7. Parties and Political Stability

MODERNIZATION AND PARTIES

Political Community in Modern Society

By mobilizing new people into new roles modernization leads to a larger and more diversified society which lacks the "natural" community of the extended family, the village, the clan, or the tribe. Because it is a larger society, whose boundaries are often determined by the accidents of geography and colonialism, the modernizing society is often a "plural" society encompassing many religious, racial, ethnic, and linguistic groupings. Such communal groupings may exist in the traditional society, but the society's low level of political participation reduces the problems they pose for integration. As the scope of social mobilization in such communal groups extends downward, however, the antagonisms between them intensify. The problem of integrating primordial social forces into a single national political community becomes more and more difficult. Modernization also brings into existence and into political consciousness and activity social and economic groups which either did not exist in the traditional society or were outside the scope of politics in traditional society. Either these groups are assimilated into the political system or they become a source of antagonism to and of revolution against the political system. The achievement of political community in a modernizing society thus involves both the "horizontal" integration of communal groups and the "vertical" assimilation of social and economic classes.

The common factor giving rise to the problems of national integration and political assimilation is the expansion of political consciousness and participation produced by modernization. Polities which have a stable balance between participation and institutionalization at low levels of both face the prospect of future instability unless the development of political institu-

tions keeps pace with the expansion of political participation. Since the prospects for this are relatively low, such societies are presumptively unstable. On the other hand, societies which have created large-scale modern political institutions with the capability of handling much more extensive political participation than exists at present are presumptively stable. Societies where participation already exceeds institutionalization are, clearly, unstable, while societies with a balance between the two at high rates of both may be said to have validated stability. These political systems are both politically modern and politically developed. They have institutions with the demonstrated capability to absorb into the system new social forces and the rising levels of participation produced by modernization.

The future stability of a society with a low level of political participation thus depends in large part on the nature of the political institutions with which it confronts modernization and the expansion of political participation. The principal institutional means for organizing the expansion of political participation are political parties and the party system. A society which develops reasonably well organized political parties while the level of political participation is still relatively low (as was largely the case in India, Uruguay, Chile, England, the United States, and Japan) is likely to have a less destabilizing expansion of political participation than a society where parties are organized later in the process of modernization. In the 1960s, the presumptive stability of Malaya, where traditional leaders had woven a plurality of ethnic groups into a single party framework, was higher than the presumptive stability of Thailand, where the virtual absence of political parties left the polity with no institutional mechanisms for assimilating new groups.

In most countries in Latin America in the 1960s peasants manifested low levels of involvement in and identification with the political system. Presumably, however, the ability of a comprehensive party system like that in Mexico to deal with this problem was far higher than that of an uninstitutionalized dictatorship like that in Paraguay. Societies with a low level of participation and a partyless absolute monarchy (like Saudi Arabia, Libya, or Ethiopia in the 1960s) were presumptively unstable. Similarly, societies such as Haiti under Duvalier, the Dominican Republic under Trujillo, or, at an earlier time, Mexico under Díaz, which lack

both effective traditional and effective modern political institutions, faced highly unstable futures. The problems faced by the American political system in the 1960s of assimilating into the system the Negro minority did not differ significantly from those faced by many political systems in modernizing countries. The American political system and American parties in the past, however, had demonstrated an institutional capability for precisely such assimilation. The successful absorption of the Karens, the Tamils, the Kurds, or the Negroes into the Burmese, Ceylonese, Iraqi, or Sudanese political systems was far more problematical simply because the political elites of those countries had no such highly developed and institutionalized procedures for handling these problems.

Societies with highly developed traditional political institutions may evolve to higher levels of political participation through the adaptation of those institutions. At some point, political parties become necessary to organize and to structure the expanded participation, but these parties play a secondary role supplementing institutional strength rather than filling an institutional vacuum. Most later modernizing countries, however, lack traditional political institutions capable of successful adaptation to the needs of the modern state. Hence minimizing the likelihood of political instability resulting from the expansion of political consciousness and involvement requires the creation of modern political institutions, i.e. political parties, early in the process of modernization.

The distinctive problem of the later modernizing countries is that they confront simultaneously the problems which the early modernizers faced sequentially over fairly long historical periods. Simultaneity, however, is an opportunity as well as a challenge. It at least enables the elites of those countries to select the problems to which they will give priority. What for the early modernizers was determined by history can for the later modernizers be a matter of conscious choice. The experience of both early and later modernizers suggests that early attention to the problems of political organization and the creation of modern political institutions makes for an easier and less destabilizing process of modernization. "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto it." The political decay in Ghana highlighted the consequences of Nkrumah's failure to follow his own precept. The political kingdom, however, cannot be found; it must be created.

The relative success of communist states in providing political order in large part derives from the priority they have given to the conscious act of political organization. In the Soviet Union, one function of the NEP was to permit the reconstruction and strengthening of the party, the reinvigoration of its cadres, before the major effort to industrialize Soviet society and to collectivize Soviet agriculture was launched in the 1930s. The Bolsheviks appropriately gave first attention to the perfection of the political organization through which they would rule Russia. As a result, as early as 1923

> the basis for the control by the party over national life had been laid: the perfected system of control over appointments which enabled the central apparatus to place trusted and well-screened nominees in key positions in all the party organizations; strict party discipline, which ensured both that the nominees would obey the centre and that the rank and file members of local party organizations would obey the central nominee; and finally, the establishment of party supremacy over state institutions.[1]

During the remainder of the 1920s the control of the party over industry and culture was extended simultaneously with the expansion of the control of the apparatus over the party. By 1930 a political organization had been created which could prosecute industrialization, collectivization, and war, and survive their consequences. A similar course was followed by the Communist Party of China in the years after 1949. First priority was given to the extension of party control throughout China and the refurbishing of the party organization. Only in the late 1950s did economic development move to the forefront among party objectives. The sequence followed in North Korea did not deviate from this pattern: "the development of Korean economic institutions took place more slowly than the political, particularly in the areas of trade and agriculture. While the adoption of Soviet political forms was virtually complete by 1948, the sovietization of the economy did not near completion until 1957, the private sector having by then been reduced to insignificant proportions." [2]

1. Leonard B. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, Random House, 1960) , p. 258.

2. Philip Rudolph, *North Korea's Political and Economic Structure* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959) , p. 61.

The more successful efforts at modernization by noncommunist one-party states have also given first priority to political objectives. In Turkey Mustafa Kemal consciously laid first the national and then the political basis for his society before turning to social reform and economic development. Similarly in Mexico the period from the Revolution of 1910 to 1940

> was an era in which Mexico was developing the essential preconditions for the new role of the state. During those thirty years, the state regained physical control over the nation; it began to shape and define a new philosophy for its existence and a new role in the performance of its goals; it manufactured a new set of powers and generated a new crop of institutions; and it began to flex its muscles by attempting new programs and new approaches to the old problems of credit, transportation, water resources, and land tenure in the country.[3]

The strengthening of the state and the development of the party organization in the 1930s laid the foundation for the tripling of the Mexican gross national product during the 1940s and 1950s.

So also in Tunisia the Neo-Destour government gave first priority to promoting national integration and developing political institutions before turning in 1961 to a program of economic and social development. A similar pattern of priorities was set for Tunisia's western neighbor. "For Algeria as for China, economic development is not priority number one, but priority number three. The prime objective is the building of the State; the second, the formation of the national ruling class. To achieve them, the second especially, it may be advantageous to regress with regard to the third." [4] In modernizing society "building the state" means in part the creation of an effective bureaucracy, but, more importantly, the establishment of an effective party system capable of structuring the participation of new groups in politics.

Parties organize political participation; party systems affect the rate at which participation expands. The stability and the strength

3. Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 59.

4. M. Corpierre, "Le totalitarisme africain," *Preuves, 143* (January 1963), 17, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States," in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development*, p. 204.

of a party and of a party system depend upon both its level of institutionalization and its level of participation. A high level of participation combined with low levels of political party institutionalization produces anomic politics and violence. Conversely, however, a low level of participation also tends to weaken political parties vis-à-vis other political institutions and social forces. It is in the interest of party leaders to expand political participation so long as they are able to organize the participation within the framework of their party. A party with mass support is obviously stronger than a party with restricted support. So also a party system with mass participation is stronger than a party system in which increased political participation leads to the gradual separation of the party from its presumptive supporters and the conversion of what was once a broad-based organization into a handful of rootless politicians. Participation without organization degenerates into mass movements; organization lacking participation degenerates into personalistic cliques. Strong parties require high levels of political institutionalization and high levels of mass support. "Mobilization" and "organization," those twin slogans of communist political action, define precisely the route to party strength. The party and the party system which combine them reconcile political modernization with political development.

Unlike elections and representative assemblies or parliaments, parties and party systems thus perform dynamic as well as passive functions in the political system. Elections and parliaments are instruments of representation; parties are instruments of mobilization. Parliaments or other types of elected councils are hence quite compatible with a relatively static traditional society. The strength of the dominant groups in the social structure is reproduced within the parliament. The existence of an elected assembly is, in itself, an indication of neither the modernity of a political system nor of its susceptibility to modernization. The same is true of elections. Elections without parties reproduce the status quo; they are a conservative device which gives a semblance of popular legitimacy to traditional structures and traditional leadership. They are, indeed, usually characterized by a very low turnout. Elections with parties, however, provide a mechanism for political mobilization within an institutional framework. The political parties direct political participation out of anomic paths and into electoral channels. The stronger the political parties involved in the elections,

the larger the voting turnout. A half dozen individual candidates furiously competing with each other without benefit of party produce a far smaller turnout of voters than one strong party lacking any effective opposition. The 99 per cent turnouts in communist states are testimony to the strength of the political parties in those states; the 80 per cent turnouts in western Europe are a function of the highly developed organization of parties there; the 60 per cent turnouts produced by American parties reflect their looser and less highly articulated organization.

The Fragility of the No-Party State

Traditional polities do not have political parties; modernizing polities need them but often do not want them. The opposition to political parties in such societies comes from three different sources. Conservatives oppose parties because they see them, quite appropriately, as a challenge to the existing social structure. In the absence of parties political leadership derives from position in the traditional hierarchy of government and society. Parties are an innovation inherently threatening to the political power of an elite based on heredity, social status, or land ownership. The conservative attitude toward parties is well reflected in Washington's warning in 1794 that the "self-created societies" were "labouring incessantly to sow the seeds of distrust, jealousy, and of course discontent" about the country and that if not stopped they would destroy the government of the country.[5]

Inevitably a ruling monarch tends to view political parties as divisive forces which either challenge his authority or greatly complicate his efforts to unify and modernize his country. Efforts to mix monarchial rule and party government almost always end in failure. The choice has to be made between Bolingbroke and Burke; and for the individual or group wishing to combine conservative authority and modernizing policies the former is far more attractive than the latter. The modernizing monarch necessarily sees himself as the "Patriot King" who is "to espouse no party, but to govern like the common father of his people." [6] The conservative nonroyal leader—Sarit, Ayub Khan, Franco, Rhee—

5. George Washington, Letter to Jay, November 1, 1794, *Writings* (W. C. Ford ed., New York, Putnam's, 1891) , *12*, 486.

6. Lord Bolingbroke, "The Idea of a Patriot King," *Works* (London, Hansard and Sons, 1809) , *4*, 280–81.

shares similar sentiments opposed to party development, although he may well be forced to compromise with the need for parties. For a state without parties is also a state without the institutional means of generating sustained change and of absorbing the impact of such change. Its ability to modernize politically, economically, socially is drastically limited. "A regime without parties is of necessity," as Duverger says, "a conservative regime." [7]

The conservative opposition to parties in a modernizing state is frequently joined by an administrative opposition. The pure conservative rejects both the rationalizing and the participant aspects of political modernization. The administrator opposed to parties accepts the need to rationalize social and economic structures. He is unwilling, however, to accept the implications of modernization for broadening the scope of popular participation in politics. His is a bureaucratic model; the goal is efficiency and the elimination of conflict. Parties simply introduce irrational and corrupt considerations into the efficient pursuit of goals upon which everyone should be agreed. The administrative opponent of parties may wear any dress, but he is less likely to be in mufti than in uniform.

The third source of opposition to parties comes from those who accept participation but not the necessity to organize it. Theirs is a populistic, Rousseauian belief in direct democracy. The conservative opponent of parties believes that the existing social structure is sufficient to link people to government. The administrative opponent sees the bureaucratic structure meeting these needs. The populist opponent denies the need for any intervening structure between the people and its political leaders. He wants a "partyless democracy." Jayaprakash Narayan joins Gamal Abdel Nasser and Haile Selassie in denying the relevance of parties to political modernization.

The conservative sees party as a challenge to the established hierarchy; the administrators see it as a threat to rationalized rule; the populists as an obstacle to the expression of the general will. Yet all the critiques share certain common themes. These were, perhaps, most cogently and eloquently stated by Washington when he warned of "the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party" on the American system of government. Party, Washington said:

7. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, John Wiley, 1954), p. 426.

serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public administration.—It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection.—It opens the doors to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the Government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.[8]

Washington's remarks neatly express the four principal charges against parties which are made today. Parties promote corruption and administrative inefficiency. They split society against itself and promote conflict: parties, as Ayub Khan said, "divide and confuse the people." They encourage political instability and political weakness. They lay the state open to influence from and penetration by external powers: if freedom is given to party development, as one leader in a modernizing country said, at least one party will become the instrument of the CIA.

The arguments against parties betray the circumstances of their historical origin in the early phases of political modernization. They are, in fact, less arguments against parties than they are arguments against *weak* parties. Corruption, division, instability, and susceptibility to outside influence all characterize weak party systems rather than strong ones. They are, indeed, features of weak political systems generally, which lack stable and effective institutions of rule. Parties may indeed furnish incentives to corruption, but the development of a strong party substitutes an institutionalized public interest for fragmented private ones. In their early stages of development, parties appear as factions and seemingly exacerbate conflict and disunion, but as they develop strength parties become the buckle which binds one social force to another and which creates a basis for loyalty and identity transcending more parochial groupings. Similarly, by regularizing the procedures for leadership succession and for the assimilation of new groups into the political system, parties provide the basis for stability and orderly change rather than for instability. Finally, while weak parties may indeed become. the instruments of foreign powers, strong parties provide in large measure the institutional

8. Washington, "Farewell Address," in Ford, ed., *13*, *304*.

mechanisms and defenses for insulating the political system against such external influence. The evils attributed to party are, in reality, the attributes of a disorganized and fragmented politics of clique and faction which prevails when parties are nonexistent or still very weak. Their cure lies in political organization; and in a modernizing state political organization means party organization.

The widespread suspicion of parties, however, means that antiparty policies of prevention or suppression prevail in many modernizing states. In a highly traditional political system, the elites normally attempt to prevent the emergence of parties. Party organizations, like labor unions and peasant associations, are illegal. At times, in such systems, a relaxation of restrictions may allow certain forms of political association to come out in the open. But in most cases, the traditional ruler and traditional elite attempt to limit political groupings to intra-elite factions and cliques func tioning within the parliamentary assembly, if such exists, or within the bureaucracy. Thus in the 1960s parties still did not exist in Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and a few other generally minuscule surv'ving potentatedoms. In other traditional systems, such as Thailand and Iran, parties had had a frag ile existence at one point but were either currently illegal (Thailand) or severely restricted (Iran). In all these systems, as modernization progresses the need to organize political participation also increases. These systems, in some cases, display all the signs of contemporary stability, but the efforts of their governments to prevent the development of political parties make them presumptively unstable. The longer the organizational vacuum is maintained, the more explosive it becomes.

In most modernizing countries the government at one time or another follows a policy of suppression vis-à-vis parties. At some point, parties are allowed to be formed either within a traditional parliament or by groupings among the people. Or parties may develop in the struggle against colonial rule. At a subsequent stage, an effort may be made to reduce the amount of political power in the system and to restrict both political participation and the organizations associated with that participation. In a traditional system, such as Morocco, a monarch may reassert his authority after a period of fairly intense party development. More frequently, a military dictator assumes power after parties have become weak-

ened or fragmented and outlaws them, attempting to rule through purely administrative means. In most Latin American countries parties have been illegal at one time or another. In African and Asian countries where military coups overthrew civilian nationalist leaders after independence, parties were also generally proscribed. The suppression of parties usually accompanies substantial efforts to decrease the level of political consciousness and political activity. In Spain, for instance, the Falange was a useful means of mobilizing and organizing support for the rebel cause during and immediately after the Civil War. Subsequently, however, the Franco regime wished to promote political passivity rather than political participation and the Falange declined in importance as a result.

In countries where parties are suppressed, the social base usually exists for parties which are somewhat more than cliques or factions and which have roots in large and at times self-conscious social forces. Prolonged periods of party suppression hence generate forces which, when the authoritarian rule comes to an end, burst forth with explosive energy. A rapid escalation in political participation occurs with hitherto submerged or underground parties coming forth into daylight. The more unexpected the end of repressive rule, the more extensive and variegated the expansion of political participation.[9] This expansion then typically leads to a rightist reaction and the renewed efforts by conservative authoritarian groups to reduce political participation and restore a narrow-based political order.

The no-party state is the natural state for a traditional society. As society modernizes, however, the no-party state becomes increasingly the antiparty state. Conscious and coercive effort is required to prevent or to suppress political parties. Increasingly efforts are made to furnish party substitutes, to find techniques for organizing political participation in such a way as to minimize its expansive and disruptive consequences. The more hostile a government is toward political parties in a modernizing society, however, the greater the probable future instability of that society. Military coups are far more frequent in no-party states than in any other type of political system. A partyless regime is a conservative

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9. See Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in LaPalombara and Weiner, p. 400.

regime; an antiparty regime is a reactionary regime. The progress of modernization increases the fragility of the no-party system.

TABLE 7.1. Coups and Coup Attempts in Modernizing Countries
Since Independence

Type of	Number of	Countries with Coups	
Political System	Countries	Number	Per cent
Communist	3	0	0
One-party	18	2	11
One-party dominant	12	4	33
Two-party	11	5	45
Multiparty	22	15	68
No effective parties	17	14	83

Source: Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1964) , p. 65.

Strong Parties and Political Stability

The stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of its political parties. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has institutionalized mass support. Its strength reflects the scope of that support and the level of institutionalization. The modernizing countries which achieve high levels of actual and presumptive political stability possess at least one strong political party. Congress, Neo-Destour, Acción Democrática, Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mapai, Partido Popular Democrático, Republican People's Party, TANU: each was at one time a model of effective political organization in a modernizing society. The differences in political stability between India and Pakistan in the 1950s were measured by the differences in organizational strength between the Congress Party and the Moslem League. The differences in political stability between North and South Vietnam during the decade after Geneva were measured by the differences in organizational strength between the Lao Dong Party, on the one hand, and the Dai Viet, VNQDD, and Can Lao, on the other. The differences in political stability in the Arab world between Tunisia, on the one hand, and the eastern Mediterranean, on the other, were in large measure the difference between the broad scope and high institutionalization of Neo-Destour and the high institutionalization but narrow scope of the Ba'ath.

The susceptibility of a political system to military intervention

varies inversely with the strength of its political parties. Countries like Mexico and Turkey which developed strong political parties also found the road to reducing military involvement in their politics. The decline in party strength, the fragmentation of leadership, the evaporation of mass support, the decay of organizational structure, the shift of political leaders from party to bureaucracy, the rise of personalism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy the capitol. Military coups do not destroy parties; they ratify the deterioration which has already occurred. In the Dominican Republic, for instance, Juan Bosch's party "had begun to disintegrate" after the elections in which he was chosen president. As a result, the party "presented no challenge to the police and the armed forces. Most of the PRD leaders, it seems, had become bureaucrats, occupying themselves with technical and administrative functions essential to the reform program." [10] So also, violence, rioting, and other forms of political instability are more likely to occur in political systems without strong parties than in systems with them.

Most non-communist modernizing countries after World War II lacked both strong political parties and strong party systems. Most parties were too young to have demonstrated any real adaptability. The principal exceptions were several Latin American parties and the Congress Party in India. Otherwise, most parties were not only young but also still led by their founders. The institutional strength of a political party is measured, in the first instance, by its ability to survive its founder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to power. The adaptability of the Congress Party was reflected in its changing leadership from Banerjea and Besant to Gokhale and Tilak to Gandhi and Nehru. Similarly the shift in leadership from Calles to Cárdenas set the National Revolutionary Party on the road to successful institutionalization, signaled by its subsequent change in name to the Institutional Revolutionary Party. The institutional strength of Mapai was measured by the fact that it was able to survive not only Ben Gurion's desertion but also his active opposition. Here clearly was a case where the party was stronger than its leader. In Puerto Rico Muñoz Marin, in contrast to Ben Gurion, consciously chose to retire from the leadership of the PPD in part to promote its institu-

10. Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents*, p. 61.

tionalization: "The election was a beginning," he said. "I've begun to prove that the Island can get along without me. The people will get used to the idea of an institutionalized party and they will learn to work with Sánchez just as they have worked with me."[11] On the other hand, weak parties depend upon their leaders. The deaths shortly after the independence of their countries of Senanayake in Ceylon, of Jinnah and Ali Khan in Pakistan, and of Aung San in Burma directly hastened the disintegration of their political parties. That the deaths of Gandhi and Patel in India had no such effect on the Congress was not due just to Nehru.

A second aspect of party strength is organizational complexity and depth, particularly as revealed by the linkages between the party and social-economic organizations such as labor unions and peasant associations. In Tunisia, Morocco, Venezuela, India, Israel, Mexico, Jamaica, Peru, Chile, and a few other countries, such linkages greatly extended the appeal and bolstered the organization of the major parties. They also created the usual problems in the relations between functional organizations and political ones, and the degree of association between party and union or league varied from almost complete integration to loose ad hoc alliances. To the extent, of course, that the party became identified with the organized expression of only a single social force, it tended to lose its own identity and to become the creature of that social group. In the stronger parties, the leadership of unions and other functional groups was subordinated to the leadership of the party, and the area of political decisions was carefully reserved for the party leadership. Most parties in modernizing countries, however, did not have such supporting organizational links. In most cases they were unable to develop mass appeals to workers and peasants; in some instances, the parties or individual leaders within the parties did have such appeals, but they did not develop the organizational and institutional framework for organizing mass support.

A third aspect of party strength concerns the extent to which political activists and power seekers identify with the party and the extent to which they simply view the party as a means to other ends. The party's competitors for the loyalty of political actors

11. Luis Muñoz Marín, *New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1964, p. 43.

may be traditional social groupings, the bureaucracy, or other parties. Conservative parties, for instance, typically place greater reliance on social structure and ascriptive relationships and hence develop a less autonomous and less highly articulated organization than more radical parties which reject or attack the existing social structure. There is, as Philip Converse has suggested, "an increasingly *overt* stress on group loyalty and cohesion *per se* as one moves from right to left across party spectra in most political systems." [12]

In many modernizing countries after independence political leaders may transfer their loyalty from nationalist party to governmental bureaucracy. In effect this represents their ideological subversion by colonial norms and their political conversion from popular to administrative rule. In many African countries the nationalist party was the single important modern organization to exist before independence. The party "was generally well organized. The conditions of the political struggle and the dedication of the top elite to the party as the prime instrument of political change led the elite to give the major portion of their energies and resources to building a solid, responsive organization capable of disciplined action in response to directives from the top and able to ferret out and exploit feelings of dissatisfaction among the masses for political ends." [13] After independence, however, the dominant political party is often weakened by the many competing demands on organizational resources. A marked dispersion of resources means a decline in the overall level of political institutionalization. "Talents that once were available for the crucial work of party organization," one observer has warned, "may now be preoccupied with running a ministry or government bureau. . . . Unless new sources of loyal organizational and administrative talents can be found immediately, the party's organization—and, therefore, the major link between the regime and the masses—is likely to be weakened." [14] In these situations identification with

12. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, The Free Press, 1964), pp. 248–49; italics in original.

13. William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York, Atherton Press, 1963), p. 121.

14. Ibid., pp. 123–24.

the party was only a transitory phenomenon, undermined by the attraction of governmental office.

In highly developed political systems it is rare for a political leader to shift from one party to another and the movement of social groups and classes from one party to another is usually a complex and lengthy historical process. In some modernizing systems, however, the interparty movement of individuals and groups is highly prevalent. In the Philippines, for instance, political leaders regularly shift back and forth between the two major parties. Local leaders typically join the party which wins the national election, and national leaders shift from one party to the other party in terms of their own electoral prospects. "You know how it is here," as one leader said, "It is not the same as in Great Britain or the United States. We have only private interests, no party loyalties. We change parties when it suits our interests. Everybody does it." [15] The constancy of the party name thinly veils constantly changing coalitions of political leaders operating beneath it.

Processes of Party Development

A strong political party system has the capability, first, to expand participation through the system and thus to preempt or to divert anomic or revolutionary political activity, and, second, to moderate and channel the participation of newly mobilized groups in such a manner as not to disrupt the system. A strong party system thus provides the institutionalized organizations and procedures for the assimilation of new groups into the system. The development of such party institutions is the prerequisite for political stability in modernizing countries. The process of party development usually evolves through four phases: factionalism, polarization, expansion, and institutionalization.

Factionalism. In the first phase both political participation and political institutionalization are low. Individuals and groups break out of the traditional patterns of political behavior, but they have not yet developed modern political organizations. Politics involves a small number of people competing with each other in a large number of weak, transitory alliances and groupings. The groupings have little durability and no structure. They are typically the

15. Quoted in Caridad C. Semaña, "Some Political Aspects of Philippine Economic Development After Independence" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), p. 166.

projections of individual ambitions in the context of personal and family rivalries and affiliations. These political groupings may be called parties, but they lack the continuing organization and social support which are the essence of party. Reports that 42 parties exist in Korea or 29 in South Vietnam or 18 in Pakistan are false on their face. Such groupings are, in fact, factions, and they closely resemble the political cliques, juntos, factions, and family groupings which dominated eighteenth-century politics in Europe and America. In American state politics in the 1780s,

> a faction appeared as a portion of an electorate, political elite, or legislature whose adherents were engaged in parallel action or coordination of some consistency but limited durability in conflict with other portions. A clique . . . was a factional group whose relationships depended upon a family, a commanding individual, or a close coterie of personal associates: generally the demise or retirement of the focal person led to the collapse of the clique. . . . Such politics depended heavily on personalities and personal ties and was subject to abrupt, kaleidoscopic change.[16]

Similar patterns predominated in most twentieth-century modernizing countries. In the 1950s, for instance, in Pakistan,

> The political party . . . became the vehicle for politicians' personal political careers. New parties were formed when a career seemed to be making no progress in an old party. A party would be founded by a leader or group of leaders who then tried to organize a following. Some parties were formed almost entirely from among members of legislatures and constituted, in effect, a temporary grouping within an assembly for the purpose of making or breaking a ministry.[17]

Similarly, in Thailand, the parties, when they exist, "have little or no extra-parliamentary organization. In general, each member must get elected through his own efforts in his own province. Party labels are incidental. Parties have never represented sub-

16. William N. Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963) , p. 26.

17. Keith Callard, *Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959) , pp. 24-25.

stantial social forces but only cliques and individuals within the top level of the ruling class." [18]

In political systems with legislatures the factions are oriented to maneuvering in the legislature rather than to campaigning in the constituency. They are parliamentary not electoral organizations. Typically they are formed within the legislature by successful candidates after they are elected rather than in the constituency by aspiring candidates in order to get elected. Candidates are elected as individuals on the basis of their social or economic status and appeal. The legislative faction or clique then becomes a means of linking them to other political activists, not a means of linking political activists to the masses. In Korea after World War II, for instance, candidates were elected as individuals and joined parties after they arrived in Seoul for the national assembly. The parties "originated in the capital as factions providing alternate—and opportunistically shifting—ladders to executive power." Even in a country like Nigeria, with the colonial stimulus to party development, most candidates elected to the legislatures in the 1951 elections ran as independents and only joined the NCNC or the Action Group after they took their seats.[19]

The legislative clique is thus one form of preparty faction typical of the early phases of modernization. In the absence of legislatures and elections the dominant form of preparty faction becomes the revolutionary conspiracy. As with the legislative cliques, these conspiracies are small in size, weak in viability, and many in number. Like the cliques they are also initially divorced from ties with any substantial social force. The intellectuals and others in them form and re-form in a confusing series of permutations and combinations which are no less factions for being equipped with ponderous names and lengthy manifestos. They are the civilian equivalents of the secret juntas and clubs formed by military officers intent on challenging the existing traditional order. If eighteenth-century England furnishes the prototype of the politics of legislative factions, nineteenth-century Russia furnishes the prototype of the politics of revolutionary factions. And the differ-

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18. David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 68.

19. Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, p. 288; David Abernethy, "Education and Politics in a Developing Society: The Southern Nigerian Experience" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), p. 331.

ences between the two, while great, are not fundamental. In one case factions function within the existing system, in the other outside it. But in both cases the amount of power in the factional pattern is very limited and what there is is highly fragmented.

Like no-party politics, factional or preparty politics is inherently conservative. The revolutionary factions may talk of the masses and may, indeed, make some efforts to mobilize mass support. But the conditions are simply not yet ripe. Like the Narodniki they are rebuffed by the very groups whose interests they wish to further. Consequently they remain as isolated in their cellars as the legislative factions are in their chambers. In and of itself the competition of factions—legislative or revolutionary—tends to be a closed system, an endless round of interminable maneuvering in which the actors continually shift partners and antagonists without ever enlarging the number of participants.

Polarization. A crucial turning point in the evolution of a political system occurs when politics breaks out of the closed circle of revolutionary or legislative factionalism, political participation broadens, new social forces appear on the political scene, and political parties are formed by the organized linking of political faction to social force. Before this "breakout" or "take-off" in party development can occur, however, the pattern of factional politics itself has to change so as to produce the incentives for factional leaders to expand political participation. So long as a multiplicity of groups compete with each other, little reason exists for any one of them to attempt to expand political participation. The key to success in the struggle between one faction and another lies in the appeal to other factions. Without an overriding cleavage to bifurcate the political arena, each faction tries to overcome its opponents of today by alliances with its opponents of yesterday. A multiplicity of groups and a multiplicity of cleavages leads the actors to devise strategies for the redistribution of power within the system rather than for the expansion of the power of the system.

The accomplishment of the latter depends upon factional coalescence and polarization, which, in turn, depend upon either the cumulation of cleavages in such a manner as to divide the factions into two reasonably stable groupings or the emergence of a single dominant issue which overshadows all others and consequently also tends to polarize the political participants. Once all the prin-

cipal actors in the political system are committed to one side or another of a two-sided struggle, the leaders of each side are under strong compulsion to expand the scope of the struggle and to mobilize additional social forces into politics on their side.

The crucial issue then becomes: Under what situations does a closed system of multiple cleavages shift to an expansible system of polarized cleavage? Clearly the strongest incentives toward polarization exist where some factions are intent on the complete destruction of the existing system. Once the opposition or revolutionary factions themselves cease to struggle with each other and instead direct their attention to the existing political system, the stage is set for a polarization of politics between the revolutionaries and the establishment. It is also possible, however, for dominant cleavages to appear among legislative factions. These may well have their roots in attitudes toward the traditional sources of authority: Whig versus Tory, the king's men reacting to the proponents of popular rule. In addition, as society modernizes, the demands on government increase, and the proper economic policies to be followed by the government in response to these demands tend to become the dominant issue of politics. The introduction of a Hamiltonian program of economic modernization into a politics of legislative factionalism can hardly help but provoke a polarization of opinion and a coalescence of factions. The coalition of factions within the political system may also be prompted by the emergence of a social force outside the system and demanding entrance into it. In this case the dominant issue of politics becomes the relation of the new social force to the political system.

Writers on politics make much of the desirability of crosscutting cleavages which moderate the intensity of conflict within a society. Such a pattern is, indeed, a condition of political stability. And the polarization of politics, we have argued in Chapter 5, is the goal of the revolutionary. It involves the intensification of political conflict. In a modernizing society, however, this intensification of conflict may be the precondition to the creation of a broader based political system. If it can be handled through the extension of the competition of groups already within the system, the revolution may be a peaceful one. A broadly mobilized system with fairly widespread popular participation requires cross-cutting cleavages to prevent it from being torn apart by the struggle be-

tween two overpowering mass movements who between them command the allegiance of almost the entire population. In a society where only a small proportion of the population is politically active, however, the polarization of opinion and the cumulation of cleavages play a much more functional role. They promote the extension of political participation and the establishment of links between the political factions and rising social forces. In one form or another, the polarization of opinion is a prerequisite for the shift from factional politics to party politics.

Expansion. A strong party appeals to large masses of the population and binds those masses to it through an effective organization. Political leaders are motivated to develop such appeals and to create such organizational bonds only when these actions are necessary to achieve highly desired goals. These goals are normally the conquest of power and the reordering of society. The expansion of participation and the organizing of that participation in parties is thus the product of intense political struggle. This struggle normally involves the efforts of political leaders either to overthrow the existing system, to control the existing system, or to enter the existing system.

In the revolutionary or nationalist pattern the aim of the political activists is to destroy the established order or to oust the imperial power. The revolutionary or nationalist leaders are driven to the continual broadening of their political appeal in their effort to build up popular support against the existing regime. They are similarly driven to organize that support and as a result they create a political party or parties. All revolutions, as we have seen, involve the expansion of political participation and successful revolutions produce strong political parties to organize that participation. Prolonged struggles for national independence have similar results. The nationalist leaders initially function simply as a number of factions on the outskirts of the imperial administration. In this stage they are frequently beset by a variety of alternative and conflicting goals: assimilation, participation, home-rule, the restoration of traditional authority, full-scale independence, all compete with each other. In due course, however, the issues simplify, the factions coalesce, and the now "unified" nationalist movement begins to develop a broader popular appeal. The factions which are unwilling to appeal to the masses are brushed aside by those who are. Through nationalist struggle participation is expanded

and organization developed. This period of incubation of parties during colonial rule requires an imperial power which is willing to permit and to contend with a nationalist movement for many years, thus furnishing the time, the struggle, and the slowly increasing responsibility which are the ingredients of institution-building. In general, however, colonial governments tend to suppress nationalist movements for as long as possible, and then when they see independence as inevitable to bring it about as quickly as possible. National independence, in short, may abort political development.

In the pattern of party development more typical of the West, parliamentary factions operating within the political system coalesced into broader groupings and then began to mobilize new supporters into politics. The shift from factional politics to party politics and the increasing competition between parties was directly related to the increases in political participation.[20] This pattern in which two groups of leaders within the existing system take the lead in expanding the system involves the least discontinuity in political evolution. The entry of new social forces into the system is made more acceptable by the proper sponsorship under which it occurs. The expansion of participation can be lasting, however, and the organizations which are established effective, only if they are the product of competitive struggle. Strong one-party systems are always the product of nationalist or revolutionary movements from below which had to fight for power. In contrast, efforts to establish one-party systems from above, as in the case of Nasser, lead nowhere: mobilization and organization are processes for acquiring or building power. Authoritarian leaders in power normally lack the need to do either. Precisely for this reason, General Pak succeeded in doing in Korea what Colonel Nasser failed to do in Egypt. Paradoxically, two-party systems can be built from the top down; one-party systems only from the bottom up.

The competitive struggle to expand participation and organize parties may also develop from the efforts of a social force to enter the political system. In this case, the social force normally creates a political party which functions initially outside or on the fringes of the political system and then attempts to penetrate the system. Many of the socialist parties in western Europe followed this pat-

20. See, e.g., the American experience discussed in Chambers, pp. 32–33.

tern as have several parties in Latin America. This challenge to the existing system often stimulates the factional leaders and traditional leaders to coalesce in opposition to the new threat. Organization from below stimulates organization above, the result consequently tending to be a multi-party system in which each major social force has its own political vehicle. Since members of the political elite play a less significant role in promoting the expansion of political participation, the process is likely to involve more violence and conflict than in the case where established leaders compete among themselves in expanding participation.

Institutionalization. The way in which political participation is expanded obviously shapes the party system which subsequently develops. The antisystem revolutionary or nationalist process eventually results in the displacement of the former political system and the establishment of a new one with typically a one-party or dominant-party system. The intrasystem process most often leads to the early institutionalization of a two-party system, while the into-system process is likely to eventuate in the emergence of a multiparty system. Once these patterns are established in the early phases of party development, they tend to become institutionalized. Subsequent changes in the nature of the party system usually occur only as result of a major crisis or fundamental change in the nature of the society.

In a one-party system the processes determining governmental policy and political leadership function almost exclusively through the framework of a single party. Minor parties may exist but they are so minor as not to exert any significant influence upon what goes on within the major party. In the mid-twentieth century one-party systems included the communist states, authoritarian regimes like Franco's Spain and Nationalist China, Tunisia, Mexico, and at one point or another almost all the African states south of the Sahara. In a dominant-party system only one party has the capacity to govern, but two or more opposition parties, usually representing more specialized social forces, are sufficiently strong so that they can affect the political process which goes on within the dominant party. The dominant party, in short, does not monopolize politics; it must, in some measure, be responsive to other groups of political actors. At one time or another dominant-party systems existed in India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, South Korea, Pakistan, and several African states.

A two-party system may have majority and minority parties, but it differs from a dominant-party system in that the minority party commands enough of the opposition to constitute a feasible alternative government. The dominant party in a dominant-party system may well command the support of less than a majority of the electorate, but fragmentation of other political groups leaves it in a dominating position. In the 1950s the Christian Democrats in Germany usually got a larger proportion of the total vote than the Congress Party got in India. Yet the Indian system was a dominant-party system because there was no major alternative to the Congress Party, while the SPD did constitute a feasible alternative to the Christian Democrats. Minor parties usually exist in two-party systems and, indeed, their existence is encouraged by the possibility of achieving a balance-of-power position between the two major parties. The distinctive characteristic of such a system, however, is that only two parties are capable of constituting a government.

Finally, in a multiparty system no party by itself is able either to form a government or to stand head and shoulders above its rivals. Some parties are bigger than others but the creation of a government requires a coalition of several parties and several different coalitions conceivably could be the basis of a government. In this situation parties may move back and forth from government to opposition as a result not of any change in their standing with the electorate but of changes in the attitudes and ambitions of their leaders. The line between a multiparty system and a dominant-party system often is hazy, and one reasonably common intermediate pattern is where one party is sufficiently larger than the others and located sufficiently in the center of the political spectrum so that it must be included in the government coalition. This was for years the case with Mapai in Israel and with the Christian Democrats in Italy.

Adaptability of Party Systems

Writers on politics have spent much time and many words arguing about the relative merits of one-party systems and competitive party systems for modernizing countries. In terms of political development, however, what counts is not the number of parties but rather the strength and adaptability of the party system. The precondition of political stability is a party system capable of assimi-

lating the new social forces produced through modernization. From this viewpoint, the number of parties is important only insofar as it affects the ability of the system to provide the institutional channels necessary for political stability. The question consequently is: What connection, if any, is there between party number and party strength in modernizing countries?

On a global basis little relationship appears to exist between party number and party strength. As Table 7.2 suggests, strong parties and weak parties may exist in each type of numerical party system. The rough and impressionistic classification of this table is apparently confirmed in Table 7.3 by the Banks and Textor breakdown of party stability in relation to party number. The absence of unstable one-party systems might well have been corrected if allowance had been made for the African states which fell victims to military coups in the 1960s.

This apparent evidence of no significant correlation between party number and party strength does not, however, tell the entire story. The relation between the two varies with the level of modernization. At high levels of modernization, any number of parties

TABLE 7.2. Party Strength and Party Number

Strength of Parties	Number of Parties			
	ONE	DOMINANT	TWO	MULTI
Strong	Communist Tunisia Mexico	India	Great Britain Germany	Low Countries Scandinavia Italy
	Taiwan	Malaya South Korea	United States	Israel Chile Venezuela
			Uruguay Jamaica	Peru
	Guinea Tanganyika Liberia		Ceylon	Argentina
			Philippines	Brazil
		Somalia? Bolivia?	Colombia Honduras	Other Central American
Weak	Other African			

may be compatible with strong parties. At lower levels of modern-
ization, one-party systems may be either strong or weak. Multi-
party systems, however, are invariably weak. The eleven stable
multiparty systems in the Banks and Textor accounting, for in-
stance, include Israel plus ten Western European countries; the
two moderately stable multiparty systems are Italy and Costa Rica;
the thirteen unstable multiparty systems include nine from Latin
America, two from Asia, and one each from the Middle East and
Africa. In short, no stable multiparty system existed in a mod-
ernizing country with the questionable exception of Israel.

TABLE 7.3. Party Stability and Party Number

Number of Parties	Degree of Stability			
	STABLE	MODERATELY STABLE	UNSTABLE	TOTAL
One party	19	4	0	23
Dominant party	2	4	3	9
One-and-a-half party	2	0	0	2
Two party	7	0	2	9
Multiparty	11	2	13	26
Total	41	10	18	69

Source: Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge,
M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 97–98, 101.

In modernizing states one-party systems tend to be more stable
than pluralistic party systems. Modernizing states with multiparty
systems are, for instance, much more prone to military interven-
tion than modernizing states with one party, with one dominant
party, or with two parties. In 1965 and 1966, to be sure, many
African states succumbed to military coups. These did not, how-
ever, alter the basic picture of the inverse relationship between
party number and party stability. As the data in Table 7.4 indi-
cate, as of 1966, one-party modernizing states still were least likely
to suffer successful coups and multiparty modernizing states were
most likely. Clearly a one-party system is no guarantee against a
military coup; but multiparty systems are almost sure to produce a
coup. The only exceptions were one borderline case (Morocco)
which did suffer a royal coup d'etat in 1965 reinstituting monar-
chial rule and two highly Europeanized countries (Israel, Chile)
in which recent or past emigration plus historical tradition repro-

duced the more stable multiparty patterns of continental Europe.

One rough measure of the adaptability of a party system is to be found in the average age of its constituent parties. The higher the average age of the parties, presumably the more institutionalized and stable is the party system. In general, of course, the average age of the principal parties in a multiparty system is lower than that of those in a single-party or two-party system. It is possible,

TABLE 7.4. Successful Coups in Modernizing Countries:
1945 or Date of Independence through 1966

	Number of Countries	Countries with Coups Number	Per cent
One-party systems	26	6	25%
Dominant-party systems	18	6	33%
Two-party systems	16	7	44%
Multiparty systems	20	17	85%

however, to compare the forms which high levels of party institutionalization assume in modernizing countries and in modernized countries. A rough division between the former and the latter can be made in terms of literacy with the line drawn at 70 per cent adult literacy. Among the 29 countries with high literacy and old parties (a major party age index of 30 years or more in 1966), no one type of party system predominated. In highly literate societies highly institutionalized party systems can take a variety of forms. In contrast ten of the sixteen countries with low levels of literacy which had highly institutionalized party systems had one-party or dominant-party systems. Six had two-party systems, and none had multiparty systems. Again it would appear that a multiparty system is incompatible with a high level of political institutionalization and political stability in a modernizing country. In modernizing countries multiparty systems are weak party systems.

The reasons for this situation are to be found in the different patterns of adaptation of the numerical party systems and the different forms that party strength assumes in those systems. In a multiparty system strong parties are normally more coherent, more complexly organized, but less flexible and less autonomous than are strong parties in a two-party system. In a strong multiparty system a one-to-one relationship tends to exist between social forces and political parties. Labor, business, landowners, urban middle class, the church, all have their own political vehicles, and

institutionalized means of compromise and adaptation have developed among them. Such a strong system can exist only with a high level of mobilization and political participation. If the latter are limited, the social forces active in politics are limited, and the social base for a strong multiparty system thus does not exist. If a multiparty system does exist in these circumstances it typically reflects differences of clique and family within a restricted elite. The

TABLE 7.5. Institutionalized Party Systems
(Major Party Age Index of 30 or more in 1966)

Level of Literacy	Type of system				
	ONE-PARTY	DOMINANT-PARTY	TWO-PARTY	MULTI-PARTY	TOTAL
70% or over	8	0	9	12	29
Below 70%	9	1	6	0	16
Total	17	1	15	12	45

poor institutionalization and narrow support for the parties in such a multiparty system makes that system extremely fragile. The step from many parties to no parties and from no parties to many parties, consequently, is an easy one. In their institutional weakness the no-party system and the multiparty system closely resemble each other.

The ability of different types of party system to adapt and to expand political participation, however, may well vary over time. The crucial question concerns the extent to which the system institutionalizes procedures for assimilating new groups into the system. On this issue the evidence suggests that two-party systems and dominant-party systems, because they have more effective party competition, are likely to produce greater long-run political stability than either one-party systems or multiparty systems.

The stability of the one-party system derives more from its origins than from its character. It is usually the product of a nationalist or revolutionary struggle which stimulates extensive mobilization and institutionalization. Once the struggle is won, however, the strong party which emerges creates a one-party system, which, in turn, removes or eliminates the conditions for its own success. The continuing stability of the system thus depends upon its inheritance from the past. The more intense and prolonged the struggle for power and the deeper its ideological commitment, the greater the political stability of the one-party system which is sub-

sequently created. One-party systems that emerge out of revolutions, consequently, are more stable than those produced by nationalist movements, and those produced by prolonged nationalist movements are more stable than those produced by movements whose struggles were brief and easy. In general, indeed, the longer a nationalist party fought for independence, the longer it was able to enjoy the power that came with independence. The Congress Party was 62 years old when independence came to India; the Neo-Destour 22 years old at the birth of Tunisia; Mapai 18 years old when Israel fought its way into the world. TANU and its predecessor had a 32-year history when Tanganyika became independent. All these parties were able to maintain a fairly vital existence in the years after independence.

In contrast, many of the nationalist parties which came into being only a few years before independence and which won independence easily had a less secure grasp on power after independence. Many African nations got independence so easily, as Emerson pointed out, that they were "cheated of their revolution." [21] Denied their revolution, they may also be denied the fruits of revolution. The prospects for political stability in Guinea appeared higher than in most of the other former French colonies in large part because the leaders of the PDG had to mobilize their followers for the struggle with France before independence and to endure the hostility of France after independence. Hostility by a colonial government toward a new government may well be a major benefit to the new government. It is also a factor whose absence cannot be fully compensated for by ritualistic incantations about neocolonialism.

In a one-party system, clearly, a new group can enter the system only by entering the party. A one-party system is, in this sense, less complex than a pluralistic party system, and consequently fewer avenues exist for the assimilation of new social forces. The political leaders of the system can hence exercise a high degree of control over the mobilization of new groups into the system. They are under no competitive impetus to broaden their appeal and to bring new groups into politics in order to stay in power. Their capacity to restrict or to control political mobilization enhances their ability to provide for the "horizontal" integration of ethnic, religious, or regional groups. In a competitive party system, in

21. Rupert Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa," in Deutsch and Foltz, pp. 110–11.

contrast, strong incentives exist for each party to appeal to a particular group, ethnic and religious animosities are fanned by the mobilization of the masses, and the competition of the parties deepens and reinforces preexisting social cleavages.

Sustained modernization, however, poses problems for the stability of one-party systems. The strength of the party derives from its struggle for power. Once in power, what incentives does it have to maintain a high level of mobilization and organization? It can coast for a while on its inheritance from the past; to the extent that it has institutionalized high levels of participation and organization, it may be able to do this for some time. By its very nature, however, it lacks the stimulus to struggle which provides a continuing basis for political stability. For a while this impetus may come from the gap between the party and society. The ideology of the party leaders usually commits them to a thoroughgoing reconstruction of society. So long as traditional structures stand or islands of resistance remain, a stimulus exists to develop the strength and organization of the party. The party may, like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, devote itself to undermining the traditional sources of power, wealth, and status, and replacing them with structures clearly of its own making and clearly under its own control. If it thus reorders society, however, it deprives itself of social enemies to justify its existence. If, as more often happens, its ideological drive falters and it comes to terms with the society it governs, then it is likewise deprived of a raison d'être.

In the long run the struggle between the party and the groups which exist outside the political system or in a different political system (an imperial power, a traditional oligarchy) has to be institutionalized within the political system. The rationale for a one-party system, however, is often grounded on the desire to deny the existence of differences and to reassert the necessity for eliminating the struggle. The continued vitality of a one-party system thus depends upon the existence of a phenomenon which is anathema to the leaders of the system. In the absence of competition among parties, the closest functional substitute which the one-party system provides is the competition between the party hierarchy and the state bureaucratic hierarchy. The preconditions for such competition, however, are (a) that the two hierarchies remain distinct, and (b) that some rough balance of power exist between

them. The struggle between the two, moreover, is a struggle between two institutions which are functionally different rather than functionally identical. Consequently, the patterns and results of the struggle resemble more those of the rivalry between executive and legislature in a presidential system of government than the rivalry between two political parties.

In the 1920s single-party systems came into being in both Turkey and Mexico. The Mexican system, as the product of a social revolution, originally mobilized a much broader segment of the rural population than was mobilized through the Turkish system which was the product of a more restricted nationalist movement. After 1946, however, Turkey shifted to a two-party system, and, as a result, the scope of popular participation, particularly rural participation, in the system broadened tremendously. In the two decades before 1946 the Mexican system was much more responsive to the needs of the rural majority than was the Turkish single-party system. In the two decades after 1946, however, the situation was reversed, and the Turkish two-party system was more responsive to the demands of the rural majority than the Mexican one-party system. Revolutionary élan waned in Mexico at the same time that the competition for peasant votes intensified in Turkey.

In addition to making the leaders of a one-party system less sensitive to the needs to expand and organize participation in the system, modernization also multiplies and diversifies the groups seeking to participate in the system. If the party leaders attempt to absorb the new groups within the framework of the single party, they achieve comprehensiveness at the price of weakening the unity, the discipline, and the élan of the party. If they exclude new groups from the party, they maintain party coherence at the price of endangering the party's monopoly of political participation and encouraging anomic and violent political behavior directed at the overthrow of the system itself. Those one-party systems which are most successful in assimilating additional social forces often tend to develop a formal or informal pattern of sectoral organization, such as exists in the Mexican PRI. If they are unable to assimilate additional social forces within the party, either the one-party system ceases to exist (as in Turkey after 1946) or the system is maintained at the price of increasing coercion and increasing instability.

The strength of a single-party system stems from its struggle against an imperial power, a traditional regime, a conservative society. Its weakness stems from the absence of institutionalized competition within the political system. Presumably a multiparty system provides this in good measure, and consequently multiparty systems should be strong party systems. Yet we have seen that this is true only in highly modernized societies where a large number of social forces have been mobilized into politics. In modernizing societies multiparty systems are weak party systems, yet party competition is supposed to produce party strength. How can this apparent contradiction be explained? The answer, of course, lies in the fact that party competitiveness and party number are not directly related. Party competition is obviously impossible in a single-party system, but it is also likely to be less in a multiparty system than in a dominant-party or two-party system. In the latter systems the leaders of parties actively compete with each other in mobilizing the voters. In a two-party system one party wins and the other party loses, and hence each party has the strongest incentive to outdo the other in mobilizing and organizing voters. In a dominant-party system, the leaders of the dominant party also have the incentive to minimize their losses to the minor parties.

In a multiparty system, on the other hand, party competition tends to be less prevalent. In a weak multiparty system in which parties are just emerging from factions, the large number of groupings precludes any effective mobilizing appeal. In multiparty systems where the parties are more solidly rooted in social forces, each party normally has its own constituency and makes intensive efforts to mobilize that constituency but party competition for the support of the same groups is less than in the two-party or dominant-party system. Each party tends to have a fixed block of voters who support it regularly, are firmly identified with the party, and are generally impervious to the appeals of other parties. Assimilation of a new social force into the multiparty system hence normally requires the creation of a new party. The system as a whole is adaptable, but its components are not. Consequently, parties rise and fall over time with changes in the social structure and composition of the politically active population. When it first appears each new party seems like a harbinger of progress and reform because it embodies the interests of a newly

emerging social force. Once it has achieved a position within the political system, however, it changes as its constituency changes, and it eventually becomes the spokesman for vested interests. The party system mirrors society only too well and its component parties possess little autonomy from the social forces with which they are affiliated. Thus in Peru, the Apristas were the reform party of the 1930s, but a strangely conservative party in the 1960s. Peruvian society had changed, but they had not changed with it and they were still representing the same interests they had thirty years earlier. As a result, the way was opened for the rise of a new reform party appealing to the progressive middle class.

Party competition is usually justified in terms of democracy, responsible government, and majority rule. It can also, however, be justified in terms of the value of political stability. Electoral competition between parties tends to expand political participation and at the same time to strengthen party organization. Party competition of this sort enhances the likelihood that new social forces which develop political aspirations and political consciousness will be mobilized into the system rather than against the system.

In a dominant-party system the assimilation of new social forces typically goes through two phases. The new group first expresses its claims on the political system through a minor party which is primarily or exclusively devoted to those interests. In due course, the growth in the votes of the minor party causes the dominant party to adjust its policies and practices and to attempt to absorb the leaders and supporters of the minor party into its own framework. In a dominant party system, the leaders of the minor parties cannot hope to win control of the government, but they can hope to deny it effectively or comfortably to the dominant party. Consequently, the political appeals and activity of the dominant party are directed primarily toward countering the appeals of its strongest opponent of the moment. If the movement of opinion is to the left, the dominant party shifts in that direction to minimize the gains by the left-wing minority parties. If opinion shifts in another direction, the dominant party responds in a similar manner. The minor parties have their own specialized appeals and hence do not normally compete with each other. Each instead competes in its own way with the dominant party.

In India the grievances of particular regions have often been initially expressed through minor parties or through nonparty

movements, but the Congress Party has then often absorbed the active protagonists of these grievances into its own structure. In Israel elections typically pivot about the struggle between Mapai and its most important opponent of the moment, with Mapai adapting its strategy and appeals to minimize the strength of that opposition. In the regional elections in Nigeria a somewhat similar pattern tended to develop in the 1950s. In 1957, for instance, the NCNC won 64 out of 84 seats in the parliament of the Eastern Region despite strong Catholic opposition on the educational issue. Independent candidates, however, received almost 20 per cent of the total vote; the leadership of the NCNC responded to this challenge by appointing Catholics to five of the fourteen positions in the regional cabinet although only one Catholic was in the cabinet before the election. In a dominant-party system, new groups thus first express their demands through a party of pressure and then are absorbed into the party of consensus.[22] If they are not assimilated into the dominant party, they may still function as permanent parties of pressure on the periphery of the major party. The dominant party system thus provides safety valves for the expression of the discontent of particularistic groups and at the same time strong incentives for the assimilation of such groups into the dominant party if they appear to have a popular appeal.

The pressures for the expansion of political participation are normally more intense in a two-party system than in any other type of system. The party out of power has the obvious incentive to mobilize new voters into the political system to outflank its opponent. In Uruguay, for instance, the rivalry between Colorados and Blancos was, in part, responsible for the early and, for Latin America, unprecedented incorporation of the urban working classes into the political system in the first part of the twentieth century. By mobilizing this group Batlle insured the dominance of the Colorado Party for the next half century. The problem in the two-party system, indeed, is that participation may expand so rapidly as to introduce serious cleavages into the system. Groups may be mobilized but not assimilated. An "excess of democracy" and "increased popular participation" in government may, as David Donald argued with respect to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, erode the power of government and its capa-

22. These terms are from Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 'System' in India," *Asian Survey*, *4* (December 1964), 1161 ff. See also Abernethy, pp. 482–89.

bility "to deal with issues requiring subtle understanding and delicate handling." [23] In twentieth-century modernizing countries, the rapid entrance of new groups into politics as a result of two-party competition has at times led to military coups in an effort to restrict participation and restore unity.

The tendencies toward the rapid expansion of political participation which inhere in a two-party system at times provoke deliberate attempts to limit this expansion. In Colombia, for instance, the two parties for long consciously maintained a limited competition restricted to members of the political elite. In the 1930s this pattern was challenged by the need to respond to the popular pressures for economic improvement. In the late 1940s the system broke down with the spread of decentralized violence and the emergence of a military dictator. That dictator, Rojas Pinilla, tried to do what the democratic system had been unable to do: to promote social reform and to identify new groups with the political system. Rojas, one observer wrote, "turned the clock forward on social achievement for the masses. He gave them status and a sense of their importance, if only because his government has emphasized their welfare. . . . In this sense, paradoxically, the military dictator is making a substantial contribution toward democracy." [24] In 1958, however, Rojas was thrown out, and the party leaders came to an explicit agreement to limit competition between them. The presidency would be alternated between Liberal and Conservative parties, and membership in the cabinet and Congress would be divided equally between them. In the words of another expert, using the same figure of speech, in 1958, "The party leaders seemed, in many respects . . . to be turning the political clock back to 1930, to an Athenian type of democracy, to conditions prevailing before the left wing of the liberal party attempted to win support from groups outside the elite." [25] The result of this agreement was a marked decline in voting and the rise of new movements and political forces, including a revived Rojas party, appealing to those whom the established parties were ignoring because they were not competing.

23. David Donald, *An Excess of Democracy* (Inaugural Lecture, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960) , p. 17.
24. Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930–1956* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957) , pp. 316–17.
25. Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1960) , p. 89.

"The natural movement of societies," says Duverger in one of his most quoted and most criticized dicta, "tends toward the two-party system." [26] In fact, however, whatever "naturalness" a two-party system may have stems not from the nature or movement of societies, but from the nature of the political system. Opinion may well crystallize "round two opposed poles," but it may also be highly fragmented, and the large number and diverse character of social forces in modernizing and modern societies would appear to make a multiparty system far more natural than a two-party system. The crucial bipolarity among groups and social forces which develops in a highly institutionalized political system is between those who are in or close to power and those who are removed from power. The "natural" distinction is furnished by the division of the political system into government and opposition. If the political system is weak, lacking authority, and not highly institutionalized, this difference is not very great, and hence the impetus toward a two-party system is weak. Where government is strong and authoritative, however, those political leaders who, for one reason or another, are alienated from those other leaders in power, have strong incentives to work together to get back in power. The natural tendency is for those who wish to get into power to win the support of all disaffected or potentially disaffected social forces. The natural bipolarity is not the social one between the left and the right but the political one between the ins and the outs.

The two-party system thus most effectively institutionalizes and moderates the polarization which gives rise to the development of party politics in the first place. In a one-party system, the political leadership tends to dominate social forces. In a multiparty system, the social forces dominate the political parties. A two-party system maintains a more equitable balance between social forces and political parties. The parties compete for the support of the social forces, but each party draws its support from many forces and hence it is the creature of no single one. Unlike the multiparty system, the appearance of a new social force in politics does not necessarily require the creation of a new party. Unlike the single-party system, the assimilation of the social force does not necessarily take place through only one political organization. There is thus a certain logic to a two-party system, but it is a political logic rather than a social one, and it is grounded as much in the need

26. Duverger, pp. 215–16.

for political stability as in the attraction of popular choice and democratic liberties.

THE GREEN UPRISING: PARTY SYSTEMS AND
RURAL MOBILIZATION

Parties and the Rural-Urban Gap

In most modernizing countries, a majority of the population—often a substantial majority—lives in rural areas and works in agriculture. In most modernizing countries, also, the urban population grows much faster than the rural population, in large part because of the movement of people from farms to cities. The combination of these two conditions—rural majority and urban growth—gives rise to a distinctive pattern of politics in modernizing countries. A gap develops between the political attitudes and behavior of the cities and those of the countryside. The city becomes the continuing center of opposition to the political system. The stability of a government depends upon the support which it can mobilize in the countryside.

A crucial function of political parties and the party system in a modernizing country is to furnish the institutional framework for this mobilization. Political parties are modern organizations; they are the creation of new men in urban environments. The party leaders are usually drawn from the Western-educated intelligentsia with upper- or middle-class backgrounds. For most modernizing countries, as for India in the 1950s, the recruitment of party workers "appears to occur largely in the cities and is conducted, for the most part, among office employees, shopkeepers, members of professions, and others in the middle classes." [27] If the party is to become first a mass organization and then a stable basis for government, however, it must extend its organization into the rural areas.

The party and the party system are the institutional means of bridging the rural-urban gap. The ideal party would be the one of which it could be said, in the words of Seydou Kouyate, that

> the political organization has been the melting pot where the peasant and the city-dweller have met. It has pulled the former out of his isolation, cured the latter of his disdain for

27. Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 230–31.

the bush, and achieved the national unity from which it was drawing its strength. Thus, the gap which existed between the city and the countryside has been filled up and the various strata of the population have been unified into one single stream oriented toward the political objectives.[28]

The obstacles to the realization of this ideal are immense. The party is a modern organization. But to be successful it must organize a traditional countryside. Urban party leaders are often unable, psychologically or politically, to reach out for rural support. If they are to do so successfully, they may have to modify drastically or to suppress their own modern values or goals and to adopt the more traditional stance which appeals to the countryside. As political consciousness grows among the more traditional groups, the party leaders are forced to choose between the values of modernity and the values of politics. The source of political modernity is the city; the source of political stability is the countryside. The task of the party is to combine the two. One major test of the institutionalization of a party and the adaptability of its leadership is the willingness of the latter to make the concessions necessary to win the support of the countryside. The strong parties and the stable party systems are those which meet this test. In a modernizing society, the successful party is born in the city but matures in the countryside.

Different types of party systems provide different bridges between city and countryside. In one-party states, the modernizing elite typically attempts to impose controls upon the peasantry and to permit them to become politically active only insofar as they accept the modernizing values of the political elite. If the peasantry remain neither active nor modernized, the political leaders in a one-party system can direct their attention to reform and change in the urban sectors. This, in effect, was what Kemal did.[29] In a different manner but with similar purpose, the leaders of the Soviet Union followed a relatively restrained and hands-off policy with respect to the rural areas during the 1920s. At some point, however, even in one-party states, the needs of stability require

28. Seydou Kouyate, *Africa Report* (May 1963), p. 16, quoted by Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa" in LaPalombara and Weiner, pp. 296–97.
29. See Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, pp. 313–14.

that the political system confront and resolve the issue of rural political participation. The Soviets attempted to make the countryside over in the image of the city, to destroy the traditional pattern of life, and to assimilate forcibly the peasantry to modern values through collectivization and the extension of the political apparatus of the Communist Party through the countryside. The political and economic costs of this effort were such that few other countries have tried to imitate it. In Turkey, on the other hand, the assimilation of the peasants involved breaking the one-party monopoly and permitting competition between groups within the modernizing elite to expand outside the modernizing elite. As a result, the assimilation of the peasants into the political system in Turkey took place on terms far more favorable to the peasants than it did in Russia. In general, competitive party systems tend to produce less rapid modernization but easier assimilation than monopolistic party systems.

In modernizing countries the city is not only the locus of instability; it is also the center of opposition to the government. If a government is to enjoy a modicum of stability, it requires substantial rural backing. If no government can win the support of the countryside, there is no possibility of stability. The result, in modernizing countries with democratic political systems, is a major difference in the voting patterns between city and countryside. The support for the governing party, if there is a governing party, comes from the countryside; the support for the opposition comes from the cities. This pattern is repeated over and over again on every continent. In India the principal sources of strength of the Congress Party are in the rural areas; the opposition parties both of the left and of the right are stronger in the cities. In Venezuela the Acción Democrática appealed to the countryside but found little support in Caracas. In 1958, it got 49 per cent of the national vote, 11 per cent of the Caracas vote. In 1962, although it dominated the executive and legislative branches of the national government, it elected only one of 22 city councillors in the national capital. In the 1963 national elections, the AD was the first-place party in the countryside, but came in fourth in Caracas.

The same pattern of urban opposition persisted in Korea throughout several regimes. During the 1950s the Liberal Party of Syngman Rhee dominated the countryside through fair means and foul. The opposition Democratic Party, however, had the blessing

of the cities. In 1956 the Democratic candidate was elected vice president as a result of urban votes. In 1958 the Democratic Party elected 23 members of the national assembly from the five largest cities in the country, the Liberals only five. In Seoul, the opposition got 15 of the 16 seats, and no Liberal candidates were elected in the important cities of Taegu and Inchon. "Toward the end of the Rhee regime," Gregory Henderson observes, "an urban consensus against the government was achieved despite arrests, threats, economic favoritism, and surveillance." [30] The same pattern however, was repeated with the Pak government in the 1960s. In the presidential election of 1963, General Pak achieved his modest victory by virtue of his rural support; the city majorities were solidly against him. In Seoul the opposition won 12 of the 14 seats in the national assembly. Throughout its first four years in office the Pak regime was constantly harassed by the boisterous and at times violent opposition which it encountered in its own capital.

Elections in the Philippines after independence revealed a similar pattern of urban opposition to the government in power. Typically the rural vote was fairly evenly split between the government and the opposition, while the opposition got about 75 per cent of the urban vote. As a result of the failure of either party to develop a strong base of support in the rural areas, the urban vote gave the opposition the upper hand. The party in power lost four of six presidential elections during the two decades after World War II.[31] In somewhat similar fashion, the opposition Democratic Party in Turkey during the late 1940s was strong in the cities and weak in the countryside. In 1950, however, it won half the rural vote from the Republican People's Party and as a result ousted the Republican People's Party from office. In the succeeding elections, it developed a broad appeal in the rural areas which remained the principal source of support for it and its successor, the Justice Party, into the 1960s. In contrast, the Republican People's Party, having lost the support of the countryside, did well in the cities.

Voting in Pakistan has followed a similar pattern. In the 1951 Punjabi election, for instance, the Moslem League won just under 75 per cent of the seats in the provincial assembly, but only a bare

30. Henderson, p. 303.
31. See Martin Meadows, "Philippine Political Parties and the 1961 Election," *Pacific Affairs, 35* (Fall 1962) , 270 n.

50 per cent of the seats from Lahore. In the 1964 presidential elections, Ayub Khan got 63 per cent of the total vote and Miss Jinnah 36 per cent. Ayub got majorities in 13 of the country's 16 divisions, Miss Jinnah in three: Chittagong, Dacca, Karachi. "In effect," one commentator observed, "the vote meant that while the cities generally went with Miss Jinnah, Ayub's massive hold in rural areas was indisputable."[32] In the Moroccan elections of 1963 the opposition parties, the Istiqlal and the NUPF, carried the cities, while the government party won in the rural areas. In El Salvador in 1964 the opposition Christian Democrat Party elected the mayor of San Salvador and 14 congressmen, predominantly from the urban areas. But the government party, the National Reconciliation Party, won 32 seats in Congress, sweeping the rural areas by substantial margins. In the Dominican elections of 1966, Bosch carried Santo Domingo with a 60 per cent plurality, but Balaguer won the presidency by getting 62 per cent of the vote outside the capital.[33]

All these elections share two points in common. First, there is a marked divergence between rural and urban voting; the parties and candidates strong in the countryside are weak in the cities and vice versa. Second, the party which was strong in the countryside normally secured control of the national government and inaugurated a regime characterized by a high degree of political stability. Where no party had a clear base of support in the countryside, some form of instability was the result. In some instances, urban revolts may overturn rural-based governments, but in general governments which are strong in the countryside are able to withstand, if not to reduce or to eliminate, the continuing opposition they confront in the cities. Even in countries where there are no clear-cut party differences between city and countryside, the opposition in the city may manifest itself in other ways. In Lebanon, for instance:

> in many parts of the core area [Beirut] there is a disdain and even contempt for electoral politics. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the electoral system is probably stronger in the rural areas, where the system matches rather closely the traditional

32. Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan's First Presidential Elections," *Asian Survey*, 5 (June 1965), 292; Keith Callard, *Pakistan* (New York, Macmillan, 1957), p. 55.
33. *New York Times*, October 25, 1965, p. 17, November 21, 1966, p. 12. I am indebted to Mr. Abraham Lowenthal for figures on the Dominican Republic.

organizations . . . It would seem that the ordinary people of the rural areas are more fully integrated into the political system than are the people of the capital, whose political potentialities are numerous, diverse, and uncertain.[34]

In other countries, where the electoral process is less meaningful, the contrast between rural support and urban opposition is no less real for not being manifested in voting patterns. In Iran this has long been the case: the opposition to the regime is centered in Teheran, the regime's continued existence dependent upon the acquiescence of the countryside. Even in South Vietnam, President Diem running for reelection in 1961 got only 48 per cent of the vote in Saigon, although he rolled up heavy majorities in the countryside. "What African president," President Ahmed Ben Bella asked in June 1965, "has a majority behind him in his capital?" [35] The events of a few weeks later showed that he was not one of them.

The rural-urban gap may be bridged by revolutionaries or by a military elite which consciously appeals to and organizes the countryside. But the assimilation of the rural masses can also be the product of the workings of parties and the party system either through the struggle of a nationalist party against colonial rule or through the competition of two or more parties for peasant support.

Rural Mobilization through Nationalist Struggle

In the nationalist pattern, the stimulus to rural mobilization is the effort of the intellectual leaders of the nationalist movement to mobilize popular support from the rural areas in their struggle against the colonial regime. Only rarely did this occur because only rarely were the nationalists able or required to mobilize rural support to win their goals. In other instances, such as China and Vietnam, communist parties capitalized on the limitations and hesitations of the nationalists and mobilized the peasants into politics under their auspices on behalf of both nationalism and revolution. The two most notable cases where extensive rural mobiliza-

34. Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York, Random House, Forthcoming, 1968) , Chap. 6.

35. Ben Bella, quoted by Russell Warren Howe, "Would-Be Leader of the 'Third World,' " *New Republic, 152* (June 19, 1965) , 11; Bernard B. Fall, "Vietnam's Twelve Elections," *New Republic, 154* (May 14, 1966) , 14.

tion took place during the struggle for national independence were India and Tunisia.

In India the nationalist movement changed decisively in the early 1920s, broadening from a relatively small circle of English-educated, thoroughly westernized intellectual leaders drawn from the traditional higher strata into a more popular movement with extensive middle sector and small-town support. The key leader in this change was, of course, Gandhi, who redefined the nationalist appeal in traditional terms for mass consumption. "Popular nationalism," in the words of the Rudolphs, "is Gandhi's creation. He transformed the rather tame and select nationalism of the pre-1920s, broadening its class base and changing its ideological content." The pre-Gandhian nationalists were "the products of the new educational system, the trouser-wearing, English-speaking upper-middle classes. For the most part, they were drawn from the upper castes and the new professions." Their values were "essentially those of the British middle class of the period," and their "appeal was to the city and not the countryside, to the educated, not the illiterate. They ignored the village and the village ignored them." After 1920 Gandhi's leadership drastically altered this pattern. The old Western-style leaders were "supplemented by leaders from the more traditional culture, often from lesser castes or callings" and from "town or rural backgrounds." These had "little or no western education," they valued the old ways and looked "with a sceptical eye at the appeals of modernity. . . . Gandhi's appeal, his language, style, and methods infused nationalism with a new spirit, a spirit which was able to speak to those still steeped in the traditional culture." Indian nationalism was transformed into a "popular and tradition-tinged movement." [36]

A somewhat similar evolution occurred in Tunisia. There the shift from liberal to popular nationalism could not be accommodated within the framework of the first major nationalist organization. Instead, the Destour Party was supplanted in the early 1930s by the Neo-Destour which developed in Tunisia the same sort of popular appeal that Gandhi developed in India. The founders of the Neo-Destour went to the masses and organized them. As in India, new sources of leadership were mobilized. Unlike the Old Destour the Neo-Destour recruited its workers and

36. Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Toward Political Stability in Underdeveloped Countries: The Case of India," *Public Policy, 9* (1959), 155–57.

supporters from small towns and villages. "Although some of the sons of the Tunis *baldi* [old families] joined the Neo-Destour, the majority of its leadership was *afaqi* [outsiders] and its most reliable shock troops were the country peasants and Tunis plebs." [37]

In those numerous circumstances in which the Green Uprising is not launched under nationalist auspices before independence, the nationalist movement which comes to power at independence is typically an urban movement drawn from the middle and upper classes. A vast gulf may separate this urban, educated political elite from both the traditional leaders and the traditional masses of the hinterland which it presumes to rule. In some respects, the post-independence rulers may be almost as distant from the bulk of the population as the imperial elite they succeed. Societies are said to become independent when the foreign imperial power withdraws. In fact, however, the society does not become independent; some people in the society do. Independence has a differential impact on the various groups in the society, and the earlier independence is achieved in terms of the process of political mobilization, the greater the differential impact which independence has. Countering this, the policies of the imperial power may be consciously designed to minimize the power in the colonial situation of those groups who will inherit the imperial power when independence comes. "It is a cardinal principle of British Colonial Policy," said Lugard in one classic statement, "that the interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will either of a small European class or of a small minority of educated and Europeanized natives who have nothing in common with them, and whose interests are often opposed to theirs." [38] When independence comes, however, it is independence for the "small minority of educated and Europeanized natives." The rhetoric of nationalism and sovereignty is scant covering for the transfer of power from an alien foreign oligarchy to an alien native one.

In such circumstances the nationalist intellectual elite is not likely to keep power for long. It occupies the positions of authority and hence has little incentive to mobilize additional popular support for new goals. It has arrived. But it is also vulnerable. The small amount of power in the political system means that it is

37. Clement Henry Moore, "The Era of the Neo-Destour," in Charles Micaud, ed., *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* (New York, Praeger, 1964), pp. 81–82.

38. Lord Lugard, quoted in Abernethy, p. 169.

liable to overthrow either by some group which can command more ruthless and persuasive forms of power or by some group which can expand the power of the system and mobilize new groups into politics. If elections occur in the post-independence political system, the Westernized nationalist elite is likely to be overthrown by more populistic and traditional leaders. If no elections are permitted, the elite is likely to be overthrown by the military. Those nationalist leaders who do not mobilize popular support before independence do not rule for long after independence. Unless they can ally with one group against the other, they are done in either by outraged colonels or by outraged citizens.

The decay of narrow-based nationalist regimes was a common feature of African politics after independence. The significance of substantial rural mobilization before independence for subsequent political stability is perhaps best illustrated, however, by the contrast between Morocco and Tunisia and between Pakistan and India. In Morocco, unlike Tunisia, the principal nationalist party, the Istiqlal, never established the same primacy that the Neo-Destour did in Tunisia. In part this was because under the French the king in Morocco had been more powerful than the bey in Tunis and had played a major role in the independence movement. But also the Istiqlal, formed in 1943 by a group of urban intellectuals, never developed a mass base comparable to that of the Neo-Destour. In Tunisia the trade unions were closely associated with the Neo-Destour and the leadership of the two groups overlapped in large measure. In Morocco the trade unions and their leadership remained more distant from the Istiqlal and eventually aligned themselves with its left wing, which broke away in 1959 to form a separate party, the National Union of Popular Forces. More significantly, while the Neo-Destour mobilized support from rural tribesmen in its struggle for independence, the strength of the Istiqlal remained concentrated in the cities. As a result, after independence it was in a position to be challenged, first, by a new party, the Popular Movement, designed to represent the interests of the countryside and the Berber tribesmen and then by the king whose most intensive support came from the rural areas. In the 1963 elections the Istiqlal and the UNFP carried the cities but the political vehicle of the monarchy, the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions, won a plurality by its appeal to the countryside.

In Pakistan, the Moslem League, like the Congress Party, was an old organization at the time of independence. It dated from 1906, but also for much of its life had been a small pressure group. In the mid-1930s it was "moribund" and in comparison with the Congress, it "was a defensive organization composed of some wealthy *zamindars* and a few discontented intellectuals who wanted greater access to government employment." [39] The mobilization of popular sentiment behind the Congress Party in the 1920s, however, had its impact on the League. Despite his own opposition to mass political participation, Jinnah, who secured control of the League in 1937–38, was compelled to develop a mass organization to rival the Congress and to support the goal adopted in 1940 of an independent Islamic state. The mobilization of mass opinion by one organization thus generated a countervailing mobilization by a competing organization. The greatest support for the Moslem League, however, came from those areas where Moslems were a minority. In 1947 many of these areas became part of India. The leaders of the Moslem League thus became the leaders of a new state which divorced them from their most active and best organized supporters.

In post-independence Pakistan the League lost both its constituency and its purposes. The League also lost its "popular character" and came to be dominated by West Pakistan landlords. In due course, "The party became a series of small cliques which had power or which wanted power, and its mass foundation withered away. . . . Whereas, in many countries parties are organized to promote ideas or interests shared by their members, in Pakistan politics have been a matter of personal rivalries, each leader being supported by a faction of adherents." [40] Pakistan, in a sense, achieved independence too easily. Having failed to produce large-scale popular mobilization among its future citizens before independence, its initial political leaders had little incentive to do so after independence. They effectively vetoed the national elections which might have compelled them to establish contact with popular sources of power. As a result, they were easily displaced first by civilian bureaucrats and then by military ones. And, ironically, the development of political structures in the countryside and

39. Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 34.
40. Callard, *Political Forces*, pp. 23–24; Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (2d ed. Karachi, Pakistan Publishing House, 1963), pp. 136, 142–43.

the mobilization of rural voters into the political arena in a com-
petitive election then took place under the auspices of a military
leader who despised party politics.

Rural Mobilization through Party Competition: The Conservatism of Democracy

Competitive party systems offer channels for the assimilation of
rural groups into the political system. The nature of those chan-
nels depends upon the nature of the party system, whether it is
dominant-party, two-party, or multiparty. The ability of the party
system to assimilate the new groups depends upon the acquies-
cence of the previously dominant groups—whether conservative,
nationalist, or military—in the loss of power. The assimilation of
the rural groups frequently requires parties to adapt their eco-
nomic programs to agrarian needs and to promise land reform and
public investment in rural areas. In this sense, the parties may
compete in proposing economic reforms for rural voters. The
aspirations and expectations of rural groups are, however, usually
fairly specific and moderate. If these expectations are reasonably
satisfied, the rural populace reverts to its customary conservative
role. In addition, whatever the nature of rural economic demands
on the political system, the social and cultural values of the rural
population typically remain highly traditional. Consequently, in
most colonial or postcolonial societies the mobilization of the rural
majority into politics through the party system has a highly tradi-
tionalizing or conservatizing effect on politics.

Traditionalizing tendencies gain strength in most societies after
they achieve independence from foreign rule. Such tendencies
seem to be stronger in democratic states than in authoritarian
ones. They stem, in the first instance, from the extension of the
suffrage to the bulk of the rural population. In the early mod-
ernizing countries, where the extension of political rights was a
fairly prolonged historical process, the first phase in that process—
the granting of the franchise to the urban middle class—had radi-
cal and modernizing consequences. The subsequent extension of
the suffrage to the rural population often brought a conservative
counterweight into the political balance.

In 1848 in Germany the liberals preferred a system of property
qualifications for voting; the conservatives advocated universal
manhood suffrage. In England Disraeli also saw and exploited the

conservative benefits of broader suffrage. Similarly, in the mid-twentieth century "rural voting can be more difficult to handle for the more progressive sectors of the Latin American middle classes." [41] Where the rural masses were able to vote in Brazil, "The main social function of suffrage was that of *preserving the existing power structure.* Within the traditional patterns, suffrage added opportunities for displaying and reinforcing feudal loyalty. At the same time, it reinforced and legalized the political status of the landowner." [42] The introduction of universal suffrage in Ceylon after 1931 had similar effects. "In effect the workers transferred into their wage-earning role elements of quasi-feudal deference. In return for the use of land, or the bullocks lent or rented, or emergency aid in time of family crises, or a chit to a doctor or lawyer, the peasant gave his vote." In the 1950s in eastern Turkey, it was reported that "In these still backward regions, where there is still almost complete illiteracy and much religious fanaticism, whole communities voted for the ruling party at a mere word from the local landowner." [43] The extension of the suffrage to the rural masses in a society which otherwise remains highly traditional strengthens and legitimizes the authority of the traditional elite.

The conservative effects of rural voting often persist after the extension of modern political agitation and organization into the countryside. Competition among traditional groups often promotes the modernization of those groups: in Nigeria, for instance, Ibo and Yoruba leaders competed with each other in extending education to their people. Competition among modern urban groups, on the other hand, promotes the traditionalization of those groups as they attempt to enlist the support of the traditional rural masses. In Burma, after 1921, "The general pattern was one in which the modernizers first fell out among themselves whenever they were confronted with demanding choices of policy, and then tended to seek support from among the more traditional elements

41. José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," p. 79.

42. Emilio Willems, "Brazil," in Arnold M. Rose, ed., *The Institutions of Advanced Societies* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 552; italics in original.

43. W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, pp. 107–08; *The Times* (London), December 12, 1960, quoted in George E. Kirk, "Political Problems of Selected Poly-ethnic Countries in the Middle East: Iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus" (unpublished paper, Fifth World Congress, International Political Science Association, Paris, 1961), pp. 18–19.

which in time gained the ascendency." Similarly, in India, "Peas-
ant protest is often mobilized and directed by one urban elite in
an attempt to weaken or destroy the political power of another
urban elite, for the urban areas are the centers of parties radiating
their influence out to the villages." [44] In reaching out to the vil-
lages, the urban elites are forced to reformulate and modify the
modern appeals which are effective in the cities. Both the competi-
tion among traditional groups and that among modern groups
help to bridge the gap between modern elite and traditional mass.
In the former, the masses come to accept at least some of the mod-
ern goals of the elite; in the latter the elites come to accept at least
some of the traditional values of the masses.

Electoral competition in postcolonial countries thus seems to
direct the attention of political leaders from the urban to the rural
voter, to make political appeals and governmental policies less
modern and more traditional, to replace highly educated cosmo-
politan political leaders with less educated local and provincial
leaders, and to enhance the power of local and provincial govern-
ment at the expense of national government. These tendencies
promote political stability but at the same time may obstruct
modernizing reforms not directed to rural interests. The precondi-
tion for reform is, in general, the concentration of power in a
single modernizing elite. The effect of democracy is to disperse
power among a plurality of more traditional elites. By increasing
the power of rural groups democracy also tends to promote poli-
cies aimed at rural and agrarian rather than urban and industrial
development.

In a two-party system these tendencies frequently manifest
themselves in a "ruralizing" election in which a rural-based politi-
cal party ousts from power an urban-based one. In a multiparty
system, the mobilization of rural voters into the political system
takes place with greater difficulty. One or more political parties
have to appear which compete for the support of the peasants.
Typically, however, these parties have little support from other
social groups; they are opposed by the parties appealing to other
groups; and because of the difficulty of mobilizing peasants into
political action, they are unable to become majority parties. Con-
sequently, the assimilation of the rural masses into politics occurs,

44. Weiner, pp. 11–12; Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building*, p. 114.

if at all, in a disjointed and halting manner. In Latin America, where multiparty systems abound, the only instance before 1967 of successful rural mobilization within the framework of such a system was Venezuela. In this case, ideology, effective leadership, and a semirevolutionary struggle against the Gómez and Pérez Jiménez dictatorships provided the environment for the effective mobilization and organization of the peasants in *campesino* unions associated with the Acción Democrática. Conceivably similar developments could take place in Chile and Peru. The two difficulties of the multiparty system, however, are that it provides insufficient incentive for any established element within the political system to mobilize the peasants and that once such mobilization does take place it cumulates political and social cleavages so as to obstruct the easy assimilation of the peasant political movement into the political system.

In a dominant-party system, the dispersive and ruralizing effects of democracy also affect the distribution of power among the parties. They are, however, more likely to be seen in changes in the organizational structure and the distribution of power within the dominant party. In India, for instance, the 1950s witnessed a struggle between the "governmental" and "organizational" wings within the Congress Party. In this struggle the organizational wing, indeed, often did "act in a manner traditionally associated with opposition parties." Its members criticized the government; they publicized their dissatisfaction in the press; they attempted to get a majority of their own in the legislature; and they campaigned vigorously in the elections for party committees and party leaders.[45] In this struggle, the organizational wing eventually emerged victorious, with the top positions in the government and the party eventually coming to be occupied by a new group of leaders who had come up through the local and state Congress structures and who were peculiarly responsive to local, communal, and rural demands rather than to national ones.

Electoral competition in India tended to hasten the replacement of the nationalist, cosmopolitan, Western-educated leaders by more provincial, less well-educated, local-oriented leaders. In the 1962 election "virtually everywhere there was a concern by the voter for electing local men who could mediate between the voter

45. Marcus F. Franda, "The Organizational Development of India's Congress Party," *Pacific Affairs 35* (Fall 1962), 251.

and the complex and often slow moving governmental machinery, rather than state-wide or national public figures who could speak on issues of public policy." [46] The general shift taking place within the Congress Party was perhaps symbolized by the change in the top leadership in 1965. Educated at Harrow and Cambridge, Nehru was as English as he was Indian. Shastri, in contrast, had never been outside his country when he became prime minister. His premature death and replacement by another Nehru at a time when indigenous political forces were gaining strength hastened the decline of the Congress Party.

The dynamics of democratic politics also brought rural leaders to the fore. About 15 per cent of the members of the 1947 provisional parliament in India came from rural areas; in 1962 about 40 per cent of the Lok Sabha were from such areas. Similar changes took place in the leadership of the Congress Party at the state levels. In Madras, for instance,

> the Chief Minister changed from C. Rajagopalachari, a Brahmin lawyer, to K. Kamraj, a peasant with little formal education. The former knew English and Sanskrit as well as the regional language, and he was the first Indian Governor-General and a national Congress leader. The latter was an astute local political leader who spoke only Tamil well. Kamraj was definitely not an intellectual, he was hailed as a "man of the people." This might be compared with John Quincy Adams' defeat by Andrew Jackson in the United States.[47]

Similarly Myron Weiner found that in the Congress Party in rural districts "recruitment has shifted from the urban centers to the smaller towns and larger villages, and there has been a general decline in the preponderance of the most educated higher castes and a corresponding increase in agriculturalists, in cadres of more varied educational level, and in the so-called middle castes." [48] Along with this shift in recruitment patterns also went a general devolution of power from the central leadership of the party to the chief ministries of the states and to the state party organizations.

46. Myron Weiner, "India's Third General Elections," *Asian Survey,* 2 (May 1962), 10.

47. George Rosen, *Democracy and Economic Change in India* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966), pp. 72–74.

48. Myron Weiner, *Congress Party Elites* (Bloomington, Ind., Department of Government, University of Indiana, 1966), pp. 14–15.

In the 1950s in India and also in Ceylon, elections and democ-
racy had "the effece of reinforcing rather than eroding the power
of traditional leaders" and thus created "an intense conflict be-
tween the values of representative government and planned
economic-social change." The lack of elections in the 1950s in
Pakistan exempted it from this conflict.[49] In the 1960s in Pakis-
tan, however, the workings of the Basic Democracies brought to
the fore the same issue: "It is one of the inner contradictions of
community development," one leading Pakistani bureaucrat ob-
served, "that the people directing the programme represent the
interests and classes which stand to lose their status, privilege and
power if the programme succeeds. Today political and economic
power is concentrated in the hands of the westernized elite and
specially the government servants. Democratisation of the society
is bound to reduce this power." [50]

Two-Party Competition and Ruralizing Elections

The three countries of south Asia neatly illustrate the three
different relationships which may exist between nationalist move-
ments and rural political mobilization. In India the nationalist
elite developed widespread rural support before independence
and was able to expand and refurbish this support after indepen-
dence. As a result, it maintained itself in power for over twenty
years. In Pakistan the nationalist elite did not mobilize popular
rural support before independence and did not dare submit itself
to the test of elections after independence. As a result, it was easily
displaced by the erstwhile bureaucratic hirelings of the imperial
power. In Ceylon, the nationalist elite was also narrowly based and
did not mobilize mass support before independence. It exposed
itself to the popular test, however, and was swept out of office in
1956 in what may well be termed the archetype of the "ruralizing
election." This is the typical means through which a two-party
system in a modernizing country accommodates mass rural partici-
pation.

Ceylon, 1956. Ceylon became independent in 1948 under the

49. Wayne Wilcox, "The Politics of Tradition in Southeast Asia" (unpublished
notes, Columbia University Seminar on the State, November 13, 1963), p. 1.

50. M. Zaman, *Village AID* (Lahore, Government of West Pakistan, 1960), quoted
in A. K. M. Musa, "Basic Democracies in Pakistan—an Analytical Study" (unpub-
lished paper, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1965), p. 26.

leadership of D. S. Senanayake and his United National Party which had been created only a year earlier. The UNP attracted many members from the Ceylon National Congress which had been organized in 1919. The latter body, however, "lacked the organizational roots in the countryside and among the lower classes in urbanized areas that its Indian counterpart developed, but it was manned by the same type of Western-educated, upper middle-class, and upper-class leadership." [51] Independence for Ceylon was fundamentally a gift of the Indians and the British: by compelling the British to grant independence to India, the Indians left them little choice but to give it to Ceylon also. The bulk of the Ceylonese population had no role in the struggle for independence. "There was no mass freedom movement in Ceylon, little self-sacrifice if any (even on the part the top leaders) and virtually no heroes and martyrs." [52]

After independence the new government was dominated by a small, upper-middle and upper class, thoroughly Anglicized, urban elite whose political vehicle was the UNP. Its members were, as one observer remarked, like "the former colonial rulers in everything but the colour of their skins." [53] This group was overwhelmingly urban, although Ceylon was 70 per cent rural. It was largely Christian, although 91 per cent of the Ceylonese were not and 64 per cent were Buddhist. Its language was English, which 92 per cent of the population could neither read nor write. In short, it was drawn from and represented a minority of less than 10 per cent of the population. The temptation such a situation offered for an appeal to the large majority of rural, Buddhist, and Sinhalese votors could not be long ignored. In 1951 one leading member of the political elite, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, deserted the UNP and formed his own opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, to contest the 1956 general election. Before the election it was generally assumed that the UNP would have another easy victory. The SLFP "entered the election campaign with virtually no hope of winning. The money, the organization, and most of

51. Wriggins, p. 106.

52. D. K. Rangnekar, "The Nationalist Revolution in Ceylon," *Pacific Affairs, 33* (December 1960) , 363; Wriggins, p. 81.

53. Rangnekar, pp. 363–64; Marshall Singer, *The Emerging Elite* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1964) , p. 122.

the prestigious families sided with the United National Party." [54]
The electoral results, however, were a smashing victory for the
SLFP and its electoral allies who polled a large minority of the
votes but a secure majority in parliament with 51 of 95 seats. The
UNP was reduced to eight seats, eight of its ten cabinet ministers
losing their seats. The composition of the House changed dramat-
ically.

In this election the rural lower middle class and lower class Sin-
halese "suddenly discovered their political strength and shattered
the monopoly of political power previously held by a small,
affluent, westernized elite." [55] The inauguration of the SLFP gov-
ernment was dominated by the symbols of the populist, traditional
revival:

> the presence in force of yellow-robed *bhikkus* (members of
> the Buddhist clergy) ; the beating of *magul bera* (traditional
> ceremonial drums) in place of a fanfare of trumpets; and, at
> the end of the ceremony, a great surge of friendly, interested,
> sarong-clad people up the steps of the House, past the depart-
> ing guests, and into the Chamber itself. *"Apē ānduwa,"* they
> said, "It's *our* Government," as they explored the House and
> tried out the seats of the members they had just elected.[56]

"It was a proud day for the people," one newspaperman had writ-
ten of a similar event 127 years earlier when backwoods farmers
had also swarmed through governmental offices. "General Jackson
is *their own* president." [57] And the parallel is apt, although the
Bandaranaike revolution of 1956 was if anything more fundamen-
tal than the Jacksonian revolution of 1829. Of all the elections in
southern Asia until the mid-1960s, as Howard Wriggins has
pointed out, "it alone resulted in a marked transfer of political
power from one segment of the population to another. This shift
in the locus of power was accomplished without bloodshed, mass
corruption, or intimidation of the electorate by violence. It was

54. Singer, p. 144.

55. Robert N. Kearney, "The New Political Crises of Ceylon," *Asian Survey, 2*
(June 1962) , 19; Wriggins, p. 327.

56. B. M., "A 'People's Government': Social and Political Trends in Ceylon," *World
Today, 12* (July 1956) , 281.

57. Amos Kendall, quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Bos-
ton, Little Brown, 1948) , p. 6; italics in original.

not the elective confirmation of a coup d'etat, but a genuine change in leadership effected by the cumulated choice of hundreds of thousands of individual votors." [58]

The victory of the SLFP was based upon its appeals to the rural interests, Buddhist beliefs, and Sinhalese prejudices of the majority of Ceylon's population. The UNP was attacked as Western and Christian. Buddhist priests went from village to village declaring that a vote for the government party was a vote against the Buddha. By advocating Sinhalese as the sole official language, the SLFP appealed both to the lower middle class and "small intellectuals" who resented the upper class its facility in English and to the Sinhalese majority which resented the extent to which the Tamil-speaking minority (about 20 per cent of the population) had preempted positions in the government. The issues of language and religion cut across other distinctions, providing the basis for an electoral alliance and "a way for urban political leaders, rural middle-class people, and peasants all to react together in common resistance to the encroachment of Western values as they came to be identified with the UNP in 1956." [59]

In the following years the SLFP government voted to make Sinhalese the official language and carried out other programs designed to cement its ties with its rural constituency. Two consequences were severe communal violence between Tamils and Sinhalese in 1958 and the assassination of Bandaranaike by a Sinhalese extremist in 1959. The March 1960 election produced a political stalemate, but a second election in July led to another victory for the SLFP. Again its support came from the rural areas, where it received two-thirds of the vote. In contrast, it won none of the 18 seats in the large cities in the first election of 1960 and only four in the second. The attitude of the party was well expressed in Parliament by a top leader who declared that the party had established a "standard . . . a very simple standard; we stand by the interests of the rural people of this country. . . . [The] common people of this country, the rural people of this country can rest assured that we shall never let them down." [60]

The policies of the SLFP government so antagonized other elite groups, however, that a military coup was attempted in January

58. Wriggins, pp. 326–27.
59. Ibid., p. 348.
60. Mr. Dias Bandaranaike, quoted in Kearney, p. 20.

1962. This, in effect, was an attempt to regain power by elements of the older, Westernized, upper-class elite. "Nearly all of the suspected conspirators were Christians, most of them Roman Catholics. Many of them came from wealthy and prominent families, had been educated in prestige schools, and generally represented the 'privileged class' against which the egalitarianism of the SLFP is directed." [61] The coup reflected the tensions which the entry of the rural masses into politics had introduced into the political system. The victory in 1965 of the UNP in cooperation with the Federal Party representing the Tamil minority also demonstrated that the political system which had been sufficiently adaptable to absorb the rural masses was also sufficiently adaptable to permit what had become the opposition party of the urban elite to return to power under the new circumstances. The UNP was able to secure power only by adapting its appeal in such a manner as to compete with the SLFP. On the one hand, the rural masses had been assimilated into the political system; on the other hand, their entry into politics also changed the style, the semantics, the policies, and the leadership dominant within that system. A competitive party system had been successful in mediating, more or less peacefully, fundamental changes in the scope of political participation and the distribution of political power.

  Turkey, 1950 and after. A shift somewhat similar to that in Ceylon occurred almost simultaneously in Turkey during the 1950s. After the end of World War II a variety of pressures and circumstances led the government of Ismet Inönü to permit a group of leading politicians within the Republican Peoples Party to break off and form an opposition party. These leaders did not differ fundamentally from those who were dominant in the RPP but they did tend to be liberal and favorably disposed toward private enterprise and thus to be associated with the Turkish business class which had developed in the 1930s and during the war. At two earlier periods during the long rule of the RPP, in 1924 and 1930, opposition parties had been briefly allowed to function, and undoubtedly the RPP leaders assumed that this new opposition group of politicians would be less of a threat to them outside the RPP than inside it. In any event, they organized the Democratic Party and contested the 1946 elections, winning about

61. Ibid., p. 26.

15 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly. During the next four years, first the Democratic Party and then the RPP in response made more and more extensive efforts to mobilize and to organize the voters in both cities and countryside. In the 1950 election the RPP again expected to win a top-heavy majority. It instead lost decisively. The Democratic Party got 53 per cent of the vote and 408 seats in the assembly; the RPP 40 per cent of the vote and only 69 seats.

The Democratic victory was compounded of a substantial majority in the cities plus an even split with the RPP of the rural vote. The election marked, however, the first step in the emergence of the rural voters as the dominant voting group in Turkish politics. During the next few years the Democratic government under Adnan Menderes made every effort to identify itself with the peasantry. Economically it pushed rural roads, agricultural equipment, farm subsidies and credits. Of equal importance, in the cultural field, it modified the strict secularism which had prevailed under the RPP, introducing religious instruction into the schools and providing government funds for the construction of mosques. Menderes, as one scholar has observed, "was the country's first ruler dramatically to place rural interests above the urban, the first to respond to the peasants' material needs, the first to give them a rudimentary sense of citizenship." [62] During the 1950s, consequently, rural support for the Democratic Party increased, at the same time that its urban middle-class support weakened. In the 1954 election the Democrats upped their percentage of the vote to 56.6. "What does it matter what the intellectuals of Istanbul think," asked Menderes, "so long as the peasantry is with us?" [63]

In the 1957 election the total vote declined and with it the Democratic share of the vote. The Menderes government turned to increasingly authoritarian methods of rule; urban middle-class opinion turned more and more against it; and in May 1960 it was ousted by the military.

The political crisis resulting in and produced by this veto coup was resolved by the speedy and responsible way in which General Gursel and his associates arranged for the return to civilian rule.

62. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Second Try at Democracy," *Yale Review, 52* (Summer 1963), 529.

63. Adnan Menderes, quoted in Irwin Ross, "From Ataturk to Gursel," *The New Leader, 43* (December 5, 1960), 17.

In the elections of 1961, however, the old pattern of voting re-appeared. Despite all the factors working in its favor, the RPP received only 37 per cent of the vote, while the newly formed Justice Party inherited the bulk of the support of the outlawed Democrats and got 35 per cent of the vote. Four years later the Justice Party swept to a commanding victory, winning 56 per cent of the popular vote and 57 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly. Its support came from a variety of sources, but pre-eminent among them were the votes of the peasants. The Turkish experience, in Weiker's words, neatly illustrates

> the difficulties of simultaneous rapid reform and free multi-party government . . . the often-voiced claim of Turkish leaders that the people, if only given proper leadership, will understand the situation and make sacrifices voluntarily, has never been borne out in Turkey. The fact is that when given the free ballot, the Turkish nation has not at any time in the past voted for the representatives of rapid reform, and there are convincing reasons for believing that such an eventuality is equally unlikely today.[64]

Electoral competition produced not only an appeal to rural interests but also tendencies toward the devolution of power in what had been a highly centralized political system. In 1947, in response to the Democratic challenge, the RPP decentralized its control over nominations so that 70 per cent of its candidates for deputy would be nominated by local party organizations. Subsequently, Frey observed

> within the political party, central control and discipline have been appreciably weakened. Local forces have become so strong as to impair the party's ability even to perform necessary political tasks, such as research into its own organization. . . . Recalcitrant party leaders who have lost their central posts are now commencing to cater to local interests to regain power despite central opposition.[65]

As in India and Ceylon the character of the principal participants in politics also tended to shift from a national, westernized bu-

64. Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960–1961: Aspects of Military Politics* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1963) , p. 89.

65. Frey, in Pye, *Communications and Political Development*, p. 325; Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959) , pp. 207–08; *Time, 86* (Oct. 22, 1965) , 46.

reaucratic elite "oriented toward the tutelary development of the country" to a provincial elite "oriented toward more immediate local and political advantage." [66] This change occurred most dramatically during the period of transition from one-party to competitive party rule in the late 1940s. Farmers, lawyers, and merchants replaced military officers and civil servants as the dominant groups in the National Assembly. Similarly, localism gained strength: at the peak of the one-party period about one third of the deputies had been born in the constituencies they represented; after a decade of two-party competition, two thirds of the deputies fell into this category.[67] Party competition not only brought the masses into politics but also brought the political leaders closer to the masses.

Ceylon and Turkey furnish dramatic examples of the ways in which two-party competition and the ruralizing elections facilitate the assimilation of the numerically predominant rural groups into politics. Somewhat similar cases may also be briefly cited from several other countries.

Burma, 1960. After independence Burma was dominated by the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, which won overwhelming victories in the elections of 1951–52 and 1956. In the former year the opposition was very weak and very scattered; in the latter year, the opposition was stronger and grouped together in the leftist-oriented National Unity Front. In 1958 the AFPFL split into two factions, and the resulting instability and growth in strength of insurgent groups led Premier U Nu to turn the government over to General Ne Win and the army in October of that year. Much to the surprise of many, the military government remained in power for only about eighteen months and arranged for the return of power to civilians through elections in the spring of 1960. The two principal parties contesting these elections were the "Clean" AFPFL led by U Nu and the "Stable" AFPFL led by two other leading AFPFL politicians. When the party had split in 1958 the Clean faction had kept control of the All Burma Peasants Organization, the Stable faction initially taking control of the labor and women's groups.

The 1960 election clearly posed the issue of traditionalism vs. reform. The military government of Ne Win had done much to

66. Frederick W. Frey quoted in Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 144.

67. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite,* Chap. 7 and pp. 396–97.

push through needed reforms, improve efficiency in the public ser-
vices, and restore law and order. Its diligence and ruthlessness,
however, had antagonized many elements in Burmese society. The
army clearly preferred a victory by the Stable faction, and U Nu con-
sequently made the most out of the identification between the mili-
tary and his electoral opponents. The alignment of political forces
closely resembled that of the Turkish elections of 1961. For the Bur-
mese, "The laxity of the old AFPFL days was considered a lesser evil,
in spite of its frequent corrupt and inefficient character, than the
Army-led reform government with its demands for sacrifices." [68]

Equally as important as his opposition to the unpleasant needs
of reform was U Nu's identification with Buddhism and tradi-
tional values. Conscientiously and conspicuously adhering to a
non-Western style of life and behavior, U Nu stood out in marked
contrast to most other Burmese political leaders. At the beginning
of the campaign he explicitly committed himself to making Bud-
dhism the state religion of Burma. As in Ceylon in 1956 the Bud-
dhist monks played a key role in the campaign: "the majority
rallied to the support of U Nu and became his most effective
propagandists in the towns and villages of Burma." [69] The result
was a smashing victory for U Nu and the Clean faction which won
two thirds of the vote and two thirds of the parliamentary seats at
stake. Unlike other ruralizing elections, U Nu's support came
from all sections of the population, his party doing even better in
Rangoon than it did in the countryside.

Like the Turkish army in the 1960s, the Burmese military reluc-
tantly allowed the more conservative party to come to power. Dur-
ing the two years he remained in office U Nu followed policies
which were "clearly more traditionalist than revolutionary" and
gave top priority to the implementation of his pledge to make
Buddhism the state religion.[70] In 1962, however, the Burmese
military decided that the traditionalizing and disintegrative ten-
dencies of democracy had gone far enough, intervened again to
remove the civilian government from power, and imposed upon
Burma an austere, authoritarian, dogmatic version of military so-

68. Richard Butwell and Fred von der Mehden, "The 1960 Election in Burma,"
Pacific Affairs, 33 (June 1960), 154.

69. Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1965), p. 242.

70. Richard Butwell, *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963),
p. 244.

cialism. Unlike the Turkish military, the Burmese soldiers were unwilling to accept the compromise which democracy requires between traditionalism and reform.

Senegal, 1951. Competitive party systems have also provided for the shift of power from a narrow urban base to a broader rural one in countries on the verge of independence. In Senegal, political power for decades rested in the coastal cities. After World War II the dominant party in the communes was a branch of the French Socialists (SFIO). In the 1951 legislative elections, however, it was challenged by a new group, the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (BDS), organized by Leopold Senghor, which directed its appeal to the newly enfranchised and newly politically conscious rural voters. "The enlarged rural electorate had numerical control and held the key to success in the elections . . . [which] were a victorious revolt of the new citizens, urban and rural, against the old citizens of the 'four communes.' " [71] In the election Senghor made use of rural and traditional appeals, particularly religious ones. As in Ceylon in 1956 and Burma in 1960, religious leaders and workers played a key role in the campaign. "It was the imams in the mosques," Senghor subsequently declared, "who made our triumph." [72]

Jamaica, 1944. In Jamaica party competition provided the means for accommodating new groups within the political system with little violence and virtually no disruption of orderly political processes. In the usual pattern, the People's National Party, formed in 1938 to press for independence, was originally composed of a "quite small middle class following of professional persons, civil servants, and teachers." It was modernizing, socialist, and nationalist. In 1944 the first elections under universal suffrage were held. Alexander Bustamante, the leader of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, which despite its name was primarily an agricultural trade union, organized the Jamaica Labor Party and mobilized the rural workers to the polls. The results were a rude shock to the middle-class PNP, which gained only 24 per cent of the total vote to 41 per cent for the JLP and 30 per cent for the Inde-

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71. Paul Mercier, "Political Life in the Urban Centers of Senegal: A Study of Transition," *PROD Translations, 3* (June 1960), 10.

72. Quoted in William J. Foltz, "Senegal," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964), p. 22.

pendents. The PNP leader, Norman Manley, was a prototype of the middle-class rational intellectual and the PNP program was radical and ideological. The BITU and the JLP, on the other hand, stressed "bread-and-butter issues" and concrete material benefits rather than sweeping ideological goals. Their "followers were chiefly urban and agricultural workers" and their leader, Busta-mante, was an earthy combination of union boss and populist demagogue.[73]

The effect of the JLP victory, however, was to promote similar efforts at mass organization on the part of the PNP, which devel-oped its own trade union organization, the National Workers Union, as a competitor for the BITU. The competition also helped the moderate wing of the PNP to win out in an intraparty struggle in the early 1950s over the extreme left wing. As a result, the PNP was able to return to power in 1955 with a substantial victory over the JLP. A few years later, the JLP in turn mobilized its rural sup-porters and came back into office. The competition of the two leaders and the two parties in Jamaica thus served to promote both the mobilization of the Jamaican masses into politics and their effective organization through the political parties and affiliated trade unions.

Lesotho, 1965. The dominant party as Basutoland approached independence was the Basutoland Congress Party. Organized on the model of the CPP in Ghana, it drew its support from intel-lectuals, teachers, Protestant missionaries, and other urban groups. Its leaders had traveled abroad and identified with pan-African movements, but they had little knowledge of or contact with the rural areas of their own country. As in Jamaica, Ceylon, and Senegal, the opposition party, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) was organized only shortly before the first general election in 1965. Its strength was in the rural areas where it benefited from the active support of the lower ranks of the chiefs and the Roman Catholic clergy. In its campaign it focused primarily on bread-and-butter issues. Much to the surprise of most observers it scored a conservative upset in the election, getting 42 per cent of the vote to 40 per cent for the BCP. Again party competition produced the victory of a conservative rural party over a more radical, national-ist, urban one.[74]

73. C. Paul Bradley, "Mass Parties in Jamaica: Structure and Organization," *Social and Economic Studies,* 9 (Dec. 1960), 375–416.

74. See *New York Times,* May 5, 1965, p. 6.

Each of these ruralizing elections is, of course, only one turning point in a long, gradual, and at times, stormy process of political mobilization and assimilation. In some countries the process may, indeed, be so gradual that it is virtually impossible to single out any particular election as heralding a significant transfer of power from urban elite to rural mass. In the Philippines after independence, for instance, the mobilization of rural voters was strung out through a series of elections in which the incumbent president was almost always defeated at the polls. In 1953 Magsaysay swept to an overwhelming victory over President Quirino. Magsaysay's appeal in the election and his activities as president were oriented to the rural voter. In addition to his land reform law and other measures designed to enhance agricultural productivity, he also set about "opening channels for continuous political communication with the masses of rural Filipinos. . . . He brought large numbers of people into contact with the government and the presidency for the first time and established that political change was possible within the legal structure of government and that violence was neither necessary nor wise. No politician after Magsaysay could afford to ignore his goals or his image." [75] His successor, García, however, was a much more conservative and upper class figure.

In 1961, the second phase of the mobilization of the rural masses occurred when the opposition candidate, Macapagal, scored a surprising victory over García. Like Magsaysay, Macapagal came from a lower-class background and directed his appeal primarily to the rural voter. During four years of campaigning he visited almost every one of the 23,000 Filipino barrios. For the first time in Filipino history a presidential candidate successfully challenged the control the landlords and the Nacionalista party machine had exercised over the rural vote.[76] In 1965 Macapagal, in turn, was defeated by Ferdinand Marcos, who seemingly was also committed to carrying on the process of rural mobilization and agrarian reform. Thus, in the Philippines, the absence of effective party organization and of very meaningful associations between parties and social forces tended to produce a situation in which the Green Uprising occurred by degrees and under a diversity of party labels.

The clearer cases of ruralizing elections shared a number of common characteristics.

75. Grossholtz, pp. 43–44.
76. See Meadows, passim, but esp. pp. 262–63, 271–73.

1. An urban-based, middle- and upper-class, modernizing elite was ousted from power.

2. The outcome was a surprise to most political observers.

3. The victorious party won primarily because it mobilized new rural voters to the polls.

4. The leader of the victorious party was typically a former member of the modernizing urban elite who, in effect, broke from the elite and espoused more popular and traditional appeals.

5. Apart from the top leader of the incoming party, its other leaders and representatives were typically drawn from non-cosmopolitan, local, rural elites.

6. The winning party appealed to the rural voters by a combination of ethnic and religious appeals and bread-and-butter issues.

7. In many cases, the winning party benefited significantly from the work of priests, *pongyis, imams,* or other religious figures in the rural areas.

8. The victory of the opposition party was viewed by both its supporters and its opponents as marking a turning point in the political evolution of the country.

9. Once in office, the new government's policies typically aimed to please and to benefit its rural supporters.

10. The new government's policies also antagonized the old elite, often in such a manner as to provoke a military coup d'etat against it, successful in Turkey and Burma, unsuccessful in Ceylon.

11. In most, but not all, cases, the party ousted from power adapted itself to the changed patterns of political participation, made its own efforts to win mass support, and, in a few cases (Ceylon, Jamaica), was subsequently voted back into power.

Through this process two-party systems assimilate rural masses into the political system, and thus produce the bridge between rural and urban areas which is the key to political stability in modernizing countries. The comparative experience of modernizing societies, both contemporary and past, suggests that two-party systems are more successful in achieving this assimilation than most other types of political systems.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVE

Social and economic modernization disrupts old patterns of authority and destroys traditional political institutions. It does not

necessarily create new authority patterns or new political institutions. But it does create the overriding need for them by broadening political consciousness and political participation. Willy-nilly the United States has helped to mobilize the masses into politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Consciously and conscientiously other groups have done much to organize that mobilization. "The proletariat has no weapon in the struggle for power except organization," said Lenin in 1905; ". . . the proletariat can and will become an unconquerable force only as a result of this." "The great masses of Chileans have no organization," said Frei in 1966, "and without organization no power, and without power no representation in the life of the country." [77] Organization is the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of political liberty. The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or by military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization. Either the established elites compete among themselves to organize the masses through the existing political system, or dissident elites organize them to overthrow that system. In the modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its politics.

77. Lenin, quoted in Rustow, *A World of Nations*, p. 100, from "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward," Robert V. Daniels, ed., *A Documentary History of Communism* (New York, Vintage, 1960) , *1*, 26 f.; Eduardo Frei, quoted in William P. Lineberry, "Chile's Struggle on the Left," *The New Leader, 49* (May 23, 1966) , 6.