management. Finally, we hope to deepen our understanding of how participation translates to voice for the individuals taking action.

Looking beyond the academic literature and from a practical standpoint, we hope the book will provide actionable research, research that can inform the strategic choices organizers make as they navigate the uncertain political terrain that defines the present state of US democracy, better enabling them to take action that builds voice for ordinary people.

Our case selection gives us the analytic leverage to examine patterns that emerge across outlying cases of powerful collective action. We know the success of collective action is unusual in contemporary democracy; is it also idiosyncratic? Using a most-different case-selection method, we sought to select cases in a way that would allow us to elucidate whether there were any consistent patterns across them. An additional ambiguity remains, however: How do we know whether the organizations in our cases actually built power? Our argument rests on the idea that they did. Yet, how can we examine this power?

3 *Defining and Measuring Power*

> Here's the interesting thing that happens when you're president. . . . So, you start [as] a community organizer, and you're struggling to try to get people to recognize each other's common interests and you're trying to get some project done in a small community, you start thinking, "Ok, you know what? This alderman's a knucklehead, they're resistant to doing the right thing, and so I need to get more knowledge, more power, more influence, so that I can really have an impact." And so you go to the state legislature, and you look around and you say, "Well these jamokes"—not all of them, but I'm just saying you start getting this sense that this is just like dealing with the alderman. So, "Nah, I got to do something different." Then you go to the US Senate and you're looking around and you're like, "Aw man!" And then when you're president, you're sitting in these international meetings, and it's like the G20 and you got all these world leaders, and it's the same people . . . the same dynamics. It's just that there's a bigger spotlight, there's a bigger stage. . . . The nature of human dynamics does not change from level to level. . . . The way power works at every level, at the United Nations or in your neighborhood, is, "Do you have a community that stands behind what you stand for?" And if you do, you'll have more power. And if you don't, you won't.
>
> FORMER PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NOVEMBER 2018

Reflecting on his experiences as the president of the United States, a United States senator, an Illinois state senator, and a community organizer, Obama argues that "at every level" the key question to ask regarding one's own power is the question of constituency: "Do you have a community that stands behind what you stand for? . . . If you do, you'll have more power. And if you don't, you won't." In Obama's analysis, people become a source of power when they "stand behind" a leader negotiating for something.

Obama's analysis speaks to essential questions about collective action and

how it gets translated into political power. Most fundamentally, what does it mean for a community to "stand behind" a leader? If we shift Obama's analysis of political power away from the context of elected officials and apply it to the context of organizations, a distinct set of questions emerges. How do community leaders gain access to the higher-level negotiations? Unlike the president of the United States, who is invited to the G20 summit because of the authority granted by his office, leaders of grassroots organizations are not automatically granted seats at any decision-making table. How do they obtain and hold onto those seats? And how do they use them?

These questions are at the heart of the analysis in this book. How do leaders translate collective action into political power—or not? How do they build a community that stands behind them, and then wield the power of that community in political negotiations? Most previous work in this arena—as well as common assumptions in the public sphere—assumes that the central challenge of collective action is to generate numbers: How do leaders overcome problems like free riding to get more people to take more action? The more people a leader like Obama has standing behind him, the more powerful he will be. We extend this work to further probe the meaning of "stand behind." A community that stands behind a leader does not just vote, rally, or march once. When Obama was negotiating with aldermen, state senators, US senators, or international leaders, he had to have confidence that his base would remain loyal over time. Understanding this logic illuminates additional pathways through which collective action can become powerful.

This chapter outlines how we made power shifts visible across our four core cases. Our strategy for identifying power rests on a definition of political power that examines how it is (a) interactional and dynamic, as opposed to static, and (b) present at multiple levels. Power is not only about winning elections or passing policies; it is also about getting a seat at the decision-making table, shaping the terms of the debate, and impacting the underlying narratives that determine the way people interpret and understand political issues. Given the dynamic and multifaceted nature of power, taking a unitary approach to measuring it across all of our cases made little sense. Instead, we developed context-sensitive approaches to making visible how power shifted in our cases.

"As a Citizen, I Didn't Feel Whole"

In 1902, state delegates gathered for the Virginia Constitutional Convention and proclaimed their intent to suppress the black vote. Representative R. L. Gordon put it bluntly: "I told the people of my county before they sent me here

that I intended . . . to disenfranchise every negro that I could disenfranchise . . . and as few white people as possible" (Ford 2016). With support from the press—the *Richmond Dispatch* characterized the state's postbellum constitution as "that miserable apology to organic law which was forced upon Virginians by carpetbaggers, scalawags, and Negroes supported by Federal bayonets" (Heinemann et al. 2007, 276)—delegates ratified a constitution that permanently disenfranchised Virginians with felony convictions. Because the carceral state has always disproportionately targeted African Americans, stripping former offenders of the right to vote was and is one of the many tools used to disenfranchise the black population in Virginia and, indeed, across the United States.[1]

The Virginia constitution laid a foundation defining voting rights in the state that persisted throughout the twentieth century. By 2014, Virginia tied Kentucky as the two states with the highest disenfranchisement rate in the nation, and was one of only four states that permanently rescinded the political rights of former felons (Gibson 2015; Brennan Center 2018). Its constitution did, however, grant the governor the authority to restore the right to vote to individuals on a case-by-case basis. Between 1938 and 2014, Virginia governors used that authority sparingly, restoring voting rights to a combined total of 22,367 people over a seventy-six-year period (Fiske 2016). This number represented a small fraction of the total number of people disenfranchised. In 2014, advocates for criminal-justice reform estimated that 6.1 million Americans were disenfranchised by such laws, including nearly one in five black residents of Virginia, the nation's first slave state (Uggen, Larson, and Shannon 2016).

In August 2016, more than a century after the 1902 convention, Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe stood outside the capitol building where the state's constitution had been ratified. McAuliffe declared that he had individually restored the rights of more than thirteen thousand formerly incarcerated Virginians, more than half the number of people whose rights had been restored over a seventy-six-year period.[2] As he made the announcement, he stood in front of—but seemed overshadowed by—a civil-rights memorial. "It seemed like reaching for the moon," read the granite inscription above McAuliffe, a quote from legendary civil-rights organizer Barbara Johns, whose bronze statue had been cast in a defiant stance. Virginia's rights-restoration effort was part of the largest voter-registration drive in state history. By 2018, the McAuliffe administration had helped restore the franchise to 173,000 returning citizens. In an interview, the data director of Virginia's Civic Engagement Table called attention to the "unprecedented [number] of registrations" that had resulted from the rights-restoration campaign. It was unprecedented

"both in raw numbers and percentage-wise," he continued, "outside of, like, women getting the right to vote when suddenly you doubled your eligible population. I think that's . . . something that will pay dividends for a long time."

By most accounts, New Virginia Majority and its coexecutive director Tram Nguyen were two of the key forces behind the rights-restoration campaign. At the organization's tenth-anniversary gala in February 2017, we witnessed NVM's other coexecutive director, Jon Liss, thank the "allies, elected officials, cabinet officials, and folks who'd organized thousands of voters" who filled one of the historic John Marshall ballrooms in downtown Richmond. Jamaa Bickley King, NVM's board chair, and his father—grandson and son, respectively, of the civil-rights attorney Oliver Hill, who helped overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine—presented the organization's inaugural Oliver W. Hill Freedom Award to McAuliffe for doing what Jon called the "difficult, unprecedented, but right thing." In McAuliffe's acceptance speech, he referred to NVM leaders on a first-name basis. The same thing happened at a national meeting of major Democratic Party donors nine months later. The meeting we observed took place just after the off-year elections, in which Democrat Ralph Northam was chosen to succeed McAuliffe as governor of Virginia. Occurring in the first major race after Trump's victory in 2016, Northam's election was a significant win for Democrats. At this gathering of some of the nation's biggest Democratic donors, governor-elect Northam videoconferenced into the meeting. After a rousing introduction and hearty round of applause, Northam began by saying, "The first thing I want to say is hi and thank you to Jon and Tram [the leaders of New Virginia Majority]." In the presence of enormous Democratic wealth and a collection of people who were undoubtedly donors to Northam's campaign, it was significant that NVM got the first shout-out.

It was not only NVM's allies who recognized the organization's leadership in voting rights and its political muscle, however. The same conservative newspaper that had reported on the 1902 convention (now called the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*) submitted a Freedom of Information Act request for McAuliffe's records related to re-enfranchisement of returning citizens after he issued a blanket restoration of voting rights. Local newspapers reported the revelations. One lede read, "When Gov. Terry McAuliffe announced that he was restoring the political rights of about 206,000 felons, it came as no surprise to New Virginia Majority, which had fliers already printed encouraging would-be voters to register immediately. The progressive activist group got an official invite days ahead of the April 22 news conference and Tram Nguyen, the group's co-executive director, had more than three weeks' notice that the

order was coming" (Zullow and Moomaw 2016). Much of NVM's reputation came through its electoral work. The organization successfully filed 148,025 voter-registration cards in the 2016 electoral cycle, 1,524 of which were collected by a fifty-four-year-old NVM organizer.[3] Of the people this organizer registered, about eight hundred were formerly incarcerated citizens. "As an ex-felon, myself, I couldn't vote and I didn't feel—as a citizen I didn't feel whole," he said. "I was paying taxes. I had to follow laws, and I had no say in what these laws were." One man he had helped register had been convicted of a felony in the 1950s for stealing a chicken. "What they have done with mass incarceration, and by putting a felony on us [black men] every chance they got, is that they have froze us out of most of the world," the NVM organizer said. "They've created an underclass." In 2016, he voted for the first time in his life.

In this case, as in our other cases, we argue that NVM was able to achieve a visible victory—rights restoration for returning citizens—in a way that not only secured a policy win but also shifted the underlying power dynamics in Virginia. NVM did so by putting the organization and its leaders into relationship with power players, including the state's current and former governors. How do we make such shifts in power visible? Although many would agree that power shifts are often the goal of most collective action, making that power visible in consistent, measurable ways is no easy task. However, the research design and the arguments we developed as a result of it depended on our ability to assess whether power actually moved. Did the organizations in our study shift power in the ways that we are claiming?

What Is Power?

Our argument about why prisms are helpful for understanding power building begins with a definition of power that focuses on its dynamic and somewhat elusive nature. In defining power, we focus on two key attributes: (a) power is expressed as the interactional relationship between (at least) two political actors, and (b) power has, as theorist Steven Lukes argues, multiple faces, some of which are largely obscured from immediate view (Lukes 2005; Gaventa 1982; Pierson 2015). This approach to understanding power builds on multiple research traditions, including work on social-movement outcomes (Amenta et al. 2010; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999), a strain of which argues that a movement achieves power (or influence) when it alters the pattern of interests its targets use to make strategic choices (Luders 2010). Power is not a static good that organizations obtain; instead, it is expressed in relationships that constantly change as the context changes, because it is dependent

on a dynamic and situational relationship between an organization and the interests of political decision makers. To obtain power, organizations must negotiate for it (Hansen 1991).

If power is dynamic, our theories must account for contingency. On the one hand, the importance of contingency in collective action may seem to be a facile point. Yet, on the other hand, scholars and practitioners alike systematically underestimate it (Staggenborg 2016; Ganz 2000; Tarrow 1998; Morris and Staggenborg 2004; Voss 1998; Morris 2000).[4] Often, our scholarly and practical analyses assume that resources—such as people or money—can be equated to power. The more supporters, voters, money, or expertise an organization has, the more power it has, this thinking goes. From a practical perspective, this means that the goal for constituency-based organizations is to aggregate as many of these resources as possible, summing the actions of individuals to form a winning majority.[5] From a scholarly perspective, this means that empirical models often use the relationship between resources (or head counts) and political outcomes as a proxy for impact (Vasi et al. 2015; Mackin 2016; Madestam et al. 2013; McVeigh 2009). Significant coefficients that describe the relationship between organizational activity (or characteristics) and outcomes thus become evidence of impact, even though they could mean many different things (Andrews 2001).

Empirical analyses and history alike show, however, that numerical majorities or simple accumulations of material resources are not always equivalent to power. In fact, research shows there is no linear relationship between any given resource and political power, whether that resource is numbers of people, amount of money, or intensity of adherents (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki et al. 2012). Analyses of lobbying and social movement activity underscore the importance of organizations and leaders in strategically translating collective action—even collective action at scale—into political power (see, e.g., Clemens 1997; Ganz 2009; Hansen 1991). Just as we can point to data showing that having more people, more passionate people, or more people distributed across strategically identified locations was associated with movement influence (e.g., Madestam et al. 2013; Gillion 2013), we can point to numerous situations in which simply amassing resources was not enough to enact the change activists sought (e.g., Skocpol 2013; Ganz 2009).

In addition, constituencies of color and low-income constituencies face even more contingency because of the structural barriers impeding their bids for power. Poor people, constituencies of color, people at the intersection of multiple marginalized groups, and others have always had to struggle for recognition and legitimacy in politics, thus making their attempts to seek power

more uncertain (e.g., Gillion 2013; García Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Piven and Cloward 1977; Piven 2006). These are the constituencies that are the focus of our study. In our cases, organizers like Jeff, Michele, Tomás, and Alex who work with low-income constituencies of color knew their bids for political power would be ignored or met with pushback, even from presumed allies. Expecting such reactions, they developed alternative strategies for collective action that prepared for the unpredictability of politics.

MEASURING THE OUTCOMES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

In both academic scholarship and the world of practice, methods for assessing power range broadly. At one level, those interested in assessing power disagree about *what* should actually be measured. In other words, how should we conceptualize the outcomes of collective action? What does it mean for collective action to be successful?

Past efforts to assess social-movement outcomes include (but are not limited to) examining the visible policy gains or electoral campaigns an organization or movement can win (Uba 2009; Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews 2004); assessing the extent to which movements and organizations can influence agendas or dominant narratives (Polletta and Ho 2006); cataloging organizations' ability to develop capacities or resources (such as large numbers of people) known to make long-term policy wins more likely (McCarthy and Zald 2001); and tracing how organizations shift public opinion or media content (Ferree et al. 2002; Ferree 2003; Gottlieb 2015). These outcomes are often challenging to obtain (let alone demonstrate), and past scholarship has shown that collective action only rarely has direct effects on policy (Olzak and Ryo 2007; Giugni 1998; Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005) in part because "there is so little of it" (Burstein and Sausner 2005, 413).[6]

Of course, movements do more than just win concrete policy and electoral victories. They can also influence broader cultural attitudes. For example, one undocumented leader in Arizona told us,

> I had a Lyft driver not long ago, and he came to drop me off and he's like, "Hey, your street isn't that lit up." And he was from like, I don't know, some other state, he had just moved here. And I was like, "Well it seems fine to me—what are you talking about?" And so that's kind of like an example of like, where it seems so normal to me because I grew up and I lived in those kinds of neighborhoods my whole life. But to someone from the outside they're like, "This

is not normal, why don't you have more light on your streets?" And then you wonder [about other things:] the crime rate and potholes or [why it] flood[s] when it rains. Our neighborhood streets are flooded and that's not going to happen in another place like Scottsdale. Their streets are not flooded there when it rains.

So, systems are in place to just maintain or, keep sorting the communities just to the side. You have the war on drugs that fuels the school-to-prison pipeline, and then you blame the kids that are in school for behaving badly . . . that's been playing since the 70s, the late 60s, and it all goes back to like, what was there before? With immigration, the system [is] broken but also . . . is it really broken? It [didn't] stop working the way that it's supposed to, with private prisons and the privatization of the whole process. Who's really benefiting from that? . . . And then you get into it and you realize, "Man, it is working exactly the way that it was meant to be all along instead of actually solving a problem."

This leader was describing a denaturalization of her worldview, a recasting of what she believed was possible. The transformation she describes in her understanding of the world, repeated throughout a constituency and diffused into the broader public through social networks, cultural narratives, and sometimes art (Isaac 2008), is a crucial part of the power shift that can emerge from collective action. These shifts are very difficult to measure, but that difficulty does not make them any less significant.

At another level, there is also a debate about not only what should be measured but also how to measure it. Even if we were to imagine a world in which scholars agreed on the conceptual outcomes of collective action, they would still debate how best to measure those outcomes. This question of measurement is bedeviled by the fact that power operates in complex ways, often hidden from immediate view (Pierson 2015; Lukes 2005). Passing a policy or winning a campaign is a clear, measurable outcome. Beyond these visible victories, which are often the culmination of very long campaigns, how do we assess the extent to which a movement is making progress on its goals? How do we assess whether it has influenced agendas or developed the resources it needs? Scholars of social movements, interest groups, and other related forms of collective action have used a range of proxies for measuring "success" in the context of collective action, such as access to decision makers (e.g., Hansen 1991), scale of actions (e.g., Gillion 2013), media coverage (e.g., Earl et al. 2004), shifts in public opinion (e.g., Lee 2002), and self-reports (Han et al. 2011).[7]

In designing this study, we were eager to move beyond the most visible

signs of power to address the less visible but potentially more transformative means by which collective action can produce change (Amenta and Caren 2004). We wanted to draw on the richness made possible by an in-depth case study to develop clearer measures of power shifts in the cases we examined. Each of the organizations in our study, for instance, took credit for at least one visible win in the form of a policy changed, an ally elected, or an adversary defeated. How could we tell whether those visible victories were one-offs or whether they reflected a broader, underlying power shift?

Because the approach we developed rests on the premise that power operates in ways that are both relational and often invisible (Gaventa 1982; Lukes 2005; Pierson 2015), we had to move away from examining power as a static trait or characteristic that any one organization can possess. Instead, the extent to which an organization has power is dependent on whether it has resources that can act on and shape a target's interests. In practical terms, organizations commonly define targets as the individuals who have the power to make decisions that can enact the change the organizations seek (Bobo, Kendall, and Max 2010; Ganz 2018b). Targets have interests that propel them to act in or against the interests of the advocate. We conceptualize the work of movement building as a process of attempting to shape the interests of the target in a way that makes them more supportive of the organization's stated interests (Luders 2010; Warren 2001).

However, the factors that shape a target's interests are not always obvious. Although we can empirically observe things like whether a target chooses to vote a certain way (such as an elected official's vote on a bill), there are many other, less visible factors that influence that choice. First, what alternatives were available to the elected official? What determined which alternatives were available? Would the elected official have made the same choice given a different set of alternatives? In addition, how did cultural factors, narratives about how the world works, or assumptions the target makes about what is possible affect their choice? In this framework, power may reasonably be analogized to an iceberg: we see only the topmost portion protruding from the water, while most of its mass remains submerged.

Taking these conceptualizations of power seriously implies that power is (a) interactional and relational and (b) largely obscured from immediate view. To study the extent to which an organization achieves political power, then, we must understand who the target is, what the interests of that target are, and how those interests shift—or not—over time. To assess these questions, we build on research that looks beyond firsthand accounts of social-movement actors to examine their interaction with targets.

We particularly draw on an interactional theory of social-movement influence developed by Joseph Luders (2010) in which success is measured as a function of the costs that challengers impose on their targets. Luders states, "The core argument is simple: the target of any social movement, interest organization, or other benefit-seeker must discern the threat posed to its interests and the cost of capitulating to demands, and then respond accordingly. A mugger's declaration, 'Your money or your life,' succinctly depicts a similar cost calculation" (2010, xi). Luders's framework, which we adopt and expand on, estimates influence not only by the ultimate outcome but also by the extent to which movement actors changed the cost calculations of their targets. These changing cost calculations rendered targets more or less likely to concede to constituency demands.

As we unpacked the work of the groups in our case studies, we observed underlying shifts in the strategic calculations of targets, similar to what Luders describes. Not only were these organizations able to generate concessions related to the state (winning visible policy gains or elections), they also altered other observable factors. We analyze these here along three dimensions: network surveys measuring shifts in power relationships, analyses of the legislative agenda measuring the range of the politically possible, and text-as-data tools to measure shifts in narrative.

Instead of trying to develop a one-size-fits-all approach to measuring power in each case, we tried to develop an approach that shared conceptual commonalities but varied measures based on the specific conditions in each case. The conceptual commonalities revolved around an approach to assessing power that focused on its interactional nature and the extent to which it operates at varying levels of visibility. Each of our core case studies, however, varied in terms of who the targets were and what sorts of invisible power shifts they were trying to effect. Our measures thus reflect that variance.

WHO ARE THE TARGETS?

Because we take an interactional approach to measuring political power, our investigation must begin with the targets. How do we identify them? What are their interests? And how can we observe whether their behavior or their interests change over time? We learned early in the interview process that it is easy to mistake the target of a power-building campaign. Relying at first on news reports and publicly available data, we sometimes misidentified who our case organizations were trying to influence. Across our cases, we found that the obvious and staunch opposition—GOP leaders in Virginia determined to

preserve felon disenfranchisement, sheriff's deputies raiding immigrant communities in Arizona, anti-tax Tea Party groups in Ohio, and anti-immigrant legislators in Minnesota—were rarely the actors with whom movement leaders directly negotiated power.

Instead, the organizations' true targets were often other actors involved in the case who, at first glance, appeared to be allies with shared interests. This is due in no small part to the fact that all of the organizations in our case studies were representing either low-income constituencies or constituencies of color, or both. In other words, they were representing constituencies that are structurally disadvantaged in our political system and, as previous research shows, often marginalized even within progressive coalitions and organizations (Strolovitch 2007; Blee 2012; Phillips 2016). A key challenge for the organizations in our case studies, in other words, was to get into strategic alignment with other dominant progressive actors so that they could draw on more shared resources. These actors often included labor unions, the Democratic Party establishment, and progressive funders—groups that controlled many of the financial means, communication tools, and other resources the organizations in our cases wanted to access.

An example of the challenge of properly identifying targets emerges from our fieldwork in Arizona. When we first arrived at the offices of LUCHA, a relatively new immigrant rights organization in Phoenix, Tomás saw us take note of the padlocks on the building and on all of the organization's file cabinets. He explained that LUCHA doesn't advertise its address, because the organization has been harassed by opponents. For instance, roughly ten Trump supporters once heckled LUCHA volunteers, guns in their waistbands. Another time, someone—they don't know who—tried to break in and steal sensitive immigration-related files. "I didn't think I was going to make it to our interview today," Tomás then said, "because I thought I was going to be in court all afternoon responding to Prop. 206 challengers." LUCHA, in other words, did not lack direct opponents. Initially, we conceptualized these opponents as their primary targets.

Over time, however, we realized that LUCHA was working to develop power not only relative to anti-immigration forces, but also, as we described in chapter 1, within the progressive political system. From LUCHA's perspective, the primary obstacle in the Proposition 206 campaign was not business owners, right-wing voters, or GOP legislators, but progressive gatekeepers. "We knew as soon as we got [Prop. 206] in front of voters they would love it," Tomás said. "The challenge was getting it on the ballot, and getting [progressive] funders to believe that we could do it. . . . Initially [labor groups] were

not supportive of the initiative. They didn't wanna fund it, they didn't think we were capable, and they also didn't think it was strategic," he said. LUCHA had to fight for the right to lead the campaign that had materialized because of the demands of their base.

Thus Alex and Tomás preemptively organized all of their grassroots partners to go to a meeting with labor and philanthropy leaders to demand that Tomás lead the minimum wage campaign—raising the cost of their targets' continued opposition to their leadership. By organizing their allies in a united front to challenge funders, LUCHA won the ability to lead the campaign. Alex further noted, "We actually went up a lot against the funders, to ensure that we were able to bring organizers, and that this wasn't just a digital-funded media campaign."

In 2016, Proposition 206 passed with 58 percent of voters' support—the single highest vote getter on the ballot. When the campaign ended, the progressive allies who had initially opposed the work changed their narrative. One leader in the Proposition 206 campaign noted,

> There was a local labor group here that was tied to a grassroots organization here, that did not wanna support the campaign. And they did not support it financially, like one of the few unions that did not give any money, although the grassroots organization that they helped seed did eventually do some of the door knocks and really help us do the persuasion and turn out for the initiative. And so at that award ceremony, the president of the union stood up and said, "And we won the minimum wage." But they were completely dragging their feet on it, completely against it the whole time.

Upon hearing this story, another leader recalled his reaction: "I was like, 'These mofos.'" There was no love lost between LUCHA and some of the allies with whom they worked to pass Proposition 206. As LUCHA leaders looked back on the campaign, their analysis of the power they had built in the campaign was in relation to the groups who were, on paper, their partners—and not the anti-immigrant forces who opposed them outright. "I've kind of created an analogy," Tomás said. "It is muscles versus brains. In 2016 we were fighting hard to be brain-led operations, instead of just muscle—just have people go out and knock doors," he said. From the perspective of shifting long-term power, LUCHA recognized that the anti-immigrant forces in Arizona were just as strong as they had been in the past. Their invisible victory in 2016, however, was to be recognized as a strategic leader within the progressive coalition in the state.

Table 3.1 captures our assessment of the range of targets identified in each

Table 3.1. Case Study Target Identification

Case	Campaign(s) and Arena	Target(s)
Arizona	Municipal and house district elections; statewide ballot initative (Proposition 206)	Joe Arpaio, Russell Pearce, moderate state legislators, and state (Democratic Party) and national (philanthropic) networks
Minnesota	2018 primary and election (includes MN gubernatorial race and selected legislative and city-level races)	Candidates for office, especially Democratic gubernatorial candidates Erin Murphy and Tim Walz
Ohio	Municipal levy (Issue 44) to fund universal preschool and K–12 education	Business and philanthropic community in Cincinnati seeking to pass the levy
Virginia	State-level rights restoration for the formerly incarcerated	Governors Bob McDonnell and Terry McAuliffe; Democratic statehouse delegates

of our cases. As reflected in the "Target(s)" column of table 3.1, the movement leaders in our study did not engage in struggle only with actors whose interests were orthogonal to their own. As with Arizona, in each of our case studies the targets included not only outright opponents of the work each organization was seeking to accomplish but also the allies the organization was trying to engage. Leaders often focused their limited resources on brokering exchanges with these would-be partners—whom they sometimes considered targets—whose concessions could yield meaningful results for their constituencies. As Marshall Ganz notes, "Both 'power with' and 'power over' are at work in organizing. Members of a constituency can create the power to achieve a shared goal by collaborating to use their resources interdependently in ways they had not done before. . . . On the other hand, where real conflicts of interest exist, organizing requires a claims-making strategy, mobilizing constituency resources to alter relationships of dependency and domination" (2018b, 18). In other words, imperfect allies were important because bringing them on board opened up access to the broader pool of political resources that the organizations needed to advance their campaigns to challenge power asymmetries.

We used three main strategies to measure power: (1) network surveys, which depicted the relevant shifts in power relationships in Virginia and Ohio; (2) assessments of legislative data, which demonstrated the shifting political agenda in Arizona; and (3) text-as-data tools, which measured the changing narrative around race and immigration in Minnesota.

Networks of Power: "Power Respects Power"

Lukes argues that a significant element of what he calls the second face of power is who gets to set the agenda (2005). Who determines what issues are discussed, what is considered relevant on the political agenda, and the nature of viable options? For New Virginia Majority and AMOS, being in relationship with power brokers was a significant part of what they were seeking to achieve, because those power relationships would allow them to advance not only the immediate campaign goals (passing a ballot initiative for universal preschool in Cincinnati and restoring voting rights to formerly incarcerated citizens in Virginia) but also their constituencies' long-term issues of concern.

In the beginning of our investigation of each of these cases, we found that leaders in both NVM and AMOS discussed their long-term goals in terms of shifting that underlying power dynamic in their communities. NVM was seeking to influence legislators in the Virginia General Assembly. AMOS wanted to influence the network of power players in Cincinnati—the business, philanthropic, political, and civic leaders who controlled many of the city's resources. To examine the extent to which NVM and AMOS were each able to access and alter these networks of power, we conducted two network surveys. We also did semistructured interviews with targets in each case to help us better understand the results of these surveys.

AMOS

In our study of AMOS's work in Cincinnati, we wanted to know whether the visible victory AMOS helped achieve—the passage of Issue 44, a ballot initiative designed to provide universal preschool—shifted the underlying power dynamics in the city. As described in the previous chapter, the campaign had been going on for over a decade when AMOS got involved. City leaders had been pushing for universal preschool through a coalition and campaign called Cincinnati Preschool Promise (CPP) since the turn of the twenty-first century.

At the height of the campaign, CPP's membership included the leaders of the education nonprofit Strive Partnership, the United Way, Cincinnati Public Schools, the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers, national partners, many prominent leaders in the local business community, and independent preschool providers. When AMOS joined, it brought along its multifaith network of churches, mosques, and synagogues.

To evaluate AMOS's role in this power network, in 2018 we conducted a survey of nineteen key Cincinnati leaders who were involved in the preschool

campaign. All but one completed the survey, yielding a 95 percent response rate. Our list of respondents included key business leaders, school officials (the district superintendent and school board members), philanthropists, the levy campaign manager, and faith and grassroots leaders who were mentioned in the interviews we conducted for the case study. We asked respondents to retrospectively identify the people they had been strategizing, exchanging resources, and negotiating conflict with at two different points in time. By comparing responses for 2013 and 2016, we observe AMOS's changing role in the coalition. When analyzed as a network graph, the survey results give us a sense of AMOS's relative power position, though the data may suffer from some of the biases inherent in all surveys that rely on respondent recall and self-reports. Nevertheless, they provide some evidence of who power players in Cincinnati thought were the key players on the campaign.

Figures 3.1a and 3.1b (p. 80) show the results from the network survey in which we asked people to name those they strategize with regarding education issues in the city. The key thing to note in these figures is the movement of Troy Jackson and key AMOS leaders from the edges of the network map in 2013 to its center in 2016. From figure 3.1a, we can see that in 2013, AMOS and its leaders were at the margins of this power network. At the time, Jackson ranked twelfth (out of eighteen) on a numerical measure of influence,[8] and was hardly mentioned as someone with whom people in the coalition strategized. Most of the people who named him as someone with whom they strategized in 2013 were clergy connected to AMOS.

The situation had changed by 2016, however, as shown in figure 3.1b. By this point, Troy had the highest score on our measure of influence within the strategizing network, matched only by the levy's campaign manager, the executive director of United Way's early-childhood initiative, and the recently elected city councilman who had initiated the ballot measure (Greg Landsman). By the end of the campaign in 2016, in other words, key business, political, philanthropic, educational, and other leaders in Cincinnati regarded Jackson as someone who was brokering the flow of strategy on a key education issue in the city.

The strategizing graph shows that by 2016 Jackson's level of influence in the network matched that of the city's traditional elite. Another set of graphs, figures 3.2a and 3.2b (p. 81), provides evidence that the source of his power is very different from theirs, a distinction we elaborate on in chapter 4. These figures show the shift in the network maps on the measure "negotiating conflict." Again, by 2016 Troy and other AMOS leaders had moved from the edges to the center of the graph. Figure 3.2a shows that in 2013, as with strategiz-



Figures 3.1a and 3.1b. Cincinnati Preschool Promise strategizing network, 2013 vs. 2016.
The graphs are based on data from a 2018 network survey of key leaders in Cincinnati regarding the people with whom they strategized around the preschool ballot initiative at two different points in time. All network maps were generated in R using the Igraph software package and the Fruchterman-Reingold layout, an algorithm that places nodes with more connections closer together.



Figures 3.2a and 3.2b. Cincinnati Preschool Promise "negotiating conflict" network, 2013 vs. 2016.
The graphs are based on data from a 2018 network survey of key leaders in Cincinnati regarding the people with whom they negotiated conflict around the preschool ballot initiative at two different points in time.

ing, Troy was hardly named by any leaders as being a person with whom they negotiated conflict. Figure 3.2b shows that by 2016, in contrast, he was at the center of negotiating conflict within the coalition, as indicated by his location in the map.

Put together, the network graphs around strategizing and negotiating conflict show that, by 2016, Troy was at the center of the power networks in the CPP coalition. Importantly, his role was not to simply cede to the demands of the better-resourced business and philanthropic allies. Instead, he was constantly holding their "feet to the fire," as one interviewee put it, negotiating conflict around the campaign, and seeking to protect the interests of his constituency within the coalition.

When they joined the preschool coalition, AMOS leaders recognized the asymmetries in power between their constituency and the other members of the coalition. However, like LUCHA, they sought to articulate their base's desired outcomes before brokering an agreement with their coalition counterparts. AMOS's base decided to get involved in the effort to fund preschool for all Cincinnatians only after creating and publicly voting to ratify the People's Platform, the guiding statement of values about the kind of preschool policy AMOS and its constituents wanted.[9] AMOS members ratified the platform as an expression of their commitment to these principles.

The People's Platform was also a tool that allowed AMOS to be strategic in brokering its relationship with coalition partners—in other words, in negotiating conflict and disagreement with them. When AMOS's leaders perceived the coalition's commitment to the People's Platform to be wavering, they forced coalition leaders to answer to AMOS constituents. "There was enough of a feeling by the business leadership that they couldn't run roughshod over this because [AMOS] had already reached what they perceived to be a critical mass of [Cincinnati's] African American leadership, of the school community . . . they had tapped into a constituency that you wouldn't necessarily expect to get fired up but were captivated," a campaign leader told us.

Another interviewee with close ties to the business community said, "I don't think any of these big companies would want to be said about them that they were against the kids." This interviewee noted that Troy had the capability to rally "all the black ministers or the Jewish community—who are all the membership of AMOS. I mean you've got a pretty broad base and a powerful group there . . . and they could blast them, blast them, *blast* them and it would be a PR challenge for these companies." When we reflected this interviewee's sentiment back to Troy, he said it was "definitely hyperbole." Nonetheless, as Troy stated in a previous conversation, "Power respects power. . . . Bottom line is there was truth to the threat that if they did not respect us we would destroy [the ballot initiative]. We had that leverage. They saw that the threat was real." This power shift is visualized in the shift in network maps over time.

NEW VIRGINIA MAJORITY

In studying the work of the New Virginia Majority, we wanted to understand how the organization was able to position itself in the political arena relative to other organizations in the state. As mentioned above, NVM is co-led by Jon and Tram. Jon is an organizing expert who likes to read books about grassroots politics. Tram, by contrast, is an operative. She leads NVM's lobbying efforts in state government, and her short stature belies the attention she commands in a room. When we shadowed her in the state legislature, a colorful shawl adorned her shoulders as she maneuvered deftly through the halls, balancing multiple requests for attention from legislators seeking her help.

Nancy Rodrigues, a former cabinet official in the McAuliffe administration, said, "You know how sometimes advocacy groups can be their own worst enemy? I've seen it in so many settings where an advocacy group will start yelling or threaten, 'We are going to vote you out!'" By contrast, she continued, "[NVM] has been very professional in their delivery to the General Assembly. . . . 'It's just the fact, sir. It's just the facts.'" Then, Nancy said something we found striking: "I know that there are some people in the legislature right now who if Tram calls them up and says, 'I need you to carry this bill,' they probably wouldn't even ask what the bill is. They would just carry it because they have that kind of respect [for NVM]." This statement is similar to many others made by interviewees in the Virginia state government and by NVM's ally organizations.

How widespread are these sentiments, however? NVM claimed that the rights-restoration campaign helped build their statewide profile not only in McAuliffe's office but also among other elected officials. Do we have any evidence that this is true?

Rights restoration was not originally one of NVM's issues. As described in chapter 2, Tenants and Workers United focused initially on housing and labor issues in Northern Virginia. When Jon founded NVM, however, he joined a wave of statewide power-building organizations that grew up around the country in the early 2000s. As national politics became more gridlocked, organizations like NVM attempted to build stronger progressive bases in the states. Moving beyond local housing and labor issues, NVM sought to build constituency by canvassing in black communities around Virginia, focusing at first on just turning out the vote. As NVM was canvassing, however,

it soon realized how many potential voters were unable to vote because the state had always disproportionately targeted black people for disenfranchisement. Thus, just as Troy decided to focus AMOS's efforts on childhood poverty and LUCHA chose to focus on minimum wage after each listened to and assimilated the demands of their bases, NVM pivoted from housing to rights restoration, giving or withholding its support for gubernatorial candidates depending on the public stance each candidate took during the campaign on the issue central to its constituents' interests. Terry McAuliffe won that race and vowed to make rights restoration a reality; NVM and its partners helped him make it so. Jon, Tram, and NVM were far from the only factors that enabled this restoration of rights, but their patient and strategic moves over the course of several years helped make it possible.

Curious whether we could corroborate interview data that spoke to NVM's influence in the statehouse—and hoping to better understand whether and how NVM wields power with respect to its Democratic targets—we designed a network survey, which we sent to all forty-nine Democrats serving in Virginia's 2018 General Assembly. We received twenty completed surveys, for a 40 percent response rate. Our cover letter to the delegates did not identify NVM as our research subject in order to avoid response bias that might favor certain answers over others. Instead, we requested delegates' participation "in a research project examining how grassroots and advocacy organizations interact with elected officials and exercise influence on behalf of their constituencies."

The first set of questions asked delegates to characterize the nature of their relationship with each of thirty-nine grassroots and advocacy organizations active in Virginia, along five dimensions: Had they (1) heard of them, (2) met with or exchanged information with them, (3) received electoral support from them, (4) strategized together directly or in coalition, or (5) experienced any form of opposition from them? We chose the organizations listed on the survey based on the responses of informants from multiple viewpoints (elected officials, progressive advocates in Virginia, and NVM organizers) who had identified influential grassroots organizations in the state.

As we expected, delegates indicated that they had "heard of" nearly all of the organizations in the survey. On these lower-barrier measures, we did not see much differentiation between the groups—delegates were as likely to have heard of New Virginia Majority as they were to have heard of groups with greater national name recognition, such as Planned Parenthood or Indivisible. We were more interested in the more intensive measures of movement-target interactions, such as the extent to which delegates indicated "strategizing with" a particular organization. Which organizations, in other words, were



Figure 3.3. Virginia House delegate relationships with movement organizations on the measure "strategized together."

This figure is based on a survey of Democratic members of the Virginia General Assembly, collected in 2018, that asked about the organizations with whom they strategized. The node size is a function of the delegate or the organization's eigenvalue: the bigger the node, the higher the influence score (by this centrality measure).

Virginia state delegates planning about passing policy with? Figure 3.3 depicts the network map for responses to this survey item. The white dot highlights NVM's location in the graph; NVM is at the center with other delegates.

The graph shows that NVM was punching above its weight. Using a numerical score called an eigenvalue, which is a measure of a node's relative influence in a network (Bonacich 2007), we found that NVM had the fifth-highest score compared to all the other organizations. All four of the groups that had higher scores than NVM on this measure were national groups with state affiliates: the Sierra Club, Planned Parenthood, the League of Conservation Voters, and Virginia's teacher's union, a state affiliate of the National Education Association. By way of comparison, NVM was only ten years old, while the teacher's union was founded in 1863 and represents more than fifty thousand teachers throughout the Commonwealth.[10] Furthermore, three delegates reported that they only strategized with NVM and one or two other organizations listed in the survey.

NVM not only carries weight in the statehouse comparable to the weight



Figure 3.4. Brokerage network of Virginia House delegates and movement organizations on the measure "strategized together."

This figure is based on a survey of Democratic members of the Virginia General Assembly, collected in 2018, that asked about the organizations with whom they strategized. In this figure, nodes are weighted based on their betweenness centrality score, described in text.

carried by these national groups but also plays a brokerage role in the network. Our survey data show which groups help link, or create bridges between, delegates and organizations that did not otherwise share direct connections. On this centrality score, called "betweenness" because it measures the shortest path between nodes, NVM ranked higher than any other organization in the survey, a finding reflected in the size of its node, as shown in figure 3.4. The only two others in the survey with a higher betweenness score were elected delegates, not organizations (represented by the two larger grey nodes).

Figure 3.4 shows that, based on our survey data, NVM and its leaders have as much brokerage power as certain elected officials. The delegate with the highest betweenness score was first elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in the early 1980s. The second largest grey node represents a delegate who, according to her website, prides herself on working with both Republicans and Democrats to "get things done," a stance that would help explain the bridging role she plays in this network.

From all of this data, we can see that NVM was on par with the largest national groups and long-serving elected officials in terms of the role it played in shaping strategy on progressive policy issues in Virginia. NVM played a particularly important role in creating bridges and brokering the flow of information and strategy between elected officials and organizations in the state. In addition to substantiating the qualitative findings from our interviews, the network survey made visible the degree and kind of influence that NVM wielded among Democratic members of the Virginia House of Representatives. A decade before McAuliffe signed the executive order to restore voting rights, NVM did not exist. According to the statehouse delegates who responded to our survey, NVM is now among the most influential grassroots organizations in Virginia.

Arizona: "The Action Is Always in the Reaction"

In Arizona, unlike in Virginia and Ohio, the organizations we were studying did not work with a clearly circumscribed community of power brokers. Thus, network surveys like the ones we used in those cases would not have been appropriate. Moreover, the leaders in the Arizona cases were not pursuing a single victory—such as the passage of Issue 44 in the 2016 election in Cincinnati—but instead seeking to beat back anti-immigration forces at the municipal, county, and state levels. Thus, we needed an alternate approach to assessing whether there was a power shift. To capture the totality of the work that the leaders in Arizona were involved in, we focused on examining how the state's immigration-related policy making changed or remained stable over time.

In examining the evolution of the state's political agenda on the issue that mattered most to our cases' constituents, one relevant comparison was the quality and quantity of immigration-related legislation before and after 2010. Over and over again, interviewees made the contrast between, as one respondent put it, "that dark spring of 2010 when SB 1070 passed and the future looked quite bleak" and "today, where the same young leaders who led the fight against SB 1070 are now leading some of the most powerful organizations and campaigns in the state." SB 1070 was only one of a slew of anti-immigrant policies enacted in Arizona in the first decade of the twenty-first century. "The first thing to note," one longtime immigrant-labor-movement leader told us, "is that there was relatively nonexistent resistance to SB 1070 [in the early 2000s]." He continued,

> There was no, no even ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union], there was no Mexican Legal Defense Fund. There was just, frankly speaking there was a

lack of civil society. There was a lack of, you know, almost nonexistent civil rights bar in Phoenix. You know? I mean like you say, "Who were the civil rights lawyers in Phoenix and in Arizona?" There were none. . . . At the time [Phoenix] was like, the fourth-largest city in America. But it was one that sort of grew up so fast and without all these sort of these institutions and cultural practices that you'd expect in other places. And which contributed to this overall kind of dystopian environment that occurred. And as a result, yeah, there was a lack of political leadership from Latinos in particular . . . a vacuum of resources entirely.

For many of our interviewees, Arizona's "dystopian" political environment was most clearly manifest in state-level legislation that directly targeted the immigrant community. Raquel Terán, the movement leader who, along with Petra Falcon, brought the NOI training to Arizona and was elected to the state House of Representatives in 2018, rattled off a list: "I think from 1996, taking away the driver's licenses of people who didn't have their social security number. To making English the official language, to taking away bilingual education." Another interviewee remembered other legislative attacks on the state's immigrant community: "In 2006, they had another series of ballot initiatives. Prop. 300 being the one to charge out-of-state tuition, take away early childhood education, and take away adult education from undocumented people. There was another ballot measure that took away bond if you're undocumented. You were guilty until proven innocent if you were an undocumented person," he said.

After the SB 1070 fight, the political terrain seemed to shift. "We learned how to fight back," said Petra, now the executive director of Promise Arizona. "We [learned] you can turn fear into courage. [In] 2010, the people at the frontline were undocumented people—and they learned how to fight," she said. In May 2011, a group called Citizens for a Better Arizona submitted 18,315 signatures to the Secretary of State's office with a petition to recall Senate president Russell Pearce, the architect and sponsor of SB 1070 and the person the *New York Times* called "Arizona's most powerful legislator" (Lacey and Seelye 2011). In a special election months later, he lost to challenger Jerry Lewis, making him the first state legislator to be recalled in Arizona. In the following year's Republican primary, he lost again—this time to Bob Worsley—by twelve percentage points.

"The action is always in the reaction," said Raquel, who was actively involved in the Pearce recall. She was referring to how both Democratic and Republican legislators responded to Pearce's ouster, which, in itself was "something that people never thought was gonna happen," as she said.[11] Stephen



Figure 3.5. Arizona state legislature ideology change over time, 2004–2016
On the Shor-McCarty index, positive numbers are more conservative and negative numbers are more liberal.

Lemons, a journalist who had covered the immigration beat in Arizona for more than a decade, reported that even the state's top Democrats thought the recall would only embolden Pearce if and when it failed. As for the Republicans, Lemons continued, it was "the 'non-crazy' wing of the state GOP" that won out after they saw Pearce and the five additional pieces of anti-immigrant legislation he tried to introduce in 2011 go "down in flames" (Lemons 2011). The recall was the opening salvo in the movement's effort to change the interest calculus of their elected representatives. Sam Richard, the former executive director of the Protecting Arizona Families Coalition (PAFCO), agreed: "There's this realization that the giant has awoken and the giant is woke."

To examine the consistency between our interview data and other measures of change in the political landscape before and after 2010, we analyzed immigration policy making in Arizona pre- and post–SB 1070. If we examine the roughly seven years on either side of SB 1070, we can see that during that fourteen-year time period, the Arizona state legislature was becoming more conservative. Figure 3.5 uses the Shor-McCarty index (Shor and McCarty 2011; Shor 2018) to describe the ideological composition of the Arizona state legislature. From 2004 to 2016 both the Arizona Senate and House grew more conservative. In the years since SB 1070, the House became more conservative

immediately after 2010, and then remained relatively stable. The Senate grew less conservative after the chamber's most conservative member was ousted in 2011 (Pearce), but then the score moved above 2010 levels in subsequent years. The 2016 Senate (.818) is considerably more conservative than the 2010 Senate that passed SB 1070 (.609).[12] In addition, until 2018, the state GOP retained at least a four-seat majority in the upper chamber and a ten-or-more seat majority in the lower chamber. In other words, Arizona GOP legislators have become more conservative, and they had the votes to continue to pass anti-immigrant legislation but have not.

Even though both chambers in the Arizona state legislature became more ideologically conservative over time, we do not see a corresponding increase in the number of restrictive immigration laws passed. This pattern emerges even though, as the leader of the state Tea Party told us, immigration is "the number one issue" for much of the conservative base in the state. Following prior research that uses data and classification schemes from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (Anzia and Moe 2016; Birkland and Lawrence 2009; Hicks, McKee, and Smith 2016), we built a database using NCSL's year-end immigration legislation summaries, which report legislative activity by state for the years 2005–2017. NCSL data tracked and summarized immigration-related bills and resolutions. We also collected data on the partisan breakdown of the roll-call vote for each piece of legislation. Putting this information together, we coded each piece of Arizona statehouse legislation according to whether it expanded or restricted the rights of immigrant communities.

We coded as "restrictive" bills like HB (House Bill) 2592, which prevented the construction of day labor centers, which provide employment opportunities for undocumented immigrants, and SB 1035, which made proof-of-citizenship requirements for receipt of public benefits more stringent. The majority of these votes fell along party lines: Republicans were often unanimous or near unanimous in their support of the restrictive bills. We only coded five bills enacted during this time period as "expansive" in terms of immigrant rights; all of these had majority opposition from Republicans and support from Democrats. They related to overtime pay and other employer-sponsored compensation benefits for "aliens" (HB 2474 and SB 1125), tenants' rights after eviction independent of immigration status (SB 1376), the establishment of a state seal of biliteracy for graduates proficient in one or more languages in addition to English (SB 1239), and an exemption to the citizenship and residency requirements for liquor licenses (HB 2606).[13]

Figure 3.6 reports the pattern in immigration-related policy making in Arizona over time. Despite an increase in the ideological conservatism of the



Figure 3.6. Timeline of immigration-related bills enacted in the Arizona state legislature, 2005–2018.

Counts and codes based on the National Conference of State Legislatures' Immigrant Policy Project annual reports and the Arizona state legislature's roll call vote archives.

chamber, the absolute number of anti-immigration bills and resolutions enacted in Arizona decreased—from thirty-four to seventeen—in the seven-year period before Pearce's recall (2005–2011) and in the seven-year period after it (2012–2018). If we remove 2007 from the data (an outlier year, with the largest number of immigrant-related bills enacted), twenty-three restrictive bills passed before Pearce's recall and seventeen afterward. Even without 2007, the pattern implies that conservatives were not able to push through as much legislation on what the Tea Party leader said was their "number one" issue even as the chamber became more ideologically conservative. In other words, the conservative majorities in the House and Senate and the growing anti-immigrant rhetoric with the election of Trump did not necessarily translate into greater momentum for their agenda in the state legislature.

Figure 3.6 accounts for the number of bills and resolutions enacted on either side of the temporal divide but does not, of course, account for the substantive impact of the bills. For example, in the 2010 session, only one bill regarding immigration issues was enacted—but it was SB 1070, widely considered to be the most extreme anti-immigrant omnibus legislation in the country. To get a sense of this qualitative pattern, we can examine bills that passed before and after SB 1070. Although one interviewee's assertions that

"no anti-immigrant legislation has passed since 2011" is not strictly true, the comparison between the types of immigration-related bills that passed before and after the turning point is interesting. In 2005, for example, the legislature passed a law that allows judges to factor immigration status into sentencing (HB 2259) and another that prevents the construction of day-labor centers that aid undocumented workers (HB 2592). The next year, the legislature passed HB 2448/SB 2738, which requires US citizenship for patients to receive health benefits, effectively limiting undocumented immigrants to emergency medical services. Another bill that same year excluded persons without "legal alien status" from the state's Comprehensive Care for the Elderly program. In 2007, HB 2787 denied release on bail if law enforcement believed that there was "probable cause" that the accused was an undocumented immigrant. And so on. In contrast, examples of the restrictive immigration bills passed in the second period include a 2012 law that allows a police officer to impound a car that is "being used to transport, harbor, or conceal illegal aliens" (HB 2286), a law that "eliminates border crossing identification cards and voter cards issued by the government of Mexico as acceptable forms of age verification when purchasing liquor" (SB 1397 in 2014), and escalating "identity theft for work verification" to a class three felony (HB 2639 in 2014). The full list of bills is available in appendix C.[14]

When we put the data in figures 3.5 and 3.6 together, the pattern that emerges is one in which both chambers of the Arizona legislature were ideologically predisposed to pass more restrictive anti-immigration legislation over time, but the pattern of bills enacted shows either a decline or relative stasis in the restrictive bills passed. Part of this could be explained by an overall drop in the productivity of the state legislature that influences the number of bills introduced (Lee 2016). We found, however, that the number of immigration-related bills introduced in the six-year period before SB 1070 and the Pearce recall (thirty-eight) was similar to the number introduced in the six-year period after (thirty-three).[15] In other words, almost as many bills were introduced, but fewer were passed.

Meanwhile, Democrats have begun to close the representation gap at the state level. In the 2018 midterms, Arizona elected its first Democratic senator since 1995 and narrowed the GOP's lead in the lower chamber of the state legislature from ten seats to just two. One of the assemblywomen whose election helped narrow this margin is Raquel Terán. In that same election, Carlos Garcia, the executive director of Puente—who immigrated to Arizona at age five and has seen five of his relatives deported since 2009—was elected to the Phoenix City Council alongside Betty Guardado, a UNITE HERE! union organizer and former housekeeper (Santos 2019).

We are not arguing that the organizing after SB 1070 *caused* this decline in anti-immigrant legislation and this increase in Latino political representation. Instead, we show that SB 1070 catalyzed the action and the learning that developed the constituency's ability to exert its voice in the political system, and that played a part in processes of change. This constituency's visible victories—the recall of Russell Pearce, the eventual defeat of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the passage of a minimum wage law, the election of a majority left-leaning city council in Phoenix, and so on—suggest a change in the immigration-related political priorities and possibilities in Arizona. While extreme legislation like SB 1070 and the bills leading up to it were viable prior to 2010, the goalposts seemed to have shifted after the emergence of an increasingly cohesive immigrant rights constituency in the state.

It is important to note that the movement organizations in the Arizona case do not take sole or even primary credit for this shift in state-level immigration policy making. Lisa Urias, founder of the business-led Real Arizona Coalition, which pressed for more "reasonable" immigration laws, described the economic impact of the national reaction to SB 1070. "I remember the exact figure being $860 million" in short-term losses, Lisa told us, "in convention business primarily. . . . We [couldn't] even calculate what the longer-term impact [was]." The Real Arizona Coalition wanted to use its corporate clout to "counter the [negative] mental imprint made by 'six million media hits'" after SB 1070 (Kallick 2014). Petra Falcon described other ripple effects in the economy: "You had two or three hundred thousand people walked away from their apartments, homes; the agriculture community suffered tremendously, the construction industry suffered, the hospitality [industry]—they were hurting. They were hurting for workers. Small Plaza shut down because people walked away and apartments went bare [after SB 1070 was signed]." Phoenix business leaders we interviewed believed that these economic impacts were the direct result of the public's response to the passage of extreme anti-immigrant legislation like SB 1070. In 2011, sixty Arizona CEOs wrote a letter to Russell Pearce opposing further anti-immigrant measures like the ones he had previously introduced.

Pressure from the business community almost certainly had an impact on the voting pattern we observed in figure 3.6, but movement organizers took advantage of what they saw as their newfound allyship with parts of the corporate community. As in our other cases, the immigrant rights organizers knew they had to work with better-resourced allies. The key, however, was that these organizers were able to do so on their own terms with the courage and capacities they had created in fighting SB 1070. "What I think was the beauty is," Raquel said, "that we were able to expose it [SB 1070]; we were able to build

a narrative that it affected [Arizona] economically." "But," she continued, "if we wouldn't have set up [the vigil], if it wouldn't have been at the capitol, if we wouldn't have been building power, if we wouldn't have been as resilient as we were that whole summer, I think that law would have passed and would've gone under the radar, just like all the other [anti-immigrant] laws that [came before]. . . . What we have seen is that these crazy legislators, these, Russell Pearce type of people—their legislation just doesn't move forward as it used to." In 2019, Raquel was sworn in as an assemblywoman at the capitol she had sat vigil outside of nearly ten years earlier.

Minnesota's Shifting Narratives: "How Much Power Did We Build?"

In the final days of the legislative session in 2017, ISAIAH felt betrayed by the choice that Minnesota's Democratic governor, Mark Dayton, had made to broker a deal that protected bargaining rights for labor unions but made it more difficult for immigrants to get driver's licenses. ISAIAH saw this as yet another example of the constant marginalization of immigrants within establishment Democratic politics. After considering and trying several different methods of protest, ISAIAH and a coalition of allies decided to call for a boycott of an important upcoming fundraising dinner for the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), the principal branch of the Minnesota Democratic Party, in the summer of 2017.

To stave off this confrontation, the DFL Party agreed to fund a study on race- and class-based messaging to voters. ISAIAH leaders believed that investments in this kind of messaging would be helpful for fielding Democratic candidates in the 2018 and 2020 elections. This research, conducted by Anat Shenker-Osorio and Ian Haney Lopez in 2017 and 2018, supported a narrative that ISAIAH had been advancing for years. Shenker-Osorio, like ISAIAH, argued that confronting and openly talking about race is preferable to focusing only on "economic" issues without addressing race.

This research helped lay the foundation for ISAIAH's "faith delegate" campaign in 2018. Leaders from ISAIAH and its sister 501(c)(4) organization, Faith in Minnesota, sought to influence the way candidates in the 2018 election spoke about race and class issues. ISAIAH and its allies wanted to pressure DFL candidates to speak openly about the intersections of race and class, instead of speaking about the economy to the exclusion of race and immigration.

As we discuss further in chapter 4, this faith-delegate campaign turned out to be more successful than ISAIAH had anticipated. In Minnesota's second congressional district, for instance, Democratic candidate Angie Craig

defeated Republican incumbent Jason Lewis by 5.6 points—Lewis had voted in line with Trump's positions more than 90 percent of the time. Craig became Minnesota's first openly LGBTQ person to serve the state in Congress. Throughout the race, Craig actively solicited the backing of ISAIAH, trying to demonstrate her support of their work in various ways, including in how she talked about race and class. As an ISAIAH organizer told us, "The day after she got the [DFL] endorsement, [Craig] texted me and her campaign manager texted me and said, 'Having Faith in Minnesota's support at the convention was really important.' Next week I'm sitting down with [member-elect Craig], one-on-one, and we're gonna talk through some of the research we've been doing about Greater Minnesota and how to bridge race and class."

Craig's text messages to ISAIAH staff are examples that speak to how the organization tried to shift power in the state by shaping narratives around race and class. However, as with our other cases, we did not want to rely solely on self-reported data and sought to test whether candidates' public statements aligned with ISAIAH's own narrative. Because the claim ISAIAH was making was about its impact on candidate narratives, we web-scraped the Twitter feeds of Democratic gubernatorial candidates Tim Walz and Erin Murphy, who were the main focus of ISAIAH's faith-delegate campaign. Tracking Walz's and Murphy's public statements on Twitter allowed us to examine the extent to which they adopted the language of ISAIAH. Both candidates were vying for the support of ISAIAH's faith delegates. We then compared that textual data to word bases drawn from ISAIAH's faith-delegate platform.

Figure 3.7 illustrates the number of times Murphy and Walz used one of the top twenty-five most-used words from ISAIAH's platform—words like "community," "justice," "family," "abundance," and "dignity." In identifying these words, we dropped terms like "campaign" or "Minnesota" that would not necessarily differentiate the extent to which candidates were adopting ISAIAH's substantive message over routine messaging. We wanted to focus on ISAIAH's overall narrative about a "community" of "abundance" in which all Minnesota families deserve to live with "dignity" and "justice."

Figure 3.7 displays the data, normalized by the number of tweets for that week. A score of 1 means that the average tweet contained only one of ISAIAH's top (most-used) twenty-five words. A score of 3 indicates that the average tweet contained three of ISAIAH's top twenty-five words. These time-series analyses allow us to compare the rates at which each candidate used a particular word throughout the 2018 campaign season.

The figure shows that, in the beginning of the campaign, neither Murphy nor Walz was using much language that mirrored ISAIAH's platform. The baseline narrative, in other words, was not consistent with the way ISAIAH



Figure 3.7. Minnesota DFL gubernatorial candidates' adoption of language from ISAIAH's platform, Twitter data from February to November 2018.

The data comes from code written to scrape all tweets composed by the Murphy campaign and Walz campaign Twitter feeds.

was talking about race and class in its platform. Over time, however, that began to change. In early June 2018, ISAIAH threw its support behind Murphy at the DFL state convention. Its support helped Murphy win the party nomination at the convention, a moment indicated by the first vertical line in the chart. Around this time, we see Murphy increasingly adopting ISAIAH's language. Murphy's unexpected victory at the DFL convention triggered a primary in August. Between June and August, when Murphy was battling the mainstream DFL candidate Walz, Murphy continued to build on ISAIAH's language. Walz did not—at least not until he got closer to the August primary (indicated by the second vertical line). In the weeks leading up to the primary, he incorporated ISAIAH's language into much of his online messaging, also laying the foundation for the general election.. Walz won the primary in August, becoming the party's official nominee in the November general election. We see that he continued to build on ISAIAH's narrative in the weeks leading up to the general election.

Using social-media text as data and textual-analysis tools, we were able to track the extent to which candidates in the gubernatorial election picked up on the narrative around race and class that ISAIAH sought to advance. Although ISAIAH's favored candidate in the 2018 election, Erin Murphy, ultimately did not win the nomination, this analysis shows that the movement

nonetheless shaped the election in other ways, including by fostering new alliances between ISAIAH and down-ballot candidates like Craig.

Making Power Shifts Visible

The premise of our argument is that the political power of ordinary people is the product of contingent interactions between movement organizations and their targets. In this chapter, we employed original data to make visible these dynamic negotiations among the diverse sets of actors across our four primary cases: Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, and Virginia. Even as we were able to document shifts in both visible and invisible power, the grassroots leaders we interviewed—who mostly stand to gain from positive accounts of their work—were wary of overstating their influence. We found that these leaders always sought to maintain a clarity about where they stand in relation to power. One leader with KFTC said, "I think that you can go into anyone's office in Frankfurt and tell them you're with KFTC, and they know who you are. That's powerful, I think, but they won't just roll over for you. We're not the NRA." Similarly, despite moving from the margins to the center of one power network in Ohio, Troy Jackson was realistic about AMOS's influence and lack thereof: "Our whole idea was, 'Who owns Cincinnati?'" he said. "I'm still convinced we didn't change that dynamic one iota in this campaign." This clarity about continued power asymmetries characterized all of the cases.

Despite these leaders' modesty, we argue that the power shifts documented here provide insight on the different ways scholarship can make the outcomes of collective action more visible and, thus, a more focused object of study. Scholars have good reason to regard a study of one visible political outcome—such as winning a vote, passing a ballot initiative, or securing an executive order—as an inadequate measure of movement success. Many other factors, such as McAuliffe's myriad motivations for restoring the voting rights of two hundred thousand Virginians, contributed to each of those victories. Without carefully considering those other factors, scholars can overplay their hands, making implicit suggestions that overstate the power or influence of collective action. While we acknowledge the fragility of these power shifts, this chapter also suggests that understanding movement influence *only* through the lens of visible wins or losses understates the level and type of change for which a movement may be responsible.