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# Party Systems and Voter Alignments:

## Cross-National Perspectives

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
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**THE FREE PRESS, *New York***

**COLLIER-MACMILLAN LIMITED, *London***

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*First Printing*



*To the memories of our fathers:  
defenders of the periphery*

**S.M.L.**

**S.R.**



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# Party Systems and Voter Alignments





# Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction

Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan

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## INITIAL FORMULATIONS

### *Questions for Comparative Analysis*

The analyses brought together in this collection bear on a series of central questions in the comparative sociology of politics.

The first set of questions concerns *the genesis of the system of contrasts and cleavages* within the national community: Which conflicts came first and which later? Which ones proved temporary and secondary? Which proved obdurate and pervasive? Which cut across each other and produced overlaps between allies and enemies, and which reinforced each other and tended to polarize the national citizenry?

A second group of questions focuses on *the conditions for the development of a stable system of cleavage and oppositions* in national political life: Why did some early conflicts establish party oppositions and others not? Which of the many conflicting interests and outlooks in the national community produced direct opposition between competing parties, and which of them could be aggregated *within* the broad party fronts? Which conditions favored extensive aggregations of oppositional groups, and which offered greater incentive to fragmented articulation of single interests or narrowly defined causes? To what extent were these developments affected by changes in the legal and the administrative conditions of political activity, through the extension of the rights of participation, through the introduction of secret voting and the development of strict controls of electoral-corruption, and through the retention of plurality

decisions or the introduction of some variety of Proportional Representation?

A third and final set of questions bears on *the behavior of the mass of rank-and-file citizens* within the resultant party systems: How quickly were the parties able to recruit support among the new masses of enfranchized citizens, and what were the core characteristics of the groups of voters mobilized by each party? Which conditions helped and which conditions hindered the mobilization efforts of each party within the different groups of the mass citizenry? How quickly did the changes in economic, social, and cultural conditions brought about through economic growth or stagnation translate themselves into changes in the strengths and the strategies of the parties? How did political success affect the rates of mobilization and the inflow of new support to each party? Did the parties tend to recruit new clienteles and change their followings as they established their viability as useful channels of influence in the decision-making processes?

These are some of the questions we hope to throw light on in this volume. We have assembled analyses of data on the economic, the social, and the cultural conditions of party oppositions and voter reactions in twelve currently competitive and one erstwhile competitive political systems and have added, for purposes of contrast and perspective, a chapter on cleavage structures in a group of new states. Ten of the twelve competitive systems are Western: five English-speaking, three continental European, and two Nordic polities. The "erstwhile competitive" but currently authoritarian system covered is Spain. The two cases outside the West are Brazil and Japan. The final chapter, by Immanuel Wallerstein, covers developments in West Africa in the wake of the movements of liberation and independence.

All these analyses have an important *historical* dimension. Most of them focus on data for elections in the fifties, but they all in one way or another confront us with tasks of *developmental comparison*: to understand the current alignments of voters behind each of the parties, we have to map variations in the *sequences of alternatives* set for the active and the passive citizens within each system since the emergence of competitive politics. Parties do not simply present themselves *de novo* to the citizen at each election; they each have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate. In single-nation studies we need not always take this history into account in analyzing current alignments: we assume that the parties are equally visible "givens" to all the citizens within the nation. But as soon as we move into comparative analysis we have to add an historical dimension. We simply cannot make sense of variations in current alignments without detailed data on differences in the sequences of party formation and in the character of the alternatives presented to the electorates before and after the extension of the suffrage.<sup>1</sup> We have to carry out our comparative analyses in several steps: we first have to consider the initial developments toward competitive politics and the institutionalization of mass elections, we next must disentangle the constellation of cleavages and oppositions which produced the national system of mass organizations for electoral action, and then, and only then, can we make headway toward some understanding of the forces producing the current alignments of voters behind the historically given alternatives. In our Western democracies the voters are only rarely called upon to express their stands on single issues. They are typically faced with choices among historically given "packages" of programs, commitments, outlooks, and,

sometimes, *Weltanschauungen*, and their current behavior cannot be understood without some knowledge of the sequences of events and the combinations of forces that produced these "packages." Our task is to develop realistic models to explain the formation of different systems of such "packages" under different conditions of national politics and socioeconomic development and to fit information on these variations in the character of the alternatives into our schemes for the analysis of current electoral behavior. This is why we have given this volume a double title. We hope to throw light on the origins and the "freezing" of different types of *party systems*, and we seek to assemble materials for comparative analyses of the *current alignments of voters* behind the historically given "packages" in the different systems.

In this introductory statement we shall limit ourselves to a few salient points of comparison. A full comparative treatment of the party systems and the voter alignments of the West, not to speak of the competitive systems in other regions of the world, must await the completion of a number of detailed sociological analyses of national political developments.<sup>2</sup> We shall first discuss a typology of possible cleavage bases within national political communities; we shall then move on to a consideration of the actual party systems in Western politics, and we shall finally point to differences between party systems in the voters' characteristic alignments behind the alternatives among which they are asked to choose. In this final section we shall give attention to alignments by such obvious sociocultural criteria as *region*, *class*, and *religious denomination*, but also to alignments by strictly political criteria of membership in "we" versus "they" groups. We shall consider the possibility that the *parties themselves* might establish themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their own alignments independently of the geographical, the social, and the cultural underpinnings of the movements.

### *The Political Party: Agent of Conflict and Instrument of Integration*

"Party" has throughout the history of Western government stood for division, conflict, opposition within a body politic.<sup>3</sup> "Party" is etymologically derived from "part" and since it first appeared in political discourse in the late Middle Ages has always retained this reference to one set of elements in competition or in controversy with another set of elements within some unified whole.<sup>4</sup>

It will be objected that since the twentieth century has given us an abundance of monolithic parties, totalitarian parties, and "one-party systems" these suggest another sense of the term, a divergent usage. This represents an old ambiguity in the use of the term. In his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Max Weber discussed the use of the term "party" in descriptions of medieval Italian city politics and asserted that the Florentine Guelfs "ceased to be a party" in the sociological sense once they had been incorporated as part of the governing bureaucracy of the city.<sup>5</sup> Weber explicitly refused to accept any equivalence between "party" as used in descriptions of competitive voluntary politics and "party" as used of monolithic systems. The distinction is of obvious analytical importance, but there is still a latent unity of usage. The totalitarian party does not function through *freie Werbung*—through free competition in the political market—but it is still a *part* of a much larger whole and it is still in *opposition* to other forces within that whole. The typical totalitarian party is

composed of the active, mobilizing part of the national system: it does not compete with other parties for offices and favors, but it still seeks to mobilize the populace *against* something—against conspiratorial counterforces within the national community or against the threatening pressures from foreign enemies. Totalitarian elections may not make much sense from a Western perspective, but they nevertheless serve important legitimizing functions: they are “rituals of confirmation” in a continuous campaign against the “hidden” opposition, the illegitimate opponents of the established regime.

Whatever the structure of the polity, parties have served as essential agencies of mobilization and as such have helped to integrate local communities into the nation or the broader federation. This was true of the earliest competitive party systems, and it is eminently true of the single-party nations of the post-colonial era. In his insightful analysis of the formation of the American party system, William Chambers has assembled a wide range of indications of the integrative role of the first national parties, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans: they were the first genuinely national organizations; they represented the first successful efforts to pull Americans out of their local community and their state and to give them roles in the national polity.<sup>6</sup> Analyses of parties in the new nations of the twentieth century arrive at similar conclusions. Ruth Schachter has shown how the African single-party organizations have been used by the political leaders to “awaken a wider national sense of community” and to create ties of communication and cooperation across territorial and ethnic populations.<sup>7</sup>

In competitive party systems this process of integration can be analyzed at two levels: on the one hand, each party establishes a network of cross-local communication channels and in that way helps to strengthen national identities; on the other, its very competitiveness helps to set the national system of government *above* any particular set of officeholders. This cuts both ways: the citizens are encouraged to distinguish between their loyalty to the total political system and their attitudes to the sets of competing politicians, and the contenders for power will, at least if they have some chance of gaining office, have some interest in maintaining this attachment of all citizens to the polity and its rules of alternation. In a monolithic polity citizens are not encouraged to distinguish between the system and current officeholders. The citizenry tends to identify the polity with the policies of particular leaders, and the power-holders habitually exploit the established national loyalties to rally support for themselves. In such societies any attack on the political leaders or on the dominant party tends to turn into an attack on the political system itself. Quarrels over particular policies or particular incumbencies immediately raise fundamental issues of system survival. In a competitive party system opponents of the current governing team may well be accused of weakening the state or betraying the traditions of the nation, but the continued existence of the political system is not in jeopardy. A competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed toward the current set of power-holders.<sup>8</sup>

Sociologists such as E. A. Ross<sup>9</sup> and Georg Simmel<sup>10</sup> have analyzed the integrative role of institutionalized conflicts within political systems. The establishment of regular channels for the expression of conflicting interests has

helped to stabilize the structure of a great number of nation-states. The effective equalization of the status of different denominations has helped to take much of the brunt off the earlier conflicts over religious issues. The extension of the suffrage and the enforcement of the freedom of political expression also helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the nation-state. The opening up of channels for the expression of manifest or latent conflicts between the established and the underprivileged classes may have brought many systems out of equilibrium in the earlier phase but tended to strengthen the body politic over time.

This conflict-integration dialectic is of central concern in current research on the comparative sociology of political parties. In this volume the emphasis will be on *conflicts and their translation into party systems*. This does not mean that we shall neglect the integrative functions of parties. We have simply chosen to start out from the latent or manifest strains and cleavages and will deal with trends toward compromise and reconciliation against the background of the initial conflicts. Our concern in this introductory discussion as well as in the chapters on particular systems is with parties as *alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body politic*. For the sociologist, parties exert a double fascination. They help to crystallize and make explicit the conflicting interests, the latent strains and contrasts in the existing social structure, and they force subjects and citizens to ally themselves across structural cleavage lines and to set up priorities among their commitments to established or prospective roles in the system. Parties have an *expressive* function; they develop a rhetoric for the translation of contrasts in the social and the cultural structure into demands and pressures for action or inaction. But they also have *instrumental* and *representative* functions: they force the spokesmen for the many contrasting interests and outlooks to strike bargains, to stagger demands, and to aggregate pressures. Small parties may content themselves with expressive functions, but no party can hope to gain decisive influence on the affairs of a community without some willingness to cut across existing cleavages to establish common fronts with potential enemies and opponents. This was true at the early stage of embryonic party formations around cliques and clubs of *notables* and legislators, but the need for such broad alliances became even more pronounced with the extension of the rights of participation to new strata of the citizenry.

No one has given us a more concise literary analysis of this process of aggregation during the early phase of mass mobilization than H. G. Wells in *The New Machiavelli*.<sup>11</sup>

. . . multitudinousness had always been the Liberal characteristic. Liberalism never has been nor even can be anything but a diversified crowd. Essentially it is the party of criticism, the "Anti" party. It is a system of hostilities and objections that somehow achieves at times an elusive common soul. It is a gathering together of all the smaller interests which find themselves at a disadvantage against the big established classes, the leasehold tenant as against the landowner, the retail tradesman as against the merchant and money-lender, the Non-conformist as against the Churchman, the smaller employer as against the demoralising hospitable publican, the man without introductions and broad connections against the man who has these things. . . . It has no more essential reason for lov-

ing the Collectivist state than the Conservatives; the smaller dealer is doomed to absorption in that just as much as the large one; but it resorts to the state against its antagonists as in the middle ages common men pitted themselves against the barons by siding with the king. The Liberal Party is the party against "class privilege" because it represents no class advantages, but it is also the party that is on the whole most set against Collective control because it represents no established responsibility. It is constructive only as far as its antagonism to the great owner is more powerful than its jealousy of the state. It organizes only because organization is forced upon it by the organization of its adversaries. It lapses in and out of alliance with Labour as it sways between hostility to wealth and hostility to public expenditure. . . .

Similar, if less vivid, descriptions could be given of most of the parties aspiring to majority positions in the West: they are conglomerates of groups differing on wide ranges of issues, but still united in their greater hostility to their competitors in the other camps. Conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these tend to polarize the politics of any given system. There is a *hierarchy of cleavage bases* in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among polities, but also tend to undergo changes over time. Such differences and changes in the political weight of sociocultural cleavages set fundamental problems for comparative research: When is region, language, or ethnicity most likely to prove polarizing? When will class take the primacy and when will denominational commitments and religious identities prove equally important cleavage bases? Which sets of circumstances are most likely to favor accommodations of such oppositions *within* parties and in which circumstances are they more apt to constitute issues *between* the parties? Which types of alliances tend to maximize the strain on the polity and which ones help to integrate it? Questions such as these will be on the agenda of comparative political sociology for years to come. There is no dearth of hypotheses, but so far very little in the way of systematic analysis across several systems. It has often been suggested that systems will come under much heavier strain if the main lines of cleavage are over morals and the nature of human destiny than if they concern such mundane and negotiable matters as the prices of commodities, the rights of debtors and creditors, wages and profits, and the ownership of property. However, this does not take us very far; what we want to know is when the one type of cleavage will prove more salient than the other, what kind of alliances they have produced and what consequences these constellations of forces have had for consensus-building within the nation-state. We do not pretend to find clear-cut answers, but we have tried to move the analysis one step further. We shall start out with a review of a variety of *logically possible* sources of strains and oppositions in social structures and shall then proceed to an inventory of the *empirically extant examples of political expressions of each set of conflicts*. We have not tried to present a comprehensive scheme of analysis in this context but would like to point to one possible line of approach.

### *Dimensions of Cleavage: A Possible Model*


The much-debated fourfold schema devised by Talcott Parsons for the

classification of the functions of a social system offers a convenient point of departure for an inventory of potential cleavage bases.

The four-function scheme was originally developed in *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*<sup>12</sup> and was derived from a cross-classification of four basic dilemmas of orientation in the roles taken by actors in social systems:

<i>Categorization of situational objects</i>	<i>Attitudes to objects</i>	<i>Corresponding functions for the system</i>
I. Universalism vs. Particularism	III. Specificity vs. Diffuseness	Adaptation  Integration
II. Performance vs. Quality	IV. Affectivity vs. Neutrality	Goal attainment  Latency: pattern maintenance and tension release

This abstract schema came to serve as a basic paradigm in a series of successive attempts<sup>13</sup> to map the flows and the media of interchange among the actors and the collectivities within social systems or within total territorial societies. The paradigm posited four "functional subsystems" of every society and six lines of interchange between each pair:



**Figure 1—The Parsonian Paradigm of Societal Interchanges.**

Jean Stengers, "Belgium," in Rogger and Weber (eds.), *The European Right, op. cit.*, pp. 128-67.

71. Herbert Luethy, "Has Switzerland a Future? The Dilemma of a Small Nation," *Encounter*, 19 (Dec., 1962), p. 25.

72. For sociological analyses of the system of cleavages in Spanish society after 1815 see Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1943; 2d ed., 1950; paperback, 1960); Carlos A. Rama, *La crise espagnole au XXe siècle* (Paris: Fischbacher, 1962); Juan Linz, *op. cit.*, and "Spain: an Authoritarian Regime" in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, op. cit.*, pp. 290-341. See also the analysis of the elections of 1931, 1933, and 1936 in J. Becarud, *La Deuxième République Espagnole* (Paris: Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales, 1962), mimeo.

73. On the function of the *cacique* as the controller or rural support in the initial phase of mass mobilization, see Brenan, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-8; Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1908-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), pp. 366-79; and the classic analyses in Joaquín Costa (ed.), *Oligarquía y caciquismo como el forma actual de gobierno en España* (Madrid: Hernández, 1902).

74. See Mattei Dogan, "La stratificazione sociale dei suffragi," pp. 407-74, in A. Spreafico and J. LaPalombara (eds.), *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia* (Milan: Ed. di Comunita, 1963), and his chapter in the present volume.

75. See R. A. Webster, *The Cross and the Fasces* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960).

76. On the origin of particularist movements in Germany see especially W. Conze (ed.), *Staat und Gesellschaft im deutschen Vormärz 1815-1848* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1962).

77. The vivid expression coined by Jean-François Gravier in *Paris et le désert français* (2d ed.; Paris: Flammarion, 1958).

78. Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Growth in France and Britain 1851-1950* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), p. 255.

79. For details see S. Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation," *op. cit.*

80. For a detailed evaluation of the comparative statistics of agricultural holdings see F. Dovring, *Land and Labour in Europe 1900-1950* (2d ed.; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), Chap. 3 and appendices. The standard source on nineteenth-century statistics of landholdings in Britain is J. Bateman, *The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland* (London: 1883); see F. M. L. Thompson, *English Landed Society, op. cit.*, Chap. V. On *latifundia* and *minimifundia* in Spain see G. Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth, op. cit.*, Chap. 6.

81. Recent advances in the techniques of electoral analysis make it possible to test such statements about the weight of the different cleavage dimensions in conditioning the alignments of voters. For data from *sample surveys* the development of "tree analysis" procedures opens up interesting possibilities of comparison. A "tree analysis" of data for the *Bundesrepublik* for 1957, 1961, and 1965 gives interesting evidence of the interaction of two major cleavage dimensions in that setting:

Owner-worker cleavage: status of head of household	Church-state commitment of respondent	Percent voting SPD in total electorate		
		1957	1961	1965
Worker, unionized	None	56	61	64
Worker, not unionized	None	37	41	43
Worker, middle-class aspirations	—	18	28	28
Worker, unionized	Committed Catholic	14	24	33
Worker, not unionized	Committed Catholic	15	10	15
Middle class, of working-class origins	—	27	24	41
Salaried, civil servants, unionized	—	25	39	52
Middle class	Committed Catholic	6	5	9

Source: K. Liepelt, "Wählerbewegungen in der Bundesrepublik," Paper, Arbeitstagung 21, July 1966, Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung, Bad Godesberg.



For periods before the advent of the sample survey similar analyses can be produced through ecological regression analysis. So far very few statistically sophisticated analyses have been carried out for European electoral time series before the 1950's: an exception is K. Cox, *Regional Anomalies in the Voting Behavior of the Population of England and Wales, op. cit.*; this includes a factor analysis of the rural vote in Wales from 1861 to 1921. For an illuminating example of a possible procedure, see the analysis of the French rural cantons by Mattei Dogan, "Les contextes politiques in France," Paper, Symposium on Quantitative Ecological Analysis, Evian, Sept. 1966. His Tables 11 and 13 give these correlation coefficients for the electoral strengths of the two left parties in 1956:

	PCF				SFIO			
	Rural France	West	Center	North	Rural France	West	Center	North
Percent industrial workers:								
—direct correlation	.28	.26	.16	.55	.33	.19	.05	.03
—partial correlation	.25	.12	.08	.39	.01	.09	.03	.19
Percent attending mass								
—direct correlation	-.60	-.62	-.48	-.67	-.21	-.39	-.10	.30
—partial correlation	-.59	-.59	-.47	-.58	-.21	-.36	-.09	.35
Multiple correlation	.64	.62	.49	.73	.21	.40	.10	.35

Within rural France the traditions of anticlericalism clearly count heavier than class in the generation of votes for the Left. If the Parisian suburbs and the other urban areas had been included in the analysis class they would obviously have weighed much heavier in the equation; see Dogan's chapter in the present volume. To test the implications of our model, analyses along the lines suggested by Cox and Dogan ought to be carried out for the elections just before and just after the extensions of the suffrage in a number of different countries; see the contrasted maps for 1849 and 1936 in Georges Dupeux, *Le Front Populaire et les élections de 1936* (Paris: Colin, 1959), pp. 169-70 and discussion pp. 157-71.

82. For an insightful analysis of the conditions for the development of these three Lager see A. Wandruszka, "Österreichs politische Struktur" in H. Benedikt (Hg.) *Geschichte der Republik Österreich* (Vienna: Verl. für Geschichte und Politik, 1952), pp. 298-485, 618-21.

83. See K. Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (3d ed.; Villingen: Ring, 1960), Chaps. III-IV., and E. Matthias and R. Morsey (Hg.) *Das Ende der Parteien 1933* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1960), pp. 154-58, 655-739.

84. Val R. Lorwin, "Working Class Politics and Economic Development in Western Europe," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 63 (1958), pp. 338-51.

85. This was a major point in the classic article by the elder Edvard Bull in "Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in den drei skandinavischen Ländern," *Arch. f. Geschichte des Sozialismus*, 10 (1922), pp. 329-61.

86. This has been brought out in an important paper by Ulf Torgersen, *Landsmøtet i norsk partistruktur 1884-1940* (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1966), mimeo, pp. 39-46, 73-98.

87. For an account of the period from 1924 to 1935 see I. Roset, *Det Norske Arbeiderparti og Hornsruds regjeringsdannelse i 1928* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), and the summary in S. Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism" in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 81-84.

88. See especially John H. Hodgson, *Communism in Finland* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966).

89. On Icelandic parties see Mary S. Olmsted, "Communism in Iceland," *Foreign Affairs*, 36 (1958), pp. 340-7, and Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Iceland: Reluctant Ally* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), Chap. I.

90. A book such as Samuel J. Eldersveld's *Political Parties: a Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), suggests important themes for new research, but its utility for comparative analysis is severely limited by its overconcentration on perhaps the most atypical of all existing party organizations, the American.

Three of these sets of interchanges are of crucial concern to the political sociologist:

He wants to know how the solidary collectivities, the latent communalities of interests and prospects, and the manifest associations and movements within a given territorial society limit the alternatives and influence the decisions of governmental leaders and their executive agencies—these are all processes of interchange between the *I* and *G* subsystems.<sup>14</sup>

He wants to know how ready or how reluctant individual subjects and households in the society are to be mobilized for action by the different associations and movements and how they make up their minds in cases of competition and conflict between different mobilizing agencies—these are all questions about interchanges between the *L* and *I* subsystems.

He is concerned finally to find out about regularities in the behavior of individual subjects and households in their direct interchanges (*L* to *G*, *G* to *L*) with the territorial agencies of government, be it as observers of legal regulations, as taxpayers and conscripted manpower, or as voters in institutionalized elections and consultations.

However, our task in this volume is narrower. We do not intend to deal with *all* the interchanges between *I* and *G*, between *I* and *L*, or between *L* and *G*. We are only concerned with the *I-G* interchanges insofar as they press forward the development of *systems of competing parties*. We are only interested in the *I-L* interchanges insofar as they help to establish *distinct links of membership, identification, and readiness for mobilization* between given parties and given categories of subjects and households. And we are not interested in *all* the *L-G* interchanges, but only in the ones that find expression in *elections* and in arrangements for *formal representation*.

In terms of the Parsonian paradigm our tasks are in fact fourfold:

1. We first have to examine the *internal structure* of the *I* quadrant in a range of territorial societies: What cleavages had manifested themselves in the national community in the early phases of consolidation, and what cleavages emerged in the subsequent phases of centralization and economic growth? Questions of this type will be dealt with in the next section.

2. Our next job is to compare *sequences of I-G interchanges* to trace regularities in the processes of *party formation*. How did the inherited cleavages find political expression, and how did the territorial organization of the nation-state, the division of powers between governors and representatives, and the broadening of the rights of participation and consultation affect the development of alliances and oppositions among political tendencies and movements and eventually produce a distinctive party system? Questions along these lines will occupy us in the two succeeding sections.

3. Our third job is to study the consequences of these developments for the *I-L interchanges*. Which identities, which solidarities, which communalities of experience and fate could be reinforced and made use of by the emerging parties and which ones had to be softened or ignored? Where in the social structure did the parties find it easiest to mobilize stable support, and where did they meet the most impenetrable barriers of suspicion and rejection? We shall touch on these questions in the final section but must refer for details to the chapters on particular national party systems.

4. And our final task is to bring all these diverse data to bear on the analysis of the *L-G interchanges* in the operation of *elections and the recruitment of representatives*. How far do electoral distributions reflect structural cleavages in the given society; how is electoral behavior affected by the narrowing of alternatives brought about by the party system; and how far are the efforts of indoctrination and mobilization hampered through the development of a politically neutral electoral machinery, the formalizing and the standardization of procedures, and the introduction of secret voting?<sup>15</sup>

Underlying this interpretation of the Parsonian scheme is a simple three-phase model of the process of nation-building:

In the first phase the thrusts of penetration and standardization from the national center increase territorial resistances and raise issues of cultural identity. Robert E. Lee's "am I a Virginian or an American?" is a typical expression of the *G-L* strains generated through the processes of nation-building.

In the second phase these local oppositions to centralization produce a *variety of alliances* across the communities of the nation: the commonalities of family fates in the *L* quadrangle generate associations and organizations in the *I* quadrangle. In some cases these alliances will pit one part of the national territory against another. This is typically the case in countries where a number of counterestablishment loyalties converge: ethnicity, religion, and class in Ireland under the raj, language and class in Belgium, Finland, Spain, and Canada. In other cases the alliances will tend to spread throughout the nation and pit opponents against each other in all localities.

In the third phase the alliances in the *I* quadrangle will enter the *G* quadrangle and gain some measure of control, not only over the use of central national resources (*G-A* interchanges) but also over the channeling of the flows of legitimation from *L* to *G*. This may find expression in franchise reforms, in changes in the procedures of registration and polling, in new rules of electoral aggregation, and in extensions of the domains of legislative intervention.


This model can be developed in several directions. We have chosen to focus initial attention on the possible differentiations within the *I* quadrangle—the locus for the formation of parties and party constellations in mass democracies.

## DIMENSIONS OF CLEAVAGE AND ALLIANCE

### *Two Dimensions of Cleavage: The Territorial-Cultural and the Functional*

Talcott Parsons has so far given surprisingly little attention to the possibilities of internal differentiation within the *I* quadrant. Among his collaborators, Smelser has devoted much ingenuity to the development of an abstract schema for the explanation of collective reactions and movements,<sup>16</sup> but this elaborate level-by-level procedure of analysis bears essentially on the emergence of single manifestations and offers no direct clues to the classification and comparison of *systems* of social movements and political parties within historically

given societies. We cannot hope to fill this lacuna in the theoretical literature but feel tempted to suggest one line of conceptual development from the basic *A-G-I-L* paradigm. Our suggestion is that the crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within the two-dimensional space generated by the two diagonals of the double dichotomy:



**Figure 2—A Possible Interpretation of the Internal Structure of the I Quadrant.**

In this model the Parsonian dichotomies have been transformed into continuous coordinates: the *l-g* line represents a *territorial* dimension of the national cleavage structure and the *a-i* line a *functional* dimension.<sup>17</sup>

At the *l* end of the territorial axis we would find strictly local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and “rationalizing” machinery of the nation-state. At the *g* end of the axis we would find conflicts not between territorial units *within* the system but over the control, the organization, the goals, and the policy options of the system *as a whole*. These might be nothing more than direct struggles among competing elites for central power, but they might also reflect deeper differences in conceptions of nationhood, over domestic priorities and over external strategies.

Conflicts along the *a-i* axis *cut across* the territorial units of the nation. They produce alliances of similarly situated or similarly oriented subjects and households over wide ranges of localities and tend to undermine the inherited solidarity of the established territorial communities. At the *a* end of this dimension we would find the typical conflict over short-term or long-term allocations of resources, products, and benefits in the economy: conflicts be-

tween producers and buyers, between workers and employers, between borrowers and lenders, between tenants and owners, between contributors and beneficiaries. At this end the alignments are specific and the conflicts tend to be solved through rational bargaining and the establishment of universalistic rules of allocation. The farther we move toward the *i* end of the axis, the more diffuse the criteria of alignment, the more intensive the identification with the "we" group, and the more uncompromising the rejection of the "they" group. At the *i* end of the dimension we find the typical "friend-foe" oppositions of tight-knit religious or ideological movements to the surrounding community. The conflict is no longer over specific gains or losses but over conceptions of moral right and over the interpretation of history and human destiny; membership is no longer a matter of multiple affiliation in many directions, but a diffuse "24-hour" commitment incompatible with other ties within the community; and communication is no longer kept flowing freely over the cleavage lines but restricted and regulated to protect the movement against impurities and the seeds of compromise.

Historically documented cleavages rarely fall at the poles of the two axes: a concrete conflict is rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively functional but will feed on strains in both directions. The model essentially serves as a *grid* in the comparative analysis of political systems: the task is to locate the alliances behind given parties at given times within this two-dimensional space. The axes are not easily quantifiable, and they may not satisfy any criteria of strict scalability; nevertheless, they seem heuristically useful in attempts such as ours at linking up empirical variations in political structures with current conceptualizations in sociological theory.

A few concrete illustrations of party developments may help to clarify the distinctions in our model.

In Britain, the first nation-state to recognize the legitimacy of party oppositions, the initial conflicts were essentially of the types we have located at the *l* end of the vertical axis. The heads of independent landed families in the counties opposed the powers and the decisions of the government and the administration in London. The opposition between the "Country party" of knights and squires and the "Court and Treasury party" of the Whig magnates and the "placemen" was primarily territorial. The animosities of the Tories were not necessarily directed against the predominance of London in the affairs of the nation, but they were certainly aroused by the high-handed manipulations of the influential officeholders in the administration and their powerful allies in the boroughs. The conflict was not over general policies but over patronage and places. The gentry did not get their share of the *quid pro quo* exchanges of local influence against governmental offices and never established a clear-cut common front against the central power-holders. "Toryism about 1750 was primarily the opposition of the local rulers to central authority and vanished wherever members of that class entered the orbit of Government."<sup>18</sup>

Such particularistic, kin-centered, "ins-outs" oppositions are common in the early phases of nation-building: the electoral clienteles are small, undifferentiated, and easily controlled, and the stakes to be gained or lost in public life tend to be personal and concrete rather than collective and general.

Purely territorial oppositions rarely survive extensions of the suffrage. Much will depend, of course, on the timing of the crucial steps in the building of the nation: territorial unification, the establishment of legitimate government and the monopolization of the agencies of violence, the takeoff toward industrialization and economic growth, the development of popular education, and the entry of the lower classes into organized politics. Early democratization will not necessarily generate clear-cut divisions on functional lines. The initial result of a widening of the suffrage will often be an accentuation of the contrasts between the countryside and the urban centers and between the orthodox-fundamentalist beliefs of the peasantry and the small-town citizens and the secularism fostered in the larger cities and the metropolis. In the United States, the cleavages were typically cultural and religious. The struggles between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists, the Jacksonians and the Whigs, the Democrats and the Republicans centered on contrasting conceptions of public morality and pitted Puritans and other Protestants against Deists, Freemasons, and immigrant Catholics and Jews.<sup>19</sup> The accelerating influx of lower-class immigrants into the metropolitan areas and the centers of industry accentuated the contrasts between the rural and the urban cultural environments and between the backward and the advanced states of the Union. Such cumulations of territorial and cultural cleavages in the early phases of democratization can be documented for country after country. In Norway, all freehold and most leasehold peasants were given the vote as early as in 1814, but took several decades to mobilize in opposition to the King's officials and the dominance of the cities in the national economy. The crucial cleavages brought out into the open in the seventies were essentially territorial and cultural: the provinces were pitted against the capital; the increasingly estate-conscious peasants defended their traditions and their culture against the standards forced on them by the bureaucracy and the urban bourgeoisie. Interestingly, the extension of the suffrage to the landless laborers in the countryside and the propertyless workers in the cities did not bring about an immediate polarization of the polity on class lines. Issues of language, religion, and morality kept up the territorial oppositions in the system and cut across issues between the poorer and the better-off strata of the population. There were significant variations, however, between localities and between religions: the initial "politics of cultural defense" survived the extension of the suffrage in the egalitarian communities of the South and the West, but lost to straight class politics in the economically backward, hierarchically organized communities of the North.<sup>20</sup> The developments in the South and West of Norway find interesting parallels in the "Celtic fringe" of Britain. In these areas, particularly in Wales, opposition to the territorial, cultural, and economic dominance of the English offered a basis for communitywide support for the Liberals and retarded the development of straight class politics, even in the coalfields.<sup>21</sup> The sudden upsurge of Socialist strength in the northern periphery of Norway parallels the spectacular victory of the Finnish working-class party at the first election under universal suffrage: the fishermen and the crofters of the Norwegian North backed a distinct lower-class party as soon as they got the vote, and so did the Finnish rural proletariat.<sup>22</sup> In terms of our abstract model the politics of the western

peripheries of Norway and Britain has its focus at the lower end of the *l-g* axis, whereas the politics of the backward districts of Finland and the Norwegian North represent alliance formations closer to *g* and at varying points of the *a-i* axis. In the one case the decisive criterion of alignment is *commitment to the locality and its dominant culture*: you vote with your community and its leaders irrespective of your economic position. In the other the criterion is *commitment to a class and its collective interests*: you vote with others in the same position as yourself whatever their localities, and you are willing to do so even if this brings you into opposition with members of your community. We rarely find one criterion of alignment completely dominant. There will be deviants from straight territorial voting just as often as from straight class voting. But we often find marked differences between regions in the *weight* of the one or the other criterion of alignment. Here ecological analyses of electoral records and census data for the early phases of mobilization may help us to map such variations in greater detail and to pinpoint factors strengthening the dominance of territorial politics and factors accelerating the process of class polarization.<sup>23</sup>

### *The Two Revolutions: The National and the Industrial*

Territorial oppositions set limits to the process of nation-building; pushed to their extreme they lead to war, secession, possibly even population transfers. Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory. They emerge with increasing interaction and communication across the localities and the regions, and they spread through a process of "social mobilization."<sup>24</sup> The growing nation-state developed a wide range of agencies of unification and standardization and gradually penetrated the bastions of "primordial" local culture.<sup>25</sup> So did the organizations of the Church, sometimes in close cooperation with the secular administrators, often in opposition to and competition with the officers of the state. And so did the many autonomous agencies of economic development and growth, the networks of traders and merchants, of bankers and financiers, of artisans and industrial entrepreneurs.


The early growth of the national bureaucracy tended to produce essentially territorial oppositions, but the subsequent widening of the scope of governmental activities and the acceleration of cross-local interactions gradually made for much more complex systems of alignments, some of them *between* localities, and others *across* and *within* localities.

The early waves of countermobilization often threatened the territorial unity of the nation, the federation, or the empire. The mobilization of the peasantry in Norway and in Sweden made it gradually impossible to keep up the union; the mobilization of the subject peoples of the Hapsburg territories broke up the empire; the mobilization of the Irish Catholics led to civil war and secession. The current strains of nation-building in the new states of Africa and Asia reflect similar conflicts between dominant and subject cultures; the recent histories of the Congo, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the Sudan can all be written in such terms. In some cases the early waves of mobilization may not have brought the territorial system to

the brink of disruption but left an intractable heritage of territorial-cultural conflict: the Catalan-Basque-Castilian oppositions in Spain, the conflict between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, and the English-French cleavages in Canada. The conditions for the softening or hardening of such cleavage lines in fully mobilized polities have been poorly studied. The multiple ethnic-religious cleavages of Switzerland and the language conflicts in Finland and Norway have proved much more manageable than the recently aggravated conflict between *Nederlands*-speakers and *francophones* in Belgium and between Quebec and the English-speaking provinces of Canada.

To account for such variations we clearly cannot proceed cleavage by cleavage but must analyze *constellations* of conflict lines within each polity.

To account for the variations in such constellations we have found it illuminating to distinguish *four critical lines of cleavage*:



**Figure 3—Suggested Locations of Four Critical Cleavages in the a-g-i-l Paradigm.**

Two of these cleavages are direct products of what we might call the *National Revolution*: the conflict between *the central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries (1 in Fig. 3): the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing *Nation-State* and the historically established corporate privileges of the *Church* (2).

Two of them are products of the *Industrial Revolution*: the conflict between the *landed interests* and the rising class of *industrial entrepreneurs* (3): the conflict between *owners and employers* on the one side and *tenants, laborers, and workers* on the other (4).

Much of the history of Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth century can be described in terms of the interaction between these two processes



of revolutionary change: the one triggered in France and the other originating in Britain. Both had consequences for the cleavage structure of each nation, but the French Revolution produced the deepest and the bitterest oppositions. The decisive battle came to stand between *the aspirations of the mobilizing nation-state and the corporate claims of the churches*. This was far more than a matter of economics. It is true that the status of church properties and the financing of religious activities were the subjects of violent controversy, but the fundamental issue was one of morals, of the control of community norms. This found reflection in fights over such matters as the solemnization of marriage and the granting of divorces, the organization of charities and the handling of deviants, the functions of medical versus religious officers, and the arrangements for funerals. However, the fundamental issue between Church and State focused on the *control of education*.

The Church, whether Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Reformed, had for centuries claimed the right to represent man's "spiritual estate" and to control the education of children in the right faith. In the Lutheran countries, steps were taken as early as in the seventeenth century to enforce elementary education in the vernacular for all children. The established national churches simply became agents of the state and had no reason to oppose such measures. In the religiously mixed countries and in purely Catholic ones, however, the ideas of the French Revolution proved highly divisive. The development of compulsory education under centralized secular control for all children of the nation came into direct conflict with the established rights of the religious *pouvoirs intermédiaires* and triggered waves of mass mobilization into nationwide parties of protest. To the radicals and liberals inspired by the French Revolution, the introduction of compulsory education was only one among several measures in a systematic effort to create direct links of influence and control between the nation-state and the individual citizen, but their attempt to penetrate directly to the children without consulting the parents and their spiritual authorities aroused widespread opposition and bitter fights.<sup>26</sup>

The parties of religious defense generated through this process grew into broad mass movements after the introduction of manhood suffrage and were able to claim the loyalties of remarkably high proportions of the churchgoers in the working class. These proportions increased even more, of course, as the franchise was extended to women on a par with men. Through a process very similar to the one to be described for the Socialist parties, these church movements tended to isolate their supporters from outside influence through the development of a wide variety of parallel organizations and agencies: they not only built up schools and youth movements of their own, but also developed confessionally distinct trade unions, sports clubs, leisure associations, publishing houses, magazines, newspapers, in one or two cases even radio and television stations.<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps the best example of institutionalized segmentation is found in the Netherlands; in fact, the Dutch word *Verzuiling* has recently become a standard term for tendencies to develop vertical networks (*zuilen*, columns or pillars) of associations and institutions to ensure maximum loyalty to each church and to protect the supporters from cross cutting communications and

pressures. Dutch society has for close to a century been divided into three distinct subcultures: the national-liberal-secular, frequently referred to as the *algemene*, the "general" sector; the orthodox Protestant column; and the Roman Catholic column.<sup>28</sup>

The orthodox Protestant column developed through a series of violent conflicts over doctrinal issues within the established National Church. The *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* came under heavy pressure in the decades after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic upheavals. With the spread of secularism and rationalism, the fundamentalists were increasingly pushed into a minority position, both within the Church and in the field of education. Originally, the orthodox protests against these developments restricted themselves to intellectual evangelical movements within the Establishment and to an isolationist walkout of pietistic lower-class elements in the separation (*Afscheiding*) of 1843. But from the 1860's onward, the movement achieved massive momentum under the organizational inspiration of Abraham Kuyper. This fundamentalist clergyman organized an Anti-School-Law League in 1872 and in 1879 succeeded in bringing together a variety of orthodox groups in a party explicitly directed against the ideas of the French Revolution, the *Anti-Revolutionary* party. This vigorous mass movement soon split up, however, over issues of doctrine and of cultural identification. Kuyper led his followers out of the Mother Church in 1886 and defended the rights of the *Kerkvolk*, the committed Calvinist Christians, to establish their own cultural community, free of any ties to the state and the nation. The very extremism of this anti-establishment posture produced several countermovements within the *Hervormde Kerk*. Important groups of orthodox Calvinists did *not* want to leave the Mother Church but wanted to reform it from within; they wanted a broad *Volkskerk* rather than an isolated *Kerkvolk*. The conflict between these two conceptions of the Christian community led to the breakup of the Anti-Revolutionary party in 1894 and the gradual formation of a second Calvinist party, the *Christian Historical Union*, formally consolidated in 1908. These two parties became the core organizations of the two wings of the orthodox Protestant front in Dutch society: the Anti-Revolutionaries deriving their essential strength from *Gereformeerden*, whether in separate dissenter churches or in *Hervormde* congregations controlled by clergymen of the same persuasion; the Christian Historicals deriving practically all their support from other orthodox segments *within* the Mother Church.

The Roman Catholic minority had at first found it to their advantage to work with the Liberal majority, but from the sixties onward took steps to form distinct political and social organizations. This was a slow process, however; the first federation of Catholic voters' associations was not formed until 1904 and a formally organized national party was not established until the twenties.<sup>29</sup>

Both the Protestant and the Catholic movements eventually developed large networks of associations and institutions for their members and were able to establish remarkably stable bases of support even within the working class. A nationwide survey carried out in 1956<sup>30</sup> tells a great deal about the importance of religious commitments for political choice in the Dutch system:

**Table 1—Denomination, Church Attendance, and Party Choice in the Netherlands: Survey Evidence for 1956**

Denomination: Attendance:	NONE	HERVORMD		GEREFORMEERD		ROMAN CATH.	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<i>Party</i>							
KPN (Communist)	7%	—	—	—	—	—	—
PvdA (Socialist)	75	22%	51%	2%	27%	3%	30%
VVD (Liberals)	11	7	18	—	—	—	9
Christian Historical	—	45	19	3	—	—	—
Anti-Revolutionary	—	17	6	90	63	—	6
Calvinist Extremist	—	5	3	1	5	—	—
KVP (Catholic)	1	—	—	—	—	94	52
Other	6	4	3	4	5	2	3
N = 100%	(218)	(134)	(236)	(101)	(22)	(329)	(33)

The segmentation is most complete within the active and intransigent minority movements: the *Gereformeerden*, the religiously active *Hervormden*, and the Catholics.

The passive members of the traditional National Church and the *onkerkelijken* tend to be aligned by class rather than by religious commitment: this was for long the only segment in which there was effective crosscutting of influences in the Dutch electorate.

In terms of our paradigm the orthodox Protestants and the Catholics form political fronts near the *i* pole of the cross-local axis. If all *three* of the subcultures had developed such strong barriers against each other, the system might conceivably have exploded, much in the way the Austrian polity did in 1934. The lower level of *Verzuiling* in the “national” sector and the greater possibilities of compromises and accommodation in a triangular system of oppositions may go far to explain the successful operation of corporate pluralism in the Dutch polity.

Analysts of the Dutch data on the three subcultures have tried to establish a variety of indicators of *changes over time* in the degree of insulation of each of the vertical segments: they use the term *Ontzuiling* for reductions in the distinctiveness of each segment and *Verzuiling* for increases.<sup>31</sup> In our paradigm these correspond to movements along the *a-i* axis: the more *ontzuild* a given opposition, the more crisscrossing of multiple memberships in the system and, in general, the less intolerance and distrust of citizens on the “other” side; the more *verzuild* the opposition, the fewer the crosspressures and the rarer the memberships across the cleavages. In a highly *ontzuild* system there is *low membership crystallization*; most of the participants tend to be tied to organizations and environments exposing them to *divergent* political pressures. By contrast in a highly *verzuild* system there is *high membership crystallization*; most of the participants tend to be exposed to messages and persuasive efforts in the *same* general direction in *all* their “24-hour-7-day” environments.<sup>32</sup>

This dimension cuts across the whole range of functional cleavages in our paradigm, whether economic, social, or religious. The symmetric representation of the four basic cleavage lines in Fig. 3 refers to *average tendencies* only and does not exclude wide variations in location along the *a-i* axis. Conflicts over the civic integration of recalcitrant regional cultures (1) or

religious organizations (2) need not always lead to *Verzuiling*. An analysis of the contrasts between Switzerland and the Netherlands would tell us a great deal about differences in the conditions for the development of pluralist insulation. Conflicts between primary producers and the urban-industrial interests have *normally* tended towards the *a* pole of the axis, but there are many examples of highly ideologized peasant oppositions to officials and burghers. Conflicts between workers and employers have always contained elements of economic bargaining, but there have also often been strong elements of cultural opposition and ideological insulation. Working-class parties in opposition and without power have tended to be more *verzuild*, more wrapped up in their own distinct mythology, more insulated against the rest of the society. By contrast the victorious Labor parties have tended to become *ontzuild*, domesticated, more open to influence from all segments within the national society.

Similar variations will occur at a wide range of points on the *territorial* axis of our schema. In our initial discussion of the *l* pole we gave examples of *cultural* and *religious* resistances to the domination of the central national elite, but such oppositions are not always *purely* territorial. The movements may be completely dominant in their provincial strongholds but may also find allies in the central areas and thus contribute to the development of *cross-local* and *cross-regional* fronts.

The opposition of the Old Left in Norway was essentially of this character. It was from the outset a movement of territorial protest against the dominance of the central elite of officials and patricians but gradually broadened into a mass movement of cultural opposition to the dominant urban strata. As the suffrage was extended and the mobilization efforts proceeded it was also able to entrench itself in the central cities and even gain control in some of them.<sup>33</sup> This very broadening of the movement made the Old Left increasingly vulnerable to fragmentation. One wing moved toward the *a* pole and set itself up as an *Agrarian* party (3 in Fig. 3); another wing moved toward the *i* pole and after a long history of strains within the mother party established itself as the *Christian People's Party* (1 in Fig. 3). The Scandinavian countries have seen the formation of several such moralist-evangelist parties opposed to the tolerant pragmatism of the Established Lutheran Church.<sup>34</sup> They differ from the Christian parties on the Continent: they have not opposed national education as such and have not built up extensive networks of functional organizations around their followers; they have been primarily concerned to defend the traditions of orthodox evangelism against the onslaught of urban secularism and to use the legislative and the executive machinery of the state to protect the young against the evils of modern life. In their rejection of the lukewarm latitudinarianism of the national Mother Church they resemble the nonconformists in Great Britain and the Anti-Revolutionaries in the Netherlands, but the contexts of their efforts have been very different. In the British case the religious activists could work *within* the Liberal Party (later, of course, also within Labour) and found it possible to advance their views without establishing a party of their own. In the Dutch case, the orthodox dissidents not only set up their own party but built up a strong column of vertical organizations around it.

The National Revolution forced ever-widening circles of the territorial

population to chose sides in conflicts over *values* and *cultural identities*. The Industrial Revolution also triggered a variety of cultural countermovements, but in the longer run tended to cut across the value communities within the nation and to force the enfranchised citizenry to choose sides in terms of their *economic interests*, their shares in the increased wealth generated through the spread of the new technologies and the widening markets.

In our *a-g-i-l* paradigm we have distinguished two types of such interest cleavages: cleavages between rural and urban interests (3) and cleavages between worker and employer interests (4).

The spectacular growth of world trade and industrial production generated increasing strains between the primary producers in the countryside and the merchants and the entrepreneurs in the towns and the cities. On the continent, the conflicting interests of the rural and the urban areas had been recognized since the Middle Ages in the separate representation of the estates: the nobility and, in exceptional cases, the freehold peasants spoke for the land, and the burghers spoke for the cities. The Industrial Revolution deepened these conflicts and in country after country produced distinct rural-urban alignments in the national legislatures. Often the old divisions between estates were simply carried over into the unified parliaments and found expression in oppositions between Conservative-Agrarian and Liberal-Radical parties. The conflicts between rural and urban interests had been much less marked in Great Britain than on the continent. The House of Commons was not an assembly of the burgher estate but a body of legislators representing the constituent localities of the realm, the counties and the boroughs.<sup>35</sup> Yet even there the Industrial Revolution produced deep and bitter cleavages between the landed interests and the urban; in England, if not in Wales and Scotland, the opposition between Conservatives and Liberals fed largely on these strains until the 1880's.<sup>36</sup>

There was a hard core of economic conflict in these oppositions, but what made them so deep and bitter was the struggle for the maintenance of acquired status and the recognition of achievement. In England, the landed elite ruled the country, and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs, many of them religiously at odds with the established church, for decades aligned themselves in opposition both to defend their economic interests and to assert their claims to status. It would be a misunderstanding, says the historian George Kitson Clark,<sup>37</sup> to think of agriculture "as an industry organized like any other industry—primarily for the purposes of efficient production. *It was . . . rather organized to ensure the survival intact of a caste.* The proprietors of the great estates were not just very rich men whose capital happened to be invested in land, they were rather the life tenants of very considerable positions which it was their duty to leave intact to their successors. In a way it was the estate that mattered and not the holder of the estate. . . ." The conflict between Conservatives and Liberals reflected an opposition between two value orientations: the recognition of status through *ascription and kin connections* versus the claims for status through *achievement and enterprise*.

These are typical strains in all transitional societies; they tend to be most intensive in the early phases of industrialization and to soften as the rising elite establishes itself in the community. In England, this process of reconciliation proceeded quite rapidly. In a society open to extensive mobility and

intermarriage, urban and industrial wealth could gradually be translated into full recognition within the traditional hierarchy of the landed families. More and more mergers took place between the agricultural and the business interests, and this consolidation of the national elite soon changed the character of the Conservative-Liberal conflict. As James Cornford has shown through his detailed ecological studies, the movement of the business owners into the countryside and the suburbs divorced them from their workers and brought them into close relations with the landed gentry. The result was a softening of the rural-urban conflict in the system and a rapidly increasing class polarization of the widened electorate.<sup>38</sup>

A similar *rapprochement* took place between the east Elbian agricultural interests and the western business bourgeoisie in Germany, but there, significantly, the bulk of the Liberals sided with the Conservatives and did not try to rally the working-class electorate on their side in the way the British party did during the period up to World War I. The result was a deepening of the chasm between burghers and workers and a variety of desperate attempts to bridge it through appeals to national and military values.<sup>39</sup>

In other countries of the European continent the rural-urban cleavage continued to assert itself in national politics far into the twentieth century, but the political expressions of the cleavage varied widely. Much depended on the concentrations of wealth and political control in the cities and on the ownership structure in the rural economy. In the Low Countries, France, Italy, and Spain, rural-urban cleavages rarely found direct expression in the development of party oppositions. Other cleavages, particularly between the state and the churches and between owners and tenants, had greater impact on the alignments of the electorates. By contrast, in the five Nordic countries the cities had traditionally dominated national political life, and the struggle for democracy and parliamentary rule was triggered off through a broad process of mobilization within the peasantry.<sup>40</sup> This was essentially an expression of protest against the central elite of officials and patricians (a cleavage on the *l-g* axis in our model), but there were also elements of economic opposition in the movement: the peasants felt exploited in their dealings with city folk and wanted to shift the tax burdens to the expanding urban economies. These economic cleavages became more and more pronounced as the primary-producing communities entered into the national money and market economy. The result was the formation of a broad front of interest organizations and cooperatives and the development of distinctive Agrarian parties. Even after the rise of the working-class parties to national dominance, these Agrarian parties did not find it possible to establish common fronts with the Conservative defenders of the business community. The cultural contrasts between the countryside and the cities were still strong, and the strict market controls favored by the Agrarians could not easily be reconciled with the philosophy of free competition espoused by many Conservatives.

The current conflicts over the prices of primary products between developed and underdeveloped countries can be seen as projections of these cleavages at the level of world economy. The Chinese Communists have for a long time seen the struggles of the emerging nations of Asia and Africa in these terms: as a fight of the peasantry against the city interests. As Lin

Piao put it in a recent policy statement: "The countryside, and the countryside alone, can offer the revolutionary bases from which the Revolution can go forward to final victory. . . . In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents the picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas."<sup>41</sup>

The conflict between landed and urban interests was centered in the *commodity* market. The peasants wanted to sell their wares at the best possible prices and to buy what they needed from the industrial and urban producers at low cost. Such conflicts did not invariably prove party-forming. They could be dealt with within broad party fronts or could be channeled through interest organizations into narrower arenas of functional representation and bargaining. Distinctly agrarian parties have only emerged where strong cultural oppositions have deepened and embittered the strictly economic conflicts.

Conflicts in the *labor* market proved much more uniformly divisive. Working-class parties emerged in every country of Europe in the wake of the early waves of industrialization. The rising masses of wage earners, whether in large-scale farming, in forestry, or in industry, resented their conditions of work and the insecurity of their contracts, and many of them felt socially and culturally alienated from the owners and the employers. The result was the formation of a variety of labor unions and the development of nationwide Socialist parties. The success of such movements depended on a variety of factors: the strength of the paternalist traditions of ascriptive recognition of the worker status, the size of the work unit and the local ties of the workers, the level of prosperity and the stability of employment in the given industry, and the chances of improvements and promotion through loyal devotion or through education and achievement.

A crucial factor in the development of distinct working-class movements was the *openness* of the given society: Was the worker status a lifetime predicament or were there openings for advancement? How easy was it to get an education qualifying for a change in status? What prospects were there for striking out on one's own, for establishing independent work units? The contrasts between American and European developments must clearly be analyzed in these terms; the American workers were not only given the vote much earlier than their comrades in Europe; but they also found their way into the national system so much more easily because of the greater stress on equality and achievement, because of the many openings to better education, and, last but not least, because the established workers could advance to better positions as new waves of immigrants took over the lower-status jobs.<sup>42</sup> A similar process is currently under way in the advanced countries of Western Europe. The immigrant proletariats from the Mediterranean countries and from the West Indies allow the children of the established national working class to move into the middle class, and these new waves of mobility tend to drain off traditional sources of resentment.

In nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe the status barriers were markedly higher. The traditions from the estate-divided society kept the workers in their place, and the narrowness of the educational channels of mobility also made it difficult for sons and daughters to rise above their fathers. There were, however, important variations among the countries of Europe in the attitudes of the established and the rising elites to the claims of the workers, and these differences clearly affected the development of the

unions and the Socialist parties. In Britain and the Scandinavian countries the attitudes of the elites tended to be open and pragmatic. As in all other countries there was active resistance to the claims of the workers, but little or no direct repression. These are today the countries with the largest and the most domesticated Labor parties in Europe. In Germany and Austria, France, Italy, and Spain the cleavages went much deeper. A number of attempts were made to repress the unions and the Socialists, and the working-class organizations consequently tended to isolate themselves from the national culture and to develop *soziale Ghettoparteien*,<sup>43</sup> strongly ideological movements seeking to isolate their members and their supporters from influences from the encompassing social environments. In terms of our paradigm, these parties were just as close to the *i* pole as their opponents in the religious camp. This "anti-system" orientation of large sections of the European working class was brought to a climax in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The Communist movement did not just speak for an alienated stratum of the territorial community but came to be seen as an external conspiracy against the nation. These developments brought a number of European countries to the point of civil war in the twenties and the thirties. The greater the numbers of citizens caught in such direct "friend-foe" oppositions to each other the greater the danger of total disruption of the body politic.

Developments since World War II have pointed toward a reduction of such pitched oppositions and some softening of ideological tensions: a movement from the *i* toward the *a* pole in our paradigm.<sup>44</sup> A variety of factors contributed to this development: the experience of national cooperation during the war, the improvements in the standard of living in the fifties, the rapid growth of a "new middle class" bridging the gaps between the traditional working class and the bourgeoisie. But the most important factor was possibly the *entrenchment of the working-class parties in local and national governmental structures* and their consequent "domestication" within the established system. The developments in Austria offer a particularly revealing example. The extreme opposition between Socialists and Catholics had ended in civil war in 1934, but after the experience of National Socialist domination, war, and occupation, the two parties settled down to share government responsibilities under a *Proporz* system, a settlement still based on mutual distrust between the two camps but at least one that recognized the necessity for coexistence.<sup>45</sup> Comparisons of the positions taken by the two leading Communist parties in Western Europe, the Italian and the French, also point to the importance of entrenchments in the national system of government. The French party has been much less involved in the running of local communities and has remained much more isolated within the national system, while the Italian party has responded much more dynamically to the exigencies of community decision-making.<sup>46</sup> Erik Allardt has implicitly demonstrated the importance of similar factors in a comparison of levels of class polarization in the Nordic countries. He points out that while the percentage of working-class voters siding with the Left (Communists and Social Democrats) is roughly the same in Finland as in Norway and Sweden, the percentage of middle-class leftists used to be much lower in Finland than in the



two other countries. This difference appears to be related to a contrast in the chances of upward mobility from the working class: very low in Finland, markedly higher in the other countries.<sup>47</sup> The continued isolation of the Finnish working-class parties may reflect a lower level of participation in responsible decision-making in the local communities and in the nation. This has not yet been investigated in detail, but studies of working class mobility and political changes carried out in Norway<sup>48</sup> suggest that the principal channels of advancement were in the public sector and that the decisive wave of "bourgeoisification" came in the wake of the accession of the Labor party to a position of dominance in the system. In Finland the protracted period of underground Communism until 1944 and the deep split in the working-class movement during the next decades tended to keep the two parties from decisive influence on the public sector and maintained the old barriers against mobility; in the other Scandinavian countries the victories of the Social Democrat Labor parties had opened up new channels of mobility and helped to break down the isolation of the working class.


### *Cleavages in Fully Mobilized Polities*

The four critical cleavages described in terms of our paradigm were all movements of protest against the *established* national elite and its cultural standards and were parts of a broad wave of emancipation and mobilization. Quite different types of protest alignments have tended to occur in *fully mobilized nation states*. In these the focus of protest has no longer been the traditional central culture but the rising networks of new elites, such as the leaders of the new large bureaucracies of industry and government, those who control the various sectors of the communications industry, the heads of mass organizations, the leaders in some countries of once weak or low-status minority ethnic or religious groups, and the like. Protest against these new elites and the institutions which foster them has often taken "anti-system" form, though the ideology has varied from country to country: Fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, Poujadism in France, "radical rightism" in the United States. In our paradigm such protest movements would cut across the territorial axis very near the g pole; the conflict is no longer between constituent territorial units of the nation, but between different conceptions of the constitution and the organization of the national polity. These have all been *nationalist* movements: they not only accept, they venerate the historically given nation and its culture, but they reject the system of decision-making and control developed through the process of democratic mobilization and bargaining. Their aim is not just to gain recognition for a particular set of interests within a pluralist system of give and take but to *replace* this system by more authoritarian procedures of allocation.

In one way or another they all express deeply felt convictions about the destiny and the mission of the nation, some quite inchoate, others highly systematized; and they all endeavor to develop networks of organizations to keep their supporters loyal to the cause. They aim at *Verzuiling* but want only one column in the nation.

In our *a-g-i-l* schema, therefore, a fully *verzuild* nationalist movement

would have to be placed at the  $g-i$  intersection outside what we might call the "competitive politics" diamond:



**Figure 4—Suggested Locations of Four "Extremes" in the a-g-i-l Schema.**

In its early varieties such nationalist movements essentially reflected the reactions of the lower-class strata of the dominant culture against the rising tides of mobilization within subject populations. In Hapsburg Austria the rise of the intransigent Pan-Germans was decisively accelerated through the alliance between the university *Burschenschaften* and Schönerer's nationalist workers' associations; these essentially recruited support among German-speaking craftsmen and workers threatened by the invasion of Czechs into the new centers of industry.<sup>49</sup> The xenophobia of the Austrian working class proved contagious. There are clear historical links between the early working-class nationalism of the eighties and nineties and the National Socialist movement after the defeat in 1918.<sup>50</sup> Hitler inherited his hatred of the Slavs and the Jews from the Austrian working-class nationalists. In our terminology, the National Socialist movement was an alliance at the  $g$  end of the territorial-cultural axis, the counterpart within the *dominant* national culture to an  $l$  opposition within some subject population at the periphery.

A variety of attempts have been made to determine the conditions for the emergence of such conflicts at the  $g$  pole of the political system. Contrasts in the continuity and regularity of nation-building have certainly counted. Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United States have all gone through extremely painful crises of nation-building and have still to contend with legacies of conflicts over national integration. Ralf Dahrendorf has recently interpreted the rise of National Socialism as the final breakthrough toward political modernization in Germany. It broke down the local pockets of insulation and established "*die traditionsfreie Gleichheit der Ausgangsstellung aller Menschen,*" an achievement-oriented society unfettered by diffuse

status barriers.<sup>51</sup> The statistical histories of a number of "anti-system" movements of this type suggest that they made their greatest electoral gains through appeals to the "kleine Mann," the isolated "unit citizen" threatened by the rise of strong and complex corporations within a pluralist body politic. The "small man" came out not only against the great financial interests, the corporations, and the entrenched bureaucracies but also against the power of the churches, the trade unions, and the cooperatives. Studies of the crucial German elections of 1930, 1932, and 1933 show beyond doubt that the decisive thrust of mass support for the National Socialists came from owners of small and medium-sized farms, from artisans, shopkeepers, and other independents in the lower rungs of the middle class, most of them Protestants, all of them in more or less direct opposition to the giant cartels and the financial networks, to the unions, and to the forbidding column of Catholic organizations around the *Zentrum*.<sup>52</sup> Similar alignments have been documented for Italy, Norway, France, and the United States. There are obvious contextual variations, but the findings suggest important invariances in the conditions for the growth of such "anti-system" movements.<sup>53</sup>

We have come to the end of a cursory review of the typical cleavages generated in Western politics during the early phases of national consolidation and the later phases of suffrage extension and organizational growth. We have proceeded by way of exemplification rather than rigorous developmental comparison. Our purpose has not been to give an exhaustive account of differences and similarities country by country but to explore the potentialities of a scheme of classification developed from central concepts in current sociological theory. We hope to go further in this direction in other contexts; here we have simply wanted to initiate discussion of these possibilities and to point to new ways of analyzing the historical experience of these very different countries.

Whatever the shortcomings of the empirical applications, we feel confident that the Parsonian *A-G-I-L* schema can generate a set of analytical tools of great value in developmental comparisons of political systems. We have no doubt departed on several points from the standard interpretations of the Parsonian model and perhaps done violence to it in transforming it into a two-dimensional system of coordinates. To us this is of minor importance. We have simply used the original schema as a springboard for an attempt to bring some order into the comparative analysis of party-political developments. We might no doubt have come up with a very similar paradigm without recourse to the Parsonian core model, but we see great intellectual advantages in the unification of conceptualizations across several sectors of social life. The very fact that the same abstract schema has inspired analytical developments in such disparate fields as the family, the professions, religion, and politics seem to us to promise definite payoffs in the future.

Our use of the Parsonian categories is novel in two respects. First of all we have used them to bring some order into the comparative analysis of *conflicts, cleavages, and oppositions*. We think we have shown that they do not just serve to describe the functional requirements of viable social systems and the conditions of consensus and integration, but can be equally fruitful in analyses of sources of disequilibrium and disruption. Second, we have used

the categories for purposes of *distinctly developmental* analysis. We have shown how the basic scheme of double dichotomies can be transformed into a model of step-by-step shifts in cleavage dimensions, from *l* to *i*, from *i* to *a*, and from *i* or *a* toward *g*.

We are aware that some of these innovations may prove to be purely terminological. We hope to show in our further development of these lines of analysis that they open up possibilities of direct gains in the intellectual control of the vast masses of information about party developments across the countries of the world.

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES INTO PARTY SYSTEMS

### *Conditions for the Channeling of Opposition*

Thus far, we have focused on the emergence of *one cleavage at a time* and only incidentally concerned ourselves with the growth of *cleavage systems* and their translations into *constellations of political parties*. In terms of our schema we have limited ourselves to the analysis of the *internal differentiations* of the *I* quadrant and only by implication touched on *interchanges* between *I* and *G*, *I* and *L*, and *L* and *G*. But cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course: there are considerations of organizational and electoral strategy; there is the weighing of payoffs of alliances against losses through split-offs; and there is the successive narrowing of the "mobilization market" through the time sequences of organizational efforts. Here we enter into an area of crucial concern in current theorizing and research, an area of great fascination crying out for detailed cooperative research. Very much needs to be done in reanalyzing the evidence for each national party system and even more in exploring the possibilities of fitting such findings into a wider framework of developmental theory. We cannot hope to deal exhaustively with such possibilities of comparison in this volume and shall limit ourselves to a discussion of a few characteristic developments and suggest a rough typology.

How does a sociocultural conflict get translated into an opposition between parties? To approach an understanding of the variations in such processes of translation we have to sift out a great deal of information about the *conditions for the expression of protest and the representation of interests* in each society.

First, we must know about the *traditions of decision-making* in the polity: the prevalence of conciliar versus autocratic procedures of central government, the rules established for the handling of grievances and protests, the measures taken to control or to protect political associations, the freedom of communication, and the organization of demonstrations.<sup>54</sup>

Second, we must know about the *channels for the expression and mobilization of protest*: Was there a system of representation and if so how accessible were the representatives, who had a right to choose them, and how were they chosen? Was the conflict primarily expressed through direct demon-

strations, through strikes, sabotage, or open violence, or could it be channeled through regular elections and through pressures on legitimately established representatives?

Third, we need information about *the opportunities, the payoffs, and the costs of alliances* in the system: How ready or reluctant were the old movements to broaden their bases of support and how easy or difficult was it for new movements to gain representation on their own?

Fourth and finally, we must know about *the possibilities, the implications, and the limitations of majority rule* in the system: What alliances would be most likely to bring about majority control of the organs of representation and how much influence could such majorities in fact exert on the basic structuring of the institutions and the allocations within the system?

### *The Four Thresholds*

These series of questions suggest a *sequence of thresholds* in the path of any movement pressing forward new sets of demands within a political system.

First, the threshold of *legitimation*: Are all protests rejected as conspiratorial, or is there some recognition of the right of petition, criticism, and opposition?

Second, the threshold of *incorporation*: Are all or most of the supporters of the movement denied status as participants in the choice of representatives or are they given political citizenship rights on a par with their opponents?

Third, the threshold of *representation*: Must the new movement join larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs or can it gain representation on its own?

Fourth, the threshold of *majority power*: Are there built-in checks and counterforces against numerical majority rule in the system or will a victory at the polls give a party or an alliance power to bring about major structural changes in the national system?

This gives us a crude four-variable typology of conditions for the development of party systems.

<i>Level of each threshold</i>				<i>Resulting party system</i>
Legiti- mation	Incorpo- ration	Represen- tation	Majority power	
<i>High</i>	H	H	H	Autocratic or oligarchic regimes, <i>Verfemung</i> of all parties: <sup>55</sup> protests and grievances either channeled through the field administration or through estate representation.
<i>Medium</i>	H	H	H	Embryonic internal party system: cliques of representatives, clubs of <i>notables</i> . Examples: Britain before 1832, Sweden during the quarrels between "Hats" and "Caps." <sup>56</sup>

<i>Level of each threshold</i>				<i>Resulting party system</i>
Legiti- mation M	Incorpo- ration M	Represen- tation H	Majority power H or M	
<i>Low</i>	M	H	H	Internal party systems generat- ing rudimentary outside support through registration associa- tion but safeguards introduced organizations: predominant in Western Europe during period between the breakdown of monarchic absolutism and the introduction of parliamentary rule under manhood suffrage.
L	M	H	M	Initial phase in development of external party system: lower- class movements free to de- velop, but suffrage still limited and/or unequal. Example: Sweden before 1909.
M	L	H	H	Same but with parliamentary rule: Belgium before 1899; Norway, 1884–1900.
L	L	H	H	Isolation of lower-class or re- ligious minority parties from the national system: restrictive measures against political or- ganizations but full manhood suffrage. Examples: the Wil- helmine <i>Reich</i> during the period of the <i>Sozialistengesetze</i> , 1878– 1890; France during the Second Empire and early decades of the Third Republic.
L	L	H	M	Competitive party system under universal and equal manhood suffrage but with high payoffs for alliances and with a clear separation of legislative and ex- ecutive powers. The best ex- ample would be the United States if it were not for the re- strictions on Communist Party activities and the low <i>de facto</i> enfranchisement of Negroes in the South. France under the Fifth Republic may be a better example.
L	L	H	M	Same but with parliamentary rule. Examples: France under later decades of the Third Re- public and most of the Fourth; Great Britain since 1918.

<i>Level of each threshold</i>				<i>Resulting party system</i>
<i>Legiti- mation</i>	<i>Incorpo- ration</i>	<i>Represen- tation</i>	<i>Majority power</i>	
L	L	M	M	
				Same but with medium thresh- old PR (Proportional Repre- sentation): little need for al- liances to achieve representa- tion but safeguards introduced against fragmentation through explicit or implicit electoral minima. Examples: the Nordic countries, Belgium, the Nether- lands, and Switzerland since 1918–20.
L	L	L	L	Same but with maximal PR and fewer restraints against ma- jority power: the fragmented, centrifugal parliament and the plebiscitarian presidency of the Weimar Republic.

Empirically, changes in one such threshold sooner or later generated pressures to change one or more others, but there were many variations in the sequences of change. There is no “scalable” dimension of political development from a condition of four “high” thresholds to one of four “low” thresholds.

Clear-cut progressions toward lower thresholds are generally observed at the early stages of change: the recognition of freedoms of association, the extension of the suffrage. Much greater variations in the paths of development can be observed at the later stages. In fact there is no single terminal stage in the series of changes but several alternative ones:

LLHH—high-threshold majoritarian representation and separation of powers

LLHM—high-threshold majoritarian parliamentarism

LLMM—medium-threshold PR parliamentarism

LLLL—low-threshold PR and plebiscitarian majority rule

The early comparative literature on the growth of parties and party systems focused on the consequences of the lowering of the two first thresholds: the emergence of parliamentary opposition and a free press and the extension of the franchise. Tocqueville and Ostrogorski, Weber and Michels, all in their various ways, sought to gain insight into that central institution of the modern polity, the competitive mass party.<sup>57</sup> The later literature, particularly since the 1920's, changed its focus to the third and the fourth threshold: the consequences of the electoral system and the structure of the decision-making arena for the formation and the functioning of party systems. The fierce debates over the pros and cons of electoral systems stimulated a great variety of efforts at comparative analysis, but the heavy emotional commitments on the one or the other side often led to questionable interpretations of the data and to overhasty generalizations from meager evidence.

Few of the writers could content themselves with comparisons of sequences of change in different countries. They wanted to influence the future course of events, and they tended to be highly optimistic about the possibilities of bringing about changes in established party systems through electoral engineering. What they tended to forget was that parties once established develop their own internal structure and build up long-term commitments among core supporters. The electoral arrangements may prevent or delay the formation of a party, but once it has been established and entrenched, it will prove difficult to change its character simply through variations in the conditions of electoral aggregation. In fact, in most cases it makes little sense to treat electoral systems as independent variables and party systems as dependent. The party strategists will generally have decisive influence on electoral legislation and opt for the systems of aggregation most likely to consolidate their position, whether through increases in their representation, through the strengthening of the preferred alliances, or through safeguards against splinter movements. In abstract theoretical terms it may well make sense to hypothesize that simple majority systems will produce two-party oppositions within the culturally more homogeneous areas of a polity and only generate further parties through territorial cleavages, but the only convincing evidence for such a generalization comes from countries with a continuous history of simple majority aggregations from the beginnings of democratic mass politics. There is little hard evidence and much uncertainty about the effects of *later changes* in election laws on the national party system: one simple reason is that the parties already entrenched in the polity will exert a great deal of influence on the extent and the direction of any such changes and at least prove reluctant to see themselves voted out of existence.

Any attempt at systematic analysis of variations in the conditions and the strategies of party competition must start out from such differentiations of developmental phases. We cannot, in this context, proceed to detailed country-by-country comparisons but have to limit ourselves to a review of evidence for two distinct sequences of change: the rise of *lower-class* movements and parties and the decline of *régime censitaire* parties.

### *The Rules of the Electoral Game*

The early electoral systems all set a high threshold for rising parties. It was everywhere very difficult for working-class movements to gain representation on their own, but there were significant variations in the openness of the systems to pressures from the new strata. The second ballot systems so well known from the Wilhelmine Reich and from the Third and the Fifth French Republics set the highest possible barrier, absolute majority, but at the same time made possible a variety of local alliances among the opponents of the Socialists: the system kept the new entrants underrepresented, yet did not force the old parties to merge or to ally themselves nationally. The blatant injustices of the electoral system added further to the alienation of the working classes from the national institutions and generated what Giovanni Sartori has described as systems of "centrifugal pluralism":<sup>58</sup> one major movement *outside* the established political arena and several opposed parties *within* it.



Simple majority systems of the British-American type also set high barriers against rising movements of new entrants into the political arena; however, the initial level is not standardized at 50 percent of the votes cast in each constituency but *varies from the outset with the strategies adopted by the established parties*. If they join together in defence of their common interests, the threshold is high; if each competes on its own, it is low. In the early phases of working-class mobilization, these systems have encouraged alliances of the "Lib-Lab" type. The new entrants into the electorate have seen their only chances of representation as lying in joint candidatures with the more reformist of the established parties. In later phases distinctly Socialist parties were able to gain representation on their own in areas of high industrial concentration and high class segregation, but this did not invariably bring about counteralliances of the older parties. In Britain, the decisive lower-class breakthrough came in the elections of 1918 and 1922. Before World War I the Labour Party had presented its own candidates in a few constituencies only and had not won more than 42 out of 670 seats; in 1918 they suddenly brought forth candidates in 388 constituencies and won 63 of them and then in 1922 advanced to 411 constituencies and 142 seats. The simple-majority system did not force an immediate restructuring of the party system, however. The Liberals continued to fight on their own and did not give way to the Conservatives until the emergency election of 1931. The inveterate hostilities between the two established parties helped to keep the average threshold for the newcomers tolerably low, but the very ease of this process of incorporation produced a split within the ranks of Labour. The currency crisis forced the leaders to opt between their loyalty to the historical nation and their solidarity with the finally mobilized working class.

Not all the simple-majority polities developed such strong and distinct working-class parties, however. Canada and the United States stayed at what we might call the "Lib-Lab" stage. Analysts of these two "deviant" nations have given prominence to factors such as early enfranchisement, high mobility, entrenched federalism, and marked regional, ethnic, and religious diversity.<sup>59</sup> There are important differences between the two cases, however, and these tell us a great deal about the importance of the *fourth* of our thresholds: the safeguards against direct majority power. In a recent comparison of the Canadian and the American party systems, Leon D. Epstein has argued with admirable cogency that the crucial differences reflect contrasts in the constitutionally set procedures of central decision-making: in Canada cabinet responsibility to a parliamentary majority, in the United States separate powers acquired through two distinct channels of representation.<sup>60</sup> The parliamentary system lowers the power threshold for numerical majorities, but the government depends for its existence on disciplined voting within the party or the parties supporting it in the legislature. The separation-of-powers system makes it more difficult to translate numerical victories into distinct changes of policy but also allows for much more flexible alliances within each of the parties. The Canadian party tends to be united in its legislative behavior and to maintain strict control over the recruitment of candidates. The American party tends to be a loose federation with a minimum of internal structure and is forced by the system of primaries to leave decisions on recruitment to a wider electoral market. As a result the Canadian system has

tended to encourage regional and cultural protest parties, while the American parties have proved remarkably open to factional or local demands from a variety of movements and interests. The straight two-party system prevalent in the United States cannot be taken as a normal outcome of simple majority elections. American parties differ markedly in structure and in character from other parties produced under this system of elections and can best be explained through an analysis of the constitutionally established separation of the two arenas of decision-making, the Congress and the Presidential Executive.

This brings us to a crucial point in our discussion of the translation of cleavage structure into party systems: *the costs and the payoffs of mergers, alliances, and coalitions*. The height of the representation threshold and the rules of central decision-making may increase or decrease the net returns of joint action, but the intensity of inherited hostilities and the openness of communications across the cleavage lines will decide whether mergers or alliances are actually workable. There must be some minimum of trust among the leaders, and there must be some justification for expecting that the channels to the decision-makers will be kept open whoever wins the election. The British electoral system can only be understood against the background of the long-established traditions of territorial representation; the M.P. represents *all* his constituents, not just those who voted him in. But this system makes heavy demands on the loyalty of the constituents: in two-party contests up to 49 percent of them may have to abide by the decisions of a representative they did not want; in three-cornered fights, as much as 66 percent.

Such demands are bound to produce strains in ethnically, culturally, or religiously divided communities: the deeper the cleavages the less the likelihood of loyal acceptance of decisions by representatives of the other side. It was no accident that the earliest moves toward Proportional Representation came in the ethnically most heterogeneous of the European countries, Denmark (to accommodate Schleswig-Holstein), as early as 1855, the Swiss cantons from 1891 onward, Belgium from 1899, Moravia from 1905, and Finland from 1906.<sup>61</sup> The great historian of electoral systems, Karl Brauns, distinguishes two phases in the spread of PR: the "minority protection" phase before World War I and the "anti-socialist" phase in the years immediately after the armistice.<sup>62</sup> In linguistically and religiously divided societies majority elections could clearly threaten the continued existence of the political system. The introduction of some element of minority representation came to be seen as an essential step in a strategy of territorial consolidation.

As the pressures mounted for extensions of the suffrage, demands for proportionality were also heard in the culturally more homogeneous nation-states. In most cases the victory of the new principle of representation came about through a convergence of pressures from below and from above. The rising working class wanted to lower the threshold of representation to gain access to the legislatures, and the most threatened of the old-established parties demanded PR to protect their positions against the new waves of mobilized voters under universal suffrage. In Belgium the introduction of graduated manhood suffrage in 1893 brought about an increasing polarization between Labor and Catholics and threatened the continued existence

of the Liberals; the introduction of PR restored some equilibrium to the system.<sup>63</sup> The history of the struggles over electoral procedures in Sweden and in Norway tells us a great deal about the consequences of the lowering of one threshold for the bargaining over the level of the next. In Sweden, the Liberals and the Social Democrats fought a long fight for universal and equal suffrage and at first also advocated PR to ensure easier access to the legislature. The remarkable success of their mobilization efforts made them change their strategy, however. From 1904 onward they advocated majority elections in single-member constituencies. This aroused fears among the farmers and the urban Conservatives, and to protect their interests they made the introduction of PR a condition for their acceptance of manhood suffrage. As a result the two barriers fell together: it became easier to enter the electorate and easier to gain representation.<sup>64</sup> In Norway there was a much longer lag between the waves of mobilization. The franchise was much wider from the outset, and the first wave of peasant mobilization brought down the old regime as early as in 1884. As a result the suffrage was extended well before the final mobilization of the rural proletariat and the industrial workers under the impact of rapid economic change. The victorious radical-agrarian "Left" felt no need to lower the threshold of representation and in fact helped to increase it through the introduction of a two-ballot system of the French type in 1906. There is little doubt that this contributed heavily to the radicalization and the alienation of the Norwegian Labor Party. By 1915 it had gained 32 percent of all the votes cast but was given barely 15 percent of the seats. The "Left" did not give in until 1921. The decisive motive was clearly not just a sense of equalitarian justice but the fear of rapid decline with further advances of the Labor Party across the majority threshold.

In all these cases high thresholds might have been kept up if the parties of the property-owning classes had been able to make common cause against the rising working-class movements. But the inheritance of hostility and distrust was too strong. The Belgian Liberals could not face the possibility of a merger with the Catholics, and the cleavages between the rural and the urban interests went too deep in the Nordic countries to make it possible to build up any joint antisocialist front. By contrast, the higher level of industrialization and the progressive merger of rural and urban interests in Britain made it possible to withstand the demand for a change in the system of representation. Labor was seriously underrepresented only during a brief initial period, and the Conservatives were able to establish broad enough alliances in the counties and the suburbs to keep their votes well above the critical point.

## **A MODEL FOR THE GENERATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM**

### *Four Decisive Dimensions of Opposition*

This review of the conditions for the translation of sociocultural cleavages into political oppositions suggests three conclusions.

First, the constitutive contrasts in the national system of party constellations generally tended to manifest themselves *before* any lowering of the

threshold of representation. The decisive sequences of party formation took place at the early stage of competitive politics, in some cases well before the extension of the franchise, in other cases on the very eve of the rush to mobilize the finally enfranchised masses.

Second, the high thresholds of representation during the phase of mass politicization set severe tests for the rising political organizations. The surviving formations tended to be firmly entrenched in the inherited social structure and could not easily be dislodged through changes in the rules of the electoral game.

Third, the decisive moves to lower the threshold of representation reflected divisions among the established *régime censitaire* parties rather than pressures from the new mass movements. The introduction of PR added a few additional splinters but essentially served to ensure the separate survival of parties unable to come together in common defense against the rising contenders for majority power.

What happened at the decisive party-forming phase in each national society? Which of the many contrasts and conflicts were translated into party oppositions, and how were these oppositions built into stable systems?

This is not the place to enter into detailed comparisons of developmental sequences nation by nation. Our task is to suggest a framework for the explanation of variations in cleavage bases and party constellations.

In the abstract schema set out in Fig. 3 we distinguished four decisive dimensions of opposition in Western politics:

two of them were products of what we called the *National Revolution* (1 and 2);

and two of them were generated through the *Industrial Revolution* (3 and 4).

In their basic characteristics the party systems that emerged in the Western European politics during the early phase of competition and mobilization can be interpreted as products of *sequential interactions between these two fundamental processes of change*.

Differences in the timing and character of the *National Revolution* set the stage for striking divergencies in the European party system. In the Protestant countries the conflicts between the claims of the State and the Church had been temporarily settled by royal *fiats* at the time of the Reformation, and the processes of centralization and standardization triggered off after 1789 did not immediately bring about a conflict between the two. The temporal and the spiritual establishments were at one in the defense of the central nation-building culture but came increasingly under attack by the leaders and ideologists of countermovements in the provinces, in the peripheries and within the underprivileged strata of peasants, craftsmen and workers. The other countries of Western Europe were all split to the core in the wake of the secularizing French Revolution and without exception developed strong parties for the defense of the Church, either explicitly as in Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and Spain or implicitly as in the case of the Right in France.<sup>65</sup>

Differences in the timing and character of the *Industrial Revolution* also made for contrasts among the national party systems in Europe.

Conflicts in the *commodity* market tended to produce highly divergent party alliances in Europe. In some countries the majority of the market farmers found it possible to join with the owner interests in the secondary sector of the economy; in others the two remained in opposition to each other and developed parties of their own. Conflicts in the *labor* market, by contrast, proved much more uniformly divisive: all countries of Western Europe developed lower-class mass parties at some point or other before World War I. These were rarely unified into one single working-class party. In Latin Europe the lower-class movements were sharply divided among revolutionary anarchist, anarchosyndicalist and Marxist factions on the one hand and revisionist socialists on the other. The Russian Revolution of 1917 split the working-class organizations throughout Europe. Today we find in practically all countries of the West divisions between Communists, left Socialist splinters, and revisionist Social Democrat parties.

Our task, however, is not just to account for the emergence of single parties but to analyze the processes of alliance formation that led to the development of stable *systems* of political organizations in country after country. To approach some understanding of these alliance formations, we have to study the *interactions* between the two revolutionary processes of change in each polity: How far had the National Revolution proceeded at the point of the industrial "takeoff" and how did the two processes of mobilization, the cultural and the economic, affect each other, positively by producing common fronts or negatively by maintaining divisions?

The decisive contrasts among the Western party systems clearly reflect differences in the *national histories of conflict and compromise across the first three of the four cleavage lines* distinguished in our analytical schema: the "center-periphery," the state-church, and the land-industry cleavages generated national developments in *divergent* directions, while the owner-worker cleavage tended to bring the party systems *closer to each other* in their basic structure. The crucial differences among the party systems emerged in the early phases of competitive politics, before the final phase of mass mobilization. They reflected basic contrasts in the conditions and sequences of nation-building and in the structure of the economy at the point of take-off toward sustained growth. This, to be sure, does not mean that the systems vary exclusively on the "Right" and at the center, but are much more alike on the "Left" of the political spectrum. There are working-class movements throughout the West, but they differ conspicuously in size, in cohesion, in ideological orientation, and in the extent of their integration into, or alienation from, the historically given national policy. Our point is simply that the factors generating these differences on the left are *secondary*. The decisive contrasts among the systems had emerged before the entry of the working-class parties into the political arena, and the character of these mass parties was heavily influenced by the constellations of ideologies, movements, and organizations they had to confront in that arena.

### *A Model in Three Steps*

To understand the differences among the Western party systems we have to start out from an analysis of the *situation of the active nation-building*

*elite on the eve of the breakthrough to democratization and mass mobilization:* What had they achieved and where had they met most resistance? What were their resources, who were their nearest allies, and where could they hope to find further support? Who were their enemies, what were their resources, and where could they recruit allies and rally reinforcement?

Any attempt at comparative analysis across so many divergent national histories is fraught with grave risks. It is easy to get lost in the wealth of fascinating detail, and it is equally easy to succumb to facile generalities and irresponsible abstractions. Scholarly prudence prompts us to proceed case by case, but intellectual impatience urges us to go beyond the analysis of concrete contrasts and try out alternative schemes of systematization across the known cases.

To clarify the logic of our approach to the comparative analysis of party systems, we have developed a *model of alternative alliances and oppositions*. We have posited several sets of actors, have set up a series of rules of alliance and opposition among these, and have tested the resultant typology of potential party systems against a range of empirically known cases.

Our model bears on relationships of alliance, neutrality or opposition among seven sets of actors. To underscore the abstract character of our exercise we shall refer to each set by a shorthand symbol:

N—a central core of cooperating “nation-builders” controlling major elements of the machinery of the “state”;

C—an ecclesiastical body established within the national territory and given a large measure of control over education;

R—the supranationally established ecclesiastical body organized under the Roman Curia and the Pope;

D—a dissident, nonconformist body of religious activists opposed to C and R;

L—a cooperating body of established landowners controlling a substantial share of the total primary production of the national territory;

U—a cooperating body of urban commercial and industrial entrepreneurs controlling the advancing secondary sectors of the national economy;

P—a movement of resistance in the subject periphery against central national control.

The model sets these *restrictions on alliance formation*:

(1) N and D and N and P will invariably be opposed, never in any joint alliance;

(2) N must decide on alliances on two fronts: the *religious* and the *economic*;

(3) on the religious front, N is faced with three options:

—alliance with C,

—a secular posture S,

—alliance with R;

(4) on the economic front, N is restricted to two alliance options:

—with L,

—with U;

(5) N’s alliances determine P’s choice of alliances but with these restric-

tions: (a) if N is allied to C, the model allows two contingent outcomes: (aa) if C is dominant, the only P option on the religious front is D, (bb) if R still constitutes a strong minority, P will be split in two alliance-groups: the response to N-C-L will be P<sub>1</sub>-S-U and P<sub>2</sub>-R, the response to N-C-U will be P<sub>1</sub>-D-L and P<sub>2</sub>-R-L: (b) if N chooses S or R, the only possible P alliances are P-S-U and P-R-L or simply P-U and P-L; P-R-U and P-S-L do not occur.

These various elements and restrictions combine to produce an eightfold typology of basic political oppositions:

TYPE	N'S COMMITMENTS		P'S RESPONSE		CLOSEST EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES	
	Religious front	Economic front		Country	"N" party (parties)	"P" parties
	Option	Conditions				
I	C	C dominant	L	P-D-U	Britain	CONS. vs. LIB: { Celtic fringe Dissenters Industry
II	C	C dominant	U	P-D-L	Scandinavia	CONS. vs. "LEFT" { AGRARIANS CHRISTIANS RADICALS
III	C	R strong minority	L	{ P <sub>1</sub> -S-U P <sub>2</sub> -R	Prussia/ Reich	CONS. vs. { BAVARIANS LIB. ZENTRUM
IV	C	R strong minority	U	{ P <sub>1</sub> -D-L P <sub>2</sub> -R-L	Netherlands	LIB. vs. { Calvinists: CHU, AR Catholics: KVP
V	S		L	{ P <sub>1</sub> -U P <sub>2</sub> -R	Spain	LIB. vs. { Catalan LLIGA Carlists
VI	S		U	P-R-L	France Italy	LIB./RAD. vs. CONS.-CATH.-CHR.
VII	R		L	P-S-U	Austria	CHR. vs. LIB. { Pan-Germans Industry
VIII	R		U	P-L	Belgium	CHR./LIB. vs. Flemish separatists

This typological exercise may appear excessively abstract and unnecessarily mechanical. To us the gains in analytical perspective outweigh the loss in historical immediacy: the model not only offers a grid for the mapping of parallels and contrasts among national developments, it also represents an attempt to establish an explanatory paradigm of the simplest possible structure to account for a wide range of empirical variations. The literature on democratic politics is replete with examples of isolated discussions of parallels and contrasts among national party systems: ours, we believe, is the first attempt to develop a general typology of such variations from a unified set of postulates and hypotheses.

Our model seeks to reduce the bewildering variety of empirical party systems to a set of ordered consequences of decisions and developments at three crucial junctures in the history of each nation:

first, during the *Reformation*—the struggle for the control of the ecclesiastical organizations within the national territory;

second, in the wake of the "*Democratic Revolution*" after 1789—the conflict over the control of the vast machineries of mass education to be built up by the mobilizing nation-states;

finally, during the early phases of the *Industrial Revolution*—the opposition between landed interests and the claims of the rising commercial and industrial leadership in cities and towns.

Our eight types of alliance-opposition structure are in fact the simple combinatorial products of three successive dichotomies:

**FIRST DICHOTOMY: THE REFORMATION**

I-IV State Controls National Church	V-VIII State Allied to Roman Catholic Church
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**SECOND DICHOTOMY: THE "DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION"**

I-II National Church Dominant	III-IV Strong Roman Minority	V-VI Secularizing Revolution	VII-VIII State Allied to Roman Church
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**THIRD DICHOTOMY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION**

Type:	Commitment to		Commitment to		Commitment to		Commitment to	
	Landed	Urban	Landed	Urban	Landed	Urban	Landed	Urban
	Interests		Interests		Interests		Interests	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII

The model spells out the consequences of the fateful division of Europe brought about through Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. The outcomes of the early struggles between State and Church determined the structure of national politics in the era of democratization and mass mobilization three hundred years later. In Southern and Central Europe the Counter-Reformation had consolidated the position of the Church and tied its fate to the privileged bodies of the *ancien régime*. The result was a polarization of politics between a national-radical-secular movement and a Catholic-traditionalists one. In Northwest Europe, in Britain, and in Scandinavia, the settlement of the sixteenth century gave a very different structure to the cleavages of the nineteenth. The established churches did not stand in opposition to the nation-builders in the way the Roman Catholic Church did on the continent, and the "Left" movements opposed to the religious establishment found most of their support among newly enfranchised dissenters, nonconformists, and fundamentalists in the peripheries and within the rising urban strata. In Southern and Central Europe the bourgeois opposition to the *ancien régime* tended to be indifferent if not hostile to the teachings of the Church: the cultural integration of the nation came first and the Church had to find whatever place it could within the new political order. In Northwest Europe the opposition to the *ancien régime* was far from indifferent to religious values. The broad "Left" coalitions against the established powers recruited decisive support among orthodox Protestants in a variety of sectarian movements outside and inside the national churches.

The distinction between these two types of "Left" alliances against the inherited political structure is fundamental for an understanding of European



political developments in the age of mass elections. It is of particular importance in the analysis of the religiously most divided of the European polities: types III and IV in our 2 x 2 x 2 schema. The religious frontiers of Europe went straight through the territories of the Low Countries, the old German *Reich*, and Switzerland; in each of these the clash between the nation-builders and the strong Roman Catholic minorities produced lasting divisions of the bodies politic and determined the structure of their party systems. The Dutch system came closest to a direct merger of the Southern-Central type (VI-VIII) and the Northwestern: on the one hand a nation-building party of increasingly secularized Liberals, on the other hand a Protestant "Left" recruited from orthodox milieus of the same type as those behind the old opposition parties in England and Scandinavia.

The difference between England and the Netherlands is indeed instructive. Both countries had their strong peripheral concentrations of Catholics opposed to central authority: the English in Ireland, the Dutch in the south. In Ireland, the cumulation of ethnic, social, and religious conflicts could not be resolved within the old system; the result was a history of intermittent violence and finally territorial separation. In the Netherlands the secession of the Belgians still left a sizable Catholic minority, but the inherited tradition of corporate pluralism helped to ease them into the system. The Catholics established their own broad column of associations and a strong political party and gradually found acceptance within a markedly segmented but still cohesive national polity.

A comparison of the Dutch and the Swiss cases would add further depth to this analysis of the conditions for the differentiation of parties within national systems. Both countries come close to our type IV: Protestant national leadership, strong Catholic minorities, predominance of the cities in the national economy. In setting the assumption of our model we predicted a split in the peripheral opposition to the nation-builders: one orthodox Protestant opposition (P-D-L) and one Roman Catholic (P-R-L). This clearly fits the Dutch case but not so well the Swiss. How is this to be accounted for? Contrasts of this type open up fascinating possibilities of comparative historical analysis; all we can do here is to suggest a simple hypothesis. Our model not only simplifies complex historical developments through its strict selection of conditioning variables, it also reduces empirical continuities to crude dichotomies. The difference between the Dutch and the Swiss cases can possibly be accounted for through further differentiation in the center-periphery axis. The drive for national centralization was stronger in the Netherlands and had been slowed down in Switzerland through the experiences of the war between the Protestant cantons and the Catholic *Sonderbund*. In the Netherlands the Liberal drive for centralization produced resistance both among the Protestants and the Catholics. In Switzerland the Radicals had few difficulties on the Protestant side and needed support in their opposition to the Catholics. The result was a party system of essentially the same structure as in the typical Southern-Central cases.<sup>66</sup>

Further differentiations of the "N-P" axis in our model will also make it easier to fit the extraordinary case of *France* into this system of controlled dimension-by-dimension comparisons.

In our model we have placed France with Italy as an example of an al-

liance-opposition system of type VI: Catholic dominance through the Counter-Reformation, secularization and religious conflict during the next phase of nation-building in the nineteenth century, clear predominance of the cities in national politics. But this is an analytical juxtaposition of polities with diametrically opposed histories of development and consolidation—France one of the oldest and most centralized nation-states in Europe, Italy a territory unified long after the French revolutions had paved the way for the “participant nation,” the integrated political structure committing the entire territorial population to the same historical destiny. To us this is not a weakness in our model, however. The party systems of the countries *are* curiously similar, and any scheme of comparative analysis must somehow or other bring this out. The point is that our distinction between “nation-builder” alliances and “periphery” alliances must take on very different meanings in the two contexts. In France the distinction between “center” and “periphery” was far more than a matter of geography; it reflected long-standing historical commitments for or against the Revolution. As spelt out in detail in Siegfried’s classic *Tableau*, the *Droite* had its strongholds in the districts which had most stubbornly resisted the revolutionary drive for centralization and equalization,<sup>67</sup> but it was far more than a movement of peripheral protest—it was a broad alliance of alienated elite groups, of frustrated nation-builders who felt that their rightful powers had been usurped by men without faith and without roots. In Italy there was no basis for such a broad alliance against the secular nation-builders, since the established local elites offered little resistance to the lures of *trasformismo*, and the Church kept its faithful followers out of national politics for nearly two generations.

These contrasts during the initial phases of mass mobilization had far-reaching consequences for each party system. With the broadening of the electorates and the strengthening of the working-class parties, the Church felt impelled to defend its position through its own resources. In France, the result was an attempt to divorce the defense of the Catholic schools from the defense of the established rural hierarchy. This trend had first found expression through the establishment of Christian trade unions and in 1944 finally led to the formation of the MRP. The burden of historic commitments was too strong, however; the young party was unable to establish itself as a broad mass party defending the principles of Christian democracy. By contrast, in Italy, history had left the Church with only insignificant rivals to the right of the working class parties. The result was the formation of a broad alliance of a variety of interests and movements, frequently at loggerheads with each other, but united in their defense of the rights of the central institution of the fragmented *ancien régime*, the Roman Catholic Church. In both cases there was a clear-cut tendency toward religious polarization, but differences in the histories of nation-building made for differences in the resultant systems of party alliances and oppositions.

We could go into further detail on every one of the eight types distinguished in our model, but this would take us too far into single-country histories. We are less concerned with the specifics of the degrees of fit in each national case than with the overall structure of the model. There is clearly nothing final about any such scheme; it simply sets a series of themes for

detailed comparisons and suggests ways of organizing the results within a manageable conceptual framework. The model is a tool and its utility can be tested only through continuous development: through the addition of further variables to account for observed differences as well as through refinements in the definition and grading of the variables already included.

Two developments from the model require immediate detailed consideration:

(1) What variables have to be added to account for the formation of *distinctly territorial* parties?

(2) What criteria should count in differentiating between N-L and N-U alliances, and what conditional variables can be entered into the model to account for the emergence of *explicitly agrarian* parties?

### *Developments and Deviations: Parties for Territorial Defense*

Nation-building invariably generates territorial resistances and cultural strains. There will be competition between potential centers of political control; there may be conflict between the capital and the areas of growth in the provinces; and there will be unavoidable tension between the culturally and economically advanced areas and the backward periphery.<sup>68</sup> Some of these territorial-cultural conflicts were solved through secession or boundary changes, but others were intensified through unification movements. To take one obvious example, the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire certainly settled a great number of hopelessly entangled conflicts, but it also led to the political unification of such culturally and economically heterogeneous entities as Italy, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Territorial-cultural conflicts do not just find political expression in secessionist and irredentist movements, however; they feed into the overall cleavage structure in the national community and help to condition the development not only of each nationwide party organization but even more of the entire system of party oppositions and alignments.

The contrast between the British and the Scandinavian party systems stands out with great clarity in our step-by-step accounting scheme. The countries of Northwest Europe had all opted for national religious solutions at the time of the Reformation, but they nevertheless developed markedly different party systems during the early phases of democratization and mobilization. This contrast in political development clearly did not reflect a difference in the salience of *any single* line of cleavage but a difference in the *joint* operation of two sets of cleavages: the opposition between the central nation-building culture and the traditions of the periphery, and the opposition between the primary and the secondary sectors of the economy. In Britain the central culture was upheld and reinforced by a vast network of *landed* families, in the Nordic countries by an essentially *urban* elite of officials and patricians. In Britain the two cleavage lines *cut across* each other; in Scandinavia they *reinforced* each other. The British structure encouraged a gradual merger of urban and rural interests, while the Scandinavian made for division and opposition.<sup>69</sup> The British Conservative Party was able to establish a joint front of landed and industrial owner interests, while the

Scandinavian "Right" remained essentially urban and proved unable to establish any durable alliance with the Agrarians and the peripheral "Left."

Similar processes of interaction can be observed at work in the development of the continental party system. Conflicts between mobilizing elites and peripheral cultures have in some cases been reinforced, in some cases dampened, by conflicts between the State and the Church and by oppositions between urban and rural interests. Belgium offers a striking example of cleavage reinforcement. The "Union of Oppositions" of the early years of nation-building broke up over the schools issue, but this was only the first step in a gradual deepening of cleavages. The continuing processes of economic, social, and cultural mobilization brought the country closer to a polarization between French-speaking, secular and industrial Wallonia and *Nederlands*-speaking, Catholic and agricultural Flanders.<sup>70</sup> This polarizing cleavage structure contrasts dramatically with the crisscrossing of religious and linguistic oppositions in Switzerland. Of the five French-speaking cantons three are Protestant and two Catholic, and of the nineteen Alemannic cantons or half-cantons ten are Protestant and nine Catholic: "this creates loyalties and affinities which counterbalance the linguistic inter-relationships."<sup>71</sup>

Conditions for the emergence and consolidation of territorial counter-cultures have varied significantly within Europe. Organized resistance against the centralizing apparatus of the mobilizing nation-state appears to have been most likely to develop in three sets of situations:

- heavy concentration of the counter-culture within one clear-cut territory;
- few ties of communication, alliance, and bargaining experience toward the national center and more toward external centers of cultural or economic influence;
- minimal economic dependence on the political metropolis.

Federalist, autonomist, and separatist movements and parties are most likely to occur through a cumulation of such conditions. A comparison of Spain and Italy tells us a great deal about such processes of cleavage cumulation. Both countries have for centuries been heavily dominated by the Catholic Church. Both were caught in a violent conflict between secular power and ecclesiastical privileges in the wake of the National Revolution, and both have remained highly heterogeneous in their ethnic structure, in cultural traditions, and in historical commitments. Yet they differed markedly in the character of the party systems they developed in the phase of initial mass mobilization. Spanish politics was dominated by territorial oppositions; Italy developed a national party system, fragmented but with irredentist-separatist parties only in such extreme cases as the South Tyrol and the Val d'Aosta.

In Spain, the opposition of the Pyrennean periphery to the centralizing Castilian regime first found expression in the mobilization of the Carlist peasantry in defense of the Church and their local liberties against the Liberals and the Freemasons in the army and government bureaucracy during the second half of the nineteenth century. Around 1900, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and significant parts of the Basque middle classes and peasantry turned to regionalist and separatist parties to fight the parasitic central administration identified with the economically backward center of the nation. In the Basque areas, strong religious loyalties contributed to

increase the hostility toward an anticlerical central government. In Catalonia, separatist sentiments could not repress cleavages along class lines. The conflicts between businessmen and workers, landowners and tenant-farmers divided the regionalist forces into a right (the *Lliga*) and a left (the *Esquerra*).<sup>72</sup>

In Italy, the thrust of national mobilization came from the economically advanced North. The impoverished provinces to the South and on the islands resisted the new administrators as alien usurpers but did not develop parties of regional resistance: the prefects ruled through varying mixtures of *combinazione* and force and proved as efficient instruments of centralization in the backward areas of Italy as the *caciques* in the regions of Spain controlled from Madrid.<sup>73</sup> There was an obvious element of territorial protest in the papal repudiation of the new nation-state, but it took several decades before this conflict found expression in the formation of a distinctly Catholic party. The loyal Catholics did not just oppose the Piedmontese administration as a threat to the established privileges of the Church; Rome fought the Liberal nation-builders as the conquerors of the Papal territories. But these resentments were not channeled into national politics. The intransigent policy of *non expedit* kept the Catholics out of the give and take of electoral bargaining and discouraged the eager advocates of a mass party for the defense of the Church. This policy of isolation divided the communities throughout the Italian territory. When the Pope finally gave in on the eve of the introduction of mass suffrage, these cross-local cleavages produced a nationwide system of oppositions among Liberals, Catholics, and Socialists. There were marked regional variations in the strength of each camp. Dogan's work on regional variations in the stratification of the Italian vote tells us a great deal about the factors at work.<sup>74</sup> But in contrast to the development in Spain, the territorial conflict within Italy found no direct expression in the party system. This was not a sign of national integration, however; the country was torn by irreconcilable conflicts among ideologically distinct camps, but the conflict cut across the communities and the regions. There were still unsettled and unsettling territorial problems, but these were at the frontiers. The irredentist claims against France and the Hapsburgs generated a nationalist-imperialist ideology and prepared the ground for the rise of Fascism.<sup>75</sup>

Such comparisons can be multiplied throughout Europe. In the multi-centered German Reich the contrasts between East and West, North and South generated a variety of territorial tensions. The conflict between the Hamburg Liberals and the East Elbian Conservatives went far beyond the tariff issue—it reflected an important cultural opposition. The Bavarian particularists again and again set up parties of their own and have to this day found it difficult to fit into a nationwide system of party oppositions.<sup>76</sup> By contrast, in hydrocephalic France conflicts between the capital and the provincial “desert”<sup>77</sup> had been endemic since the sixteenth century but did not generate distinct regional parties. Paris was without serious competitors for political, economic, and cultural power—there was no basis for durable alliances against the center. “Paris was not only comparable to New York and Washington, as was London, but also to Chicago in transport, Detroit and Cincinnati in manufacturing, and Boston in letters and education.”<sup>78</sup>

*Developments and Deviations: Parties for Agrarian Defense*

We distinguished in our initial paradigm (Fig. 3) between two "typical" cleavages at the *l* end of the territorial-cultural axis: on the *i* side the opposition of ethnic-linguistic minorities against the upholders of the dominant national culture (1), on the *a* side the opposition of the peasantry against economic exploitation by the financial, commercial, and industrial interests in the cities (3).

Our discussion of the "party formation" model brought out a few hypotheses about the transformation of cleavages of type 1 into a distinct parties for territorial defense. We shall now proceed to a parallel discussion for cleavages of type 3 in Fig. 3.

Our model predicts that agrarian interests are most likely to find direct political expression in systems of close alliance between nation-builders and the urban economic leadership—the four N–U cases in our eightfold typology. But in three of the four cases the opposition of the peasantry to the dominance of the cities tended to be closely linked up with a rejection of the moral and religious standards of the nation-builders. This produced D–L alliances in Scandinavia (type II) and the Netherlands (type IV) and R–L alliances in the secularizing southern countries (type VI). In the fourth N–U case (type VIII) there was no basis for explicit mergers of agrarian with religious opposition movements: the Belgian Roman Catholics were strong both in the urban "establishment" and among the farmers but, as it happened, were themselves torn between the *l* and the *g* poles over issues of ethnic-linguistic identity between Flemings and Walloons.

In only one of these four cases did distinctly agrarian parties emerge as stable elements of the national systems of electoral constellations—in the five countries of the North. A peasant party also established itself in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland. In the other countries of the West there may have been peasant lists at a few elections, but the interests of agriculture were generally aggregated into broader party fronts: the Conservative parties in Britain, in Prussia, and in France, the Christian parties elsewhere.

Why these differences? This raises a number of difficult questions about the economics of nation-building. In our three-step model we brutally reduced the options of the central elite to a choice between an alliance with the *landed* interests and an alliance with the *urban-financial-commercial-industrial*. This, of course, was never a matter of either/or but of continuing adjustment to changes in the overall equilibrium of forces in each territory. Our dichotomy does not help the description of any single case but simply serves to bring out contrasts among systems in the *relative* openness to alliances in the one direction or the other at the decisive stages of partisan mobilization.

To understand the conditions for alliance options in the one direction or the other it is essential to go into details of the *organization of rural society* at the time of the extensions of the suffrage. What counted more than anything else was the *concentration of resources for the control of the process of mobilization*, and in the countryside the *size of the units of production* and the *hierarchies of dependence* expressed in the tenure systems counted more than any other factors: the greater the concentration of economic power and social prestige the easier it was to control the rural votes and the greater

the political payoffs of alliances with landowners. It was no accident that Conservative leaders such as Bismarck and Disraeli took a lead in the extension of the suffrage; they counted on the loyalty and obedience of the dependent tenants and the agricultural workers.<sup>79</sup> To measure the political potentialities of the land-owning classes it would be essential to assemble comparative statistics on the proportions of the arable land and the agricultural manpower under the control of the large estate owners in each country. Unfortunately there are many lacunae in the historical statistics and comparisons are fraught with many hazards. The data at hand suggest that the countries we identified as typical "N-L cases" (types I, III, V, and VII in our eightfold model) all tended to be dominated by large estates, at least in their central territories. This was the case in most of England and Scotland, in Prussia east of the Elbe, in the *Reconquista* provinces of Spain, and in lowland Austria.<sup>80</sup> There were, to be sure, large estates in many of the countries we have identified as "N-U cases" (types II, IV, VI, and VIII), but such alliances as there were between urban and rural elites still left large groups of self-owning peasants free to join counter-alliances on their own. In Belgium and the Netherlands the holdings tended to be small and closely tied in with the urban economy. In France and Italy there were always marked regional variations in the size of holdings and the systems of land tenure, and the peasantry was deeply divided over cultural, religious, and economic issues. There were large estates in Jutland, in southern Sweden, and in southwestern Finland, and the owners of these helped to consolidate the conservative establishments in the early phases of competitive politics, but the broad masses of the Nordic peasantry could not be brought into any such alliances with the established urban elites. The traditions of independent peasant representation were strong and there was widespread rejection of the cultural influences from the encroaching cities. In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden the decisive "Left" fronts against the old regime were coalitions of urban radicals and increasingly estate-conscious peasants, but these coalitions broke up as soon as the new parties entered government. In Denmark the urban Radicals left the agrarian *Venstre*; in Norway and Sweden the old "Left" was split in several directions on moralist-religious as well as on economic lines. Distinctly agrarian parties also emerged in the two still "colonial" countries of the North, Finland and Iceland. In these predominantly primary-producing countries the struggle for external independence dominated political life in the decades after the introduction of universal suffrage, and there was not the same need for broad opposition fronts against the establishments *within* each nation.

Typically, agrarian parties appear to have emerged in countries or provinces

(1) where the cities and the industrial centers were still numerically weak at the time of the decisive extensions of the suffrage;

(2) where the bulk of the agricultural populations were active in family-size farming and either owned their farms themselves or were legally protected lease-holders largely independent of socially superior landowners;

(3) where there were important cultural barriers between the countryside and the cities and much resistance to the incorporation of farm production in the capitalist economy of the cities; and

(4) where the Catholic Church was without significant influence.

These criteria fit not only the Nordic countries but also the Protestant cantons of Switzerland and even some areas of German Austria. A *Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei* emerged in Berne, Zurich, and other heavily Alemannic-Protestant cantons after the introduction of PR in Switzerland in 1919. This was essentially a splinter from the old Radical-Liberal Party and recruited most of its support in the countryside. In the Catholic cantons the peasants remained loyal to their old party even after PR. Similarly in the Austrian First Republic the Nationalist *Lager* was split in a middle-class *Grossdeutsche Volkspartei* and a *Landbund* recruited among the anti-clerical peasants in Carinthia and Styria. The Christian Social Party recruited the bulk of its support among the Catholic peasantry but was able to keep the rural-urban tensions within bounds through elaborate organizational differentiations within the party.

#### *The Fourth Step: Variations in the Strength and Structure of the Working-Class Movements*

Our three-step model stops short at a point before the decisive thrust toward universal suffrage. It pinpoints sources of variations in the systems of division within the "independent" strata of the European national electorates, among the owners of property and the holders of professional or educational privileges qualifying them for the vote during the *régime censitaire*.

But this is hardly more than half the story. The extension of the suffrage to the lower classes changed the character of each national political system, generated new cleavages, and brought about a restructuring of the old alignments.

Why did we not bring these important developments into our model of European party systems? Clearly not because the three first cleavage lines were more important than the fourth in the explanation of *any one national party system*. On the contrary, in sheer statistical terms the fourth cleavage lines will in at least half of the cases under consideration explain much more of the variance in the distributions of full-suffrage votes than any one of the others.<sup>81</sup> We focused on the three first cleavage lines because these were the ones that appeared to account for most of the variance *among systems*: the interactions of the "center-periphery," state-church, and land-industry cleavages tended to produce much more marked, and apparently much more stubborn, differences among the national party systems than any of the cleavages brought about through the rise of the working-class movements.

We could of course have gone on to present a four-step model immediately (in fact, we did in an earlier draft), but this proved very cumbersome and produced a variety of uncomfortable redundancies. Clearly what had to be explained was not the emergence of a distinctive working-class movement at some point or other before or after the extension of the suffrage but the *strength and solidarity* of any such movement, its capacity to mobilize the underprivileged classes for action and its ability to maintain unity in the face of the many forces making for division and fragmentation. All the European polities developed some sort of working-class movement at some point be-



tween the first extensions of the suffrage and the various "post-democratic" attempts at the repression of partisan pluralism. To predict the *presence* of such movements was simple; to predict which ones would be strong and which ones weak, which ones unified and which ones split down the middle, required much more knowledge of national conditions and developments and a much more elaborate model of the historical interaction process. Our three-step model does not go this far for *any* party; it predicts the presence of such-and-such parties in polities characterized by such-and-such cleavages, but it does not give any formula for accounting for the strength or the cohesion of any one party. This *could* be built into the model through the introduction of various population parameters (percent speaking each language or dialect, percent committed to each of the churches or dissenting bodies, ratios of concentrations of wealth and dependent labor in industry versus landed estates), and possibly of some indicators of the cleavage "distance" (differences in the chances of interaction across the cleavage line, whether physically determined or normatively regulated), but any attempt in this direction would take us much too far in this all-too-long introductory essay. At this point we limit ourselves to an elementary discussion of the between-system variations which would have to be explained through such an extension of our model. We shall suggest a "fourth step" and point to a possible scheme for the explanation of differences in the formation of national party systems under the impact of universal suffrage.

Our initial scheme of analysis posited four decisive dimensions of cleavage in Western polities. Our model for the generation of party systems pinpointed three crucial junctures in national history corresponding to the first three of these dimensions:

<i>Cleavage</i>	<i>Critical juncture</i>	<i>Issues</i>
Center-Periphery	Reformation— Counter-Reformation: 16th-17th centuries	National vs. supranational religion National language vs. Latin
State-Church	National Revolution: 1789 and after	Secular vs. religious control of mass education
Land-Industry	Industrial Revolution: 19th century	Tariff levels for agricultural products; control vs. freedom for industrial enterprise

It is tempting to add to this a fourth dimension and a fourth juncture:

<i>Cleavage</i>	<i>Critical juncture</i>	<i>Issues</i>
Owner-Worker	The Russian Revolution: 1917 and after	Integration into national polity vs. commitment to international revolutionary movement

There is an intriguing cyclical movement in this scheme. The process gets under way with the breakdown of one supranational order and the establishment of strong territorial bureaucracies legitimizing themselves through the standardizing of nationally distinct religions and languages, and it ends with a conflict over national versus international loyalties within the last of the

strata to be formally integrated into the nation-state, the rural and the industrial workers.

The conditions for the development of distinctive working-class parties varied markedly from country to country within Europe. These differences emerged well before World War I. The Russian Revolution did not generate new cleavages but simply accentuated long-established lines of division within the working-class elite.

Our three-step model does not produce clear-cut predictions of these developments. True enough, the most unified and the most "domesticable" working-class movements emerged in the Protestant-dominated countries with the smoothest histories of nation-building: Britain, Denmark, and Sweden (types I and II in our model). Equally true, the Catholic-dominated countries with difficult or very recent histories of nation-building also produced deeply divided, largely alienated working-class movements—France, Italy, Spain (types V and VI). But other variables clearly have to be brought into account for variations in the intermediary zone between the Protestant Northwest and the Latin South (types III and IV, VII and VIII). Both the Austrian and the German working-class movements developed their distinctive counter-cultures against the dominant national elites. The Austrian Socialist *Lager*, heavily concentrated as it was in Vienna, was able to maintain its unity in the face of the clerical-conservatives and the pan-German nationalists after the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire.<sup>82</sup> By contrast, the German working-class movement was deeply divided after the defeat in 1918. Sharply contrasted conceptions of the rules of the political game stood opposed to each other and were to prove fatal in the fight against the wave of mass nationalism of the early thirties.<sup>83</sup> In Switzerland and the Netherlands (both type IV in our scheme), the Russian and the German revolutions produced a few disturbances, but the leftward split-offs from the main working class by parties were of little significance. The marked cultural and religious cleavages reduced the potentials for the Socialist parties, but the traditions of pluralism were gradually to help their entry into national politics.

Of all the intermediary countries Belgium (type VIII in our model) presents perhaps the most interesting case. By our overall rule, the Belgian working class should be deeply divided: a thoroughly Catholic country with a particularly difficult history of nation-building across two distinct language communities. In this case the smallness and the international dependence of the nation may well have created restraints on the internal forces of division and fragmentation. Val Lorwin has pointed to such factors in his analysis of Belgian-French contrasts:<sup>84</sup>

The reconciliation of the Belgian working class to the political and social order, divided though the workers are by language and religion and the Flemish-Walloon question, makes a vivid contrast with the experience of France. The differences did not arise from the material fruits of economic growth, for both long were rather low-wage countries, and Belgian wages were the lower. In some ways the two countries had similar economic development. But Belgium's industrialization began earlier; it was more dependent on international commerce, both for markets and for its transit trade; it had a faster growing population; and it became much more urbanized than France. The small new nation,

“the cockpit of Europe,” could not permit itself social and political conflict to the breaking point. Perhaps France could not either, but it was harder for the bigger nation to realize it.

The contrast between France, Italy, and Spain on the one hand and Austria and Belgium on the other suggests a possible generalization: the working-class movement tended to be much more divided in the countries where the “nation-builders” and the Church were openly or latently opposed to each other during the crucial phases of educational development and mass mobilization (our “S” cases, types V and VI) than in the countries where the Church had, at least initially, sided with the nation-builders against some common enemy outside (our “R” cases, an alliance against Protestant Prussia and the dependent Hapsburg peoples in the case of Austria; against the Calvinist Dutch in the case of Belgium). This fits the Irish case as well. The Catholic Church was no less hostile to the English than the secular nationalists, and the union of the two forces not only reduced the possibilities of a polarization of Irish politics on class lines but made the likelihood of a Communist splinter of any importance very small indeed.

It is tempting to apply a similar generalization to the Protestant North: the greater the internal division during the struggle for nationhood, the greater the impact of the Russian Revolution on the divisions within the working class. We have already pointed to the profound split within the German working class. The German Reich was a late-comer among European nations, and none of the territorial and religious conflicts within the nation was anywhere near settlement by the time the working-class parties entered the political arena. Among the northern countries the two oldest nations, Denmark and Sweden, were least affected by the Communist-Socialist division. The three countries emerging from colonial status were much more directly affected: Norway (domestically independent from 1814, a sovereign state from 1905) for only a brief period in the early 1920's; Finland (independent in 1917) and Iceland (domestically independent in 1916 and a sovereign state from 1944) for a much longer period. These differences among the northern countries have been frequently commented on in the literature of comparative politics. The radicalization of the Norwegian Labor Party has been interpreted within several alternative models, one emphasizing the alliance options of the party leaders, another the grass-roots reactions to sudden industrialization in the peripheral countryside, and a third the openness of the party structure and the possibilities of quick feedback from the mobilized voters. There is no doubt that the early mobilization of the peasantry and the quick victory over the old regime of the officials had left the emerging Norwegian working-class party much more isolated, much less important as a coalition partner, than its Danish and Swedish counterparts.<sup>85</sup> There is also a great deal of evidence to support the old Bull hypothesis of the radicalizing effects of sudden industrialization, but recent research suggests that this was only one element in a broad process of political change. The Labour Party recruited many more of its voters in the established cities and in the forestry and the fisheries districts, but the openness of the party structure allowed the radicals to establish themselves very quickly and to take over the majority wing of the party during the crucial years just after the Russian

Revolution.<sup>86</sup> This very openness to rank-and-file influences made the alliance with Moscow very short-lived; the Communists split off in 1924 and the old majority party "joined the nation" step by step until it took power in 1935.<sup>87</sup>

Only two of the Scandinavian countries retained strong Communist parties after World War II—Finland and Iceland. Superficially these countries have two features in common: prolonged struggles for cultural and political independence, and late industrialization. In fact the two countries went through very different processes of political change from the initial phase of nationalist mobilization to the final formation of the full-suffrage party system. One obvious source of variation was the distance from Russia. The sudden upsurge of the Socialist Party in Finland in 1906 (the party gained 37 percent of the votes cast at the first election under universal suffrage) was part of a general wave of mobilization against the Tsarist regime. The Russian Revolution of 1917 split Finland down the middle; the working-class voters were torn between their loyalty to their national culture and its social hierarchy and their solidarity with their class and its revolutionary defenders.<sup>88</sup> The victory of the "Whites" and the subsequent suppression of the Communist Party (1919–21, 1923–25, 1930–44) left deep scars; the upsurge of the leftist SKDL after the Soviet victory in 1945 reflected deep-seated resentments not only against the "lords" and the employers of labor but generally against the upholders of the central national culture. The split in the Icelandic labor movement was much less dramatic; in the oldest and smallest of the European democracies there was little basis for mass conflicts, and the oppositions between Communist sympathizers and Socialists appeared to reflect essentially personal antagonisms among groups of activists.<sup>89</sup>

## IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

We have pushed our attempt at a systematization of the comparative history of partisan oppositions in European politics up to some point in the 1920's, to the freezing of the major party alternatives in the wake of the extension of the suffrage and the mobilization of major sections of the new reservoirs of potential supporters. Why stop there? Why not pursue this exercise in comparative cleavage analysis right up to the 1960's? The reason is deceptively simple: *the party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's.* This is a crucial characteristic of Western competitive politics in the age of "high mass consumption": *the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates.* To most of the citizens of the West the currently active parties have been part of the political landscape since their childhood or at least since they were first faced with the choice between alternative "packages" on election day.

This continuity is often taken as a matter of course; in fact it poses an intriguing set of problems for comparative sociological research. An amazing number of the parties which had established themselves by the end of World

War I survived not only the onslaughts of Fascism and National Socialism but also another world war and a series of profound changes in the social and cultural structure of the polities they were part of. How was this possible? How were these parties able to survive so many changes in the political, social, and economic conditions of their operation? How could they keep such large bodies of citizens identifying with them over such long periods of time, and how could they renew their core clienteles from generation to generation?

There is no straightforward answer to any of these questions. We know much less about the internal management and the organizational functioning of political parties than we do about their sociocultural base and their external history of participation in public decision-making.<sup>90</sup>

To get closer to an answer we would clearly have to start out from a comparative analysis of the "old" and the "new" parties: the early mass parties formed during the final phase of suffrage extension, and the later attempts to launch new parties during the first decades of universal suffrage. It is difficult to see any significant exceptions to the rule that the parties which were able to establish mass organizations and entrench themselves in the local government structures *before* the final drive toward maximal mobilization have proved the most viable. The narrowing of the "support market" brought about through the growth of mass parties during this final thrust toward full-suffrage democracy clearly left very few openings for new movements. Where the challenge of the emerging working-class parties had been met by concerted efforts of countermobilization through nationwide mass organizations on the liberal and the conservative fronts, the leeway for new party formations was particularly small; this was the case whether the threshold of representation was low, as in Scandinavia, or quite high, as in Britain.<sup>91</sup> Correspondingly the "post-democratic" party systems proved markedly more fragile and open to newcomers in the countries where the privileged strata had relied on their local power resources rather than on nationwide mass organizations in their efforts of mobilization.

France was one of the first countries to bring a maximal electorate into the political arena, but the mobilization efforts of the established strata tended to be local and personal. A mass organization corresponding to the Conservative Party in Britain was never developed. There was very little "narrowing of the support market" to the right of the PCF and the SFIO and consequently a great deal of leeway for innovation in the party system even in the later phases of democratization.

There was a similar asymmetry in Germany: strong mass organizations on the left but marked fragmentation on the right. The contrast between Germany and Britain has been rubbed in at several points in our analysis of cleavage structures. The contrast with Austria is equally revealing; there the three-*Lager* constellation established itself very early in the mobilization process, and the party system changed astoundingly little from the Empire to the First Republic, and from the First to the Second. The consolidation of conservative support around the mass organizations of the Catholic Church clearly soaked up a great deal of the mobilization potential for new parties. In Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany the only genuine mass organization to the right of the Social Democrats was the Catholic *Zentrum*; this still left a

great deal of leeway for "post-democratic" party formations on the Protestant right. Ironically, it was the defeat of the National Socialist regime and the loss of the Protestant East which opened up an opportunity for some stabilization of the German party system. With the establishment of the regionally divided CDU/CSU the Germans were for the first time able to approximate a broad conservative party of the British type. It was not able to establish as solid a membership organization but proved, at least until the debacle of 1966, amazingly effective in aggregating interests across a wide range of strata and sectors of the federal community.

Two other countries of the West have experienced spectacular changes in their party systems since the introduction of universal suffrage and deserve some comment in this context—Italy and Spain. The *Italian* case comes close to the *German*: both went through a painful process of belated unification; both were deeply divided within their privileged strata between "nation-builders" (Prussians, Piedmontese) and Catholics; both had been slow to recognize the rights of the working-class organizations. The essential difference lay in the *timing* of the party developments. In the Reich a differentiated party structure had been allowed to develop during the initial mobilization phase and had been given another fifteen years of functioning during the Weimar Republic. In Italy, by contrast, the State-Church split was so profound that a structurally responsive party system did not see the light before 1919—three years before the March on Rome. There had simply been no time for the "freezing" of any party system before the post-democratic revolution, and there was very little in the way of a traditional party system to fall back on after the defeat of the Fascist regime in 1944. True, the Socialists and the *Popolari* had had their brief spell of experience of electoral mobilization, and this certainly counted when the PCI and the DC established themselves in the wake of the war. But the other political forces had never been organized for concerted electoral politics and left a great deal of leeway for irregularities in the mobilization market. The *Spanish* case has a great deal in common with the *French*: early unification but deep resentments against central power in some of the provinces and early universalization of the suffrage but weak and divided party organizations. The Spanish system of sham parliamentarianism and *caciquismo* had not produced electoral mass parties of any importance by the time the double threat of secessionist mobilization and working-class militancy triggered off nationalist counterrevolutions, first under Primo de Rivera in 1923, then with the Civil War in 1936. The entire history of Spanish electoral mass politics is contained in the five years of the Republic from 1931 to 1936; this is not much to go on, and it is significant that a lucid and realistic analyst like Juan Linz does not base his projections about the possible structuring of a future Spanish party system on the experiences of those five years but on a projection from Italian voting alignments.<sup>92</sup>

These four spectacular cases of disruptions in the development of national party systems do not in themselves invalidate our initial formulation. The most important of the party alternatives got set for each national citizenry during the phases of mobilization just before or just after the final extension of the suffrage and have remained roughly the same through decades of subsequent changes in the structural conditions of partisan choice. Even in the

three cases of France, Germany, and Italy the continuities in the alternatives are as striking as the disruptions in their organizational expressions. On this score the French case is in many ways the most intriguing. There was no period of internally generated disruption of electoral politics (the Petain-Laval phase would clearly not have occurred if the Germans had not won in 1940), but there have been a number of violent oscillations between plebiscitarian and representative models of democracy and marked organizational fragmentation both at the level of interest articulation and at the level of parties. In spite of these frequent upheavals no analyst of French politics is in much doubt about the underlying continuities of sentiment and identification on the right no less than on the left of the political spectrum. The voter does not just react to immediate issues but is caught in an historically given constellation of diffuse options for the system as a whole.

This "historicity" of the party alternatives is of crucial importance not only in the study of differences and similarities *across* nations but also *within* nations. The party alternatives vary in "age" and dominance not only from one overall system to another but equally from one locality to another within the same polity. To gain any detailed understanding of the processes of mobilization and alignment within any single nation we clearly need information not just about turnout and the division of votes but about the *timing of the formation of local party organizations*. This process of local entrenchment can be pinpointed in several ways: through organizational records, through membership registers, and through information about the lists presented at local elections. Representation in localities will in most countries of the West open up much more direct access to power resources than representation at the national level. The local officeholders tend to form the backbone of the party organization and are able to attract nuclei of active supporters through the distribution of whatever rewards their positions may command. To the parties of the underprivileged, access to the local machineries of government has tended to be of crucial importance for the development and maintenance of their organizational networks. They may have survived on their trade union strength, but the additional resource potentials inherent in local offices have meant much more to them than to the parties deriving their essential strength from the networks of economic power-holders or from the organizations of the Church.

The study of these processes of local entrenchment is still in its infancy in most countries, and serious comparative studies have so far never been attempted.<sup>93</sup> This is one of the great lacunae in empirical political sociology. There is an unfortunate asymmetry in our knowledge and our efforts at systematization: we know very little of the processes through which political alternatives *get set* for different local electorates, but we have a great deal of information about the circumstances in which one alternative or the other *gets chosen*. This, obviously, reflects differences in the access to data. It is a time-consuming and frustrating job to assemble data locality by locality on the formation, development, and, possibly, stagnation or disappearance, of party organizations. It is vastly easier to find out about choices among the alternatives once they are set; the machineries of electoral bookkeeping have for decade after decade heaped up data about mass choices and so have, at least since World War II, the mushrooming organizations of pollsters and

surveyors. What is needed now are systematic efforts to bring together information about the timing of local party entrenchments to pin down their consequences for voter alignments.<sup>94</sup> With the development of ecological data archives<sup>95</sup> in historical depth such analyses are bound to multiply. What is needed now is an international effort to maximize the coordination of such efforts.

With the development of such archives the *time dimension* is bound to gain prominence in the comparative study of mass politics. The early school of French electoral geographers were deeply conscious of the importance of local entrenchments and their perpetuation through time. Statistical ecologists such as Tingsten were less concerned with diachronic stability than with rates of change, particularly through the mobilization of the latest entrants into the national electorates, the workers and the women. The introduction of the sample survey as a technique of data gathering and analysis shortened the time perspective and brought about a concentration on synchronic variations; the panel technique focused attention on short-term fluctuations, and even the questions about past voting and family political traditions did not help to make surveys an adequate tool of developmental research. The last few years have seen an important reversal in this trend. There is not only a marked increase in scholarly interest in historical *time series data* for elections and other mass data<sup>96</sup> but also a greater concentration of work on *organizational developments and the freezing of political alternatives*. These are essential prerequisites for the growth of a truly comparative sociology of Western mass politics. To understand the current alignments of voters in our different countries it is not enough to analyze the contemporary issues and the contemporary sociocultural structure; it is even more important to go back to the initial formation of party alternatives and to analyze the interaction between the historically established foci of identification and the subsequent changes in the structural conditions of choice.

This joining of diachronic and synchronic analysis strategies is of particular importance for an understanding of the mass politics of the organizationally saturated "high mass consumption" societies of the sixties. Decades of structural change and economic growth have made the old, established alternatives increasingly irrelevant, but the high level of organizational mobilization of most sectors of the community has left very little leeway for a decisive breakthrough of new party alternatives. It is not an accident that situations of this type generate a great deal of frustration, alienation, and protestation within the organizationally least committed sections of the community, the *young* and, quite particularly, the *students*. The "revolt of the young" has found many varieties of expression in the sixties: new types of criminality and new styles of living but also new types of politics. The rejection of the old alternatives, of the politics of party representation, has perhaps found its most spectacular expression in the civil rights struggle and the student protest movement in the United States,<sup>97</sup> but the disaffection of the young from the established parties, particularly the parties in power, is a widespread phenomenon even in Europe. The widespread disagreements with the national powers-that-be over foreign and military policy constitute only one among several sources of such disillusionment; the distance between levels of aspiration and levels of achievement in the welfare state has clearly also been of importance.



The probability that such resentments will coalesce into movements broad enough to form viable new parties is on the whole low, but the processes of socialization and recruitment within the old ones will clearly be affected. Much, of course, depends on local concentrations and the height of the thresholds of representation. In the low-threshold Scandinavian system the waves of disaffection have already disrupted the equilibrium of the old parties: there have been important splinter movements on the Socialist Left, and these have sapped some of the strategic strength of the old Social Democratic parties. This happened first in Denmark: the split-up of the Communist party led to the development of a remarkably vigorous national-Titoist party on the Socialist Left and brought about serious losses for the Social Democrats, most spectacularly in the autumn of 1966. Much the same sort of development has taken place in Norway since 1961. A splinter movement within the governing Labor Party suddenly broke through and gained two seats in 1961; for the first time since the war Labor was brought into a minority position. This was the beginning of a series of crises. By 1965 the Left splinter had grown to 6 percent of the votes cast and the Labor Party was finally out of power. Recent results for Sweden show similar developments there; the CP has switched to a "national" line close to the Danish model and has gained ground.

There is a crucial consideration in any comparative analysis of such changes in party strength: Which parties have been in power, which ones have been in opposition? In the fifties many observers feared the development of permanent majority parties. It was argued that the parties in government had all the advantages and could mobilize so many strategic resources on their side that the opposition might be left powerless forever more. It is heartening to see how quickly these observers had to change their minds. In the sixties the mounting "revolutions of rising expectations" clearly tend to place governing parties at a terrifying disadvantage: they have to take the responsibility for predicaments they can no longer control; they become the targets of continuous waves of demands, grievances, criticisms, and no longer command the resources needed to meet them. The troubles of the governing Labor parties in Scandinavia and in Great Britain can be understood only in this light. The welfare state, the spread of the "car and TV" culture, the educational explosion—all these developments have placed the governing authorities under increasing strains and made it very difficult for the old working-class parties to retain the loyalties of the younger generation. Even the Swedish Social Democrats, the most intelligent and the most farsighted of the Labor rulers in Europe, seem finally to have reached the end of their era. They met the demands for an extension of the welfare state with innovative skill through the development of the supplementary pensions scheme after 1956, but they could not live on that forever. Their recent troubles center on the "queuing society": queues in front of the vocational schools and the universities, queues for housing, queues for health services. Swedish workers enjoy perhaps the highest standard of living in the world, but this does not help the Swedish Social Democratic government. The working-class youngsters see others get more education, better housing, better services than they do, and they develop signs of frustration and alienation. It is significant that in all the three Scandinavian countries the Social Democratic losses have been

most marked in the cities and quite small in the rural periphery; the governing parties run into the greatest difficulties in the areas where the "revolution of expectations" has run the furthest.

It is still too early to say what kinds of politics this will engender. There will clearly be greater fluctuations than before. This may increase the chances of government by regular alternation, but it may also trigger off new varieties of coalition-mongering: politicians are naturally tempted to "spread the blame," to escape electoral retaliation through the sharing of responsibilities with competing parties. Developments in Denmark suggest a trend toward open negotiations across all established party barriers. Norway is experiencing a four-party coalition of the non-Socialist front; there are strains among the four but it seems to work because each party finds it easy to blame its failure to perform on electoral promises on the need for unity within the government. In Sweden this alternative has not yet been tried, but there is much talk about a "Norwegian solution." The events in the German *Bundesrepublik* during the summer and autumn of 1966 show similar processes at work in quite a different political setting: an increasing disenchantment with the top political leadership and with the established system of decision-making, whatever the party coloring of the current incumbents.

To understand these developments and to gauge the probabilities of the possible projections into the future it will be essential to build up, monograph by monograph, analysis by analysis, a comparative sociology of competitive mass politics. If this lengthy introduction to a volume of widely differing national analyses has helped to suggest new themes and new perspectives for such research and such systematization, it will have served its purpose.

#### NOTES

1. Single-nation analysts sometimes reveal extraordinarily little awareness of this historical dimension of political research: in their final theoretical chapter of *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), Bernard Berelson and his colleagues ask themselves why "democracies have survived *through the centuries*" (p. 311, our italics). What is problematic about this loose formulation is not the error of historical fact (only the United States had had competitive politics and near-universal suffrage, although for white males only, for more than a hundred years, and most Western polities did not reach the stage of full-suffrage democracy before the end of World War I) but the assumption that mass democracy had had such a long history that events at the early stages of political mobilization no longer had any impact on current electoral alignments. In fact in most of the Western polities the decisive party-forming developments took place in the decades immediately before and after the extension of the suffrage, and even in the 1950's these very events were still alive in the personal memories of large proportions of the electorates.

2. For a review of current efforts to establish "statistical histories of national political developments" see S. Rokkan, "Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National Integration," a chapter in J. LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966).

3. For a highly illuminating analysis of the place of the theory of parties in the history of political thought see Erwin Faul, "Verfemung, Duldung und Anerkennung des Parteiwesens in der Geschichte des politischen Denkens," *Pol. Viertelj.schr.* 5(1) (March, 1964), pp. 60-80.

4. For a general discussion of current usages of the term "party" in the context of a comparative analysis of pluralistic vs. monolithic political systems, see Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

5. "Wenn eine Partei eine geschlossene, durch die Verbandsordnung dem Verwalt-

ungsstab eingegliederte Vergesellschaftung wird—wie z.B. die "parte Guelfa". . . —, *so ist sie keine Partei mehr sondern ein Teilverband des politischen Verbandes*" (our italics), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (4th ed.; Tübingen: Mohr, 1956), I, p. 168; see the attempted translation in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 409–10.

6. W. Chambers, *Parties in a New Nation* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), p. 80.

7. Ruth Schachter, "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 55 (1961), p. 301.

8. For a general analysis of this process see S. M. Lipset *et al.*, *Union Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 268–9.

9. E. A. Ross, *The Principles of Sociology* (New York: Century, 1920), pp. 164–5. ("Society is sewn together by its inner conflicts.")


10. G. Simmel, *Soziologie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1923 and 1958), Chap. IV; see the translation in *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

11. First published in London, The Bodley Head, 1911; quoted from Penguin ed., 1946, p. 238.

12. T. Parsons, R. F. Bales, and E. A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (New York: The Free Press, 1953), Chaps. III and V.

13. The first extensive development of the schema is found in T. Parsons and N. J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (London: Routledge, 1956). A simplified restatement is found in T. Parsons, "General Theory in Sociology," in R. K. Merton *et al.* (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York, Basic Books, 1959), pp. 39–78. Extensive revisions in the schema were adumbrated in T. Parsons "Pattern Variables Revisited," *Am. Sociol. Rev.*, 25 (1960), pp. 467–83, and have been presented in further detail in "On the Concept of Political Power," *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, 107 (1963), pp. 232–62. For an attempt to use the Parsonian schema in political analysis see William Mitchell, *The Polity* (New York: The Free Press, 1962); see also his recent *Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

14. Parsons has specified the "inputs" and "outputs" of the I–G interchange in these terms:



See "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 80–120.

15. Talcott Parsons, in a private communication, has pointed out a number of difficulties in these formulations: we have singled out the dominant functional attributes of a series of concrete political acts without considering their many secondary functions. Clearly a vote can be treated as an act of support of a particular movement (L–I) or a particular set of leaders (I–G) as well as a counter in the direct interaction between households and constituted territorial authorities (L–G). Our point is that in the study of electoral mass politics in the competitive systems of the West a crucial distinction has to be made between the vote as formal act of legitimation (the elected representative is legitimated through the votes cast, *even* by those of his opponents) and the vote as an expression of party loyalty. The standardization of electoral procedures and the formalization of the act of preference underscored this distinction between legitimation (L–G) and support (L–I). For further discussion of these developments see S. Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting and Political Participation," *Arch. Eur. Sociol.*, 2 (1961), pp. 132–52, and T. Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 29 (June, 1964), pp. 339–57, particularly the discussion of Rokkan's article, pp. 354–6.

16. Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behaviour*, (London: Routledge, 1962).

17. In conformity with Parsonian conventions we use *lower-case* symbols for the parts of *subsystems* and *capitals* for the parts of *total* systems.

18. Sir Lewis Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1930), quoted from second ed. (1961), p. 183.

19. For detailed discussion of the linkage between religious cleavages and political alliances in the United States see Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), Chap. 4, and "Religion and Politics in the American Past and Present" in R. Lee and M. Martin, *Religion and Social Conflict* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 69–126.

20. For details see S. Rokkan and H. Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics" in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 162–238, and the chapter by S. Rokkan below.

21. See Kenneth O. Morgan, *Wales in British Politics 1868–1922* (Cardiff: Univ. of Wales Press, 1963), pp. 245–55. For a detailed ecological analysis of vote distributions in Wales 1861–1951 see K. R. Cox, *Regional Anomalies in the Voting Behavior of the Population of England and Wales: 1921–1951*, diss., Univ. of Illinois, 1966. Cox explains the strength of the Liberals in Wales in much the same terms as Rokkan and Valen explain the strength of the Left "counterculture" in the south and west of Norway: the predominance of small farms, the egalitarian class structure, linguistic opposition, and religious nonconformity.

22. For Norway see the writings of S. Rokkan already cited. For Finland see Pirkko Rommi, "Finland" in *Problemer i nordisk historie-forskning*. II. Framveksten av de politiske partier i de nordiske land på 1800-tallet (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), pp. 103–30; E. Allardt, "Patterns of Class Conflict and Working Class Consciousness in Finnish Politics" in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, pp. 97–131; and the chapter by E. Allardt and Pesonen below.

23. See S. Rokkan, "Electoral mobilization . . .," *op. cit.*

24. For a definition of this concept and a specification of possible indicators see Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 55 (1961), pp. 493–514.

25. The contrast between "primordial attachment" to the "givens" of social existence (contiguity, kinship, local languages, and religious customs—all at our *l* pole) and "national identification" (our *g* pole) has been described with great acumen by Clifford Geertz in "The Integrative Revolution," in C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105–57; see Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *Brit. J. Sociol.*, 7 (1957), pp. 130–45.

26. For an analysis of steps in the extension of citizenship rights and duties to all accountable adults see S. Rokkan "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting and Political Participation," *Arch. Eur. de Sociol.*, 2 (1961), pp. 132–52, and the chapter by R. Bendix and S. Rokkan, "The Extension of Citizenship to the Lower Classes," in R. Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: Wiley, 1964). For a review of the politics of educational developments see R. Ulich, *The Education of Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1961).

27. This, of course, was not a peculiarity of Catholic-Calvinist countries; it can be observed in a number of polities with geographically dispersed if locally segregated ethnic minorities. For an insightful discussion of a similar development in Russia, see C. E. Woodhouse and H. J. Tobias, "Primordial Ties and Political Process in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: The Case of the Jewish Bund," *Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist.*, 8 (1966), pp. 331–60.

28. For detailed statistics see J. P. Kruijt, *Verzuiling* (Zaandijk: Heijnis, 1959) and J. P. Kruijt and W. Goddijn, "Verzuiling en ontzuiling als sociologisch proces" in A. J. den Hollander *et al.* (eds.), *Drift en Koers* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962), pp. 227–63. For an attempt at a broader interpretation of *Verzuiling* and its consequences for the theory of democracy, see Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, manuscript, 1967. For comparative interpretations of data on religious segmentation see David O. Moberg, "Religion and Society in the Netherlands and in America," *Am. Quart.*, 13 (1961), pp. 172–78, and G. Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (rev. ed.; Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books,

1963), pp. 359–66; see also J. Mathes (ed.), *Religiöser Pluralismus und Gesellschaftsstruktur* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965).

29. For general accounts of the development of party oppositions and segmented politics in the Netherlands, see H. Daalder, "Parties and Politics in the Netherlands," *Pol. Studies*, 3 (1955), pp. 1–16 and his chapter in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966). Detailed party chronologies and "pedigrees" are given in H. Daalder "Nederland: het politieke stelsel" in L. van der Land (ed.), *Repertorium van de Sociale Wetenschappen*, I (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1958), pp. 213–38.

30. Cited in S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, op. cit., p. 258; for further breakdowns from a sample of a suburb of Amsterdam see L. van der Land, et al., *Kiezer en verkiezing* (Amsterdam: Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek, 1963), mimeo. For analyses of a nationwide survey from 1964 see Lijphart, op. cit., Chap. II.

31. Kruijt and Goddijn, op. cit.

32. The concept of "membership crystallization" has been formulated by analogy with the concept *status* crystallization developed by Gerhard Lenski in "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 21 (1956), pp. 458–64; see Erik Allardt, "Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Structure," and Ulf Himmelstrand, "A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depoliticization and Political Involvement," both in S. Rokkan (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation* (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1962), pp. 67–110.

33. For an analysis of this process see Ulf Torgersen, "The Structure of Urban Parties in Norway During the First Period of Extended Suffrage 1884–1898," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages . . .*, op. cit., pp. 377–99.

34. The Swedish Liberals split into two parties over alcohol policies in 1923 but these merged again in 1934. A new party, the Christian Democrat Union, was set up by Free Church leaders in 1964, but failed in the election that year.

35. For a comparative analysis of differences in the organization of estate assemblies, see especially Otto Hintze, "Typologie der ständischen Verfassung des Abendlandes," *Hist. Zs.*, 141 (1930), pp. 229–48; F. Hartung and R. Mousnier, "Quelques problèmes concernant la monarchie absolue," *Relazioni X Congr. Int. Sci. Storiche*, IV (Florence, 1955); and R. R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution: The Challenge* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), Ch. II.

36. The critical issue between the two sectors of the economy concerned foreign trade: Should domestic agriculture be protected against the cheaper grain produced overseas or should the manufacturing industry be supported through the supply of cheaper food for their workers? For a comparative review of the politics of the grain tariffs see Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1943).

37. *The Making of Victorian England* (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 218, our italics. For a broader treatment see F. M. L. Thompson, *English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Routledge, 1963).

38. James Cornford, "The Transformation of Conservatism in the Late 19th Century," *Victorian Studies*, 7 (1963), pp. 35–66.

39. On the unsuccessful attempts of the Progressive Liberals to broaden their working-class base, see especially Thomas Nipperdey, *Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1918* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1963), pp. 187–92, and W. Link "Das Nationalverein für das liberale Deutschland," *Pol. Vierteljahrschr.*, 5 (1964), pp. 422–44. On the "plebiscitarian nationalism" of Friedrich Naumann and Max Weber, see Theodor Heuss, *Friedrich Naumann* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1957), W. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890–1920* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1959), and the discussions at the Weber centenary conference at Heidelberg reported in O. Stammer (ed.), *Max Weber und die Soziologie heute* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965).

40. For a detailed presentation of the background of these developments see Bryn J. Hovde, *The Scandinavian Countries 1720–1865* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1948), particularly Chaps. VIII–IX and XIII.

41. Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," *Peking Review*, 8 (Sept. 3, 1965), p. 24.

42. See S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation*, op. cit., Chaps. 5, 6, and 7.

43. This is the phrase used by Ernest Fraenkel, "Parlament und öffentliche Meinung,"

in *Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie: Festgabe für H. Herzfeld* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958), p. 178. For further details on German developments, see the recent study by Günther Roth, *The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany* (Totowa: Bedminster Press, 1963), Chaps. VII-X.

44. One of the first political analysts to call attention to these developments was Herbert Tingsten, then editor-in-chief of the leading Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, see his autobiography, *Mitt Liv: Tidningen* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1963), pp. 224-31. For further details see S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics." *Daedalus*, 93 (1964), pp. 271-303.

45. On Austrian politics since 1945 see A. Vodopivec, *Wer regiert in Österreich?* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1961), and the chapter by F. C. Engelmann on Austria in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, *op. cit.*

46. See Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), *Polycentrism: The New Factor in International Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1962); L. Labedz (ed.), *Revisionism* (New York: Praeger, 1962), and S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure . . .", *op. cit.*

47. Erik Allardt, "Patterns of Class Conflict and Working Class Consciousness in Finnish Politics" in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-131.

48. See chapter by S. Rokkan in this volume and the recent study of Egil Fivelsdal of unionization and politics among white-collar workers in Norway, *Funksjonærenes syn på faglige og politiske spørsmål* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964).

49. See Andrew G. Whiteside, *Austrian National Socialism before 1918* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), and his article on Austria in T. Rogger and E. Weber (eds.), *The European Right* (London: Weidenfeld, 1965), pp. 328-63.

50. For a detailed analysis of the Austrian "invention" of mass anti-Semitism see Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

51. R. Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich: Piper, 1965), esp. Chap. 26.

52. On the electoral support for the NSDAP, see especially Sten S. Nilson, "Wahlsoziologische Probleme des Nationalsozialismus" *Zs. Ges Staatswiss*, 110 (1954), pp. 229-311; K. D. Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (3d ed.; Villingen: Ring-Verlag, 1960), Chap. VI; and Alfred Milatz, "Das Ende der Parteien im Spiegel der Wahlen 1930 bis 1933," in E. Matthias and R. Morsey (eds.), *Das Ende der Parteien 1933* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1960), pp. 741-93. A summary of evidence from electoral analyses is given in S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-51. The best analysis of the rural strength of the NSDAP is still Rudolf Heberle's *From Democracy to Nazism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1945). The fuller German manuscript from 1932 has recently been published as *Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1963).

53. Such similarities in social bases and in attitudes to national authority obviously do not necessarily imply similarities in organizational tactics and in actual behavior toward opponents. There is no implication that all such movements would conform to the Fascist or the National Socialist *ethos* if victorious. For a discussion of the evidence for Italy, France, and the United States see S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, Chap. V, as well as "Radical Rightists of Three Decades—Coughlinites, McCarthyites and Birchers," in Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), and "Beyond the Backlash," *Encounter*, 23 (Nov., 1964), pp. 11-24. For Norway, see Nilson, *op. cit.* For an interesting analysis of the Social Credit Movement in Canada in similar terms see Donald Smiley, "Canada's Poujadists: a New Look at Social Credit," *The Canadian Forum*, 42 (Sept., 1962), pp. 121-23: the Socreds are anti-metropolitan and anti-institutional and they advocate pure plebiscitarian politics against organized group interests and established elites.

54. In a recent review of Western European developments Hans Daalder has argued this point with great force. It is impossible to understand the development, structure, and operation of party systems without a study of the extent of elite competition *before* the industrial and the democratic revolutions. He singles out Britain, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Sweden as the countries with the strongest traditions of conciliar

pluralism and points to the consequences of these preconditions for the development of integrated party systems. See H. Daalder, "Parties, Elites and Political Development(s) in Western Europe" in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, *op. cit.* For a fuller discussion of contrasts in the character of the nation-building process, see S. P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics*, 18 (1966), pp. 378-414.

55. This is Faul's term for the initial phase in the growth of parties, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-9.

56. See especially Gunnar Olsson, *Hattar och mössor: Studier över partiväsendet i Sverige 1751-1762* (Gothenburg: Akademi-förlaget, 1963).

57. For a review of this literature see S. M. Lipset, "Introduction: Ostrogorski and the Analytical Approach to the Comparative Study of Political Parties," in M. I. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (abridged ed.; New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. IX-LXV.

58. "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism" in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, *op. cit.*

59. For reviews of similarities and differences among two English-speaking democracies, see the chapter by R. Alford and A. D. Robinson in this volume and also L. Lipson, "Party Systems in the United Kingdom and the Older Commonwealth," *Pol. Studies*, 7 (1959), pp. 12-31; S. M. Lipset, *The First New Nation*, Chaps. 5, 6, and 7; and R. Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), esp. Chap. XII.

60. Leon D. Epstein, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 63 (March, 1964), pp. 46-59.

61. The basic reference work on the history of PR in Europe is still Karl Braunias, *Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1932) I-II. Polemical works such as F. A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?* (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1941); E. Lakeman and J. D. Lambert, *Voting in Democracies* (London: Faber, 1955); and H. Unkelbach, *Grundlagen der Wahlsystematik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1956) offer a great wealth of information but do not contribute much to the understanding of the *sociocultural conditions* for the success of the one or the other procedure of electoral aggregation. See S. Rokkan, "Electoral Systems," article in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (forthcoming).

62. Braunias, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 201-4.

63. See J. Gilissen, *Le régime représentatif en Belgique depuis 1790* (Brussels: Renaissance du Livre, 1958), pp. 126-30.

64. The rise of the nationwide movement for universal suffrage and the parallel mobilization of support for the Liberals and the Social Democrats has been described in great detail by S. Carlsson, *Lantmannapolitiken och industrialismen* (Lund: Gleerup, 1952), and T. Vallinder, *I kamp för demokrati* (Stockholm: Natur o. kultur, 1962). For a convenient account of the bargaining over suffrage extension and PR see Douglas V. Verney, *Parliamentary Reform in Sweden 1866-1921* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), Chap. VII.

65. On the ties between the Church and the Right in France, see René Rémond, *La droite en France de 1815 à nos jours* (Paris: Aubier, 1954), pp. 239-45.

66. Types VI to VII in our typology, the deviant type V is discussed in detail below.

67. For an illuminating analysis of the sociocultural characteristics of the classic region of counterrevolutionary resistance, see Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (London: Arnold, 1965).

68. For an interesting approach to the analysis of the political consequences of "monocephality" vs. "polycephality" see Juan Linz and A. de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in R. L. Merritt and S. Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 267-319.

69. This point has been developed in further detail in S. Rokkan, "Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National Integration," *op. cit.*

70. For an analysis of the three decisive cleavage lines in Belgian politics, the language conflict, the church-school issue, and the owner-worker opposition, see Val Lorwin's chapter on Belgium in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, *op. cit.*, It is interesting to note that the same factors disrupted Belgian Fascism during the 1930s and made it impossible to build a single major nationalist-Fascist party; see