Political Order in Changing Societies

Samuel P. Huntington

Foreword by Francis Fukuyama

New Haven and London, Yale University Press

For Nancy,
Timothy, and Nicholas

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Foreword by Francis Fukuyama

It is an immense honor for me to write the Foreword to the new paperback edition of Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*. This book, which first appeared in 1968, was one of the classics of late twentieth-century social science, a work that had enormous influence on the way people thought about development, both in academia and in the policy world. The breadth of knowledge about developing countries, as well as the analytical insight that *Political Order* brought to bear, was astonishing, and cemented Samuel Huntington's reputation as one of the foremost political scientists of his generation.

In order to understand the book's intellectual significance, it is necessary to place it in the context of the ideas that were dominant in the 1950s and early 1960s. This was the heyday of "modernization theory," probably the most ambitious American attempt to create an integrated, empirical theory of human social change. Modernization theory had its origins in the works of late nineteenth-century European social theorists like Henry Maine, Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Max Weber. These authors established a series of concepts (e.g., status/contract; mechanical/organic solidarity; *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft;* charismatic/bureaucratic-rational authority) to describe the changes in social norms and relationships that took place as human societies made the transition from agricultural to industrial production. While basing their works primarily on the experiences of early modernizers like Britain or the United States, they sought to draw from them general laws of social development.

European social theory was killed by the two world wars; the ideas it generated migrated to the United States and were taken up by a generation of American academics after the Second World War at places like Harvard's Department of Comparative Politics, the MIT Center for International Studies, and the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. The Harvard department, led by Weber's protégé Talcott Parsons, hoped to create

an integrated, interdisciplinary social science that would combine economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology.

The period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s also corresponded to the dissolution of European colonial empires and the emergence of what became known as the third or developing world, newly independent countries with great aspirations to modernize and catch up with their former colonial masters. Scholars like Edward Shils, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, and Walt Whitman Rostow saw these momentous developments as a laboratory for social theory, as well as a great opportunity to help developing countries raise living standards and democratize their political systems.

Modernization theorists placed a strong normative value on being modern, and in their view, the good things of modernity tended to go together. Economic development, changing social relationships like urbanization and the breakdown of primary kinship groups, higher and more inclusive levels of education, normative shifts towards values like "achievement" and rationality, secularization, and the development of democratic political institutions were all seen as an interdependent whole. Economic development would fuel better education, which would lead to value change, which would promote modern politics, and so on in a virtuous circle.

Political Order in Changing Societies appeared against this backdrop and directly challenged these assumptions. First, Huntington argued that political decay was at least as likely as political development, and that the actual experience of newly independent countries was one of increasing social and political disorder. Second, he suggested that the good things of modernity often operated at cross-purposes. In particular, if social mobilization outpaced the development of political institutions, there would be frustration as new social actors found themselves unable to participate in the political system. The result was a condition he labeled praetorianism, and was the leading cause of insurgencies, military coups, and weak or disorganized governments. Economic development and political development were not part of the same, seamless process of modernization; the latter had its own separate logic as institutions like political parties and legal systems were created or evolved into more complex forms.

Huntington drew a practical implication from these observa-

tions, namely, that political order was a good thing in itself and would not automatically arise out of the modernization process. Rather the contrary: without political order, neither economic nor social development could proceed successfully. The different components of modernization needed to be sequenced. Premature increases in political participation — including events like early elections — could destabilize fragile political systems. Huntington thus laid the groundwork for a development strategy that came to be called the "authoritarian transition," whereby a modernizing dictatorship provided political order, a rule of law, and the conditions for successful economic and social development. Once these building blocks were in place, other aspects of modernity, like democracy and civic participation, could be added. (Huntington's student Fareed Zakaria would write a book in 2003, *The Future of Freedom,* making a somewhat updated variant of this argument.)

The significance of Huntington's book must be seen against the backdrop of U.S. foreign policy at the time it was published. The year 1968 was a high-water mark in the Vietnam War, when troop strength swelled to half a million and the Tet offensive undermined the U.S. public's confidence. Many modernization theorists hoped their academic work would have useful implications for American policy; Walt Rostow's book *The Stages of Economic Growth* was a guide for the new U.S. Agency for International Development as it sought to buffer countries like South Vietnam and Indonesia against the appeals of communism. But by the late 1960s, there were not a lot of success stories to which Americans could point. The competing communist and Western nation-building strategies in North and South Vietnam ended with the latter's eventual defeat.

Huntington suggested that there was another way forward, through modernizing authoritarianism, a point of view that brought considerable opprobrium on him in the highly polarized context of the United States in the late 1960s. But it was exactly this kind of leader — Park Chung-Hee in Korea, Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore, and Suharto in Indonesia — who brought about the so-called Asian Miracle, even as Vietnam was going communist.

It is safe to say that *Political Order* finally killed off modernization theory. It was part of a pincer attack, the other prong of which was the critique from the Left that said that modernization theorists

enshrined an ethnocentric European or North American model of social development as a universal one for humanity to follow. American social science found itself suddenly without an overarching theory, and began its subsequent slide into its current methodological Balkanization.

What are we to make of Huntington's arguments, nearly four decades after they were originally laid out? Many developing countries are now more than two generations removed from independence. Enormous changes, including the East Asian Miracle, the collapse of communism, and what Huntington himself would label the Third Wave of democratizations, have occurred in the years since *Political Order* was written. In what ways do these events confirm, bolster, or weaken his observations?

There are many ways in which Huntington's observations have been vindicated. He argued that both traditional and modernized societies tended to be stable; problems occurred in the early stages of modernization, when traditional social structures were upended by new expectations. Economic growth could be stabilizing, but growth followed by sudden setback created potentially revolutionary situations. It remains largely true that the worst cases of instability have occurred in countries at relatively early stages of modernization, or in countries facing setbacks.

The problem of social mobilization outpacing political institutionalization clearly continues to occur. The most notable example was the Iranian revolution of 1978, when excessively rapid state-driven modernization ran afoul of traditional social actors; merchants in the bazaar combined with radical students to produce an Islamic revolution. Today in Andean countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, new social actors (particularly indigenous groups left out of the formal political system) are undermining weak institutions and leaving chaos in their wake. The Suharto regime in Indonesia was destabilized by the 1997–98 financial crisis, which came against a backdrop of steadily rising expectations, and one could argue that radical Islamist terrorism is driven at least in part by the massive drop in Saudi per-capita income that occurred in the two decades prior to September 2001.

Huntington is further correct that political development follows its own logic independent of economic development. While there is evidence that long-term economic growth breeds stronger democratic institutions (or, more exactly, makes them less vulnerable

to setbacks), this is true only at a relatively high level of per-capita GDP. For poor countries, political order and competent institutions are a precondition for economic growth. Sub-Saharan Africa's internal conflicts and weak governments are powerful inhibitors of the other dimensions of development.

Finally, *Political Order* was clearly prescient in focusing on political decay as a special object of study. The post–Cold War world has been subject to substantial political decay, from the collapse of the former Soviet Union to series of weak and failing states like Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan.

If one compares the periods before and after the book was written, the years 1945–68 saw a far higher level of political disorder than 1968–2006. In the first period, coups, insurgencies, and peasant revolts occurred in virtually every part of the developing world, while in the second period, large areas of stability have emerged. Part of the reason for this change is that successful political development has occurred in many places, especially in East Asia. These developments suggest that Huntington was pointing to a transitional problem to some extent. But the degree of overall stability is surprising. The Arab Middle East, for example, has seen relatively little political violence since the end of the Lebanese civil war, with the exception of Iraq and the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the post-1968 period, long-serving leaders in Morocco, Libya, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt either have turned over or are preparing to turn over leadership to their sons. Indeed, many observers argue that the region is *too* stable; the political stasis that has overtaken most regimes there has blocked political participation and bred resentment. Since the return of democracy in the 1980s, Latin America has weathered debt and currency crises without military coups or return to authoritarianism, despite recent trouble in the Andes and Haiti. While agrarian revolts drag on in Nepal, Colombia, and the Philippines, they are far less common now than in the 1950s and 1960s.

One development that doesn't fit neatly into *Political Order*'s framework is the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The book's first page contains the remarkable assertion that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were equally developed in political terms, although the first two countries were liberal democracies and the last a communist dictatorship. The notion that a country could have a high degree of political institutionalization

without being democratic shocked many people at the time but underscored Huntington's point that political order and democracy were not necessarily interdependent and could work at cross-purposes.

In retrospect, it would appear that the former Soviet Union's apparent degree of political development was something of a Potemkin village. Through sheer political willpower and violence, the Bolsheviks created a remarkably artificial system that looked very powerful, virtually until the moment it collapsed. The problem was a moral one: people living under the system, including many who eventually climbed to the top ranks of the Communist Party, ultimately did not believe in its legitimacy. Thus, while democracy can be destabilizing in the short run, it can also confer resilience in the long run.

It is in the area of political decay that Huntington's thesis needs to be not so much amended as extended. As noted above, we see a number of contemporary cases of classic Huntingtonian political decay, where participation has outrun institutionalization. But if one looks at the universe of weak and failed states that has emerged in the past two decades, there are clearly other forces at work. One factor in particular is the peculiar nature of the contemporary international system, one that despite good intentions arguably promotes political decay.

If one examines historical cases of state formation and state building in the regions of the world that have strong states (primarily Europe and East Asia), the uncomfortable truth emerges that violence has always been a key ingredient. Charles Tilly has argued that the modern European state emerged out of the military competition that took place among the decentralized political actors there. The Chinese, Japanese, and Korean states were all forcibly unified at the beginning of their histories, and required continuing violence to keep them together. Even the United States, which prides itself on being a constitutional democracy, owes its national unity to a bloody civil war that took the lives of more than half a million of its citizens.

Today's international system does not look kindly on interstate violence and the kind of wars of conquest and consolidation that as recently as the 1870s produced the present-day countries of Italy and Germany. Africa, for example, was saddled with an irrational political map upon decolonization, one that corresponded to

neither geography, ethnicity, nor economic functionality. The international system supported that region's leaders' decision to retain those boundaries, even as decreasing transportation and communications costs made those boundaries more porous, and the political units more susceptible to mutual destabilization.

Today, we have a situation in which things that weaken states and promote political decay—like weapons, drugs, laundered money, security advisors, refugees, and diamonds—can cross international borders with relative ease, while the world's normative structure and the institutions built around it (e.g., the United Nations, the African Union, and the various nongovernmental organizations devoted to human rights) inhibit the kind of muscular state-building that was necessary to political development in other parts of the world. (Try to imagine what the outcome of the American Civil War might have been had it taken place in today's globalized world.) Even the well-intentioned activities of international donors and nongovernmental organizations devoted to promoting economic development have had the unanticipated effect of weakening state capacity by creating aid dependency and bypassing indigenous governments. In an ironic twist, there is enough violence and conflict in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia to promote untold human suffering, but not enough (or not enough of the right type) to produce strong political institutions.

Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* was perhaps the last serious effort to produce a grand theory of political change. Since then, there has been a good deal of relatively useful middle-range theory related to issues like democratic transitions, institutional design, and specific regions, as well as somewhat less-useful mathematical models coming out of rational-choice political science. Perhaps all grand theories are ultimately doomed to failure owing to the underlying complexity of the subject matter or to changing circumstances over time. Or perhaps the problem is that there are simply not many thinkers of Huntington's ability, insight, and ambition, who could hope to produce a book of this scope. In the meantime, we will have to be satisfied that this classic work will remain available for future generations of students interested in the problem of political development.

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Preface

The "political order" referred to in the title of this book is a goal, not a reality. The pages following are, consequently, filled with descriptions of violence, instability, and disorder. In this respect this book resembles those volumes which purport to deal with "economic development" but whose actual subjects are economic backwardness and stagnation. Economists who write about economic development presumably favor it, and this book originates in a parallel concern which I have for political stability. My effort here is to probe the conditions under which societies undergoing rapid and disruptive social and economic change may in some measure realize this goal. The indices of economic development, such as per capita gross national product, are reasonably familiar and accepted. The indices of political order or its absence in terms of violence, coups, insurrections, and other forms of instabilty are also reasonably clear and even quantifiable. Just as it is possible for economists to analyze and to debate, as economists, the conditions and policies which promote economic development, it should also be possible for political scientists to analyze and to debate in scholarly fashion the ways and means of promoting political order, whatever their differences concerning the legitimacy and desirability of that goal. Just as economic development depends, in some measure, on the relation between investment and consumption, political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics. At least that is the framework in which I have approached the problem in this book.

My research and writing were done at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. This work was supported in part by the Center from its own resources, in part by a Ford Foundation grant to the University for work in international affairs, and in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to the Center for a research program in Political Institutionalization and Social Change. The impetus for the overall elaboration of the

argument of the book came from the invitation of Professor Robert Dahl and the Council on International Relations of Yale University to deliver the Henry L. Stimson Lectures in 1966. Portions of chapters 1, 2, and 3 appeared in *World Politics* and *Daedalus* and are incorporated into this manuscript with the permission of the publishers of these two journals. Christopher Mitchell, Joan Nelson, Eric Nordlinger, and Steven R. Rivkin read the manuscript in whole or in part and made valuable comments on it. Over the past four years my thinking on the problems of political order and social change has benefited greatly from the insight and wisdom of my colleagues in the Harvard-MIT Faculty Seminar on Political Development. During this period also many students have helped me in collecting and analyzing data on modernizing countries. Those who made substantial contributions directly relevant to this book are Richard Alpert, Margaret Bates, Richard Betts, Robert Bruce, Allan E. Goodman, Robert Hart, Christopher Mitchell, and William Schneider. Finally, throughout my work on this book, Shirley Johannesen Levine functioned as an invaluable research assistant, editor, typist, proofreader, and, most importantly, chief-of-staff tying together the activities of others also performing these roles. I am profoundly grateful to all these institutions and individuals for their support, advice, and assistance. With all this help, the remaining errors and deficiencies must clearly be mine alone.

S.P.H.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
April 1968

POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES

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1. Political Order and Political Decay

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based. All three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict. These governments command the loyalties of their citizens and thus have the capacity to tax resources, to conscript manpower, and to innovate and to execute policy. If the Politburo, the Cabinet, or the President makes a decision, the probability is high that it will be implemented through the government machinery.

In all these characteristics the political systems of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union differ significantly from the governments which exist in many, if not most, of the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These

countries lack many things. They suffer real shortages of food, literacy, education, wealth, income, health, and productivity, but most of them have been recognized and efforts made to do something about them. Beyond and behind these shortages, however, there is a greater shortage: a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government. "I do know," Walter Lippmann has observed, "that there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed." [1] Mr. Lippmann wrote these words in a moment of despair about the United States. But they apply in far greater measure to the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the political community is fragmented against itself and where political institutions have little power, less majesty, and no resiliency—where, in many cases, governments simply do not govern.

In the mid-1950s, Gunnar Myrdal called the world's attention to the apparent fact that the rich nations of the world were getting richer, absolutely and relatively, at a faster rate than the poorer nations. "On the whole," he argued, "in recent decades the economic inequalities between developed and underdeveloped countries have been increasing." In 1966 the president of the World Bank similarly pointed out that at current rates of growth the gap in per capita national income between the United States and forty underdeveloped countries would increase fifty per cent by the year 2000.[2] Clearly, a central issue, perhaps the central issue, in international and developmental economics is the apparently remorseless tendency for this economic gap to broaden. A similar and equally urgent problem exists in politics. In politics as in economics the gap between developed political systems and underdeveloped political systems, between civic polities and corrupt polities, has broadened. This political gap resembles and is related to the economic gap, but it is not identical with it. Countries with underdeveloped economies may have highly developed political systems, and countries which have achieved high levels of economic welfare may still have disorganized and chaotic politics. Yet in the

1. Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune,* Dec. 10, 1963, p. 24.
2. Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor* (New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1957), p. 6; George D. Woods, "The Development Decade in the Balance," *Foreign Affairs, 44* (Jan. 1966), 207.

twentieth century the principal locus of political underdevelopment, like that of economic underdevelopment, tends to be the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties. In the two decades after World War II, successful coups d'etat occurred in 17 of 20 Latin American countries (only Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay maintaining constitutional processes), in a half-dozen North African and Middle Eastern states (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, Iraq, Turkey), in a like number of west African and central African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Congo), and in a variety of Asian societies (Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, South Korea). Revolutionary violence, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare wracked Cuba, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic in Latin America, Algeria and Yemen in the Middle East, and Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaya, and Laos in Asia. Racial, tribal, or communal violence or tension disrupted Guyana, Morocco, Iraq, Nigeria, Uganda, the Congo, Burundi, the Sudan, Ruanda, Cyprus, India, Ceylon, Burma, Laos, and South Vietnam. In Latin America, old-style, oligarchic dictatorships in countries like Haiti, Paraguay, and Nicaragua maintained a fragile police-based rule. In the eastern hemisphere, traditional regimes in Iran, Libya, Arabia, Ethiopia, and Thailand struggled to reform themselves even as they teetered on the brink of revolutionary overthrow.

During the 1950s and 1960s the numerical incidence of political violence and disorder increased dramatically in most countries of the world. The year 1958, according to one calculation, witnessed some 28 prolonged guerrilla insurgencies, four military uprisings,

and two conventional wars. Seven years later, in 1965, 42 prolonged insurgencies were underway; ten military revolts occurred; and five conventional conflicts were being fought. Political instability also increased significantly during the 1950s and 1960s. Violence and other destabilizing events were five times more frequent between 1955 and 1962 than they were between 1948 and 1954. Sixty-four of 84 countries were less stable in the latter period than in the earlier one.[3] Throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America there was a decline in political order, an undermining of the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of government. There was a lack of civic morale and public spirit and of political institutions capable of giving meaning and direction to the public interest. Not political development but political decay dominated the scene.

TABLE 1.1. Military Conflicts, 1958–1965

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Prolonged, irregular or guerrilla insurgency	28	31	30	31	34	41	43	42
Brief revolts, coups, uprisings	4	4	11	6	9	15	9	10
Overt, militarily conventional wars	2	1	1	6	4	3	4	5
Total	34	36	42	43	47	59	56	57

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

What was responsible for this violence and instability? The primary thesis of this book is that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions. "Among the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville observed, "there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."[4] The

3. Wallace W. Conroe, "A Cross-National Analysis of the Impact of Modernization Upon Political Stability" (unpublished M.A. thesis, San Diego State College, 1965), pp. 52–54, 60–62; Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10* (Sept. 1966), 253–54.

4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (ed. Phillips Bradley, New York, Knopf, 1955), 2, 118.

political instability in Asia, Africa, and Latin America derives precisely from the failure to meet this condition: equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than "the art of associating together." Social and economic change—urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion—extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, broaden political participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions; they enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.

For two decades after World War II American foreign policy failed to come to grips with this problem. The economic gap, in contrast to the political gap, was the target of sustained attention, analysis, and action. Aid programs and loan programs, the World Bank and regional banks, the UN and the OECD, consortia and combines, planners and politicians, all shared in a massive effort to do something about the problem of economic development. Who, however, was concerned with the political gap? American officials recognized that the United States had a primary interest in the creation of viable political regimes in modernizing countries. But few, if any, of all the activities of the American government affecting those countries were directly concerned with the promotion of political stability and the reduction of the political gap. How can this astonishing lacuna be explained?

It would appear to be rooted in two distinct aspects of the American historical experience. In confronting the modernizing countries the United States was handicapped by its happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being, and political stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal aids in the achievement of others. In American policy toward modernizing countries this experience was reflected in the belief that po-

litical stability would be the natural and inevitable result of the achievement of, first, economic development and then of social reform. Throughout the 1950s the prevailing assumption of American policy was that economic development—the elimination of poverty, disease, illiteracy—was necessary for political development and political stability. In American thinking the causal chain was: economic assistance promotes economic development, economic development promotes political stability. This dogma was enshrined in legislation and, perhaps more important, it was ingrained in the thinking of officials in AID and other agencies concerned with the foreign assistance programs.

If political decay and political instability were more rampant in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in 1965 than they were fifteen years earlier, it was in part because American policy reflected this erroneous dogma. For in fact, economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other. In some instances programs of economic development may promote political stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such stability. So also, some forms of political stability may encourage economic growth; other forms may discourage it. India was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s and had only a modest rate of economic growth. Yet through the Congress Party it achieved a high degree of political stability. Per capita incomes in Argentina and Venezuela were perhaps ten times that in India, and Venezuela had a phenomenal rate of economic growth. Yet for both countries stability remained an elusive goal.

With the Alliance for Progress in 1961, social reform—that is, the more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources—joined economic development as a conscious and explicit goal of American policy toward modernizing countries. This development was, in part, a reaction to the Cuban Revolution, and it reflected the assumption among policymakers that land and tax reforms, housing projects, and welfare programs would reduce social tensions and deactivate the fuse to Fidelismo. Once again political stability was to be the by-product of the achievement of another socially desirable goal. In fact, of course, the relationship between social reform and political stability resembles that between economic development and political stability. In some circumstances reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful rather

than violent change. In other circumstances, however, reform may well exacerbate tensions, precipitate violence, and be a catalyst of rather than a substitute for revolution.

A second reason for American indifference to political development was the absence in the American historical experience of the need to found a political order. Americans, de Tocqueville said, were born equal and hence never had to worry about creating equality; they enjoyed the fruits of a democratic revolution without having suffered one. So also, America was born with a government, with political institutions and practices imported from seventeenth-century England. Hence Americans never had to worry about creating a government. This gap in historical experience made them peculiarly blind to the problems of creating effective authority in modernizing countries. When an American thinks about the problem of government-building, he directs himself not to the creation of authority and the accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power. Asked to design a government, he comes up with a written constitution, bill of rights, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, regular elections, competitive parties—all excellent devices for limiting government. The Lockean American is so fundamentally anti-government that he identifies government with restrictions on government. Confronted with the need to design a political system which will maximize power and authority, he has no ready answer. His general formula is that governments should be based on free and fair elections.

In many modernizing societies this formula is irrelevant. Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations. In many, if not most, modernizing countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority. "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men," Madison warned in *The Federalist,* No. 51, "the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." In many modernizing countries governments are still unable to perform the first function, much less the second. The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they

cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.

It is precisely this scarcity that communist and communist-type movements are often able to overcome. History shows conclusively that communist governments are no better than free governments in alleviating famine, improving health, expanding national product, creating industry, and maximizing welfare. But the one thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority. Their ideology furnishes a basis of legitimacy, and their party organization provides the institutional mechanism for mobilizing support and executing policy. To overthrow the government in many modernizing countries is a simple task: one battalion, two tanks, and a half-dozen colonels may suffice. But no communist government in a modernizing country has been overthrown by a military coup d'etat. The real challenge which the communists pose to modernizing countries is not that they are so good at overthrowing governments (which is easy), but that they are so good at making governments (which is a far more difficult task). They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do create governments that can govern. While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists offer modernizing countries a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernizing countries, they provide some assurance of political order.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL ORDER

Social Forces and Political Institutions

The level of political community a society achieves reflects the relationship between its political institutions and the social forces which comprise it. A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group. Modernization involves, in large part, the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in society. Kinship, racial, and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class, and skill groupings. A political organization or procedure, on the other hand, is an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus

promoting community among two or more social forces. A simple political community may have a purely ethnic, religious, or occupational base and will have little need for highly developed political institutions. It has the unity of Durkheim's mechanical solidarity. The more complex and heterogeneous the society, however, the more the achievement and maintenance of political community become dependent upon the workings of political institutions.

In practice, the distinction between a political institution and a social force is not a clear-cut one. Many groups may combine significant characteristics of both. The theoretical distinction between the two, however, is clear. All men who engage in political activity may be assumed to be members of a variety of social groupings. The level of political development of a society in large part depends upon the extent to which these political activists also belong to and identify with a variety of political institutions. Clearly, the power and influence of social forces varies considerably. In a society in which all belong to the same social force, conflicts are limited and are resolved through the structure of the social force. No clearly distinct political institutions are necessary. In a society with only a few social forces, one group—warriors, priests, a particular family, a racial or ethnic group—may dominate the others and effectively induce them to acquiesce in its rule. The society may exist with little or no community. But in a society of any greater heterogeneity and complexity, no single social force can rule, much less create a community, without creating political institutions which have some existence independent of the social forces that gave them birth. "The strongest," in Rousseau's oftquoted phrase, "is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty." In a society of any complexity, the relative power of the groups changes, but if the society is to be a community, the power of each group is exercised through political institutions which temper, moderate, and redirect that power so as to render the dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many.

In the total absence of social conflict, political institutions are unnecessary; in the total absence of social harmony, they are impossible. Two groups which see each other only as archenemies cannot form the basis of a community until those mutual perceptions change. There must be some compatibility of interests

among the groups that compose the society. In addition, a complex society also requires some definition in terms of general principle or ethical obligation of the bond which holds the groups together and which distinguishes its community from other communities. In a simple society community is found in the immediate relation of one person to another: husband to wife, brother to brother, neighbor to neighbor. The obligation and the community are direct; nothing intrudes from the outside. In a more complex society, however, community involves the relation of individual men or groups to something apart from themselves. The obligation is to some principle, tradition, myth, purpose, or code of behavior that the persons and groups have in common. Combined, these elements constitute Cicero's definition of the commonwealth, or "the coming together of a considerable number of men who are united by a common agreement upon law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages." *Consensus juris* and *utilitatis communio* are two sides of political community. Yet there is also a third side. For attitudes must be reflected in behavior, and community involves not just any "coming together" but rather a regularized, stable, and sustained coming together. The coming together must, in short, be institutionalized. And the creation of political institutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interest is, consequently, the third element necessary for the maintenance of community in a complex society. Such institutions in turn give new meaning to the common purpose and create new linkages between the particular interests of individuals and groups.

The degree of community in a complex society thus, in a rough sense, depends on the strength and scope of its political institutions. The institutions are the behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest. The isolated family, clan, tribe, or village may achieve community with relatively little conscious effort. They are, in a sense, natural communities. As societies become larger in membership, more complicated in structure, and more diverse in activities, the achievement or maintenance of a high level of community becomes increasingly dependent upon political institutions. Men are, however, reluctant to give up the image of social harmony without political action. This was Rousseau's dream. It remains the dream of statesmen and soldiers who imagine that they can induce community in their societies

without engaging in the labor of politics. It is the eschatological goal of the Marxists who aim to re-create at the end of history a perfect community where politics is superfluous. In fact, this atavistic notion could only succeed if history were reversed, civilization undone, and the levels of human organization reduced to family and hamlet. In simple societies community can exist without politics or at least without highly differentiated political institutions. In a complex society community is produced by political action and maintained by political institutions.

Historically, political institutions have emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces, and the gradual development of procedures and organizational devices for resolving those disagreements. The breakup of a small homogeneous ruling class, the diversification of social forces, and increased interaction among such forces are preconditions for the emergence of political organizations and procedures and the eventual creation of political institutions. "Conscious constitution-making appears to have entered the Mediterranean world when the clan organization weakened and the contest of rich and poor became a significant factor in politics." [5] The Athenians called upon Solon for a constitution when their polity was threatened by dissolution because there were "as many different parties as there were diversities in the country" and "the disparity of fortune between the rich and the poor, at that time, also reached its height." [6] More highly developed political institutions were required to maintain Athenian political community as Athenian society became more complex. The reforms of Solon and of Cleisthenes were responses to the social-economic change that threatened to undermine the earlier basis of community. As social forces became more variegated, political institutions had to become more complex and authoritative. It is precisely this development, however, which failed to occur in many modernizing societies in the twentieth century. Social forces were strong, political institutions weak. Legislatures and executives, public authorities and political parties remained fragile and disorganized. The development of the state lagged behind the evolution of society.

5. Francis D. Wormuth, *The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism* (New York,
6. Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans* (trans. John Dryden, New York, Modern Library, n.d.) , p. 104.
Harper, 1949) , p. 4.

Criteria of Political Institutionalization

Political community in a complex society thus depends upon the strength of the political organizations and procedures in the society. That strength, in turn, depends upon the *scope of support* for the organizations and procedures and their *level of institutionalization*. Scope refers simply to the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the population is politically organized and follows the political procedures, the scope is broad. Institutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior. Organizations and procedures vary in their degree of institutionalization. Harvard University and the newly opened suburban high school are both organizations, but Harvard is much more of an institution than the high school. The seniority system in Congress and President Johnson's select press conferences are both procedures, but seniority was much more institutionalized than were Mr. Johnson's methods of dealing with the press.

Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.[7] The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. If these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their levels of institutionalization. And it will also be possible to measure increases and decreases in the institutionalization of the particular organizations and procedures within a political system.

7. For relevant definitions and discussions of institutions and institutionalization, see Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed. Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1954) , pp. 143, 239; Charles P. Loomis, "Social Change and Social Systems," in Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., *Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change* (New York, Free Press, 1963) , pp. 185 ff. For a parallel but different use of the concept of institutionalization in relation to modernization, see the work of S. N. Eisenstadt, in particular his "Initial Institutional Patterns of Political Modernisation," *Civilisations, 12* (1962) , 461–72, and *13* (1963) , 15–26; "Institutionalization and Change," *American Sociological Review, 24* (April 1964) , 235–47; "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," ibid., *24* (June 1964) , 375–86.

Adaptability-Rigidity. The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organizational characteristic. It is, in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. The more challenges that have arisen in its environment and the greater its age, the more adaptable it is. Rigidity is more characteristic of young organizations than of old ones. Old organizations and procedures, however, are not necessarily adaptable if they have existed in a static environment. In addition, if over a period of time an organization has developed a set of responses for effectively dealing with one type of problem, and if it is then confronted with an entirely different type of problem requiring a different response, the organization may well be a victim of its past successes and be unable to adjust to the new challenge. In general, however, the first hurdle is the biggest one. Success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges. If, for instance, the probability of successful adjustment to the first challenge is 50 per cent, the probability of successful adjustment to the second challenge might be 75 per cent, to the third challenge 87.5 per cent, to the fourth 93.75 per cent, and so on. Some changes in environment, moreover, such as changes in personnel, are inevitable for all organizations. Other changes in environment may be produced by the organization itself—for instance, if it successfully completes the task it was originally created to accomplish. So long as it is recognized that environments can differ in the challenges they pose to organizations, the adaptability of an organization can in a rough sense be measured by its age.[8] Its age, in turn, can be measured in three ways.

One is simply chronological: the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period. The probability that an organization which is one hundred years old will survive one additional year, it might be hypothesized, is perhaps

8. Cf. William H. Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Development," in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965) , p. 453: "the basic nature of adaptation is such that the longer an organization survives, the better prepared it is to continue surviving."

one hundred times greater than the probability that an organiza-
tion one year old will survive one additional year. Political institu-
tions are thus not created overnight. Political development, in this
sense, is slow, particularly when compared to the seemingly much
more rapid pace of economic development. In some instances par-
ticular types of experience may substitute for time: fierce conflict
or other serious challenges may transform organizations into insti-
tutions much more rapidly than normal circumstances. But such
intensive experiences are rare, and even with such experiences
time is still required. "A major party," Ashoka Mehta observed, in
commenting on why communism was helpless in India, "cannot
be created in a day. In China a great party was forged by the revo-
lution. Other major parties can be or are born of revolutions in
other countries. But it is simply impossible, through normal chan-
nels, to forge a great party, to reach and galvanize millions of men
in half a million villages." [9]

A second measure of adaptability is generational age. So long as
an organization still has its first set of leaders, so long as a proce-
dure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adapt-
ability is still in doubt. The more often the organization has sur-
mounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set
of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is. In
considerable measure, of course, generational age is a function of
chronological age. But political parties and governments may con-
tinue for decades under the leadership of one generation. The
founders of organizations—whether parties, governments, or busi-
ness corporations—are often young. Hence the gap between chro-
nological age and generational age is apt to be greater in the early
history of an organization than later in its career. This gap pro-
duces tensions between the first leaders of the organization and the
next generation immediately behind them, which can look for-
ward to a lifetime in the shadow of the first generation. In the
middle of the 1960s the Chinese Communist Party was 45 years
old, but in large part it was still led by its first generation of lead-
ers. An organization may of course change leadership without
changing generations of leadership. One generation differs from

9. Ashoka Mehta, in Raymond Aron, ed., *World Technology and Human Destiny*
(Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1963) , p. 133.

another in terms of its formative experiences. Simple replacement of one set of leaders by another, e.g. in surmounting a succession crisis, counts for something in terms of institutional adaptability, but it is not as significant as a shift in leadership generations, that is, the replacement of one set of leaders by another set with significantly different organizational experiences. The shift from Lenin to Stalin was an intra-generation succession; the shift from Stalin to Khrushchev was an inter-generation succession.

Thirdly, organizational adaptability can be measured in functional terms. An organization's functions, of course, can be defined in an almost infinite number of ways. (This is a major appeal and a major limitation of the functional approach to organizations.) Usually an organization is created to perform one particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organization faces a major crisis: it either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a lingering death. An organization that has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one that has not. Functional adaptability, not functional specificity, is the true measure of a highly developed organization. Institutionalization makes the organization more than simply an instrument to achieve certain purposes.[10] Instead its leaders and members come to value it for its own sake, and it develops a life of its own quite apart from the specific functions it may perform at any given time. The organization triumphs over its function.

Organizations and individuals thus differ significantly in their cumulative capacity to adapt to changes. Individuals usually grow up through childhood and adolescence without deep commitments to highly specific functions. The process of commitment begins in late adolescence. As the individual becomes more and more committed to the performance of certain functions, he finds it increasingly difficult to change those functions and to unlearn the responses he has acquired to meet environmental changes. His personality has been formed; he has become "set in his ways." Organizations, on the other hand, are usually created to perform very specific functions. When the organization confronts a changing environment, it must, if it is to survive, weaken its commitment to

10. See the very useful discussion in Philip Selznick's small classic, *Leadership in Administration* (New York, Harper and Row, 1957) , pp. 5 ff.

its original functions. As the organization matures, it becomes "unset" in its ways.[11]

In practice, organizations vary greatly in their functional adaptability. The YMCA, for instance, was founded in the mid-nineteenth century as an evangelical organization to convert the single young men who, during the early years of industrialization, were migrating in great numbers to the cities. With the decline in need for this function, the "Y" successfully adjusted to the performance of many other "general service" functions broadly related to the legitimizing goal of "character development." Concurrently, it broadened its membership base to include, first, non-evangelical Protestants, then Catholics, then Jews, then old men as well as young, and then women as well as men! [12] As a result the organization has prospered, although its original functions disappeared with the dark, satanic mills. Other organizations, such as the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the Townsend Movement, have had greater difficulty in adjusting to a changing environment. The WCTU "is an organization in retreat. Contrary to the expectations of theories of institutionalization, the movement has not acted to preserve organizational values at the expense of past doctrine." [13] The Townsend Movement has been torn between those who wish to remain loyal to the original function and those who put organizational imperatives first. If the latter are successful, "the dominating orientation of leaders and members shifts *from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent* (by leaders, members, and public alike), *to maintaining the organizational structure as such,* even at the loss of the organization's central mission." [14] The conquest of polio posed a similar acute crisis for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.

11. Cf. Starbuck, pp. 473–75, who suggests that older organizations are less likely than younger ones to resist changes in goals but more likely to resist changes in social structure and task structure.

12. See Mayer N. Zald and Patricia Denton, "From Evangelism to General Service: The Transformation of the YMCA," *Administrative Science Quarterly, 8* (Sept. 1963) , 214 ff.

13. Joseph R. Gusfield, "Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union," *American Journal of Sociology, 61* (Nov. 1955) , 232; and Gusfield, "The Problem of Generations in an Organizational Structure," *Social Forces, 35* (May, 1957) , 323 ff.

14. Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," *American Sociological Review, 20* (Feb. 1955) , 10; italics in original.

The original goals of the organization were highly specific. Should the organization dissolve when these goals were achieved? The dominant opinion of the volunteers was that the organization should continue. "We can fight polio," said one town chairman, "if we can organize people. If we can organize people like this we can fight anything." Another asked: "Wouldn't it be a wonderful story to get polio licked, and then go on to something else and get that licked and then go on to something else? It would be a challenge, a career." [15]

The problems of functional adaptability are not very different for political organizations. A political party gains in functional age when it shifts its function from the representation of one constituency to the representation of another; it also gains in functional age when it shifts from opposition to government. A party that is unable to change constituencies or to acquire power is less of an institution than one that is able to make these changes. A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism. A party which acts this way is less of an institution than one, like the Congress Party, which drops its anticolonialism after achieving independence and quite rapidly adapts itself to the tasks of governing. Industrialization has been a major function of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A major test of the institutionalization of the Communist Party will be its success in developing new functions now that the major industrializing effort is behind it. A governmental organ that can successfully adapt itself to changed functions, such as the British Crown in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is more of an institution than one which cannot, such as the French monarchy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Complexity-Simplicity. The more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve

15. David L. Sills, *The Volunteers* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957) , p. 266. Chapter 9 of this book is an excellent discussion of organizational goal replacement with reference to the YMCA, WCTU, Townsend Movement, Red Cross, and other case studies.

both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of subunits the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose. The diversified corporation is obviously less vulnerable than that which produces one product for one market. The differentiation of subunits within an organization may or may not be along functional lines. If it is functional in character, the subunits themselves are less highly institutionalized than the whole of which they are a part. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are fairly easily reflected by changes in the power and roles of its subunits. If the subunits are multifunctional, they have greater institutional strength, but they may also, for that very reason, contribute less flexibility to the organization as a whole. Hence, a political system with parties of "social integration," in Sigmund Neumann's terms, has less institutional flexibility than one with parties of "individual representation." [16]

Relatively primitive and simple traditional political systems are usually overwhelmed and destroyed in the modernization process. More complex traditional systems are more likely to adapt to these new demands. Japan, for instance, was able to adjust its traditional political institutions to the modern world because of their relative complexity. For two and a half centuries before 1868 the emperor had reigned and the Tokugawa shogun had ruled. The stability of the political order, however, did not depend solely on the stability of the shogunate. When the authority of the shogunate decayed, another traditional institution, the emperor, was available to become the instrument of the modernizing samurai. The overthrow of the shogun involved not the collapse of the political order but the "restoration" of the emperor.

The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual. It is also the least stable. Tyrannies, Aristotle pointed out, are virtually all "quite short-lived." [17] A political system with sev-

16. Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 403–05.

17. Aristotle, *Politics* (trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 254.

eral different political institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set of institutions; the needs of the next by a different set. The system possesses within itself the means of its own renewal and adaptation. In the American system, for instance, President, Senate, House of Representatives, Supreme Court, and state governments have played different roles at different times in history. As new problems arise, the initiative in dealing with them may be taken first by one institution, then by another. In contrast, the French system of the Third and Fourth Republics centered authority in the National Assembly and the national bureaucracy. If, as was frequently the case, the Assembly was too divided to act and the bureaucracy lacked the authority to act, the system was unable to adapt to environmental changes and to deal with new policy problems. When in the 1950s the Assembly was unable to handle the dissolution of the French empire, there was no other institution, such as an independent executive, to step into the breach. As a result, an extraconstitutional force, the military, intervened in politics, and in due course a new institution, the de Gaulle Presidency, was created which was able to handle the problem. "A state without the means of some change," Burke observed of an earlier French crisis, "is without the means of its conservation." [18]

The classical political theorists, preoccupied as they were with the problem of stability, arrived at similar conclusions. The simple forms of government were most likely to degenerate; the "mixed state" was more likely to be stable. Both Plato and Aristotle suggested that the most practical state was the "polity" combining the institutions of democracy and oligarchy. A "constitutional system based absolutely, and at all points," Aristotle argued, "on either the oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality is a poor sort of thing. The facts are evidence enough: constitutions of this sort never endure." A "constitution is better when it is composed of more numerous elements." [19] Such a constitution is more likely to head off sedition and revolution. Polybius and Cicero elaborated this idea more explicitly. Each of the "good" simple forms of government—kingship, aristocracy, and democracy—is likely to degenerate into its perverted counterpart—tyranny, oligarchy, and

18. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Chicago, Regnery, 1955) , p. 37.

19. *Politics*, pp. 60, 206.

mobocracy. Instability and degeneration can only be avoided by combining elements from all the good forms into a mixed state. Complexity produces stability. "The simple governments," Burke echoed two thousand years later, "are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them." [20]

Autonomy-Subordination. A third measure of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior. How well is the political sphere differentiated from other spheres? In a highly developed political system, political organizations have an integrity which they lack in less developed systems. In some measure, they are insulated from the impact of nonpolitical groups and procedures. In less developed political systems, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences.

At its most concrete level, autonomy involves the relations between social forces, on the one hand, and political organizations, on the other. Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organizations and procedures that are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. A political organization that is the instrument of a social group—family, clan, class—lacks autonomy and institutionalization. If the state, in the traditional Marxist claim, is really the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," then it is not much of an institution. A judiciary is independent to the extent that it adheres to distinctly judicial norms and to the extent that its perspectives and behavior are independent of those of other political institutions and social groupings. As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is measured by the extent to which they have their own interests and values distinguishable from those of other institutions and social forces. As also with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is likely to be the result of competition among social forces. A political party, for instance, that expresses the interests of only one group in society—whether labor, business, or farmers—is less autonomous than one that articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups. The latter type of party has a clearly defined existence apart from particular social forces. So also with legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies.

Political procedures, like political organizations, also have vary-

ing degrees of autonomy. A highly developed political system has procedures to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of violence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system. To the extent that political officials can be toppled by a few soldiers or influenced by a few dollars, the organizations and procedures lack autonomy. Political organizations and procedures which lack autonomy are, in common parlance, said to be corrupt.

Political organizations and procedures that are vulnerable to nonpolitical influences from within the society are also usually vulnerable to influences from outside the society. They are easily penetrated by agents, groups, and ideas from other political systems. Thus a coup d'etat in one political system may easily "trigger" coup d'etats by similar groups in other less developed political systems.[21] In some instances, apparently, a regime can be overthrown by smuggling into the country a few agents and a handful of weapons. In other instances, a regime may be overthrown by the exchange of a few words and a few thousand dollars between a foreign ambassador and some disaffected colonels. The Soviet and American governments presumably spend substantial sums attempting to bribe high officials of less well-insulated political systems, sums they would not think of wasting in attempting to influence high officials in each other's political system.

In every society affected by social change, new groups arise to participate in politics. Where the political system lacks autonomy, these groups gain entry into politics without becoming identified with the established political organizations or acquiescing in the established political procedures. The political organizations and procedures are unable to stand up against the impact of a new social force. Conversely, in a developed political system the autonomy of the system is protected by mechanisms that restrict and moderate the impact of new groups. These mechanisms either slow down the entry of new groups into politics or, through a process of political socialization, impel changes in the attitudes and behavior of the most politically active members of the new group. In a highly institutionalized political system, the most important positions of leadership can normally only be achieved by

21. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York, Free Press, 1962) , pp. 44–47.

those who have served an apprenticeship in less important positions. The complexity of a political system contributes to its autonomy by providing a variety of organizations and positions in which individuals are prepared for the highest offices. In a sense, the top positions of leadership are the inner core of the political system; the less powerful positions, the peripheral organizations, and the semipolitical organizations are the filters through which individuals desiring access to the core must pass. Thus the political system assimilates new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing its institutional integrity. In a political system that lacks such defenses, new men, new viewpoints, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapidity.

Coherence-Disunity. The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group. An effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries. The consensus must extend to those active in the system. Nonparticipants, or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system, do not have to share the consensus and usually, in fact, do not share it to the same extent as the participants.[22]

In theory, an organization can be autonomous without being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. In actuality, however, the two are often closely linked together. Autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling the organization to develop an esprit and style that become distinctive marks of its behavior. Autonomy also prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces, although, of course, autonomy does not protect against disruption from internal sources. Rapid or substantial expansions in the membership of an organization or in the participants in a system tend to weaken coherence. The Ottoman Ruling Institution, for instance, retained its vitality and coherence as long as admission was restricted and recruits were "put through an elaborate

22. See, e.g., Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review, 18* (June 1964) , 361 ff.; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1955) , passim.

education, with selection and specialization at every stage." The Institution perished when "everybody pressed in to share its privileges. . . . Numbers were increased; discipline and efficiency declined." [23]

Unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. Numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in politics. The problems of creating coherent political organizations are more difficult but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent military organizations. "The sustaining sentiment of a military force," David Rapoport has argued,

> has much in common with that which cements any group of men engaged in politics—the willingness of most individuals to bridle private or personal impulses for the sake of general social objectives. Comrades must trust each other's ability to resist the innumerable temptations that threaten the group's solidarity; otherwise, in trying social situations, the desire to fend for oneself becomes overwhelming.[24]

The capacities for coordination and discipline are crucial to both war and politics, and historically societies which have been skilled at organizing the one have also been adept at organizing the other. "The relationship of efficient social organization in the arts of peace and in the arts of group conflict," one anthropologist has observed, "is almost absolute, whether one is speaking of civilization or subcivilization. Successful war depends upon team work and consensus, both of which require command and discipline. Command and discipline, furthermore, can eventually be no more than symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves." [25] Societies, such as Sparta, Rome, and Britain, which have been admired by their contemporaries for the authority and justice of their laws, have also been admired for the coherence and

23. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (abridgement of Vols. I–VI by D. C. Somervell, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947) , pp. 176–77.

24. David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, p. 79.

25. Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War* (Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1949) , pp. 235–36.

discipline of their armies. Discipline and development go hand in hand.

Political Institutions and Public Interests

Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces —between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and class—a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The "amoral familism" of Banfield's backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism, amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.

Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways.[26] It has been identified with either abstract, substantive, ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice, or right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual ("L'état, c'est moi"), group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism). The problem in all these approaches is to arrive at a definition that is concrete rather than nebulous and general rather than particular. Unfortunately, in most cases, what is concrete lacks generality and what is general lacks concreteness. One partial way out of the problem is to define the public interest in terms of the concrete interests of the governing institutions. A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is more able to articulate and achieve its public interests. "Organized (institutionalized) political communities," as Friedrich argues, "are *better adapted* to reaching decisions and developing policies than unorganized com-

26. See, in general, Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1960); Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Nomos V: The Public Interest* (New York, American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy, 1962); Douglas Price, "Theories of the Public Interest," in Lynton K. Caldwell, ed., *Politics and Public Affairs* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 141-60; Richard E. Flathman, *The Public Interest* (New York, Wiley, 1966).

munities." [27] The public interest, in this sense, is not something which exists a priori in natural law or the will of the people. Nor is it simply whatever results from the political process. Rather it is whatever strengthens governmental institutions. The public interest is the interest of public institutions. It is something created and brought into existence by the institutionalization of government organizations. In a complex political system, many governmental organizations and procedures represent many different aspects of the public interest. The public interest of a complex society is a complex matter.

Democrats are accustomed to thinking of governmental institutions as having representative functions, that is, as expressing the interests of some other set of groups (their constituency). Hence they tend to forget that governmental institutions have interests of their own. These interests not only exist, they are also reasonably concrete. The questions "What is the interest of the Presidency? What is the interest of the Senate? What is the interest of the House of Representatives? What is the interest of the Supreme Court?" are difficult but not completely impossible to answer. The answers would furnish a fairly close approximation of the "public interest" of the United States. Similarly, the public interest of Great Britain might be approximated by the specific institutional interests of the Crown, Cabinet, and Parliament. In the Soviet Union, the answer would involve the specific institutional interests of the Presidium, Secretariat, and Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Institutional interests differ from the interests of individuals who are in the institutions. Keynes' percipient remark that "In the long run we are all dead" applies to individuals, not institutions. Individual interests are necessarily short-run interests. Institutional interests, however, exist through time; the proponent of the institution has to look to its welfare through an indefinite future. This consideration often means a limiting of immediate goals. The "true policy," Aristotle remarked, "for democracy and oligarchy alike, is not one which ensures the greatest possible amount of either, but one which will ensure the longest possible life for both." [28] The official who attempts to maximize power or

27. Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 150; italics in original.
28. *Politics*, p. 267.

other values in the short run often weakens his institution in the long run. Supreme Court justices may, in terms of their immediate individual desires, wish to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. In deciding whether it is in the public interest to do so, however, presumably one question they should ask themselves is whether it is in the long-term institutional interest of the Supreme Court for them to do so. Judicial statesmen are those who, like John Marshall in *Marbury vs. Madison,* maximize the institutional power of the Court, in such a way that it is impossible for either the President or Congress to challenge it. In contrast, the Supreme Court justices of the 1930s came very close to expanding their immediate influence at the expense of the long-term interests of the Court as an institution.

"What's good for General Motors is good for the country" contains at least a partial truth. "What's good for the Presidency is good for the country," however, contains more truth. Ask any reasonably informed group of Americans to identify the five best presidents and the five worst presidents. Then ask them to identify the five strongest presidents and the five weakest presidents. If the identification of strength with goodness and weakness with badness is not 100 per cent, it will almost certainly not be less than 80 per cent. Those presidents—Jefferson, Lincoln, the Roosevelts, Wilson—who expanded the powers of their office are hailed as the beneficent promoters of the public welfare and national interest. Those presidents, such as Buchanan, Grant, Harding, who failed to defend the power of their institution against other groups are also thought to have done less good for the country. Institutional interest coincides with public interest. The power of the presidency is identified with the good of the polity.

The public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional interests of the top organs of the Communist Party: "What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union." Viewed in these terms, Stalinism can be defined as a situation in which the personal interests of the ruler take precedence over the institutionalized interests of the party. Beginning in the late 1930s, Stalin consistently weakened the party. No party congress was held between 1939 and 1952. During and after World War II the Central Committee seldom met. The party secretariat and party hierarchy were weakened by the creation of competing organs. Conceivably this process could have resulted in the dis-

placement of one set of governing institutions by another, and some American experts and some Soviet leaders did think that governmental organizations rather than party organizations would become the ruling institutions in Soviet society. Such, however, was neither the intent nor the effect of Stalin's action. He increased his personal power, not the governmental power. When he died, his personal power died with him. The struggle to fill the resulting vacuum was won by Khrushchev who identified his interests with the interests of the party organization, rather than by Malenkov who identified himself with the governmental bureaucracy. Khrushchev's consolidation of power marked the reemergence and revitalization of the principal organs of the party. While they acted in very different ways and from different motives, Stalin weakened the party just as Grant weakened the Presidency. Just as a strong Presidency is in the American public interest, so also a strong party is in the Soviet public interest.

In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the "public philosophy." [29] According to democratic theory, they derive their legitimacy from the extent to which they embody the will of the people. According to the procedural concept, they are legitimate if they represent the outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interested groups have participated. In another sense, however, the legitimacy of governmental actions can be sought in the extent to which they reflect the interests of governmental institutions. In contrast to the theory of representative government, under this concept governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but to the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups. Politicians frequently remark that things "look different" after they are in office than they did when they were competing for office. This difference is a measure of the institutional demands of office. It is precisely this difference in perspective that legitimizes the demands of the officeholder on his fellow citizens. The interests of the president, for instance, may coincide partially and temporarily first with those of one group and then

29. See Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (Boston, Little Brown, 1955), esp. p. 42, for his definition of the public interest as "what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently."

with those of another. But the interest of the Presidency, as Neu-
stadt has emphasized,[30] coincides with that of no one else. The
president's power derives not from his representation of class,
group, regional, or popular interests, but rather from the fact that
he represents none of these. The presidential perspective is unique
to the Presidency. Precisely for this reason it is both a lonely office
and a powerful one. Its authority is rooted in its loneliness.

The existence of political institutions (such as the Presidency or
Central Committee) capable of giving substance to public inter-
ests distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped
ones. It also distinguishes moral communities from amoral soci-
eties. A government with a low level of institutionalization is not
just a weak government; it is also a bad government. The function
of government is to govern. A weak government, a government
which lacks authority, fails to perform its function and is immoral
in the same sense in which a corrupt judge, a cowardly soldier, or
an ignorant teacher is immoral. The moral basis of political insti-
tutions is rooted in the needs of men in complex societies.

The relation between the culture of society and the institutions
of politics is a dialectical one. Community, de Jouvenel observes,
means "the institutionalization of trust," and the "essential func-
tion of public authorities" is to "increase the mutual trust prevail-
ing at the heart of the social whole." [31] Conversely, the absence of
trust in the culture of the society provides formidable obstacles to
the creation of public institutions. Those societies deficient in
stable and effective government are also deficient in mutual trust
among their citizens, in national and public loyalties, and in orga-
nization skills and capacity. Their political cultures are often said
to be marked by suspicion, jealousy, and latent or actual hostility
toward everyone who is not a member of the family, the village,
or, perhaps, the tribe. These characteristics are found in many cul-
tures, their most extensive manifestations perhaps being in the
Arab world and in Latin America. "Mistrust among the Arabs,"
one acute observer has commented,

> is internalized early within the value system of the child.
> . . . Organization, solidarity, and cohesion are lacking.
> . . . Their public-mindedness is not developed and their

30. See Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, John Wiley, 1960),
passim, but esp. pp. 33–37, 150–51.

31. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1963), p. 123.

social consciousness is weak. The allegiance towards the state is shaky and identification with leaders is not strong. Furthermore, there prevails a general mistrust of those that govern and lack of faith in them.[32]

In Latin America similar traditions of self-centered individualism and of distrust and hatred for other groups in society have prevailed. "There is no good faith in America, either among men or among nations," Bolívar once lamented. "Treaties are paper, constitutions books, elections battles, liberty anarchy, and life a torment. The only thing one can do in America is emigrate." Over a century later the same complaint was heard: "With a politics of ambush and permanent mistrust, one for the other," argued an Ecuadorean newspaper, "we cannot do otherwise than create ruin and destruction in the national soul; this kind of politics has wasted our energies and made us weak."[33]

Other countries outside the Arab and Iberian cultures have manifested similar characteristics. In Ethiopia the "mutual distrust and lack of cooperation which inform the political climate of the country are directly related in a very low regard for man's capacity for solidarity and consensus. . . . The idea that it is possible to transcend the prevailing atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion by trusting one another . . . has been slow to appear and extremely rare." Iranian politics have been labeled the "politics of distrust." Iranians, it is argued, find "it exceptionally difficult to trust one another or to work together over time in any significant numbers." In Burma the child is taught to feel "safe only among his family while all outsiders and especially strangers are sources of danger to be treated with caution and suspicion." As a result, the Burmese find "it difficult to conceive of themselves in any way associated with objective and regulated systems of human relationships." Even a country as "Western" and as economically developed as Italy may have a political culture of "relatively unrelieved political alienation and of social isolation and distrust."[34]

32. Sania Hamady, *Temperament and Character of the Arabs* (New York, Twayne, 1960), pp. 101, 126, 230.

33. Simón Bolívar, quoted in Kalman H. Silvert, ed., *Expectant Peoples* (New York, Random House, 1963), p. 347; *El Dia*, Quito, Nov. 27, 1943, quoted in Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 318.

34. Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Prince-

The prevalence of distrust in these societies limits individual loyalties to groups that are intimate and familiar. People are and can be loyal to their clans, perhaps to their tribes, but not to broader political institutions. In politically advanced societies, loyalty to these more immediate social groupings is subordinated to and subsumed into loyalty to the state. "The love to the whole," as Burke said, "is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. . . . To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections." In a society lacking political community, however, loyalties to the more primordial social and economic groupings—family, clan, village, tribe, religion, social class—compete with and often supersede loyalty to the broader institutions of public authority. In Africa today tribal loyalties are strong; national and state loyalties weak. In Latin America in the words of Kalman Silvert, "An innate distrust of the state coupled with the direct representation of economic and occupational interest in the government are destructive of party strength, erode pluralism, and deny the sweeping grandeur possible to enlightened political action in its broadest senses." [35] "The state in the Arab environment," one scholar has noted, "was always a weak institution, weaker than other social establishments such as the family, the religious community, and the ruling class. Private interest was always paramount over public interest." In a similar vein, H. A. R. Gibb has commented that "it is precisely the great weakness of Arab countries that, since the breakdown of the old corporations, no social institutions have been evolved through which the public will can be canalized, interpreted, defined, and mobilized. . . . There is, in short, no functioning organ of social democracy at all." [36] So also, Italians practiced within the family "virtues other men usually dedicate to the welfare of their country at large; the Italians' family loyalty is their true patriotism. . . . All official

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ton, Princeton University Press, 1965) , pp. 277–78; Andrew F. Westwood, "Politics of Distrust in Iran," *Annals*, *358* (March 1965) , 123–36; Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 205, 292–93; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, Little Brown, 1965) , p. 308.

35. Silvert, pp. 358–59.

36. P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961) , pp. 213–14; H. A. R. Gibb, "Social Reform: Factor X," in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., *The Middle East in Transition* (New York, Praeger, 1958) , p. 8.

and legal authority is considered hostile by them until proved friendly or harmless." [37] Thus in a politically backward society lacking a sense of political community, each leader, each individual, each group pursues and is assumed to be pursuing its own immediate short-run material goals without consideration for any broader public interest.

Mutual distrust and truncated loyalties mean little organization. In terms of observable behavior, the crucial distinction between a politically developed society and an underdeveloped one is the number, size, and effectiveness of its organizations. If social and economic change undermine or destroy traditional bases of association, the achievement of a high level of political development depends upon the capacity of the people to develop new forms of association. In modern countries, in de Tocqueville's words, "the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made." The most obvious and most striking contrast between Banfield's village and an American town of similar size is the latter's "buzz of [associational] activity having as its purpose, at least in part, the advancement of community welfare." [38] The Italian village, in contrast, had only one association, and it did not engage in any public spirited activity. The absence of associations, this low level of organizational development, is characteristic of societies whose politics are confused and chaotic. The great problem in Latin America, as George Lodge has pointed out, is that "there is relatively little social organization in the sense that we know it in the United States." The result is a "motivation-organization vacuum" that makes democracy difficult and economic development slow. The ease with which traditional societies have adapted their political systems to the demands of modernity depends almost directly on the organizational skills and capacities of their people. Only those rare peoples possessed in large measure of such skills, such as the Japanese, have been able to make a relatively easy transition to a developed economy and a modern polity. The "problems of development and modernization," in Lucian Pye's words, are "rooted in the need to create more effective, more adaptive, more complex, and more rationalized organizations. . . . The ultimate test of

37. Luigi Barzini, *The Italians* (New York, Atheneum, 1964) , p. 194.
38. De Tocqueville, 2, 118; Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1958) , p. 15.

development is the capacity of a people to establish and maintain large, complex, but flexible organizational forms." [39] The capacity to create such institutions, however, is in short supply in the world today. It is precisely the ability to meet this moral need and to create a legitimate public order which, above all else, communists offer modernizing countries.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DECAY

Modernization and Political Consciousness

Modernization is a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity. It is, as Daniel Lerner has said, "a process with some distinctive *quality* of its own, which would explain why modernity is felt as a *consistent whole* among people who live by its rules." The principal aspects of modernization, "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion." Historically they have been "so highly associated as to raise the question whether they are genuinely independent factors at all—suggesting that perhaps they went together so regularly because, in some historical sense, they *had* to go together." [40]

At the psychological level, modernization involves a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations. Traditional man expected continuity in nature and society and did not believe in the capacity of man to change or control either. Modern man, in contrast, accepts the possibility of change and believes in its desirability. He has, in Lerner's phrase, a "mobile personality" that adjusts to changes in his environment. These changes typically require the broadening of loyalties and identifications from concrete and immediate groups (such as the family, clan, and village) to larger and more impersonal groupings (such as class and nation). With this goes an increasing reliance on universalistic rather than particularistic values and on standards of achievement rather than of ascription in judging individuals.

At the intellectual level, modernization involves the tremen-

39. George C. Lodge, "Revolution in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs, 44* (Jan. 1966), 177; Pye, pp. 38, 51.

40. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1958), p. 438; italics in original.

dous expansion of man's knowledge about his environment and the diffusion of this knowledge throughout society through increased literacy, mass communications, and education. Demographically, modernization means changes in the patterns of life, a marked increase in health and life expectancy, increased occupational, vertical, and geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of urban population as contrasted with rural. Socially, modernization tends to supplement the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles with consciously organized secondary associations having much more specific functions. The traditional distribution of status along a single bifurcated structure characterized by "cumulative inequalities" gives way to pluralistic status structures characterized by "dispersed inequalities." [41] Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skill rises significantly; the ratio of capital to labor increases; subsistence agriculture gives way to market agriculture; and agriculture itself declines in significance compared to commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural activities. There tends to be an expansion of the geographical scope of economic activity and a centralization of such activity at the national level with the emergence of a national market, national sources of capital, and other national economic institutions. In due course the level of economic well-being increases and inequalities in economic well-being decrease.

Those aspects of modernization most relevant to politics can be broadly grouped into two categories. First, social mobilization, in Deutsch's formulation, is the process by which "major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." [42] It means a change in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world. It is a consequence of literacy, education, increased communications, mass media exposure, and urbanization. Secondly, economic development refers to the growth in the total economic activity

41. Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 85–86.

42. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (Sept. 1961), 494.

and output of a society. It may be measured by per capita gross national product, level of industrialization, and level of individual welfare gauged by such indices as life expectancy, caloric intake, supply of hospitals and doctors. Social mobilization involves changes in the aspirations of individuals, groups, and societies; economic development involves changes in their capabilities. Modernization requires both.

The impact of modernization on politics is varied. Numerous authors have defined political modernization in even more numerous ways. Most of these definitions focus on the differences between what are assumed to be the distinctive characteristics of a modern polity and of a traditional polity. Political modernization is naturally then held to be movement from the one to the other. Approached in this manner, the most crucial aspects of political modernization can be roughly subsumed under three broad headings. First, political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority. This change implies that government is the product of man, not of nature or of God, and that a well-ordered society must have a determinate human source of final authority, obedience to whose positive law takes precedence over other obligations. Political modernization involves assertion of the external sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national government against local and regional powers. It means national integration and the centralization or accumulation of power in recognized national lawmaking institutions.

Secondly, political modernization involves the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. Areas of particular competence—legal, military, administrative, scientific—become separated from the political realm, and autonomous, specialized, but subordinate organs arise to discharge those tasks. Administrative hierarchies become more elaborate, more complex, more disciplined. Office and power are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription. Thirdly, political modernization involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society. Broadened participation in politics may enhance control of the people by the government, as in totalitarian states, or it may en-

hance control of the government by the people, as in some democratic ones. But in all modern states the citizens become directly involved in and affected by governmental affairs. Rationalized authority, differentiated structure, and mass participation thus distinguish modern polities from antecedent polities.

It is, however, a mistake to conclude that in practice modernization means the rationalization of authority, differentiation of structure, and expansion of political participation. A basic and frequently overlooked distinction exists between political modernization defined as movement from a traditional to a modern polity and political modernization defined as the political aspects and political effects of social, economic, and cultural modernization. The former posits the direction in which political change theoretically should move. The latter describes the political changes which actually occur in modernizing countries. The gap between the two is often vast. Modernization in practice always involves change in and usually the disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern political system. Yet the tendency has been to assume that what is true for the broader social processes of modernization is also true for political changes. Social modernization, in some degree, is a fact in Asia, Africa, Latin America: urbanization is rapid, literacy is slowly increasing; industrialization is being pushed; per capita gross national product is inching upward; mass media circulation is expanding. All these are facts. In contrast progress toward many of the other goals which writers have identified with political modernization—democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement patterns, national integration—often is dubious at best. Yet the tendency is to think that because social modernization is taking place, political modernization also must be taking place. As a result, many sympathetic Western writings about the underdeveloped areas in the 1950s had the same air of hopeful unreality which characterized much of the sympathetic Western writing about the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. They were suffused with what can only be described as "Webbism": that is, the tendency to ascribe to a political system qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities which actually characterize its processes and functions.

In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept "political modernization" characterized the

"modernizing" areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there was an "erosion of democracy" and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes.[43] Instead of stability, there were repeated coups and revolts. Instead of a unifying nationalism and nation-building, there were repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalization and differentiation, there was frequently a decay of the administrative organizations inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence. Only the concept of political modernization as mobilization and participation appeared to be generally applicable to the "developing" world. Rationalization, integration, and differentiation, in contrast, seemed to have only a dim relation to reality.

More than by anything else, the modern state is distinguished from the traditional state by the broadened extent to which people participate in politics and are affected by politics in large-scale political units. In traditional societies political participation may be widespread at the village level, but at any levels above the village it is limited to a very small group. Large-scale traditional societies may also achieve relatively high levels of rationalized authority and of structural differentiation, but again political participation will be limited to the relatively small aristocratic and bureaucratic elites. The most fundamental aspect of political modernization, consequently, is the participation in politics beyond the village or town level by social groups throughout the society and the development of new political institutions, such as political parties, to organize that participation.

The disruptive effects of social and economic modernization on politics and political institutions take many forms. Social and economic changes necessarily disrupt traditional social and political groupings and undermine loyalty to traditional authorities. The leaders, secular and religious, of the village are challenged by a new elite of civil servants and schoolteachers who represent the authority of the distant central government and who possess skills, resources, and aspirations with which the traditional village or

43. On the "erosion of democracy" and political instability, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), Chap. 5; and Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), Chap. 2.

tribal leaders cannot compete. In many traditional societies the most important social unit was the extended family, which itself often constituted a small civil society performing political, economic, welfare, security, religious, and other social functions. Under the impact of modernization, however, the extended family begins to disintegrate and is replaced by the nuclear family which is too small, too isolated, and too weak to perform these functions. A broader form of social organization is replaced by a narrower one, and the tendencies toward distrust and hostility—the war of one against all—are intensified. The amoral familism which Banfield found in southern Italy is typical not of a traditional society, but of a backward society in which the traditional institution of the extended family has disintegrated under the impact of the first phases of modernization.[44] Modernization thus tends to produce alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and new. The new values undermine the old bases of association and of authority before new skills, motivations, and resources can be brought into existence to create new groupings.

The breakup of traditional institutions may lead to psychological disintegration and anomie, but these very conditions also create the need for new identifications and loyalties. The latter may take the form of reidentification with a group which existed in latent or actual form in traditional society or they may lead to identification with a new set of symbols or a new group which has itself evolved in the process of modernization. Industrialization, Marx argued, produces class consciousness first in the bourgeoisie and then in the proletariat. Marx focused on only one minor aspect of a much more general phenomenon. Industrialization is only one aspect of modernization and modernization induces not just class consciousness but new group consciousness of all kinds: in tribe, region, clan, religion, and caste, as well as in class, occupation, and association. Modernization means that all groups, old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups. One of the most striking phenomena of modernization, indeed, is the increased consciousness, coherence, organization, and action which it produces in many social forces which existed on a much lower level of conscious identity and or-

44. See Banfield, pp. 85 ff.

ganization in traditional society. The early phases of modernization are often marked by the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements, such as the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and the Buddhist movements in Ceylon, Burma, and Vietnam, which combine modern organizational methods, traditional religious values, and highly populist appeals.

So also in much of Africa tribal consciousness was almost unknown in traditional rural life. Tribalism was a product of modernization and the western impact on a traditional society. In southern Nigeria, for instance, Yoruba consciousness only developed in the nineteenth century and the term, Yoruba, was first used by Anglican missionaries. "Everyone recognizes," Hodgkin has observed, "that the notion of 'being a Nigerian' is a new kind of conception. But it would seem that the notion of 'being a Yoruba' is not very much older." Similarly, even in the 1950s, an Ibo leader, B. O. N. Eluwa, could travel through Iboland attempting to convince the tribesmen that they were Ibos. But the villagers, he said, simply "couldn't even imagine all Ibos." The efforts of Eluwa and other Ibo leaders, however, successfully created a sense of Iboness. Loyalty to tribe "is in many respects a *response* to modernization, a product of the very forces of change which colonial rule brought to Africa." [45]

A traditional society may possess many potential sources of identity and association. Some of these may be undermined and destroyed by the process of modernization. Others, however, may achieve a new consciousness and become the basis for new organization because they are capable—as for instance are tribal associations in African cities or caste associations in India—of meeting many of the needs for personal identity, social welfare, and economic advancement which are created by the process of modernization. The growth of group consciousness thus has both integrating and disintegrating effects on the social system. If villagers learn to shift their primary identity from a village to a tribe of many villages; if plantation workers cease to identify simply with their fellow workers on the plantation and instead identify with planta-

45. Thomas Hodgkin, "Letter to Dr. Biobaku," *Odü*, No. 4 (1957), p. 42, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, No. 3 (Oct. 1960); David Abernethy, "Education and Politics in a Developing Society: The Southern Nigerian Experience" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), p. 307; italics in original.

tion workers in general and with an organization of plantation workers in general; if Buddhist monks broaden their allegiances from their local temple and monastery to a national Buddhist movement—each of these developments is a broadening of loyalty and in that sense presumably a contribution to political modernization.

The same group consciousness, however, can also be a major obstacle to the creation of effective political institutions encompassing a broader spectrum of social forces. Along with group consciousness, group prejudice also "develops when there is intensive contact between different groups, such as has accompanied the movement toward more centralized political and social organizations." [46] And along with group prejudice comes group conflict. Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the tensions, the inequalities generated by social and economic modernization. Modernization thus increases conflict among traditional groups, between traditional groups and modern ones, and among modern groups. The new elites based on Western or modern education come into conflict with the traditional elites whose authority rests on ascribed and inherited status. Within the modernized elites, antagonisms arise between politicians and bureaucrats, intellectuals and soldiers, labor leaders and businessmen. Many, if not most, of these conflicts at one time or another erupt into violence.

Modernization and Violence

The Poverty and Modernization Theses. The relation between modernization and violence is complex. More modern societies are generally more stable and suffer less domestic violence than less modern societies. One study produced a correlation of .625 (n = 62) between political stability and a composite index of modernity defined in terms of eight social and economic variables. Both the level of social mobilization and the level of economic development are directly associated with political stability. The relation between literacy and stability is particularly high. The frequency of revolutions also varies inversely with the educational

46. "Report on Preliminary Results of Cross-Cultural Study of Ethnocentrism," by Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, *Carnegie Corporation of New York Quarterly* (Jan. 1966) , p. 7.

level of the society, and deaths from domestic group violence vary inversely with the proportion of children attending primary school. Economic well-being is similarly associated with political order: in 74 countries, the correlation between per capita gross national product and deaths from domestic group violence was

TABLE 1.2. Per Capita GNP and Violent Conflicts, 1958–1965

Economic group	Number of countries	Number with conflicts	Per cent of total countries affected	Number of conflicts in group	Rate of conflicts for all nations in group
Very poor (under $100)	38	32	87%	72	1.9
Poor ($100–$249)	32	22	69	41	1.3
Middle income ($250–$749)	37	18	48	40	1.1
Rich (above $750)	27	10	37	11	.4
Total	134	82	61%	164	1.2

Source: U.S. Department of Defense and Escott Reid, *The Future of the World Bank* (Washington, D.C., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965), pp. 64–70.

—.43. A different study of 70 countries for the years 1955–60 found a correlation of —.56 between per capita gross national product and the number of revolutions. During the eight years between 1958 and 1965, violent conflicts were more than four times as prevalent in very poor nations as they were in rich nations; 87 per cent of the very poor countries suffered significant outbreaks of violence as compared to only 37 per cent of the rich countries.[47]

Clearly countries which have high levels of both social mobilization and economic development are more stable and peaceful politically. Modernity goes with stability. From this fact it is an easy step to the "poverty thesis" and the conclusions that economic and social backwardness is responsible for instability and hence

47. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors," pp. 258–62; Bruce M. Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), p. 273; Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11* (Sept. 1967), 271–72; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955–1960: Turmoil and Internal War," *Papers, Peace Research Society, 3* (1965), 175.

that modernization is the road to stability. "There can, then, be no question," as Secretary McNamara said, "but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness." Or in the words of one academic analyst, "all-pervasive poverty undermines government—of any kind. It is a persistent cause of instability and makes democracy well-nigh impossible to practice." [48] If these relationships are accepted, then obviously the promotion of education, literacy, mass communications, industrialization, economic growth, urbanization, should produce greater political stability. These seemingly clear deductions from the correlation between modernity and stability are, however, invalid. In fact, modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability.

The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable. By the mid-twentieth century, however, all traditional societies were also transitional or modernizing societies. It is precisely the devolution of modernization throughout the world which increased the prevalence of violence about the world. For two decades after World War II American foreign policy toward the modernizing countries was in large part devoted to promoting economic and social development because these would lead to political stability. The success of this policy is, however, written in both the rising levels of material well-being and the rising levels of domestic violence. The more man wages war against "his ancient enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance" the more he wages war against himself.

By the 1960s every backward nation was a modernizing nation. Evidence, nonetheless, did exist to suggest that causes of violence in such nations lay with the modernization rather than with the backwardness. Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries just above them. Even Secre-

48. Speech by Robert S. McNamara, Montreal, Quebec, May 18, 1966, *New York Times,* May 19, 1966, p. 11; Brecher, pp. 62–63.

tary McNamara's own statistics offered only partial support for his proposition. The World Bank, for instance, classified six of the twenty Latin American republics as "poor," that is, they had per capita gross national products of less than $250. Six of the twenty countries were also suffering from prolonged insurgencies in February 1966. Only one country, Bolivia, however, fell into both categories. The probability of insurgency in those Latin American countries which were not poor was twice as high as it was in those countries which were poor. Similarly, 48 out of 50 African countries and territories were classified as poor, and eleven of these were suffering from insurgency. Certainly, however, the probabilities of insurgency in the two African countries which were not poor—Libya and South Africa—were just as high as in the remaining 37 poor countries and territories. Moreover, the insurgency which did exist in 11 countries seemed to be related in four cases to continued colonial rule (e.g., Angola, Mozambique) and in the other seven to marked tribal and racial differences among the population (e.g. Nigeria, Sudan) . Colonialism and ethnic heterogeneity would seem to be much better predictors of violence than poverty. In the Middle East and Asia (excluding Australia and New Zealand) 10 out of 22 countries classified as poor were suffering from insurgencies in February 1966. On the other hand, three out of the four countries which were not poor (Iraq, Malaysia, Cyprus, Japan) were also experiencing insurgencies. Here again, the likelihood of insurgency in the richer countries was about twice that in the poorer countries. Here also, ethnic heterogeneity appeared to be a better predictor of insurgency than poverty.

The weakness of the direct correlation between poverty and instability is also suggested by other evidence. While a correlation of —.43 (n = 74) existed between per capita GNP and deaths from domestic group violence, the largest amount of violence was found not in the poorest countries with per capita GNPs of less than $100, but in those slightly more wealthy with per capita GNPs between $100 and $200. Above $200 the amount of violence tended to decline significantly. These figures led to the conclusion that "underdeveloped nations must expect a fairly high level of civil unrest for some time, and that the very poor states should probably expect an increase, not a decrease, in domestic violence over the next few decades." [49] So also, Eckstein found that the 27 countries in

49. Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, "The Analysis of Trends and Patterns," in Russett et al., pp. 306–07. See also Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg,

which internal wars were rare between 1946 and 1959 were divided into two groups. Nine were highly modern (e.g. Australia, Denmark, Sweden), while 18 were "relatively underdeveloped countries whose elites have remained tied closely to the traditional types and structures of life." Among these were a number of still backward European colonies plus such countries as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia.[50] Somewhat similarly, a division of countries according to their levels of literacy also suggested a bell-shaped pattern of instability. Ninety-five per cent of those countries in the middle range with 25 to 60 per cent literacy were unstable as compared to 50 per cent of those countries with less than 10 per cent literacy and 22 per cent of those countries with more than 90 per cent literacy. In another analysis mean instability scores were calculated for 24 modern countries (268), 37 transitional countries (472), and 23 traditional countries (420).[51]

TABLE 1.3. Literacy and Stability

Level of literacy	Number of countries	Number of unstable countries	Per cent unstable
Below 10%	6	3	50.0
10%–25%	12	10	83.3
25%–60%	23	22	95.6
60%–90%	15	12	80.0
Over 90%	23	5	21.7

Source: Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend and Betty A. Nesvold, "Correlates of Political Stability" (paper presented at Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Sept. 1963), pp. 19–21.

The sharp difference between the transitional and modern countries demonstrates graphically the thesis that modernity means stability and modernization instability. The small difference between the traditional societies and the transitional societies reflects the fact that the line drawn between the two was a purely arbitrary one intended to produce a group of "traditional" countries

The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton, Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 28, 1967), pp. 66–67.

50. Harry Eckstein, "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool et al., Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution, 1963), pp. 120–21.

51. Feierabend, p. 263.

equal in size to the modern group. Hence virtually all the societies classified as traditional were actually in the early phases of transition. Again, however, the data suggest that if a purely traditional society existed, it would be more stable politically than those in the transitional phase.

The modernization thesis thus explains why the poverty thesis could acquire a certain seeming validity in the late twentieth century. It also explains seeming reversals in the relation between modernity and stability for particular sets of countries. In Latin America, for instance, the wealthiest countries are at the middle levels of modernization. Consequently, it is not surprising that they should be more unstable than the more backward Latin American countries. As we have seen, in 1966 only one of the six poorest Latin American countries, but five of the 14 wealthier Latin American countries, suffered from insurgency. Communist and other radical movements have been strong in Cuba, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela: four of the five wealthiest of the 20 Latin American republics and three of the five most literate republics. The frequency of revolution in Latin America is directly related to the level of economic development. For the continent as a whole the correlation of per capita income and number of revolutions is .50 (n = 18); for nondemocratic states it is much higher (r = .85; n = 14).[52] Thus, the data on Latin America which suggest a positive relationship between modernity and instability actually bolster the argument that relates modernization to instability.

This relationship also holds for variations within countries. In modernizing countries, violence, unrest, and extremism are more often found in the wealthier parts of the country than in the poorer sections. In analysing the situation in India, Hoselitz and Weiner found that "the correlation between political stability and economic development is poor or even negative." Under British rule political violence was most prevalent in the "economically most highly developed provinces"; after independence violence remained more likely in the industrialized and urban centers than

52. Manus Midlarsky and Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Instability in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research, 4* (1967), 215. See also Robert D. Putnam's discovery of a positive association between economic development (but not social mobilization) and military intervention in Latin America: "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics, 20* (Oct. 1967), 94–97.

"in the more backward and underdeveloped areas of India." [53] In numerous underdeveloped countries the standard of living in the major cities is three or four times that prevalent in the countryside, yet the cities are often the centers of instability and violence while the rural areas remain quiet and stable. Political extremism is also typically stronger in the wealthier than in the poorer areas. In fifteen Western countries, the communist vote was largest in the most urbanized areas of the least urbanized countries.[54] In Italy the center of communist strength was the prosperous north rather than the poverty-stricken south. In India the communists were strongest in Kerala (with the highest literacy rate among Indian states) and in industrialized Calcutta, not in the economically more backward areas. In Ceylon, "In a fundamental sense, the areas of Marxist strength are the most Westernized" and those with the highest per capita income and education.[55] Thus, within countries, it is the areas which are modernizing rather than those which remain traditional that are the centers of violence and extremism.

Not only does social and economic modernization produce political instability, but the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization. The historical evidence with respect to the West is overwhelming on this point. "The *rapid* influx of large numbers of people into *newly* developing urban areas," Kornhauser observes, "invites mass movements." So also, the European and particularly the Scandinavian experience demonstrates that wherever "industrialization occurred *rapidly*, introducing sharp *discontinuities* between the pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerged." [56] Similarly, the combined rate of change on six of eight indicators of modernization (primary and postprimary education; caloric consumption; cost of living; radios; infant mortality; urbanization; literacy; and national income) for 67 countries between 1935 and 1962 correlated .647 with political instability in those coun-

53. Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," *Dissent, 8* (Spring 1961), 173.

54. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1959), pp. 143-44.

55. William Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 134-35, 138-40.

56. Kornhauser, p. 145 (italics in original); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1960), p. 68 (italics in original).

tries between 1955 and 1961. "The higher the rate of change toward modernity, the greater the political instability, measured statically or dynamically." The overall picture which emerges of an unstable country is:

> one exposed to modernity; disrupted socially from the traditional patterns of life; confronted with pressures to change their ways, economically, socially and politically; bombarded with new and "better" ways of producing economic goods and services; and frustrated by the modernization process of change, generally, and the failure of their government to satisfy their ever-rising expectations, particularly.[57]

Political instability was rife in twentieth-century Asia, Africa, and Latin America in large part because the rate of modernization was so much faster there than it had been in the earlier modernizing countries. The modernization of Europe and of North America was spread over several centuries; in general, one issue or one crisis was dealt with at a time. In the modernization of the non-Western parts of the world, however, the problems of the centralization of authority, national integration, social mobilization, economic development, political participation, social welfare have arisen not sequentially but simultaneously. The "demonstration effect" which the early modernizers have on the later modernizers first intensifies aspirations and then exacerbates frustrations. The differences in the rate of change can be dramatically seen in the lengths of time which countries, in Cyril Black's formulation, required for the consolidation of modernizing leadership. For the first modernizer, England, this phase stretched over 183 years, from 1649 to 1832. For the second modernizer, the United States, it lasted 89 years, from 1776 to 1865. For 13 countries which entered it during the Napoleonic period (1789–1815), the average period was 73 years. But for 21 of the 26 countries which began it during the first quarter of the twentieth century and had emerged by the 1960s, the average was only 29 years.[58] In a similar vein, Karl Deutsch estimates that during the nineteenth century the principal indicators of social mobilization in modernizing countries changed at about the rate of 0.1 per cent per year, while in

57. Conroe, "A Cross-National Analysis," pp. 65–73, 86–87; Feierabend, pp. 263–67.
58. Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 90–94.

twentieth-century modernizing countries they change at about the rate of 1 per cent per year. Clearly the tempo of modernization has increased rapidly. Clearly, also, the heightened drive for social and economic change and development was directly related to the increasing political instability and violence that characterized Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the years after World War II.

Social Mobilization and Instability. The relationship between social mobilization and political instability seems reasonably direct. Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics. In the absence of strong and adaptable political institutions, such increases in participation mean instability and violence. Here in dramatic form can be clearly seen the paradox that modernity produces stability and modernization instability. For 66 nations, for example, the correlation between the proportion of children in primary schools and the frequency of revolution was —.84. In contrast, for 70 nations the correlation between the rate of change in primary enrollment and political instability was .61.[59] The faster the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government.

The rapid expansion of education has had a visible impact on political stability in a number of countries. In Ceylon, for instance, the school system expanded rapidly between 1948 and 1956. This "increase in the number of students graduating in the indigenous languages satisfied some ambitions but contributed new social pressures among the articulate educated middle classes." It was, apparently, directly related to the electoral overturn of the government in the elections of 1956 and to the increased instability affecting Ceylon during the following six years.[60] Similarly, in Korea during the 1950s Seoul became "one of the largest education centers of the world." Its law schools, it is estimated, produced about eighteen times as many graduates in 1960 as the field could absorb. At the lower levels of education, the expansion was even more striking, with the literacy rate increasing

59. Tanter and Midlarsky, p. 272, citing forthcoming *Dimensions of Nations* by Rummel, Sawyer, Tanter, and Guetzkow; Conroe, p. 66.

60. Wriggins, pp. 119, 245. On the Feierabend-Nesvold-Conroe index, instability in Ceylon increased from 3:012 during 1948–54 to 4:089 for 1955–62; see Conroe, Table I.

from less than 20 per cent in 1945 to over 60 per cent in the early 1960s.[61] This expansion of awareness presumably shared some responsibility for the political instability of Korea during the early 1960s, the principal source of which was students. Students and unemployed university graduates were, indeed, a common concern in the 1960s to the nationalist military regime in Korea, the socialist military regime in Burma, and the traditional military regime in Thailand. The extent to which higher education in many modernizing countries is not calculated to produce graduates with the skills relevant to the country's needs creates the paradoxical but common situation "of a country in which skilled labor is a scarce resource, and yet in which highly educated persons are in superabundant supply." [62]

In general, the higher the level of education of the unemployed, alienated, or otherwise dissatisfied person, the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results. Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less significant forms of political unrest. In West Africa, for instance, "disgruntled and restless though they are, these school-leavers stand not at the center but on the perimeter of significant political events. The characteristic forms of political disturbance for which they are responsible are not revolutions but acts of arson, assault, and intimidation directed against political opponents." [63]

The problems posed by the rapid expansion of primary education have caused some governments to reassess their policies. In a debate on education in the Eastern Region of Nigeria in 1958, for instance, Azikiwe suggested that primary education could become an "unproductive social service," and one cabinet member warned that the United Kingdom followed "the pattern of industry and increased productivity first, free education second. Never free education first, as there must be jobs for the newly educated to take up, and only industry, trade and commerce can

61. Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, forthcoming, 1968) , p. 170.

62. Hoselitz and Weiner, p. 177.

63. David Abernethy and Trevor Coombe, "Education and Politics in Developing Countries," *Harvard Educational Review, 35* (Summer 1965) , 292.

provide such jobs in bulk. . . . We must hesitate to create politi-
cal problems of unemployment in the future." [64] Literates and
semiliterates may furnish recruits for extremist movements gen-
erating instability. Burma and Ethiopia had equally low per cap-
ita incomes in the 1950s: the relative stability of the latter in com-
parison to the former perhaps reflected the fact that fewer than 5
per cent of the Ethiopians were literate but 45 per cent of the Bur-
mese were. [65] Similarly, Cuba had the fourth highest literacy rate
in Latin America when it went communist, and the only Indian
state to elect a communist government, Kerala, also has the highest
literacy rate in India. Clearly, the appeals of communism are us-
ually to literates rather than illiterates. Much has been made of
the problems caused by the extension of suffrage to large numbers
of illiterates; democracy, it has been argued, cannot function satis-
factorily if the vast bulk of the voting population cannot read. Po-
litical participation by illiterates, however, may well, as in India,
be less dangerous to democratic political institutions than partici-
pation by literates. The latter typically have higher aspirations and
make more demands on government. Political participation by il-
literates, moreover, is likely to remain limited, while participation
by literates is more likely to snowball with potentially disastrous
effects on political stability.

Economic Development and Instability. Social mobilization in-
creases aspirations. Economic development, presumably, increases
the capacity of a society to satisfy those aspirations and therefore
should tend to reduce social frustrations and the consequent polit-
ical instability. Presumably, also, rapid economic growth creates
new opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment and
thereby diverts into money-making ambitions and talents which
might otherwise go into coup-making. It can, however, also be
argued to the contrary that economic development itself is a
highly destabilizing process and that the very changes which are
needed to satisfy aspirations in fact tend to exacerbate those aspi-
rations. Rapid economic growth, it has been said:

> 1. disrupts traditional social groupings (family, class,
> caste), and thus increases "the number of individuals who are

64. Quoted in Abernethy, p. 501.
65. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," p. 496.

déclassé . . . and who are thus in circumstances conducive to revolutionary protest"; [66]

2. produces *nouveaux riches* who are imperfectly adjusted to and assimilated by the existing order and who want political power and social status commensurate with their new economic position;

3. increases geographical mobility which again undermines social ties, and, in particular, encourages rapid migration from rural areas to cities, which produces alienation and political extremism;

4. increases the number of people whose standard of living is falling, and thus may widen the gap between rich and poor;

5. increases the incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order;

6. requires a general restriction of consumption in order to promote investment and thus produces popular discontent;

7. increases literacy, education, and exposure to mass media, which increase aspirations beyond levels where they can be satisfied;

8. aggravates regional and ethnic conflicts over the distribution of investment and consumption;

9. increases capacities for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy.

To the extent that these relationships hold, economic growth increases material well-being at one rate but social frustration at a faster rate.

The association of economic development, particularly rapid economic development, with political instability received its classic statement in de Tocqueville's interpretation of the French Revolution. The revolution, he said, was preceded by "an advance as rapid as it was unprecedented in the prosperity of the nation." This "steadily increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing the

66. Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History, 23* (Dec. 1963) , 532. This list of the destabilizing effects of economic growth is drawn primarily from Olson's article.

population, everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest" and "it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest." Similar conditions of economic improvement, it has been argued, preceded the Reformation, the English, American, and Russian revolutions, and the agitation and discontent in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Mexican revolution similarly followed twenty years of spectacular economic growth. The rate of change in per capita gross national product for seven years before a successful revolt correlated very highly with the extent of violence in such revolts in Asian and Middle Eastern countries between 1955 and 1960, although not in Latin America. The experience of India, it has been argued, from the 1930s through the 1950s also shows "that economic development, far from enhancing political stability, has tended to be politically unstabilizing." [67] All this data is, of course, also consistent with the finding that during World War II discontent about promotions was more widespread in the Air Force than in other services despite or because of the fact that promotions were more frequent and rapid in the Air Force than in the other services.[68]

Much specific evidence thus exists of an apparent association between rapid economic growth and political instability. On a more general level, however, the link between the two is not so clear. During the 1950s the correlation between rate of economic growth and domestic group violence for 53 countries was a mildly negative one of —.43. West Germany, Japan, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Austria, the U.S.S.R., Italy, and Czechoslovakia had very high rates of economic growth and little or no domestic violence. Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, and Indonesia, on the other hand, had many deaths from domestic violence but very low, and in some cases even negative, growth rates. Similarly, the correlation for seventy countries of the rate of change in national income between 1935 and 1962 and level of political instability between 1948 and 1962 was —.34; the correlation between the change in national income

67. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1955), pp. 173, 175–76; Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, Vintage, 1958), p. 264; Olson, pp. 544–47; Tanter and Midlarsky, pp. 272–74; Hoselitz and Weiner, p. 173, for the quotation on India.

68. See Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949), *1*, 251–58, 275–76.

and the variations in stability for the same countries in the same years was —.45. In a similar vein, Needler found that in Latin America economic growth was a precondition for institutional stability in countries with high rates of political participation.[69]

TABLE 1.4. Rapid Economic Growth and Political Instability

Annual growth of GNP *per* capita	Deaths from Domestic Group Violence in 53 Countries, 1950–62 (*per 1,000,000 population*)				
	NONE	LOW .1–9.9	MODERATE 10–99	HIGH 100–1,335	TOTAL
Very high, 6% and over	4	3	0	0	7
High, 4%–5.9%	0	6	1	2	9
Moderate, 2%–3.9%	8	5	1	3	17
Low, 1%–1.9%	3	4	6	1	14
Very low, below 1%	0	1	2	3	6
Total	15	19	10	9	53

Source: Bruce Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), Tables 29 and 45. Periods for the growth figures vary but are generally for 7 to 12 years centering on the 1950s.

This conflicting evidence suggests that the relationship, if any, between economic growth and political instability must be a complicated one. Perhaps the relationship varies with the level of economic development. At one extreme, some measure of economic growth is necessary to make instability possible. The simple poverty thesis falls down because people who are really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for protest. They are indifferent, apathetic, and lack exposure to the media and other stimuli which would arouse their aspirations in such manner as to galvanize them into political activity. "The abjectly poor, too," Eric Hoffer observed, "stand in awe of the world around them and are not hospitable to change. . . . There is thus a conservatism of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged, and the former is as much a factor in the perpetuation of a social order as

69. Conroe, pp. 65–69; Martin C. Needler, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change* (New York, Random House, forthcoming), Chap. 5.

the latter." [70] Poverty itself is a barrier to instability. Those who are concerned about the immediate goal of the next meal are not apt to worry about the grand transformation of society. They become marginalists and incrementalists concerned simply with making minor but absolutely essential improvements in the existing situation. Just as social mobilization is necessary to provide the motive for instability, so also some measure of economic development is necessary to provide the means for instability.

At the other extreme, among countries which have reached a relatively high level of economic development, a high rate of economic growth is compatible with political stability. The negative correlations between economic growth and instability reported above are, in large part, the result of combining both highly developed and underdeveloped countries into the same analysis. Economically developed countries are more stable and have higher rates of growth than economically less developed countries. Unlike other social indicators, the rate of economic growth tends to vary directly with the level of development rather than inversely with it. In countries which are not wealthy, the rate of economic growth is not related significantly to political instability one way or another: for 34 countries with per capita GNP below $500 the correlation between rate of economic growth and deaths from domestic group violence was —.07. Thus, the relation between the rate of economic growth and political instability varies with the level of economic development. At low levels, a positive relation exists, at medium levels no significant relation, and at high levels a negative relationship.

The Gap Hypothesis. Social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development. The gap between these two forms of change furnishes some measure of the impact of modernization on political stability. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants. The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new as-

70. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York, New American Library, 1951), p. 17; Daniel Goldrich, "Toward an Estimate of the Probability of Social Revolutions in Latin America: Some Orienting Concepts and a Case Study," *Centennial Review, 6* (Summer 1962), 394 ff. See also below, pp. 278 ff.

pirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations function and the level-of-living function.[71] This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.

The reasons for this relationship between social frustration and political instability are somewhat more complicated than they may appear on the surface. The relationship is, in large part, due to the absence of two potential intervening variables: opportunities for social and economic mobility and adaptable political institutions. Since Puritanism, the go-getting economic innovator and the dedicated revolutionary have had qualitatively different goals but strikingly similar high aspirations, both the product of a high level of social mobilization.[72] Consequently, the extent to which social frustration produces political participation depends in large part on the nature of the economic and social structure of the traditional society. Conceivably this frustration could be removed through social and economic mobility if the traditional society is sufficiently "open" to offer opportunities for such mobility. In part, this is precisely what occurs in rural areas, where outside opportunities for horizontal mobility (urbanization) contribute to the relative stability of the countryside in most modernizing countries. The few opportunities for vertical (occupational and income) mobility within the cities, in turn, contribute to their greater instability. Apart from urbanization, however, most modernizing countries have low levels of social-economic mobility. In relatively few societies are the traditional structures likely to encourage economic rather than political activity. Land and any other types of economic wealth in the traditional society are tightly held by a relatively small oligarchy or are controlled by foreign corporations and investors. The values of the traditional society often are hostile to entrepreneurial roles, and such roles consequently may be largely monopolized by an ethnic minority

71. These are terms employed by Deutsch, pp. 493 ff.; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (Feb. 1962) , 5 ff.; Feierabend, pp. 256–62; Charles Wolf, *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960) , pp. 296 ff.; and Tanter and Midlarsky, pp. 271 ff.

72. For the relation between n-Achievement and communism, see David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1961) , pp. 412–13.

(Greeks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire; Chinese in southeast Asia; Lebanese in Africa). In addition, the modern values and ideas which are introduced into the system often stress the primacy of government (socialism, the planned economy), and consequently may also lead mobilized individuals to shy away from entrepreneurial roles.

In these conditions, political participation becomes the road for advancement of the socially mobilized individual. Social frustration leads to demands on the government and the expansion of political participation to enforce those demands. The political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionalization, moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to political instability. The impact of modernization thus involves the following relationships:

(1) $\dfrac{\text{Social mobilization}}{\text{Economic development}}$ = Social frustration

(2) $\dfrac{\text{Social frustration}}{\text{Mobility opportunities}}$ = Political participation

(3) $\dfrac{\text{Political participation}}{\text{Political institutionalization}}$ = Political instability

The absence of mobility opportunities and the low level of political institutionalization in most modernizing countries produce a correlation between social frustration and political instability. One analysis identified 26 countries with a low ratio of want formation to want satisfaction and hence low "systemic frustration" and 36 countries with a high ratio and hence high "systemic frustration." Of the 26 satisfied societies, only six (Argentina, Belgium, France, Lebanon, Morocco, and the Union of South Africa) had high degrees of political instability. Of the 36 dissatisfied countries, only two (Philippines, Tunisia) had high levels of political stability. The overall correlation between frustration and instability was .50. The differences in Communist voting strength in Indian states can also in part be explained by the ratios between social mobilization and economic well-being in these states. Similarly, in Latin America, constitutional stability has been shown to be a function of economic development and politi-

cal participation. Sharp increases in participation produce insta-
bility unless they are accompanied by corresponding shifts in the
level of economic well-being.[73]

Political instability in modernizing countries is thus in large
part a function of the gap between aspirations and expectations
produced by the escalation of aspirations which particularly occurs
in the early phases of modernization. In some instances, a similar
gap with similar results may be produced by the decline in expec-
tations. Revolutions often occur when a period of sustained eco-
nomic growth is followed by a sharp economic downturn. Such
downturns apparently occurred in France in 1788–89, in England
in 1687–88, in America in 1774–75, before Dorr's rebellion in
1842, in Russia (as a result of the war) in 1915–17, in Egypt in
1952, and in Cuba in 1952–53 (when Castro launched his first at-
tack on Batista). In addition, in Latin America coups d'etat occur
more frequently during years when economic conditions worsen
than in those years marked by increases in real per capita in-
comes.[74]

Inequality and Instability. "In all these cases," Aristotle ob-
served of political change in Greece, "the cause of sedition is al-
ways to be found in inequality." [75] Political inequality is, by defi-
nition, almost an inherent aspect of political instability. What
about economic inequality? The paucity of data on the distribu-
tion of income and wealth makes it difficult to test the proposition
that economic inequality is associated with political instability.
For eighteen countries a correlation of .34 was found between the
Gini index of inequality in income before taxes and deaths from
political violence; for twelve countries the correlation of income
inequality after taxes and political violence was .36.[76] More sub-
stantial evidence exists, however, to link inequalities in land own-
ership to political instability. In a study of 47 countries, Russett
found a correlation of .46 between a Gini index of inequality in
land ownership and deaths from domestic group violence. Lower
correlations existed between unequal land ownership and fre-
quency of violent incidents. The relationship of the concentration

73. Feierabend, p. 259; Wolf, Chap. 9; Needler, Chap. 5.
74. See Davies, pp. 5 ff.; Tanter and Midlarsky, passim; Martin C. Needler, "Polit-
ical Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political
Science Review, 60* (Sept. 1966), 617–18.
75. Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 205.
76. Russett et al., p. 272.

of land ownership to violence was, however, greatly strengthened when the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture was also taken into account. In highly agricultural countries, presumably the social-economic mobility opportunities for those in agriculture are less and hence inequality in land ownership should be more directly related to violence. This is, indeed, the case, and the correlation of inequality in land ownership with violent deaths was found to be about .70 in agricultural countries.[77]

Modernization affects economic inequality and thus political instability in two ways. First, wealth and income are normally more unevenly distributed in poor countries than in economically developed countries.[78] In a traditional society this inequality is accepted as part of the natural pattern of life. Social mobilization, however, increases awareness of the inequality and presumably resentment of it. The influx of new ideas calls into question the legitimacy of the old distribution and suggests the feasibility and the desirability of a more equitable distribution of income. The obvious way of achieving a rapid change in income distribution is through government. Those who command the income, however, usually also command the government. Hence social mobilization turns the traditional economic inequality into a stimulus to rebellion.

Secondly, in the long run, economic development produces a more equitable distribution of income than existed in the traditional society. In the short run, however, the immediate impact of economic growth is often to exacerbate income inequalities. The gains of rapid economic growth are often concentrated in a few groups while the losses are diffused among many; as a result, the number of people getting poorer in the society may actually increase. Rapid growth often involves inflation; in inflation prices typically rise faster than wages with consequent tendencies toward a more unequal distribution of wealth. The impact of Western legal systems in non-Western societies often encourages the replacement of communal forms of land ownership with private ownership

77. Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics, 16* (April 1964) , 442–54.

78. See Simon Kuznets, "Qualitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: VIII. Distribution of Income by Size," *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 11* (Jan. 1963) , 68; UN Social Commission, *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, United Nations, 1952) , pp. 132–33; Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy* (New York, Harper, 1956) , p. 133.

and thus tends to produce greater inequalities in land ownership than existed in the traditional society. In addition, in less developed societies the distribution of income in the more modern, nonagricultural sector is typically more unequal than it is in the agricultural. In rural India in 1950, for instance, five per cent of the families received 28.9 per cent of the income; but in urban India five per cent of the families received 61.5 per cent of the income.[79] Since the overall distribution of income is more equal in the less agricultural, developed nations, the distribution of income within the nonagricultural sector of an underdeveloped country is much more unequal than it is in the same sector in a developed country.

In particular modernizing countries the impact of economic growth on economic inequality may become quite noticeable. The twenty years before the revolution in Mexico witnessed a tremendous growth in economic inequalities, particularly in land ownership. In the 1950s the gap between wealth and poverty in Mexico and in Latin America generally was again tending to increase. The gap between high and low incomes in the Philippines was also reported to have increased significantly during the 1950s. Similarly, Pakistan's rapid economic growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s gave rise to "tremendous disparities in income" and tended to produce "relative stagnation at the bottom of the social pyramid." [80] In African countries independence brought to the few who assumed power frequent opportunities to amass immense wealth at a time when the standard of living for the bulk of their populations remained stationary or even declined. The earlier independence came in the evolution of a colonial society, the greater the economic—and political—inequality which independence fastened on that society.

Economic development increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that

79. Kuznets, pp. 46–58.

80. Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 207, 67–72, 176–78, and Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson), Notes for Seminar, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, March 11, 1965. See also David Wurfel, "The Philippine Elections: Support for Democracy," *Asian Survey,* 2 (May 1962), 25; John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 94–95.

inequality. Both aspects of modernization combine to produce political instability.

Modernization and Corruption

Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends. Corruption obviously exists in all societies, but it is also obviously more common in some societies than in others and more common at some times in the evolution of a society than at other times. Impressionistic evidence suggests that its extent correlates reasonably well with rapid social and economic modernization. Political life in eighteenth-century America and in twentieth-century America, it would appear, was less corrupt than in nineteenth-century America. So also political life in seventeenth-century Britain and in late nineteenth-century Britain was, it would appear, less corrupt than it was in eighteenth-century Britain. Is it merely coincidence that this high point of corruption in English and American public life coincided with the impact of the industrial revolution, the development of new sources of wealth and power, and the appearance of new classes making new demands on government? In both periods political institutions suffered strain and some measure of decay. Corruption is, of course, one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalization. Public officials lack autonomy and coherence, and subordinate their institutional roles to exogenous demands. Corruption may be more prevalent in some cultures than in others but in most cultures it seems to be most prevalent during the most intense phases of modernization. The differences in the level of corruption which may exist between the modernized and politically developed societies of the Atlantic world and those of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in large part reflect their differences in political modernization and political development. When the leaders of military juntas and revolutionary movements condemn the "corruption" in their societies, they are, in effect, condemning the backwardness of their societies.

Why does modernization breed corruption? Three connections stand out. First, modernization involves a change in the basic values of the society. In particular it means the gradual acceptance by groups within the society of universalistic and achievement-based norms, the emergence of loyalties and identifications of indi-

viduals and groups with the nation-state, and the spread of the assumption that citizens have equal rights against the state and equal obligations to the state. These norms usually, of course, are first accepted by students, military officers, and others who have been exposed to them abroad. Such groups then begin to judge their own society by these new and alien norms. Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing society is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior. New standards and criteria of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behavior patterns as corrupt. "What Britons saw as corrupt and Hausa as oppressive," one scholar has noted of northern Nigeria, "Fulani might regard as both necessary and traditional." [81] The calling into question of old standards, moreover, tends to undermine the legitimacy of all standards. The conflict between modern and traditional norms opens opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by neither.

Corruption requires some recognition of the difference between public role and private interest. If the culture of the society does not distinguish between the king's role as a private person and the king's role as king, it is impossible to accuse the king of corruption in the use of public monies. The distinction between the private purse and public expenditures only gradually evolved in Western Europe at the beginning of the modern period. Some notion of this distinction, however, is necessary to reach any conclusion as to whether the actions of the king are proper or corrupt. Similarly, according to traditional codes in many societies, an official had the responsibility and obligation to provide rewards and employment to members of his family. No distinction existed between obligation to the state and obligation to the family. Only when such a distinction becomes accepted by dominant groups within the society does it become possible to define such behavior as nepotism and hence corruption. Indeed, the introduction of achievement standards may stimulate greater family identification and more felt need to protect family interests against the threat posed by

81. M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption Among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 6 (Jan. 1964), 194.

alien ways. Corruption is thus a product of the distinction be-
tween public welfare and private interest which comes with mod-
ernization.

Modernization also contributes to corruption by creating new
sources of wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is
undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the society and on
which the modern norms are not yet accepted by the dominant
groups within the society. Corruption in this sense is a direct prod-
uct of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of
these groups to make themselves effective within the political
sphere. Corruption may be the means of assimilating new groups
into the political system by irregular means because the system has
been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and ac-
ceptable means for this purpose. In Africa, corruption threw "a
bridge between those who hold political power and those who con-
trol wealth, enabling the two classes, markedly apart during the
initial stages of African nationalist governments, to assimilate each
other." [82] The new millionaires buy themselves seats in the
Senate or the House of Lords and thereby become participants in
the political system rather than alienated opponents of it, which
might have been the case if this opportunity to corrupt the system
were denied them. So also recently enfranchised masses or recently
arrived immigrants use their new power of the ballot to buy them-
selves jobs and favors from the local political machine. There is
thus the corruption of the poor and the corruption of the rich.
The one trades political power for money, the other money for po-
litical power. But in both cases something public (a vote or an
office or decision) is sold for private gain.

Modernization, thirdly, encourages corruption by the changes it
produces on the output side of the political system. Moderniza-
tion, particularly among the later modernizing countries, involves
the expansion of governmental authority and the multiplication
of the activities subjected to governmental regulation. In North-
ern Nigeria, "oppression and corruption tended to increase among
the Hausa with political centralization and the increase of govern-
mental tasks." All laws, as McMullan has pointed out, put some
group at a disadvantage, and this group consequently becomes a

82. M. McMullan, "A Theory of Corruption," *The Sociological Review, 9* (July
1961) , 196.

potential source of corruption.[83] The multiplication of laws thus multiplies the possibilities of corruption. The extent to which this possibility is realized in practice depends in large part upon the extent to which the laws have the general support of the population, the ease with which the law can be broken without detection, and the profit to be made by breaking it. Laws affecting trade, customs, taxes plus those regulating popular and profitable activities such as gambling, prostitution, and liquor, consequently become major incentives to corruption. Hence in a society where corruption is widespread the passage of strict laws against corruption serves only to multiply the opportunities for corruption.

The initial adherence to modern values by a group in a transitional country often takes an extreme form. The ideals of honesty, probity, universalism, and merit often become so overriding that individuals and groups come to condemn as corrupt in their own society practices which are accepted as normal and even legitimate in more modern societies. The initial exposure to modernism tends to give rise to unreasonable puritanical standards even as it did among the Puritans themselves. This escalation in values leads to a denial and rejection of the bargaining and compromise essential to politics and promotes the identification of politics with corruption. To the modernizing zealot a politician's promise to build irrigation ditches for farmers in a village if he is elected seems to be just as corrupt as an offer to pay each villager for his vote before the election. Modernizing elites are nationalistic and stress the overriding preeminence of the general welfare of society as a whole. Hence in a country like Brazil, "efforts by private interests to influence public policy are considered, as in Rousseau, *inherently* 'corrupt.' By the same token government action which is fashioned in deference to particular claims and pressures from society is considered 'demagogy.' "[84] In a society like Brazil the modernizing elements condemn as corrupt ambassadorial appointments to reward friends or to appease critics and the establishment of government projects in return for interest group support. In the extreme case the antagonism to corruption may take the form of the intense fanatical puritanism characteristic of most revolutionary and some military regimes in at least their early phases.

83. Smith, p. 194; McMullan, pp. 190–91.

84. Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *American Behavioral Scientist, 8* (Nov. 1964) , 132; italics in original.

Paradoxically, this fanatical anticorruption mentality has ultimate effects similar to those of corruption itself. Both challenge the autonomy of politics: one substituting private goals for public ones and the other replacing political values with technical ones. The escalation of standards in a modernizing society and the concomitant devaluation and rejection of politics represent the victory of the values of modernity over the needs of society.

Reducing corruption in a society thus often involves both a scaling down of the norms thought appropriate for the behavior of public officials and at the same time changes in the general behavior of such officials in the direction of those norms. The result is a greater congruence between prevalent norms and prevalent behavior at the price of some inconsistency in both. Some behavior comes to be accepted as a normal part of the process of politics, as "honest" rather than "dishonest graft," while other, similar behavior comes to be generally condemned and generally avoided. Both England and the United States went through this process: at one point the former accepted the sale of peerages but not of ambassadorships, while the latter accepted the sale of ambassadorships but not of judgeships. "The result in the U.S.A.," as one observer has noted, "is a patchwork: the scope of political patronage has been greatly reduced and the cash bribery of higher public servants largely eliminated. At the same time, large areas of public life have so far remained more or less immune to reform, and practices that in one sphere would be regarded as corrupt are almost taken for granted in another." [85] The development within a society of the ability to make this discrimination is a sign of its movement from modernization to modernity.

The functions, as well as the causes, of corruption are similar to those of violence. Both are encouraged by modernization; both are symptomatic of the weakness of political institutions; both are characteristic of what we shall subsequently call praetorian societies; both are means by which individuals and groups relate themselves to the political system and, indeed, participate in the system in ways which violate the mores of the system. Hence the society which has a high capacity for corruption also has a high capacity for violence. In some measure, one form of deviant behavior may substitute for the other, but, more often, different social

85. Colin Leys, "What Is the Problem About Corruption?" *Journal of Modern African Studies, 3* (1965) , 230.

forces simultaneously exploit their differing capacities for each. The prevalence of violence, however, does pose a greater threat to the functioning of the system than the prevalence of corruption. In the absence of agreement on public purposes, corruption substitutes agreement on private goals, while violence substitutes conflict over public or private ends. Both corruption and violence are illegitimate means of making demands upon the system, but corruption is also an illegitimate means of satisfying those demands. Violence is more often a symbolic gesture of protest which goes unrequited and is not designed to be requited. It is a symptom of more extreme alienation. He who corrupts a system's police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who storms the system's police stations.

Like machine politics or clientalistic politics in general, corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is. Corruption itself may be a substitute for reform and both corruption and reform may be substitutes for revolution. Corruption serves to reduce group pressures for policy changes, just as reform serves to reduce class pressures for structural changes. In Brazil, for instance, governmental loans to trade association leaders have caused them to give up "their associations' broader claims. Such betrayals have been an important factor in reducing class and trade association pressure upon the government." [86]

The degree of corruption which modernization produces in a society is, of course, a function of the nature of the traditional society as well as of the nature of the modernizing process. The presence of several competing value systems or cultures in a traditional society will, in itself, encourage corruption in that society. Given a relatively homogeneous culture, however, the amount of corruption likely to develop during modernization would appear to be inversely related to the degree of social stratification in the traditional society. A highly articulated class or caste structure means a highly developed system of norms regulating behavior between individuals of different status. These norms are enforced both by the individual's socialization into his own group and by the expectations and potential sanctions of other groups. In such a society fail-

86. Leff, p. 137.

ure to follow the relevant norms in intergroup relations may lead to intense personal disorganization and unhappiness.

Corruption, consequently, should be less extensive in the modernization of feudal societies than it is in the modernization of centralized bureaucratic societies. It should have been less in Japan than in China and it should have been less in Hindu cultures than in Islamic ones. Impressionistic evidence suggests that these may well be the case. For Western societies, one comparative analysis shows that Australia and Great Britain have "fairly high levels of class voting" compared to the United States and Canada. Political corruption, however, appears to have been more extensive in the latter two countries than in the former, with Quebec perhaps being the most corrupt area in any of the four countries. Consequently, "the more class-polarized countries also seem to have less political corruption." [87] Similarly, in the "mulatto" countries (Panama, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Haiti) of Latin America, "there appears to be greater social equality and much less rigidity in the social structure" than in the Indian (Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia) or *mestizo* (Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay) countries. Correspondingly, however, the relative "absence of an entrenched upper class means also the relative absence of a governing class ethic, with its sense of noblesse oblige" and hence "there seems little doubt that it is countries in this socioracial category in which political graft reaches its most flagrant heights." Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Batista in Cuba, and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic all came from non-upper-class backgrounds and all became multimillionaires in office. So also, "Brazil and Panama are notorious for more 'democratic,' more widely-distributed, graft-taking." [88] The prevalence of corruption in the African states may well be related to the general absence of rigid class divisions. "The rapid mobility from poverty to wealth and from one occupation to another," one observer has noted of Africa, "has prevented the development of class phenomena, that is, of hereditary status or class consciousness." [89] The same mobility, however, multiplies the opportunities for and the

87. Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), p. 298.
88. Needler, *Political Development in Latin America*, Chap. 6, pp. 15–16.
89. Peter C. Lloyd, "The Development of Political Parties in Western Nigeria," *American Political Science Review, 49* (Sept. 1955), 695.

attractions of corruption. Similarly, the Philippines and Thailand, both of which have had reasonably fluid and open societies with relatively high degrees of social mobility, have been characterized by frequent reports of widespread political corruption.

In most forms corruption involves an exchange of political action for economic wealth. The particular forms that will be prevalent in a society depend upon the ease of access to one as against the other. In a society with multiple opportunities for the accumulation of wealth and few positions of political power, the dominant pattern will be the use of the former to achieve the latter. In the United States, wealth has more commonly been a road to political influence than political office has been a road to wealth. The rules against using public office to obtain private profit are much stricter and more generally obeyed than those against using private wealth to obtain public office. That striking and yet common phenomenon of American politics, the cabinet minister or presidential assistant who feels forced to quit office *in order* to provide for his family, would be viewed with amazement and incredulity in most parts of the world. In modernizing countries, the reverse situation is usually the case. The opportunities for the accumulation of wealth through private activity are limited by traditional norms, the monopoly of economic roles by ethnic minorities, or the domination of the economy by foreign companies and investors. In such a society, politics becomes the road to wealth, and those enterprising ambitions and talents which cannot find what they want in business may yet do so in politics. It is, in many modernizing countries, easier for an able and ambitious young man to become a cabinet minister by way of politics than to become a millionaire by way of business. Consequently, contrary to American practice, modernizing countries may accept as normal widespread use of public office to obtain private wealth while at the same time taking a stricter view of the use of private wealth to obtain public office. Corruption, like violence, results when the absence of mobility opportunities outside politics, combined with weak and inflexible political institutions, channels energies into politically deviant behavior.

The prevalence of foreign business in a country in particular tends to promote corruption both because the foreigners have less scruples in violating the norms of the society and because their control of important avenues to economic well-being forces poten-

tial native entrepreneurs to attempt to make their fortunes through politics. Taylor's description of the Philippines undoubtedly has widespread application among modernizing countries: "Politics is a major industry for the Filipinos; it is a way of life. Politics is the main route to power, which, in turn, is the main route to wealth. . . . More money can be made in a shorter time with the aid of political influence than by any other means." [90] The use of political office as a way to wealth implies a subordination of political values and institutions to economic ones. The principal purpose of politics becomes not the achievement of public goals but the promotion of individual interests.

In all societies the *scale* of corruption (i.e. the average value of the private goods and public services involved in a corrupt exchange) increases as one goes up the bureaucratic hierarchy or political ladder. The *incidence* of corruption (i.e. the frequency with which a given population group engages in corrupt acts) on a given level in the political or bureaucratic structure, however, may vary significantly from one society to another. In most political systems, the incidence of corruption is high at the lower levels of bureaucratic and political authority. In some societies, the incidence of corruption seems to remain constant or to increase as one goes up the political hierarchy. In terms of frequency as well as scale, national legislators are more corrupt than local officials; high level bureaucrats are more corrupt than low level ones; cabinet ministers are the most corrupt of all; and the president or top leader the most corrupt among them. In such societies the top leader—the Nkrumah, Sarit, San Martín, Pérez Jiménez, Trujillo—may make off with tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars. In such a system corruption tends to accentuate already existing inequalities. Those who gain access to the most political power also have the more frequent opportunities to gain access to the most wealth. Such a pattern of top-heavy corruption means a very low level of political institutionalization, since the top political institutions in the society which should be most independent of outside influences are in fact most susceptible to such influences. This pattern of corruption is not necessarily incompatible with political stability so long as the avenues of upward mobility through the political machine or the bureaucracy remain open. If, however,

90. George E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership* (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 157.

the younger generation of politicians sees itself indefinitely ex-
cluded from sharing in the gains of the older leaders, or if the
colonels in the army see little hope of promotion and the chance
to share in the opportunities open only to generals, the system be-
comes liable to violent overthrow. In such a society both political
corruption and political stability depend upon vertical mobility.

The expectation of more corruption at the top is reversed in
other societies. In these societies the incidence of corrupt behavior
increases as one goes down the political or bureaucratic hierarchy.
Low-level bureaucratic officials are more likely to be corrupt than
high-level ones; state and local officials are more likely to be cor-
rupt than national ones; the top national leadership and the na-
tional cabinet are comparatively free from corruption, while the
town council and local offices are deeply involved in it. Scale and
incidence of corruption are inversely related. This pattern would
seem to be generally true for highly modern societies, such as the
United States, and also for at least some modernizing societies,
such as India. It is also probably the dominant pattern in com-
munist states. The crucial factor in this type of society is the exis-
tence of fairly strong national political institutions which socialize
rising political leaders into a code of values stressing the public re-
sponsibilities of the political leadership. National political institu-
tions are reasonably autonomous and differentiated, while lower-
level and local political individuals and organizations are more
closely involved with other social forces and groups. This pattern
of corruption may directly enhance the stability of the political
system. The top leaders of the society remain true to the stated
norms of the political culture and accept political power and
moral virtue as substitutes for economic gain. Low-level officials,
in turn, are compensated for their lack of political standing by
their greater opportunity to engage in corruption. Their envy of
the power of their leaders is tempered by the solace of their own
petty graft.

Just as the corruption produced by the expansion of political
participation helps to integrate new groups into the political sys-
tem, so also the corruption produced by the expansion of govern-
mental regulation may help stimulate economic development.
Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or
bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion. In
the United States during the 1870s and 1880s corruption of state

legislatures and city councils by railroad, utility, and industrial corporations undoubtedly speeded the growth of the American economy. "Many economic activities would be paralyzed," Weiner observes of India, "were it not for the flexibility which *bakshish* contributes to the complex, rigid, administrative system." [91] In somewhat similar fashion, during the Kubitschek era in Brazil a high rate of economic development apparently corresponded with a high rate of parliamentary corruption, as industrializing entrepreneurs bought protection and assistance from conservative rural legislators. It has even been suggested that one result of governmental efforts to reduce corruption in societies such as Egypt is to produce additional obstacles to economic development. In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy. A society which is relatively uncorrupt—a traditional society for instance where traditional norms are still powerful—may find a certain amount of corruption a welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization. A developed traditional society may be improved—or at least modernized—by a little corruption; a society in which corruption is already pervasive, however, is unlikely to be improved by more corruption.

Corrruption naturally tends to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the government bureaucracy. In this respect, it is incompatible with political development. At times, however, some forms of corruption can contribute to political development by helping to strengthen political parties. "The corruption of one government," Harrington said, ". . . is the generation of another." [92] Similarly, the corruption of one governmental organ may help the institutionalization of another. In most modernizing countries, the bureaucracy is overdeveloped in comparison with the institutions responsible for aggregating interests and handling the input side of the political system. Insofar as the governmental bureaucracy is corrupted in the interests of the political parties, political development may be helped rather than hindered. Party

91. Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 253. See in general Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review, 61* (June 1967), 417–27.

92. James Harrington, quoted in Sabine, *A History of Political Thought* (rev. ed. New York, Henry Holt, 1950), p. 501.

patronage is only a mild form of corruption, if indeed it deserves
to be called that at all. For an official to award a public office in
return for a payment to the official is clearly to place private inter-
est over public interest. For an official to award a public office in
return for a contribution of work or money to a party organization
is to subordinate one public interest to another, more needy, pub-
lic interest.

Historically strong party organizations have been built either by
revolution from below or by patronage from above. The nine-
teenth-century experience of England and the United States is one
long lesson in the use of public funds and public office to build
party organization. The repetition of this pattern in the moderniz-
ing countries of today has contributed directly to the building of
some of the most effective political parties and most stable politi-
cal systems. In the later modernizing countries the sources of pri-
vate wealth are too few and too small to make a major contribu-
tion to party building. Just as government in these countries has
to play a more important role in economic development than it
did in England and the United States, so also it must play a more
important role in political development. In the 1920s and the
1930s, Ataturk used the resources of the Turkish government to
foster the development of the Republican Peoples Party. After its
creation in 1929 the Mexican Revolutionary Party similarly bene-
fited from governmental corruption and patronage. The forma-
tion of the Democratic Republican Party in Korea in the early
1960s was directly helped by the use of governmental monies and
governmental personnel. In Israel and India, governmental pa-
tronage has been a major source of strength for Mapai and Con-
gress. The corruption in West Africa derived in part from the
needs of the political parties. And, of course, in the most obvious
and blatant case of all, communist parties, once they acquire
power, directly subordinate governmental bureaucracies and gov-
ernmental resources to their own purposes.

The rationale for corrupting the bureaucracy on behalf of the
parties does not derive simply from a preference for one organiza-
tion as against another. Corruption is, as we have seen, a product
of modernization and particularly of the expansion of political
consciousness and political participation. The reduction of cor-
ruption in the long run requires the organization and structuring

of that participation. Political parties are the principal institution of modern politics which can perform this function. Corruption thrives on disorganization, the absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority. The development of political organizations which exercise effective authority and which give rise to organized group interests—the "machine," the "organization," the "party"—transcending those of individual and social groups reduces the opportunity for corruption. Corruption varies inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence.

Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties, in societies where the interests of the individual, the family, the clique, or the clan predominate. In a modernizing polity the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the greater the likelihood of corruption. In countries like Thailand and Iran where parties have had a semilegality at best, corruption on behalf of individual and family interests has been widespread. In the Philippines where political parties are notoriously weak, corruption has again been widely prevalent. In Brazil, also, the weakness of political parties has been reflected in a "clientelistic" pattern of politics in which corruption has been a major factor.[93] In contrast, it would seem that the incidence of corruption in those countries where governmental resources have been diverted or "corrupted" for party-building is on the whole less than it is where parties have remained weak. The historical experience of the West also reflects this pattern. The parties which at first are the leeches on the bureaucracy in the end become the bark protecting it from more destructive locusts of clique and family. Partisanship and corruption, as Henry Jones Ford argued, "are really antagonistic principles. Partisanship tends to establish a connection based upon an avowed public obligation, while corruption consults private and individual interests which secrete themselves from view and avoid accountability of any kind. The weakness of party organization is the opportunity of corruption." [94]

93. See Leff, pp. 10–12.
94. Henry Jones Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York, Macmillan, 1858), pp. 322–23.

The City-Country Gap: Urban Breakthrough and
Green Uprising

One crucial political result of modernization is the gap it produces between countryside and city. This gap is, indeed, a preeminent political characteristic of societies undergoing rapid social and economic change. It is the primary source of political instability in such societies and a principal, if not the principal, obstacle to national integration. Modernization is, in large part, measured by the growth of the city. The city becomes the locus of new economic activities, new social classes, new culture and education, which make it fundamentally different from the more tradition-bound countryside. At the same time modernization may also impose new demands on the countryside which intensify its hostility toward the city. The city dweller's feelings of intellectual superiority to and contempt for the backward peasant are matched by the country dweller's feelings of moral superiority to and yet envy of the city slicker. The city and the countryside become different nations, different ways of life.

Historically, the emigration of the peasant from village cottage to city slum was a decisive and irreversible change. In the later modernizing countries, however, the very process of modernization itself has made the move less decisive and has reduced the gap between city and countryside. The radio brings the language and the hopes of the city to the village; the bus brings the language and the beliefs of the village to the city. City cousins and country cousins are more often in contact with each other. The modern infrastructure of modernization has thus narrowed the rural-urban gap, but it has not eliminated it. The differences are still fundamental. The standard of living in the city is often four or five times that of the countryside. Most of those in the city are literate; a substantial majority of those in the countryside are illiterate. The economic activities and opportunities in the city are almost infinitely more varied than those in the countryside. The culture of the city is open, modern, secular; that of the countryside remains closed, traditional, and religious. The difference between the city and the countryside is the difference between the most modern and the most traditional parts of society. A fundamental problem of politics in a modernizing society is the development of

the means for bridging this gap and re-creating through political means the social unity which modernization has destroyed.

The expansion of political participation is reflected in the changing relationship between city and countryside and their changing patterns of political instability and stability. In a typical traditional phase, the countryside dominates the city both politically and socially, and in the countryside a small aristocratic group of landowners dominates a large passive peasant mass. Outside the village the level of political participation is low. It is limited to aristocrats, landowners, high bureaucratic officials, ecclesiastics, and high-ranking military officers. All these are drawn from the same small ruling elite, and the distinctions among the various roles and functions are still relatively primitive. Except in centralized bureaucratic empires, the city plays a minor or secondary role in most traditional societies. It may well be the seat of government, but the government itself requires few professional officials and is dominated by the rural elite whose wealth and power is based upon their control of land. In such a society, the countryside is preeminent and both city and countryside are stable.

Modernization changes the nature of the city and the balance between city and countryside. Economic activities multiply in the city and lead to the emergence of new social groups and to the development of a new social consciousness by old social groups. New ideas and new techniques imported from outside the society make their appearance in the city. In many cases, particularly where the traditional bureaucracy is fairly well developed, the first groups within the traditional society to be exposed to modernity are the military and civilian bureaucrats. In due course, students, intellectuals, merchants, doctors, bankers, artisans, entrepreneurs, teachers, lawyers, and engineers emerge on the scene. These groups develop feelings of political efficacy and demand some form of participation in the political system. The urban middle class, in short, makes its appearance in politics and makes the city the source of unrest and opposition to the political and social system which is still dominated by the country.

Eventually the urban elements assert themselves and overthrow the ruling rural elite, thereby marking the end of the traditional political system. This urban breakthrough is usually accompanied by violence, and at this point the politics of the society becomes

highly unstable.[95] The city is still but a small growth in society as a whole, but the groups within the city are able to employ their superior skills, location, and concentration to dominate the politics of the society at the national level. In the absence of effective political institutions, politics becomes a city game fought out among the elements of the emerging urban middle class. The community is divided by a fundamental gap; the society is still rural but its politics have become urban. The city is becoming the dominant source of political power, but the middle-class groups in the city are committed to opposition first to the rural elite which they have dislodged but then also to each other. The sources of instability in a modernizing society are seldom in its poorest or most backward areas; they are almost always in the most advanced sectors of the society. As politics becomes more and more urban, it becomes less and less stable.

At this point the re-creation of political stability requires an alliance between some urban groups and the masses of the population in the countryside. A crucial turning point in the expansion of political participation in a modernizing society is the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics. This rural mobilization or "Green Uprising" is far more important politically for the later modernizing countries than it was for most early modernizers. In the latter, urbanization and industrialization usually reached high levels before the bulk of the rural population became available for political mobilization. The rural population was less important numerically when it became more involved politically. The one major exception was the United States. In eighteenth-century America, the war of independence, the norms of equality and democracy, the relatively high levels of literacy and education, and the relatively widespread distribution of land ownership (outside the south) combined to produce extensive agrarian political participation before the rise of the city. Somewhat similarly, in later modernizing countries the telescoping of modernization tends to spread political consciousness and the possibility of political action through the countryside at a time when urban development and industrialization are still at relatively low levels. In these countries, consequently, the key to political stability is the extent to

95. See Chap. 4 for a more detailed analysis of breakthrough coups and the politics of radical praetorianism.

which the rural masses are mobilized into politics within the existing political system rather than against the system.

The timing, the method, and the auspices of the Green Uprising thus decisively influence the subsequent political evolution of the society. The uprising may occur rapidly or it may occur slowly and proceed through several stages. It usually takes one of four forms. In a colonial society, the Green Uprising may occur under the auspices of the nationalist intellectuals who, as in India and Tunisia, mobilize peasant groups into politics within the framework of the nationalist movement to support them in their struggles with the imperial power. Once independence is achieved, however, the problem for the nationalist leaders is to organize and sustain this rural participation and support. If the nationalist party fails to do this, some other group of urban leaders opposed to it or opposed to the political system of which it is a part may move to win the support of the peasants. In a competitive party system, the Green Uprising often takes the form of one segment of the urban elite developing an appeal to or making an alliance with the crucial rural voters and mobilizing them into politics so as to overwhelm at the polls the more narrowly urban-based parties. The victories of Jefferson and Jackson over the Adamses had their twentieth-century counterparts in Turkey, Ceylon, Burma, Senegal, the Sudan, and other modernizing countries. Thirdly, the Green Uprising may take place, in part at least, under military leadership, if as in South Korea and perhaps Egypt a rural-oriented military junta comes to power and then attempts to develop a broad power base in the countryside to overwhelm and contain its urban opponents. Finally, if no group within the political system takes the lead in mobilizing the peasants into politics, some group of urban intellectuals may mobilize and organize them into politics against the political system. This results in revolution.

Each form of the Green Uprising involves the mobilization of the peasants for political combat. If there is no combat, there is no mobilization. The crucial differences involve the target of the uprising and the framework in which it occurs. In the nationalist case, the target is the imperial power and the mobilization takes place within the framework of a nationalist movement which replaces the imperial power as the source of legitimacy in the political system. In the competitive case, the target is the ruling party

TABLE 1.5. Political Modernization: Changes in Urban-Rural Power and Stability

Phase	City	Countryside	Comments
1. Traditional Stability	Stable Subordinate	Stable Dominant	Rural elite rules; middle class absent; peasants dormant
2. Modernization Take-off	Unstable Subordinate	Stable Dominant	Urban middle class appears and begins struggle against rural elite
3. Urban Breakthrough	Unstable Dominant	Stable Subordinate	Urban middle class displaces rural elite; peasants still dormant
A4. Green Uprising: Containment	Unstable Subordinate	Stable Dominant	Peasant mobilization within system reestablishes stability and rural dominance
A5. Fundamentalist Reaction	Stable Dominant	Unstable Subordinate	Middle class grows and becomes more conservative; working class appears; shift of dominance to city produces rural fundamentalist reaction
B4. Green Uprising: Revolution	Unstable Subordinate	Unstable Dominant	Peasant mobilization against system overthrows old structures
B5. Modernizing Consolidation	Stable Dominant	Unstable Subordinate	Revolutionaries in power impose modernizing reforms on peasantry
6. Modern Stability	Stable Dominant	Stable Subordinate	Countryside accepts modern values and city rule

and the mobilization takes place within the framework of the political system but not within the framework of the ruling party. In the military case, the target is usually the former ruling oligarchy and the mobilization is part of the effort by the military leaders to construct a new political framework. In the revolutionary case, the target is the existing political system and its leadership and the mobilization takes place through an opposition political party whose leadership is dedicated to replacing the existing political system.

The instability of the city—the instability of coups, riots, and demonstrations—is, in some measure, an inescapable characteristic of modernization. The extent to which this instability manifests itself depends upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the political institutions of the society. Urban instability is thus minor but universal. Rural instability, on the other hand, is major but avoidable. If urban elites identified with the political system fail to lead the Green Uprising, the way is opened for an opposition group to come to power through revolution with the support of the peasants and to create a new institutional framework in the form of a single party to bridge the gap between country and city. If urban elites identified with the political system are, however, able to bring the peasants into politics on their side, they are able to surround and to contain the instability of the city. The rural strength of the regime enables it to survive the hostility of the city in the early phases of modernization. The price of rural support, however, is the modification or abandonment by the regime of many of its Western or modern values and practices. Thus, paradoxically, the Green Uprising has either a highly traditionalizing impact on the political system or a profoundly revolutionary one.

If revolution is avoided, in due course the urban middle class changes significantly; it becomes more conservative as it becomes larger. The urban working class also begins to participate in politics, but it is usually either too weak to challenge the middle class or too conservative to want to do so. Thus, as urbanization proceeds, the city comes to play a more effective role in the politics of the country, and the city itself becomes more conservative. The political system and the government come to depend more upon the support of the city than upon that of the countryside. Indeed, it now becomes the turn of the countryside to react against the prospect of domination by the city. This reaction often takes the

form of rural protest movements of a fundamentalist character, which vainly attempt to undermine the power of the city and to stop the spread of urban culture. When these opposition move-ments are stalemated or defeated, modernization, in its political sense, has reached modernity. Both city and countryside again be-come stable, but the dominant power now rests with the former rather than with the latter. The society which was once unified by a rural traditional culture is now unified by a modern urban one.

Whether a society evolves through a more or a less revolution-ary path thus depends upon the choices made by its leaders and their urban opponents after the city asserts its role in the political system. At this point either the leaders of the system mobilize the peasantry into politics as a stabilizing force to contain urban dis-order or the opposition mobilizes them into politics as a revolu-tionary force to join in the violent destruction of the existing po-litical and social order. A society is, in these terms, vulnerable to revolution only when the opposition of the middle class to the po-litical system coincides with the opposition of the peasants. Once the middle class becomes conservative, rural rebellion is still pos-sible, but revolution is not.

POLITICAL STABILITY: CIVIC AND PRAETORIAN POLITIES

Political systems can thus be distinguished by their levels of po-litical institutionalization and their levels of political participa-tion. In both cases the differences are obviously differences in de-gree: no clear-cut line separates the highly institutionalized polity from the disorganized polity; so also no clear-cut line exists be-tween one level of political participation and another. To analyze the changes in both dimensions, however, it is necessary to identify different categories of systems, recognizing full well that rarely will any actual political system in fact fit into any specific theoreti-cally defined pigeonhole. In terms of institutionalization, it is per-haps enough to distinguish those systems which have achieved a high degree of political institutionalization from those which have achieved only a low degree. In terms of participation, it seems de-sirable to identify three levels: at the lowest level, participation is restricted to a small traditional aristocratic or bureaucratic elite; at the medium level, the middle classes have entered into politics; and in a highly participant polity, elite, middle class, and the pop-ulace at large all share in political activity.

It would be convenient to leave the matter there, but things are not quite so simple. The stability of any given polity depends upon the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization. The level of political institutionalization in a society with a low level of political participation may be much lower than it is in a society with a much higher level of participation, and yet the society with lower levels

Figure 1.

**POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**

Political Participation

of both may be more stable than the society having a higher level of institutionalization and a still higher level of participation. Political stability, as we have argued, depends upon the ratio of institutionalization to participation. As political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.

Modern polities are, in some measure, distinguished from traditional polities by their level of political participation. Developed polities are, in some measure, distinguished from underdeveloped

ones by their level of political institutionalization. To these distinctions must now be added a third: the distinction between those polities where political participation is high relative to political institutionalization and those where institutionalization is high relative to participation. Political systems with low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation are systems where social forces using their own methods act directly in the political sphere. For reasons elaborated below, such political systems are appropriately called praetorian polities. Conversely, political systems with a high ratio of institutionalization to participation may be termed civic polities. One society may thus have more highly developed political institutions than another and yet may also be more praetorian in character because of its still higher level of political participation.

Civic or praetorian societies may thus exist at various levels of political participation. The combination of the classification of societies according to their level of political participation, on the one hand, and their ratio of institutionalization to participation, on the other, produces, of course, a typology of six kinds of political systems, which are identified in Table 1.6.

TABLE 1.6. Types of Political Systems

Political Participation	Ratio of Institutionalization to Participation	
	HIGH: CIVIC	LOW: PRAETORIAN
Low: traditional	Organic (Ethiopia)	Oligarchical (Paraguay)
Medium: transitional	Whig (Chile)	Radical (Egypt)
High: modern	Participant (Soviet Union)	Mass (Argentina)

This typology may strike a familiar note to the historian of political ideas. Starting with a different set of categories but with similar concern for the conditions of political stability, our analysis has led to a typology of political systems strikingly similar to that of the classics. The ancient theorists divided political systems in two ways: according to the number of rulers and according to the nature of the rule. Their division of systems into those ruled by the one, the few, and the many corresponds in a rough sense to the distinctions made here, and by other modern political analysts, according to levels of political participation. The distinction between civic and praetorian polities corresponds roughly to the difference postulated by Plato, Aristotle, and other classical writers

between legitimate or law-abiding states, where the rulers acted in the public interest, and perverted or law-neglecting systems, where the rulers acted in their own interests rather than those of the polity. "Those constitutions which consider the common interest are *right* constitutions," says Aristotle, and those "constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all *wrong* constitutions, or *perversions* of the right forms." [96]

As the Greeks recognized, the "right" constitutions might take a variety of forms, even as today the political systems of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union differ significantly from each other. The societies with perverted constitutions, in contrast, were societies which lacked law, authority, cohesion, discipline, and consensus, where private interests dominated public ones, where there was an absence of civic obligation and civic duty, where, again, political institutions were weak and social forces strong. Plato's degenerate states were ruled by various forms of appetite: by force, wealth, numbers, and charisma. They were manifestations of what Machiavelli called the corrupt state, dominated, in the words of one commentator, by "all sorts of license and violence, great inequalities of wealth and power, the destruction of peace and justice, the growth of disorderly ambition, disunion, lawlessness, dishonesty, and contempt for religion." [97] Modern equivalents of the classical corrupt society are Kornhauser's theory of the mass society, where, in the absence of institutions, elites are accessible to masses and masses are available for mobilization by the elites, and Rapoport's concept of the praetorian state, where "private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority; [and] the role of power (i.e. wealth and force) is maximized." [98]

It is virtually impossible to classify such states in terms of their form of government. We can have little doubt that the United States is a constitutional democracy and the Soviet Union a communist dictatorship. But what is the political system of Indonesia, of the Dominican Republic, South Vietnam, Burma, Nigeria, Ecuador, Argentina, Syria? These countries have held elections,

96. Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 112; italics in original.

97. Sabine, p. 343.

98. Kornhauser, passim; David C. Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government Without Consensus" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960) ; and Rapoport, in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns*, p. 72, where the quotation occurs.

but they are clearly not democracies in the sense in which Denmark or New Zealand is a democracy. They have had authoritarian rulers, but they are not effective dictatorships like the communist states. At other times they have been dominated by highly personalistic, charismatic rulers or by military juntas. They are unclassifiable in terms of any particular governmental form because their distinguishing characteristic is the fragility and fleetingness of all forms of authority. Charismatic leader, military junta, parliamentary regime, populistic dictator follow each other in seemingly unpredictable and bewildering array. The patterns of political participation are neither stable nor institutionalized; they may oscillate violently between one form and another. As Plato and Aristotle pointed out long ago, corrupt or praetorian societies often swing back and forth between despotism and mobrule. "Where the pre-established political authority is highly autocratic," says Kornhauser, "rapid and violent displacement of that authority by a democratic regime is highly favorable to the emergence of extremist mass movements that tend to transform the new democracy in antidemocratic directions." Rapoport finds in Gibbon an apt summary of the constitutional rhythms of the praetorian state which "floats between the extremes of absolute monarchy and wild democracy." Such instability is the hallmark of a society lacking political community and where participation in politics has outrun the institutionalization of politics.[99]

Civic polities, in contrast, have recognizable and stable patterns of institutional authority appropriate for their level of political participation. In traditional polities, these structures normally take the form of either a centralized bureaucratic empire or of a complex feudal monarchy, or some combination of these two. At the Whig level of middle-class participation, the dominant political institutions are normally parliamentary assemblies with members chosen through some limited form of elections. In the fully participant, modern polity, political parties supplement or replace the traditional political structures as the key institutions for organizing mass involvement in politics. At all levels of participation, however, political institutions are sufficiently strong to pro-

99. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York, Macmillan, 1899), *1*, 235, quoted by Rapoport in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns*, p. 98.

vide the basis of a legitimate political order and a working politi-
cal community. The institutions impose political socialization as
the price of political participation. In a praetorian society groups
become mobilized into politics without becoming socialized by
politics. The distinguishing characteristic of a highly institutional-
ized polity, in contrast, is the price it places on power. In a civic
polity, the price of authority involves limitations on the resources
that may be employed in politics, the procedures through which
power may be acquired, and the attitudes that power wielders may
hold. If the society is modern and complex, with a large number of
social forces, individuals from any one of the social forces may
have to make extensive changes in their behavior, values, and at-
titudes in the process of acquiring power through the political in-
stitutions of the society. They may well have to unlearn much
which they have learned from family, ethnic group, and social
class, and adapt to an entirely new code of behavior.

The development of a civic polity may have some relation to the
stage of modernization and of political participation, but it is not
directly dependent upon it. By the mid-twentieth century many of
the more advanced Latin American nations had achieved compar-
atively high indices of literacy, per capita national income, and
urbanization. In the mid-1950s, for instance, Argentina was eco-
nomically and socially a highly developed country. Almost half the
population lived in cities of over 20,000 people; 86 per cent of the
people were literate; 75 per cent were engaged in nonagricultural
employment; the per capita gross national product was over $500.
Argentine politics, however, remained notably underdeveloped.
"The public good," Sarmiento had said in the 1850s, "is a mean-
ingless word—there is no 'public.' " A hundred years later the fail-
ure to develop effective political institutions meant the continued
absence of public community. As one observer noted,

> The hard surface of military rule or the mottled aspect of
> Machiavellian balancing and intriguing have been the two
> masks of Argentine politics since 1930. The masks, most un-
> happily, do not disguise reality—they *are* the reality of Argen-
> tina's situation of weak government, a debility stemming
> from several fundamental causes. . . . The state is not firmly
> established as the ultimate arbiter of Argentine public life.

The other institutions competing for men's loyalties permit a
high degree of protection from the dictates of the state.[100]

So long as a country like Argentina retained a politics of coup
and counter-coup and a feeble state surrounded by massive social
forces, it remained politically underdeveloped no matter how
urbane, prosperous, and educated its citizenry.

In reverse fashion, a country may be politically highly devel-
oped with modern political institutions while still very backward
in terms of modernization. India, for instance, was typically held
to be the epitome of the underdeveloped society. Judged by the
usual criteria of modernization, it was at the bottom of the ladder
during the 1950s: per capita GNP of $72, 80 per cent illiterate, over
80 per cent of the population in rural areas, 70 per cent of the
work force in agriculture, fourteen major languages, deep caste
and religious differences. Yet in terms of political institutionaliza-
tion, India was far from backward. Indeed, it ranked high not only
in comparison with other modernizing countries in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, but also in comparison with many much more
modern European countries. A well developed political system has
strong and distinct institutions to perform both the "input" and
the "output" functions of politics. India entered independence
with not only two organizations, but two highly developed—
adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent—institutions ready
to assume primary responsibility for these functions. The Congress
Party, founded in 1885, was one of the oldest and best organized
political parties in the world; the Indian Civil Service, dating
from the early nineteenth century, was appropriately hailed as
"one of the greatest administrative systems of all time." [101] The
stable, effective, and democratic government of India during its
first twenty years of independence rested far more on this institu-
tional inheritance than it did on the charisma of Nehru. In addi-
tion, the relatively slow pace of modernization and social mobili-
zation in India did not create demands and strains which the party
and the bureaucracy were unable to handle. So long as these two
organizations maintained their institutional strength, it was ridic-

100. Sarmiento, *Facundo* (New York, Appleton, 1868), p. 33; Silvert, pp. 358–59.
101. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph
LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1963), p. 373.

ulous to think of India as politically underdeveloped no matter how low its per capita income or how high its illiteracy rate.

Almost no other country attaining independence after World War II was institutionally as well prepared as India for self-government. In countries like Pakistan and the Sudan, institutional evolution was unbalanced: the civil and military bureaucracies were more highly developed than the political parties, and the military had strong incentives to move into the institutional vacuum on the input side of the political system and to attempt to perform interest aggregation functions. This pattern, of course, has also been common in Latin America. In countries like Guate-

TABLE 1.7. Institutional Development
at Time of Independence

Input Institutions	Output Institutions	
	High	Low
High	India	N. Vietnam
Low	Sudan	Congo

mala, El Salvador, Peru, and Argentina, John J. Johnson pointed out, the military was "the country's best organized institution and is thus in a better position to give objective expression to the national will" than were parties or interest groups. In a very different category was a country like North Vietnam, which fought its way into independence with a highly disciplined political organization but which was distinctly weak on the administrative side. The Latin American parallel here would be Mexico, where, as Johnson put it, "not the armed forces but the PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional] is the best organized institution, and the party rather than the armed forces has been the unifying force at the national level." [102] In yet a fourth category were those unfortunate states, such as the Congo, which were born with neither political nor administrative institutions. Many of these new states deficient at independence in one or both types of institutions were also confronted by high rates of social mobilization and rapidly increasing demands on the political system.

If a society is to maintain a high level of community, the expansion of political participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex, and more autonomous political institutions. The effect of the expansion of political participa-

102. Johnson, *Military and Society*, p. 143.

tion, however, is usually to undermine the traditional political institutions and to obstruct the development of modern political ones. Modernization and social mobilization, in particular, thus tend to produce political decay unless steps are taken to moderate or to restrict its impact on political consciousness and political involvement. Most societies, even those with fairly complex and adaptable traditional political institutions, suffer a loss of political community and decay of political institutions during the most intense phases of modernization.

This decay in political institutions has been neglected or overlooked in much of the literature on modernization. As a result, the models and concepts which are hopefully entitled "developing" or "modernizing" are only partially relevant to many of the countries to which they are applied. Equally relevant would be models of corrupt or degenerating societies highlighting the decay of political organization and the increasing dominance of disruptive social forces. Who, however, has advanced such a theory of political decay or a model of a corrupt political order which might be useful in analyzing the political processes of the countries usually called "developing"? Perhaps the most relevant ideas are again the most ancient ones. The evolution of many contemporary new states, once the colonial guardians have departed, has not deviated extensively from the Platonic model.[103] Independence is followed by military coups, as the "auxiliaries" take over. Corruption by the oligarchy inflames the envy of rising groups. Conflict between oligarchy and masses erupts into civil strife. Demagogues and street mobs pave the way for the despot. Plato's description of the means by which the despot appeals to the people, isolates and eliminates his enemies, and builds up his personal strength is a far less misleading guide to what has taken place in Africa and elsewhere than many things written yesterday.[104]

103. See, in general, *The Republic*, Book VIII, and especially the description of the despotic regime (Cornford trans., New York, Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 291–93.

104. Perhaps the closest contemporary model comes not from a social scientist but from a novelist: William Golding. The schoolboys (newly independent elites) of *The Lord of the Flies* initially attempt to imitate the behavior patterns of adults (former Western rulers). Discipline and consensus, however, disintegrate. A demagogic military leader and his followers gain or coerce the support of a majority. The symbol of authority (the conch) is broken. The voices of responsibility (Ralph) and reason (Piggy) are deserted and harassed, and reason is destroyed. In the end,

The extent to which a society undergoes complete political decomposition during the modernization process depends in large part on the nature of its traditional political institutions. If these are weak or nonexistent, or if they are destroyed by colonialism or other means, the society usually evolves directly from traditional praetorianism to an even more praetorian transitional phase with extensive urban middle-class participation in politics. If a society has a reasonably highly developed and autonomous bureaucratic structure in its traditional phase, it will face acute problems in adapting to broader political participation because of the nature of the structure. Paradoxically, those traditional systems which seem most "modern" in their structural differentiation and rationalization of authority often also have more difficulties in adapting to broader political participation than traditional political systems which are less rationalized and differentiated but institutionally more complex and pluralistic. Highly centralized bureaucratic monarchies like those of China and France seem more modern than more pluralistic feudal systems such as those of England and Japan. Yet the latter prove to be more adaptable than the former.[105] In these instances, the struggle between oligarchy and middle class tends to become muted, and the political institutions of the society prove to be sufficiently adaptable to absorb into the political system the new middle-class groups.

Societies which have high levels of middle-class political participation have strong tendencies toward instability because of the nature of the middle class and the dominance of politics by the city at the expense of the country. It is in this middle-class phase of expansion that politics is most likely to assume a praetorian cast and to become, in Macaulay's phrase, "all sail and no anchor." [106] In such a society the political system has lost its rural anchor and is tossed about in rough seas under a full head of urban sail. The strain on political institutions, even highly developed institutions,

the naval officer (British Marine Commandos) arrives just in time to save Ralph (Nyerere) from the "hunters" (mutinous troops) .

105. See Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1966) .

106. Thomas B. Macaulay, letter to Henry S. Randall, Courtlandt Village, New York, May 23, 1857, printed in "What Did Macaulay Say About America?," *Bulletin of the New York Public Library, 24* (July 1925) , 477–79.

is great, and in most societies the traditional institutions inherited from the past disintegrate or collapse.

If the traditional political institutions do adapt to middle-class political participation or if, in a previously praetorian society, new political institutions are created to stabilize politics at the middle-class level, in due course these institutions face the problem of adapting to the expansion of participation to the urban working class and the rural peasantry. If the existing political institutions of the middle-class polity are capable of adjustment, the transition is made to a fully participant, highly institutionalized modern polity. If these institutions are incapable of adapting themselves to mass participation or if in the society a situation of radical praetorianism prevails, the society then moves in the direction of mass praetorianism in which the dominant social forces become the large-scale movements characteristic of a highly modern and mobilized society.

Both the mass society and the participant society have high levels of political participation. They differ in the institutionalization of their political organizations and procedures. In the mass society political participation is unstructured, inconstant, anomic, and variegated. Each social force attempts to secure its objectives through the resources and tactics in which it is strongest. Apathy and indignation succeed each other: the twin children of the absence of authoritative political symbols and institutions. The distinctive form of political participation is the mass movement combining violent and nonviolent, legal and illegal, coercive and persuasive actions. Mass society lacks organized structures which can relate the political desires and activities of the populace to the goals and decisions of their leaders. As a result, a direct relationship exists between leaders and masses; in Kornhauser's terms, the masses are available for mobilization by the leaders and the leaders are accessible to influence by the masses. In the participant polity, on the other hand, a high level of popular involvement is organized and structured through political institutions. Each social force must transform its sources of power and forms of action—be they numbers, wealth, knowledge, or potential for violence—into those which are legitimate in and institutionalized in the political system. The structure of a participant polity may assume a variety of forms, and power may be dispersed or concentrated. In all cases, however, participation is broad and is organized and structured

into legitimate channels. Popular participation in politics does not necessarily mean popular control of government. Constitutional democracies and communist dictatorships are both participant polities.

The modern polity thus differs from the traditional polity in the scope of the political consciousness and political involvement of its population. The modern, developed polity differs from the traditional, developed polity in the nature of its political institutions. The institutions of the traditional polity need only structure the participation of a small segment of society. The institutions of a modern polity must organize the participation of the mass of the population. The crucial institutional distinction between the two is thus in the organizations for structuring mass participation in politics. The distinctive institution of the modern polity, consequently, is the political party. The other institutions which exist in modern political systems are adaptations of or carry-overs from traditional political systems. Bureaucracies are not distinctly modern. The bureaucracies which existed in the Chinese, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and other historic empires often had high degrees of structural differentiation, elaborate systems for recruitment and promotion according to merit and achievement, and carefully worked out procedures and regulations governing their actions. Nor are assemblies and parliaments unique to the modern polity: assemblies existed in the ancient city-states, and parliaments and other meetings of the estates were common phenomena in medieval Europe, most of which were destroyed during the process of modernization. Elections are also found in nonmodern polities: elective chiefs are common in tribal societies; the *strategoi* and other magistrates were elected in Athens, the tribunes and consuls in ancient Rome. The idea and practice of constitutionalism are similarly ancient. Constitutions, laws, and courts all existed in highly developed forms long before the appearance of the modern state. So also did cabinets and executive councils. The only potential rival to the party as the distinctive institution of the modern polity is federalism.[107] The more widespread existence of federal institutions among modern states than among traditional ones reflects the same factor which accounts for the development of parties: the extension of the scope of the polity in terms of popula-

107. See William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston, Little Brown, 1964), pp. 1–10.

tion as well as territory. Yet federalism is neither unique to the modern world nor prevalent within it. Such, however, is precisely the case with the political party. The party is the distinctive institution of modern politics.

Cliques and factions exist in all political systems. So also do parties in the sense of informal groups competing with each other for power and influence. But parties in the sense of organizations are a product of modern politics. Political parties exist in the modern polity because only modern political systems require institutions to organize mass participation in politics. The political party as an organization had its forerunners in the revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The first appearance of organized political parties, however, comes in the eighteenth century in those countries where political participation was first expanded, in America and then in France. The shift, in Rudolph's terms, from the politics of status to the politics of opinion, led to the creation of the political party as a political institution.[108] In 1800 political parties existed only in the United States; by 1900 they existed throughout the Western world. The development of political parties parallels the development of modern government. The more traditional political institutions have been able to adapt to the needs of modern politics, the less significant has been the role of the political party. Conversely, the importance of the political party in providing legitimacy and stability in a modernizing political system varies inversely with the institutional inheritance of the system from traditional society. Where traditional political institutions (such as monarchies and feudal parliaments) are carried over into the modern era, parties play secondary, supplementary roles in the political system. The other institutions are the primary source of continuity and legitimacy. Parties typically originate within the legislatures and then gradually extend themselves into society. They adapt themselves to the existing framework of the political system and typically reflect in their own operations the organizational and procedural principles embodied in that system. They broaden participation in the traditional institutions, thus adapting those institutions to the requirements of the modern polity. They help make the traditional

108. Lloyd I. Rudolph, "From the Politics of Status to the Politics of Opinion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1956).

institutions legitimate in terms of popular sovereignty, but they are not themselves a source of legitimacy. Their own legitimacy derives from the contributions they make to the political system.

Where traditional political institutions collapse or are weak or nonexistent, the role of the party is entirely different from what it is in those polities with institutional continuity. In such situations, strong party organization is the only long-run alternative to the instability of a corrupt or praetorian or mass society. The party is not just a supplementary organization; it is instead the source of legitimacy and authority. In the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy, legitimacy is sought in ideology, charisma, popular sovereignty. To be lasting, each of these principles of legitimacy must be embodied in a party. Instead of the party reflecting the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party. The actions of government are legitimate to the extent that they reflect the will of the party. The party is the source of legitimacy because it is the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty, the popular will, or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Where traditional political institutions are weak or nonexistent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalized political party. States with one such party are markedly more stable than states which lack such a party. States with no parties or many weak parties are the least stable. Where traditional political institutions are smashed by revolution, post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence of one strong party: witness the otherwise very different histories of the Chinese, Mexican, Russian, and Turkish revolutions. Where new states emerge from colonialism with little or no inheritance of political institutions, the stability of the polity depends directly on the strength of the party.

The political party is the distinctive organization of modern politics, but in another sense it is not an entirely modern institution. The function of the party is to organize participation, to aggregate interests, to serve as the link between social forces and the government. In performing these functions, the party necessarily reflects the logic of politics, not the logic of efficiency. A bureaucracy with its differentiated structure and merit system is, by the latter logic, a more modern institution than a political party which operates on patronage, influence, and compromise. Conse-

quently, the promoters of modernization, like the defenders of tradition, often reject and denigrate political parties. They attempt to modernize their society politically without establishing the institution that will make their society politically stable. They pursue modernity at the expense of politics and in the process fail to achieve the one because of their neglect of the other.