineteenth century involving forced labor and debt peonage.

<sup>4</sup> Repressive state in the nineteenth century. 1954 CIA backed invasion, start of internal conflict that claims 200,000 lives.

<sup>5</sup> Peru was a viceroyalty.

<sup>6</sup> Large indigenous population at time of conquest, reduced by disease and violence.

<sup>7</sup> Large plantations of sugar and cotton; mines. Powerful *gamonales* in the countryside.

<sup>8</sup> Repression of APRA in 1920s. Guerrilla conflict in 1960s. Shining Path war claims 69,000 lives in 1980s.

<sup>9</sup> Mexico was a viceroyalty.

<sup>10</sup> Majority (60%) indigenous in 1810, including Nahuatl, Yucatec, Tzotzil, Mixtec, Zapotec, Otomi, Huichol, Totonac. Mestizo identity encouraged after Revolution.

<sup>11</sup> Dominant class integrated network of landowners, foreign capitalists and small local bourgeoisie. Division between large haciendas and *ejidos*; silver and gold mines.

<sup>12</sup> Caste war of Yucatán, war with United States, French occupation. Mexican revolution was extremely violent. Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. War on drugs (164,000 killed between 2006 and 2014).

(continued)

TABLE 1 2.2 (continued)

Countries	Importance to the Colonial Administration	Significance of Indigenous Peoples and Culture	Repression in Agriculture or Mines	Frequency of Mass Violence, War, Intervention
				<sup>13</sup> Part of Alto Peru, mines in Potosí a major source of Spanish wealth.
				<sup>14</sup> Substantial Aymara, Quechua, Guaraní, and other cultures.
				<sup>15</sup> Large plantations ( <i>latifundios</i> ) in lowlands; mining enclaves in highlands; later gas discovered in lowlands.
				<sup>16</sup> Defeated in war by Chile, Chaco War with Paraguay. The weakness and corruption of the military after the MNR revolution attenuated violence somewhat from the 1950s onward.
				<sup>17</sup> Nueva Granada (cap. Bogota); 1777 becomes captaincy general.
				<sup>18</sup> Sparsely populated, few indigenous peoples – most of the population is pardo (former slaves), mestizo, or mulato.
				<sup>19</sup> Ranching on <i>llanos</i> (lowlands), oil discovered in early 1920s, by 1935 91% exports; oil reserves comparable to Saudi Arabia.
				<sup>20</sup> Independence struggle was extremely violent (40% of population died) Federal war in nineteenth century. Caracazo 1989.
				<sup>21</sup> Bogota viceroyalty of New Granada.
				<sup>22</sup> Small indigenous population, majority mestizo. Strong localism, regionalism.
				<sup>23</sup> Large estates produce coffee, cacao, potatoes, corn, wheat. Banana, sugar plantations. Gold mines.
				<sup>24</sup> Three waves of violence: (1) 1,000 day war (100k dead) (1903 US annexation of Panama); (2) <i>La Violencia</i> (100 200k dead); (3) FARC (220k dead).
				<sup>25</sup> Not a major colonial center until after 1776. Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was mainly an important port.
				<sup>26</sup> Largely exterminated indigenous peoples, small sedentary peasantry; massive European immigration in period 1880–1930.
				<sup>27</sup> Ranching on Pampas ( <i>estancias</i> ); export of cereal, wool, beef. Today, intensive agribusiness (especially soy).
				<sup>28</sup> Dirty war and conflict over Malvinas/Falklands under military rule.
				<sup>29</sup> Portugal a weak colonial power; Brazil enjoys more autonomous development.
				<sup>30</sup> Substantial slave population, freed gradually in nineteenth century. Dualistic social pyramid.
				<sup>31</sup> Plantation economy. Landowners from Northeast, Rio, and Minas Gerais, and São Paulo dominant. Sugar, tobacco, cotton. Gold mining. <i>Coronelismo</i> in rural areas.
				<sup>32</sup> Few episodes of mass violence. Repression mild.
				<sup>33</sup> Small homogeneous country with relatively small indigenous population.
				<sup>34</sup> Haciendas lacked abundant labor supply, needed to attract <i>inquilinos</i> . Labor intensive, not highly repressive. Mining enclaves in the north become important at end of nineteenth century.
				<sup>35</sup> United States supports 1973 coup, dirty war.
				<sup>36</sup> Marginal to colonial power, few colonizers, mainly farmers.
				<sup>37</sup> Small scale agriculture, especially coffee; timber.
				<sup>38</sup> Brief civil war in 1948. Avoided (and helped make peace) during Central American wars in 1980s.

of social investments necessary to enhance the capacities of marginalized groups to become citizens as agents. As former viceroyalties, Guatemala, Peru, Mexico, and Bolivia (then part of Alto Peru) are all examples of societies in which colonial legacies are very strong. Venezuela and Colombia were part of Nueva Granada with a viceroyalty in the capital of Bogota, which was of secondary importance. The same is true of Argentina, which was a viceroyalty only late in the colonial period, primarily because of the role of Buenos Aires as a port. In Brazil, colonial legacies were attenuated by the fact that Portugal was a weaker power. Countries that were marginal to the colonial enterprise include Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay.<sup>12</sup>

Second, states with the greatest colonial legacies always have substantial indigenous populations for the obvious reason that European colonizers settled in areas where there was a labor force to exploit. The presence of indigenous peoples either as majorities or substantial minorities magnifies the challenge of inclusion. This challenge might have been met through compromise and negotiation, and the search for a synthesis between European and indigenous cultures, but the peninsular colonizers and post-independence *criollo* oligarchs chose instead to exclude and repress indigenous peoples because it suited their material interests in land and resources. Substantially sized and culturally vibrant indigenous populations survived in Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and Mexico.<sup>13</sup> The indigenous populations in other countries were either targeted for extermination (Argentina), or fairly small (Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica Chile, and Uruguay). Brazil's economy, by contrast, relied heavily on the transatlantic slave trade, and slavery was gradually abolished in the nineteenth century.

Third, the type of agriculture and the presence of mining enclaves has powerful consequences for inclusion. Labor-repressive agriculture and mineral extraction required heavy doses of coercion to guarantee a supply of labor. Wages were strictly a cost of production rather than an investment in human capital. In countries with a scarce supply of labor, agriculture tended to be more mildly repressive. Where agriculture was based on less intensive use of labor, as in the ranching economies of the Southern Cone, or where small-scale production was more commonplace, transculturation – the merging and converging of elite and popular cultures (see Chasteen 2001) – was more feasible. The most coercive

<sup>12</sup> One could add or subtract cases, but my goal is simply to identify broad patterns.

<sup>13</sup> For estimates of the size of indigenous populations, see Yashar (2005, 21).

plantation economies were in Central America (especially Guatemala), the Andes (Peru, Bolivia, Colombia), Mexico, and Brazil. Chile had a powerful, landowning class but its rural sector was less labor-repressive.<sup>14</sup> Agriculture was also less labor-repressive where extensive plains allowed for ranching (Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela), or where small-scale agriculture was possible (Costa Rica). Another major focus of coercion and exploitation of labor was in mining enclaves (which existed in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil, Chile).

As Table 12.2 reveals, the same countries – Guatemala, Peru, Mexico, and Bolivia – that were central to the colonial enterprise had labor-repressive agriculture and mines in the nineteenth century, and today have large and increasingly mobilized indigenous populations. These are among the countries where the challenge of inclusion is greatest, both historically and at present (a point to which I return later). Costa Rica and Uruguay were marginal to the colonial enterprise. Today they remain small, homogeneous, and relatively egalitarian societies in which the challenge of inclusion is far more manageable. Most of the region falls between these poles, each with a distinctive mix of structural features.

Table 12.2 highlights one crucial additional implication of these structural-historical conditions. Latin America is not only one of the most unequal regions in the world, it is also one of the most violent. Violence is a pervasive feature of postcolonial societies, and it is most intense in the cases where colonial legacies are greatest. Violence, the inevitable handmaiden of an exclusionary pact of domination, can create social traps.<sup>15</sup> It is used to prevent inclusion and its traumatic effects undermine the capacity of marginalized groups to assert themselves as agents. The level of violence and repression tend to reflect the degree to which inclusion generates a perception of threat among powerful political forces. This was true of the period of mass mobilization and repression in the 1960s and

<sup>14</sup> Nineteenth century Chilean agriculture should not be assigned to the labor repressive category. James Mahoney focuses on “labor intensive estates” rather than on the repressiveness of labor intensive agriculture (see Mahoney 2003, especially table 7). Valenzuela (1999) argues that agriculture was less important than mining, and the biggest source of radicalization in Chile was repression in mining enclaves (e.g. Iquique massacre, 1907) rather than dispossession or repression on the land. Due to rural labor scarcity, the rural upper class had no choice but to negotiate with *inquilinos* to secure their ongoing compliance. In other words, Chile is not a clear case of labor repressive agriculture, notwithstanding the miserable conditions of many rural workers. The willingness of the rural upper class to extend democratic reforms is consistent with the claim that Chilean development was following a constitutional pathway.

<sup>15</sup> On social traps, see Rothstein (2005).




FIGURE 12.1 Pathways to inclusion in Latin America

1970s toward the end of the period of ISI and incorporation, but it is also true of the other historical periods. Thus, violence was most extreme in countries like Guatemala and Peru, where the process of incorporation was actually blocked or delayed for decades. Large-scale incidents of mass violence are an obstacle to reform and the inclusion of people as citizens. Mass violence also invites foreign intervention, which can block inclusionary reforms if inclusion does not serve the interests of imperialist powers.

PATHWAYS TO INCLUSION

Structural-historical conditions set countries on distinct pathways. Recognizing the critical role of violence as a barrier to full inclusion, Figure 12.1 highlights two ideal-typical pathways. The first is the modal path. The more violent and prolonged the period of anarchy in the nineteenth century, the more likely the oligarchic state was to use repression in order to consolidate. In turn, more repressive oligarchic states found it more difficult to respond to the social question. This meant that pressures for reform tended to express themselves in more radical forms of populism. This not only contributed to the polarized politics and class conflict that resulted in the inauguration of authoritarian regimes, it also hindered the development of state capacity over the long haul, so that

radical populism was more likely to reemerge following redemocratization during Latin America's Left turns.

By contrast, the briefer and less violent the period of anarchy following independence, the more likely oligarchic states would consolidate constitutional features. In this second pathway, dominant classes and sectors would become habituated to sharing power. The sharing of power among elites would make it easier for them to incorporate the popular sectors with incremental reforms. As a result, the social question did not lead to the kind of polarized politics that would cause the formation of repressive coup coalitions in the 1930s.<sup>16</sup> Where democracy broke down in the 1970s, in Uruguay and Chile, the development of state capacity would enable pressures for inclusion following redemocratization to occur in institutionalized, pragmatic ways, channeled through electoral competition. I call this the constitutional pathway to inclusion.

A distinct variation of the modal pathway, aimed at creating an elite settlement to avoid protracted violence and instability, was the negotiated pact (notably, Colombia's 1957 National Front and Venezuela's 1958 Punto Fijo Pact). Pacts are not enduring solutions to the challenge of inclusion, however, because they tend to be exclusionary (especially of the Left), and this feature makes them prone to break down.

Table 12.3 describes the pathways of inclusion for the cases considered here, presented in the same order as in Table 12.2. The countries that for structural-historical reasons have the greatest challenges of inclusion are also those most likely to follow the modal pathway, while the cases where the challenges of inclusion are fewer follow the constitutional pathway. The modal pathway was more likely to result in a tense interplay of neoliberalism and popular inclusion (with demands for post-liberal recognition in some cases), while the constitutional pathway was the only route to inclusive citizenship.

Three cases followed the constitutional pathway: Costa Rica, Uruguay, and, with qualifications, Chile. States on this trajectory tended to invest in citizenship. For example, they were early adopters of public schools. Whereas inequality elsewhere in the region "exacerbated the collective action problems associated with the establishment and funding of universal public schools because the distribution of benefits across the population would be quite different from the incidence of taxes and other costs or because population heterogeneity made it more difficult for

<sup>16</sup> Except in Chile.

TABLE 12.3 *Pathways to inclusion in Latin America*

Countries	Anarchy after Independence	Type of Oligarchy in Nineteenth Century	Politics in Period of ISI Initial Incorporation	Result of Threat/Repression Sequence	Postdemocratic Transition Left Turn/ Inclusionary Turn?
Guatemala	Long/intense <sup>1</sup>	Repressive, <i>caudillo</i> rule <sup>2</sup>	Late, aborted reform <sup>3</sup>	Internal conflict <sup>4</sup>	Neither Left nor inclusionary turns <sup>5</sup>
Peru	Long/intense <sup>6</sup>	Repressive, <i>caudillo</i> rule <sup>7</sup>	Late, delayed corporatist, nationalist reforms <sup>8</sup>	Internal conflict <sup>9</sup>	No Left turn; limited/constrained inclusionary turn <sup>10</sup>
Mexico	Long/intense <sup>11</sup>	Repressive, <i>caudillo</i> rule <sup>12</sup>	Revolution <sup>13</sup>	Civilian dictatorship, low level repression <sup>14</sup>	Left turn; limited/constrained inclusionary turn <sup>15</sup>
Bolivia	Long/intense <sup>16</sup>	Repressive but divided <sup>17</sup>	Late, corporatist, nationalist revolution	Unstable military dictatorships <sup>18</sup>	Left turn; comprehensive inclusionary turn <sup>19</sup>
Venezuela (pact)	Long/intense <sup>20</sup>	Repressive, <i>caudillo</i> rule <sup>21</sup>	Pacted democracy <sup>22</sup>	Persistence of pact <sup>23</sup>	Left turn; constrained inclusionary turn <sup>24</sup>
Colombia (pact)	Long/intense <sup>25</sup>	Repressive oligarchy, with parties <sup>26</sup>	Pacted democracy <sup>27</sup>	Persistence of pact, internal conflict <sup>28</sup>	No Left turn; limited/constrained inclusionary turn <sup>29</sup>
Argentina	Long/intense <sup>30</sup>	Repressive oligarchy, <i>caudillo</i> rule <sup>31</sup>	Radical populism, party <sup>32</sup>	Military dictatorship, high level of repression <sup>33</sup>	Left turn; constrained inclusionary turn <sup>34</sup>
Brazil	No anarchy, monarchy <sup>35</sup>	Constitutional oligarchy <sup>36</sup>	State corporatism <sup>37</sup>	Military dictatorship, moderate level of repression <sup>38</sup>	Left turn; constrained inclusionary turn <sup>39</sup>

(continued)

TABLE 12.3 (continued)

Countries	Anarchy after Independence	Type of Oligarchy in Nineteenth Century	Politics in Period of ISI Initial Incorporation	Result of Threat/Repression Sequence	Postdemocratic Transition Left Turn/ Inclusionary Turn?
Chile (constitutional)	Brief/mild <sup>40</sup>	Constitutional oligarchy <sup>41</sup>	Populist reforms, rise of socialism <sup>42</sup>	Military dictatorship, high level of repression <sup>43</sup>	Left turn; limited/ constrained inclusionary turn <sup>44</sup>
Uruguay (constitutional)	Brief/mild <sup>45</sup>	Constitutional oligarchy <sup>46</sup>	Democratic reforms <sup>47</sup>	Military dictatorship, low level of repression <sup>48</sup>	Left turn; comprehensive inclusionary turn <sup>49</sup>
Costa Rica (constitutional)	Brief/mild	Constitutional oligarchy <sup>50</sup>	Democratic reforms <sup>51</sup>	Democratic rule <sup>52</sup>	Left turn; comprehensive inclusionary turn <sup>53</sup>

<sup>1</sup> United Province of Central America breaks up in 1838. Intense violence and conflict between Liberals and Conservatives in nineteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> Liberal oligarchy consolidated under Justo Rufino Barrios to Jorge Ubico. Heavy investment in military repressive capacity.

<sup>3</sup> Reform under Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz (1944–1954). Agrarian reform, unionization, democratization. Ended with CIA backed coup by Castillo Armas.

<sup>4</sup> Guerrillas initially formed by dissident military. Three decade internal conflict, over 200,000 deaths. URNG guerrillas defeated.

<sup>5</sup> Facade of democratization and neoliberal reform in 1980s, consolidation of counterinsurgent state. Referendum on indigenous rights fails due to low turnout.

<sup>6</sup> Long period of anarchy following independence; twenty four changes in government between 1821 and 1845.

<sup>7</sup> Consolidation of oligarchy begins with Ramón Castilla (1845–1851, 1851–1862) and guano era. Manuel Pardo (1872–1876) founds Civil Party.

<sup>8</sup> Pressure for change in 1919 onward with rise of APRA and PCP, repressed by military. Change resisted by Leguía (1919–1930); APRA included in Manuel Prado's government (1939–1945), then repressed by Odría (1950–1956).

<sup>9</sup> APRA aligns with Odría. Failure of first Belaúnde (1963–1968) government. Oligarchic state collapses in 1970s under military reformist rule. Internal conflict with Shining Path leaves 69,000 dead.



- <sup>10</sup> Failure of populism under Alan García (1985–1990) leads to economic shock therapy and Fujimori autogolpe. Adoption of neoliberal constitution (1993). Fujimori resigns (2000).
- <sup>11</sup> Long period of anarchy (fifty changes in government between 1821 and 1860). Powerful regional *caudillos* rule.
- <sup>12</sup> Oligarchy of *caudillo* Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911). Consolidates and concentrates power and wealth, supported by large landlords (*hacendados*).
- <sup>13</sup> Revolution creates constitution of 1917, and consolidation of ruling party (PNR, then PRI), corporatist controls extended especially under Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940).
- <sup>14</sup> Low level of threat and mild repression. “Perfect dictatorship” survives dissent starting with students in 1960s (Tlatelolco massacre 1968), undertakes reforms under Echeverría (1970–1976) and Portillo (1976–1982) (e.g. 1977 electoral reforms).
- <sup>15</sup> Crisis in 1982; PRI splits, PRD formed; contested elections in 1988; NAFTA negotiated under Salinas; democratization in 2000 with PAN victory. Left turn starts with Zapatista uprising, culminates in election of López Obrador of MORENA in 2018.
- <sup>16</sup> Bolívar’s 1826 constitution rejected in 1831. Long period of anarchy and rule by *caudillos* (Belzu, Melgarejo). Defeat in War of Pacific, Bolivia loses access to sea. Creole oligarchy consolidates power from 1880 to 1930s.
- <sup>17</sup> Divisions between silver and tin factions of oligarchy (represented by Conservative and Liberal parties) weakens domination. Loss of Chaco War (1934–1935) with Paraguay contributes to radicalizing peasantry and pressures for reform.
- <sup>18</sup> Peasants and miners repressed. Unstable and corrupt (drug linked) military rule. Shift to indigenous mobilization (*Katarismo*).
- <sup>19</sup> Very harsh austerity (Sachs’s New Economic Policy) and political pacts in 1980s; backlash against neoliberalism; water and gas wars in early 2000, 2003–2005. “Catastrophic impasse.”
- <sup>20</sup> Bolívar founds creole republics. Gran Colombia fails.
- <sup>21</sup> Federal Revolution (1859–1863) between Conservatives and Liberals. Oligarchy consolidated late under repressive *caudillo* Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1935).
- <sup>22</sup> Acción Democrática formed in 1941, participates in a coup in 1945, overthrown in 1948; later, in 1958, forms Pact of Punto Fijo with COPEI. Populism deferred.
- <sup>23</sup> Low level of threat perception and repression. Minor guerrilla movement, no coups or military rule: persistence of Pact of Punto Fijo.
- <sup>24</sup> *Gran Viraje* under Carlos Andrés Pérez; failure of constitutional reforms under Caldera, 1998 election of Chávez.
- <sup>25</sup> Violence between Liberals and Conservatives; War of Supremes (1838–1842); fifty insurrections between 1863 and 1885; War of 1,000 days in 1899–1903.

(continued)

TABLE 12.3 (continued)

Countries	Anarchy after Independence	Type of Oligarchy in Nineteenth Century	Politics in Period of ISI Initial Incorporation	Result of Threat/Repression Sequence	Postdemocratic Transition Left Turn/ Inclusionary Turn?
					<sup>26</sup> 1903–1945 oligarchy based on Liberal and Conservative parties with conflict persisting. 1946 <i>La Violencia</i> begins.
					<sup>27</sup> Failure of populism. Assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. <i>La Violencia</i> intensifies. Ends in National Front Pact 1958–1977 and removal of dictator Rojas Pinillas (1953–1958).
					<sup>28</sup> Guerrillas (especially FARC) wage war since 1960s, fueled by drug trade. Reforms by Gaviria lead to 1991 Constitution.
					<sup>29</sup> Colombia never abandoned export orientation, retained formally democratic institutions. Rise of Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) and “democratic security.”
					<sup>30</sup> Long period of anarchy and rule by <i>caudillos</i> (until 1860s). Divisions between unitarians and federalists.
					<sup>31</sup> Governed by <i>caudillos</i> (e.g. Juan Manuel de Rosas) in first half of nineteenth century. Oligarchic state (1860–1914) controlled by Pampa bourgeoisie.
					<sup>32</sup> Pressure for change from Radicals under Yrigoyen (1916–1922; 1928–1930) and then Peronism (1943–1955).
					<sup>33</sup> High threat and repression, caused by the “defensive alliance”; political cycles; Bureaucratic Authoritarian state (1966–1973; 1976–1983).
					<sup>34</sup> Neoliberalism implemented under Alfonsín (1983–1989) and Menem (1989–1999). Crisis of domination under Fernando de la Rúa, 1999–2001.
					<sup>35</sup> Monarchic rule continues under Dom Pedro I and II; republic formed after bloodless coup in 1889.
					<sup>36</sup> Oligarchy consolidated through negotiation between center and provinces, Liberals and Conservatives. Pact among governors underpins 1891 constitution. Rise of São Paulo.
					<sup>37</sup> Vargas, corporatist <i>Estado Novo</i> (1930–1945; 1951–1954). Labor incorporation.
					<sup>38</sup> João Goulart (1961–1964) populism and weak guerrilla movement; moderately repressive bureaucratic authoritarian state (1964–1985).
					<sup>39</sup> Redemocratization in 1985; 1988 constitution contains sweeping social protections and retains corporatist features; neoliberalism under Cardoso brief and moderate.
					<sup>40</sup> Brief period of anarchy. Monarchist fought back against patriots but lost. O’Higgins creates first constitutional order in 1817.
					<sup>41</sup> Early consolidation of conservative oligarchic rule with 1833 Constitution (lasts until 1925). Struggle with landlords and church in provinces resolved with a compromise; gradual integration of capitalist interests.

- <sup>42</sup> Reforms begin under oligarchic rule; populist reforms under Alessandri, who drafted the 1925 constitution, and Ibáñez (1927–1931); multiple efforts at reform between 1930 and 1973 (e.g. Radicals 1938–1952) with pressure from socialists.
- <sup>43</sup> Ley Maldita excludes left, encourages radicalization. Election of Salvador Allende in 1970 promises socialism by democratic means. Repressive reaction: Pinochet regime (1973–1990). Ends after 1989 plebiscite.
- <sup>44</sup> Early adopter of neoliberalism, guaranteed in 1980 constitution; gradual reforms to eliminate authoritarian features of the constitution. Moderate Left turn within constraints of neoliberalism.
- <sup>45</sup> Brief period of anarchy. Rivalry between two groups of *caudillos* gives rise to Blanco/Nacional and Colorado parties.
- <sup>46</sup> Constitution of 1830. Modernization under militarista oligarchy (1876–1886) followed by civilista period (1886–1903).
- <sup>47</sup> Batlle builds on oligarchic state and introduces democratic reforms and a new constitution in 1918. First incorporation of the popular sectors, pursuit of ISI.
- <sup>48</sup> Coup in 1933, democracy restored with constitution of 1942. Continuation of reforms under *neoBatllismo*. Economic crisis and political instability in 1960s. Military dictatorship 1973–1985.
- <sup>49</sup> Military government adopts neoliberal policies, continued under civilian rule. Referendum in 1992 partially repeals law of privatization.
- <sup>50</sup> Liberal Republic (1820–1948). Weak cleavage between Liberals and Conservatives (clerical/anti clerical cleavage weaker). Oligarchy promotes social reforms.
- <sup>51</sup> Depression leads to Coffee Pact, followed by reforms under Calderón; brief civil war followed by democratizing reforms, abolition of military.
- <sup>52</sup> No internal threat or coups.
- <sup>53</sup> Neoliberal reforms adopted while retaining social programs.

communities to reach consensus on public projects” (Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000, 163), in more homogeneous and egalitarian countries these collective action problems were overcome relatively early and easily. Chile and Uruguay developed free public education systems under oligarchic rule in the nineteenth century. They also established robust civilian constitutional orders. When populist leaders emerged – Arturo Alessandri (1920–1924, 1925, 1932–1938) in Chile and José Batlle y Ordóñez (1904–1907, 1911–1915) in Uruguay – their reforms reinforced citizen inclusion and democracy as well as popular inclusion by means of the expansion of welfare policies and labor reform.<sup>17</sup> Even in the nineteenth century, Costa Rican governments promoted public education and healthcare (Isbester 2011a, 186–187). A major expansion in welfare provision began after a brief civil war in the 1940s after which the army was abolished, which blocked praetorian solutions. However, the capacity of powerful political actors to include marginalized groups was already demonstrated in the “coffee pact” in which the coffee producing oligarchy acted to protect the interests of smaller producers during the Depression.

In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, a wave of revolutionary protest and repression swept the Latin American region. Nearly all but the pacted democracies collapsed. The coup in Chile was a traumatic event without precedent in that nation’s political history, and the Uruguayan coup, although milder, was also a dramatic shock. However, both countries sought to retain a thread of constitutionalism. The Chilean junta, recognizing the illegality of their coup, attempted to constitutionalize military rule by seeking approval for a new constitution in 1980 (Barros 2002). The constitution was approved and remained in force after the transition to democracy in 1990, although it was modified substantially. Uruguay’s voters rejected the constitution drafted by the military in 1980. In both cases, Left turns have been relatively mild and nonthreatening to powerful actors, but for different reasons. The relative stability of their party systems and respect for the rule of law have meant that participatory innovations have been adopted or reinforced without weakening existing mechanisms of representation in Uruguay, while Chile has adopted few direct mechanisms of participatory democracy.

<sup>17</sup> Even the more dictatorial leaders of the period, like Colonel Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who governed Chile between 1927 and 1931, were mildly repressive and open to reform. Ibáñez reformed the labor code to incorporate workers in the model of Brazil’s Vargas.

Whereas throughout the mid-twentieth century (1930–1980) cycles of inclusion and repression often culminated in regime change, today they occur *within* democratic regimes. Sustained in part by the commodities boom of 2003–2013, the social basis of contemporary inclusionary turns is still strikingly similar to what O’Donnell (1978, 20–24), in an earlier period, called the “defensive alliance.” In the current cycle, anti-neoliberal social movement activism that *preceded* electoral Left turns was channeled by multiclass popular sector electoral alliances (like the MAS in Bolivia, MVR in Venezuela, and PT in Brazil). In other words, Latin America’s electoral Left turns were preceded by a decade of social movement activism. These movements, which have encompassed the informal sectors, the rural poor, indigenous peoples, and other previously marginalized groups, have proven capable of successfully resisting neoliberal policies. But the progressive governments, whose way was paved by these movements, have not, by and large, broken the pattern of economic dependence on commodities, much less have they created an alternative development model (Wolff 2012; McCarthy 2012; Anria, 2013; Goldfrank 2017), and this has limited their inclusionary achievements.

While some countries on the modal pathway have adopted forms of inclusion limited by neoliberalism, others have been limited by historical experiences with mass violence. Since popular inclusion, especially in its radical expressions, generates a high level of threat perception, there tends to be substantial resistance to radical populism from powerful political actors (business, professionals, the middle classes, the military) willing to use coercion. In countries with large rural populations (such as Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Guatemala), state repression was often met with the formation of guerrilla armies. Wherever an armed Left emerged but failed to seize power (Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Guatemala), its presence generally inhibited the emergence of an electoral Left in the neoliberal era (El Salvador is a partial exception to this pattern because it battled the Salvadoran military to a stalemate). Inclusionary politics in these historically violent modal cases have been limited.

Peru is an excellent example. A military veto against the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) delayed the development of a national-popular project based on ISI. When a reformist military regime (1968–1980) used corporatist institutions to enact land reform, it provoked a reactive sequence of rural insurgency and repression that culminated in an electoral authoritarian regime under Alberto Fujimori (Cotler 1994). The traumatic effect of the conflict weakened civil society, destroyed the Left as a political force, and thereby facilitated governance by neoliberal technocrats.

Only in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela, where large-scale guerilla movements never developed, despite the efforts of Cuban-inspired revolutionary groups, did a radical Left alternative emerge. Where indigenous movements emerged (Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru only at the sub-national level) post-liberal recognition was also demanded. Bolivia is a fascinating case because although the Chaco War (1932–1935) involved violence on a massive scale, the divisions with oligarchic factions and the weakness of the military after the war radicalized the peasantry and set the stage for the National Revolution in 1952. Thereafter, corruption and divisions within the military prevented it from serving as an effective instrument of repression while the emergence of *Katarismo* in the 1970s stimulated indigenous mobilization. Neoliberal reforms created grievances while democratic reforms, especially the democratization of municipal governments, created further opportunities for mobilization (Yashar 1999). The rise of the MAS in the 2000s brought about a mix of popular and post-liberal demands.

Alone among nations on the modal pathway, Brazil never had a period of post-independence anarchy and was ruled by monarchs for much of the nineteenth century. Slavery was abolished gradually and with minimal violence, and pacts among rural bosses and governors created a relatively well consolidated oligarchy under the 1891 Constitution. The process of incorporation under the *Estado Novo* was largely achieved by top-down corporatist reforms, and the period of populist mobilization was relatively mild. Consequently, the bureaucratic authoritarian regime (1964–1988) was mildly repressive – at least compared to its counterparts in Argentina or Chile. After the restoration of democracy, Brazil pursued important welfare and citizenship-enhancing reforms. Under the Workers' Party (PT), Brazil advanced inclusion by means of both neoliberal policies (conditional cash transfer programs – CCTs – like *Bolsa Familia*) and innovations like policy conferences, participatory budgeting, and participatory governance (see Goldfrank, this volume).

Argentina might have been expected to follow the constitutional pathway. Despite a ranching economy that did not require heavy doses of labor repression, Argentina experienced a protracted and violent period of post-independence anarchy, and the violence was intensified by military campaigns to exterminate indigenous peoples. Governed by violent *caudillos* during much of the nineteenth century, Argentina consolidated a repressive and exclusionary oligarchy. When pressures for change came under the Radicals and Peronists in the early twentieth century, they included the mobilization of excluded and radicalized immigrant workers

whose demands were perceived as threatening to the dominant classes. The pattern of mobilization and repression, brilliantly analyzed in O'Donnell's classic 1978 article, "State and Alliances in Argentina," culminated in a highly repressive bureaucratic authoritarian state. The oscillation between radical populism and neoliberalism reasserted the familiar cyclical patterns of Argentine politics following the transition to democracy in 1983.

Venezuela's experience with anarchy and civil war in the nineteenth century led to the late consolidation of a repressive oligarchy sustained by the discovery of oil in the early twentieth century. A period of intense conflict was settled with the Pact of Punto Fijo, which endured as long as the oil revenues flowed. The neoliberal *gran viraje* (great reversal) in 1989 was followed by mass violence (the *Caracazo*) and two coup attempts (including one led by Hugo Chávez), before Chávez was elected president in 1998. The Chávez government pursued popular inclusion through a range of participatory innovations – Bolivarian circles, community councils, socialist collectives – funded by rising oil revenues.<sup>18</sup> Notwithstanding these innovations, the precarious constitutional basis of Chávez's project was exposed upon his death in 2013, when he was replaced by Nicolás Maduro in the context of intensified internal opposition and declining oil revenues. After 2013, Venezuela entered a spiral of crisis, repression, and authoritarianism.

<sup>18</sup> The emergence of new institutions for direct participatory democracy – including community councils, policy conferences, participatory budgeting and innovations in indigenous self government – has been widely noted (Abers and Keck 2008; Wampler 2008, 2009; Avritzer 2009; Goldfrank 2011; Cameron et al. 2012; McCarthy 2012; Montambeault 2012; Pogrebinski 2012, 2013; Mayka and Rich, this volume). Federico Rossi and Eduardo Silva have drawn a parallel between the initial incorporation of labor in the ISI period and what they call the "new incorporation," which encompasses these new types of direct participatory democracy (Rossi 2015, 2017; Silva 2017; Silva and Rossi 2018). Yet the current inclusionary turn differs from the initial incorporation of labor in several respects. First, whereas the incorporation of labor complemented and reinforced the strategy of ISI, new mechanisms of direct participatory democracy are neither an intrinsic feature of the neoliberal model nor do they necessarily support it. Second, social movements, particularly indigenous movements, have been reluctant to surrender their autonomy (Alvarez and Escobar 1992, 321; Yashar 2005; Stahler Sholk 2007; Van Cott 2008). Third, there have been few attempts to revive moribund corporatist institutions; and investments in party building have been rare despite the erosion of mass parties (Oxhorn 1998; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Cook 2004, 2007; Roberts 2014). As Cannon and Kirby (2012) argue, emerging participatory models of democracy seek to rebuild and reclaim the state in an attempt to overcome deeper patterns of exclusion and marginalization (2012, 189–190).

## INCLUSIONARY OUTCOMES

Diverse initial structural-historical conditions and distinctive pathways of institutional change explain the wide variety of inclusionary outcomes we observe in the region. These outcomes represent different equilibria or cycles generated by logics of inclusion. Comprehensive inclusion of citizens occurs only among countries on the constitutional pathway. More commonly, inclusionary turns are limited by the low capacity of states or by policy design. In the latter case, inclusion is subordinated to the requirements of free markets – that is, inclusionary measures are embraced so long as they do not threaten the neoliberal model. Inclusionary turns may also be constrained by cycling between inclusionary initiatives and repressive responses by conservative elites. Inclusion can lead to crises or even the breakdown of the underlying pact of domination. Alternatively, pressures for inclusion may be resisted through repression – a solution incompatible with democratization.

Only a couple of countries have established robust citizenship regimes with institutionalized mechanisms of representation and broad direct popular participation: Uruguay and Costa Rica are Latin America's most inclusive democracies. Their inclusionary turns, although unremarkable in relation to their historical trajectories, were both expansive in their aims and comprehensive in substance. From a comparative perspective, the distinctiveness of these cases lies not simply in active participation of citizens, engagement of civil society organizations in policy processes, social programs with expansive coverage, well-institutionalized political parties, and opportunities for unions to participate in national-level collective bargaining processes; rather it lies in the fact that all of these occur within the context of states in which major political actors respect the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.

Chile, the third case on the constitutional pathway, could have attained a similar level of democratic development, but lagged in terms of institutions of direct participation (most notably in the area of deeply flawed consultations with indigenous peoples, see Ugarte Urzua 2019). Inclusionary initiatives have been limited by the need to operate within the parameters of the neoliberal development model and constrained by the resistance of conservative elites. The explanation for Chile's underperformance is unambiguous: the military regime (1973–1990) imposed a powerful straightjacket on Chilean democracy.

Cycling between inclusion and repression is the modal pattern in the region, and this has resulted in limited and/or constrained inclusionary turns in most cases. The countries that have attempted to pursue the most



expansive and comprehensive inclusionary policies are those in which mechanisms of direct popular participation have been adopted most enthusiastically due to crises of representation, such as the breakdown of party systems. In such cases, the opposition to neoliberalism has tended to be more defiant, but these are also where elite resistance has been most intense (Flores-Macías 2012).

Bolivia and Venezuela created direct mechanisms of popular participation because they needed solutions to political problems created by the virtual collapse of their party systems. Propelled by the urgency of protracted crises, Presidents Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales governed in conformity with O'Donnell's (1994) description of "delegative" rule. But they went further. Drawing on the idea of constituent power (Bernal 2017), they used participatory innovations as part of an expansive vision to rewrite constitutions, challenge term limits, and consolidate their authority. The initial quiescence of elites turned to open hostility as hegemonic projects took shape that threatened their vital interests. Morales emerged victorious from a spectacular showdown with powerful elites in Bolivia's *media luna* region, but in the aftermath of that confrontation he was careful to avoid policies that would prevent his opponents from sharing in the rents from commodity-based growth. His dependence on social movements also prevented him from using inclusionary initiatives to consolidate authoritarian powers. Starting from a low base, Bolivia's citizenship regime was dramatically enhanced under Morales.

Chávez and his successor Maduro directly challenged the parameters of capitalist development in Venezuela, leading to a crisis of domination and the breakdown of the constitutional order. Participatory mechanisms were used as part of a project to degrade representative institutions. The failure to enhance citizenship cannot be attributed to elite resistance alone – which, in any event, has been largely unsuccessful. The Bolivarian approach to inclusion recognized popular organizations as channels of influence – and access to resources – only as long as they expressed loyalty to the revolution. In this sense, popular participation was designed to create highly partisan organizations as pillars of *poder popular* (McCarthy 2012). Thus, inclusion was constrained and citizenship effectively eroded.

As Mayka and Rich note (this volume), participatory institutions may provide opportunities for popular sector inclusion, but they cannot provide a cure for problems associated with deficient institutions of representative democracy. In no country on the modal pathway did participatory mechanisms provide a defense against the pendular swings

between inclusion and elite resistance. These swings have imposed powerful constraints on inclusionary turns. Brazil is the most dramatic case of this problem. The PT invented participatory budgeting at the local level and used policy conferences and councils extensively while in office at the national level, but these innovations did not immunize the party against massive protests following the economic downturn in 2008. Middle-class discontent and a massive corruption scandal resulted in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016. Since then, and especially following the election of Jair Bolsonaro, Brazilian governments have sought to roll back participatory reforms. Likewise, the collapse of the Morales government in 2019 brought a halt to inclusionary reforms.

Argentina's Peronists pursued participatory innovations less vigorously than Brazil, and relied more heavily on clientelism, but they attempted to follow a more heterodox economic model, and thus were willing to experiment with policies that were in opposition to neoliberalism. The election of Mauricio Macri in 2015 returned Argentina to economic orthodoxy until 2019 when the Peronists were once again elected under the leadership of Alberto Fernández. As in the past, the cumulative effect of cycles of inclusion and exclusion has been to further politicize state institutions.

A number of cases have neither advanced significantly toward fully inclusive citizenship, nor embraced participatory innovations beyond what is compatible with a neoliberal governing alliance. Peru, Mexico, and Colombia are cases of limited *and* constrained inclusionary turns. Generally, this pattern occurs among the cases following the modal pathway where a major conflict was resolved in favor of the interests of dominant classes and sectors, or where ongoing violence heightens elite perceptions of threat associated with policies of inclusion. Legacies of violence in Colombia and Peru have undermined the viability of left-wing options while sustaining conservative and antidemocratic political projects associated with Álvaro Uribe and the Fujimori family, respectively. In Mexico, political inclusion has been complicated by the 1994 Zapatista insurrection and the spread of drug violence, as well as the locking-in of a neoliberal policy orientation under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in 2018 may be seen as a belated Left turn for Mexico, AMLO's government represented continuity with Mexico's past as much as change. In these cases, where the political power of economic elites is essentially uncontested, the inclusionary turn, if it has occurred at all, has not altered the balance of class power.

Finally, persistent political exclusion is an option only in countries like Guatemala, where the legacy of genocidal violence has left the country with a facade of democracy. Guatemala's inclusionary turn has been largely a formality, while effective participatory practices have been developed largely at the margins of the formal political arena.

## CONCLUSION

I have argued that the more inclusion threatens the interests of powerful political actors by expanding the political arena in ways that undermine social domination, the more aggressively the demands of previously marginalized group are likely to be resisted. Violent repression is costly, however: it delays reforms necessary to build inclusionary societies. States that established constitutional oligarchies in the nineteenth century adapted more easily to the social question with incremental reforms in the twentieth century, while repressive oligarchies were confronted by more radical pressures for inclusion. Although only a small number of countries managed to create constitutional regimes based on inclusive citizenship, the fact that these countries were able to avoid some of the praetorian dynamics of the other countries offers a powerful lesson about inclusion. Early investments in human capabilities can enable reforms that avert catastrophic violent events and set nations on a path toward stable, inclusionary democracies. To support these conclusions, I have compared cases varying along two dimensions: changes in the *types* of inclusion over time and differences in *pathways* to inclusion across the region. The breadth of the comparison brings structural-historical factors back into focus, without denying the importance of political institutions.

A major theme in the literature on Latin American politics is the relationship between economic and political change (O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1979b; Hirschman 1979; Luna et al. 2014). The literature on authoritarian rule failed to establish a direct causal connection between the exhaustion of ISI and the inauguration of bureaucratic authoritarian states, but most of that literature was written before ISI was actually dismantled and replaced by neoliberalism. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems more fruitful to think of ISI as characteristic of a major and discrete *period* in Latin American politics, one defined by a particular mode of reinsertion of the region into the global capitalist system. In each of the periods we have examined the model of development imposed systemic effects: agro-exporting economies and oligarchic states could not function without mass exclusion; national-popular projects in the

period of ISI demanded a certain type of inclusion, one that lay the basis of class compromise necessary to sustain inward-oriented development; neoliberalism demands competition and the penetration of markets into all spheres of life, thereby undermining older corporatist forms of inclusion, promoting the development of markets but also provoking new demands for popular inclusion and post-liberal recognition.

The rise and fall of brutal forms of authoritarian rule in the 1960s and 1970s was an effect of systemic forces (not just conjunctural factors) that the pattern of insertion into the global system created. Indeed, the problems of ISI may have been more critical to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes than their inauguration. The literature on incorporation, which emerged out of debates on corporatism (see Malloy 1977; Collier and Collier 1977, 1979; Collier 1979a), dealt with dynamics – such as efforts by states and parties to mobilize and control organized labor – that persisted in Latin America roughly from 1930 to 1980 during the period of ISI. These dynamics reflected logics associated with a particular model of development and mode of insertion into the global capitalist system. They are largely irrelevant under neoliberalism. The “irresponsibility” of civilian politicians, to use a favorite trope of coup-mongers, or even their experimentation with radical reforms, today do not easily lead to the formation of coup coalitions that in the past would have generated repressive military regimes. Demands for inclusion are rarely associated with collectivist challenges to the basic parameters of the capitalist economy in a post-Cold War period, and thus generate a lower perception of threat.<sup>19</sup>

By the same token, it is unlikely that a unidirectional link can be established between crises of neoliberalism and left turns, as the editors of this volume note, but that does not mean that the politics of the current era are not powerfully shaped by the systemic logics imposed by neoliberalism. Today, Latin America struggles with the challenge of inclusion within the severely constrained context of the neoliberal terms on which it has been integrated into the global capitalist system. This makes corporatism an unlikely outcome because the kind of class compromises that would underpin it are impossible.<sup>20</sup> As a result, struggles for inclusion take the form of new expressions of *lo popular*, increasingly delinked from class-based organizations; it also takes the form of demands for

<sup>19</sup> With the exception of Venezuela.

<sup>20</sup> See Chartock (2013) for an application of corporatism in the context of indigenous politics.

post-liberal recognition based on ethnic or territorial identities; and it involves the exercise of citizenship. Where neoliberalism is uncontested, citizenship is likely to be weak and uneven. New forms of direct popular participation may facilitate more active forms of citizenship, but citizenship demands “good” – that is, constitutionally robust, lawful, and inclusive – states (Peruzzotti 2012). This is the most urgent political task facing Latin America today.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> The theme of state capacity is stressed by Handlin in this volume. Unlike the literature upon which I draw, which links the weakness of the state to politicization by civil society, Handlin explains variation in party systems by focusing on state weakness.

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## Inclusionary Turn, Rentier Populism, and Emerging Legacies

### *The Political Effects of the Commodity Boom*

Sebastián Mazzuca

#### INTRODUCTION

The causes of the inclusionary turn in Latin America strongly overlap with the effects of the boom in commodity prices of the 2000s. Yet, inclusion's causes and the boom's effects are not the same thing. In the introductory chapter, Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar define the inclusionary turn and identify three constitutive dimensions of the outcome: resources, recognition, and access. They also provide an exemplary inventory of drivers of the turn in the region as a whole, as well as of variations across countries in terms of the scope and pace of inclusion.

This chapter differs from the others in the volume, and the research on the inclusionary and Left turns in general, in that it analyzes the effects of the boom rather than the causes of the turn.<sup>1</sup> The reason for the change in focus is rooted in methodology, the statistical canon, on the one hand, and in theory, the critical juncture template to explain long-term social change, on the other. The change in focus produces four benefits.

First, the boom is an *exogenous* source of variation. By contrast, the relation between the inclusionary turn and other factors often referred to as causes (e.g. party system configurations, social contention dynamics, economic reforms, democratic consolidation) is almost certainly reciprocal, which exposes even the finest analyses to major endogeneity pitfalls.

For valuable comments, I thank Kent Eaton, Diana Kapiszewski, Steve Levitsky, Gerardo Munck, and Deborah Yashar.

<sup>1</sup> For the Left turn, see Weyland et al. (2010), and Levitsky and Roberts (2011). For the inclusionary turn, under a different theoretical perspective from the one adopted in this volume, see Huber and Stephens (2012), and Silva and Rossi (2018).

Second, the boom created a *juncture* as customarily understood in the social sciences; that is, the *combination of two causal streams*. In the early 2000s, an important juncture combined one causal stream that was global and one that was national. The commodity boom, the global shock, hit each national arena at the same chronological time but at different points in their post-democratization and post-marketization trajectories, the national causal stream. The “propagation effects” of the commodity boom in each national arena were changes caused by the boom as “filtered” by the domestic elements in the juncture; what in comparative historical analysis is known as “antecedent conditions.” An important portion of the inclusionary turn in general, as well as of its national variations, was simply the propagation effects of the boom.

Third, a focus on the boom allows for a clear, deductive identification of key micro-foundations involved in the inclusionary turn and in the creation of variants. It forces the analysis to examine incentives and constraints faced by the leaders who happened to be in power when the boom hit their countries. Their strategic response as power-maximizing actors is what set in motion the propagation process and provides the causal linkages between economic boom and final outcomes. The variety of national incentives and constraints given by domestic antecedent conditions inherited from the pre-boom context accounts for the diversity of responses, which in turn shape variants of the inclusionary turn. Comparative historical analysis and game theory are not necessarily the best bedfellows. Yet, the combination is well suited to the analysis of responses to external shocks in general, and of reactions to the commodity boom and its inclusionary propagations in particular.

Finally, the commodity boom is a solid point of departure to approach causal processes shaping any of the *four macro-outcomes* that affect the lives of Latin American citizens the most: income per capita, socioeconomic inequality, political regime, and state capacity. The four macro-outcomes have inspired the most creative and influential work on Latin American politics and society, from Germani (1965) and Cardoso and Faletto (1969) to O'Donnell (1972) and Collier and Collier (1991). Against this background, the inclusionary turn, as well as its differentiation into a moderate (social-democratic) variant and a radical (populist polarizing) one, are seen as important but only intervening variables linking together an exogenous shock and one or more of the four relevant outcomes.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Two differences of emphasis between the book and this chapter are important. First, whereas the book views the inclusionary turn as a general wave, and thereby correctly

Junctures are critical or not, depending on whether they produce a disruptive change that has a lasting legacy. It is simply too early to tell whether the package of policies defining the inclusionary turn will produce a legacy (which can occur when a juncture either sets in place mechanisms of self-reproduction that are robust to new shocks or creates a patterned sequence of reactions and counter-reactions). Yet, a focus on the commodity boom does make it possible to identify the broad contours of long-term trends. Two examples are worth noting. First, the variable sustainability of the inclusionary turn, and, more important, the associated effects on socioeconomic inequality, can be bounded within reasonable values for decades to come if the focus starts with the commodity boom. The more dependent the inclusionary turn is on commodity money, the less sustainable it is. Second, different patterns of political polarization, and, more important, the effects on regime dynamics, can also be delineated as long-term scenarios. When the inclusionary turn is used to create coalitions that attempt to bulldoze agencies of horizontal accountability and opposition parties, protracted conflict will become a permanent feature of the political landscape well into the foreseeable future.

A watershed effect of the juncture was whether a country experienced the emergence of what I elsewhere called “rentier populism,” a new type of ruling coalition that provides the social basis for the more polarizing and less sustainable variant of the inclusionary turn (Mazzuca 2013a). Rentier populism groups together what is otherwise a variegated set of cases, including Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. For two cases of rentier populism, Argentina and Venezuela, and for one case exempted from it, Chile, the transformation introduced by the commodity boom will be distinctly durable, albeit in opposite directions. The durable legacy in Argentina and Venezuela is the loss of an unrepeatable opportunity for sustained economic development, which could have propelled both countries into the status of a high-income economy. By contrast, Chile used the boom to enter the OECD club, which it will not abandon.

emphasizes commonalities across cases, this chapter focuses on divergent coalitional uses of the Left turn across groups of cases, which a special emphasis on the commonalities among four otherwise dissimilar cases: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Also, as the introductory chapter makes clear, the inclusionary turn is at least a three dimension transformation; yet the chapter focuses only on the political economy aspects of it. As noted, the introductory chapter makes cultural recognition and political access, in addition to economic redistribution, part of the definition of the inclusionary turn. This chapter analyzes only economic redistribution.

Political repercussions were also durable. In the cases of rentier populism, the ruling coalition is largely a self-liquidating phenomenon. When the exceptional conditions of the commodity boom are gone, rentier populism cannot not stay in power (and stick to the economic policy required to keep the coalition together) and preserve democracy at the same time. Something has to give. Yet, rentier populism leaves a legacy of political polarization that is out of proportion with the underlying social conflicts of society. Polarization has strong, negative effects on subsequent regime dynamics.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section analyzes the “juncture” by focusing first on the exogenous causal shock generated by the boom in international commodity prices, and then on the causal stream of antecedent conditions at the national level that contributed to propagate the effects of the boom in distinct patterns across the region. The second section analyzes rentier populism, a specific political economy variant of the inclusionary turn, resulting from the combination of the international commodity boom with a critical set of national antecedent conditions, rooted in the capital markets and the party system. Given structural incentives, presidents of rentier populist countries expropriate key natural resources, overheat the economy, polarize public opinion, concentrate discretionary power, and erode democracy. The third section argues, against the cautious spirit that dominates the rest of the book, that the juncture opened by the commodity boom was in fact “critical.” A key legacy of the disruptive change wrought via rentier populism was a lost economic decade and the self-liquidation of the inclusionary turn in both Argentina and Venezuela. Chile is the best counterexample both in terms of the type of ruling coalition and its subsequent legacy.

### JUNCTURE: THE THEORY

In the 2000s, two streams of causality combined in Latin America: an unprecedented boom in the international prices of commodities, and the aftermath of democratization and marketization, including centrally the emergence of the precariat – a large sector of unemployed and informal workers whose life chances had fallen abruptly in the context of free markets.<sup>3</sup> In some countries the emergence of the precariat was accompanied by widespread public distrust of parties, leaders, and politics in

<sup>3</sup> For the precariat in general, see Standing (2014), and for the Latin American precariat, see Munck (2013).

general, as well as by deep fiscal and financial crises. In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, the juncture was extremely combustible. It resulted in the emergence of “rentier populism.”

### **The Commodity Boom in Historical and Methodological Perspective**

Latin America is undoubtedly one of the most “dependent” regions in the world.<sup>4</sup> Yet, truly exogenous shocks producing major social and political change across the entire subcontinent have been few and far between. They were seven in total. Four of them occurred before the rise of mass politics. The Iberian conquest in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries caused the installation of colonial extractive institutions. The decline of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the late eighteenth century, and the concomitant rise of Great Britain, France, and the United States as modern superpowers, caused independence. The first economic globalization in the mid-nineteenth century caused both export-led growth and state formation. Finally, the negative turn in the terms of trade initiated during World War I and deepened with the Great Depression – combined with natural externalities of the period of export-led growth – caused industrialization in the largest countries and led to the rise of mass politics. Since the rise of mass politics, global geopolitical forces produced the two most consequential shocks. The onset of the Cold War exacerbated ideological polarization and contributed to the rise of authoritarian regimes especially equipped to prevent redistributive pressures. The end of the Cold War after the implosion of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s contributed to making democracy safer for Latin American elites worried about property rights. The debt crisis of 1982, which began in Mexico but sent shockwaves throughout the region, was probably the single most important factor causing democratic transitions as well as market reforms. Yet, the debt crisis was endogenous to the import substitution model of industrialization. It had enormous repercussions, but it does not count as an exogenous shock.

The rise of China and India as economic powerhouses, and voracious consumers of raw materials, is the proximate cause of the seventh exogenous shock. It caused the first systematic rebound in the terms of trade for

<sup>4</sup> For a critical discussion of dependency theory in Latin America, see Halperin Donghi (1982). For a balance of the facts of Latin American economic dependence, see the exemplary analysis of Glade (1986, especially 46–56), and Bulmer Thomas (2014; especially chaps. 1 and 7).

agricultural and mineral commodities in more than a century. Its economic effects on Latin America are paralleled only by those derived from the industrialization of Great Britain and the rest of the North Atlantic in the 1870s. It is a once-in-a-century opportunity.

The inflection point in commodity prices occurred in the second half of 2002. In 2001, a hundred metric tons of soybeans were needed to buy a compact model of a Honda car. In 2008, the same quantity purchased a convertible BMW. Arguments that de-link the commodity boom and the inclusionary turn are wrong. It is true that inclusionary policies as measures redistributing economic resources to the poor were in some cases adopted before 2002 (Garay, this volume). Yet, the key causal process is not the *adoption* of a policy but its fiscal *sustainability* over a considerable bloc of time, which makes it, in effect, a policy program. Remove China, and economic inclusion in Latin America would have been both less generous and less durable. It is also true that Peru, which derived enormous benefits from the commodity boom, made only modest efforts at inclusion. The commodity boom is a necessary condition for the inclusionary turn (to be more precise, a necessary condition for its medium-run sustainability), but not a sufficient one. The inclusionary turn is a policy choice made by politicians facing electoral and coalitional incentives. The commodity boom expanded the space of political options, but it did not force the hand of any leader.

The commodity boom also provides a methodological opportunity for political analysts. As an exogenous change, it is possible to trace its impact on the scope and sustainability of the inclusionary turn, irrespective of what set the turn in motion. The commodity boom is appealing for its simplicity: it is nothing but a new set of international prices. Its effects are necessarily conditioned by domestic factors, which not only mediate between economic boom and inclusionary turn, but also, given the diversity of domestic factors, shape variations in the national forms and political repercussions of the inclusionary turn.

The methodological opportunity provided by the international commodity boom is the flipside of the theoretical challenge of selecting the right set of national variables that shaped responses to the boom by national governments. The responses were “political economy” solutions, that is, they centered on picking winners and losers in order to build coalitions that allowed leaders to maximize power. Progressive social policy, and “resource inclusion” as defined in the introductory chapter in particular, is one component of a larger strategy of coalition-making. The set of selected national variables, when combined with the commodity boom, form a *juncture*. That is the focus of the next section.

### The National Elements in the Juncture: Inequality, Size of the Natural Economy, Party System, and Capital Markets

What made the commodity boom differ across cases were domestic structures, not national leaders. Structures trumped personalities, no matter how sophisticated one's conception of political agency, and especially despite the fact that large sections of the popular sectors have viewed presidents Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Cristina Kirchner as irreplaceable economic saviors whose extraordinary courage for policy reform earned them a tall debt of social gratitude and political loyalty. The distinction between national structures and individual agency is important.

**Political Agency: Wrong Answer.** A widespread and persuasive argument for explaining the divergence between a radical and a moderate variant of the inclusionary turn focuses on the exceptionally charismatic personality and ideological outlook of Chávez (Edwards 2010, 191–215). As elected president of Venezuela (1999–2013), Chávez used the China effect on the international economy to launch socialist change. The political agency argument emphasizes not only Chávez's popularity within Venezuela but also his influence beyond national borders into the broader Andean region. Either through demonstration effects, financial leverage based on oil diplomacy, or sheer charisma, Chávez was allegedly the political engine of a cross-national movement self-described as a “Bolivarian Revolution,” which was also adopted by Ecuador under Correa and Bolivia under Evo Morales.

The Bolivarian Revolution launched by Chávez departed from the moderate cases of the inclusionary turn – Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay – in both economic and political terms. Economically, the moderate cases centered on social-democratic reform based on respect for private property, whereas the Bolivarian cases pursued state-centered socialist redistribution based on the nationalization of key sectors of the economy. Politically, the moderate cases banked on the preservation of liberal democracy and the search for consensus with rival parties to introduce reform. The Bolivarian cases, on the other hand, experimented with the intensification of plebiscitarian mechanisms of presidential support at the expense of traditional checks and balances and the polarization of the relation between government and opposition. In sum, according to the argument based on political agency, the divergence between moderate and radical turns is due to contrasting types of leadership: Chávez, Correa, and Morales on the one hand, and Luis Inácio “Lula” Da Silva

(Brazil, 2003–2011), Ricardo Lagos (Chile, 2000–2006), and Tabaré Vázquez (Uruguay, 2005–2010) on the other.

The argument based on political personalities hinders rather than advances understanding of the inclusionary turn and its variants. As a general Ockhamian rule, political agency should be left to explain individual deviations from a general trend that cannot be accounted for by more systematic, less idiographic factors. In the specific case of the inclusionary turn in Latin America, the political agency argument fails to explain both the key commonality and the fundamental difference across cases. The commonality is a meaningful expansion of economic transfers to the precariat, members of the lowest echelons of the income distribution (centrally unemployed and informal workers) who were hard hit by marketization reforms in the 1990s. Differences in political agency cannot explain common outcomes. Additionally, whether political agency is “Bolivarian” or not fails to explain divergence. Peru under Ollanta Humala (2011–2016), who had explicitly embraced a Bolivarian platform and tactics during the campaign, adopted the moderate variant of the inclusionary turn, whereas Argentina under the Kirchners (2003–2015) adopted the radical variant despite having no intention of imitating Chávez.

Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela can be seen as “most different” cases along a number of key dimensions that have been considered central to understanding the inclusionary turn. First, whereas Bolivia, Ecuador, and especially Venezuela export oil or gas, Argentina’s international sales are based on a basket of agricultural products, within which soybeans have gained undisputed centrality. Agricultural land is much harder to nationalize than firms involved in the exploration and refining of oil and gas; the number of players in the latter is lower and in many cases they are foreign, which makes nationalization much more viable electorally. Second, in Ecuador and especially Bolivia, ethnic cleavages are both more salient and potentially more conflictual. Indigenous populations in Ecuador and Bolivia are much larger than in Venezuela and Argentina, and they have suffered decades, if not centuries, of economic and political discrimination. Inclusion as cultural recognition, as defined in the introductory chapter, was a key component in Bolivia, which was absent in the other cases, even Ecuador.

Yet, for the purposes of analyzing the response to the commodity boom, the very differences among the four cases help highlight the robustness of the forces and mechanisms at play in the emergence of rentier populism. The “rent” in rentier populism is a key common



denominator. Rent does not derive only from mineral wealth, as is usually understood in political science. Since Ricardo, economists have understood rent as any income an asset generates after all factors of production are paid (including physical capital, land, and management). Soybeans in Argentina in the 2000s generated an enormous rent, probably the highest ever commanded by an agricultural product. Because of the atomized pattern of land tenure, soybean fields could not be the target of nationalization. Yet, they could be (and were) the target of confiscatory taxation. The Kirchners' government appropriated the lion's share of the agrarian rent via a supertax on exports of soybeans and soybean oils. From a political economy perspective, government appropriation of natural rents in Argentina did not differ from appropriation of oil and gas rents in the Bolivarian cases (which occurred through nationalization or aggressive renegotiations of exploitation contracts).

**Structural Incentives and Constraints: The Inclusionary Turn and Its Variants.** Four structural features of the national political and economic arena – antecedent conditions when the region was hit by the commodity boom – explain the pattern of commonalities and differences in the nature of national inclusionary turns: (1) socioeconomic inequality, (2) size of commodity rents, (3) capital markets, and (4) the party system. These shaped how the effects of the commodity boom propagated across national economic and political arenas.

The list appears inductive. It is not. It derives from asking the two fundamental questions that scholars placing themselves in the strategic shoes of presidents with a winning ticket in the commodity lottery have to solve. First, how to maximize the fiscal benefits of the new source of wealth. Second, how to use extra revenues so as to maximize electoral and coalitional support. It is the simplest form of political economy problem, framed by the twin issues of from where and how much to extract, and where and how much to spend.

*Inequality* is the structural feature that, combined with democracy, explains the *common* response to the commodity boom across Latin America (Mazzuca 2013b; Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume). Inequality is the only of the four structural variables whose score is roughly the same across all cases. The median voter in Latin America is markedly poor, that is, the median income is substantially lower than the average income (GDP per capita). Progressive redistribution is the most effective campaign promise and, if fiscally viable, it is also the optimal policy for enlarging the coalition and gaining reelection.

Yet, the commodity boom, as is most vividly exemplified by the rentier states of the Persian Gulf, presents presidents in resource-rich countries with three temptations: the “confiscation” temptation, the “populist” temptation, and the “hegemonic” temptation. Whether or not presidents succumb to one or more of the temptations is extremely consequential. When they fall in the first two, a new type of ruling coalition emerges and consolidates in power: rentier populism. Rentier populism then becomes a cause in its own right of presidents succumbing to the third temptation: political hegemony. Hegemony combines three phenomena: a massive concentration of presidential power, the elevation of perpetuation in power to the main motive of institutional change and policymaking, and a presidential campaign to obliterate political opposition and institutional controls on their performance.

It is not the personality of the leader governing in good times that determines whether they will find any of the temptations hard to resist. What matters is the cost-benefit analysis. At the limit, presidents can be treated as perfectly substitutable clones of each other. The rewards of resource confiscation, economic populism, and political hegemony are weighed against the benefits of their respective alternatives: committing to private property, preventing consumption from trumping investment, and respecting diverse forms of horizontal accountability. The structure of relative costs and benefits is shaped most directly by the set of conditions characterizing each country when it was hit by the commodity boom.

The set of varying antecedent conditions works as follows:

- *Size of the natural rents*: the larger they are, the bigger the potential reward from confiscation.<sup>5</sup>
- *Creditworthiness* of the national government: the less willing private capital is to participate in the national economy, the lower the opportunity costs of confiscation.<sup>6</sup>
- *Party system*: the weaker the ability of rival parties to organize opposition to the power concentration of the lucky president, the easier the path to confiscate property and dismantle institutional controls on their behavior.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For a complementary approach to the effect of the commodity boom on twenty first century Latin American politics, see Weyland (2009).

<sup>6</sup> For important ramifications and refinements of this argument, see Campello (2015).

<sup>7</sup> For a substantially more elaborated version of this argument, see Flores Macías (2012).

Specific scores on the three structural variables (which, in contrast to inequality, showed variation across the cases) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the rise of rentier populism. Large rents derived from commodity exports, combined with a deep crisis in the capital market and the party system, are the most highly effective incubator of rentier populism. Remove any of the three structural conditions, and rentier populism is not a politically profitable option.

Rentier populism is a ruling coalition that (1) obtains the support of unemployed and informal workers, a central component in the alliance, in exchange for economic transfers designed to increase levels of private consumption by the popular sectors and (2) pays for inclusion by resorting to exceptional rents from commodity exports. The alternative to the “populist” component (1) is an alliance centered on the formal working class and the middle sectors, which includes the precariat but only as a junior partner. The alternative to the “rentier” component (2) is to expand economic output by inducing productivity gains in economic activity through the provision of public goods for capital accumulation and technological innovation (e.g. incentives to national research and development or association with foreign firms).

Figure 13.1 presents the decision tree explaining the inclusionary turn and its variants as propagation effects of the international commodity boom when combined with distinct sets of domestic antecedent conditions. High levels of socioeconomic inequality are the only attribute shared by all countries in Latin America and explain the common attributes of the inclusionary turn. The remaining three variables exhibit substantial differences across cases and account for the key variations in terms of ruling coalition. The emergence of rentier populism is the direct cause of the lower sustainability of the inclusionary turn and the higher levels of political polarization (with potential repercussions on the political regime) in the subset of cases including Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

#### RENTIER POPULISM: THE PATHWAY AND THE CASES

Rentier populism emerges as a ruling coalition when structural conditions at the national level induce the president to take advantage of the commodity boom by expropriating natural assets or the income generated by them, and by fostering unsustainable levels of private consumption, that is, engaging in economic populism. Once rentier populism consolidates in




FIGURE 13.1 The global commodity boom and its propagation effects through national structures

power, the president seeks hegemonic power: concentration, perpetuation, and discretionary decision-making.

### The Expropriation Temptation

In countries with large endowments of natural assets, presidents want to maximize the government’s cut in the torrential flow of revenues derived from the commodity boom. A larger government budget is simply the master key for power accumulation and preservation. Brazil and Mexico, despite having large reserves of oil, did not offer their presidents an attractive expropriation option. The industrial sector in both countries is the main employer and makes the largest contribution to GDP. Confiscation of natural assets would disrupt the central engine of growth in both countries. Rents from natural resources became politically attractive during the 2000s only in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (see Table 13.1).

TABLE 13.1 *Rents from natural resources as percentage of GDP*

Country	1990	2000	2002	2011	Growth (1990–2011)
Venezuela	26.86		34.89		1.3x
Bolivia	6.78		29.61		4.3x
Ecuador	14.02		24.35		1.7x
Chile	7.95		18.49		2.3x
Argentina	3.72		17.44		4.7x
Peru	2.85		9.78		3.4x
Colombia	5.28		8.13		1.5x
Brazil	2.27		5.69		2.5x
Uruguay	0.51		0.98		1.9x

Source: World Bank (2012); data on Argentina modified to take into account the soybean rent. Data accessed on August 15, 2019, at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS>

Both Chile and Peru, which benefited from a steep rise in the price of copper and precious metals, resisted the expropriation temptation. Whereas barriers to expropriation in Chile were double, in Peru only one barrier prevented confiscation. Expected punishment by capital markets prevented confiscation in both countries. Chile achieved investment grade a decade before the commodity boom, and Peru was rapidly approaching it in 2011 when Humala reached power. Expropriation was unthinkable in Chile, and the recent upgrade in financial outlook in Peru persuaded Humala to abandon the Bolivarian promises made during the campaign. The dilemma in Chile and Peru was to suddenly own a large stock of assets (nationalization) or keep the flow of private investments growing (respect for private ownership). The appeal of private investments prevailed. Additionally, in Chile private interests were articulated both in the opposition party and in the junior parties within the ruling social-democratic coalition. Expropriation risked governability and, if pro-business parties decided to mobilize opposition, it risked electoral viability as well. By contrast, in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, a deep financial crisis made it impossible to regain the trust of the international financial community within the short time frame of a presidential term. Expropriation via nationalization of the natural asset, or via confiscatory taxation of the flow of revenues derived from it, was a clearly superior option to patient reconstruction of the confidence of financial markets. Table 13.2 shows the credit rating of sovereign debt for Latin American countries at the onset of the commodity boom or the year in which a leftist president rose to power (if the latter occurred later than the former).

TABLE 13.2 *Credit rating by country in year of commodity boom or year of leftist force rise to power*

Country	Credit Rating	Outlook (trend)
Argentina (2002)	Default	Negative
Bolivia (2006)	B	Negative
Ecuador (2007)	B	Negative
Venezuela (2002)	CCC+	Negative
Brazil (2003)	BB	Rapidly approaching investment grade
Chile (2002)	A (one notch above investment grade)	Positive
Peru (2011)	BB+ (one notch below investment grade)	Rapidly approaching investment grade

Data accessed on August 15, 2019, at [www.spratings.com/topic/ /render/topic\\_detail/global\\_sovereigns](http://www.spratings.com/topic/ /render/topic_detail/global_sovereigns)

Additionally, all four countries had recently experienced a particularly acute episode of state and economic crisis (see Handlin, this volume). The crisis created a sense of urgency in the public about the need for radical policy change. More important for power distribution, the crisis caused the bankruptcy of the entire party system in the three Andean countries and of at least half of it in Argentina. According to Mainwaring (2018, 58), the five least institutionalized party systems of South America for the entire 1990–2015 period were Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and Ecuador, in that order, whereas the three most institutionalized were Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil. Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela are cases of party deinstitutionalization caused by economic and fiscal (state) crisis.

The measure of party system institutionalization needs to be complemented with a qualitative analysis of what parties could and could not offer to the electorate when the commodity boom hit the region. In Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, parties could offer nothing. Given general discredit caused by economic crisis in the aftermath of market reforms, in some cases sponsored by labor-based parties, political outsiders in all four cases were more reliable than professional politicians. Outsiders reached out to the precariat as the main source of electoral support, except in Peru, where the outsider Humala reached power when the economic crisis had already abated, and the country had an

international financial reputation to protect. In Argentina, only the Peronist party managed to survive the crisis. Yet, in order to survive, it had to change. If it had not changed, most likely it would have collapsed as well. Peronism was held responsible for the economic depression caused by the market reforms introduced during Carlos Menem's government (1989–1999). Promises of reversals in economic policy by the same party that introduced the policy are inherently weak. Given the bankruptcy of the other parties and the explosion of social protest by the precariat, the faction that led Peronist reconstruction banked on gaining the support of the unemployed and informal workers, the main victims of Menem's reforms, rather than focusing on its traditional base in formal labor, which distrusted the party leaders.

By contrast, in the more institutionalized party systems of Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, the leftist parties had been critics of market reforms, a fact that made their promises of economic redress credible (Roberts 2014). At the same time, the leftist parties in these countries had to moderate the redistribution proposals. The sources of moderation were twofold: their main constituency was formal labor, which put a limit on how much redistribution could be achieved through nationalization (because of the ensuing valley of tears for employees in the nationalized firms); and their partisan rivals were strong, which meant that the radicalization of promises would lead to electoral losses at the hands of business-friendly parties.

In sum, it is not only private owners of assets who dissuade from confiscation under the threat of exit. Opposition parties also resist confiscation out of fear that nationalization will help entrench the president in power via a vastly expanded arsenal for patronage. Such political opposition was strong in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay but was virtually nonexistent in the Bolivarian cases, Argentina, and Peru. In Peru capital markets tied Humala's hands.

### **The Temptation of Economic Populism**

New fiscal resources from the surge in the value of primary exports can be consumed or invested. The moderate cases, and Chile in particular, avoided economic populism. Argentina and the Bolivarian cases, especially Venezuela, never stopped subsidizing consumption, which had extraordinary short-term electoral effects even after it became obvious that the strategy was seriously hurting investment and thereby eating substantial portions of future GDP.

Party building and party opposition were fundamental sources of divergence in terms of economic policy. In Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the parties in power were not building themselves. Brazil's Workers' Party (PT), Chile's Socialists (PS), and Uruguay's Progressive Front (FA) were already consolidated organizations, with stable core constituencies in the middle class and formal labor. Lula, Lagos, and Vázquez used the good economic times to reinforce old bases of support and gradually add a new layer, the precariat. Governments that sponsor consumption booms expect to receive a substantial electoral reward based on their assumption that every private citizen welcomes rising personal income and consumption subsidies. Yet, in the moderate cases ruling parties largely avoided the temptation of fostering consumption if it risked unbalanced fiscal accounts or lower rates of private investment. They instead banked on consolidating the support of their traditional constituencies via provision of growth-enhancing public goods, which essentially meant public investment instead of consumption. The lack of urgency to build a party from scratch – as in the Bolivarian cases, and partially in Argentina – and the presence of an opposition that would denounce irresponsible spending, made the leftist parties of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay strike a delicate political economy balance. They combined growth incentives, which would benefit the vast majority of the electorate in the medium run, with the incorporation of outside constituencies (the precariat), which would reward the instant relief provided by the programs of cash transfers.

By contrast, in the Bolivarian cases and Argentina, the crises had swept away confidence in traditional political parties and leaders, and the new movements in power were desperate to build a quick basis of support. Cash transfers or government-sponsored wage hikes for the lowest echelons of the income distribution were sought after not only as an act of justice but crucially as the most cost-effective strategy of party building. Under the Kirchners, the Peronist party, traditionally based on formal labor, was especially generous toward the precariat. Unemployed and informal workers became an equal partner within a party that for the first time since the return of democracy was facing a survival threat. The Kirchners needed new sources of electoral support to stop the hemorrhage of political capital suffered by the other Argentine parties and most other Peronist leaders.

In Argentina and Venezuela, consumption subsidies – via cash transfers, easy credit for inexpensive goods, or government-mandated price freezes, especially in energy and transportation – became unsustainable in the late 2000s. Price controls dissuaded new investments. Government-sponsored



consumption continued expanding while the economic pie was shrinking. Both Chávez and Cristina Kirchner could have reigned in private consumption. They chose not to. Neither of them wanted to risk losing electoral support. For Chávez and Cristina, every election, presidential or mid-term, was a challenge to show plebiscitary levels of support (50 percent or higher). Electoral landslides would further discourage an already disarticulated opposition and generate the expectation of indefinite reelection. In a context of party building in which economic policy-making and electoral campaigning became indistinguishable, Chávez and Cristina financed consumption with public deficits and, ultimately, the inflationary tax. The inclusionary turn in both Venezuela and Argentina had started off with a generous surplus in the government's accounts. By the end of the 2000s, the surplus had evaporated, and in the early 2010s it turned into a large, chronic deficit. The most visible symptom was hyper-inflation in Venezuela (over 200 percent) and super-inflation in Argentina (over 30 percent). Chávez and Cristina had to choose between building (or rebuilding) parties to stay in power in the short run or putting the economy on a sounder basis in the long run. Given the antecedent conditions of a deep crisis of party representation, they chose the former.

Economic populism in Argentina and Venezuela had strong ratchet effects. Ten years after it showed clear signs of unsustainability, the governments of both countries were still unable to curb public spending. Macroeconomic instability still haunts both countries, with acute episodes of devaluation, bank runs, and prohibitive interest rates for public borrowing.

In sum, economic populism is the most cost-effective strategy of party-building after the collapse of the party system, as occurred in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and in part in Argentina. In Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, consolidated leftist parties tied the hands of their own leaders in power. Their middle-class and formal labor constituencies knew that economic populism would result in a form of redistribution that favored consumption by the precariat at the expense of productive investment.

### **The Hegemonic Temptation: A Dual Concentration of Power**

The commodity boom also had institutional repercussions, directly affecting the political regime, in addition to its effects on coalition-making through government revenues and spending. In the Bolivarian cases and Argentina, a dual concentration of power took place. The state gained

power vis-à-vis the private economy, and the president gained power vis-à-vis other branches of government, including the legislatures, the judiciary, and technical agencies in the civil service, that could monitor presidential performance and, in some cases, punish wrongdoings like corruption or abuse of power. The dual concentration of power is a true novelty compared to the delegative democracies associated with neoliberal reform in the 1990s (O'Donnell 1994). Delegative democracies concentrated presidential power, but the president was the pilot of a shrinking state, and the state fostered the *de*-mobilization of the popular sectors. In sharp contrast, throughout the 2000s, increased power of the state over the economy via confiscation and increased presidential power over the state via patrimonialism added up to an unprecedented level of discretionary power of the president over the entire economy. Redistribution allowed populist presidents to rely on the *re*-mobilization of the popular sectors to sponsor perpetuation in power and intimidate the opposition. The only previous instances of the pattern observed in Bolivia, Ecuador, and especially Argentina and Venezuela is the power accumulation achieved by Vargas, Perón, and Cárdenas in the 1930s and 1940s, with the difference that the first generation relied mostly on the support of formal labor.

What prevented the dual concentration of power in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay was in part the relative health of state agencies, which had not suffered anything comparable to the crisis experienced by the Bolivarian cases (see Handlin, this volume) and Argentina. An even more important barrier to presidential concentration was the existence of opposition parties, and rival candidates within the president's party, with a distinct interest in preventing presidential abuse and entrenchment. Presidential abuse in the moderate cases was off the equilibrium path because of the counterfactual inter- and intra-party struggle that a hegemonic attempt would unleash. That is, presidential hegemony was not an option in the moderate cases not because of the personality traits of Lagos, Lula, and Vázquez, or because "political culture" removed it from the realm of the conceivable. It was not an option because the cost of venturing into hegemonic projects were simply too high given the vibrancy of the opposition parties and the internal dynamics of the president's party. In short, power accumulation and power abuse were unencumbered in Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Bolivia.

However, it was not only the weakness of the opposition that allowed for hegemonic concentration of power. It was also an effect of the strength derived from the very success that the rentier populist coalition

achieved in the few years after the commodity boom. Once rentier populism had consolidated as the dominant coalition, two mechanisms fostered concentration of power in the executive. The rising living standards of the informal sectors made possible by the boom and redistribution encouraged presidents to intensify the use of plebiscites. In turn, popular ratification emboldened presidents to wrest remaining powers away from the other branches of government and portray resistance to hegemony as antidemocratic conspiracies. The string of ratifications dispelled any doubt about the validity of the majority's verdict. Frequent plebiscitarian consultations extend a blank check for the unconstrained use of presidential superpowers. The other mechanism was fiscal. When prices are sufficiently high, rents from natural resources cover all the coalition's expenses. State control means the government does not need to negotiate with anyone to secure the flow of revenue, and it grants rulers independence from any group, national or international, that might otherwise make demands of institutional quality in exchange for taxation or investments.

Elkins (this volume) documents the constitutional changes in the Bolivarian cases that allowed for a concentration of presidential power. Although the reforms ostensibly had an important aspect of "recognition"-based inclusion (as defined in the introductory chapter), it is certainly the case that inclusion was part of a package of institutional change in which the absolute priority was the accumulation of discretionary power and perpetuation via the legalization of indefinite reelection. Some of the clauses about inclusion were actually window dressing reforms that facilitated the activation of plebiscitarian mechanisms with which presidents expected to gain support for further concentration of presidential power, and to weaken legislative, judiciary, or media control. Argentina did not change the constitution. Yet, Cristina had plans for that, which were aborted only after an electoral defeat in the key mid-term elections of 2013.<sup>8</sup> However, the Kirchners were able to produce a "regime change" without constitutional reform, through a little-known but decisive law, which in the mid-2000s allowed the Chief of Cabinet, a puppet figure, to discretionally amend the national budget as approved by

<sup>8</sup> Cristina's intentions of obtaining support for a constitutional reform through a victory in the 2013 elections were public knowledge for the informed political community in Argentina. No scholarly analysis of Cristina's plans in 2013 exists; yet, media coverage at the time was abundant, e.g. "La Irrupción de Sergio Massa Adelanta la Pelea por la Presidencia," *La Nación*, June 23, 2013.

Congress. Elected representatives during the peak of Argentina's rentier populism essentially lost control over public spending (Gelli 2006). And before the premature death of Néstor Kirchner, perpetuation in power was premised on indefinite alternation between husband and wife.

#### WAS THE JUNCTURE “CRITICAL”? INCHOATE LEGACIES

This chapter's first section argued for the existence of a “juncture,” the combination of an international economic shock and four domestic antecedent conditions shaping the presidents' responses to it. The second section presented “rentier populism” as a distinct response shaped by high levels of inequality, a torrential level of revenues derived from commodity exports, and a dual crisis in the capital markets and the party system.

This section discusses whether the juncture was “critical.” A juncture is critical if it produces a substantial change with lasting power: a legacy (Collier and Collier 1991). Skepticism about the critical character of the juncture is in many ways the safest – and most facile – position. First, skeptics can rightly argue that it is too early to tell. Not enough time has passed to assess whether the impact of the commodity boom, as filtered by the critical set of antecedent conditions, will be more or less permanent. Second, “rentier populism” is certainly not a durable coalition because it depends on highly volatile international prices.

Yet, easy answers are most likely wrong. If we focus attention on the four most relevant macro-variables – income per capita, socioeconomic inequality, political regime, and state capacity – it is possible to see the juncture opened by the commodity boom as a critical one. Rentier populism was from the beginning a fragile coalition. But rentier populism is not a legacy. Rentier populism was only the first component of a longer legacy – or, to be more precise, a step that set in motion a number of possible legacies and ruled out others. Rentier populism in the Bolivarian cases and Argentina set durable boundaries for the values of the four relevant macro-variables.

#### Economic Development

In terms of economic development, rentier populism is most consequential for the “unseen legacy,” the path not taken. In both Argentina and Venezuela in particular, rentier populism caused both countries to lose a unique opportunity at economic takeoff. Extremely high prices for

natural advantages lasting almost an entire decade are very rare events. Argentina and Venezuela simply wasted an extraordinary economic chance. Chile is the counterexample. The same structural conditions that prevented the confiscation temptation and the populist temptation allowed Chile to make the best use of the commodity boom. Chile allocated the extraordinary rents from copper exports to a stabilization fund that, technically, was run like the Norwegian one, with an anti-cyclical emphasis on smoothing the effects of price volatility on macroeconomic aggregates (Medina 2010). The commodity boom hit Chile after two decades of steady economic growth, which admittedly was already a rather unique trajectory in Latin America. With strong antibodies to presidential temptations, the commodity boom helped Chile become the first high-income economy of Latin America. Since 2010 it belongs to the exclusive OECD club.

By contrast, the consumption subsidies to the precariat in Venezuela and Argentina, which were initially funded with rents from oil and soybean exports, did not scale back when international prices dropped. Accelerated consumption in hard times caused the economy to shrink because of the lack of incentives to invest, and subsidies to the precariat began to create fiscal deficits and eventually runaway inflation. A balanced use of the export rents, which allocated a portion to infrastructure investment and a portion to a rainy-day fund, would have prevented long-term stagnation and, in the case of Venezuela, sheer scarcity of basic consumption goods. Starting in 2010, Argentina alternated years of modest growth with years of considerable recession. The net effect was zero growth for the 2010s. In the same period, Venezuela's economy shrank by approximately 10 percent. By contrast, income per capita in Chile during the 2010s expanded by 30 percent, the outcome of a rather steady annual rate of growth of 2.5 percent, similar to that of the 2000s, and to that of the 1990s. In sum, the 2010s were a lost economic decade for Argentina and Venezuela, and a victorious decade for Chile. They reflect differential responses to the commodity boom of the early 2000s. It is hard to think of such growth trajectories as something different from a legacy.

### **Socioeconomic Inequality**

Stable economic growth had massive repercussions on socioeconomic inequality. The inclusionary turn, which was supposed to reduce inequality in Latin America, worked in all moderate cases, and in the two rentier populist cases that started off with an enormous proportion of the population living in poverty, Bolivia and Ecuador. In Argentina and Venezuela,

the macroeconomic imbalances caused by populism, especially runaway inflation – which hits the poorest the hardest – made inclusion unsustainable. In both Argentina and Venezuela the number of poor people was larger at the end of the 2010s than it was at the beginning of the decade. Given the poor use of the commodity boom during the 2000s, no president in the 2010s could have avoided the reversal of “resource inclusion” in Argentina and Venezuela. It will take a decade of surgical macroeconomic management, in turn an unlikely event, to return Argentina and Venezuela to a path of poverty reduction. The self-liquidation of the inclusionary turn is in fact the true legacy of rentier populism in Argentina and Venezuela.<sup>9</sup>

### State Capacity

In all four cases of rentier populism the state grew in size, from a “neoliberal” share of 20 percent of the GDP to a “socialist” level of 45 percent. However, only in Argentina and Venezuela were key state capacities destroyed. In 2007 the Argentine Office of Statistics (INDEC), an enclave of technical excellence, was taken over by Kirchnerista activists with no skills or incentives to produce truthful information. In Venezuela, Chávez fired a large proportion of employees of PDVSA, the national oil firm, which was unambiguously the organization with the highest concentration of human capital in the country. Technocrats were replaced by militants. As a consequence, production of oil dropped continuously from 3 million barrels per day in 2002 to 700,000 in 2019 (Stanley and Verrastro 2018), a unique phenomenon of output shrinkage under propitious international demand conditions. Building state capacity is a slow-moving process. Extinguishing it can be done overnight.

<sup>9</sup> Some authors, like Garay (2016), are more optimistic about the sustainability of the inclusionary turn in Argentina. They have good theoretical reasons, based on the canon of historical institutionalism: beneficiaries of the inclusionary turn have now the mobilization power to block attempts at dismantling the safety net. Yet, the difference between nominal and real income could help solve the apparent contradiction between optimism and pessimism. It is hard to imagine a sustainable solution to Argentina’s chronic macroeconomic imbalances that does not include a major devaluation, which would fundamentally shrink the income of the most vulnerable sections of the population in real terms (although not in nominal terms). Also, for poor people’s real income to grow, the source of redistribution has to be a drastic reduction of political corruption, which ballooned under rentier populism, rather than new taxes on the middle class and the incipient entrepreneurial class, which in contrast to some of Argentina’s traditional economic elites, abhors crony capitalism.

### Political Regime

Presidents of rentier populism eroded liberal democracy, and, in the case of Venezuela, broke it down. Erosion occurred through the dismantlement of agencies of horizontal accountability. The attacks against the media and opposition legislators, the intimidation and co-optation of judges, and the neutralization of comptrollers had two purposes: the expansion of the discretionary power of the president and the removal of obstacles against perpetuation in power. In 2016, Morales lost the referendum to decide whether he would be allowed to run for a fourth presidential term in Bolivia. His response was to take the decision to the Supreme Court, which was packed with partisan judges. A third reelection was allowed. During his second and third presidential terms (2009–2017) in Ecuador, Correa mounted a deliberate campaign against the free press based on exemplary punishments to major independent newspapers and TV stations, and the expansion of state-controlled outlets.<sup>10</sup> In Argentina, starting in 2007, when inflation got out of control, Cristina prohibited the publication of true measures of price growth. Throughout the three presidential terms of the Kirchners, the main agency in charge of supervising public expenditures was run by the wife of the Minister of Public Works, who was sent to prison in 2017 for several cases of major corruption. As truthful data to inform the public became scarcer, corruption became more abundant.

In Venezuela, Maduro built a classic dictatorship. After a decade of macroeconomic instability and large-scale predation of public resources, the public punished the government with a clear defeat in the parliamentary elections of 2015. A Supreme Court filled with Maduro's allies refused to acknowledge the new assembly, and in 2017 it took over the power to legislate. Rentier populism causes erosion of liberal democracy, not breakdown. Maduro, with only a fraction of the political talent and capital of his predecessor, explains the aberration of a breakdown in a democratic continent.

In all four cases of rentier populism, political polarization reached levels only seen in the 1960s and 1970s, at the peak of the Cold War.

<sup>10</sup> The key targets of Correa's legal actions were the TV station Teleamazonas, the news paper *El Universo*, and two journalists who authored an investigation accusing Correa's brother of large scale corruption. Outlets like *El Comercio*, *Diario Hoy*, *Diario Expreso*, and *La Hora*, were subject to constant criticism by Correa, who accused them of being mafias. For an overview of Correa's relationship with the press, see "Ecuador's Autocrat Cracks Down on Media Freedom," *Washington Post*, July 28, 2011.

TABLE 13.3 *Political polarization and respect in moderate versus rentier populist cases*

	Polarization (0-1, min max)	Respect for Counter Arguments <i>before</i> Leftist Government <sup>a</sup>	Respect for Counter Arguments <i>since</i> Leftist Government (0-1, min max)
Brazil	0.46	0.70	0.74
Chile	0.21	0.96	0.85
Uruguay	0.11	0.89	0.84
Average Moderate Cases	0.26	0.85	0.81
Argentina	0.78	0.81	0.56
Bolivia	0.81	0.77	0.44
Ecuador	0.87	0.42	0.44
Venezuela	0.88	0.91	0.36
Average Rentier Populism	0.835 (0.57 > <i>moderate</i> <i>cases</i> )	0.728 ( <i>small difference</i> <i>with moderate</i> <i>cases</i> )	0.45 (0.27 <i>decline relative to</i> <i>own past</i> )

Data accessed on September 2, 2019 at [www.vdem.net/en/](http://www.vdem.net/en/) Scores were normalized to 1 using the max score in the sample as denominator.

<sup>a</sup> Since (re)democratization in all cases, except Venezuela, which is the average for the decade 1988-1997.

Polarization will not lead to anti-populist coups, as happened in the past. The political attitudes of the business sector and the military institution, two central components of the old authoritarian coalitions, have experienced dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War (lack of communist threat), the second globalization of capitalism (more exit options for property owners), and the third wave of democratization (inescapable legitimacy of elections in the Western Hemisphere). Yet, polarization in the aftermath of rentier populism has distinct effects, all of which further erode democracy. Using data from V-Dem, Table 13.3 provides two complementary measures of polarization: (1) polarization of society, for which data is available only since 2000 and (2) respect for counter-arguments, for which data is available since 1900.

Rentier populism polarized societies, in sharp contrast with the moderate cases of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Moreover, before the rise of rentier populism, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela were not polarized



societies.<sup>11</sup> Government and opposition were as respectful of each other as they were in the moderate cases. Hence, the difference in levels of polarization is large not only between rentier populism and the moderate cases but also between rentier populism and its own immediate past.

In Argentina, polarization made the country ungovernable for the first democratic right-wing force in history (2015–2019). Broad agreements between economic sectors and between political forces were required to regain control of the economy. Polarization made agreements impossible. Against the background of much more manageable macroeconomic imbalances, polarization in Ecuador has led to a major policy reversal after Correa stepped down from power (2017). A U-turn in economic policy is usually only the inaugural one in a long chain of policy instability, which can easily escalate into government weakness. In Venezuela, even higher levels of polarization and a dictatorial regime form a combustible duo. A peaceful transition to democracy is hard to imagine. Even if it occurred, governability will be hard to achieve for the first president in any form of restored democracy.

In sum, the juncture opened by the commodity boom in the early 2000s can be usefully seen as critical. Through the emergence of rentier populism, the boom caused a lost economic decade and the reversal of the trend in poverty reduction in Argentina and Venezuela, where it also extinguished key state capabilities. In all three Bolivarian cases and Argentina, democracy stagnated, eroded, or broke down. A level of political polarization not seen since the times of the Cold War is a durable obstacle to democratic progress. If these are not legacies, what are they?

## CONCLUSION

In the early 2000s, the convergence of an external economic shock, the commodity boom, and the chronic economic suffering of an increasingly large proportion of the population, informal workers and unemployed, made inclusion *qua* resource redistribution both electorally profitable and fiscally viable.

<sup>11</sup> Political polarization and social conflict may vary separately, or the former may lag the latter. Social protests, even if abundant as in Bolivia and Venezuela before the Left turn, may be isolated events that occur in a context of a persistently high level of respect for political rivals or contribute to a slow moving process of polarization. V Dem measures of respect for political rivals in Bolivia and Venezuela are high at the time of Cochabamba's Water War (2000) and the *Caracazo* (1989).

The inclusionary turn adopted two starkly divergent variants: social-democratic in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, and rentier populist in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Even if the long-term legacies of the broad inclusionary turn are uncertain, the differential legacies of the variants are discernible. Because of conditions that predated the boom – weak capital markets and party systems – presidents of the rentier populist variant made two bold and complementary choices about macro-politics and macroeconomics. They sought a drastic concentration of political power in the presidency at the expense of legislatures and courts, and they promoted a boost in private consumption, through cash transfers and subsidized prices, that risked unsustainability if the international prices of primary commodities were to take a significant downturn. The legacy for Argentina and Venezuela was the erosion and the breakup of democracy, respectively, and the loss of an unrepeatable economic decade, which could have been used – as Chile did within the social-democratic variant of the turn – to propel the countries into the club of advanced economies. Instead, both the economies of Argentina and Venezuela are cumulating macroeconomic imbalances that will require years of hyper-competent political leadership to solve. Yet, the polarized political arena inherited from rentier populism makes the emergence of such leadership unlikely. For the same reason, the much-needed economic safety net built during the inclusionary turn is at risk.

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## Strong Citizens, Strong Presidents

### *The Constitutional Architecture of the Inclusionary Turn in Latin America*

Zachary Elkins

The Constitution, and with it the ill fated political system to which it gave birth 40 years ago, has to die. It is going to die, señores, accept it!

Hugo Chávez, inaugural speech, 1999

#### INTRODUCTION

It must be the rare inauguration ceremony in which a newly elected president swears allegiance to a constitution while at the same time proposing its death. Hugo Chávez did just that during his 1999 inauguration in Caracas, however, and his projection was basically right: the Venezuelan political system *would* be much different after 1999. Together with Evo Morales (Bolivia) and Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Chávez represented the militant edge of a concerted move to the Left in millennial Latin America (the countries reached by the “pink tide,” the “Bolivarians,” or more formally, the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [ALBA] countries). The general phenomenon extends well beyond the Bolivarians. Constitutions of a decade earlier in Brazil (1988) and Colombia (1991) had begun to take up the “social question” in Latin America with a rather dramatic – if less militant – adoption of

Thanks to David and Ruth Collier for inspiring this essay and to Steven Levitsky, Deborah Yashar, and Diana Kapiszewski for steering the project. Diana Kapiszewski, in all fairness, deserves co authorship for shaping and sharpening many of the ideas here. Thanks also to my Latin Americanist colleagues at the University of Texas – Dan Brinks, Henry Dietz, Ken Greene, Wendy Hunter, Raul Madrid, Kurt Weyland – for, as usual, minimizing my errors.

rights and institutions that served to include more citizens than ever before. Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) term this widespread movement the “inclusionary turn,” and see it as comparable to the mid-century period in which workers were incorporated into Latin American politics in an abrupt and pervasive fashion (Collier and Collier 1991).

But what is interesting about the inclusionary moment – and how its ideas are expressed constitutionally – goes beyond inclusion. A deeper look into the content of these changes suggests a paradoxical constitutional arrangement. There is no doubt the movement has realized new and expanded forms of *recognition*, *access*, and *resource* distribution for citizens (to use Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar’s conceptualization of the “inclusionary turn”). However, a closer reading of the constitutions written since the beginning of the inclusionary turn, which the volume’s co-editors date to the 1980s, suggests that these openings are fused with a curious concentration of power in the executive (president). Some commentators have understandably read the authority of these muscular executives as competing with citizens’ power (e.g. Gargarella 2013). However, an alternative interpretation is that executive power and citizen inclusion can complement and reinforce one another, *if the executive is predisposed to inclusion*. Indeed, enhanced executive power may well thrive in a plebiscitary, rights-infused habitat in which executives enjoy a direct relationship with empowered citizens, at the expense of the legislature. This constellation of citizen and executive prerogatives represents a distinct kind of constitutional architecture that we might call *executive-led inclusion*.

This chapter documents this parallel constitutional empowerment in three Acts, each of which leverages original data on the content of historical constitutions. Act I focuses on the Bolivarian constitutions, in something of a “hoop test”<sup>1</sup> that examines the threshold plausibility of the inclusionary turn. The question is whether these constitutions represent something new and even “revolutionary,” as opposed to business as usual. If the Bolivarians – understood as the region’s inclusionary vanguard – have assembled highly derivative constitutions (i.e. constitutions similar to their predecessors), two things are possible: either the inclusionary turn is illusory, or its ideas are not enshrined in constitutional texts. This latter possibility – that the revolution may not be

<sup>1</sup> A term of art used by scholars who employ the qualitative analytic method of process tracing; see, e.g. Van Evera (1997), Bennett and Checkel (2015).

constitutionalized – is an important background question of this chapter. The relevance of formal constitutions is a perennial point of skepticism among scholars and actors, who emphasize noncompliance with formal texts. The assumption is that if inclusion is important to political leaders, they will infuse its elements into their countries' foundational documents precisely because these charters are difficult to change; put more succinctly, constitutionalization may be understood as a measure of commitment. The question of whether Bolivarian ideas are stamped into constitutional texts thus speaks more generally to the political role of constitutional texts and, not incidentally, to the texts' utility for analysts as documentation of seismic change. In fact, the evidence will show that these Bolivarian constitutions *do* appear original and disruptive, in historical perspective.

Act II widens the lens to the region, and to the question of whether, and particularly, *how* the inclusionary turn has manifested across Latin America. That is, which aspects of inclusion (and of constitutions) have “turned,” again judged by the introduction of inclusionary elements in the constitutional texts themselves? One observation from this analysis is that elements of *political access* – such as pronounced increases in channels of participation and representation, in the style of direct democracy (à la Altman 2010) – represent some of the most noticeable characteristics of the inclusionary turn in constitutional texts. Finally, Act III turns to the office of the executive, and the constitutional arrangement of power. The section describes differences in the lawmaking power of presidents and why this increase in executive strength matters for realizing the inclusionary dream. Strong presidents, it appears, are a distinctive element of the inclusionary turn and may even be an essential element.

#### THE EPICENTER OF THE INCLUSIONARY TURN

We might consider the Andes mountains at the beginning of the new millennium to be ground zero for the inclusionary turn, although the turn's roots are evident in other countries as early as the 1980s, as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) show. At a minimum, the Bolivarian republics in that place and time (i.e. millennial Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) represent the most vocal and strident cases of inclusion. It follows that if the content of constitutions in the Bolivarian countries does not appear to be novel or disruptive, we might be skeptical of either the magnitude of the inclusionary turn *or* the degree to which it is reflected in written constitutions.

On their face, the signature elements of the new Bolivarian constitutions suggest real innovation. The Bolivian constitution, for example, takes a dramatically plurinational approach: it recognizes no fewer than thirty-six *official* languages and requires that public services accommodate at least one indigenous language (Article 5). Further, all three constitutions create a “fourth branch” of government, sometimes called the “electoral power,” which is composed of the elected – not appointed – members of public bodies.<sup>2</sup> The Venezuelan constitution (Article 136) articulates not four but *five* branches (the fifth being the “citizen” power), and as such, includes a significant number of avenues for direct democracy. More prominently, both the Bolivian and Venezuelan constitutions *rename* the countries (adding “plurinational” and “Bolivarian,” respectively), a departure with nontrivial knock-on effects on the printing of everything from stationery to signs, in addition to any symbolic impact. Ecuador’s signature contributions are no less exciting: its constitution is the first to grant rights to nature itself through the indigenous concept of *pacha mama* (Article 71 and the preamble).

These marquee elements seem radical, but what about the rest of these constitutions? And how do these constitutions compare to those that have come before, within the three Bolivarian countries, the Latin American region, and the world? In order to answer these questions, I draw on evidence from a long-term project involving the systematic reading of nearly every constitution that has been enacted since 1789. The sample in our Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), my collaboration with Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, at this point includes almost 780 of the 846 constitutional systems that came into force from 1789 to 2018, along with most of the amendments to these systems. In our project, we record the content of each of these constitutions and their amendments across some 600 characteristics. The research objective is to answer a set of questions regarding the origins and consequences of constitutional provisions. We maintain a highly-indexed version of the current version of the texts at [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org), a collaboration with Google.

One threshold test of the extent of constitutional shift is that of girth. If the Bolivarian constitutions represent something of a structural break, we should expect an abrupt shift in the *length* of these constitutions. Figure 14.1 charts the word count of every constitution that has been enacted in each Latin American country with the exception of the

<sup>2</sup> See the constitutions of Venezuela (Article 136), Bolivia (Article 12), and Ecuador (various).




FIGURE 14.1 Number of words in Bolivarian constitutions.  
 Source: *Comparative Constitutions Project*

1836 constitution of Bolivia. The other seventeen Bolivian constitutions are included, as are all twenty-two and twenty-three from Venezuela and Ecuador, respectively. As noted above, the CCP data also includes “amendments” to these constitutions, but we leave these aside for now.

The data show anything *but* continuity. Changes in the length of prior constitutions in the three series seem incremental compared with the pronounced spike of the recent texts. Prior to their Bolivarian “moment,” the size of the constitutions in the three countries hovers at something close to the historical average for constitutions across the world. In our sample of 780 “new” constitutions since 1789, the mean word count is 13,270. By contrast, the Bolivarian texts are three to four times as long: the Bolivian and Venezuelan documents are around 40,000 words, and



the Ecuadorian one a whopping 54,000, making it the twelfth longest constitution ever written. In fact, regression analysis suggests that Bolivarian texts are 20,000 words longer than we would expect controlling for the era and region of their birth – two conditions that are highly predictive of constitutional content (Elkins 2017). But does the significant lengthening of these texts necessarily signal a dramatic shift in the institutional landscape (i.e. in terms of content)?

To consider this question, we can compare the content of the three charters, in particular the similarity in *rights provisions*, one of the areas of greatest innovation by the Bolivarian millenials.<sup>3</sup> One could conceivably build an even more comprehensive measure of content similarity that includes items having to do with a wider range of institutional choices, including the more structural components of governance. However, any measure of similarity in institutional choice depends upon the assumption that the basic institutional structure is similar – or at least comparable – across constitutions. Such a measure also depends on the comparability of what is included in constitutions – that is, inventory similarity. For example, it would be challenging to compare the choice of electoral system for the legislature since only some 30 percent of constitutions specify such systems in any detail. By contrast, rights are nearly universal in constitutions and represent a fairly discrete and structure-free set of binary choices along which to make comparisons of content. Indeed, each Latin American constitution in our sample provides for at least some rights; the question is which ones.

I therefore calculate a simple measure of “rights similarity” by summing the number of rights (e.g. right to privacy) on which any two constitutions agree (that is, that they both omit or both include) and dividing by the number of rights in the set (seventy). Accordingly, two cases score a 0 if they do not match on a single right and a 1 if they match on every right. The score any pair of constitutions receives thus reflects the proportion of items that “match” between the two. I calculate this measure of similarity for the CCP sample of 780 of the 836 constitutions in the universe (i.e. I compare each charter with every other charter in the sample). The result is a matrix with some 303,810 unique constitutional dyads (one score for each of the 780 constitutions and its 779 counterparts). The scores across these dyads have a mean of 0.64 (s.d. = 0.11) and

<sup>3</sup> See Roberto Gargarella (2013) and his reminder that changes in rights can be ineffectual unless accompanied by changes in the constitutional “engine room” (structure of government), a point we return to below.




FIGURE 14.2 Constitutions' similarity to their predecessors with regard to rights. Source: *Comparative Constitutions Project*

range from 0.10 to 1.0. What do these similarity scores tell us about constitutional innovation?

Figure 14.2 plots the proximate similarity (i.e. a constitution's similarity to its predecessor) for each constitution in each of the three Bolivarian series. The horizontal line indicates the mean similarity for any two constitutions in the full sample from any continent or era. We see in Venezuela, where the first Bolivarian charter was promulgated in 1999,

a series of constitutions in the early part of the twentieth century that appear to have been almost identical to one another with respect to rights. By contrast, the interwar (1936) and postwar Venezuelan constitutions (1947, 1953, and 1961) break new ground, as we would expect (especially for the postwar constitutions, for which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set a new agenda). But even by these standards, the 1999 constitution is transformational: its similarity to the constitution that preceded it (the 1961 constitution) is equal to the mean similarity of the full sample. That is, the 1999 Venezuelan constitution is as similar to its predecessor as *any* constitution is to *any* other from across the world over the last 200 years! Evidently, 1999 represents a markedly new direction for Venezuelan rights.

The Bolivian constitution of 2009 shows a similar pattern to that of Venezuela. Ecuador is a more complicated case. Because its leaders wrote four constitutions in the 1990s, the degree of change is diffused among these charters. Nonetheless, all four were quite different from the postwar texts, and the analysis demonstrates that the Ecuadorian charter of 2008 is one of the most novel in Ecuadorian history, with a score of 0.72. The Bolivarian millenials, it seems, were on to something very different.

#### THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF INCLUSION

The Bolivarians may be the most noticeable set of cases of dramatic change in constitutional architecture. But for the increase in inclusion that occurred in Latin American countries to be understood as an “inclusionary turn,” per Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar’s (this volume) definition, the reach must be truly regional. To what degree has the inclusionary wave spread through the Americas? And how momentous is this period, really, compared in particular with the mid-century juncture? Constitutions are, again, interesting artifacts of study in this regard. Also, since constitutions entrench ideas in higher law (rendering them more difficult to change than if they were enshrined in ordinary law), they ostensibly represent deeper commitments, and so tell us something about their authors’ central, sincerely held, and important ideas.

What, exactly, has “turned”? As noted earlier, Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) conceive of political inclusion along three dimensions, which constitute useful categories by which to measure any constitutional shifts. Briefly, the first is the *recognition* of new groups, in particular of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. Constitutional

changes reflecting this dimension of inclusion might be the addition of cultural rights, such as official language provisions for minority languages, or the provision of property rights and autonomy for indigenous groups on traditionally indigenous land. The second dimension of inclusion refers to the widening of *access* to political participation, for instance, through introducing or enhancing modes of direct democracy such as public referenda and citizen initiatives. Goldfrank (this volume) and Mayka and Rich (this volume) describe these new participatory forms in rich detail. Collier and Handlin (2009), whose work complements and informs the volume's introductory chapter, describe the shift along this dimension as one from a centralized set of political relationships to a decentralized "network" of relationships. A third dimension in the co-editors' framework involves the distribution of political, legal, and/or financial *resources*, for instance through dramatic social policy initiatives such as conditional cash transfer programs (Garay, this volume) and noncontributory pension schemes (Hunter, this volume). To what degree are period shifts in these dimensions evident in constitutions and how, exactly, would they manifest? This analysis of the contents of constitutional texts complements that carried out by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume), who evaluate inclusion's three elements across nineteen Latin American countries using a different set of indicators and drawing on a broader set of sources.

### Recognition

Some of the most interesting – and conflictual – moments in constitutional design are those in which drafters address "equal protection" and, perhaps ironically (in their particularism), enumerate particular groups that are entitled to equal treatment, presumably because of prior social exclusion. Consider the failed proposal for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) launched in the United States in the 1970s. In some sense, it is baffling to think that such a seemingly consensual proposal for gender equality would *not* be approved. One explanation might be that the US constitution is especially difficult to amend and even the ERA had its fierce opponents, such as Phyllis Schlafly, who argued that equal *rights* might imply equal *duties*, such as serving in the military (Mansbridge 1986). But another, more interesting, logic to explain the ERA's failure is that the Fourteenth Amendment already provided for a general guarantee of equality, and that equality for a specific group would be redundant, and potentially exclusionary. Of course, other countries *do* single out




FIGURE 14.3 Number of Latin American constitutions that stipulate equal protection along certain dimensions.

Source: Comparative Constitutions Project; Universe: 33 Latin American countries (1900–2018)

particular groups for equal protection. The reasoning, presumably, is that these groups might under some interpretations of the constitution not be considered entitled to the rights and guarantees promised to all others. It is, then, a particularly telling exercise to observe *which* groups are singled out in the constitution for equal treatment. In an historical setting of social exclusion, equality stipulations are, perhaps, one of the best markers of *which* citizens (if they even are citizens) are (newly) deserving of recognition and of commitments to inclusion.

Consider, in this vein, the series of plots in Figure 14.3, which again draws on CCP data. These plots represent the number of Latin American countries (out of a total of thirty-three) that, in any given year since 1900, specify that a certain group is entitled to equality.<sup>4</sup> The quantity is traced for nine social dimensions – those most frequently designated by constitutional drafters since 1787, when the CCP sample begins. We note that gender and race, at least by 1980, are almost universally specified in equality clauses in the constitutions of the Americas – another reminder

<sup>4</sup> This is the number of Latin American countries that have existed since 1900, according to the CCP's regional categorization.

of the exceptionalism represented by the failed ERA attempt in the United States. Gender and race, as “first generation” equality groups, are not hallmarks of the inclusionary turn, but rather were part of the postwar convergence on sixty or so rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Elkins et al. 2017), which subsequently gained traction in national constitutions.

Rights referencing the equality of particular groups, then, have been part of Latin American constitutional architecture for some time. However, as the plots suggest, equal protection on several dimensions began to increase late in the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, as part of the hypothesized inclusionary turn. The equal treatment of political partisans, for instance, seems clearly to be associated with the inclusionary turn; in stark contrast to the situation in 1975, half of Latin American constitutions now provide for equal protection with respect to party identification. We return to this finding below, in the discussion of access, and the interesting clauses regarding prohibited parties. The equality of other groups has been included in few constitutions, or none at all, which suggests the potential for further turning. For instance, equal protection with respect to sexual orientation has not yet been a central part of the inclusionary turn. Three Latin American countries – Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil – have included equality according to sexual orientation in their constitutions but, curiously, only for a short period of time in the case of Brazil and Ecuador.<sup>5</sup>

Increasingly, an important part of augmenting recognition is not only to guarantee equal treatment to new groups, but also to affirm and validate certain cultural traditions, taking an explicitly multicultural (or plurinational) approach. Such an approach may even involve elevating a minority language or religion to official status. Official status, quite apart from the real privileges of practicing one’s creed and using one’s language, communicates to a community that its members *belong*.

Even on this aspect, however, the data presented above reflect interesting variation. Not surprisingly, conferring official status to minority religions appears to be rare, perhaps in part because of increasing secularism. Only 12 percent of Latin American constitutions in force in 2018 declared an official religion at all, down from a high of 89 percent in 1848, and none of the 12 percent identifies anything but Roman Catholicism as official. Affirming language rights, however, seems more central to the

<sup>5</sup> Fiji, Kosovo, New Zealand, and South Africa are the other worldwide constitutions with such clauses.

multicultural approach. Language is a persistent and necessary fact of public life, key to critical processes such as education and legal procedures. Official language recognition is important to integrating members of a language community, and also important for language *preservation*. Not incidentally, most indigenous languages in Latin America are listed as “vulnerable” or “endangered” by UNESCO.<sup>6</sup>

Historically, six Latin American countries have declared as “official” a language other than their colonial tongue. While five of these countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Peru) have significant indigenous communities with distinct and active languages,<sup>7</sup> so do other countries in the region, such as Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Thus official recognition for minority languages is decidedly not universal among countries demographically disposed to such recognition. Of course, countries balance ethnic accommodation and national integration in different ways, and constitutional affirmation is not the only way to approach language diversity (Kymlicka and Patten 2003). Guatemala, for example, recognizes the twenty-plus Mayan and Amerindian languages in its National Language Law of 2003 as worthy of “respect and promotion,” but designates only Spanish as official. Nonetheless, declaring languages’ official status is one clear way both to augment inclusion and to deter language extinction, and a nontrivial number of Latin American countries have taken this significant, and costly, step toward cultural recognition and national inclusion.

In summary, a significant number of Latin American constitutions have begun to reflect elements of recognition characteristic of the inclusionary turn. However, we clearly do not observe a regional consensus on such elements. This variation in approach stands in contrast to the more homogenous nature of constitutions from the region’s independence era.

### Access

If there is one category of phenomena that is clearly pronounced in the constitutions of the inclusionary turn era, it is political *access*. Suffrage

<sup>6</sup> “Vulnerable” means that children do speak the language, but only at home; “endangered” means that children do not speak the language at home or, worse, only grandparents speak the language. See UNESCO’s census of languages, online at [www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/](http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/)

<sup>7</sup> Haiti, which has granted official status to Creole and French since 1983, is the sixth.




FIGURE 14.4 Number of Latin American constitutions that prohibit suffrage to certain groups (out of thirty three constitutions).  
 Source: Comparative Constitutions Project; *Universe*: 33 Latin American countries (1900–2018)

restrictions represent at least a starting place for thinking about expansions to access, which refers broadly to new modes of participation, representation, and accountability, such as the elements of direct democracy. Most Latin American countries broadened suffrage considerably in the nineteenth century, though as Figure 14.4 shows, something close to universal suffrage was not complete until at least the mid-twentieth century. For instance, women, illiterates, and the landless were finally fully enfranchised in 1938 in Bolivia and in 1957 in Haiti – although not until 1990 in Colombia. The only groups that continue to be deprived of the vote today are the mentally incapacitated and convicted criminals, and their suffrage is restricted in only about a fifth of Latin American constitutions each. Nonnationals in most countries are also largely disenfranchised – indeed, increasingly so – although Brazil and several other countries have considered constitutional amendments in recent years to allow noncitizen residents to vote in at least some elections. On the whole, however, suffrage fights were part of an earlier epoch of inclusion, well before either the mid-century or contemporary inclusionary turns.

In the contemporary period, by contrast, the access-related issues that governments have addressed concern information, accountability, and



direct participation in politics. Consider the six indicators in Figure 14.5. Two elements of direct democracy, the right of citizens to *initiate* legislative projects and the provision for *referenda* on legislative projects, demonstrate distinct spikes in the 1990s (though referenda crept into Latin American constitutions as early as 1925 and have grown steadily ever since). The *right to information* about government processes and the existence of an *ombudsman* follow similar trajectories. Both are important features of modern-day accountability and arm citizens in the face of intrusive government practices. Clearly these are distinctive elements of the inclusionary turn; beginning around 1980, the prevalence of these two institutions moves rapidly from rare to *de rigueur*.

Two other elements of electoral politics also seem to be hallmarks of the inclusionary turn. One is the rapid decline of Cold War era restrictions on parties, a seemingly essential but troubled institution of democracy. Yet the constitutionalization of political parties has a longer, fascinating history. While the first mention of a political party in any constitution (Latin American or otherwise) was in the Colombian text of 1886, whose Article 47 was written to prohibit parties,<sup>8</sup> the prohibition on particular parties is largely a Cold War, anti-communist phenomenon (Elkins 2019). Peru's constitution, for example, until 1978 forbade parties that were part of an "international organization." Today, however, the only remaining formal prohibition on parties are those in Mexico and Panama, which prohibit parties formed on particularistic characteristics such as race, religion, and gender, as well as those that violate the republican or democratic nature of the state. Apart from these restrictions, citizens in Latin America enjoy an unfettered ability to form these quintessential vehicles of political access.

A final way of thinking about access to politics and the state is by considering the delicate issue of how money and politics relate. About a third of constitutions in Latin America had introduced some regulation of campaign financing by 2000. This trend seems to suggest at least an attempt to weaken the link between financial resources and political influence (by potentially increasing the chances of access for the less well-endowed by *decreasing* access for those with deep pockets). Again, this effort appears to be very much a product of the inclusionary turn. In summary, then, the "access" element of the inclusionary turn is clearly evident in Latin American constitutional texts; indeed, of the three

<sup>8</sup> Article 47 of the Colombian Constitution states, "Popular political organizations of a permanent character are prohibited."




FIGURE 14.5 Number of Latin American constitutions with certain elements of political access (out of thirty three constitutions).  
 Source: Comparative Constitutions Project; *Universe*: 33 Latin American countries (1900–2018)

elements of inclusion, access seems to be the more prominently constitutionalized.

### Resources

What evidence is there of inclusion through the distribution of resources in Latin American constitutions, and when did it appear? In analyzing this dimension of inclusion in particular, it is illuminating to compare contemporary developments with those of mid-century. Recall that observers of the region over the last 100 years see two predominant shifts in the way that “interest regimes” address social exclusion. The mid-twentieth-century inclusionary turn has been characterized as focusing on the centralized incorporation of labor (Collier and Collier 1991). The more recent inclusionary turn is thought to be less centralized and based on less hierarchical networks of association. What shape would we expect these interest regimes to take in constitutions, and with what implications for the distribution of resources?

We might expect labor-based representation to be reflected in a new set of rights and obligations for labor groups. Labor elements that we might expect to have first emerged in constitutions during the period of labor incorporation are the right to join trade unions, the right to strike, the right to leisure and a good standard of living, the right to choose one's occupation, and the right to decent work conditions. We might also expect the constitutional establishment of evaluative and adjudicative mechanisms such as labor courts to have occurred in that era. Each of these could be understood as representing, or providing, “assets to members of previously marginalized groups to enhance their opportunities as citizens” (as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume, define resources). If the conventional historical narrative that understands these elements as trademarks of labor incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991) is apt, we should see these elements appear in constitutions in the mid-nineteenth century.

Figure 14.6 plots the number of Latin American constitutions that provide for inclusion via the granting of new resources. By 1950, at least ten Latin American constitutions included the right to join trade unions, to enjoy a reasonable standard of living, to leisure, and to just remuneration, not to mention prohibiting child labor. Additional countries have introduced such rights and prohibitions since that era. Another important component of mid-century labor incorporation – if one not quite so broadly adopted – were labor courts, which were established in seven




FIGURE 14.6 Number of Latin American constitutions with certain elements of resource based incorporation (out of thirty three constitutions).

Source: Comparative Constitutions Project; *Universe*: 33 Latin American countries (1900–2018)

countries in the 1950s. These trends represent solid evidence of the constitutional incorporation of workers into the state in the mid-twentieth century.

Another way to address social exclusion is through wealth and property transfer. However, only a handful of constitutions mention anything about wealth transfer, either in the form of transfers to social groups, or property expropriation and agrarian reform. That said, a basic set of social and economic rights, such as rights to housing and to health care, have found their way into most constitutions in the postwar, post-Universal Declaration era. These are decidedly “mid-century modern,” however – in evidence well before the more recent inclusionary turn.

With the exception of labor courts, the mid-century vision of labor incorporation has continued to be actualized in constitutions throughout the rest of the twentieth century and through the inclusionary turn. Most of the mid-century rights (e.g. right to an adequate standard of living), increase in popularity in a secular fashion well into the millennium. In addition, some constitutional innovations characterize the late-twentieth-century inclusionary turn in particular. One is the right of the consumer, which has clearly spiked during the last twenty years. This right was one

of the many innovations in Mexico's 1917 constitution,<sup>9</sup> and for many years Mexico and Panama were the only countries to enshrine such a right. By the early 1980s, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador had joined, which contributed to a cascade of such rights throughout the region's texts. By 2018, half of all Latin American constitutions provided for the right of the consumer.

In general, however, the resource dimension of the inclusionary turn – at least in the elements that we track here – is not as evident in national constitutions. Many of the important economic and social rights developed well before the turn, though they penetrated, and were consolidated in, constitutions through the millennial period.

#### THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE POWER

I turn now to examine a phenomenon that, if discussed at all in association with the inclusionary turn, is generally considered a potential impediment to its progress: enhancements in executive power. In contrast to the way in which this dynamic is generally examined, I will seek to suggest that it is inextricably linked – and indeed positively entwined – with modern modes of associational and participatory institutions, and thus with elements of the inclusionary turn.

Observers of Latin America's constitutional innovators – and of the Bolivarians in particular – have noted that the new constitutional frameworks in many countries of the region have been accompanied by hyper-presidentialism, and highlighted the negative implications of this trend. Mazzuca (this volume), for instance, highlights the perils of the dual shift to both powerful states and powerful presidents. Of course, strong executive power is nothing new in Latin American constitutionalism, at least as manifested in *de facto* authority patterns (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). However, some analysts appear to have expected (or at least hoped) that the potential downward shift in power signaled by greater inclusion would come at the expense of executive authority. Gargarella's work is a common reference point in this debate. Gargarella (2013) argues that the pronounced shift to comprehensive social and economic rights in Latin American constitutions has not necessarily translated into social transformation, and attributes this shortfall to a lack of change in the “engine room” (that is, the part of the constitution that deals with

<sup>9</sup> Switzerland had a form of the right in place from 1848 to 1872 (Elkins et al. 2005 [2019]), however.

authority relations). In his view, Bolivarian constitutions continue a formal and informal tradition of tilting power disproportionately to the executive, that is, of hyper-presidentialism, that is inconsistent with the idea of dispersing power through direct democracy and other elements of inclusion. More generally, Helmke (2017) suggests that increased executive power is the primary source of many constitutional crises rooted in inter-branch disagreement.

One threshold question, then, is whether this assessment is accurate. Are Bolivarian constitutions hyper-presidentialist? Critically, are they *more* hyper-presidentialist than other contemporary Latin American constitutions, and than previous Latin American constitutions? That is, how do Latin American presidents compare with respect to their political power, both across time and space? How much variation is there and how does it affect the elements of inclusion under discussion here?

### **Executive Lawmaking Power and the Concept of Outside Options**

Executive power is exercised across a number of domains. Arguably, the most important domain is that of lawmaking. To what degree can presidents push through a legislative program that introduces major societal reforms? To the degree that presidents can do so, we can say that their power is both absolutely and relatively (compared to the legislature) substantial. In some sense, lawmaking powers are straightforward. The basic set has to do with the president's power (or not) to propose and veto legislation. Yet other aspects of executive power should matter as well, and those *other* aspects are particularly relevant to the Bolivarian recipe for governance.

We can think of some of these other powers as relevant to lawmaking in that they represent alternative routes to state action. Call them *outside options*, following the standard parlance of bargaining theory. *Outside options* come in various forms, but the basic idea is that alternatives to an agreement help to determine each bargainer's disagreement point (the value that each would expect to receive in the case of nonagreement), and can be used to induce the opposing side to make a better inside offer (Fearon 1995; Gruber 2001; Voeten 2001). Depending upon the scenario, outside options can be offers from other parties, alternative means to settling disputes (e.g. war), or some other unilateral action. With regard to executive power, we might consider the outside options of legislative substitutes and collateral threats.

Legislative substitutes are alternatives to ordinary legislation for effecting policy outcomes. In typical cases of lawmaking, there are several noncooperative (unilateral) constitutional options available. The most direct course of action is to use executive decree power, by which the executive is empowered to enact legislation unilaterally, typically subject to some set of conditions such as sunset clauses (that indicate the expiration date of the decree). An important set of studies focused on decree power has suggested that the existence of this power enhances a president's bargaining power in the way we describe here (Shugart and Carey 1992; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Aleman and Calvo 2010). Another legislative substitute, though designed to be available only in extreme circumstances, is the use of emergency powers. In that alternative, executives retain the prerogative to act outside of constitutional limits conditional upon some understanding – ideally a consensual one – of a crisis. A third option is to initiate an amendment to the constitution, which can substitute for ordinary legislation. A fourth legislative substitute is to propose referenda, which allows the executive to work around the legislature and appeal directly to the people. These various alternative mechanisms operate as *substitutes* for legislation and, if available, should enhance executive bargaining power (and power more generally).

The other set of outside options, collateral threats, involve punitive measures that one side can impose on the other and that also effectively decrease the value of nonagreement for the opposing side. Though formally outside the bargaining process, these collateral tools can shape the primary legislative game. In the context of bargaining over legislation, the punitive measures an executive can potentially leverage include their power to dissolve the legislature, issue challenges to the constitutionality of legislation, and veto legislation. (This last power is not, in a strict sense, an “outside” option since it would be central to any legislative bargaining model. Nevertheless, its bargaining function is similar to those of the other punitive powers.) The critical assumption here is that bargaining is highly multidimensional and repeated. Parties must inevitably deal with one another on multiple issues across time; one side's intransigence in one arena (e.g. the budget) may subsequently affect negotiations in another arena (e.g. approval of judicial appointments). In general, it is well known that repeated games will lead to cooperation among parties. The insight here is that more muscular executive powers *may* be particularly important for forcing change on issues of social exclusion, which would otherwise stall in more balanced executive–legislative regimes.

Of course, any negotiation by definition includes more than one party, and here the powers of, and outside options available to, the legislature are also important. The legislature can impose its own punitive costs on executives by threatening opposition to future executive appointments that require legislative approval or by initiating investigations of the executive branch. (This latter power, however, can be somewhat muted by corresponding provisions for executive immunity from prosecution.) The interplay is thus intricate and the precise power balance difficult to calculate.

The core question in this analysis, however, is how these alternative forms of presidential power interact with the inclusionary turn. On the one hand, it seems likely that the more power inclusion-minded presidents have, the better able they will be to introduce inclusionary reform. On the other hand, a key intuition is that some elements of direct democracy that are closely associated with popular sovereignty and thus inclusion might simultaneously be outside options that serve to enhance executive power. That is, taking a legislative question to the people via a referendum seems to facilitate the kind of participatory activity emblematic of greater inclusion, and access in particular. Yet as noted above, referenda are simultaneously an alternative strategy (and source of leverage) for a president who is bargaining with the legislature. These dynamics are just a few – very illustrative – ways in which enhanced executive muscle can work so seamlessly – if paradoxically – with a program of inclusion and direct, populist democracy.

### A Measure of Lawmaking Power

It is possible to calculate a measure of executive lawmaking power that comprises the sources just discussed. I do so by creating a simple additive index composed of the following seven binary indicators, weighted equally, with a positive score signifying that the power is included in the national constitution:

1. Decree power
2. Emergency power
3. Power to propose constitutional amendment
4. Power to propose referenda
5. Power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation
6. Power to dissolve the legislature
7. Power to initiate legislation






FIGURE 14.7 Formal lawmaking power in the Americas (c. 2015).

Source: Comparative Constitutions Project

Figure 14.7 shows that there is plenty of variation in the distribution of presidential power (measured using this index) across presidential systems in the Americas (including the United States). Despite the heterogeneity, the Bolivarians clearly stand out: Ecuador and Venezuela grant their president all seven of these powers, and Bolivia is also on the high end with the constitutionalization of five of the seven powers.

This analysis offers support for Gargarella's (2013) contention about hyper-presidentialism: Bolivarian constitutions empower presidents in significant ways. However, it is not at all clear that the presence of decidedly muscular executives in the "engine room" is necessarily a threat to social programs, or inclusion more broadly. An alternative is to understand enhanced executive power as *necessary* to inclusion – even if a necessary "evil." One's view will depend upon one's opinion of the presidential program (and of presidential power). But if one of the roadblocks to programs of social justice (or any government action) is the complicated set of Madisonian institutions that have proved so inflexible in the Americas (Albertus 2015), then it would seem that enhanced power in the hands of an ambitious and programmatic president could be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. That is, an elective affinity between enhanced executive power and direct democracy (and other

elements of inclusion) may not be as contradictory as it seems at first blush: dispersing power to the masses and concentrating power in the executive may well be mutually reinforcing.

### Effects of Muscular Executives

But do these differences in lawmaking power matter? One way to explore the implications is to compare the success of presidents in enacting their legislative projects. Presidents' ability to secure their grand plans for the country through official legislation is highly emblematic, and a clear indicator of their impact. Consider, in this spirit, some novel data collected by Sebastian Saiegh (2011). From a universe of countries (eighty) and years (1946–2006), Saiegh counts the number of bills advanced by the executive and the number that become law. Understandably, the data are missing in some parts of the time series for many countries. However, Brazil, for which the Saiegh data cover most of the period in question, makes for an illuminating study.

Brazil's 1988 constitutional moment occurs early in the inclusionary turn. Throughout the almost two-year Brazilian constitutional assembly (1986–88), a parade of previously marginalized citizen groups journeyed to, and pressed their cases in, Brasília. The result was a tome (more than 70,000 words) with a detailed set of expansive rights and privileges for citizens. Despite some similarities in terms of outcomes, Brazil's constitutional politics – including those concerning inclusion – differ from those of the Bolivarians in intriguing ways, and thus it is illustrative to consider them in some depth here.

Recall from Figure 14.7 that the Brazilian president is also vested with considerable power courtesy of the “citizen's constitution,” as it was christened. Among other powers, Brazilian presidents can enact laws by decree, initiate legislation, challenge the constitutionality of laws, propose constitutional amendments, and declare national emergencies. Their leverage over legislation is considerable. To be sure, the balance of executive–legislative power has some roots in the vagaries of Brazil's constitution-writing process. For well into a year of the constitutional convention, Brazil seemed likely to wind up with something close to semi-presidentialism, a structure that was overturned only late in the process (Cheibub et al. 2014). As a result, the text ultimately included several executive prerogatives (e.g. decree power) that make more sense in a parliamentary system. Yet setting aside this aspect of its genesis, I would argue that this heavy executive power is not as paradoxical as we might think in a citizen's constitution.




FIGURE 14.8 Executive lawmaking power in Brazil and elsewhere (1946–2010).  
 Source: *Comparative Constitutions Project*

Figure 14.8 compares executive power over time in Brazil. For reference, the figure includes the perennial (parchment) weakness of the US president, along with the averages for presidential and parliamentary systems (which diverge little, as argued by Cheibub et al. 2014). It should not be surprising that the military's 1968 constitution included a strong executive. But it is quite striking that presidential powers in the constitution of the 1946 republic pale in comparison to those in the 1988 document. In the 1946 republic, presidents could not, formally at least, declare emergencies, propose constitutional amendments, or challenge the constitutionality of laws.

These two republican periods – and the seemingly significant shift in executive power between them – coincide with the period of incorporation in the mid-twentieth century and the more recent inclusionary turn analyzed in the volume. Mid-century Brazilian politics (before and after the 1946 republic) was heavily influenced by the populism of Getúlio Vargas and his acolytes.<sup>10</sup> The Vargas era, which covers the decade and a half before the end of the war, was one of de-federalizing centralization,

<sup>10</sup> See Skidmore (2009) for a lucid historical sketch of these years.




FIGURE 14.9 Percentage of executive initiated bills enacted, Brazil (1946–2006). Source: Saiegh (2014)

nationalism, and importantly, labor incorporation. The Vargas shadow hangs over most of the postwar era, including his ill-fated come-back administration of 1951–1954 (which was capped by his suicide) and subsequent administrations, particularly that of João Goulart. Indeed, that whole era is known for the continued incorporation of organized labor, large state projects including the founding of Petrobras (the state oil company) and the establishment of the new capital of Brasília.

Thus the 1946 republic and the 1988 republic each involved enhancements in inclusion, bookending the military dictatorship of 1964–1985. However, the constitutions of the two periods invested the president with very different levels and sets of powers. Has strong presidential power, as manifested in the second inclusionary period, facilitated the passage of inclusionary legislation? Figure 14.9 plots the overall percentage of bills (including those introducing inclusionary legislation) enacted in Brazil from 1946 to 2006, with data missing during the first four years of the military dictatorship (1964–1967). Vertical lines divide the covered years into the three well-known political periods: (1) the postwar period beginning with the 1946 constitution, (2) the period of the military dictatorship, 1964–1985, and (3) the recent democratic era marked by the 1988

constitution. Note that the data is not always pooled yearly. During the 1946 republic, the data are pooled roughly by administration – that is, Dutra (1946–1950), Vargas (1951–1953), Filho (1954–1955), Kubitschek (1956–1960), Quadros (1961), and Goulart (1962–1963).

The contrast between the 1946 republic, on the one hand, and the military years *and* the 1988 republic on the other, is striking. Administrations in the 1946 republic passed from 15 to 40 percent of their proposals. The military presidents and those in power after 1988 have consistently passed at least 80 percent of theirs. The high passage rate for the military makes sense, of course. But that the 1988 republic, the period of the citizen's constitution, and arguably the most democratic and inclusive era in Brazilian politics, shows continuity with the military years in passage rates is noteworthy, to say the least. While this analysis is not focused directly on the passage of *inclusionary* legislation, we have no reason to believe that the enactment of such laws would represent an exception to the trends we observe here.

A thorough accounting of the striking difference between the effectiveness of presidents in the two republics extends well beyond the possibilities of this piece. Prominent characteristics of the postwar context in Brazil might have both facilitated and complicated the exercise of executive power. Three presidential administrations ended as a direct result of political impasse, and in dramatic fashion: suicide (Vargas), resignation (Quadros), and coup (Goulart). But the era was also one of relative harmony, particularly in the administration of Juscelino Kubitschek (JK), an ambitious president who famously set out to accomplish fifty years of development in five years and met with some success as we see, for example, in the founding of a new capital (Brasília). But even in the Kubitschek years the rate of bill passage (34 percent) was far below that of presidents in the 1988 republic (and even lower than that of several other administrations, including Vargas [42 percent]), Quadros [48 percent], and Goulart [41 percent]).<sup>11</sup> Of course, the 1988 republic years were hardly ones of consensus and unity: the impeachment of the first directly elected post-transition president, Fernando Collor, in 1992; the controversial success Fernando Henrique Cardoso found with implementing neoliberal reform; and Lula's grand project on the Left all suggest otherwise. One consistent feature of Brazil's post-1988 context, however,

<sup>11</sup> Astute observers will note that the part of the Goulart administration operated under a semi presidential framework, which may have accounted for some of his lawmaking success.

is executive lawmaking power, a highly suspect culprit for the remarkable presidential effectiveness that marks the period.

In summary, executive lawmaking power seems to be consequential for legislative success. What this means for inclusionary politics, which can be both divisive and legislatively intensive, is that presidential power may be a critical ingredient in realizing inclusionary objectives *as long as* the president is committed to inclusion. Ecuador presents an interesting illustration in this sense. President Rafael Correa's handpicked successor, Lenin Moreno, has demonstrated a very different set of priorities from his predecessor. Indeed, Moreno has begun to use his significant power to undo some of the policies that marked the Ecuadorian inclusion. Presidential power can accelerate inclusion, but only if inclusion is a presidential priority.

#### CONCLUSION

For observers of Latin American politics, the years surrounding the millennium represent a groundbreaking movement of social inclusion (Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume). This chapter considers whether and how this moment is represented in written constitutions. Given that "ground zero" for this movement are the Bolivarian republics in the Andes, if the movement is in constitutional evidence anywhere, it should be evident in the Bolivarian constitutions that came on line in the early 2000s. Of course, an alternative possibility is that Bolivarian inclusion is real, but just not represented in written constitutions. Do these republics and their inclusionary policies, which seem novel, constitute something new on the institutional map of Latin America? If so, have similar changes appeared elsewhere in the region? And how might executive power interact with these dynamics?

The data I present here suggests that talk of "fifth republics" and "revolutions" is not *entirely* overblown. To the extent that we can take what the Bolivarians have written into higher law seriously, we are witnessing a significant twist in the institutional trajectory of these countries. First, Bolivarian constitutional authors have taken remarkable license with respect to constitutional style. The mold of the sparse, "framework" constitution is now broken. Bolivarian drafters have tripled the size of their country's higher law. Further, this increase, though consistent with the trend in modern constitutions, lies very much above the regression line. Longer constitutions hold the potential to be meaningful with regard to inclusion to the extent that more words means more

rights, more government agencies reaching out to citizens, and more domains under the state's jurisdiction (but see below); their impact also depends on the degree to which stakeholders and ancillary institutions adapt to their components, and on how long they endure. In 2017, Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, proposed (remarkably) to *replace* his mentor's historic charter and established a constituent assembly to do so, despite international and national objections. It seems unlikely, however, that Maduro's maneuver and future moves would deeply disturb the Bolivarian principles. The Cuban model of constitutionalism is to refresh its revolutionary principles every fifteen years with constitutional reform, and the Venezuelan dynamic may not be that different.

A second observation is that the Bolivarian constitutions do indeed break from the past in what they provide substantively. I suggested a way to explore this question systematically – through a cross-national, cross-temporal study of similarity in content across constitutions. Specifically, I analyzed the similarity in the *rights* provisions between constitutions in the year of their drafting. My sense is that an analysis of rights captures, in a highly cross-contextually comparable manner, something fundamental about constitutions. The results of the analysis are clear: the Bolivarians have broken new ground, at least compared with their prior rights trajectory.

Given that Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) paint the inclusionary turn as a Latin America-wide movement, it makes sense to examine broader ripples of change throughout the region. The data suggest that the inclusionary turn is noticeable along all three of the dimensions of inclusion the co-editors sketch (*recognition*, *access*, and *resource* redistribution). For example, in the realm of recognition, small pockets of plurinationalism have taken root in the form of official language provisions for minority languages in about half of the constitutions of Latin American countries with significant indigenous populations. But perhaps what is most noticeable in the era's constitutions are the new forms of *access* enshrined in these texts. These aspects of plebiscitary, direct, democracy have clearly taken root.

Perhaps the most startling aspect of these new forms of access, however, is how they coincide with more traditional patterns of authority. In this sense we observe two seemingly contradictory elements of Bolivarianism: increasing popular sovereignty and increasing executive power. Some see hyper-presidentialism as a roadblock to the new inclusion, yet in the hands of a president committed to social change, the two can be highly reinforcing. In fact, in the deeply divisive politics of social

inclusion, a new source of executive power may even be *necessary* to overcome some of the frustrating limitations of Madisonian institutions.

Finally and most broadly, these results are quite illuminating for those who are curious about the potential for the world's written constitutions to chronicle the world of political reform. Constitutions seem to track the reforms implicated in the “new inclusion” and the “old inclusion” (mid-century incorporation) faithfully (as they must, to some degree, given their status as higher law). The “revolution,” it seems, “has been constitutionalized.”

Of course and as always, the great hopes and plans to which leaders constitutionally commit are not always easy to follow; indeed the tension between commitment and flexibility (and discretion) is a basic problem in politics and human behavior. With respect to the social question in Latin America, however, it seems that the challenge has been not just one of keeping commitments, but of *making* commitments in the first place. In this sense, a clear articulation of constitutional commitments to inclusion seems meaningful and novel. Moreover, even if the ideas of the Bolivarians do not fully take shape in some form of implementing legislation or rulemaking in the Andes or elsewhere, the genie would seem to be out of the bottle. Ideas are powerful and, once crystallized in constitutional documents, do not evaporate quickly. Again, *de jure* law should not be mistaken for *de facto* action – but nor should we ignore an important and systematic statement of reformers’ intentions. Much more needs to be done in order to determine whether there is new wine in these new bottles.

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## Shaping the People

### *Populism and the Politics of Identity Formation in South America*

Jason Seawright and Rodrigo Barrenechea

#### INTRODUCTION

Is populism a mere short-term eruption of emotion by which citizens express a fundamentally destructive anger at elites and existing institutions, or can it be the source of long-lasting political transformations? A key contribution of Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier's (1991) book, *Shaping the Political Arena*, is its argument that classic Latin American populism indeed had a lasting institutional legacy in the form of different modes of labor incorporation and divergent consequent structures of party systems and competition. As crucial as institutional legacies are, however, we should also ask whether populism also produces meaningful and potentially durable changes in terms of individual citizens' beliefs, behaviors, and political identities.

This chapter argues that populism is fundamentally an identity-shaping political phenomenon. Populist movements mobilize constituencies on the basis of an ideological antiestablishment appeal that draws a wedge between what is represented as a corrupt and illegitimate political elite and the authentic but victimized people of the nation. Given the inclusive nature of the broad and cross-sectional cleavage advanced by populism, it is particularly well-equipped to attract a rather heterogeneous and potentially large collection of voters to its support coalition. This quality is at the core of the "incorporating" property of populism, as this heterogeneous coalition can draw previously marginalized sectors of society into the political arena, as with workers in the classic populist period. This heterogeneity, however, implies a sustainability problem. With little to glue its members together beyond their anti-elite status,

populist support coalitions are particularly vulnerable to disintegration after their initial victory, which implies populist movements must seek ways to stabilize them. Hence, studying populism from this perspective implies learning not only about its identity-shaping properties, but about the identity-stabilizing mechanisms it puts in place as well. Such is the dual objective of this chapter.

First, we show through observational and experimental evidence that populism has indeed the capacity to bring different and potentially antagonistic sectors of society together by reducing the cost and increasing the benefit of assuming non-elite social identities. The sharp divide that populists draw between the corrupt elite and a victimized people decreases social distance among groups within “the people,” reducing for populist coalition members the stigma connected with previously marginalized identities – and thereby calling into existence larger marginalized populations for the populist to represent. We present evidence for this effect by exploring a dramatic transition in Venezuelans’ ethno-racial self-concepts as well as a more measured but parallel transition in Bolivians’ identities during the populist period. Experimental evidence from a context with a relatively low recent history of populist appeals, Peru, demonstrates the social distance mechanism theorized to account for the emergence of these newly enlarged ethno-racial constituencies. From this perspective, populist discourse is an identity-shaping political tool.

Second, we argue that looking at populism through the lens of its support coalitions illuminates other puzzles about populism; namely, the correlation between populism as a discourse, redistributive economic policies, and a tendency to foster the organization of its constituents. Theories of populism have expanded in range and diverged in content since the emergence – roughly in the 1990s – of a wave of populist, right-wing populist, and/or neo-populist movements and leaders in Western Europe, the United States, Latin America, Canada, and elsewhere. Three major areas of emphasis characterize different theories of populism: discourse and coalition structure (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996, 2001; Laclau 2005; Hawkins 2009, 2011); organizational constitution of and political incorporation of previously marginalized actors (Collier and Collier 1991); and economically distorting state activism with a redistributionist agenda (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). While the set of cases encompassed by each theory’s treatment of populism is distinct enough to regard these as empirically separate concepts, there is nonetheless a striking elective affinity across these ideas of populism. That

is to say, political movements that adopt a discourse emphasizing the revolt of the people against the elites often seek to bring “the people” into participation in new organizational forms and also frequently experiment with visible-hand economic policies in which the state is highly active in picking economic winners and losers. We argue that economically distorting redistributionist interventions and novel patterns of political organization help solve the problem of holding a heterogeneous discursively populist coalition together over time and across shifting policy agendas. We argue these are identity-stabilizing political tools.

In Latin America, populism has been traditionally associated with the incorporation of formerly excluded groups into the political arena. An important implication of this chapter is that identity-shaping is one more way in which populism can integrate those at the margins. Against a world political moment in which populist appeals to identity are associated, throughout North America and Western Europe, with right-leaning nationalist movements that seek to reassert the primacy of “the people” in an ethnonational sense against a wide variety of marginalized groups, this chapter serves in part as a reminder that populism comes in quite different forms and can sometimes have inclusionary consequences.<sup>1</sup>

The first part of this chapter will address the concept of populism, as well as what we mean when we refer to populist coalitions. The second and third sections will discuss and provide both observational and experimental evidence of the identity-shaping properties of populism. The fourth will be dedicated to what we claim are the identity-stabilizing tools that populism uses in order to provide cohesion to its support coalition. Finally, we include some conclusions about populism as an identity-shaping phenomenon and how these properties allow populist parties and leaders to fulfill its role as a political incorporator, even in an age of full electoral enfranchisement.

#### WHAT MAKES A POPULIST COALITION

In order to systematically analyze the identity-shaping role of populism, it is necessary to examine the once contested and now quite standardized content of populism as a social science concept. Following the recent consensus among scholars of populism, we understand the concept in line with Laclau’s (2005) discursive theory, as developed more recently into

<sup>1</sup> On exclusionary and inclusionary varieties of populism, see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013).

an empirical analysis of populist leadership in Venezuela and elsewhere by Hawkins (2011). Laclau offers a sophisticated and subtle characterization of populism, providing reasons for the prominence in populism of a single demand and that demand's embodiment in a single leader among other issues; nonetheless, a simple sketch of a few core themes that are pivotal to Hawkins's analysis will suffice for present purposes.

The discursive approach to populism involves the idea of a space of demands – for example, possible political grievances or policy ideas. The pre- or counter-populist elite can be seen as connected with the demands at the center of that space; demands are progressively farther from that center in one direction or another the less they are taken seriously in current governance. It may make sense to place the pre-populist elite at the center of the space because those actors represent a spatially centrist ideological position. However, even if not, the positioning may make sense because governing elites substantially influence the space of political debate.

In pre-populist politics, competition is presumably among different factions of the existing political elite. Thus, competing non-populist political coalitions would likely consist of a collection of demands (and, obviously, the individuals who support those demands) that includes a subset of the central positions connected with the current political elite as well as nearby demands in one direction within the demand space. In other words, non-populist coalitions split the political space along a line that goes through the center.

By contrast, a populist coalition takes on a ring shape, with all demands that are sufficiently removed from the elite center uniting against the middle. This kind of coalition does not follow a spatially connected, minimum-coalition policy logic. Instead, demands combined into the coalition can be in substantial tension or can even be extreme opposites in terms of policy or ideological logic. Instead, the coalition is unified by opposition to the current governing elite – the political force that has inflicted a common harm of neglect or opposition on each member of the populist alliance. That common harm, and its common source, is the central theme and unifying element of a populist coalition in Laclau's conception, and also in Hawkins's empirical analysis; certainly political forms that create an opposition between “the people” or “the great majority” and “the elites” or the “corrupt oligarchy” are well represented in the historical record, as well (Laclau 2005, 86–88).

This coalition logic of all against the current ruling elite captures a strong populist style of politics, but care is still needed to separate

populism out from neighboring concepts that refer to other styles of grand coalitions and of rejections of the status quo. The semantic field (Sartori 1984, 51–54; Collier and Levitsky 1997, 444–445) surrounding populism consists of concepts that share traits with Laclau’s concept of populism but that seem importantly different. Populism’s diverse alliance of outsiders against the elite shares patterns with a number of concepts that describe heterogeneous or outsider coalitions. Grand coalitions such as the National Front in Colombia (Hartlyn 1988) share populism’s support from a heterogeneous array of ideological positions, and often also the sense of unity due to threat from an enemy of the people. When the grand coalition is a wartime phenomenon, this enemy is generally mostly foreign to the country, concerns about collaborators aside. However, the enemy may also be located within the country, as in Colombia where the grand coalition occurred in a context of ongoing civil war. National or democratic unity governments in an immediate post-authoritarian context may also have this flavor in that the diverse coalition is united against the authoritarian elite as in the immediate Punto Fijo period following Venezuela’s Perez Jimenez dictatorship. Similarly, in the last months of Fujimori’s administration in Peru, the anti-authoritarian coalition that supported the outsider opposition leader Alejandro Toledo in the 2000 election was formed by left to center-right politicians and by an equally diverse electorate, all of them coalesced under the anti-authoritarian umbrella. Nonetheless, such grand coalitions are clearly a poor example of populism.

On occasion, a particularly offensive, corrupt, or incompetent head of government may motivate the rest of the political class to form a temporary alliance with the delimited goal of removing that head of government, as for example in the fall of Brazil’s Collor de Melo (Szwarcberg 2012, 9–11) or to a lesser extent the impeachment vote against Richard Nixon in the United States, in which a notable minority of Republicans on the relevant committee voted to recommend removing the president (Wright 1977). Such temporary alliances share the all-against-the-powerful nature of populism, although it seems altogether undesirable to classify them as populist because they lack a broadly antiestablishment and pro-popular character.

Finally, broad movements for political, economic, or social reformism, such as civil rights movements, the progressive movement in the United States, or Latin America’s liberation theology movement very often feature broad, heterogeneous coalitions against the status quo. Furthermore, some but not all such movements fit well with the concept of populism. It

is useful to differentiate here between populist coalitions and coalitions of diverse groups pursuing a carefully negotiated joint agenda in which each coalition member agrees to give something up in some areas in exchange for receiving their ideal policy in others. With the latter kind of logrolling transaction, it can often be possible to hold together a heterogeneous coalition of outsiders against the positions of the powerful through a pure logic of policy and bargaining, rather than a populist discourse.

More generally, a useful way of differentiating populism from related but divergent forms of broad and diverse coalition formation is to emphasize the distinctively unbounded scope of a populist project. Populism proposes an indefinite alliance of outsiders to defeat the insiders and repair society, not a finite, limited-purpose, or pre-negotiated partnership. When populism enacts reformist or civil rights policies, those policies are never the end of the political project – they are instead part and parcel of an ongoing and unlimited agenda of healing the damage done by illegitimate elites. That is to say, populism is differentiated from neighboring concepts that also invoke broad coalitions, the goal of eliminating undesired insiders, and transformative agendas in social and economic spheres by its temporally and substantively unlimited nature.

#### SHAPING IDENTITIES: POPULISM AND INCORPORATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Do the psychological mechanisms activated by the populist movements of the twenty-first century act in such a way as to transform the political landscape and bring new groups into political life, in parallel to the way that classic populists incorporated often recently enfranchised working-class and/or rural voters? It may initially seem as if this would be impossible, given that Latin American countries have had effectively universal franchise for decades. Nonetheless, new constituencies can and do arise in countries with universal franchise, via the social and political legitimization of identity categories that were previously marginal or not articulated. Thus, a feminist movement can create a new electoral constituency of feminists, or the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) movement can create the possibility of publicly and politically claiming a previously unacceptable identity. Do contemporary Latin American populists create or expand identities and thus incorporate new constituencies in this way, and if so does the process rely on the central psychological mechanisms of populist appeal?

This section focuses on showing that, during the Chávez period in Venezuela and the Morales period in Bolivia, populist governing coalitions corresponded with substantial movements in citizens' demographic self-definition. Both Venezuelans and Bolivians changed how they described themselves in a way that reduced the Europeaness of overall national identity. In Venezuela, the largest and most lasting change was a shift from a plurality "mestizo" self-concept toward a plurality "moreno" identity that leans more heavily in an African and indigenous direction. For Bolivia, the key change is a dramatic reduction in "white" self-concepts.

Scholars have long emphasized the bounded changeability of ethnic self-concepts. An influential example is offered by Nagel (1995), who analyzes a trajectory in which the number of self-reported American Indians in the United States tripled between the 1960 census and the 1990 census. She argues persuasively that these changes result in large part from shifts in identity among urban, intermarried, bicultural individuals; these shifts in turn were encouraged by "changes in American political culture brought about by the ethnic politics of the civil rights movement [that] created an atmosphere that increased ethnic consciousness, ethnic pride, and ethnic mobilization among all ethnic groups, including American Indians" (Nagel 1995, 948). Groups such as those studied by Nagel are characterized by a varied "repertoire of nominal ethnic identities" that are plausible given the ethnic definitions prevalent in their society, as well as their inherited characteristics (Chandra 2012, 16–18). When various ethnic identities can be claimed by a given individual, the choice of a particular identity to activate from among the available repertoire may often be influenced by the social, material, and political incentives that a given context attaches to each alternative (e.g. Laitin 1998; Waters 1999; Posner 2005).

Scholars of the Andes have pointed to the role of elite political strategies and state institutions in people's activation of ethnic identities, conceptualized by Yashar (2005) in terms of corporatist versus neoliberal citizenship regimes. Alongside such institutional explanations, there is room to ask whether there is also space in analyzing Andean ethnicity for the kinds of ideational and cultural explanatory factors emphasized by Nagel. Can politicians' use of a populist ideology and discourse produce a shift in individuals' ethnic self-concepts by altering the salience of different identities, due to cultural changes and resulting shifts in costs and benefits to different options within a person's ethnic repertoire? This section will show, first, that a large-scale shift in ethnic identities has



TABLE 15.1 *Venezuelan racial and ethnic self-descriptions (2000–2008)*

Year	White(%)	Mestizo(%)	Moreno(%)	Black(%)	Other(%)
2000	36	43	17	4	0
2004	25	30	36	5	4
2008	37	12	41	4	6

indeed occurred in some South American populist contexts, and, second, that the kinds of populism prevalent in the region do shift the relative costs and benefits of different ethnic identity options in ways that resonate with the work of Nagel and others.

Table 15.1 shows the evolution of Venezuelans' racial and ethnic self-categorization from 2000, near the beginning of the Chávez period, to 2008.<sup>2</sup> The data show some volatility in white self-identification, as well as a gradual increase in people refusing to self-identify or selecting less common identities. However, the overwhelmingly dominant trend is a transition from 43 percent of Venezuelans identifying as “mestizo” to 41 percent identifying as “moreno.” These terms are not interchangeable in Venezuela. Both refer to racial/ethnic mixture, indicating an identity that combines European and indigenous and/or African roots. However, the mestizo identity in Venezuela emphasizes light skin and an orientation toward European ancestry and culture, while “moreno” emphasizes darker skin and an orientation toward traditionally more marginalized indigenous/African origins (Bolívar et al. 2009, 304). Thus, the substantial shift in Venezuelan responses to questions about self-identification seen in Table 15.1 corresponds to a truly major shift away from centering European heritage in the self-concepts among Venezuelan citizens.

Table 15.2 shows the patterns for similar survey responses in Bolivia before and during the early years of the Evo Morales government.<sup>3</sup> Here,

<sup>2</sup> Data for the year 2000 come from Wave 4 of the World Values Survey, administered in December of that year by the Red Inter universitaria de Cultura Política. Data for 2004 come from the International Social Survey Programme 2004: Citizenship survey administered in March and April of that year by the Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales. Data for 2008 come from the AmericasBarometer survey carried out in January and February of that year by Vanderbilt University and Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales. Although these surveys vary substantially, the wording of the question about racial/ethnic identity and the response set are consistent.

<sup>3</sup> Data for 2004 come from the Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2004 survey conducted by Vanderbilt University and Encuestas y Estudios (Gallup) Bolivia. Data for 2006 come from the Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2006 survey conducted by Vanderbilt University in collaboration with Encuestas y Estudios. Data for 2008 come from the

TABLE 15.2 *Bolivian racial and ethnic self-descriptions (2004–2008)*

Year	White(%)	Mestizo(%)	Indigenous(%)	Other(%)
2004	18	62	16	4
2006	11	63	20	6
2008	8	68	17	7

the most dramatic trend is the decline in self-reported “white” identity, which falls by more than half. Bolivians instead claim “mestizo” identities, select less common identities, or refuse to self-identify. Although the scope of change is in some ways smaller than in Venezuela, these results show a substantial shift away from elite self-concepts that emphasize European heritage and toward traditionally more marginalized identities among Bolivian citizens during the Morales period.

The dramatic decline in Bolivian white self-identification, and corresponding increase in mestizo and other forms of identification, raises the concern that the actual population of the country may have changed. Perhaps white Bolivians, rather than reconceptualizing themselves as mestizo, simply emigrated en masse. Bolivian emigration statistics do not accord with this interpretation. The country’s net migration rate for the period captured in this analysis was  $-3.4$  percent, as compared with a net migration rate for the 1995–2000 period of  $-2.5$  percent.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the period of Morales’s election was marked by a significant increase in out-migration, but at a level completely incapable of accounting for a 10 percent shift in racial and ethnic self-concept. Furthermore, remittances substantially increased during the period of heightened emigration, implying that migrants were largely workers motivated by job opportunities in Argentina and to a lesser extent other countries – a group that is not known to be disproportionately white.

Thus, we see evidence of a dramatic racial recategorization process in Venezuela, in which about a quarter of the population shifts its racially hybrid identity from one that emphasizes proximity to European ancestry

AmericasBarometer survey administered in February and March of that year by Vanderbilt University, Ciudadania, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública and Universidad Católica Boliviana.

<sup>4</sup> These data, as well as the remittances data referenced later in this paragraph, come from the UNICEF “Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Migration Profiles.” <https://esa.un.org/migmgprofiles/indicators/files/Bolivia.pdf>

TABLE 15.3 *Colombian racial and ethnic self-descriptions (2004–2008)*

Year	White(%)	Mestizo(%)	Indigenous(%)	Black(%)	Other(%)
2004	33	51	6	9	1
2006	35	52	4	7	2
2008	35	46	4	8	7

toward a category that emphasizes proximity to traditionally marginalized African and indigenous American roots.

To what extent are these changes consequences of the populist movements of Venezuela and Bolivia, as opposed to chance co-occurrences? A full-scale causal inference on this question is challenging; there appear to be no panel data in either question that ask about citizens' racial and ethnic self-concepts over time, and no framing experiments were undertaken during the period in question. However, a partial answer may be found through selected cross-national comparisons, through a process-tracing test, and through experimental evidence from a different context that shows the viability of the key causal pathway.

First, it is reasonable to ask whether other relatively similar Latin American countries experienced similar shifts away from white racial and ethnic identification during the first decade of the twenty-first century. That is to say, was there a general region-wide trend toward emphasizing previously less desirable African and indigenous ancestry, or is this pattern relatively unusual and therefore more plausibly a consequence of political dynamics?

For Venezuela, Colombia offers a helpful comparison. Data shown in Table 15.3 reveal a generally stable racial and ethnic landscape. There is no statistically significant change in the proportion of Colombians who categorize themselves as white, indigenous, or black. The only significant change is a modest shift, between 2006 and 2008, from mestizo identification to non-response. In strong contrast to the neighboring Venezuelans, Colombians show no sign of reconceptualizing their origins in a more African and/or indigenous direction.

Peru may offer a less proximate comparison to Bolivia than Colombia does to Venezuela, since Peruvians have long been less likely to classify themselves as indigenous in comparison with Bolivians. Nonetheless, the results in Table 15.4 once again show little evidence of a region-wide trend away from claiming whiteness. Indeed, during the years that most closely correspond to the early Morales period in Bolivia, the percentage

TABLE 15.4 Peruvian racial and ethnic self-descriptions (2006–2010)

Year	White(%)	Mestizo(%)	Indigenous(%)	Black(%)	Other(%)
2006	12	75	6	1	6
2008	12	73	7	2	6
2010	12	77	3	2	6

of Peruvians describing themselves as white remains entirely unchanged. The only statistically significant shift is a 4 percent move, between 2008 and 2010, from indigenous to mestizo self-description – a modest shift in a more European-emphasizing direction.

Indeed, analysis of the available Americasbarometer data on citizens' racial and ethnic identity shows no other shifts approaching the magnitude of Venezuela's. Brazil is the only other country with a shift in racial self-concept comparable to that in Bolivia. In summary, the moves away from white racial and ethnic self-concepts in Venezuela and Bolivia are regionally distinctive and thus cannot be accounted for by appeal to common trends.

Is it, then, reasonable to attribute these trends in substantial part to the political movements led by Chávez and Morales? A useful process-tracing test is to ask whether the political messages that these leaders deployed had elements that could persuade people to reconceptualize themselves in ways that emphasize traditionally marginalized African and indigenous heritage. It is perhaps uncontroversial to argue that Morales's MAS movement in Bolivia has appealed to mestizo- and white-identified populations in ways that fit this reconceptualization (Madrid 2012). However, racial and ethnic politics has been less central to the scholarly and journalistic narrative of Chavismo in Venezuela.

Yet in fact, Chávez repeatedly conceptualized Venezuela and Latin America more generally in ways that fit with the distancing from European roots mentioned above. In speeches throughout his presidency and before diverse audiences, Chávez routinely referred in celebratory fashion to "*América morena*,"<sup>5</sup> and took pains in more anecdotal moments to emphasize the *moreno* character of some of Venezuela's

<sup>5</sup> See, for example: Speech, Banco Central de Venezuela, August 18, 2000. 382. Speech, Teatro Teresa Carreno, Caracas, November 13, 2001. 596. Speech, Avenida Bolívar, Caracas, April 13, 2003. 277. Speech to the 7th summit of the African Union, July 1, 2006. 373. Armed Forces Academy Graduation Speech, December 28, 2006. 717.

founding figures,<sup>6</sup> and of Chávez's own supporters.<sup>7</sup> Chávez's constitution and other government actions also reinforced this message regarding the centrality of African and indigenous communities and inheritance to Venezuela's national identity (Herrera Salas 2005, 106–109; see also Cannon 2008). Thus, alongside the more widely discussed partisan and social class messages of Chavismo, there is a significant strand of speech and policy legitimating *moreno* and other non-European racial and ethnic identities – a pattern both distinctive in Venezuelan history (Herrera Salas 2005) and consistent with the existence of a causal connection between populism and the identity changes described earlier on.

In other words, in both Venezuela and Bolivia, contemporary populist governments coexist with important shifts in racial and ethnic identity that create new constituencies of less-white citizens. These shifts are not merely products of region-wide trends, and they correspond with distinctive elements of the populist appeals made by both governments. As such, there is a kind of initial pattern-matching evidence in favor of the claim that these populist governments, and perhaps the prevalence of populist ideology itself, provided a causal impetus for the observed changes in racial and ethnic self-description.

#### POPULISM AND SOCIAL DISTANCE: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

The previous section has provided initial reason to think that contemporary populists echo the populists of the classic period by incorporating new populations of voters. However, whereas classic populists incorporated newly enfranchised populations, contemporary populists incorporate groups of newly reidentified citizens. The large segment of new “*moreno*” Venezuelans that Chávez brought into the country's social and political life, as well as the smaller but still significant group of nonwhite Bolivians incorporated by Morales, were already citizens before their identities changed. Contemporary populists thus incorporate existing citizens on new terms, rather than incorporating newly enfranchised citizens. While this distinction points to an important difference, there is a fundamental underlying similarity: in both eras, populists have the opportunity to create relationships of special durability and intensity with groups of citizens whose terms of political inclusion seem to be authored by the populists.

<sup>6</sup> Speech, Avenida Universidad, Caracas, August 24, 2002. 402.

<sup>7</sup> Speech, Círculo Militar, Caracas, July 10, 2001. 231.

Yet, is the incorporation of new groups closely tied to the ideational content of populism? Is there something about the nature of a populist movement that encourages deploying ideas that encourage new identities and that change the social costs and benefits of adopting those identities? If so, then it makes sense to reaffirm the incorporation of new citizen groups as a core feature of populisms past and present.

In fact, there is a central component of populist political appeals that seems as if it may indeed soften some existing identity boundaries and create a window of opportunity for legitimating previously marginalized or even outright excluded political identities. This is the populist's appeal to the unity of the people against the victimizing elite. In identifying the source of problems for the "real" members of the society as a conspiratorial elite outside that circle of belonging, the populist message is implicitly – and sometimes even explicitly – leveling vis-à-vis members of the populist coalition. In Chávez's words:

So, that's why I say, value this day and this afternoon so that we can all feel equal and act on that feeling: those from the east and the west (in the case of Caracas), indigenous people, peasants, workers, managers, professionals. Let none think that because they are doctors they are better than patients – we are all equal! – or that because they are the general they are better than a lieutenant.

This message of equality is striking because of its explicit inclusion of the core members of the Chavista populist coalition: residents of the impoverished eastern and western wings of Caracas, indigenous and rural Venezuelans, members of the military, and favored urban groups. Excluded are the stereotyped occupations of the enemy: traditional politicians, business owner, landlord, investor, representative of transnational corporations, and so forth. By belonging to the virtuous group that is, in the populist worldview, victimized by these traitorous elites, members of the Chavista coalition are made more equal and therefore more socially similar.

More generally, a populist political message contains the frame that all members of the nation that are not part of the elite are equal in their suffering at the hands of the elite, in their underappreciated virtue, and in their power to affect change by supporting the populist movement. As long as an identity is included within the national self-concept and is not part of the elite counter-coalition, any stigma associated with that identity will tend to be weakened by the populist message. This weakened stigma, in turn, facilitates identity transition for citizens adjacent to previously marginalized but now incorporated identity categories.

The Venezuelan and Bolivian identity changes fit this theory well. Moreno populations were long recognized as subordinate but typical

members of the Venezuelan polity, and so a positive valuation of the identity category in conjunction with the softening identity boundaries connected with populism could readily facilitate a massive shift into that group. In Bolivia, likewise, indigenous and mestizo identities (although accorded lower status than white identities) were long central to the national self-image and were reemphasized during the revolution of 1952, and so these groups are a natural beneficiary of populist reevaluation.

The central causal step of this account, in which populist political appeals reduce social distance and stigma among non-elite identities within the national self-concept, deserves close empirical scrutiny. Fortunately, this causal linkage is susceptible to experimental testing using a framing paradigm (Chong and Druckman 2007). Specifically, citizens can be randomly exposed to a populist explanation of a salient social problem or to an alternative narrative. Then respondents answer a set of measures of social distance (Bogardus 1933; Fernández et al. 2015) vis-à-vis members of traditionally marginalized minority groups. If populist appeals in fact facilitate identity transition into these groups by reducing the stigma associated with such groups, then it should be the case that exposure to a populist frame reduces citizens' perceived social distance from members of marginalized groups, and the experiment should show the existence of such a causal effect.

We implemented an experiment along these lines in Lima, Peru, during the fall of 2017. From a methodological perspective, we judged Peru to be a useful context in which to test these claims, superior to contemporary Venezuela and Bolivia themselves. The reasons are several. First, citizens of Venezuela and Bolivia live in an information environment already saturated with populist messages, which would limit the effect on the subjects of a brief exposure to a populist message. On the other hand, in a context where populist messages are altogether absent, such messages may seem effectively unintelligible and thus may lack causal weight. Thus, the ideal context for testing this causal linkage is a country with a low to moderate history of populist appeals, such as contemporary Peru. The country has seen populists coming from the Right, like Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, and the Left, like Ollanta Humala in the 2000s. Importantly, a certain vindication of excluded ethnic groups was central to their appeals.<sup>8</sup> However, at present, these appeals have faded from the political scene.

<sup>8</sup> The ethnic undertones of Fujimori's appeal during his successful 1990 presidential campaign made his populist message more attractive in areas with high density of indigenous population (Degregori 1991; Madrid 2011). Although Humala did not run as a populist

An additional reason that justifies using Peru as a research context is its complex and multidimensional ethnic structure, a characteristic that is shared with Bolivia and Venezuela. These countries show a combination of European, mestizo, African, and indigenous that makes them among the most comparable in the region. Furthermore, their shared postcolonial history has made the imagined “true people,” the national identity of these countries, have nonwhite connotations, at the same time that nonwhite individuals typically belong to the materially and symbolically excluded sectors of society. In Peru in particular, the Inca Empire, its constituent peoples, and related cultural symbols have been distinctively central to twentieth- and twenty-first-century national identity projects (Molinie 2004; Alcalde 2009, 29–45); Peru’s connection with these pre-Colombian societies serves to differentiate the country both from Spanish colonialism and from its South American neighbors. As such, it has played a foundational role in Peruvian nationalism since at least the 1970s, with grade school textbooks emphasizing the country’s origins in the pre-colonial period (vom Hau 2009, 140). This history justifies a claim that indigenous identities are central to the meaning of “the Peruvian people” in a way that other marginalized identities (e.g. Afro-Peruvian, feminist, minority religious) are not.

Finally, changes in sociopolitical identities can be seen as the result of episodes of change with path-dependence properties. The rise to power of populist parties can be conceived as critical events that change how people perceive themselves vis-à-vis other members of their polities and to the imagined national identity. If this is the case, using an experiment to test for the mechanism behind these changes in countries where the critical event has already taken place will only provide us with information about the state of the world in its aftermath, not about the process of change itself. Given that Peru is closer to the situation of Venezuela and Bolivia before the path-dependent change than those countries now are themselves, the experiment was more credible in Peru than in those countries.

The experiment took place at parks and street corners in various parts of the city, where 300 randomly selected passers-by were asked to participate in a survey implemented via internet-enabled tablets. After a consent process, respondents were shown a brief statement attributed to a

when he won the 2011 presidential election, he very clearly did so in 2006. His original message was a combination of populist and ethnic inclusion appeals, which some have labeled as “ethnopolitism” (Madrid 2011).



“defender of the public interest,” in conjunction with a generic photo of an affluent young Peruvian man. The content of the statement is randomly assigned to include a populist message, a socialist message, and a developmentalist message.<sup>9</sup> Respondents were asked three questions evaluating the statement they read.

They were asked to complete a set of three social distance scales. These scales asked respondents to report their degree of comfort with the idea of a given individual in different roles: as mayor of Lima, as the president of Peru, as a personal physician, as a tenant, and as a personal religious leader. Respondents were asked these questions with respect to a series of images: a photo of an Afro-Peruvian man in a suit, one of an indigenous Peruvian man in traditional clothes, and one of a middle-class Peruvian woman in a suit posed with a collection of legal books. The theoretical account developed in this chapter implies that populist messages should, on average, reduce respondents’ social distance from the indigenous man but not the others; after all, Peru’s indigenous heritage has long been pivotal to the idea of the Peruvian people in a way that Afro-Peruvians and professional women have not been. Hence, the homogenizing social logic of populism vis-à-vis identities that fit within “the people” should make people feel more similar to an indigenous person than they otherwise would – but perhaps not more similar to the others.

This implication is supported by the experimental results. Across the five social distance questions, respondents exposed to the populist treatment described themselves as being an average of 1.78 steps ( $p$  value of 0.081) more comfortable with the indigenous man than were respondents

<sup>9</sup> The populist message says, “There is so much inequality in Peru because some powerful people who supposedly know best conspire with the government and transnational companies to steal the country’s wealth for themselves. All of us who are part of the real Peruvian people are victims of these so called leaders of the country. They steal from all of us and dictate the laws to hurt anyone who isn’t rich, from Lima, and white like they are.” The developmentalist message says, “There is so much inequality in Peru because we’re still in the intermediate steps of economic development. We need time, patience, investment, and solid economic policy to ensure that our country will keep growing. As our economy becomes bigger and more powerful, it will create more jobs in our country. Each Peruvian who is willing to work hard and get an education will be able to achieve a good life, and inequality will reduce.” Finally, the socialist message says, “There is so much inequality in Peru because our government has not done enough to support social and economic solidarity in our country. All of us Peruvians are one people, and we should support each other so that everyone can enjoy the well being we’ve earned. We can achieve this if all those who are already well off pay their taxes and if we use that money to improve our schools, hospitals, and neighborhoods, and to make sure that they are as good as they can and should be.”

in other treatment groups. Using a counterfactual synthetic random forest analysis (Lu et al. 2018) to non-parametrically condition on the available demographic variables of education, employment status, racial/ethnic identity, and frequency of attention to political news yields a more efficient estimate of a 2.11 step shift toward comfort with the indigenous man ( $p$  value of 0.034). These shifts are against a full range on the social distance scale of thirty possible steps; the treatment effect is equivalent to roughly one-fourth of a standard deviation in the experimental data.

Neither of the other photos provoked similar effects. The simple difference in means associated with the Afro-Peruvian man was a shift of 0.26 steps toward comfort ( $p$  value of 0.79), and the effect for the professional woman was a similar move of 0.50 steps ( $p$  value of 0.59). When the developmentalist and socialist treatments are compared with each other, neither produces statistically significant differences for any comparison. While the results are not significant, it is worth noting that the developmentalist message shifts respondents slightly away from comfort with each of the three images, while the socialist message shifts them slightly toward comfort with each message. Neither of these messages has a disproportionate effect on respondents' social distance from a particular kind of person; rather, both move respondents toward or away from all of the pictured individuals.

The counterfactual synthetic random forest method also produces estimates of causal effects for each individual. While these are highly uncertain, they can point toward moderation effects in which some demographic or other background variable reduces or enhances the causal effect of interest. When the estimates in the present experiment are grouped by each available demographic variable, statistically meaningful patterns emerge only for the respondent's ethnic identity. Specifically, the average causal effect is only significantly different from zero among respondents with a mestizo identity; those who identify as entirely white or indigenous, in particular, are unaffected by the treatment. Thus, the effect of populism on social distance structure is distinctively concentrated among the set of people whose identity repertoire includes the option of leaning toward or away from indigenous identification.

These experimental findings support the proposed theory that populism reshapes social distances in ways that can help account for the large identity shifts observed in Bolivia and particularly Venezuela during recent populist periods. Furthermore, they offer a provocative reminder that populism does not always and everywhere entail demonization of all

marginalized groups within a society. Rather, those groups that form part of the society's stereotypical image of the people can become less marginal and less objectionable under a populist worldview.

#### STABILIZING IDENTITIES: THE CHALLENGES OF BOUNDLESSNESS IN POPULIST COALITIONS

The role of identity in populism is not, of course, limited to the kinds of short-term shifts in distances and social costs demonstrated in the previous section. Populism's unlimited project requires the construction of a political coalition that is durable in the face of changing political agendas and the implementation of policy that hurts some members of the coalition. That is, a genuine populist project needs to resolve the problem of insulating its coalition against costs related to policy conflict and agenda change. How can the coalition be held together when the insiders have been removed from power? When new events occur that raise unforeseen issues not directly connected with the original grievances against the political elite? When constituencies within the coalition disagree about fundamental issues of policy? In the face of such challenges, populism needs mechanisms to stabilize and reinforce identity shifts. This section offers a theoretical framework, drawing on social identity theory and other strands of political psychology, for how commonly noted features of populist governments could help meet such challenges.

In Hawkins's conception, populism elides political and policy tensions by its focus on the tension between the populist "people" and the old political elite. In political-psychological terms, populism manages tensions and change by maintaining a strong in-group/out-group boundary, with the traditional political elite and its supporters as the out-group. When such a boundary is strong, members of the in-group will tend to think about issues in a collective, zero-sum way: an event or policy is good for "us" if and only if it is bad for "them" (Tajfel 1981, 254–267). The value of such a worldview for the populist coalition is, perhaps, evident: coalition members will tend to neglect their own personal interests in favor of the collective's need to defeat the evil outsiders. Any personal harm or ideological discomfort that arises along the way is simply the price of defeating the enemy; indeed, it is essentially yet another grievance to hold against that enemy. Thus, when the populist coalition can sustain a strong, deeply felt boundary between the in-group of the "people," the "masses," and so forth, and the out-group of the old elite, this goes a long

way toward solving the tension between populism's unbounded project and its need to retain a deeply heterogeneous coalition of supporters.

Social identity theory provides a strong theoretical account, with substantial grounding in experimental and observational research, regarding the causal factors that best produce and sustain the kind of deep in-group/out-group tensions that a populist discourse needs to survive over time and across changes in the agenda. Such identity boundaries are strengthened by a number of factors, each of which contributes to making the in-group/out-group comparison particularly salient, making that comparison particularly easy to analyze, and/or making the in-group identity particularly fundamental to group members' self-concept (Tajfel and Turner 1986). We would highlight three patterns that have special relevance for thinking about populism and that contribute to these aspects of strengthening in-group/out-group contrasts.

First, an in-group/out-group boundary is reinforced by the existence of an active opposition that speaks and acts to attack the in-group. When both the in-group and the out-group embrace the identity division, that division is strengthened – and all the more so when the out-group acts in ways that genuinely threaten the in-group. Such active opposition fits the theoretical framework of social identity theory by making the in-group/out-group comparison salient and easy to interpret (Louche 1982; Rothgerber 1997). Furthermore, to the extent that the out-group's resistance takes on conflictual, anti-institutional, or illegal forms, the opposition may contribute to the perception of the out-group as an illegitimate actor, thereby strengthening the group identity boundary (Turner and Brown 1978; Caddick 1982; Drury and Reicher 1999).

Along these lines, a populist coalition benefits when the old political elite and their supporters unite against the populists, attack them rhetorically, and especially carry out real-world acts of aggression against the populist coalition. These patterns establish a context of conflict and may help in-group members frame the populists' out-group as illegitimate. Both of these perceptions make the group boundary more salient and easier to judge, thereby making the distinction sharper and making in-group members more willing to sacrifice to defeat the out-group. As various social movements scholars have pointed out, then, opposition to the populist coalition can paradoxically strengthen a movement's identity and resilience. Social identity theory explains that this takes place by making informationally salient the in-group/out-group divide and increasing the perceived stakes of that divide.

Second, the in-group identity is stronger if it involves ongoing face-to-face small-group interaction with peers as well as one-to-many large-scale messages from the leader or leaders. Brewer (1991) provides an important reason why small groups are so vital. People's identities balance between two fundamental categories of needs: the need for group inclusion and similarity, and the need for separateness and differentiation. As the size and diversity of an identity group grows, the need for differentiation comes to dominate over the need for inclusion. This is a fundamental issue for a populist identity, which structurally must encompass a large and diverse group.

Small-scale, more homogeneous groups strongly nested within the populist identity help resolve this issue by linking the overarching populist identity tightly to an identity category that is small, local, and therefore a powerful driver of inclusion and similarity motivations. If a populist coalition can arrange for recurrent, institutionalized interaction among socially similar peers within the coalition, then it will generate a stronger and more resilient broad populist identity because that identity will be strongly tied to a more local social reference group.

Third, for some subgroups the in-group identity will be stronger if a regular flow of material benefits can be very visibly provided to members of the in-group on the basis of their identity. A line of experiments drawing on social identity theory has found that evaluation of leaders depends on a causal interaction among a leader's degree of prototypicality for a group's identity category, the leader's degree of favoritism toward in-group members in distributing resources, and the follower's strength of identification with the in-group (Platow and van Knippenberg 2001). For those who identify weakly with the in-group, leaders are consistently evaluated more highly when they are distributively unbiased, providing benefits to in-group and out-group members alike. For those who identify strongly with the in-group and see the leader as prototypical of the identity category, distributive behavior is irrelevant and the leader will simply be supported. However, for the subset of strong identifiers with the in-group who see the leader as non-prototypical, biased distribution toward the in-group makes the difference between a positive and a negative evaluation of the leader.

For an identity category that becomes as strongly connected with an individual leader as populism, the implications seem evident. Broad distributive programs should be initiated that include both in-group and out-group members to reassure weak identifiers with the in-group. In parallel with this, biased patronage-style distribution should target groups of

strong identifiers with the populist cause who have characteristics (in terms of social or economic traits, but conceivably also in terms of policy preferences) that are markedly unlike those of the leader. Thus, in contrast with the elections-oriented clientelism literature that emphasizes strategies of targeting weak opposition members to buy votes (Stokes 2005), or core members of the clientelistic coalition to buy turnout (Nichter 2008), populist coalitions should target biased distributive policies toward the subset of core members of the coalition who are least accommodated by the current coalition leadership or policy package in order to buy their loyalty and identification.

In summary, populism's need to create a durable in-group/out-group boundary, in order to survive through changing circumstances and specific policy agendas that will inevitably impose costs on subsets of the coalition, generates a collection of needs: for an out-group that will palpably and regularly fight back, for organizational forms in which coalition members interact with similar local peers within the well-defined context of the broader populist identity, and for targeted benefits to the right subset of in-group members in ways such that in-group bias in the distributive policy is easy for recipients to identify and interpret while potentially obscured from less central members of the coalition. In the remainder of this section, we shall argue that classic populist social and economic policies met all these needs. This compatibility between the identity-structure needs of populist discourse and the political dynamics produced by classical populism may account for the elective affinity between the two phenomena: if classical populist social and economic policy meets essential needs of populist discourse, and if other models that also meet these needs are not overabundant, then there should be an empirical tendency for the two modes of populism to cluster together. Populist discourses that do not also adopt populist social forms and economic policies may well fail to meet these needs and therefore die off.

What, specifically, about classical populist social and economic policies helped solve the identity needs of discursive populist coalition-building? Unionization, redistributive and state-led industrialization, and organization of supporters into clientelist organizational units is a policy package that did quite a lot to solve these problems of identity construction and maintenance. First, and most obviously, this package provided easily attributable material benefits to populist coalition members. Unionists and favored industrialists are targeted through highly visible economic policies involving tariffs, state recognition, subsidies, and so forth (Collier and Collier 1991). These policies can be defended

when necessary in universalist terms as a way that the state breaks patterns of economic dependency (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Evans 1979), but it is also clear that specific actors could easily be included or excluded depending on their degree of support for the populist coalition (Collier and Collier 1979). Thus, the in-group bias of these programs can be made evident to the relevant audiences while potentially being at least partially obscured for marginal members of the populist coalition. Of course, populist coalitions offer biased distribution of benefits to other supporters through more clientelistic and personalistic payoffs via the populist organizational apparatus (Auyero 2000).

Perhaps less obviously, classical populist economic policies generate a highly visible set of antagonists to the populist movement, who are motivated to attack the coalition in the way that is needed to reinforce the in-group/out-group division. Classical populist economics is well known to have favored domestic industrialization, redistributed to the urban poor and working classes, and sought to change the terms of international trade. Yet not all policy packages with these agendas are populist. Non-populist governments have combined welfare states with active industrial policy in Western Europe and to some extent in Asia; populist economics is not merely characterized by these goals. Rather, a central populist signature in economic policy is the inescapably activist state. That is to say, a classical populist government intervenes visibly in the economy, generating explicit winners and losers. Wealthy landowners and exporters, in particular, are targeted for economically distorting, highly palpable redistribution via price caps and exchange rate controls. In comparison with alternative policy packages that meet similar redistributive agendas (for example, income taxes combined with food subsidies to the poor and investment incentives to industrialists), classical populist economic policies make the state's imposition of costs on specific actors feel far more targeted, personal, deliberate, and potentially arbitrary – a combination that is a good match for the set of assessments known to generate anger (Lazarus 1991) and therefore counterattack. In this way, classical populist policy meets the need, acute in populism as a mobilizing strategy, for active enmity on the part of the out-group.

Finally, classical populism also centrally involved the creation of new organizational forms that incorporated previously marginalized populations into the political process. While these organizations have clear strategic value for populist movements, serving as a source of political flexibility in the face of repression and political backlash (Collier and Collier 1991, 344–347, 493–497; McGuire 1997), they also created

spaces that encourage peer-to-peer interaction within a clearly pro-populist context. Thus, the organizational forms of unions, agricultural cooperatives, and local units provide ample opportunities for symbolic reaffirmation of the populist identity – while also reducing costs associated with mobilization and the distribution of patronage.

In summary, classical populist economic and social policies coexist often with populist discursive and mobilizing strategies because these economic and social policies provide ready solutions to a series of needs that such strategies generate. An interesting question arises whether neoliberal populism (Roberts 1996; Weyland 1996) displays the same strong harmonies as classical populist policy and populist mobilization. Indeed, it would seem that there is not as strong an alignment. On the one hand, the neoliberal marketizing policy package obviously generates strong opposition from a set of organized interests including unions and their members, state employees, and beneficiaries of social spending. Furthermore, clever politicians can certainly find ways of using the neoliberal reform process itself as a source of patronage goods (Etchemendy 2001). There may be problems of sustainability for both of these arrangements – but there are clearly sustainability issues for classical populist economic policies, as well.

The most serious challenge for neoliberal neo-populism, in terms of meeting the social identity needs analyzed here, involves the challenge of facilitating regular peer-to-peer reinforcement of the identity. Neoliberal economic policies do not naturally facilitate face-to-face organizational forms, and in fact undermine existing political forms with such traits, such as unions, groups of beneficiaries of state programs, and so forth (Collier and Handlin 2005). Thus, neoliberal policies do not offer as complete a solution to the task of building a durable populist coalition as classical populist policies. This may help account for the relative lack of durability of neoliberal neo-populist coalitions in Latin America.

## CONCLUSION

Populists in the classic period were fundamentally agents of incorporation for newly or recently enfranchised social groups. In a period of universal suffrage, some twenty-first-century populists have managed to play this role by legitimating existing marginalized identities and facilitating large-scale changes in self-concept among voters. Thus, Chávez could incorporate a large new constituency of *moreno* as opposed to *mestizo* Venezuelans – new not because these citizens had previously been legally excluded, but because they had previously not been *moreno*. Likewise,



Morales could incorporate an expanded population of nonwhite Bolivians because of parallel if more modest identity transitions.

This chapter has argued that such changes in fundamental self-concept are not incidental but instead responsive to the core psychological logic of populism. Because populists inherently strive to create strong, homogenizing identities among diverse coalitions, they need to establish a powerful sense of equivalence among all members of the national community who can be represented as victims of the existing elite. Such an equivalence reduces social distance among groups and thus decreases the stigma associated with membership in a traditionally marginalized group. In this way, populist appeals solve coalition-management problems in a way that helps create new constituencies. If, as has been argued above, populism facilitates racial and/or ethnic identity change, it must surely also bring about the existence of new constituencies in identity domains that seem more flexible, such as social class, cultural categories, or region. Populism in the twenty-first century thus may retain the incorporating character of classic populism, albeit in a novel form.

Furthermore, when populists incorporate new constituencies by encouraging shifts in identities, they create a potentially durable legacy in terms of citizens' self-concepts and related patterns of political behavior. The literature on populism has already pointed at how a critical juncture framework can help us understand the ways in which the irruption of populist alternatives can transform party systems (Roberts 2015). However, such models of punctuated equilibrium can illuminate not only institutional dimensions of change, but also psychological transformations. Party system collapse creates moments of opportunity in which political identities are more fluid and more susceptible to transformation by populist discourses. The explored psychological mechanisms by which populist leaders reshape identities help us understand the micro-dynamics of change taking place in these historical episodes. If the kinds of identity changes seen in Venezuela and Bolivia's contemporary populist periods prove durable, then such identity patterns deserve attention as an indication that the critical junctures framework has potential extensions into mass politics, and beyond the realm of elites and institutional politics in which it was been traditionally used.

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## The Inclusionary Turn and Its Political Limitations

Kenneth M. Roberts

### INTRODUCTION

Latin America's inclusionary turn at the dawn of the twenty-first century produced tangible political, economic, and social gains for working- and lower-class "popular sectors." In so doing, it challenged the region's long-standing reputation for exclusionary politics and entrenched social and economic inequalities. Although Latin America remained the world's most unequal region, its success at reducing inequalities after 2000 ran counter to trend lines seen elsewhere in the world. Poverty levels fell sharply across the region, and popularly elected governments of diverse ideological persuasions launched new social programs that provided benefits to millions of low-income families.

As the contributors to this volume show, these forms of inclusion were multifaceted, and they had meaningful effects on people's lives. They were also, however, partial and tentative, often falling short of parchment commitments, not to mention popular expectations (Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume). In that sense, the new inclusionary turn was not unlike the early twentieth-century forms of labor-based incorporation analyzed in the seminal work of Collier and Collier (1991), a process that largely defined the onset of mass politics in the region.

In other respects, however, the new inclusion was strikingly different from that which the region had experienced historically. Labor-based incorporation provided recognition, access, and resources – the three dimensions of inclusion identified by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar – in ways that were highly segmented or truncated, concentrating

ample rights and generous benefits on unionized workers (in the formal sector of the economy) who were linked to states and ruling parties through corporatist modes of interest representation. The new inclusion, by contrast, was noted more for its breadth than its depth, for pluralist as opposed to corporatist modes of interest representation, and for organizational diffuseness rather than density. Above all, the new inclusion extended recognition, access, and resources to social sectors left behind or excluded from the historical process of labor incorporation – sectors that Garay aptly labels “outsiders” in her chapter in this volume. In most of the region these outsiders included urban unemployed and informal sector workers, rural peasants and landless laborers, and indigenous groups or racial minorities facing varied forms of discrimination.

While the first two distinctive traits of the new inclusionary turn – its breadth and its pluralism – generated much of the enthusiasm that surrounded the process, the third trait – its organizational diffuseness – accounted for many of its shortcomings, not to mention the shallowness of its institutional legacies in much (though not all) of the region. Taken together, these traits help explain why the new inclusionary turn was associated with the “easy stage” of redistributive politics identified by Holland and Ross Schneider (2017) – one in which politically “safe,” if not anodyne, low-cost cash transfers could be made to large numbers of weakly or non-organized popular constituencies. They also help explain why the region struggled to build on this success and advance toward the “hard stage” of redistributive politics, which requires more expensive and politically contentious investments in public services and institutional reforms. This hard stage may also require more densely organized popular constituencies to advance redistributive reforms against the inevitable political resistance of economic elites, sectors of the middle class, and varied “insider” groups (see Holland and Ross Schneider 2017) – an uncertain political proposition, to say the least, in light of the region’s political history.

As explained below, the defining features of the inclusionary turn and the “easy” stage of redistribution were heavily conditioned by the institutional legacies of the earlier historical process of labor incorporation chronicled by Collier and Collier (1991). So too were they conditioned by the more recent “dual transitions” of the late twentieth century: the spread and, more tentatively, the consolidation of political democracy across the region, and the crisis-induced transition from inward-oriented, state-led industrialization to globalized market liberalism (or “neoliberalism”). Broad, pluralistic, and organizationally diffuse inclusion reflected

the transformation of both civil societies and welfare state institutions that accompanied these dual transitions in Latin America. The shift to a new stage of capitalist development – anticipated, in much of the region, by labor-repressive forms of authoritarian rule (O'Donnell 1973) – weakened and fractured the union-party hubs that dominated popular sector representation during the era of state-led development (Collier and Handlin 2009). It also, however, spawned heterogeneous and loosely-networked forms of grassroots organization among previously excluded groups that sought protection from market insecurities under the neoliberal model (see Polanyi 1944; also Yashar 2005; Silva 2009; Simmons 2016; Rossi 2017). Latin America's inclusionary turn was shaped by the efforts of these outsider groups to obtain recognition, access, and resources from newly democratized states. It was also shaped by the efforts of political entrepreneurs and ruling technocrats to appeal to, or at least politically neutralize, the masses of the unorganized poor in competitive electoral environments.

The new inclusionary turn, however, did not simply graft new popular constituencies onto the old, or introduce a new set of actors to the democratic arena. It followed in the wake of, and was arguably predicated upon, labor's thorough political disarticulation between the 1960s and 1980s in most of the region. Discontinuities in access – the domain of political representation – were thus sharper, I argue, than those in recognition or resources, where new citizenship rights and social benefits were often layered on the old (Holland and Ross Schneider 2017; see also Hunter's chapter in this volume). These analytical distinctions are informed not only by Collier and Collier's (1991) landmark study of mass incorporation in Latin America, but also by the rich intellectual debate their book launched over different models of institutional change – in particular, the distinctions between critical junctures and gradual or incrementalist approaches to change (Thelen 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Roberts 2014; Collier and Munck 2017).

#### BROADENING INCLUSION

The most notable feature of Latin America's new inclusionary turn has been, arguably, its breadth, as the contributors to this volume demonstrate across a number of comparative dimensions. This breadth is best understood in analytical juxtaposition to the segmented or truncated character of mass incorporation historically. That historical process was not only segmented *within* countries, in terms of social groups that did or

did not obtain recognition, access, and resources, but also *across* countries, given the failure of a large number of Latin American countries to meaningfully participate in the process at all.

After nearly a century of post-independence oligarchic rule, labor incorporation marked the definitive entry of popular sectors onto the Latin American political scene. Labor incorporation was associated with the extension of suffrage rights to the working class in a large number of countries – a most basic form of citizenship – as well as the recognition of workers' rights to associate in unions and engage in collective bargaining. Where efforts to associate and engage in collective action had previously been met with coercion or repression, labor incorporation transformed workers' relationship to the state by recognizing, legalizing, and institutionalizing their associational forms (Collier and Collier 1991, 6). Organization, in turn, provided newfound access to both partisan and corporatist channels of interest representation, as unions forged alliances with emerging mass-based parties and negotiated with states, as well as employers, over wages, benefits, and working conditions. Such forms of organized access allowed unions and workers to claim new resources, and they induced Latin American states to become, for the first time, welfare states that provided basic forms of social protection like pensions, health care, and employment security for a significant number of citizens.

These forms of social protection, however, were largely funded by employer and employee contributions, making eligibility for benefits highly contingent on an individual's employment status in the formal sector of the economy. Where labor markets are relatively unified, absorbing the bulk of the labor force into formal sector activities, such contributory welfare systems can reach a large majority of a country's citizens, as in much (but not all) of continental Europe. Where delayed industrialization created highly dualistic labor markets, however, with large numbers of workers unemployed or underemployed in precarious and informal labor activities – as in Latin America and Southern Europe – contributory models tend to produce truncated welfare states that concentrate their benefits on formal sector (especially unionized) workers in large firms and the public sector, as well as the middle and upper classes (Huber and Stephens 2012; Rueda et al. 2015; Holland 2017). Consequently, during the period of labor incorporation in Latin America, resource flows to peasant smallholders, agricultural workers, domestic workers, the unemployed, and informal sectors at-large were minimal or nonexistent throughout the region.



Segmentation, moreover, was not limited to the flow of resources and social benefits. Although peasants formed unions linked to reformist, labor-based parties during the period of incorporation in Mexico and Venezuela (see Collier and Collier 1991), in most of the region peasants remained poorly organized, weakly represented in the partisan arena, and severely constrained by patron-clientelist forms of political control exercised by landlords and traditional oligarchic parties. Indeed, political efforts to extend the incorporation process to peasants helped trigger elite backlashes and democratic breakdowns in a number of countries, including Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), and Chile (1973). These breakdowns not only precluded the political incorporation of peasants, but also led to the authoritarian reversal of labor incorporation itself, including brutal repression of labor unions and their affiliated populist or leftist parties.

Prolonged periods of authoritarian rule, in fact, prevented any sustained or meaningful process of mass political incorporation in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic prior to the onset of the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991), which started in Latin America at the end of the 1970s. This set of countries retained exclusionary forms of military or patrimonial authoritarian rule along with predominantly agrarian economies during Latin America’s era of populism and state-led industrialization. As such, they skirted or short-circuited the historical patterns of labor incorporation chronicled by Collier and Collier (1991). And even in countries like Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador that experimented with democracy and experienced cycles of labor mobilization, the most elementary form of citizenship – the right to vote – was formally restricted by literacy requirements that effectively disenfranchised much of the rural and urban poor, especially those of indigenous or African descent.

In short, the initial process of mass incorporation in twentieth-century Latin America was partial, reversible, and highly segmented along multiple dimensions. It occurred in the region’s most industrialized and democratic societies but bypassed many of those that remained largely agrarian and/or undemocratic. Even where labor incorporation occurred – a critical juncture that had durable effects on states, regimes, party systems, and interest representation (Collier and Collier 1991) – basic citizenship rights, access to representative and policymaking institutions, and social benefits were selectively extended to organized popular constituencies in ways that excluded substantial sectors of the population. Despite their limited reach, these segmented and partial forms of

incorporation were largely reversed during the wave of authoritarian repression that swept across most of the region during the 1960s and 1970s, at least in part as a response to distributive conflicts unleashed by the process of incorporation itself (O'Donnell 1973).

Although Latin America's most recent inclusionary turn would be conditioned by these historical antecedents and their institutional legacies, its central logic was aimed at the social and political inclusion of groups – and countries – that remained outsiders during the initial process of labor incorporation. First and most obviously, the inclusionary turn involved every country in the region outside of socialist Cuba, reflecting the region-wide scope of the democratization process in Latin America in the 1980s. And while many of the new democratic regimes could surely be criticized for their lack of responsiveness to popular constituencies, none formally excluded them, as literacy restrictions on suffrage rights were lifted in the countries that had retained them during earlier waves of democratization (Kellam 2013). The recognition of universal individual citizenship rights across every country in the region, therefore, was a crucial first step toward broader forms of political inclusion, one that largely coincided with transitions to democracy itself. As a mode of institutional change, it represented the outward extension of basic citizenship rights to countries and social groups previously denied such rights.

Universal individual citizenship rights, moreover, were supplemented by new forms of collective recognition for indigenous peoples, who waged unprecedented struggles in a number of countries for constitutional recognition of rights to subnational cultural and political autonomy (Van Cott 2000; Yashar 2005; Lucero 2008; Rice 2012). Indigenous communities mobilized behind a diverse set of claims, including the recognition of customary political and judicial authorities; local control over land use, water, and natural resources; and the right to educate children in indigenous languages in public schools. In so doing, they demanded forms of political inclusion that went beyond conventional liberal and corporatist models of interest representation; indigenous peoples articulated claims that were collective in nature but rooted in ethnic identities, cultural differences, and community solidarity rather than class-based material interests alone (Yashar 2005). Many of these multicultural and plurinational claims were incorporated within constitutional reform projects across the region in the aftermath of the International Labour Organization's 1989 adoption of Convention 169 on the collective rights of indigenous peoples. In some countries – namely, the Bolivarian cases (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) examined in the chapter by Elkins –

plurinational rights and cultural recognition were integral features of political efforts to break with the past and refound constitutional orders. In others, collective rights for indigenous peoples were simply grafted onto preexisting individual citizenship rights within national constitutions, following the logic of Thelen's (2004) institutional layering. Although effective enforcement of indigenous rights often fell short of parchment commitments (see below), constitutional recognition of these rights represented an important milestone in Latin America's efforts to overcome the most egregious exclusionary practices rooted in its colonial heritage.

Broadening by means of institutional layering was also pronounced in the sphere of social policy, as Hunter suggests in her chapter on conditional cash transfers (CCTs), and as Holland and Ross Schneider (2017) argue in their work on the "easy stage" of redistribution. Although truncated welfare states were constructed during an era of state-led industrialization, their segmented character survived the transition to neoliberalism, even where they were heavily privatized, as in Chile. Indeed, market liberalization reinforced the contributory logic of traditional welfare states, while shifting service delivery from public agencies to private providers like pension funds and insurance companies (see Madrid 2003). The truncated character of social protection programs was thus reproduced in a more free market form, as benefits continued to be concentrated among formal sector workers (and their families) who were able to contribute to privatized pension and insurance plans.

In a context of increasing informalization of the workforce and institutionalized democratic competition, however, the exclusionary effects of this heightened dependence on the market were difficult to sustain. Even in less-than-fully-democratic settings – such as Mexico and Peru in the early 1990s – conservative governments committed to neoliberal projects, but wary of their potential political effects, began to cushion the impact of market reforms by adopting compensatory social programs targeted on the poorest sectors of society. While compensatory programs such as PRONASOL in Mexico and FONCODES in Peru initially prioritized local infrastructure and grassroots development projects, targeted poverty relief initiatives quickly evolved as democratic governments across the region experimented with novel ways to respond to economic hardships. In particular, governments of diverse ideological persuasions adopted direct, means-tested, noncontributory transfer payments to low-income citizens who were outsiders to formal sector labor markets and the social welfare programs attached to them. Programs such as CCTs and

noncontributory pension plans were clearly aimed at “broadening” Latin American welfare states and expanding their coverage, not by dismantling preexisting truncated programs, but by layering new types of benefits alongside them for families and individuals who failed to qualify for programs attached to formal sector employment.

Such forms of means-tested layering fostered the construction of hybrid, multitiered welfare state institutions that combined contributory and noncontributory benefits programs, often involving both public and private sector providers. Indeed, adding to the complexity, a number of countries in the region cautiously introduced universalistic principles to their pension and health care systems, making at least minimal forms of coverage a universal right of social citizenship. As such, across and even within countries, all three of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) ideal-typical welfare state institutions could be found in Latin America during the inclusionary turn: (1) means-tested or “residual” safety-net programs that targeted minimal benefits on the poorest individuals who struggled to secure their basic needs in a competitive market environment; (2) contributory programs that provided uneven benefits to workers and families, conditional on their employment background or status; and (3) universalistic programs that offered a standard package of benefits to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay.

As in the sphere of education, middle and upper classes routinely supplement or opt out of the universalist programs in order to take advantage of private options that offer superior quality or enhanced benefits, hence maintaining segmentation in quality if not necessarily in coverage. For many of the poor, access to quality medical care remains a perpetual challenge, and noncontributory transfer payments like CCTs and pensions are much lower than the standard minimum wage, still leaving their recipients below or near the poverty line. Nevertheless, the central thrust of the new inclusionary turn has been to strengthen and extend the social safety net to sectors of society where it had never reached before, in particular to individuals outside the formal sector labor market. In so doing, the inclusionary turn layered new programs and benefits on top of or alongside the old, creating hybrid welfare states that combine, in complex and sometimes contradictory ways, different eligibility rules, coverage principles, and institutional models. Slowly, if unevenly, as democratic contestation became institutionalized in contexts of egregious inequalities, the region began to recognize at least minimal rights of social citizenship attached to universal voting and citizenship rights.

## PLURALIZING INCLUSION

If the new inclusionary turn broadened the recognition of citizenship rights and the reach of the social safety net, so also did it pluralize forms of access and political representation. As explained in the chapters by Garay and Etchemendy, organized labor played a significant role in the new inclusionary turn in several countries, particularly Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, and forms of corporatist bargaining were even revived under the left-leaning Peronist governments of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina and the leftist Broad Front in Uruguay. Even in these countries, however, the inclusionary turn involved a wide range of other social actors other than labor unions, and elsewhere in the region unions took a back seat to nonclass-based actors. Indeed, in a few countries – namely Venezuela and Ecuador – traditional labor unions found themselves in political opposition to left-populist governments that adopted inclusionary policies for other (less densely organized) sectors of society. The inclusionary turn, therefore, reflected basic changes in Latin America’s social landscape, including the makeup and organization of civil society and the forms of representation and participation that afforded civic groups access to policymaking arenas.

Pluralization was, in many respects, a social correlate to Latin America’s transition from state-led industrialization to market liberalism. Simply put, different stages of capitalist development in Latin America had corresponding patterns of civic associationism and interest representation. Labor incorporation in the early twentieth century was closely coupled politically to the process of class formation itself. It coincided with the early stages of industrialization, formalizing the political recognition of an emerging social actor whose aggregation on the shop floor created – potentially, at least – a formidable capacity for disruptive collective action and institutionalized political voice. Although the urban working class remained a relatively small part of Latin America’s sprawling “popular sectors,” no other popular constituency could rival its strategic importance to national economies or its capacity for collective action and political organization. Whether, and how, labor was incorporated during the early stages of industrialization largely defined the character of mass politics in Latin America during the middle of the twentieth century, including the sociological foundations and competitive alignments of national party systems (Collier and Collier 1991; Roberts 2014).

Labor incorporation provided forms of access to governing institutions that relied on hierarchical and centralized patterns of social organization: shop-level unions joined larger sectoral associations, which in turn formed peak-level, multisector national confederations (at least in the countries where labor incorporation advanced the furthest). This combination of horizontal linkage and vertical “scaling up” enhanced unions’ political leverage. So also did workers’ organizational density and their capacity for collective action – that is, the concentration of large numbers of workers in a relatively small number of federated associations, and the ability of workers to engage in disruptive forms of collective action (i.e. strikes) in strategically important sectors of the economy. Such organizational traits made union confederations valuable coalition partners of many political parties, and in some countries they became the organizational fulcrum of mass-based populist parties themselves. These traits also induced states to formally charter national labor confederations, incorporate them within peak-level bargaining institutions, and exchange concessions over wages and social benefits for a measure of political control over unions’ finances, leadership selection, and demand articulation – the dominant features of Latin America’s state–corporatist mode of interest representation (Collier and Collier 1979).

As seen in the chapters by Goldfrank, Garay, Etchemendy, Boas, Palmer-Rubin, Dunning and Novaes, and Mayka and Rich, the new inclusion has been more decentralized and pluralistic in its organization of popular sectors and in the forms of recognition and access they are afforded (also see Oxhorn 2011). The new inclusion encompassed a plethora of social actors, interests, identities, and organizational forms, as individuals engaged in collective action not only as producers but also as consumers, pensioners, neighborhood residents, women, indigenous peoples, unemployed workers, or simply as rights-bearing citizens. In most cases, associational patterns have also been notable for their voluntary, self-constituted, and autonomous character; as discussed in the chapter by Palmer-Rubin, emerging social actors were more independent of national states and political parties than they were during the era of corporatist labor incorporation, and most relied on decentralized, small-scale, and often territorially-based organizational forms that were congruent with localized channels of participation.

The communal basis of many popular claims for inclusion dovetailed with larger patterns of political decentralization that enhanced localized, territorially-based access to representative institutions. Democratic transitions at the national level were often followed by institutional reforms

aimed at strengthening local democratic governance, including reforms in a number of countries to elect mayors and municipal authorities who had previously been appointed. Local governments were awarded greater control over fiscal resources, and they often assumed responsibilities for a wider range of public services. Democratization and decentralization, therefore, contributed to making the new inclusionary turn a multilevel phenomenon with multiple points of entry or access for popular constituencies – another example, perhaps, of institutional layering (Thelen 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

Indeed, decentralization created institutional spaces for new forms of grassroots consultation and participation in local public policymaking processes, including budgeting and the design and implementation of local infrastructure projects (Baiocchi et al. 2011; Goldfrank 2011). As stated by Goldfrank in his chapter in this volume, Latin America became the “world’s leading laboratory” for innovative participatory practices at the local level, as municipal governments and planning commissions opened doors for a plethora of community organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to have voice in the making of public policies. Rather than national-level union–party hubs, the new inclusion tended to privilege access through pluralistic and decentralized associative networks that brought together shifting, often issue-specific coalitions of local government officials, NGOs, professional civic associations, party activists, and grassroots community organizations (see Chalmers et al. 1997; Collier and Handlin 2009). The chapter by Mayka and Rich shows that these participatory practices and associative networks were especially prominent in the social policy field around issues like health care, education, and social assistance. According to Mayka and Rich, virtually all countries in the region made formal commitments to participatory reforms, and while some countries failed to translate these parchment commitments into concrete practices, others – like Brazil – experimented widely and made efforts to translate participatory practices from local to regional and even national-level policymaking arenas.

In many respects, the strengthening of local channels for popular participation and self-governance – like the extension of suffrage rights to previously disenfranchised subaltern groups, the creation of noncontributory social welfare programs, and the recognition of plurinational cultural rights – was an example of incremental change by means of institutional layering within the third wave of democratization (Thelen 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). All of these reforms promoted popular inclusion by supplementing, building onto, or expanding the coverage

of existing institutions without breaking with or dismantling what existed beforehand. They were, in short, cumulative in nature.

As a mode of political inclusion, however, the pluralist patterns of civic and community participation described above did not merely layer onto historical models of corporatist, labor-incorporating interest representation in most of the region. The transformation of interest representation was not simply a response to local-level democratization and the institutional channels or incentives it provided, and new social actors were not, for the most part, grafted onto the old. Instead, pluralist modes emerged in the political void left by the demise or dismantling of labor-based popular representation in both civic and partisan spheres. In the representational sphere, therefore, the new inclusion was characterized by a much higher level of institutional discontinuity, reflecting the wrenching demise of the union-party hubs embedded in the logic of state-led industrialization, but increasingly misaligned with the political coordinates of the emerging neoliberal era. As such, the pluralist social landscape of the neoliberal era brought new actors and voices into the public sphere, but in much of the region it left popular sectors with less organizational density and more tenuous linkages to partisan arenas of representation. The nature and political implications of this organizational diffuseness are analyzed below.

#### INCLUSION AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFUSENESS

The combination of military repression, economic crisis, and market-based structural adjustment between the 1960s and 1980s wreaked havoc on labor movements in the region, particularly in those countries where labor had been strongest during the era of state-led development. Unionization rates plummeted across the region, the workforce became increasingly informal and precarious, and political linkages between unions and parties were loosened or severed. Most of the historic labor-based parties in the region suffered steep electoral declines or transformed themselves into architects of neoliberal reform (Murillo 2001; Levitsky 2003; Burgess 2004; Roberts 2014). These changes thoroughly undermined the political and organizational bases of corporatist interest representation; indeed, corporatist bargaining over wages and employment security was highly antithetical to neoliberalism's emphasis on the commodification of labor and the flexibilization of labor markets.

But if the region-wide transition to neoliberalism pulverized labor-based forms of political representation, it also heightened popular



exposure to a wide range of market insecurities that eventually stimulated other types of collective responses. During the debt crisis of the 1980s – a decade of economic contraction and acute inflationary pressures across most of the region – the cracks in an already-porous social safety net were enlarged by cuts in public employment, social spending, and employment protection guarantees, leaving a growing number of citizens vulnerable to the vagaries of the marketplace. Economic restructuring not only threatened workers – the labor market insiders – with wage cuts and layoffs in the public sector and once-protected national industries. It also posed threats to many outsider groups as well, including the urban poor accustomed to price controls or subsidies for basic goods and services, pensioners and precarious workers facing uncertain coverage under privatized social security schemes, and indigenous communities confronting the commodification of land, water, and natural resources (Yashar 2005; Silva 2009; Simmons 2016).

Paradoxically, this exacerbation of economic hardships and insecurities occurred during a period when the region was returning to political democracy and expanding citizenship rights. The basic – and potentially combustible – contradictions between expanded democratic rights, weakened labor unions, and heightened market insecurities shaped the basic contours of the new inclusionary turn, from its sociopolitical actors to its institutional forums and social policy content. These contradictions made it highly likely that societal pressures for economic security and political inclusion would emerge in democratic arenas but be articulated – in most of the region – outside the union-party hubs of the earlier labor-incorporating period (Silva and Rossi 2018).

As seen in the chapters by Etchemendy and Garay, organized labor and labor-aligned parties were part of broader popular sector alliances that pushed forward the new inclusionary turn in a relatively small number of countries – namely Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil. Such insider-outsider alliances, according to Etchemendy, were harder to construct where labor markets were highly informalized. They were also less likely where historic labor-based parties played a major role in the adoption of structural adjustment policies; Argentina was an exception, given the singular capacity of Peronism to veer back to the left and reconstruct alliances with unions and the new unemployed workers' (*piquetero*) movement following the financial crisis and mass uprising of 2001–2002 (Roberts 2014; Rossi 2017).

In most of the region, however, neither labor unions nor labor-based parties were major players in the new inclusionary turn. Where the

inclusionary turn was preceded by mass popular uprisings – namely, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia (Silva 2009) – varied outsider groups, rather than unions, rose to the forefront of protest movements. Such was the case with the urban poor in Venezuela’s 1989 urban riots; the *piqueteros*, the urban poor, and popular assemblies in Argentina (Auyero 2007; Rossi 2017); and the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia’s multiple uprisings. More typically – where the inclusionary turn was *not* preceded by a groundswell of mass protest – more quotidian forms of community-based organization and networking were channeled into local participatory forums, as described above. As Garay suggests, the mobilization of social pressure for inclusion “from below” varied widely across the region; where social mobilization was weak or highly fragmented, as in Peru, inclusionary policies remained very modest in their levels of spending, their breadth of coverage, and the opportunities they provided for popular participation.

Similarly, partisan channels of access for popular constituencies were ruptured, transformed, or reconfigured in much of the region during the transition to market liberalism and the early stages of the inclusionary turn. Discontinuities in the partisan sphere of representation largely account for efforts to interpret Latin America’s transition to neoliberalism as a new critical juncture in the region’s political development (see Roberts 2014). Historic labor-based parties all but collapsed during the 1990s or early 2000s in Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela, while that in Mexico transformed itself into an architect of neoliberal reform. A new leftist “movement party” emerged in Bolivia with organic linkages to the powerful indigenous, coca growers, and urban popular movements that brought down the old order (Madrid 2012; Anria 2019), and important currents of the *piquetero* movement were incorporated within – and helped revive – Argentine Peronism as it turned to the left after the 2001 financial meltdown.

These latter cases of organic party-movement linkages were rare, however, during the inclusionary turn. Ecuador’s once-powerful indigenous movement failed to translate its mobilizational capacity effectively into partisan and electoral arenas, and new leftist alternatives that displaced traditional party systems in Venezuela and Ecuador relied heavily on top-down populist leadership styles. Indeed, both Chávez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador clashed with organized labor and built their support largely among previously unorganized popular constituencies. As the chapters by Seawright and Barrenechea and Mazzuca demonstrate, the combination of charismatic authority, populist discourse, and ample

commodity rents helped stitch together heterogeneous electoral coalitions of informal sectors and other outsider groups, but rebuilding party organizations as durable – much less democratic – vehicles for the articulation and representation of popular constituencies proved to be an elusive goal in both countries.

There was, in short, no uniform pattern of partisan access undergirding Latin America's new inclusionary turn, and as the chapter by Pop-Eleches demonstrates, neither was there a durable or uniform pattern of electoral realignment associated with it. The chapters by Garay and Etchemendy, as well as other work by scholars like Pribble (2013) and Anria (2019), suggest that the new inclusion was broader, more generous, and more participatory where major left-leaning parties were aligned with unions and other organized popular constituencies – a type of socio-political alignment found primarily in Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay during the first decade of the twenty-first century. But such alignments were clearly *not* a precondition for the adoption of inclusionary policies. Inclusionary social policies were also adopted during the “third wave” by historic leftist parties, like the Chilean Socialists, which had become increasingly technocratic and professionalized over time, retaining few if any linkages to organized popular constituencies; by left-populist governments, like that of Correa in Ecuador, which also adopted reforms in a technocratic manner while eschewing most ties to organized popular sectors; and even by governments led by conservative parties (Mexico) or center-right coalitions (Brazil under Fernando Henrique Cardoso) that faced electoral competition from rising leftist rivals.

It is in part due to this political heterogeneity that Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar see the stabilization of democracy itself, in particular the institutionalization of electoral competition, as being instrumental to Latin America's inclusionary turn. In contexts of egregious social and economic inequalities, routinized democratic contestation made elected governments of diverse partisan and ideological makeups responsive to popular constituencies in ways that were conducive to inclusionary policies, whether or not governing parties provided institutionalized access to organized popular sectors, or counted them among their core constituencies. Indeed, some of the most prevalent inclusionary policies were *not* aimed at the organized poor, in contrast to the classic inclusionary policies of the labor-incorporating period. They were, instead, targeted at the unorganized poor who were outsiders to traditional welfare states. Programs like CCTs and noncontributory pensions provided parcelized benefits to individual citizens or family units, not to social aggregates, and

they did not require their recipients to organize, engage in collective action, or gain access by means of group-based partisan mediation. Eligibility was, instead, determined by technocratic means, conditional on means-tested economic hardships and, for most CCTs, commitments to send children to school and receive medical checkups.

In contrast to social programs during the labor incorporation period, such inclusionary policies were not necessarily a response to social mobilization from below, and they did not provide incentives from above for subaltern groups to organize in order to gain access to social benefits or leverage in political bargaining arenas. They were, then, a politically “easy” form of redistribution not only because of their very modest fiscal burden, their broad base of support, and their limited distortionary effects on labor markets (Holland and Ross Schneider 2017), but also because they were nonthreatening to elite interests and non-polarizing ideologically. They did not engender second-order feedback effects that organized, mobilized, or empowered recipients and stakeholders to push for deeper and more radical redistributive measures. Neither did they generate binding and durable organizational linkages between citizens and the parties that adopted them, even where they provided cyclical electoral payoffs. They had, instead, a self-limiting quality that prevented them from serving as the first step in a sequential or cumulative process of reform leading to the “harder” stage of redistribution (Holland and Ross Schneider 2017); as such, they did not generate higher quality and effectively universalistic public services, or genuinely progressive systems of taxation, which the new inclusion did little to advance.

Indeed, broader patterns of organizational fragmentation and diffuseness arguably contributed to many of the other limits to the inclusionary process identified in this volume and other works. This could be seen, for example, in the difficulty of “scaling up” participatory practices from local to regional and national territorial units, as discussed by Goldfrank (this volume). Similarly, as seen in the chapter by Mayka and Rich, participatory practices were common in social policy spheres, but the mainsprings of economic policymaking remained far more insulated from popular input; rarely did popular constituencies develop the organizational density and mobilizational capacity required to challenge technocratic mandates and elite economic interests in the latter policy sphere. Organizational diffuseness also helped account for the patterns of “inclusion without representation” analyzed in the work of Htun (2016), whereby institutional reforms like quotas and reserved seats provided women and racial and ethnic minorities with greater presence in

governing institutions, but not necessarily more leverage or accountability in shaping public policies. In short, the spread of internationally-sanctioned norms and institutional innovations did not necessarily translate into effective inclusionary policies in the absence of sustained and organized social pressure.

Furthermore, while Latin America's decade-long (2003–2013) commodity boom provided newfound fiscal space and revenues for a range of social programs, it also deepened the region's dependence on extractive industries that routinely clashed with institutional innovations designed to provide local communities, especially indigenous communities, with rights to prior consultation and control over the use of land, water, and natural resources. The resulting conflicts of interest often drove a wedge between different popular constituencies, some of which benefited from extractive activities that provided employment or resources for social programs, but others which bore the brunt of their environmental and community effects. Consequently, although indigenous and other popular movements in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia had united at the turn of the century against a model of neoliberal extractivism that generated few positive social externalities, they often splintered once new leftist governments adopted more statist versions of extractivism that taxed and diverted commodity rents into a range of developmentalist projects.

These fractures and more generalized patterns of organizational diffuseness help to account for some of the troubling gaps between parchment rights and inclusionary practices identified by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar. Formal rights to social goods, prior consultation, and participation in decision-making arenas are not always recognized or practiced, in part because citizens – especially those of lower social status – are too poorly organized to exercise or claim them. Much less are they consistently organized to overcome the political resistance of privileged groups who are better-endowed or strategically-positioned to leverage democratic institutions. Organizational diffuseness reinforces the tendency to rely on charismatic forms of populist leadership to weld together disparate social strands. And it is the primary reason why Latin America's inclusionary turn is unlikely to spawn institutional legacies in either civic or partisan arenas as powerful and enduring as those that inspired Collier and Collier's (1991) classic study of labor incorporation. Although the inclusionary turn in Bolivia entailed massive levels of partisan and civic mobilization, organization building was more shallow or tenuous elsewhere in the region; party systems became more programmatically aligned with the revival of populist and leftist alternatives, but rarely were

they reconstituted through a groundswell of popular mobilization in a manner reminiscent of the mid-twentieth century labor-incorporating process. As such, the new inclusion has surely left its mark on the region's policy landscape going forward, but its institutional legacies remain uncertain.

## CONCLUSION

Latin America's inclusionary turn broadened welfare states and pluralized civil society, extending the social safety net and opening new channels for civic and political participation by previously excluded sectors of society. In the favorable domestic and international context of the early twenty-first century – a period when inclusionary reforms were facilitated by sympathetic international institutions, windfall commodity rents, and supportive leftist governments – social inclusion could advance despite the organizational diffuseness of many core supporters and beneficiaries. The shifting political winds of the second decade of the century, however, are clearly testing the organizational debilities of the new inclusion in more formidable ways. Sustaining the multiple forms of inclusion analyzed in this volume, much less advancing toward the “harder” stage of redistribution identified by Holland and Ross Schneider (2017), was never going to be an easy task; doing so in a context of conservative political ascendance (as in Brazil and Chile), tightening international financial constraints, and an increasingly illiberal global political environment merely compounds the level of uncertainty. A key lesson learned from Collier and Collier (1991) is that processes of mass incorporation in contexts of egregious inequalities are always politically contingent, and hardly linear in nature. Readers attuned to that lesson recognize that the jury is still out on the political trajectory and the institutional and policy legacies of Latin America's new inclusionary turn.

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