
When Movements Anchor Parties

PRINCETON STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
HISTORICAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

*Ira Katznelson, Eric Schickler, Martin Shefter, and Theda Skocpol,
Series Editors*

A list of titles in this series appears at the back of the book

When Movements Anchor Parties

ELECTORAL ALIGNMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

Daniel Schlozman

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Princeton and Oxford

Copyright © 2015 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street,
Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW
press.princeton.edu
All Rights Reserved
ISBN 978-0-691-16469-4
ISBN (pbk.) 978-0-691-16470-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015935301
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Sabon Next LT Pro
Printed on acid-free paper ∞
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

In what will the history of a party consist? Will it be a simple narrative of the internal life of a political organization? . . . Clearly it will be necessary to take some account of the social group of which the party in question is the expression and the most advanced element.

—ANTONIO GRAMSCI, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*

All the New Right has done is copy the success of the old left.

—RICHARD VIGUERIE, *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead*

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xi
CHAPTER 1	
Introduction: The Making of Anchoring Groups	1
CHAPTER 2	
Political Parties and Social Movements	14
PART I	
FORGING ALLIANCE	
CHAPTER 3	
Labor and the Democrats in the New Deal	49
CHAPTER 4	
“We Are Different from Previous Generations of Conservatives”: The New Right and the Mobilization of Evangelicals	77
CHAPTER 5	
The Limits of Influence: Populism and the Antiwar Movement	108
PART II	
MAINTAINING ALLIANCE	
CHAPTER 6	
The Price of Alliance: Labor and the Democrats Meet Postwar Realities	131
CHAPTER 7	
Alliance through Adversity: Labor and the Democrats since the Merger	159
CHAPTER 8	
From the Moral Majority to Karl Rove	198
CHAPTER 9	
The Failure of Abolition-Republicanism	223
CHAPTER 10	
Conclusion: The Future of Alliance	242
<i>Index</i>	257

Introduction

THE MAKING OF ANCHORING GROUPS

“CLEAR IT WITH SIDNEY.” THE TIME WAS JULY 1944, A WEEK BEFORE THE Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The Sidney was Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and chairman of the Congress of Industrial Organizations’ Political Action Committee. The speaker was said to be Franklin Delano Roosevelt, instructing Robert Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a St. Louis pol, to get Hillman’s approval before selecting a vice presidential nominee to replace the erratic Henry Wallace. As a Republican catchphrase, the slogan aimed to show FDR in the pocket of sinister elements sympathetic to communism. Exactly what Roosevelt told Hannegan remains frustratingly out of reach; the evidence is stronger that Hillman quashed the nomination of Jimmy Byrnes, a conservative from South Carolina, than that he affirmatively approved Harry Truman.

Whatever the particulars, granting something like a veto over the year’s most important political decision to the leader of a small men’s clothing union, an immigrant with a thick Eastern European accent, confirmed major shifts in both the Democratic Party and the labor movement. Wallace having become unacceptable to southern conservatives, the party regulars—Hannegan and his pals in other big-city organizations—sought a candidate who would satisfy all factions, including labor. The new reality was clear. As a leftist magazine explained, “there was a deeper reason for the choice of Senator Truman: he was the only candidate on whom both the conservative pro-Roosevelt elements and the most advanced labor groups could agree.”¹ For the labor movement, the moment marked a turning

¹A. B. Magil, “Why They Chose FDR, Truman,” *New Masses*, 1 August 1944, 6.

point: the breakaway CIO had abandoned organized labor's long-standing practice and, through CIO-PAC, embraced party politics to press for broad social legislation that would benefit all workers.

"I know you can't endorse *me*. But . . . I want you to know that I endorse *you*." The date was 22 August 1980. The speaker was Ronald Reagan. The place was the National Affairs Briefing, a gathering of fifteen thousand conservative evangelicals organized by a who's who of the emergent Christian Right and its allies in the conservative movement. And the line was hardly spontaneous: James Robison, a Fort Worth televangelist who entered politics the previous year when his program had been yanked from the local station after he discussed homosexuals recruiting children, had fed it to Reagan in a meeting on the way from the airport.²

The National Affairs Briefing represented a major departure for white evangelicals, who had long shied away from direct engagement in party politics and from alliances that crossed sectarian boundaries. The Dallas event heralded the shift. As Robison told the crowd just before Reagan spoke, "I'm sick and tired of hearing about all of the radicals and the perverts and the liberals and the leftists and the Communists coming out of the closet. It's time for God's people to come out of the closet." Six members of Congress, Republicans all, addressed the crowd; New Right political guru, Paul Weyrich, an Eastern Rite Catholic, spoke on emulating liberals' organization; Phyllis Schlafly, also Catholic, denounced the Equal Rights Amendment; Paige Patterson, a driving force behind the conservative takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention, addressed how "The Bible Sets the Agenda"; and a Georgia judge spoke on "Scientific Creationism."³ The Republican Party, too, had begun to shift. In the 1970s, surveys show, Republicans favored fewer restrictions on abortion than did Democrats.⁴ Yet the party had begun to expand its issue agenda, emphasizing social issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and school prayer, and linking them to the embrace of traditional American values.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Each gathering marked a pivotal juncture in alliance—that is, institutionalized accommodation of mutual priorities—between what I term an

²William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America*, rev. ed. (New York: Broadway Books, 2005), 216; Allen J. Mayer, "A Tide of Born-Again Politics," *Newsweek*, 15 September 1980, 28.

³Howell Raines, "Reagan Backs Evangelicals in Their Political Activities," *New York Times*, 23 August 1980, 8; Box 4, Religious Roundtable file, unprocessed accretion of September 1986, Papers of Paul M. Weyrich, American Heritage Center, Laramie, Wyo.

⁴Greg D. Adams, "Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 730.

“anchoring group” and a major political party. Anchoring groups are organized actors that forego autonomous action to ally with major political parties. Inside parties, anchoring groups exercise broad influence on national politics by virtue of the money, votes, and networks that they offer to the party with which they have allied. Just as other influential actors may keep would-be anchors outside the party, anchoring groups control the entrance into the partisan coalition of new claimants. More than just a logroll, anchoring groups shape parties’ long-term trajectories by enacting favored policies and shaping parties’ ideological development.

This book offers a new framework for understanding party development from the Civil War to the present day, emphasizing the crucial role of social movements. Repeatedly, movements have redefined the fundamental alignments of political parties and, in turn, the organizable alternatives in national politics. The alliances between labor and the Democrats, and the Christian Right and the Republicans have defined parties’ basic priorities, and exerted long-term influence away from the median voter. The two alliances’ fates have proceeded in close parallel with each other. Still more important, they diverged sharply from those of major social movements that failed to find and to maintain a stable place inside political parties.

Mass movements and mass parties emerged together at the dawn of modern democracy, as means for ordinary citizens to influence the state. In the United States, these developments define the Jacksonian era; in Europe, they began in the Age of Revolution and quickened through the nineteenth century.⁵ Movements and parties share a common history—but they hold very different roles, and operate on different time horizons.

Social movements hold special possibility to disrupt the terms of debate and expand ideological horizons. The movements in this study have all offered public philosophies that reframe basic questions asked since the founding. Each has thrust into party politics conflictual, moralistic traditions of

⁵For macrohistorical context, see Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” in *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*, ed. Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 297–317; Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768–2004* (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2004), chap. 2; Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1–64. In Tilly’s definition (“Social Movements and National Politics,” 306), “A social movement is a sustained series of interactions between powerholders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for change in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.” This definition offers a more concrete understanding of power than that in his 2004 book.

reform, protest, and dissent.⁶ Social movements seek radical change—but they cannot simply institutionalize their visions and call it victory. Instead, the American electoral system agglomerates social cleavages inside parties. Given the realities of the Electoral College and a first-past-the-post voting system, movements that seek durable change in the state and its priorities must confront political parties.

“A political party,” wrote E. E. Schattschneider in 1942, “is an organized attempt to get control of the government.”⁷ This venerable definition zeroes in on the goal of parties, and of parties alone. Because political parties organize social conflict—the sine qua non of a democratic party system⁸—they also structure the possibilities for movements to achieve ongoing influence. Movements for fundamental change in American society seek influence through alliance, by serving as anchoring groups to sympathetic parties, because parties hold the special capacity to control the government and its resources, and to define the organizable alternatives in public life.

Through the votes, and networks that they offer to allied parties, anchoring groups gain influence when they ally with a party—but they also gain the power to mold ideological possibilities in republican government. Just as Felix Frankfurter once said of Franklin Roosevelt, anchoring groups “take the country to school” as they inject ideas into partisan politics.⁹ So, too, anchoring groups loom largest in coalition management, allowing into parties’ orbit only partners whose visions can be rendered compatible with their own. These patterns link together: social movements inject foundational ideas into the party system, which then defines the democratic questions to which partisans offer differing answers.¹⁰

Movements join with political parties only on terms acceptable to winning coalitions inside those parties. Political parties want to win election. Otherwise, the politicians and interests that constitute them have no hope of wielding power or setting policy. And pragmatists inside party coalitions know this lesson best of all. Parties accept alliance only with the support of a winning coalition inside the party, including hard-nosed realists as well as ideological sympathizers. If the movement threatens the pragmatists’ core interests, whether electoral or pecuniary, then the party seeks other paths

⁶Seymour Martin Lipset, “Third Parties and Social Movements,” *Dialogue* 5 (1972): 3–8; cf. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1944), chap. 1; Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1982), chap. 2.

⁷E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Rinehart, 1942), lix.

⁸The canonical statement is V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), chap. 14.

⁹Quoted in Marc Landy and Sidney M. Milkis, *Presidential Greatness* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 158.

¹⁰See Nancy L. Rosenblum, *On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

to majority. No movements that meet the terms parties set, no alliance. If parties believe that movement radicals imperil their electoral prospects, then movement moderates must jettison their brethren if they want to sustain alliance with a major party. Anchoring groups pay a high price to join together with parties. Yet given the rules of the game, it is a price well worth paying.¹¹

In a two-party system, it takes a majority to win election and gain access to the levers of power. Alliance requires parties, including pragmatists as well as strong sympathizers, to believe that they can win an ongoing majority with the movement incorporated. Parties must perceive that movements offer them votes and the resources needed to get votes—time, money, and access to networks—to make alliance a beneficial proposition. When movements knit together effective organizations, often politicizing face-to-face networks and exploiting new technology, then parties will find them attractive partners. When they fall apart, parties will swoop in, and organize their supporters directly.

Parties and movements cannot magically join together. While conditions present the opportunity for elites to forge alliance, the real work falls to brokers, midlevel figures with deep ties spanning party and movement. They build coalitions from neither the top down nor the bottom up, but from the inside out and the outside in, stitching together different blocs of supporters and finding policies and candidates with appeal across them. Brokers lower transaction costs, explaining to parties the deal that makes alliance work for both sides: use of the movement's grassroots networks to offer the party electoral support, in return for the party delivering on the movement's substantive priorities.

Over time, parties have lost their monopoly over political resources. They have relied increasingly on outside partners who provide the money, time, and networks required to win office. Those outside groups, for their part, demand policy payback—what I term “ideological patronage”¹²—in return for their support, pushing parties away from the median voter. Through this dynamic, anchoring groups and their competing ideological agendas lie at the roots of polarized politics.

TWO TRANSFORMATIVE ALLIANCES

The reciprocal processes by which organized labor came together with the Democratic Party, and the Christian Right joined with the Republican

¹¹Cf. Paul Frymer, *Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), discussed in the conclusion.

¹²I have taken the term from Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 57.

Party demonstrate remarkable similarities.¹³ Although the cases may seem disparate—a movement of the left centered on the job site and a movement of the right centered in the church—no other social movements have built such broad and deep relationships with political parties over such a long stretch of time. Religion and work, defining sources of meaning in modern life, have animated these alliances. Rather than taking each in isolation and emphasizing its particular telos, systematic comparison emphasizes their similarities as organizers of political conflict.

Both alliances built on connections and alignments adumbrated in prior campaigns. In 1908 and 1916, the American Federation of Labor supported Democratic presidential candidates in exchange for promises to limit labor injunctions. “Fighting Bob” La Follette’s third-party insurgency in 1924 brought together many of the key supporters of labor-liberalism in the coming decade: old Progressives from the West and the settlement houses, moderate socialists, and labor unions. So, too, the networks forged among conservative activists in the Goldwater campaign and the Young Americans for Freedom formed the nucleus of the political New Right. Yet these early efforts hardly resembled full-blown party-group alliance.

In 1936 and in 1980, anchoring groups mounted large-scale, nominally independent, efforts to elect realigning presidents. Group leaders vouched for the candidates, as they gave entrée into voting blocs not yet cemented in their partisan loyalties. Labor’s Non-Partisan League, spearheaded by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, spent millions to reelect Franklin Roosevelt. In 1980, Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, along with other new groups such as Christian Voice, sought to rouse the “sleeping giant” of American evangelicals against the born-again Jimmy Carter, whom they viewed as a failure in office. However unsophisticated in the mechanics of electioneering they may have been, these efforts set out the leading edges of campaigns to reframe electoral coalitions and Americans’ expectations of the state.

Amid convulsive social change, midlevel entrepreneurs from both party and movement took advantage of opportunities around galvanizing events to politicize key actors in civil society and meld internal group and broader partisan cleavages. In 1935, John L. Lewis stomped out of the AF of L convention in Atlantic City after punching the Carpenters’ “Big Bill” Hutcheson in the jaw. He formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations to embrace

¹³I use the term “Christian Right” as opposed to “Religious Right” to note the movement’s particular religion. The term “conservative” has different meanings in religious and political contexts, and in upper- and lowercase, while the term “profamily,” often used in movement circles, converts a valence issue—the family—into a position issue. “Christian Right,” however imperfect, seems the best shorthand to describe a complex and multifaceted set of leaders and mass publics evolving over decades.

positions long anathema to the federation: to “organize the unorganized” in industrial unions, and to fight for social legislation that would benefit all workers, organized or not. In 1979, conservatives began their takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention, the nation’s largest Protestant denomination, committing the SBC to a platform of biblical inerrancy—and also, for the first time, to opposing abortion rights and the Equal Rights Amendment.

More than realigning presidents, midlevel brokers such as Hillman and Weyrich, located at key sites of power across the sprawling American state, made alliance. Young movement loyalists and their intellectual allies moved into government, aggressively staffing up the New Deal administrative state, and decades later attempting to channel hiring, regulations, and rulemaking to new ends. The executive branch followed the dictum of New Right operative turned Reagan aide Morton Blackwell, who expressly emulated Franklin Roosevelt: “personnel is policy.”¹⁴

In Congress, partisan brokers reached out to give the movement space to organize, and to demonstrate the rewards for involvement. The key figure in the Second New Deal of 1935 was Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, the loyal Democrat who wrote the law guaranteeing most workers the right to bargain collectively. In the late 1970s and 1980s, a passel of congressional conservatives stopped the Carter administration from revoking tax exemptions for discriminatory schools formed in the wake of school desegregation (so-called seg academies) and banned federal dollars for abortions. Later, they enacted a universal child tax credit, and banned abortions by intact dilation and extraction.

Cementing the partnerships between movements and parties took further, less-dramatic rounds of institution building. Labor and the Christian Right routinized the coming together first effected in moments of ideological tumult. As movements sought to prove themselves as responsible partners even in politically unfriendly times, they discarded troublesome voices—communists in the one instance, millennialists and televangelists in the other—and shifted toward maintaining ongoing influence *inside* political parties.

After disillusion and defeat—the devastating 1942 midterm elections, and the collapse of the Moral Majority amid policy drift in the late Reagan years—savvier leaders, with deep ties in party as well as movement circles formed new groups to lead effective political efforts. Supporters and opponents alike tagged them as vote-getting machines. Even as they espoused fundamental visions of social change, many radical elements ultimately accepted the rationale for working inside a political party. Sidney Hillman

¹⁴Quoted in Becky Norton Dunlop, “The Role of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel,” in *Steering the Elephant: How Washington Works*, ed. Robert Rector and Michael Sanera (New York: Universe, 1987), 145.

founded CIO-PAC for the 1944 elections. It matured politically—and was joined by Labor’s League for Political Education from the AF of L—in 1948, when labor helped mastermind Harry Truman’s unlikely victory. Although Pat Robertson failed to win a single state in his 1988 run for the GOP nomination, he brought hundreds of thousands of evangelicals and Pentecostals into electoral politics for the first time. They served as the base for the Christian Coalition, which he formed in 1989 with the young GOP operative Ralph Reed. CIO-PAC and the Christian Coalition established ties with political parties far closer than those of their predecessor organizations.

In return, the anchoring groups have wielded effective vetoes on important appointments—to the vice presidency or the Supreme Court. Especially when anchoring groups have leveraged other bases of support inside party coalitions, they have achieved victories against long odds. Labor has protected the welfare state and pushed toward full employment. The Christian Right has funneled public dollars into faith-based programs, appointing a phalanx of conservative judges, and gaining a public role for faith. Nevertheless, cherished policy hopes—reformed labor law, a ban on abortions—have remained unmet.

Alliance has always had internal opponents, even in friendly parties. Libertarian-minded conservatives, worried about the loyalties of tolerant young people, may abandon the Christian Right on issues around gay rights. Similarly, Democrats for Education Reform now seeks to place teachers’ unions and their inflexible ways at the center of education policy debates, asking Democrats about the price of some of their most loyal backers.

Courts critically shaped the process of party-group alliance. For unions, the story happened earlier in their life cycle. The labor injunction and restrictions from the Commerce and Due Process Clauses had long constrained both unions and social-welfare legislation. These hostile realities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries nurtured Gompersian voluntarism, with workers extracting benefits directly from employers. When the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act in 1937, it opened the door for unions to safeguard the interests of all workers, without fear of losing their special privileges. For its part, anger at Supreme Court decisions on abortion and school prayer helped to mobilize the Christian Right into politics. This focus has remained in the decades since, encompassing both legal strategies through conservative legal organizations, as well as political activism around court decisions, the role of judging, and even the rules for judicial selection.

Albeit in different ways, racial politics centrally shaped the trajectories of both these alliances, whose formation bracketed the civil rights years. Southern opposition to labor, predicated on the fear that strong unions threatened Jim Crow, sharply limited the reach of labor-liberalism, and pushed unions inward to defend their prerogatives and seek benefits

through the private welfare state as the conservative coalition in Congress blocked public programs. A generation later, the crumbling of the Solid South and “white backlash” created possibilities for evangelicals regardless of region to ally with the Republican Party. Two critical episodes—the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act over Truman’s veto in 1947, with support from southern Democrats as well as Republicans, and the controversy over the IRS’s plans to revoke the tax exemptions of racially discriminatory schools in 1978—demonstrate the ways that racial politics impinged on issues of class and religion respectively.

As movements became fully incorporated into partisan politics, they lost the fringes unacceptable to their partisan allies and forswore sweeping notions of a renewed society. Movement moderates—although not, to be sure, moderates in the system as a whole—oversaw multilevel bargains that sprawled across campaigns, appointments, and policies. Anchoring groups have represented, in many instances, the most radical voices included inside the party system. Yet if 1935 and 1979 signaled the rise of ideologues pushing groups into large-scale issues about where society ought to go, then 1948, especially, and 1989 represented victories for accommodation as majorities proved harder to build. Partial victories inside the system prevailed over more sweeping visions of industrial democracy or a Christian America. Despite predictions, in rocky patches, that alliance would soon end in divorce or oblivion, these partnerships continue to shape the Democratic and Republican Parties, and their responses to fundamental questions about the kind of society in which Americans seek to live.

OUTLINE

The coming chapters develop these themes. Part I asks why movements get inside, or remain frozen outside, the party system. Part II then asks why movements stay inside, or are forced outside, the party system. Each part begins with the story of organized labor and the Democrats, moves onto that of the Christian Right and the Republicans, and finally considers “shadow cases” of movements that failed respectively to ally and to consolidate alliance with major parties. The book moves progressively through the process of alliance rather than chronologically through historical time. By moving the narrative forward in alliance time, the sequence highlights how the same mechanisms of party-movement alliance have played out across very different eras.

Chapter 2 lays out a framework to analyze the confrontations of parties and movements. Political parties accept alliance with potential anchoring groups only when winning coalitions inside those parties see the path to ongoing electoral majority with the anchoring group incorporated. They

TABLE 1.1
 POTENTIAL ALLIANCES BETWEEN PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS

Movement	Party	Elections	Outcome
Abolitionism	Republicans	1860–96	Incorporated but not consolidated
Populism	Democrats	1892, 1896	Not incorporated
Labor-CIO	Democrats	1936–present	Incorporated and consolidated
Anti-Vietnam War	Democrats	1968, 1972	Not incorporated
Christian Right	Republicans	1980–present	Incorporated and consolidated

see that path, in turn, when the anchoring group does not threaten their core interests, and when it is sufficiently organized so as to offer electoral incentives—votes, money, time, and networks—unavailable to the party if it mobilizes movement supporters directly. When powerful forces inside parties exercise their blocking power to exclude movements, then movements face nearly impossible odds to institutionalize themselves, or to find their ideological visions a place in ongoing political contestation.

The following chapters apply that structure to critical episodes of party development at each major realignment in the American party system. Table 1.1 lists the five potential alliances between movement and party that this book explores, the presidential elections in which movements played a role, and then the ultimate outcome of alliance in the party system.

Part I examines the moments when major social movements mobilized politically quiescent publics and first confronted political parties. Chapter 3 explores the alliance of organized labor and the Democratic Party in the New Deal years. The breakaway Congress of Industrial Organizations reversed the long-standing philosophy of the American Federation of Labor to eschew partisan politics, and simply “reward its friends and punish its enemies.” The Wagner Act gave state sanction to labor unions, and required employers to recognize and bargain with representatives of workers’ own choosing. Newly emboldened by a sympathetic state, the CIO embraced industrial unionism and the welfare state, and opened its treasury and mobilized its members on behalf of sympathetic candidates, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in 1936.

Chapter 4 considers the entrance into Republican Party politics of white evangelicals during the late 1970s. New Right brokers, led by the direct mail wizard Richard Viguerie and the Coors-funded organizer Paul Weyrich, sought out evangelicals as the crucial new component of a lasting

conservative majority, culminating in the founding of Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority in 1979. The New Right demonstrated to evangelicals how electoral politics impinged on their religious practice—and then mobilized them on the basis of perceived threat.

Chapter 5 tackles two great failures, movements that fell apart before their remnants ended up in the Democratic fold: Populism in the 1880s and 1890s, and the antiwar movement of the 1960s. In each instance, at the moment of movements' greatest strength, parties would not accept alliance with actors they deemed injurious to their core interests. By the time the parties began to come around, movement organization had dissipated and any possibilities for a national majority had vanished. The Silverite remnants of the Populist crusade merged into the Democrats in 1896, while the antiwar senator George McGovern won the presidential nomination in 1972 only after the movement had splintered and the public had tired of casualties in Vietnam. With Populism died the most serious challenge to corporate capitalism that United States would ever see. Although its personnel occupied positions at the top of the Democratic Party for decades, the antiwar movement failed to restrain American empire or reorient American democracy toward a more authentic politics.

Part II treats parties and anchoring groups further in their life cycle. Over time, movement energy dissipates into the ongoing back-and-forth of ordinary politics. The extraordinary circumstances that propelled initial victories recede, even as fundamental controversies from formative moments remain touchstones of partisan division. Majorities prove evanescent and other actors inside parties grow wary. Movements focus on the imperatives of organizational maintenance, exercising influence inside parties and protecting their policy victories even when they cannot realize their visions for a transformed society. To that end, they attempt to build with their partisan partners virtuous circles that trade policy and influence in exchange for votes and the resources that deliver them. Alliance works when those circles benefit both partners, and when other influencers inside the party accept their legitimacy. Should they break down, so does alliance.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the long alliance between labor and the Democratic Party in the seven decades since the end of the Second World War. As Chapter 6 explains, organized labor cemented its status in the postwar Democratic order, but only at an enormous price. The CIO and, after 1955, the merged AFL-CIO, buoyed Democratic candidates and pushed them toward liberal priorities. At the peak, unions represented more than a third of American workers. Yet it was not the thirties. Congress passed the strongly antilabor Taft-Hartley Act over Harry Truman's veto. The CIO forced out its left-led unions, home of the most talented organizers, when they would not endorse the staunchly anticommunist Truman. And once

Congress blocked expanded pensions and universal health care, unions negotiated benefits at the bargaining table that foreclosed future possibilities for public provision.

Chapter 7 brings the story to the present. Starting in the late 1960s, labor and the Democrats endured their roughest years, tested by Vietnam and the “New Politics.” Since the 1970s, the fragile foundations of the postwar order have eroded. Weak federal labor law and a patchwork welfare state, unresolved issues from the Fair Deal years, have reemerged amid conservative resurgence. The divide between party and movement has healed; labor’s structural position continues to worsen. Organized labor seeks the same goals as it has for decades: space to organize, and support from the state for all workers. Labor’s influence inside an emasculated Democratic coalition remains robust—for now.

Chapter 8 explores the Christian Right as it has matured. The sharp distinctions between party on the one hand and movement on the other have softened, and group-specific infrastructure has atrophied. A sequence of peak associations—the Moral Majority, ACTV, the Christian Coalition—have flamed out and, with many of the same leaders and direct-mail supporters, re-formed. All the while, Christian conservatives have grown far more influential inside the organizational Republican Party. The GOP, in turn, has increasingly mobilized church-based networks for its candidates directly, without relying on the assistance of group elites. Evangelicals and their allies may eventually serve as a particularly influential party faction rather than as an ongoing anchoring group.

Chapter 9 takes up another case of failed incorporation, albeit from a very different starting point in party politics: after the Civil War and the end of slavery, the abolitionist movement failed to sustain alliance between African Americans and their northern supporters, and a Republican Party dominated by the interests of northern industry. Although perhaps the most consequential alliance in American history, the movement failed to sustain effective infrastructure in the North, nor did it forge effective links between the freedmen and northern supporters of the Union cause. What began as a social movement died in high politics. In Reconstruction and after, alliance frayed as the Republican Party followed the interests of its core industrialist backers, and forsook its founding heritage.

The conclusion, finally, tackles the problem of writing political history in medias res with some speculation on the future. Both the Occupy movement of 2011 and the Tea Party have aimed to remake American politics. Although the framework presented here helps to make sense of their experience, neither one precisely fits the model of a potential anchoring group—and for rather different reasons. Occupy revealed in its rejection of hierarchical organization and lost any infrastructural capacity before it meaningfully confronted the party system. The Tea Party, for its part,

should be understood more as a party faction aiming to take control of a party than as a social movement with independent goals and supporters.

And so history will continue on. Parties will look to outside supporters for various baskets of resources, and welcome or fear new claimants. Citizens seeking to change society will join together in social movements. They will call Americans back to their visions of what its founding demands, and make claims for opinions and on behalf of social groups often heretofore invisible. Yet they will do so inside a framework that imposes harsh limits on party and movement alike. Parties will have to cobble together majorities from diffuse collections of minorities. Movements will have to hold specific influence over supporters in order to induce parties to move far from the median and include them in their fold. Whatever the issues and whomever the players, when major social movements confront parties, the stakes will remain high. As long as political parties determine competing alternative visions in public life, the entrance into party politics of social movements making radical claims will play a critical role in determining the organizable alternatives in American public life.

Acknowledgments

AS I HAVE TOILED FOR FAR TOO LONG ON THIS BOOK, LET ME BEGIN WITH A round of appreciation to absolutely everyone who has pointedly, and often reproachfully, asked me when I might finally finish. Extraordinary scholars supervised the dissertation from which this book arose. Theda Skocpol, my advisor, trained me that thinking historically and thinking rigorously go hand in hand. She has watched over this project since its gestation. Without her, it would have been done badly—or not at all. Andrea Campbell, ever supportive, taught me to turn concepts into prose, not least by learning what should get left on the cutting-room floor. Eric Schickler combines deep knowledge about American political history, wide-ranging interests in political science, and remarkable good cheer. Sid Verba has rare wisdom about many subjects academic and otherwise. I would be a better scholar and person if I took all his advice—at least I’ve now followed his dictum to “get it done.”

My thinking on religion owes much to the Saguaro Seminar, and particularly to Valerie Lewis and Robert Putnam. My colleagues at Johns Hopkins University have provided a wonderful environment in which to complete this book. I thank Bentley Allan, Joe Cooper, Matt Crenson, Ben Ginsberg, Adam Sheingate, Lester Spence, Steve Teles, Chloe Thurston, and Emily Zackin for all their thoughts on the manuscript.

Over the years, more discussants, panelists, and friends than I can recount have offered thoughts or have read particular sections. Dorian Warren offered detailed notes on the labor chapters. Paul Frymer and David Karol traveled to Baltimore for an extremely stimulating book conference that helped me to clarify the argument. Entirely unbidden, several special people read the entire manuscript: John Corcoran (every liberal should have so steadfast a right-wing friend), Colin Moore (who also provided a beachside tutorial on the political development of Hawaii), Sam Rosenfeld (whose combination of political historian and editor gave this book its title), and Kay Schlozman (thanks, Mom). Dan Galvin and an anonymous reviewer provided extensive and helpful comments for Princeton University Press. As only those who saw early drafts could possibly understand, the concepts and the prose alike owe much to their now-virtual red pencils. At the press,

the editor, Eric Crahan, Jenny Wolkowicki, and Joseph Dahm skillfully brought the book into print.

For more than a decade, I spent my spare hours doing party politics, and even served a term as chair of the Cambridge (Mass.) Democratic City Committee. I count all the mornings holding signs in the cold, and all the nights on folding chairs in storefront offices, as my real education in politics. So many mentors taught me how to play the game—and, still more important, why it's worth the good fight—among them Mo Barbosa, Jarrett Barrios, Donna Barry, Larry Field, Helen Glikman, Avi Green, Elaine Kistiakowsky, Gerry McDonough, Jesse Mermell, K.D. Mernin, Mark Puleo, Trellis Stepter, and Alice Wolf. I especially remember Brian Murphy, whom we lost far too soon.

Finally, I thank my family. My sister, Julia, bucked up my spirits and listened to tale after tale of political intrigue. My parents, Kay and Stan Schlozman, offered equal and opposite contributions: my mother has always taken me and my ideas seriously; my father has never taken me too seriously. In the fall of 1934, at the tender age of fifteen, my grandfather, Elliot Lehman, moved from one seedbed of the New Deal to the other. After graduating from DeWitt Clinton High School in New York City, he headed off to the University of Wisconsin. His father thought that Elliot would be looked after in Madison by a cousin on the faculty, the labor economist Selig Perlman. (That very spring, I recently learned, Perlman had supervised the senior thesis of Wilbur Cohen, soon to become “Mr. Social Security.”) As it transpired, Cousin Selig was too busy writing about the job consciousness of American trade unions—a concept that returns in the pages that follow—to pay Elliot much heed. However, Elliot soon met a whip-smart Chicagoan named Frances Mecklenburger, and they recently celebrated their seventy-fourth anniversary. So, as the circle comes round, I dedicate this book to my grandparents, lifelong New Deal Democrats all: to the memory of Mary and Morris Schlozman, and to Frances and Elliot Lehman.

Abbreviations

ABL	American Bimetallic League
ACTV	American Coalition for Traditional Values
ACWA	Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
ADA	Americans for Democratic Action
AFL/AF of L	American Federation of Labor
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFSCME	American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees
AFT	American Federation of Teachers
ALP	American Labor Party
CBN	Christian Broadcasting Network
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations (from 1935 to 1938, Committee for Industrial Organization)
CIO-PAC	CIO–Political Action Committee
CNP	Council for National Policy
COPE	Committee on Political Education (of the AFL-CIO)
CP	Communist Party of the United States of America
CSFC	Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress
DNC	Democratic National Committee
EFCOA	Employee Free Choice Act
ERA	Equal Rights Amendment
ERLC	Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission (of the Southern Baptist Convention)
FEPC	Fair Employment Practices Committee

ILGWU	International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
ILWU	International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
IUE	International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
LLPE	Labor's League for Political Education
LNPL	Labor's Non-Partisan League
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NC-PAC	National Citizens Political Action Committee
NCPAC	National Conservative Political Action Committee
NEA	National Education Association
NIRA	National Industrial Recovery Act
NLRA	National Labor Relations Act
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board
NRTWC	National Right to Work Committee
PAC	Political Action Committee
PATCO	Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
PCA	Progressive Citizens of America
RAVCO	Richard Viguerie Company
RNC	Republican National Committee
SBC	Southern Baptist Convention
SEIU	Service Employees International Union
SP	Socialist Party of America
UAW	United Automobile Workers
UE	United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
UMW	United Mine Workers of America
UPWA	United Public Workers of America
USWA	United Steelworkers of America
YAF	Young Americans for Freedom

When Movements Anchor Parties

Political Parties and Social Movements

THE FERTILE AND CONTESTED MEETING GROUND BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES and social movements has made and remade American politics. As the incentives of parties to win elections have interacted with the incentives of movements to exert influence, would-be anchoring groups have found their place in or out of the party system. Together, these confrontations between party and movement have shaped parties' long-term ideological trajectories, and defined the possibilities and limits in national politics.

Influencers inside parties are made, not born. Movements cannot simply wish themselves to become anchoring groups inside the party system. Instead, their presence inside—or absence from—parties itself requires explanation. Therefore, rather than simply asking *who* has influence inside political parties, we must ask *how* those influencers got their influence. And asking that question, in turn, requires asking about both who didn't get influence and how, and what difference it has made.

This chapter offers a framework to make sense of the circumstances under which parties will—or will not—ally with a particularly critical category of influencers: the major social movements that confront them. To summarize the argument, political parties have achieved durable alliance with social movements when two conditions intersect. First, winning coalitions inside parties perceive that the party can achieve durable electoral majority with the movement incorporated. Not all these partisan actors, and certainly not the pivotal ones, agree with the movement in all its particulars. Rather, they favor alliance over alternative paths to build the coalitions that will win them elections. Second, for parties to pay movements' price of admission, they must believe that movements control resources—votes, money, and networks—unavailable to parties themselves. That judgment in turn requires serious organization building on movements' part, tying together grassroots supporters with elite brokers whom parties trust to deliver on their electoral bargains.

Specifically, I define that parties achieve alliance with movements when winning coalitions of partisan and movement elites accept the bulk, albeit not the totality, of each other's priorities, and when movements wield legitimate vetoes, over partisan priorities in Congress and presidential nomination, that reorient the party's long-term ideological trajectory.

The coming pages make sense of alliance step by step, proceeding through the logic behind each of these concerns. Social movements and political parties each enter into and then maintain alliance under constrained circumstances that have interacted with changing patterns of political conflict across time and between the parties.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS MEET PARTIES

The contested meeting point between social movements and political parties, relatively little theorized, comes at a moment in the life cycle after the questions usually asked about social movements, and before the questions usually asked about parties. Yet it crucially determines critical variables for scholars of movements and of parties: the institutionalization (or dissolution) of social movements, and the place of groups in the party system.

By the point in their development when they confront the party system, movements must have already framed issues, catalyzed members, and cultivated allies.¹ Those are tall orders, and research beginning with movements' origins would undoubtedly emphasize different variables. Some movements may, in a relative instant and at critical junctures for a political regime, influence mainstream actors, who preempt, co-opt, institutionalize, or otherwise respond to movement demands. At such moments, structural opportunities hold far more sway than any factors internal to movements. The Townsend movement, which pushed for generous universal pensions in the 1930s, serves as a particularly apt example.²

¹See, e.g., Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Social Movements," in *Handbook of Sociology*, ed. Neil Smelser (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1988), 695–737; Sidney Tarrow, "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41–61; Bert Useem and Mayer N. Zald, "From Pressure Group to Social Movement: Organizational Dilemmas of the Effort to Promote Nuclear Power," *Social Problems* 30 (1982): 144–56.

²See the important dispute between William Gamson and Jack Goldstone on goals, tactics, and organization, as opposed to structural opportunities, in determining movement outcomes; reprinted in William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd ed. (Belmont,

Nevertheless, the story here continues beyond the point where most scholars of American social movements leave off: as movements struggle to join forces with mainstream allies, win recognition from the state, and find their place in ongoing political contestation. Simply to say that movements institutionalize or that they switch to conventional tactics avoids hard questions about the opportunity structure, conditioned above all by the electoral regime, that they face.³

Alliance between parties and social movements represents a particularly consequential outcome for movements seeking to reshape American society, but not the only one. Movements represent a minority; they must make an impact that persuades a majority. Robert Dahl, in the concluding chapter of his 1967 textbook, outlined a trilemma of mutually exclusive and exhaustive options:

- “The movement can organize a separate political party.”
- “Although it remains neutral between the two major parties, the movement can act as a pressure group to secure favorable legislation and the nomination and election of sympathetic candidates.”
- “By entering into one of the existing parties, the movement can become an element in a major party coalition; it can then use its bargaining power to gain influence for the movement within the party.”⁴

Even as movement activists continue to debate these alternatives, the first two strategies offer grave perils to movements seeking major social change that impinges on state policies. If both extant parties prove hostile to movement demands and unwilling to accept alliance, a movement may form a third party to supplant them. Only the Republicans in the 1850s have succeeded in displacing a major party. The People’s Party in 1892 tried to

Calif.: Wadsworth, 1990); and Edwin Amenta, *When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Soon, however, the Townsendites confronted the party system. Beginning in the 1936 election (and after their peak influence), they followed a pressure-group strategy, endorsing rural Republicans as well as populist Democrats, as they sought universal old-age annuities.

³For important exceptions, see Jack A. Goldstone, “Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics,” in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–24; and Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, “Social Movements and Elections: Toward a Broader Understanding of the Political Context of Contention,” in *The Future of Social Movement Research: Dynamics, Mechanisms, and Processes*, ed. Jacquelin van Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband, and Bert Klandermans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 2013), 325–46. To be sure, the march toward institutionalization is not universal. In a few instances (parts of the New Left, for example) radical cadres may direct movements further toward militant protest. For a typology, see Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context,” in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives*, 157.

⁴Robert Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 429–30. Dahl further distinguishes between single-issue third parties such as the Greenbackers and third-party coalitions such as the Progressives of 1924.

disrupt the existing parties, but failed. In the twentieth century, even as maximalists occasionally dreamed of a third party, unconnected outsiders promising to clean up political messes largely supplanted social movements in waving the banner for third parties.⁵

As Dahl warned, “a movement that seeks something more than its own group interests may conclude that as a pure pressure group it will exert too limited an influence over the policies of the American republic.”⁶ And so it was for each of these atypically consequential movements. The vast majority of groups eyeing the American party system debate trade-offs between strategies that emphasize, in various measure, working inside a single party or else lobbying both parties.⁷ Although minimalists advocated incremental lobbying strategies, movement leaders in every instance explored here recognized the power of the party system to enact policy and define alternatives. Instead, the real challenge has come not in choosing strategy but in implementing it, as movements have struggled to find the allies and build the infrastructure that allows them to attain and maintain a place in the party system.

Maximalists who prize movement autonomy and confrontational tactics may also wish to elide the trilemma altogether, and continue to agitate from the outside.⁸ Such a decision augurs enormous risk. No social movement has sustained effective militancy on a society-wide basis—rather than inside a single organization—over decades. Passions fade; radicals and moderates split; organizations collapse.⁹ Windows to enter the party system often open and close quickly.¹⁰ Movements’ legacies influence politics even if the movement cannot effectuate alliance, by changing the policy agenda and leaving behind an activist core, but should movements miss their opportunity to

⁵Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, *Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁶Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy*, 454.

⁷On the relation between parties and interest groups, see E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), 54–60; E. E. Schattschneider, “United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government,” in *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics*, ed. Sigmund Neumann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 213–14; V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), 155–61; John Mark Hansen, *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 222–27; and Mildred A. Schwartz, “Interactions between Social Movements and US Political Parties,” *Party Politics* 16 (2010): 587–607. For a comparative review, see Elin H. Allern and Tim Bale, “Political Parties and Interest Groups: Disentangling Complex Relationships,” *Party Politics* 18 (2012): 7–25.

⁸Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (1977; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

⁹Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

¹⁰John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), chap. 8.

transform politics, it rarely comes again. The trilemma is both a choice and an iron cage.

POLITICAL PARTIES MEET MOVEMENTS

Political parties require resources in order to secure ongoing majorities. Those resources come from other actors, increasingly organized across diffuse “party networks” that link together party organizations, ideologically driven party factions, and pressure groups.¹¹ Organized groups offer specific influence through social networks that encompass activists and supporters, and resources in money and time beyond the reach of individual activists. Yet those groups, like many issue activists in their ranks, hold views distant from the median, and demand that parties move closer to them in order to access their votes and resources. As Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos write, “When challenged by sustained, national movements attuned to electoral politics, ‘playing to the base’ can come to be seen as more important strategically than courting the ‘median voter.’”¹²

To gain the collective benefits, including party identification and shared electoral resources, that parties provide, politicians accept demands from off-median actors as they compete to win office.¹³ Hence, parties seek alliance with movements because movement leaders, with the power to direct resources and frame issues, have access to resources that political parties covet but cannot control directly. Those movement elites, therefore, may use their influence—through access to votes, and the money, time, and networks that help in winning votes, or else the threat of disruptive protest—as ransom with parties seeking to hold and maintain power. In return for providing parties with this access, movements bargain to extract off-median concessions. These may include policy (“ideological patronage”), vetoes over key appointments and positions, public jobs for supporters, esteem and prestige, and access to ongoing state policies. It is a mutually beneficial exchange relationship.¹⁴

¹¹Gregory Koger, Seth Masket, and Hans Noel, “Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2009): 633–53; Matt Grossmann and Casey B. K. Dominguez, “Party Coalitions and Interest Group Networks,” *American Politics Research* 37 (2009): 767–800; Michael T. Heaney, Seth E. Masket, Joanne M. Miller, and Dara Z. Strolovitch, “Polarized Networks: The Organizational Affiliations of National Party Convention Delegates,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 56 (2012): 1654–76.

¹²Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos, *Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Post-war America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 10.

¹³John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 50; he expands on Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1957).

¹⁴John D. May, “Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity,” *Political Studies* 21 (1973): 151–73; Thomas Quinn, “Block Voting in the Labour Party: A Political Exchange Model,” *Party Politics* 8 (2002): 207–26.

TABLE 2.1
PARTISAN SUPPORT, MOVEMENT CAPACITY, AND ALLIANCE

Alliance	Strength of allies in party	Independent movement capacity	Outcome
Abolition-GOP	Medium (1868) then low	Medium (1868) then low	Incorporated but not consolidated
Populism-Dems	Low	High (1892) then low (1896)	Not incorporated
Labor-Dems	High	High	Incorporated
Antiwar-Dems	Low (1968) then high (1972)	Medium (1968) then low (1972)	Not incorporated
Christian Right-GOP	Medium	High	Incorporated

In such a world, a party develops as a group-oriented, policy-demanding long coalition; this is the powerful insight of research from the past decade.¹⁵ Yet a theory that places high-demanders front and center cannot simply bracket the question of who becomes a high-demander, or of how the answer has changed. Rather, to understand movements and parties fully, we must study them together as they have developed jointly over time.

Table 2.1 applies this framework to the episodes of party development explored in the coming chapters. The second column summarizes the strength of movements' allies—that is, the organized actors inside the party who favor alliance over alternative paths to building a majority, whether for reasons of deep sympathy with the movement's project or pragmatic desire for victory and its spoils. The third column offers a capsule assessment of movement elites' capacity to overcome collective action problems and mobilize supporters on behalf of partisan allies. Each anchoring alliance—between organized labor and the Democrats, and the Christian Right and the Republicans—combined support inside the party with strong mobilization capacity.

The other would-be anchoring groups did not achieve that combination, and they could not consolidate long-term incorporation inside parties. The position of the freedmen and their northern allies inside the Republican

¹⁵Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller, "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics," *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (2012): 571–97; and Martin Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller, *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). See also David Karol, *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), which emphasizes group allies' leverage over members of Congress.

Party deteriorated as their Radical allies lost sway, and as abolitionist organizations and the Freedmen's Bureau alike folded up their tents, rendering far more difficult the process of mobilization apart from partisan patronage channels. The other two movements never found a stable place inside parties. Populism threatened the Democratic Party, which embraced only its Silverite fringe. The movement transformed itself into a third party in 1892, but by the time it sought fusion (in this book's parlance, alliance) with the Democrats, the cooperatives that sustained it had collapsed, and the Democrats, on their way to an epochal defeat, swooped in to attract its voters while freezing out movement elites. The antiwar movement in 1968 faced a hostile Democratic Party still under the control of hawkish regulars. By 1972, with reformers in the ascendance and the dovish George McGovern the nominee, the movement had splintered apart. Again, albeit on more favorable terms, the party appealed directly to supporters. Only when parties accept movement allies, and movement allies deliver resources, can both sides effectuate durable partnership.

Parties not only link elites and masses, but also shape the contours of political conflict. Together, the "lines of cleavage" that divide and "the outer boundaries" that demarcate parties' positions mark the organizable alternatives at a given historical moment.¹⁶ Realignment theory at its grandest sought to explain both electoral outcomes and the basic issues over which the parties grappled.¹⁷ For a generation, scholars emphasized the former claims, and examined the American party system principally in terms of candidates and elections. Yet the attempt to identify particular critical elections has fallen out of academic favor.

¹⁶Quotes from respectively James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1983), 23; and Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970), 10.

¹⁷On realignment, see V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (1955): 3–18; V. O. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," *Journal of Politics* 21 (1959): 198–210; Schattschneider, *Semisovereign People*, chaps. 4 and 5; Burnham, *Critical Elections*; Jerome M. Clubb, William M. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980); Sundquist, *Dynamics*; David Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Larry M. Bartels, "Electoral Continuity and Change, 1868–1996," *Electoral Studies* 17 (1998): 301–26; David R. Mayhew, *Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). For an intellectual history, see Theodore Rosenof, *Realignment: The Theory That Changed the Way We Think about American Politics* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). Note that Mayhew attacks principally the claims about critical elections. He interprets partisan alignment primarily in terms of parties' ideological self-presentation (drawing on John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]), rather than their representation—or nonrepresentation—of groups or interests. The emphasis on alignments emerges especially from Schattschneider, *Semisovereign People*, chap. 4; and Sundquist, *Dynamics*, chap. 2.

This book takes up the other side of realignment theory, and focuses on alignments—that is, on political parties’ competing positions, rooted in coalitional interests.¹⁸ It reinterprets party development through the movement origins of partisan alignments. In every realignment since the 1850s, a potential anchoring group has sought entrance into politics demanding, in the context of the prior political order, radical change. Alignments privilege and discourage conflict along certain issues; they are vulnerable to disruption along some lines but not others. Together alignments define the ideas and interests represented (or nor represented) in the party system. As Samuel Beer wrote of the New Deal years, “one side says ‘yes,’ the other ‘no,’ but they are trying to answer the same question.”¹⁹

The era of polarization raises questions of alignment anew. The parties have nationalized, divided on ever more issues, and grown more internally coherent. Activists inside, on the penumbra of, and outside formal parties have forged our conceptions of liberalism and conservatism.²⁰ Given their size and importance in coalition management, anchoring groups have a special role among the polarizers who have built the contemporary coalitions. Even if the underlying ideas originated earlier and the ultimate effects in roll calls appeared later, anchoring groups have reified substantive disagreements into ideology, and chained them to partisan priorities. The CIO retooled liberalism for the urban worker and injected race into the Democratic coalition, while the Christian Right offered social conservatism in a form maximally acceptable to big and small business alike. Above all anchoring groups have muscle behind their pronouncements: they deploy resources to favored candidates, forcing politicians to respond to these alternative bases of authorities. Anchoring groups are, in short, polarizers with troops.

PATTERNS OF ALLIANCE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

As movements have sought allies inside parties and resources to offer to those allies, however, they have done so under highly variant circumstances.

¹⁸On changing alignments over time, see Sundquist, *Dynamics*; A. James Reichley, *The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties*, updated ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, *Dynamics of American Political Parties* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹⁹Samuel H. Beer, “In Search of a New Public Philosophy,” in *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 6.

²⁰For recent treatments, see Hans Noel, *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Katherine Krimmel, “Special Interest Partisanship: The Transformation of American Political Parties” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013); and Sam Rosenfeld, “A Choice, Not an Echo: Polarization and the Transformation of the American Party System” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2014).

Over time, parties have lost their monopoly over the electoral process and become increasingly reliant on resources from outside partners. The available alternatives for would-be anchoring groups have been largely sequential. In the nineteenth century, parties controlled politics, from slating candidates to printing ballots to mobilizing voters. When movements sought to exercise influence inside existing parties, they held few cards against internal opponents—and with little room inside existing parties, often looked instead to form third parties.

After 1896, party competition declined in most regions. Movements harnessed new organizational forms to create pressure groups that lobbied both parties. Since the New Deal, traditional political organizations have receded and the parties hollowed out. Since the 1970s, the parties have divided as supporters sorted themselves into rival camps and conflict diffused across institutional boundaries. With their reach exceeding their grasp, parties have looked to movements to gain resources and reach out to supporters. A surfeit of alliances between parties and movements uniquely define the warring camps in contemporary politics.

These patterns have abraded against consistent differences between the major parties.²¹ Alliances between movements and the diffuse, fractious Democrats have generally emerged from grassroots pressure to which elites have responded. For the relatively more homogeneous Republicans, state sponsorship and party elites' search for a mass base have proven more important. Some history helps to make sense of these trends.

Nineteenth-century politics was party politics.²² The Jacksonian era established the pattern for mass-based parties eager to reap the rewards of office and fill appointments through the spoils system. Popular enthusiasm sustained the system. Voters turned out in the decades after the Civil War at rates never again equaled, even in a vastly better educated country. Given weak national institutions, parties stitched politics together. State and local bosses and their organizations, with varying institutional bases, jostled against one another, newspaper editors in the partisan press, and the interests that bankrolled them. State legislatures chose senators, who in turn oversaw patronage relationships in the post office and customs house, and into state and local government.

²¹Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, *The Search for American Political Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²²Joel H. Silbey, *The American Political Nation, 1838–1893* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Richard L. McCormick, *The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Michael Holt, "Change and Continuity in the Party Period: The Substance and Structure of American Politics, 1835–1885," in *Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History, 1775–2000*, ed. Byron E. Shafer and Anthony J. Badger (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 93–115.

The tight networks in the nineteenth-century party dominated every facet of American elections, from slating candidates to funding campaigns to printing ballots. Because parties controlled all the resources necessary to wage electoral combat, movements had few inducements to tempt parties into alliance. Groups like the Grand Army of the Republic, veterans of the Union Army, spread the party's message out every bit as much as they applied pressure to it.²³ Just as women, Native Americans, often African Americans (a more complicated case, as Chapter 9 explains), and the organized working class fell outside the parameters of party-led distributive politics, so, too, movement claimants either remained excluded from mainstream politics, or had to enter it on unfavorable terms that rendered them vulnerable when other influential forces in the party clashed with their priorities.

Shut out from major parties, movements typically formed third parties. To prove their bona fides, they displayed the full trappings of party, with national and state officers, and candidates at all levels of government. That is the story of the Free Soil Party—which bolted precisely because a faction of New York Democrats disapproved of its rivals' disposition of patronage—the American Party (the Know Nothings), the nascent Republican Party, the Prohibition Party, and the People's Party (the Populists). For a generation of reformist causes, the Republicans' emergence as a new party exploiting sublimated issue cleavages served as a model, however chimerical. As agricultural prices fell in the decades following the Civil War, third parties moved West, and a series of agrarian radical parties proposed inflationary policies designed to aid indebted farmers.

The defeat of Populism and the victory of the corporate-dominated Republicans in 1896 shifted earlier patterns. Sectionalism and federalism explain much of the puzzle. Elite dominance by the Republicans in the North and the Democrats in the South forestalled party-based mass mobilization. For the American Federation of Labor, as for other advocates—suffragists, prohibitionists—one-party dominance in most states posed a common challenge. Groups' natural allies appeared on both sides of the fence, and paths to systemic change seemed blocked. In states and cities, national alliances could preclude useful local relationships. "To local unionists, a policy of national nonpartisanship meant they could be Democratic in Democratic cities, and Republican in Republican cities."²⁴

²³Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1993), chap. 2; Mary R. Dearing, *Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G.A.R.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952); Stuart McConnell, *Glorious Contentment: The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

²⁴Michael Rogin, "Voluntarism: The Political Functions of an Antipolitical Doctrine," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 15 (1962): 535.

Parties fell from their pedestal, and lost control over basic tasks. The voter initiative, party primary, civil service, and secret (Australian) ballot all served to weaken party organization, dismantle the spoils system that sustained it, and shift campaigns from mass spectacle to individual persuasion. National committees, close to large corporations and the growing executive establishment, centralized fundraising while local organization attenuated.²⁵

New actors filled the void as parties retreated. Pressure groups developed new techniques and organizational forms to lobby officials and persuade voters.²⁶ The Anti-Saloon League, for instance, pioneered direct mail and the voter guide as it worked with sympathetic officials, Republicans in the North and Democrats in the South, first for the local option and then for national prohibition.²⁷ The Progressive movement, individualistic, led from the upper-middle class, was, by the standard definitions, hardly a social movement at all. While industrial violence flared up from Ludlow to Lawrence, an insulated political system responded more to reformism than to mass agitation.

The New Deal realignment decisively changed these patterns. The Rooseveltian coalition rested on a “three-legged stool.” The administrative state, directed by the presidency, placated, sometimes uneasily, the South, big-city bosses, and organized labor. Yet only labor, especially in the CIO, swelled with the children of new-stock immigrants, fully shared the goal of a robust federal government devoted to a modicum of protection against what Roosevelt termed “the hazards and vicissitudes of life.” The New Deal state protected workers’ rights through the National Labor Relations Board, while labor proved an able defender of programs outside the reach of the traditional, state and locally oriented Democratic organizations.²⁸

²⁵Michael McGerr, *The Decline of Popular Politics: The American North, 1865–1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Harold Gosnell, “Thomas C. Platt—Political Manager,” *Political Science Quarterly* 38 (1923): 443–69; Mark Kornbluh, *Why America Stopped Voting: The Decline of Participatory Democracy and the Emergence of Modern American Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 2000); Daniel Klinghard, *The Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880–1896* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁶Elisabeth S. Clemens, *The People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 17–31. The reforms’ ultimate impact—whether as demobilizers of mass politics or creators of responsive government—is a more complicated question.

²⁷Peter H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 107–9.

²⁸See Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Milkis suggests a direct link between the growth of ideological patronage and the atrophy of state and local party organizations, but a comparative look at union-party relations in the postwar decades suggests a more complicated story. The UAW’s near takeover of the Michigan Democratic Party contrasts with fluid factionalism in New York City and segmentation between pliant

Racial tensions formed under the surface once the Democratic Party married egalitarian commitments with an activist, national state, and first burst out with the Dixiecrat bolt of 1948. By the 1960s, the three-legged stool had collapsed. Civil rights nationalized politics. Sectionalism and federalism, the old confounders, retreated. Traditional political organizations, labor's friends and rivals both across the New Deal era, finally expired. Professional advocacy in Washington exploded. When new groups sought to enter politics, first on the left and then on the right, they found ample funding and leverage points from subcommittees to courts.²⁹

Initially, politics seemed disorganized amid an individualized Congress and postreform nominating process. "Political parties," Hugh Hecló observed in 1983, "have traditionally served as grand simplifiers. People mobilized through the new group politics, in contrast, serve as grand complicators."³⁰ Contrary to expectations among political scientists and New Right operatives alike, groups and coalitions have not replaced political parties but increasingly define them.³¹

Instead, the advocacy explosion of the 1960s interacted with the New Deal divide over the size and scope of government and the new group politics became partisan. Just as their opponents in the Christian Right anchored the Republican Party, cultural liberals emerging from the feminist and gay rights movements exercised increasing influence in the Democratic Party.³² Yet parties failed to regain their preeminence, and new space opened for movements. Parties needed group allies to reach voters and fund cam-

crafts unions and frustrated industrial unions in machine Chicago. Cf. J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1969).

²⁹See, from perceptive analysts at best ambivalent about these shifts, James Q. Wilson, "American Politics, Then and Now," *Commentary*, February 1979, 39–46; and Martha Derthick, "Crossing Thresholds: Federalism in the 1960s," *Journal of Policy History* 8 (1996): 64–80.

³⁰Hugh Hecló, "One Executive Branch or Many?," in *Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and Congress in the 1980s*, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 38.

³¹See McAdam and Kloos, *Deeply Divided*.

³²See Jo Freeman, "Whom You Know versus Whom You Represent: Feminist Influence in the Democratic and Republican Parties," in *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe: Consciousness, Political Opportunity, and Public Policy*, ed. Mary Fainsood Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 215–44; Christina Wolbrecht, *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); John Gallagher and Chris Bull, *Perfect Enemies: The Religious Right, the Gay Movement, and the Politics of the 1990s* (New York: Crown, 1996); Kira Sanbonmatsu, *Democrats, Republicans, and the Politics of Women's Place* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002). The gender gap in partisan voting that has arisen since the 1970s has had more to do with support by women for the welfare state, and with men abandoning the Democratic Party, than with divergent preferences about "women's issues." Indeed, men and women have notably similar views on abortion. See Karen M. Kaufmann and John R. Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1999): 864–87.

paigns. Without sufficient resources on their own to appeal to an electorate whose loyalties had frayed and attenuated, they paid movements' price. It was one they could afford: given the vast expansion in the role of government, they also controlled ideological patronage to dole out to supporters.

The parties' organizational hollowing out and ideological separation simultaneously widened the scope for and narrowed the explicitly partisan role in political conflict. Groups both polarized parties, and took advantage of new opportunities.³³ Fights traverse institutional boundaries that once served to separate presidency, Congress, courts, and agencies. In venues from independent expenditures to confirmation hearings to policy proposals, group allies—including para-organizations such as super PACs, public interest organizations, and business associations, as well as the movements here—search for “a piece of the action” in no-holds-barred conflict.³⁴ As in much of the nineteenth century, the parties stand deeply divided—but where once those parties controlled the electoral process and defined the contours of American political life, the new elite-led, group-oriented coalitions messily strain to match their long-lost forebears as organizers of democratic politics.

DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN ALLIANCES

The divergent coalitional imperatives of Democrats and Republicans have shaped their strategies in ways that have remained largely constant across time. The Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans have continued to ally with the preponderance of big business. So, too, even as alignments and geographies have shifted, the modal American has remained in the Republican

³³On polarization, see, in a large literature, Alan I. Abramowitz, *The Polarized Public? Why Our Government Is So Dysfunctional* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson, 2013); Morris P. Fiorina, *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Longman, 2011); William Galston and Pietro S. Nivola, “Delineating the Problem,” in *Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America's Polarized Politics*, ed. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 1–47; Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006); Andrew Gelman, *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

³⁴This is the world described in Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, *Politics by Other Means: Politicians, Prosecutors, and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater*, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2002). On interest group and party campaign activity, see Michael M. Franz, *Choices and Changes: Interest Groups in the Electoral Process* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008). For an historical schema, see David C. W. Parker and John J. Coleman, “Pay to Play: Parties, Interests, and Money in Federal Elections,” in *The Medium and the Message: Television Advertising and American Elections*, ed. Kenneth M. Goldstein and Patricia Strach (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2004), 147.

fold, consistently white and Christian and less conflicted over sectionalism. Since the Civil War, Democrats have assembled their coalition through agglomerating diffuse minorities, and been more heterogeneous and prone to internal schisms than Republicans.

The march from the party period to the networked party continues, refracted through distinctive coalitional biases. Both parties have grown more permeable and more dependent on outside groups, but in different ways. Barriers to entry into the Democratic camp have always been lower as the party has cobbled together its coalition, and have grown even more so as traditional organization collapsed. No party has ever contained quite so many disparate elements as the contemporary Democrats, and the relations among them define partisan priorities. Republicans have often reached out to their allied movements rather than simply confronting them, while existing players have effectively wielded vetoes to stop would-be entrants that confront them at the coalition's gate. Yet, as the Tea Party shows, even there the old blocking power has dissipated.

Republicans have sought to energize allies and to politicize groups with sympathetic agendas. Relatively homogeneous parties can protect their borders, but face danger in failing to create resonant allegiances among supporters. Hence, political entrepreneurs seek to tap deeper, prior loyalties, as Republicans did with the Grand Army of the Republic, and New Right leaders with gun owners as well as evangelicals in the 1970s. So, too, the acquiescence of business interests, the party's bulwark since its founding, looms larger for would-be Republican allies. The GOP's centralized structure and emphasis on leaders hashing out differences behind closed doors encourages movement activists to move, as social conservatives from Phyllis Schlafly to Ralph Reed have done, directly into party positions, rather than relying solely on public pressure as a way to carry on party-group negotiations.³⁵ For all its antiestablishment rhetoric and divisive primary challenges, even the party faction of the Tea Party carefully maintained ties with Republican official-dom.³⁶

Democrats, by contrast, have been the more permeable party, seeking to build majorities through a coalition of out-groups jostling to control the party's agenda. Group claimants, seemingly representing geological strata of movement activity, have emerged more from movements making demands on the state than from elites cultivating associational allies, and have played a larger role in the party's coalitional development. Small farmers, industrial workers, African Americans, women, and gays were all deeply

³⁵Jo Freeman, "The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (1986): 327–56; Freeman, "Whom You Know."

³⁶See, e.g., Robert Costa, "Conservatives Seek to Regain Control of Republican Agenda," *Washington Post*, 16 May 2014, 1.

marginalized in American politics as collective actors (even if their members were variously excluded as *individuals*) prior to joining with the Democrats. Yet these different players have often failed to congeal into a partisan whole above its parts. In the party's darkest years in the last century—the 1920s and, on a presidential level, the 1980s—these divisions have become endemic.³⁷ Indeed, accounts of the two decades can sound notably similar, with cultural and economic divisions fought out almost as bitterly within the Democratic Party as between it and the GOP. Democratic elites and the professionals surrounding them have sought maneuvering room—and often coziness with powerful economic interests—to the detriment of movement and party building.³⁸

WINNING PARTISAN COALITIONS

From these overviews of parties, movements, and their interactions across American history, we now turn to the inner dynamics within political parties. Pivotal players inside party coalitions, around whom winning coalitions must be built, determine the posture that parties take toward movements. Parties accept movement insurgencies inside their ranks only with the assent of a winning coalition inside those parties.³⁹ In turn, that assent comes only if a winning coalition finds the movement consonant with its basic ideological interests, and if it believes that incorporating the movement will make the party better placed to achieve ongoing electoral majority. It is a multilevel game. A majority inside the party must see a path, with the movement incorporated, that betters its own position and that delivers an ongoing majority in the electorate as a whole. Should party elites doubt that movements will deliver them such a majority, those movements will be forced outside the party-political order.

³⁷David Burner, *The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918–1932* (New York: Knopf, 1968); Thomas Byrne Edsall with Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1991); William Mayer, *The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996).

³⁸Daniel J. Galvin, *Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Philip A. Klinkner, *The Losing Parties: Out-Party National Committees, 1956–1993* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

³⁹A few regional “party-movements” have blunted the basic dichotomy here, but they have had relatively little impact in national politics—and virtually none since the nationalization of politics in the New Deal. See Mildred A. Schwartz, *Party Movements in the United States and Canada: Strategies of Persistence* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Richard M. Valelly, *Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and, on the merits of pressure-group or alliance strategies even for a party-movement, Samuel P. Huntington, “The Election Tactics of the Nonpartisan League,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 36 (1950): 613–32.

TABLE 2.2
STRENGTH OF PLAYERS IN PARTIES

Alliance	Movement supporters	Pivotal players	Movement opponents
Abolition-GOP	Medium then low (Radicals)	High (Stalwarts)	High (northern business)
Populism-Dems	Low (none)	High (Silverites)	High (Goldbugs, Bourbon Democrats)
Labor-Dems	High (urban liberals)	High (northern machines)	High (southern Democrats)
Antiwar-Dems	Low then high (doves)	Low then high (“New Politics” reformers)	High then medium (hawks, regulars)
Christian Right-GOP	Medium (conservative insurgents)	High (big business)	Low (moderate Republicans)

Table 2.2 summarizes the views of key party factions to disaggregate partisan actors, and assess for each case—generally and subjectively, to be sure—the strength of partisan actors who determined movements’ fate. The second column in Table 2.2 is the same as in Table 2.1, and the additional columns add the strength of other key actors inside the party. The pivotal players are the actors whose choices decide whether or not alliance holds a winning coalition inside the party. When supporters are stronger than opponents, then pivotal players acquiesce to alliance.

Supporters inside the party actively desire alliance; opponents hope to stop it. Either way, they understand that the new entrants will disrupt existing cleavages.⁴⁰ Partisan brokers who seek to lower the costs to alliance emerge from the former group. Partisans in the latter group, their core interests threatened, seek to freeze out the movement and highlight the costs of alliance at every turn. For both sets of actors, the party’s long-term ideological trajectory hangs in the balance, fundamentally affecting their own status as high-demanders inside the party coalition and, ultimately, their ability to win goodies from the state. Yet in every instance, neither strong supporters nor implacable opponents have held a majority inside parties. If the former had held true, then the movement would hardly have brought new and radical sentiments into parties; if the latter, then it would have had

⁴⁰Cf. William H. Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

to abandon mainstream politics and head to the streets, or else into hearts and minds, to have any chance of success.

Pivotal players favor alliance if they perceive (whether correctly or not, if such an objective determination might even be possible) that new group allies will offer a higher probability of continued electoral majority than will other available coalitional alternatives. Under this model, pivotal players inside parties do not necessarily seek to maximize votes or seats, potentially weakening candidates in marginal districts, but they do seek majorities so they can wield power and implement policies. Since opponents of alliance can be expected to defect or to sit on their hands should unwanted guests gain entrance to the partisan club, the pivotal players back alliance only when its supporters are, in their judgment, more influential in the party than its opponents.

If pivotal players acquiesce to movement incorporation, they exercise power subtly and sometimes invisibly as they negotiate and renegotiate the terms of trade in alliance, gaining resources—votes, money, time, and networks—from movements in exchange for ideological patronage. When movements are weak, however, and offer few resources to tempt partisans, pivotal players will abandon any such compromises, and mobilize group supporters without paying the ideological price. Silverites nominated William Jennings Bryan on the ruins of Populist insurgency, and liberal reformers took from the antiwar movement its spirit of openness more than its opposition to American empire. In turn, when those pivotal players find the arguments of opponents more compelling, then movements find themselves in the cold. Loyal Republicans in the 1870s and 1880s turned against abolition-republicanism when they feared the costs to core supporters in northern business.

Above all, partisan power is blocking power. Elites keep unwanted elements out of parties, or else feast on their remains when those movements cannot bargain for a better deal. They exercised this blocking power against abolition-republicanism, Populism, the left-led unions in the CIO, and the radical elements in the antiwar movement. Once excluded from mainstream party politics, their alternative visions disappeared from national life.

In each instance, the pivotal players controlled the central party organs, and held sway over its presidential and congressional wings; if we may speak of a party outside of its constituent elements, these players are it. These swing voters have relatively weak *ex ante* views on the movement's core demands, but they want victory and its spoils. Far more than for movement radicals, for whom ideas matter, the goal-oriented assumptions of rational choice well describe pivotal players' behavior. Paradoxically, even as anchoring groups inject into politics ideas far from the mainstream, their success depends on acquiescence by hard-boiled regulars.

Successful alliance emerges typically reflects what Eric Schickler, in explaining the coalitions behind congressional rules changes, terms "common

carriers”: policies that a multiplicity of interests support for sometimes dissimilar reasons.⁴¹ American parties are diverse, heterogeneous coalitions, not, even in polarized periods, simple unidimensional entities. A first-past-the-post system and, especially, the Electoral College force parties to persuade majorities in a system that sometimes uneasily aggregates cleavages. The impetus for pivotal players emerges from a complicated mixture of material and purposive incentives, sometimes linking sympathies in one venue with policymaking seemingly far afield. Democrats’ alliances with women’s and gay rights groups in recent decades have endeared them to Hollywood, which in turn has managed to get Democrats to take relatively restrictive stances on issues of piracy and intellectual copyright. Brokers must construct those logrolls, and demonstrate to pivotal players the electoral viability of their newly constructed coalitions.

In the two anchoring alliances, the pivotal players favored alliance. Northern machine Democrats faced powerful New Deal liberals aligned with organized labor, and southerners deeply (and correctly!) fearful that labor would push their Democratic Party to abandon Jim Crow. Because even progressive unions offered at least a modicum of support to Democratic organizations in their own states, keeping themselves and their pals in office, urban bosses, most prominently in the 1944 vice presidential selection, went with labor. At a time of weak parties, movement conservatives, working alongside their New Right and Christian Right allies, constructed coalitions across the Sun Belt with increasingly assertive business interests, attacking high taxes and a meddlesome federal government. Accommodationist Republican moderates, on the ropes in an increasingly assertive party, soon faded away.

The other potential anchoring groups found fewer friends among partisan decisionmakers. As Radicalism waned, Republican pragmatists found ideological appeals to “the very idea of Republicanism” less appealing than fealty to business interests, who feared that a strong southern policy would threaten cheap cotton and incite northern labor. Populism had virtually no real supporters inside the parties. In its stead, the Silverite center mobilized its supporters directly. The antiwar movement faced a changing pivot. In 1968, party regulars could still freeze out the antiwar movement. By 1972, a sympathetic reform coalition controlled the party center—but no longer had a meaningful movement partner.

Successful anchoring groups make common cause with important segments of the business community. Mere reference to “party elites” fails to capture this dynamic, by which such elites serve as agents rather than solely as principals. In a direct sense, should capitalist elites decide that a

⁴¹Eric Schickler, *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

movement threatens their core interests, they will use their influence to ensure that parties remain hostile, and to freeze the movement out of the political system.⁴² The pattern holds with particular strength in the Republican Party. Abolition-republicanism after the Civil War failed to forge the same *modus vivendi* with corporate capitalism inside the GOP fold that the Christian Right achieved a century hence. Yet even among the catch-all Democrats, similar pressures apply. Populism, bereft of any funding save the silver mining interests with the coming of fusion, became a supplicant to Democratic priorities in the summer of 1896. The extrusion of CIO radicals tells a similar story.

On the other hand, parties—instruments of social control as well as inclusion—often insulate themselves from mass pressure, with Republicans particularly choosy. Parties, under the right circumstances, may prosper even without movement allies. The extraordinary success of the post-1896 Republicans came precisely as industrial elites organized politics so as to protect themselves from agitation, especially on the “social question.” To reiterate the essential argument, because party-movement alliance can fundamentally disrupt the political landscape, it takes place only on terms acceptable to political parties and the coalitions behind them. Yet determining *why* parties deem movements to be good electoral bets requires exploring movements’ own organizations and incentives as they attempt to mobilize supports, demand policies and recognition from the party system, and broker with partisan elites.

INFLUENCE AND ORGANIZATION

Unlike most “resource donors” to political parties, movement elites exercise much of their influence indirectly, as they principally activate and persuade other supporters.⁴³ Whether for material, solidary, or purposive incentives, when effective movements have established channels to disseminate information around person-to-person interaction, followers will look up to group leaders for political cues. Those cues offer movements leverage when dealing with American parties, which must reach out to disparate constituencies in search of electoral majority. Group-specific appeal serves as a mechanism to explain both conversion of those who would have voted (or

⁴²See Thomas Ferguson, *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), esp. 61–79 and 205–26.

⁴³I have taken the phrase from Seth E. Masket, *No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 34.

otherwise behaved politically) differently absent party-movement alliance, and mobilization of those who would not have voted (or been politically involved) at all.⁴⁴ As Anna Harvey explains in a rational-choice account of why the women's movement proved unable to shift from lobbying to electoral mobilization, at which the parties had a built-in advantage, following women's suffrage: "Group members will likely have more information than nonmembers on the development of shared expectations of appropriate behavior within any given group; benefit-seeking group elites will thus likely have an informational advantage over office-seeking party elites who are not group members in initiating electoral mobilization."⁴⁵

To make parties accept alliance, movements need more than informational advantage about supporters. Movements also need the special infrastructural capacity to mobilize them. Movement infrastructure with deep roots in civil society serves as a necessary if insufficient condition for successful incorporation. If that infrastructure atrophies, parties will have less incentive to work through movement elites. Movement loyalties come and go, but party identification endures as a lifelong guide to individuals' political behavior.⁴⁶ Without the need to give ideological patronage in exchange for support, parties will either seek to mobilize movement supporters directly or else build their majorities elsewhere.

Organization building to leverage votes, time, money, and networks requires stitching together into national politics grassroots networks grounded in face-to-face, personal organization. These efforts have constituted movement building on a vast scale. Potential anchoring groups have almost all had forums for face-to-face organizing. They have combined avowedly political and nonpolitical functions, providing supporters with purposive and solidary incentives to come together.⁴⁷ They have also had to link national elites with grassroots leaders and then neighborhood-level

⁴⁴On mobilization and conversion in the New Deal elections, see Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and Gerald Gamm, *The Making of New Deal Democrats: Voting Behavior and Realignment in Boston, 1920–1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989).

⁴⁵Anna L. Harvey, *Votes without Leverage: Women in American Electoral Politics, 1920–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 55. The attribution of motive to "benefit-seeking" and "office-seeking" elites sometimes obscures as much as it reveals. Movement elites typically hold, and behave so as to keep, organizational office, sometimes to the detriment of extracting policy benefits. On the other side, party elites who back alliance to the hilt often push their views on issues beyond the limits of pure reelection-seeking or vote-maximizing caution.

⁴⁶For an incisive demonstration of this proposition in practice, see Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas, *Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement and the Democratic Party after 9/11* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁴⁷James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (1973; repr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 3.

TABLE 2.3
MOVEMENT CAPACITY TO PROVIDE RESOURCES

Alliance	Independent movement capacity	Locus of movement capacity
Abolition-GOP	Medium (1868) then low	Freedmen's Bureau and Union League Clubs (1868 only)
Populism-Dems	High (1892) then low (1896)	Farmers' Alliance, movement press
Labor-Dems	High	Union halls
Antiwar-Dems	Medium (1968) then low (1972)	Mass demonstrations
Christian Right-GOP	High	Churches, para-organizations

organizers.⁴⁸ Movements that try to build their own infrastructure, rather than to politicize extant networks and organizations, face deep vulnerabilities. No meeting hall, no movement, no influence.

Table 2.3 shows where movements have based their face-to-face organizing. The second column is repeated from Table 2.1, and the third column identifies the locus of movement building for each case. The labor-Democratic partnership has benefited from automatic dues deduction, and launched millions of canvasses from the local union halls that also coordinate ice cream socials and worker trainings. Despite tensions among them only partially ameliorated through joint efforts, international unions follow a classic federated model, zipping information back and forth from local to state to national offices. The Christian Right, like other social movements beginning with abolitionists in the 1830s and on through temperance and the civil rights movement, has based itself in the most common voluntary associations in the United States: churches. As Chapter 8 discusses, congregation-based local supporters, embedded in direct-mail lists, helped the Christian Right to overcome the successive implosions of its premier national organizations.

Problems of organizational maintenance crippled other movements' ability to enter the party system. In an era when parties dominated politics, abolition-republicans worked through Republican organization more

⁴⁸Theda Skocpol, *Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003).

than they offered resources to it. In 1868, the Freedmen's Bureau and Union League Clubs served as adjuncts to the party apparatus, reaching out to African American voters, but they soon disbanded, and factional fights over patronage doomed efforts to build stable organizations. The last two movements make the point particularly sharply. The Populists worked through the Grange, the reform press, and a vast network of alliances and cooperatives centered in rural communities. Yet the institutions that sustained the Farmers' Alliance atrophied during the explicit move to electoral politics following the launch of the People's Party. The antiwar movement eschewed the seamy backrooms it associated with hawkish compromisers. Democracy, it proclaimed, is in the streets. But when the fragile leadership coordinating mass protests splintered, the movement had no organizational base from which to regroup.

NETWORKS AND BROKERS

The work of making alliance has fallen to brokers, midlevel actors with ties spanning party and movement, who patiently work with both sides to explain and achieve the benefits of alliance. The narrative chapters that follow represent a kind of "lives of the brokers" as they search for power, and puzzle through complicated and imperfect choices.⁴⁹ Although the boundary between party and movement may seem crisp here, in the case histories it seems far more fluid and contested.

From the movement side, brokers make movements political and sharpen their goals. They lead movements to see why alliance, among all orientations toward politics, will help them achieve the society for which they yearn. Brokers help to define goals as compatible (or incompatible) with partisan activity, and then assist the party in targeting the relevant populations. They help to shape worldviews so that partisan goals encompass the movement, and the movement links its struggles with the party. Jesse Helms, in a speech at Jerry Falwell's Baptist Fundamentalism '84 conference, captured the rhetoric of alliance, warning preachers that "They are the same people after me who are after you: the atheists; the homosexuals; the militant woman's groups; the union bosses; the block [*sic*] voters."⁵⁰ This joint project, embedded in dense issue networks, transcends policy and ideological patronage, as well as electioneering.

⁴⁹Brokers play the same role as bureaucrats in Hugh Hecló, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

⁵⁰W. Craig Bledsoe, "The Fundamentalist Foundations of the Moral Majority" (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1985), 182.

At the same time, brokers clarify for parties why those parties will achieve majorities with movements inside their coalitions, and then cement those alliances with ideological patronage, and access. Precisely because the long-term calculus of the expected number of votes to be gained from group affiliation as against the cost in would-be supporters repelled and the opportunity cost of potential supporters elsewhere foregone is so fraught, brokers have tremendous autonomy in shaping partisan response.

The structural conditions behind alliance emerge directly from the American electoral system, which agglomerates cleavages in a pluralistic society. Yet rather than claiming omniscience for groups and parties incapable of independent judgment, brokerage provides a contingent, individual mechanism to ascribe decisions about partisan electoral strategy and movement goal definition. Even as structural factors—urbanization and the policymaking revolution of the New Deal; later, the unfreezing of southern political cleavages and the social dislocations of the 1960s—set the stage for transformations in the party system, only the actions of determined brokers opened the windows of historical opportunity.

Given their differing incentives, political transformations emerge from midlevel elites more than from presidents or their immediate circle. Because presidents need support from actors across a panoply of issues, strident presidential advocacy for divisive causes threatens either to split the coalitions they have assembled, or else to engender such immense hostility that other parts of their program fall into jeopardy.⁵¹ Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, without whose dominance of the national agenda potential anchoring alliances would never have congealed into historically meaningful blocs, flit only fitfully across the stage in the pages to follow. Their image-makers to the contrary, neither had great personal commitment to the anchoring groups that still incant their names in party battles. In the making of alliance, direct presidential leadership is notable principally for its absence. As the partisan presidency has developed, the executive establishment has become increasingly important in brokerage. Still, brokers, often reaching out to old pals from earlier battles, have operated out of the cabinet, lower-level White House staff, or the national committees, much more than from the nerve centers of presidents' own personalistic initiatives.⁵² Members of Congress, too, figure prominently. As long as they can win reelection, they have freedom to expand beyond their geographic

⁵¹For a similar conclusion reached from very different evidence, see Elizabeth Sanders, "Presidents and Social Movements: A Logic and Preliminary Results," in *Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making*, ed. Stephen Skowronek and Matthew Glassman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 223–40.

⁵²See the discussion of Reagan and the Christian Right in Sidney M. Milkis, Daniel J. Tichenor, and Laura Blessing, "'Rallying Force': The Modern Presidency, Social Movements, and the Transformation of American Politics," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43 (2013): 641–70.

constituencies. Investigations, symbolic resolutions, and awkward votes on riders all offer targeted tools that can be directly linked to ongoing electoral mobilization.

MOVEMENTS, GROUPS, AND CASES

Meaningful comparison requires variance across the dependent variable.⁵³ Rather than drawing faulty inferences from the primary cases alone, the coming chapters also explore three other defining episodes when social movements in a fairly literal sense confronted political parties. The abolitionist, Populist, and antiwar movements were all *potential* anchoring groups—but given external opposition and internal turmoil, none produced the durable partnerships of organized labor and the Democrats, or the Christian Right and the Republicans. In ways the primary cases alone cannot, their stories together show just how rare, consequential, and historically patterned have been long-running alliances between political parties and social movements.

The movements that shaped the party system at critical episodes in American political development look, in a universe either of social movements or of group influencers on parties, quite atypical.⁵⁴ Yet American politics would have developed vastly differently without them. Among the myriad groups seeking to influence parties, I focus only on the subset that are social movements, and then only on movements that carried with them the potential, whether realized or not, to anchor major-party coalitions. Not all anchoring groups emerge from social movements; not all social movements try to become anchoring groups. Let us take these issues in turn, first separating social movements from other group claimants on the party system, and then dividing the potential anchoring groups from other social movements.

The movements explored here have all sought systemic change that threatened to upend other policy demanders and extant commitments inside a party, and that required intense back-and-forth with those demanders for successful alliance. Movements with such possibilities are rare birds; anchoring alliance, to belabor the point, deserves attention precisely as a consequential exception to ordinary patterns in American politics. Their

⁵³Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 137.

⁵⁴In David Karol's helpful definition, a group is "a self-aware collection of individuals who share intense concern about a particular policy area" (*Party Position Change*, 9). For these purposes, their concern need not encompass policy per se, but the distribution of goods and status in public life.

particular issue concerns and priorities spring from an ideology—whether free labor or industrial democracy—that spans policy concerns, and frames particular issues in the context of foundational principles.

These movements make appeals not just to a set of definable movement beneficiaries, but outward to wide swaths of the electorate insufficiently represented in the extant political order. As Chapter 4 outlines, New Right brokers took particular issues threatening white evangelicals, especially around tax exemptions for church schools, and transformed them into an ideology with concerns from the role of the state to personal morality to American exceptionalism. Such movements represent more than congeries of voters, circles of elites, or interests in civil society. They possess leaders who seek to mobilize a mass base, and a structure embedded in face-to-face contact by which to do so. And they confront the party system in ways that shake it to the core.

More typically, social movements cannot reorder the extant party system, and alliance takes place in the context of issues already consonant with larger partisan priorities. Under these circumstances, movements decide strategies conditional on expected partisan response. Over time, as parties have divided across ever-more issues and required resources from outsiders, they have looked with greater favor on movement claimants.

When their would-be supporters crosscut the extant cleavages, movements pursue pressure group strategies, working with allies on both sides of the aisle and avoiding offense to either major party on core issues. They may find supporters in different places—as the Anti-Saloon League worked with Republicans in the North and Democrats in the South—or else for different parts of a multi-issue agenda. Or else they follow the strategy common to professional advocacy groups with only disembodied “paper memberships,” focusing on the courts and avoiding political organizing.⁵⁵

When movements find their allies in a single party, they organize supporters to offer resources to parties in exchange for ideological patronage, and they win acceptance into the party coalition if partisan elites approve of the deal. At a basic level, then, these narrow alliances operate under the same logic as anchoring groups, trading supporters’ resources for policy and prestige. Yet they pose fewer challenges in coalition management. To take a quintessential example of narrow alliance, the National Rifle Association frames a distinctive worldview, emphasizing how individual liberty requires the right to keep and bear arms, interwoven with the philosophy of the Republican Party since the 1970s. It applies this worldview only to issues around firearms. That the NRA has tied itself to the GOP probably makes little difference for most captains of industry.

⁵⁵See Jeffrey Berry, *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

To be sure, these are ideal types, and some groups straddle boundaries. The environmental movement offers a good example. Although its closest allies have long been liberal Democrats, it deliberately eschewed overt partisanship so as to keep ties with conservation-minded Republicans; Richard Nixon signed the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts and George H. W. Bush the sweeping 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The movement has struggled to switch toward a strategy of alliance with Democrats as its Republican friends have dwindled to irrelevance. A stronger movement, with a comprehensive ideology, might have aimed to be an anchoring group, an American equivalent to Green parties in Western Europe.⁵⁶

Even as business and parties engage in the same kinds of exchange as movements and parties, key distinctions separate business from mass movements. Foremost, mass movements, unlike business, face the daunting imperative to keep supporters responsive to group-specific mobilization. If they cannot do so, their influence collapses. Firms certainly influence their employees, shareholders, and customers, but in no way does their power in American politics spring directly from their ability to mobilize a population. Nor, among other group influencers inside American parties, do I consider pure party factions, elite-led subunits from the Mugwumps to the Democratic Leadership Council.⁵⁷ I similarly exclude a slew of ethnic groups and lobbies that have worked inside and outside the party system.

The civil rights movement represents a particularly tricky case. Ultimately, however, it represents an instance more of incorporation and mobilization of an already salient group than of alliance along the lines considered here. The exigencies of movement leadership, group definition, and organizational maintenance define the contours of anchoring-group alliance, and none applied in the same way as in the episodes in this book. Like them, the civil rights movement connected movement demands with deep themes in the American promise, brought new issues and voters into party politics, altered partisan alignments, and aimed to exerted influence away from the median voter and toward group priorities. Critically, and in notable contrast to its abolition-republicanist predecessor a century earlier,

⁵⁶Samuel P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 40–43; Charles R. Shipan and William R. Lowry, “Environmental Policy and Party Divergence in Congress,” *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (2001): 245–63; Brian P. Obach, “Labor-Environmental Relations,” *Social Science Quarterly* 83 (2002): 82–100; Judith A. Layzer, *Open for Business: Conservatives’ Opposition to Environmental Regulation* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012); Theda Skocpol, “Naming the Problem: What It Will Take to Counter Extremism and Engage Americans in the Fight Against Global Warming” (paper, Symposium on the Politics of America’s Fight Against Global Warning, Cambridge, Mass., 14 February 2013).

⁵⁷See Daniel DiSalvo, *Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

however, no ongoing organized movement mediated between voters and elites. In the North, African Americans had begun to be incorporated into urban municipal regimes, principally as Democrats in the wake of the Great Migration and the New Deal. The links between ethnic and partisan solidarities resembled in degree if not kind the ties between parties and waves of European immigrants. After 1965, the civil rights movement fragmented, just as the Voting Rights Act finally brought universal suffrage to the South. Democrats have received overwhelming support from and catered, if often fitfully, to the demands of African American voters.

Yet they have not had to rely on group intermediaries in the same way, nor have policy demands emerged as the price of mobilization. While Democratic elites mobilized using the black church, it is harder to think of the distinct concessions that the black church has demanded. Nor have elites had to create supporters and politicize their identities in the same way as labor, the Christian Right, or any of the shadow cases. The tie between African Americans and the Democrats, and the subsequent backlash against it, has transformed party politics—but it does not constitute party-movement alliance in the precise sense as the episodes discussed here.

To be sure, business, party factions, and ethnocultural groups have all exercised influence inside—indeed, have anchored—American parties. The mechanisms of exchange between parties and group allies, the process of anchoring inside parties, and the historical context of changing partisan resources and alignments structured their relations, as well. Yet these underlying factors impinged on parties and groups in different ways, and I make no claims that alliance between parties and other group allies proceeded in precisely the same manner as they did for the major social movements considered in these pages. That is the work for researchers who will refine the comparisons, and reframe the concepts deployed here.

For their part, not all movements direct their fire at the national state. Others aim at targets ranging from the local water board to Nike to the World Trade Organization. From utopian communities in the 1840s to open-source software today, scores of movements have had little to do with politics per se. Their supporters seek, instead, to live out their values through the conduct of their lives. So, too, movements change far more than coalitions or policies. “The movement,” in Joseph Gusfield’s words, “is to be found in the housewife considering entry into the labor force, the relations of blacks and whites in ambiguous situations, the response of parents to knowledge of a child’s homosexuality.”⁵⁸ By considering only formal organizations with aims to affect the authoritative allocation of resources in national politics, this book underplays those social and cultural processes.

⁵⁸Joseph R. Gusfield, “The Modernity of Social Movements: Public Roles and Private Parts,” in *Societal Growth: Processes and Implications*, ed. Amos H. Hawley (New York: Free Press, 1979), 297.

Nor do the categories here apply outside the highly idiosyncratic context of the United States. In other democracies, poor as well as rich, alliance between unions and center-left parties tends in most cases to be more formalized, and to take place within an explicit commitment to social democracy; often, it exists alongside various corporatist arrangements.⁵⁹ Neither does the relationship between the Christian Right and the Republican Party have any close parallel. It resembles neither once-confessional parties typically formed in the historical response to liberalism, nor other militant Protestant politics, which in Northern Ireland and South Africa have stressed the ties between Calvinism and ethnicity, rather than the issues of moral uplift designed to unite believers across churches and sects common in American politics.⁶⁰

TOWARD MATURE ALLIANCE

As parties and movements seek to consolidate victories won amid early triumphs, the exigencies of coalition building and organizational maintenance sap radical tendencies, but also create substantial incentives to maintain ongoing benefits from the other partner in alliance.⁶¹ The two sides air disagreements internally and attempt to change the other actor's policy

⁵⁹Although ties between trade unions and political parties form an elemental building block of the democratic left, and of comparative political economy, with a large literature to match, no systematic study gathers together the relevant data, or explains legal rules' real-world consequences. Accounts that move across continents would be especially welcome. For a useful list of cross-national variables, see Michael Shalev, *Labour and the Political Economy in Israel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 346–47. On general patterns of left party formation, see Bernard Ebbinghaus, "The Siamese Twins: Citizenship Rights, Cleavage Formation, and Party-Union Relations in Western Europe," *International Review of Social History* 40 (1995): 51–89; and Konstantin Vössing, "Social Democratic Party Formation and National Variation in Labor Politics," *Comparative Politics* 43 (2011): 167–86. Paul Leduc Browne, ed., *Labour & Social Democracy: International Perspectives* (Ottawa: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, 2002) offers a rich record of talks from union leaders around the world on their experiences working with center-left parties in and out of government.

⁶⁰Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 255; John Madeley, "Politics and the Pulpit: The Case of Protestant Europe," *West European Politics* 5 (1982): 149–71; Steve Bruce, *Conservative Protestant Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁶¹For classic treatments of institutionalization and organizational maintenance, see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 297–301; the original critique of bureaucratism in social-democratic parties in Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (1915; repr., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), esp. 393–409; and Wilson, *Political Organizations*, chap. 3. For a recent account of interest group development over time, see McGee Young, *Developing Interests: Organizational Change and the Politics of Advocacy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010).

from within, rather than abandoning alliance, in what the colloquial metaphor calls “divorce,” and the academic jargon terms “exit.”⁶²

American politics, built on overlapping coalitions of minorities, holds no permanent majorities. When normal politics resumes, movements and parties repeatedly renegotiate their relationships. Movements shape parties, but parties also shape movements.⁶³ Across long decades, they experience limits and disappointments. All the same, if partisan elites continue to favor alliance, then the movements may still exercise influence. Governing elites inside parties seek to redistribute power toward favored groups. They receive programmatic resources from the state and then organize on behalf of their political patrons. Indeed, the long-term effects of party-group alliance have emerged less through particular programs than by helping to organize the structure of political conflict around differing responses to those policies. Party-movement alliance has endured not just through issue-by-issue policy feedback, but through long-term ideological feedback.⁶⁴

However, this virtuous circle works only when movements find issues and policies that bring them together with other high-demanders inside the party coalition. When groups find common ground—as fiscal Keynesianism provided a basis for the long labor-Democratic partnership and tax cuts united the Christian Right with other “tribes of the right”—their place is secure. When they fail—as with abolition-republicanism—their place as partisan allies becomes perilous, indeed, and victories won at moments of historical opportunity prove vulnerable to drift, retreat, and counterattack.

The internal opponents of alliance—whether driven by policy goals or vote maximization if the allied group risks sinking a majority—will often seek to substitute new issue cleavages, shine light on repellent features, and point out the electoral danger if nothing is done to right the ship. In some

⁶²See Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

⁶³Scholars have begun to describe this process as coevolution. The approach here tracks their ideas closely, although I do not use the metaphor because evolution raises questions about agency. See Michael T. Heaney, “Linking Parties and Interest Groups,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Parties and Interest Groups*, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Jeffrey M. Berry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 568–87; and Clyde Wilcox, “Of Movements and Metaphors: The Coevolution of the Christian Right and the GOP,” in *Evangelicals and Democracy in America*, vol. 2, ed. Steven Brint and Jean Reith Schroedel (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009), 337. Karol, *Party Position Change*, 188–89, expresses a similar position to mine.

⁶⁴See Eric M. Patashnik, *Reforms at Risk: What Happens after Major Policy Changes Are Enacted* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Andrea Louise Campbell, *How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Joe Soss, “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action,” *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 363–80.

cases, they oppose alliance outright; more often they want the allied group not to anchor quite so tightly. John McClellan, an archconservative Arkansas Democrat, for instance, shone a spotlight on union corruption in the 1950s, and contemporary Democrats concerned about mediocre schools have emphasized “rubber rooms” and other unattractive pieces of contracts with teachers’ unions. Liberal Republicans in the 1980s pointed up Christian Right funding from the Unification Church, famous for its opaque finances and mass wedding ceremonies.

Should would-be anchoring groups unambiguously cause parties to lose elections, however, then office-oriented elites will boot them out and attempt to build a majority on other grounds.⁶⁵ If office-oriented elites principally answer to dominant business interests, the party’s unwanted guests may be ushered especially swiftly toward the door, rather than tolerated amid intraparty feuds—although parties’ authority to do so has atrophied over time. Partisan response, rather than movement choice, determines the ultimate outcome.

DELIMITING RADICALISM

Incorporation inside a political party defangs movement radicalism as parties seek supporters who will not unduly upset their coalitions. This paradox lies at the heart of alliance. Movement moderates, whom politicians trust not to inflame other supporters, assume leadership and shunt aside their more doctrinaire brethren. To be sure, even many of the winners seem radical in the context of the median voter and the political system as a whole. Thus Sidney Hillman, the “labor statesman” from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, always deferred to Franklin Roosevelt, unlike the fiery coal miner, John L. Lewis, or Lewis’s erstwhile allies in the left-led unions, purged from the CIO at the Democrats’ behest as the Cold War heated up. Christian conservatives, for their part, have turned away from the jeremiads of Jerry Falwell. The cleavages in the black community after 1965 reveal similar patterns.

In turn, when support is high and the bargain of movement support gained to other votes foregone in the movement’s favor, then relatively more militant figures will gain legitimacy and influence; Hillman himself stood far to the left of the AF of L. When support runs against the movement, whether because it is unpopular or has dissolved, then parties will ignore even moderates. Martin Shefter, observing the freeze-out of the left-led

⁶⁵The key word is “unambiguously.” Voters cast ballots, and pundits may spin them as they please. Movement activists far from the median are especially creative, and so the dangers of alliance may remain obscured.

American Labor Party in postwar New York, describes the process well: “If a group is to gain a position in the regime that is secure, it must be integrated into the system in a manner consistent with the interests of other members of the regime’s dominant political coalition. Political parties are the institutions that seek to construct such coalitions.”⁶⁶

More generally, movements’ confrontations with established power create opportunities but also foreclose possibilities. Alliance is a story of losers every bit as much as winners, of powerlessness as well as power. Movements often bring previously excluded voices into politics. Yet, as abolition-republicans, Populists, and the CIO all learned through bitter experience, when windows of opportunity for fundamental change clang shut, they rarely open so wide again. Janus looks forward and back; this story tells a tale neither of declension nor of Whiggish progress. Across the sweep of history, democratic possibilities have narrowed even as democracy embraced ever more Americans.⁶⁷

MOVEMENT LEGACIES

Social movements with political aims seek to realize their visions for a transformed society, and parties gate-keep them on the way. They aim to inject radical visions into the bloodstream of party politics, and then transform those visions into law. Their legacies differ across those dimensions. Considering only the fate of radical worldviews undersells real-world policy and risks counterfactual nostalgia; looking principally to policy change, a common pattern in political science, misses the extent to which movements have carried with them the potential for more fundamental transformations of the social order.

Even as movements lose their radical edge as they enter mainstream politics—and few observers of George Meany or Ralph Reed would mistake them for genuine insurgents—their power emerges from what were

⁶⁶Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 231.

⁶⁷For a similar scheme, see Bruce Ackerman, “The Broken Engine of Progressive Politics,” *American Prospect*, May 1998, 34–43. Cf. the small-d democratic James A. Morone, *The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Aziz Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010); and the small-r republican Joseph Cooper, “From Congressional to Presidential Preeminence: Power and Politics in Late Nineteenth-Century America and Today,” in *Congress Reconsidered*, 9th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), 361–91. On multiple orders, see Robert C. Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,” *American Political Science Review* 96 (2002): 697–712; and Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, “Racial Orders in American Political Development,” *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005): 75–92.

TABLE 2.4
LEGACIES OF POTENTIAL ALLIANCES

Alliance	Incorporation of radicals	Ideology in party	Policy
Abolition-GOP	Low-medium (marginalized)	Low-medium	High (Civil Rights Act of 1866, Reconstruction amendments)
Populism-Dems	Low (frozen out)	Low	High (income tax, fiat currency)
Labor-Dems	Low (frozen out)	High	High (Wagner Act, Medicare)
Antiwar-Dems	Medium (some incorporated)	Low-medium	Low (Boland Amendment)
Christian Right-GOP	High (incorporated)	High	Medium (Hyde Amendment, Supreme Court appointments)

movements at the moment they confronted the party system. Whether or not these long-institutionalized actors still deserve the sobriquet of “movement,” their ongoing influence represents the consequences of movement-born activity. Cutting short the study when they “go mainstream” fails properly to gauge their long-term impact.

Table 2.4 assesses—again, at a general level, with details of the particular policies in the subsequent chapters—the legacies of each potential alliance in bringing radical visions into or freezing them out from mainstream politics, influencing the ideological trajectory of major parties, and enacting consequential public policies. To begin with the anchoring alliances, the labor-Democratic partnership has stood at the heart of economic liberalism for eight decades, with its fingerprints all over the American welfare state and attempts to create the infrastructure for full employment. But its grander visions of industrial democracy remained unfulfilled. The Christian Right, too, has exerted enormous influence inside the Republican Party, without such painful extrusions of its supporters on the extreme right. Yet its attempts to roll back cultural liberalism have met little success.

Both nineteenth-century movements left concrete legacies before they crumbled. For abolition-republicanism, its brief years as an anchor left a powerful legacy in the Reconstruction Amendments, but one that was buried as its supporters lost influence in the postbellum party and polity.

While Congress and the Warren Court could have eradicated Jim Crow without them, their commandments on the states and egalitarian commitments made the job vastly easier. Populism, by contrast, saw its policy legacy decades later; it was enormously important, but also paled against the movement's goals. Democrats and progressive-minded Republicans in the 1910s, who feared any notions of a "cooperative commonwealth" and often battled Populists in state politics, enacted its proposals to regulate railroads, elect senators directly, and impose a constitutional amendment for an income tax. Over time, the United States even accepted a fiat currency—albeit without the inflationary benefits the Populists had hoped. The antiwar movement brought a generation of into politics, but their own history as influencers in the post-1968 Democratic Party belies the movement's limited ideological and policy legacy as the insurgents came to define the new party establishment. In short, no movement has confronted the party system and realized the totality of its vision, yet even the movements that failed to institutionalize themselves inside political parties have held powerful legacies in American political life.

Together, the factors explored in this chapter provide a framework for social movements in party politics that makes sense of key transformations across American history. Movements and parties will ally only when winning coalitions inside parties accept support from movements, and when movements offer to parties resources otherwise unattainable to them. Alliance has become more likely over time, as parties have divided on the issues that animate movements, and looked to outsiders for resources that allow them to win elections. The consequences at critical junctures have repeatedly shaped the terms of ideological combat. They have defined the contours of partisan cleavage, and marked the outer boundaries for radical possibilities.

Part I explains how this process played out as consequential social movements across American history attempted to enter the party system. For three anchoring groups—abolitionism and the Republicans, organized labor and the Democrats, and the Christian Right and the GOP—Part II examines the histories after party and group join together, showing how only the latter two cases consolidated partnerships forged amid extraordinary circumstances into long-running alliance.