Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America

Nearly four decades since the onset of the third wave, political parties remain weak in Latin America: parties have collapsed in much of the region, and most new party-building efforts have failed. Why do some new parties succeed while most fail? This book challenges the widespread belief that democracy and elections naturally give rise to strong parties and argues that successful party-building is more likely to occur under conditions of intense conflict than under routine democracy. Periods of revolution, civil war, populist mobilization, or authoritarian repression crystallize partisan attachments, create incentives for organization-building, and generate a "higher cause" that attracts committed activists. Empirically rich chapters cover diverse cases from across Latin America, including both successful and failed cases.

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1

Introduction

Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America

Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, and Brandon Van Dyck

Political parties are the basic building blocks of representative democracy. Political scientists have long argued that democracy is "unworkable" (Aldrich 1995: 3) or even "unthinkable" (Schattschneider 1942: 1) without them. Yet four decades into the third wave of democratization, parties remain weak in much of Latin America. Since 1990, major parties have weakened dramatically or collapsed altogether in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela.[1] At the same time, most efforts to build new parties have failed. The regional landscape is littered with the corpses of new parties that either failed to take off or experienced brief electoral success but then fizzled out or collapsed.[2] Consequently, most Latin American party systems are more fluid today than they were two decades ago. Of the six party systems scored as "institutionalized" in Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) seminal work, one (Venezuela) has collapsed fully, three (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica) have collapsed partially, and a fifth (Chile) has arguably been "uprooted" (Luna and Altman 2011).[3] Of the four party systems that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) classified as "inchoate," only Brazil's has strengthened

[1] On party weakness and party system collapse in Latin America, see Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Sánchez (2009), Morgan (2011), Seawright (2012), and Lupu (2014, 2016).

[2] Examples include the United Left (IU), Liberty Movement, Independent Moralizing Front (FIM), and Union for Peru (UPP) in Peru; the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO), the Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE), the Movement for Dignity and Independence (MODIN), and Action for the Republic in Argentina; the National Encounter Party (PEN) in Paraguay; the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), National Advancement Party (PAN), and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in Guatemala; and the M-19 Democratic Alliance (AD M-19) in Colombia.

[3] Uruguay's party system remains institutionalized.

over the last two decades. The Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian party systems have only weakened further.[4]

These developments have generated a new pessimism about the prospects for party-building in Latin America. Scholars such as Levitsky and Cameron (2003) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) argue that changing structural conditions – particularly the spread of mass media technologies – have weakened incentives for party-building. If politicians no longer need parties to win elections, these scholars suggest, the era of stable mass party organizations may be over.

Yet the experience of party-building has not been universally bleak. Several new parties have, in fact, taken root in contemporary Latin America. These include the Workers' Party (PT) and Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) in Brazil; the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and Party for Democracy (PPD) in Chile; the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador; the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico; the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua; and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in Panama.[5] These cases challenge sweeping claims that the era of party-building is over. Party-building, it seems, is difficult but not impossible in contemporary Latin America.

This volume seeks to explain variation in party-building outcomes in Latin America since the onset of the third wave of democratization (1978 to present). Why have some new parties established themselves as enduring political organizations while the vast majority of them have failed? This question has important implications for both the stability and quality of democracy. Where parties are weak, or where party systems decompose and are not rebuilt, democracies frequently suffer problems of governability, constitutional crisis, and even breakdown (e.g., Peru in the 1990s, Venezuela in the 2000s). In contrast, where parties remain strong, or where previously inchoate party systems become institutionalized, democracies tend to remain stable (e.g., Chile, Uruguay) or consolidate (e.g., Brazil, Mexico).

Despite the scholarly consensus around the importance of strong parties, we know relatively little about the conditions under which such parties emerge. Dominant theories of party and party system development are

[4] For a more optimistic perspective on the recent evolution of Latin American party systems, see Carreras (2012).

[5] For a complete list, see Table 1.1.

based mainly on studies of the United States and Western European countries.[6] Since almost all of these polities developed stable parties and party systems, much of the classic literature takes party-building for granted. Thus, while scholars such as Duverger (1954), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Sartori (1976), Shefter (1994), and Aldrich (1995) help us understand the origins and character of parties and party systems in advanced industrialized democracies, they offer less insight into a more fundamental question: Under what conditions do stable parties emerge in the first place?

Building on recent research on party formation in Europe, Africa, Asia, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America,[7] this introductory chapter develops a conflict-centered approach to party-building. We argue that robust parties emerge not from stable democratic competition, but rather from *extraordinary conflict* – periods of intense polarization accompanied by large-scale popular mobilization and, in many cases, violence or repression. Episodes of intense conflict such as social revolution, civil war, authoritarian repression, and sustained popular mobilization generate the kinds of partisan attachments, grassroots organizations, and internal cohesion that facilitate successful party-building. We also argue that party-building is more likely to succeed where party founders inherit a brand and/or organizational infrastructure from social movements, guerrilla movements, or previous dictatorships.

Latin America is a useful region for analyzing variation in party-building. For one, it is almost uniformly democratic. Unlike Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, nearly every country in Latin America has had three or more decades of regular, competitive elections. In addition, Latin American countries share broadly similar histories, cultures, and social structures, as well as broadly similar institutional arrangements (e.g., presidentialism, combined with proportional representation [PR] or mixed PR/plurality electoral systems). Yet party-building outcomes vary widely in the region, both cross-nationally and within countries over time. This empirical variation is crucial for understanding the determinants

[6] See, for example, Duverger (1954), Downs (1957), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Panebianco (1988), Kitschelt (1989), Shefter (1994), and Aldrich (1995). Mainwaring (1999) makes a similar critique.

[7] On party-building in Europe, see Kitschelt (1989), Kalyvas (1996), Hug (2001), Tavits (2013), and Ziblatt (forthcoming); on Africa, see LeBas (2011), Arriola (2013), and Riedl (2014); on Asia, see Hicken (2009) and Hicken and Kuhonta (2015); on the former Soviet Union, see Moser (2001), Hale (2006), and Hanson (2010); on Latin America, see Mainwaring (1999), Levitsky and Cameron (2003), Van Cott (2005), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), Mustillo (2007, 2009), Lupu and Stokes (2010), Vergara (2011), Luna (2014), and Lupu (2014, 2016).

of party-building: we cannot pinpoint the sources of successful party-building without also studying cases of failure.

DEFINING AND MEASURING PARTY-BUILDING

The focus of this volume is *party-building*, which we define as the process by which new parties develop into electorally significant and enduring political actors.[8] We seek to explain not party formation, which is widespread across Latin America,[9] but instead cases in which new parties actually take root. Thus, our operationalization of successful party-building includes both electoral and temporal dimensions. To be considered a success, a new party must achieve a minimum share of the vote and maintain it for a significant period of time. It need not win the presidency, but it must, at a minimum, consistently receive a sizable share of the national vote. Our conceptualization thus excludes "flash parties," which perform well in one or two elections but then collapse (e.g., Front for a Country in Solidarity [FREPASO] in Argentina), as well as minor parties that persist over time but win only a small share of the vote (e.g., some Latin American communist parties).

We score party-building as successful when a new party wins at least 10 percent of the vote in five or more consecutive national legislative elections.[10] We add the condition that a successful new party must also survive the departure of its founding leader. Parties that are little more than personalistic vehicles may achieve success over multiple elections if their founding leaders remain active and at the head of the party ticket (e.g., Hugo Banzer's Nationalist Democratic Action [ADN] in Bolivia). While some of these parties eventually institutionalize (e.g., Peronism), most collapse after their founding leaders exit the political stage (e.g., ADN, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance [ANAPO] in Colombia,

[8] Following Sartori (1976: 56), we define a political party as any political group that competes in elections with the goal of placing candidates in public office.

[9] Barriers to party formation are low throughout Latin America (Mainwaring 2006). Parties form easily, frequently, and for a variety of reasons. According to Mustillo, for example, 133 new parties formed in Bolivia and Ecuador alone during the third wave (2007: 2). Many of these parties were personalistic vehicles, created by and for a single candidate. On party formation, see Kitschelt (1989), Aldrich (1995), Hug (2001), and Van Cott (2005).

[10] National legislative elections must be held at least two years apart from one another. If elections are held in consecutive years (e.g., Guatemala in 1994 and 1995, Peru in 2000 and 2001), both elections are counted, but parties that participate in them must reach the 10-percent threshold in six consecutive elections to be considered successful.

Manuel Odría's National Odriísta Union [UNO] in Peru). In our view, such cases should not be viewed as cases of successful party-building.[11]

Based on this operationalization, we count eleven cases of successful party-building in Latin America since the onset of the third wave (see Table 1.1).[12] These successes represent a tiny fraction of the overall number of parties created in Latin America during this period. We compiled a list of all parties that emerged in eighteen Latin American countries between 1978 and 2005,[13] and which won 1 percent or more of the national legislative vote at least once (see Appendix I for the full list).[14] Using these somewhat restrictive criteria (many additional parties failed to capture 1 percent of the national vote), we counted 307 new parties. Of these, 244 are scored as unsuccessful because they: (1) failed to win 10 percent of the vote and then disappeared (N = 202); (2) failed to win 10 percent of the vote but survived as marginal parties (N = 20); (3) won 10 percent of the vote in at least one election (but fewer than five) and then collapsed (N = 20); or (4) won 10 percent of the vote in five consecutive elections but collapsed after their founding leader left the political scene (N = 2).

An additional fifty-two parties are scored as "incomplete" cases, either because they have yet to compete in five elections, or because they have competed in five elections but only recently reached the minimum 1 percent threshold for inclusion.[15] Of these fifty-two incomplete cases, twelve have won at least 10 percent of the vote in one or more elections and can thus be considered "potentially successful."[16] A few of these parties, such as Bolivia's

[11] Thus, personalistic parties that reach the 10-percent threshold in five consecutive elections but then collapse after the founding leader dies or otherwise ceases to be a viable presidential candidate are not scored as successful. The two parties excluded on these grounds are Hugo Banzer's ADN in Bolivia and Abdalá Bucaram's Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE).

[12] Peru's *Fujimorismo* nearly qualifies as a success but is excluded because it failed to win 10 percent of the vote in the 2001 legislative election. Uruguay's Broad Front (FA), though discussed in Luna's chapter, is not included in our sample because it was formed in 1971, prior to the onset of the third wave.

[13] This includes all Latin American countries except Cuba.

[14] We include parties that won at least 1 percent of the vote in coalition with other parties. We exclude strictly provincial parties; thus, parties must compete in more than one province for seats in national legislative elections to be included.

[15] Most of these parties have not competed in five consecutive legislative elections. A few have competed in five elections but surpassed the 1 percent threshold for inclusion (e.g., Indigenous Social Alliance/Independent Social Alliance [ASI] in Colombia) or the 10-percent threshold for success (e.g., *Fujimorismo* in Peru) fewer than five elections ago.

[16] These are Bolivia's Movement toward Socialism (MAS); Colombia's Social Party of National Unity (PSUN/Party of the U); Costa Rica's Citizens' Action Party (PAC) and Broad Front (FA); Guatemala's Patriotic Party (PP), National Unity of Hope (UNE), and Grand National Alliance (GANA); Panama's Democratic Change (CD); Peru's

TABLE 1.1 *Cases of successful party-building in Latin America since 1978*[1]

Country	Party	Birth
Brazil	Workers' Party (PT)	1980
Brazil	Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)	1988
Brazil	Liberal Front Party (PFL)/Democrats (DEM)	1985
Chile	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	1983
Chile	National Renewal (RN)	1987
Chile	Party for Democracy (PPD)	1987
El Salvador	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	1981
El Salvador	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)	1992
Mexico	Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)	1989
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	1979
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)	1979

[1] A party is scored as successful if it wins at least 10 percent of the vote in five or more consecutive national legislative elections *and* survives after its founding leader has ceased to be a viable presidential contender (due to death, forced or voluntary retirement, or abandonment of the party). Elections must be held at least two years apart from one another. If two legislative elections are held within two years of one another (e.g., Guatemala in 1994 and 1995, Peru in 2000 and 2001), both elections count, but parties must win 10 percent or more of the vote in at least *six* consecutive elections. To be scored as successful, a party must receive 10 percent or more on its own in at least one national legislative election; once it has done so, subsequent elections in which it participates in alliances that win at least 10 percent of the vote are also counted.

Movement toward Socialism (MAS), the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), and Costa Rica's Citizens' Action Party (PAC), are likely to become full cases of success. Most of the others, however, are already in decline and are thus unlikely to reach the 10-percent/five-election threshold. The other thirty-nine incomplete cases are parties that have never won 10 percent of the vote and are thus unlikely to succeed. Hence, our limited number of successful new parties is not simply due to their having had insufficient time to meet our five-election criterion. Beyond the PSUV, MAS, PAC, and perhaps Peru's *Fujimorismo* and Colombia's Social Party of National Unity (PSUN/Party of the U), very few of the incomplete cases are poised to cross the 10-percent/five-election threshold in the years to come.

Of the 255 new parties that emerged in Latin America between 1978 and 2005 and can be scored definitively, then, only eleven (or 4 percent) actually took root. These results are similar to those generated

Fujimorismo, National Solidarity Party (PSN), and Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP); and Venezuela's Fifth Republic Movement (MVR)/United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).



FIGURE 1.1 Party-building outcomes in eighteen Latin American countries, 1978–2005.



FIGURE 1.2 Types of unsuccessful party, 1978–2005.

by Mustillo's (2009) study of new party trajectories in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Of the 297 parties examined by Mustillo, 3.5 percent were successful (what he calls "explosive" or "contender" parties), while 89 percent died without achieving any success ("flops"), 4

percent achieved brief success but then collapsed ("flash" parties), and 3 percent remained marginal contenders ("flat" parties) (2009: 325).

Our eleven cases of successful party-building are diverse. They span the left (PT, PPD, FMLN, FSLN, Mexico's PRD) and right (UDI, RN, ARENA, PFL/DEM), and include insurgent successor parties (FMLN, FSLN), social movement-based parties (PT), authoritarian successor parties (UDI, ARENA, Panama's PRD), and parties born from schisms within established parties (PSDB, PFL/DEM, Mexico's PRD).

EXPLAINING SUCCESSFUL PARTY-BUILDING: A CONFLICT-CENTERED APPROACH

Why have a handful of new parties established themselves as enduring electoral contenders in Latin America, while so many others have not? What factors enabled the PT, the FMLN, and the Mexican PRD to take root, while other new left-of-center parties, such as the United Left (IU) in Peru, FREPASO in Argentina, and the Democratic Alliance M-19 (AD M-19) in Colombia, collapsed? Likewise, what explains the success of the UDI in Chile and ARENA in El Salvador, when most other new conservative parties, such as the Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE) in Argentina, the National Advancement Party (PAN) in Guatemala, and the Liberty Movement in Peru, failed?

Contemporary approaches to party-building do not adequately explain this variation. For example, scholars have argued that democracy itself, if uninterrupted, should encourage party development.[17] There are two versions of this argument. The top-down version focuses on how democratic institutions shape the incentives of individual politicians. In his seminal work on party formation in the United States, for example, John Aldrich (1995: 28–55) argues that under democracy, individual politicians have an incentive to "turn to parties" in order to achieve collective goals, such as winning elections and passing legislation, which, in turn, increase the likelihood of sustaining a long political career. Although Aldrich recognizes the coordination problems inherent in party formation (1995: 55–56), he argues that stable democracy creates "more or less continuous incentives for ambitious politicians to consider party organizations as a means to achieve their goals" (1995: 286).

The bottom-up version of the democracy-centered approach links regular elections to the development of partisan attachments (Campbell et al.

[17] See Aldrich (1995), Brader and Tucker (2001), and Lupu and Stokes (2010).

1960; Converse 1969; Tucker and Brader 2001; Lupu and Stokes 2010; Dinas 2014). Drawing on classic works such as Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1969), Lupu and Stokes argue that since voters cast ballots for parties, "the desire to resolve cognitive dissonance leads them to see themselves as partisans of this party, which in turn makes them more likely to cast votes for it in the future" (2010: 92).[18] Thus, "over time, as people have repeated opportunities to vote for parties and are exposed to their mobilizing efforts, they acquire partisan attachments" (Lupu and Stokes 2010: 102).

Yet evidence from Latin America suggests that elections and democracy are insufficient to induce politicians to invest in parties or to engender stable partisan identities. Nearly four decades since the onset of the third wave, new parties have taken root in only a handful of Latin American countries. Moreover, of our eleven successful cases, only one (Brazil's PSDB) was born under democracy. The other ten all emerged under authoritarian rule.[19] Outside of Brazil, then, no successful party-building occurred under democracy in Latin America between 1978 and 2005, despite the fact that many countries experienced two or more decades of uninterrupted electoral competition.

Another approach to party-building focuses on institutional design. Institutionalist approaches highlight how constitutional, electoral, and other rules shape incentives for politicians and voters to coordinate around or aggregate into national parties.[20] For example, scholars have examined the impact of electoral and other institutional barriers to entry on party formation in Latin America (Van Cott 2005). Likewise, scholars of Brazilian politics have argued that open-list PR electoral systems weaken parties by encouraging candidate-centered strategies (Mainwaring 1999; Ames 2001). These analyses have generated useful insights into how parties organize and how politicians operate in relation to those organizations. They are less useful, however, for explaining what enables parties to take root. Electoral rules may shape incentives for party formation, but they do not generate the partisan attachments or activist networks that are so essential to long-term party survival. In Latin America, institutional design has had a limited impact on party-building

[18] Dinas (2014) makes a similar argument, drawing on US electoral data.

[19] Brazil's PFL was born in 1985 in the last days of the Brazilian military regime, and Chile's RN and PPD were created in 1987 in anticipation of a transition to a more competitive regime.

[20] See Duverger (1954), Cox (1997), Mainwaring (1999), Moser (2001), Chhibber and Kollman (2004), and Hicken (2009).

outcomes. Empirical analyses find little, if any, relationship between electoral rules and party-building outcomes in the region. For example, Mustillo (2007: 80) found that electoral rules had a "rather trivial" impact on party-building. Among our cases, new parties succeeded in federal (e.g., Brazil, Mexico) and unitary systems (e.g., Chile, El Salvador), under powerful executives (e.g., Brazil, Chile) and more constitutionally limited ones (e.g., Mexico), and in electoral systems with high (e.g., Brazil) and low (e.g., Chile) district magnitudes. In some cases (e.g., Brazil), new parties consolidated in institutional contexts widely considered unpropitious for party-building (Mainwaring 1999), while in others (e.g., Peru), new parties failed despite repeated efforts to design institutions aimed at strengthening parties (Vergara 2009; Muñoz and Dargent, Chapter 7, this volume). Indeed, electoral rules have changed so frequently in much of Latin America that they may be best viewed as endogenous to, rather than determinative of, party strength (Remmer 2008).

What, then, explains variation in party-building outcomes in Latin America? New parties must generally do three things if they are to take root. First, they must cultivate strong partisan identities. To succeed over time, parties need partisans, or individuals who feel an attachment to the party and thus consistently turn out to support it. In his chapter for this volume and elsewhere (2014, 2016), Noam Lupu argues that the key to building a stable partisan support base lies in the development of a *party brand*. A party's brand is the image of it that voters develop by observing its behavior over time.[21] Parties with strong brands come to "stand for" something in the eyes of their supporters. According to Lupu (2014: 567), voter attachments to party brands are based on a sense of "comparative fit": in other words, "individuals identify with a party to the extent that they consider themselves similar to the party brand."

Establishing a party brand is no easy task. New parties must either carve out space for themselves vis-à-vis established parties or, where party systems are weakly institutionalized, compete with a plethora of other new parties. According to Lupu (2014, 2016), two factors are essential for brand development: interparty differentiation and intraparty consistency. In other words, a new party must distinguish itself from other parties, and its behavior must be consistent over time. If it becomes indistinguishable from other parties, or if its profile changes markedly from one election to the next, the perception of "comparative fit" will diminish

[21] The notion of party brand is similar to what Hale (2006: 12) calls "ideational capital," or the "cultivation of a *reputation* for standing for [certain] principles."

and its brand will be diluted. When a party's brand is diluted, its ability to maintain electoral support will depend more on its performance in office (Kayser and Wlezien 2011; Lupu 2014). For Lupu, then, a new party that both dilutes its brand *and* performs poorly in office is especially likely to collapse.

Whereas Lupu defines the concept of party brand in programmatic terms, we define it more broadly. The bases of partisan attachments vary. In Latin America, partisan identities have at times been rooted in sociocultural (Ostiguy 2009a, 2009b) and even personalistic appeals. Indeed, many of the most successful and enduring party brands in Latin America (e.g., Radicalism and Peronism in Argentina, Colorados and Blancos in Uruguay, *Aprismo* in Peru, *Priísmo* in Mexico) have been programmatically ambiguous. Several of these parties emerged out of conflicts (e.g., populism/antipopulism) whose axes did not correspond to the standard left–right spectrum,[22] and their brands persisted for decades despite considerable programmatic inconsistency and internal heterogeneity. Thus, although brand development clearly contributes to the formation of partisan attachments, it is important to recognize that brands are built on diverse – and sometimes nonprogrammatic – bases.

A second element of successful party-building is the construction of a *territorial organization*.[23] Parties rarely survive in voters' minds alone. Rather, most durable parties have an organized presence on the ground, whether in the form of official branch structures, informal patronage-based machines, or social movements. Territorial organization contributes to the success of new parties in several ways. First, it enhances parties' capacity to mobilize electoral support. The boots on the ground provided by grassroots organization enable parties to disseminate their brand (Samuels 2006; Samuels and Zucco 2014), build and sustain clientelist linkages (Levitsky 2003; Stokes et al. 2013; Luna 2014), and mobilize voters on election day (Tavits 2013: 24–36). Second, territorial organization helps new parties survive crisis. Because the rank-and-file cadres who make up new party organizations tend to be ideologically committed activists, they are more prone to "stick it out" in the face of electoral setbacks and other early crises (Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). Thus, new parties with organized activist bases have a built-in cushion against early failure. Third, a strong territorial organization

[22] On populism versus antipopulism and its relationship to the left–right axis, see Ostiguy (2009a, 2009b).

[23] See Tavits (2013) and Van Dyck (2014b, Chapter 5, this volume).

facilitates the capture of subnational office, which, by allowing parties to demonstrate a capacity to govern, can contribute to their longer-term success (Holland, Chapter 10, this volume).

In sum, parties with grassroots organizations are more sustainable than those without them. Although a handful of parties with weak territorial organizations have enjoyed enduring electoral success (e.g., PPD in Chile, PSDB in Brazil), such parties are the exception. Nearly all of the new parties that took root in Latin America since the onset of the third wave – from the PT and the FMLN on the left to ARENA and the UDI on the right – possessed extensive grassroots organizations.

A third element of successful party-building is a *robust source of organizational cohesion*. Organizational cohesion refers to the propensity of party leaders and cadres to hang together – especially in the face of crisis. Low cohesion is the Achilles' heel of many new parties; parties that suffer schisms during their formative periods usually fail. For example, Peru's IU, which emerged as a major electoral force in the 1980s, was decimated by a schism in 1989 and never recovered (Roberts 1998; Van Dyck 2014b). Similarly, the conservative UCEDE, which became Argentina's third largest party in the 1980s, collapsed after suffering a wave of defections to the government of Carlos Menem in the early 1990s (Gibson 1996). The Guatemalan PAN suffered a precipitous decline after founder Álvaro Arzú and presidential candidate Óscar Berger abandoned the party in the early 2000s, and Colombia's Green Party, which came out of nowhere to finish second in the 2010 presidential election, was crippled by defections – including that of its presidential candidate and best known figure, Antanas Mockus – following the election.

Although parties of all ages suffer schisms, new parties are especially vulnerable to them. For one, they tend to lack strong brands that, in established parties, raise the electoral cost of defection for losers of internal power struggles. Parties may use patronage to keep politicians in the fold (Muñoz and Dargent, Chapter 7, this volume), but patronage in the absence of strong partisan attachments tends to be a weak source of cohesion (Levitsky and Way 2012). Strictly patronage-based parties are prone to fragmentation, as politicians have an incentive to "jump ship" whenever their access to public office becomes imperiled. Indeed, many new patronage-based parties in Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, and elsewhere suffered debilitating schisms during the third wave.[24] Thus, new parties that possess an alternative source of cohesion, such as

[24] On party fragmentation in Brazil, see Mainwaring (1999).

a shared ideology (Hanson 2010), *esprit de corps* generated by intense polarization or threat (LeBas 2011; Levitsky and Way 2012), or perhaps charismatic leadership (Panebianco 1988), are less likely to suffer debilitating schisms.

New parties are thus most likely to succeed when they develop a clear brand, build a strong territorial organization, and acquire a robust source of organizational cohesion. Such tasks have proven difficult to accomplish in contemporary Latin America. Consider, for example, brand development. As Roberts (2014; also Chapter 2, this volume) argues, the 1980s and 1990s constituted a "neoliberal critical juncture" in Latin America, marked by severe economic crisis and far-reaching policy change. The 1982 debt crisis and subsequent emergence of a broad consensus around market-oriented policies hindered brand development in at least two ways. First, recession, fiscal crisis, and soaring inflation undermined government performance throughout the region, increasing the likelihood of policy failure. Second, the so-called Washington Consensus encouraged interparty convergence and intraparty inconsistency. Parties that had previously favored statist or redistributive programs engaged in abrupt programmatic reversals, abandoning leftist or statist programs in favor of macroeconomic orthodoxy and neoliberal reforms (Stokes 2001; Roberts 2014). As a result, many of these new parties experienced brand dilution (Lupu, Chapter 3, this volume).

The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s thus undermined brand development by increasing the likelihood that new parties would dilute their brands *and* perform poorly in office. As Roberts' chapter shows, several party-building projects in Latin America were derailed, at least in part, by the neoliberal critical juncture. For example, Argentina's FREPASO, which originated as a left-of-center party, diluted its brand by rapidly shifting to the center in the 1990s, and then collapsed after serving as junior partner in the disastrous government of Fernando de la Rúa (Lupu, Chapter 3, this volume). Left-of-center parties such as the Democratic Left (ID) in Ecuador and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Bolivia were similarly weakened by periods in government in which neoliberal policies diluted their brands (Roberts, Chapter 2, this volume), and the embryonic brand of Pachakutik in Ecuador as an "ethnopopulist" party was diluted when its political ally, Lucio Gutiérrez, turned to the right after winning the presidency in 2002 (Madrid, Chapter 11, this volume). In contrast, new left parties that did not win the presidency in the 1980s and 1990s had the luxury of remaining opposed to neoliberalism during this period and could therefore maintain programmatic

consistency. Paradoxically, then, *losing* elections appears to have been critical for the survival of new left parties in the 1980s and 1990s.[25]

Organization-building also proved difficult in the contemporary period. As Kalyvas (1996: 41) has observed, "Organization-building does not come naturally or automatically to political actors. It is a difficult, time-consuming, costly, and often risky enterprise." Given the costs of organization-building, politicians who can win and maintain office *without* investing in territorial organization are likely to do so.[26] Hale (2006) has shown, for example, that Russian politicians routinely deploy state agencies and large business conglomerates as substitutes for party organization.[27] Other scholars have emphasized that mass media – especially television – provide a quicker, easier route to electoral success than does organization-building (Cameron and Levitsky 2003; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). As Mainwaring and Zoco (2007: 156–157) write:

> When television emerges as a major campaign vehicle before parties are well entrenched, political actors have less incentive to engage in party-building. It is easier and – in the short term – more effective to use the modern mass media than to build a party.

Drawing on such work, Van Dyck (Chapter 5, this volume) argues that the third wave of democratization inhibited organization-building in Latin America by providing office-seekers with unprecedented access to mass media and state substitutes. His chapter shows that due to open electoral competition and widespread media access, left-wing parties born under democracy tended to underinvest in organization. Indeed, since the onset of the third wave, Latin American politicians of diverse ideological backgrounds have either not invested seriously in territorial organization (e.g., AD M-19, FREPASO) or opted to forego party-building altogether in favor of personalistic candidacies (e.g., Fernando Collor in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo in Peru, Rafael Correa in Ecuador).

The Centrality of Conflict

Building on the classic work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Huntington (1968), we argue that it is not the ordinary politics of democratic competition but rather extraordinary times, marked by intense – and often

[25] This was arguably the case with the PT, the FMLN, the Mexican PRD, and the Uruguayan Broad Front (FA).

[26] See Levitsky and Cameron (2003), Hale (2006), and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007).

[27] Levitsky and Zavaleta (Chapter 15, this volume) find a similar use of party substitutes in Peru.

violent – conflict, that create the most favorable conditions for party-building.[28] Periods of extraordinary conflict, including armed revolutionary struggle, civil war, sustained popular mobilization, and authoritarian repression, are most likely to generate the partisan attachments, territorial organization, and cohesion that enable new parties to take root.

Extraordinary conflict contributes to party-building in several ways. First, it strengthens partisan attachments. As scholars such as Wood (2003), LeBas (2011), and Balcells (2012) have shown, experience with civil war, repression, and other forms of violence tends to generate enduring political identities.[29] Conflict also tends to produce the partisan differentiation that Lupu (Chapter 3, this volume) identifies as essential to brand development. In Latin America, civil war (e.g., nineteenth-century Colombia and Uruguay, twentieth-century El Salvador), revolution (Mexico, Nicaragua), and sustained conflict between populists and anti-populists (e.g., Peronism/anti-Peronism in Argentina) or leftists and right-wing dictatorships (e.g., Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s) often sharply divided societies along partisan lines. Parties that represented the poles of such conflicts were highly differentiated, which helped to crystallize partisan identities.

Conflict also encourages organization-building. Politicians have a greater incentive to invest in organization when their goals extend beyond the electoral arena, and particularly when they face severe extraelectoral threats (Kalyvas 1996; Roberts 2006). In his analysis of party-building under populist governments, for example, Roberts (2006) argues that Hugo Chávez built a more extensive organization than Alberto Fujimori because Chávez's leftist project triggered greater resistance from powerful actors – and thus required greater mobilizational capacity to defend – than Fujimori's neoliberal project. Several strong party organizations in contemporary Latin America were born of extraelectoral conflict. For example, both guerrilla movements seeking to seize power via armed struggle (e.g., FMLN, FSLN) and conservative parties seeking to defend the status quo in the face of a perceived revolutionary threat (e.g., ARENA, UDI) had strong nonelectoral incentives to organize at the grassroots level. Although these organizations were not initially created

[28] Our argument also draws on the work of Smith (2005), Hanson (2010), Slater (2010), LeBas (2011), Vergara (2011), Balcells (2012), and Levitsky and Way (2012).

[29] Wood (2003) argues that experience with military repression in El Salvador increased political identification with the FMLN. Similarly, Balcells (2012) shows that victimization during the Spanish Civil War was correlated with strong political identities in the post-Franco era.

for electoral purposes, they eventually contributed to parties' longer-term electoral success.

Conflict also facilitates organization-building by mobilizing activists. Grassroots organizations are networks of activists. Without the boots on the ground provided by such activists, formal party organizations are often little more than shells (Scarrow 1996; Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). In established parties, grassroots party work may be carried out by party employees and patronage-seekers (Kitschelt 1989; Greene 2007). Because most new parties have limited access to state resources, however, they typically must rely on volunteer activists to build grassroots organizations. Given the time, labor, and uncertain payoffs associated with building a new party organization, it is usually only the most ideologically committed activists – what Panebianco (1988: 26–30) calls "believers" – who are willing to engage in such work. The mobilization of believers, in turn, requires the existence of a "higher cause."[30] High-stakes conflicts such as civil wars, revolutions, populist movements, and antiauthoritarian struggles provide precisely such higher causes. For this reason, episodes of conflict often mobilize the initial generation of ideologically committed activists who are so vital to building grassroots organizations.

The organization-building consequences of conflict may be reinforced by a selection effect. Adversity and violent conflict deter less committed individuals from partisan participation, attracting only those whose convictions trump their risk aversion and short-term ambitions (Greene, Chapter 6, and Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). Parties born in a context of violence or repression thus tend to be composed of an unusually large number of rank-and-file ideologues. While the presence of large numbers of "believers" may handicap parties' electoral performance by limiting their capacity to appeal to electoral majorities (Greene 2007, Chapter 6, this volume), their presence nevertheless facilitates organizational survival, for it ensures that the party's "boots" remain on the ground even in the face of major setbacks, such as electoral defeat (Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume).

Finally, conflict can be a powerful source of organizational cohesion. As Adrienne LeBas has argued, intense polarization hardens partisan boundaries by sharpening "us–them" distinctions, strengthening collective identities, and fostering perceptions of a "linked fate" among cadres (2011: 44–47). Where such polarization is accompanied by

[30] See Hanson (2010).

violent conflict, it often generates strong partisan loyalties (e.g., American Popular Revolutionary Alliance [APRA] after the 1930s; Peronism after 1955). For example, the conflict and repression that followed Perón's 1955 overthrow cemented Peronist loyalties for at least a generation (James 1988). For Peronists of the so-called Resistance era, "there was no doubt that the fundamental enemy was anti-Peronism whatever its different guises; and conversely the fundamental friend was another Peronist … The Resistance saw no need for any internal differentiation."[31] The hardened partisan boundaries generated by violent polarization effectively "trap" potential defectors inside the organization (LeBas 2011: 46). Where the main partisan alternative is associated with an historic enemy (e.g., *gorilas* for Peronists, *Somocistas* for the FSLN, "communists" for ARENA), abandoning the party may be equated with extreme disloyalty and even treason (LeBas 2011: 47; Levitsky and Way 2012).

Conflict has long been a source of party-building in Latin America. As Domínguez reminds us in the Conclusion, many of the region's most historically successful parties were born or became consolidated during periods of violent conflict. For example, Uruguay's long-dominant parties, the Blancos and Colorados, "emerged as a product of war" (López-Alves 2000: 69), with partisan attachments and nationwide activist networks consolidating amid a series of civil wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (López-Alves 2000: 69–87). The Guerra Grande (Great War) (1838–1851) played a "decisive" role in crystallizing partisan identities, as the "horrors of a long and often ferocious war cemented popular loyalties" to such an extent that the parties "enjoyed more loyalty … than the … state" (González 1995: 140). Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties were similarly forged in civil wars (López-Alves 2000: 117–134). The War of the Supremes (1839–1843) was a "watershed for party-building, shaping party subcultures and organizations" (López-Alves 2000: 127–128), and the series of (often brutal) civil wars that followed left partisan identities "deeply entrenched" (Archer 1995: 174). The Liberal and National parties in Honduras and the National Liberation Party (PLN) in Costa Rica were also forged in civil war, and historically dominant parties in Mexico and Bolivia trace their origins (Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI]) or consolidation (Bolivia's Revolutionary Nationalist Movement [MNR]) to revolutionary uprisings. Other major parties, including the Dominican

[31] Roberto Carri, "La Resistencia peronista: crónica por los resistentes," *Antropología del Tercer Mundo* (June 1972), quoted in James (1988: 96).

Revolutionary Party (PRD) in the Dominican Republic, the Radicals and Peronists in Argentina, Democratic Action (AD) in Venezuela, APRA in Peru, and the Broad Front (FA) in Uruguay, took root during periods of intense polarization and authoritarian repression.

Polarization and violence were also a major source of party-building during the third wave. Three of our eleven cases of successful party-building – the FMLN and ARENA in El Salvador and the FSLN in Nicaragua – emerged out of violent conflict. El Salvador, which is arguably the most striking case of party-building in Latin America since the onset of the third wave, experienced a bloody civil war during the 1980s. The civil war strengthened partisan identities, generated intra-party cohesion, and involved guerrilla and paramilitary structures that later served as organizational platforms for party-building (Wood 2003; Loxton, Chapter 9, and Holland, Chapter 10, this volume). The FSLN also emerged out of a violent revolutionary struggle in the late 1970s. The party's extensive grassroots presence, solid partisan support base, and striking level of internal cohesion have been widely attributed to *Sandinismo*'s guerrilla origins (Gilbert 1988: 49–55; Miranda and Ratliff 1993: 13–14). Three other successful new left parties – the PT, the PPD, and the Mexican PRD – were born in opposition to authoritarian rule, and their formative periods were shaped, to varying degrees, by polarization, protest, and repression (Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). At the other end of the ideological spectrum, the formation of the UDI was powerfully shaped by perceptions of a Marxist threat in the polarized context of Augusto Pinochet's Chile (Loxton, Chapter 9, this volume). Finally, two new parties that appear likely to take root – *Chavismo* in Venezuela and the MAS in Bolivia – were also products of conflict. *Chavista* identities and organizations were strengthened by intense polarization, which culminated in the 2002 coup attempt and the large-scale mobilizations of late 2002 and early 2003 (see Roberts 2006). Likewise, the MAS was forged in the context of a massive wave of social protest that included the 2000 "Water War," the 2003 "Gas War," and violent regional autonomy protests of 2007–2008 (Anria 2013).

Conflict-centered approaches to party-building may be traced back to the classic work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Huntington (1968). Huntington argued, for example, that robust ruling parties were often a "product of intense political struggle," such as revolutionary and violent anticolonial movements (1968: 415–417). Likewise, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal analysis of the origins of modern European party systems centers on the role of polarization and conflict.

Until recently, however, contemporary scholarship on party-building has largely neglected the role of conflict.[32] Although Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are widely cited, their work is often mischaracterized as attributing party formation to the mere presence of class, religious, or ethnic cleavages in society.[33] Based on this interpretation, scholars often conclude that a "social cleavage" approach has little explanatory power in Latin America.[34] In fact, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) made no such argument. For them, the "critical cleavages" that produced enduring partisan identities and organizations in Europe did not simply reflect underlying social structures. Rather, they were generated by *conflict*, either in the form of "movements of protest against the established national elite" or "organized resistance" to the expansion of state authority (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 21–23, 42). Thus, it was not the growth of the working class, per se, that gave rise to strong socialist parties, but rather the sustained mass mobilization waged by working-class movements, which in many cases brought countries to the brink of civil war.[35] Indeed, Lipset and Rokkan's "critical cleavages" did not even require objective social bases. In the United States, for example, enduring partisan conflicts were based on "contrasting conceptions of public morality," not underlying social divisions (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 12). If the primary impetus for party-building in Lipset and Rokkan (1967) is *actual conflict* rather than underlying social divisions, their ideas may have more contemporary relevance in Latin America than is often believed.

A potential critique of conflict-centered explanations is that the causal arrows may be reversed: perhaps polarization and conflict are endogenous to, rather than determinative of, party strength. Yet close examination of historical cases suggests that polarization creates strong parties, and not vice versa. In Colombia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, for example, there is ample evidence that strong partisan identities and organizations emerged after – and as a consequence of – the onset of

[32] Recent exceptions include Smith (2005), Slater (2010), Lebas (2011), Levitsky and Way (2012), and Slater and Smith (2016).

[33] According to Mainwaring (1999: 21), for example, the social cleavage approach is "predicated on the idea that social identities such as class, religion, ethnicity, and region provide the bases for common interests and thereby create enduring partisan sympathies."

[34] See, for example, Dix (1989), Mainwaring (1999), and Van Cott (2005).

[35] See Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 21–22). Thus, in Austria, "extreme opposition between Socialists and Catholics … ended in civil war" (22); in Finland, civil war and subsequent repression of the communists left "deep scars" on the party system (50); Italy was "torn by irreconcilable conflicts among ideologically distinct camps" (43); and Belgian parties emerged out of "continuing processes of economic, social, and cultural mobilization" (42).

civil war.[36] Similarly, the organizations and collective identities that undergirded Mexico's PRI and Nicaragua's FSLN were clearly products of revolutionary war. Indeed, at the outset of revolutionary violence in their respective countries, the PRI did not exist and the FSLN was a relatively small guerrilla organization. Likewise, populist parties such as Peronism and *Chavismo* were better organized and more societally rooted *after* periods of conflict than when populist governments assumed office.[37] For example, Peronist organizations and identities were almost certainly strengthened by the mobilization and repression that occurred in the wake of Perón's 1955 overthrow (James 1988; McGuire 1997). Although strong parties may in some cases help to generate polarization, as in Chile in the 1960s and 1970s,[38] it is more common for such parties to moderate over time. Indeed, comparative research on Latin American party systems suggests that societally rooted parties and party systems are associated with *lower* levels of polarization than are weak parties and inchoate party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 28–33). Hence, the claim that strong parties generate polarization, and not vice versa, lacks empirical support.

Conflict is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful party-building. Some new parties (e.g., PSDB in Brazil) take root in the absence of intense polarization, and as Eaton's chapter on the failure of Bolivia's eastern autonomy movement to produce a successful party shows, periods of conflict do not invariably lead to the emergence of strong parties. However, strong parties are more *likely* to take root when they emerge in contexts of extraordinary conflict.

A conflict-centered approach thus helps to explain why successful party-building is a relatively rare event – and why it has been especially uncommon in Latin America since the onset of the third wave. Latin America has been predominantly democratic since the 1980s, and most of the region's civil wars ended by the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, left–right polarization diminished across much of the region (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013), and the level of programmatic differentiation between parties fell considerably.[39] In most respects, democratization, peace, and decreasing

[36] On Colombia and Uruguay, see López-Alves (2000). On El Salvador, see Wood (2003).
[37] On Peronism, see James (1988). On *Chavismo*, see Roberts (2006) and Hawkins (2010).
[38] On Chile, see Valenzuela (1978) and Scully (1992).
[39] There were exceptions. In some countries, particularly Bolivia and Venezuela, ideological polarization increased in the 2000s. It is worth noting that in these cases, polarization gave rise to parties (the MAS in Bolivia, *Chavismo* in Venezuela) that appear likely to take root.

polarization were desirable developments. They may, however, have inhibited party-building.

Organizational Inheritance

Conflict is not the only path to successful party-building. Another means of acquiring a party brand and grassroots organization is inheritance.[40] The costs and coordination problems inherent in party-building may be reduced where politicians can appropriate preexisting brands or organizations and deploy them for partisan ends. Studies of party-building in Europe (Kalyvas 1996; Ziblatt, forthcoming), Africa (LeBas 2011), and Latin America (Van Cott 2005; Vergara 2011) suggest that new parties are more likely to succeed where politicians build upon an infrastructure inherited from preexisting movements or organizations.

Several of the chapters in this volume highlight the importance of organizational inheritance. For example, Loxton's chapter shows how authoritarian successor parties in Chile and El Salvador benefited from organizational resources inherited from former dictatorships.[41] In Chile, the success of the UDI was facilitated by its inheritance of extensive clientelistic networks built by mayors appointed by the military authorities during the 1980s. In El Salvador, ARENA inherited much of its organizational muscle from the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN), a vast paramilitary group created by the country's previous military regime. Authoritarian successor parties may also inherit popular brands, particularly if the previous regime retains substantial public support. Thus, brands that were originally forged by authoritarian regimes (e.g., *Pinochetismo* in Chile, *Torrijismo* in Panama, *Fujimorismo* in Peru) may continue to appeal to part of the electorate, and thus attract voters to parties led by incumbents of the old regime (see also Levitsky and Zavaleta, Chapter 15, this volume).

As Holland's chapter demonstrates, insurgent successor parties may also benefit from organizational inheritance. Both the FMLN and the

[40] Conflict and organizational inheritance are not mutually exclusive. Intense conflict is often accompanied by organization-building in the form of powerful social movements, guerrilla or paramilitary organizations, or authoritarian regime structures. Such organizational infrastructure, in turn, can later serve as the platform for party-building (e.g., Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua).

[41] On authoritarian successor parties and the phenomenon of authoritarian inheritance, see Loxton (2015).

FSLN were built upon established guerrilla movements with networks of activists and supporters throughout the national territory (Allison 2006a, 2006b).[42] In her chapter, Holland shows how the FMLN drew on these networks in order to win subnational office after democratization, which laid the bases for its subsequent growth at the national level. The FMLN and FSLN also inherited brands forged during armed struggle. Revolutionary brands were polarizing, which posed a challenge for insurgent successor parties at election time. However, they also provided voters with a clear sense of what those parties stood for (and how they differed from other parties), which allowed them to sidestep many of the challenges of brand development.

Organizational inheritance also contributed to the success of many movement-based parties. Recent scholarship has shown that unions (LeBas 2011), religious associations and churches (Kalyvas 1996; Ziblatt, forthcoming), and indigenous and other social movements (Van Cott 2005; Vergara 2011) often serve as mobilizing structures for new parties. Brazil's PT is a prime example. Unions and grassroots church organizations played a major role in the PT's initial organization-building efforts (Keck 1992; Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). Moreover, as Samuels and Zucco argue in their chapter, the PT's later organizational expansion was based on a strategy of opening local offices in areas with high NGO density and mobilizing NGO activists for partisan work. Similarly, Madrid argues in his chapter that ethnic parties were more likely to succeed in Latin America where they built upon the infrastructure of preexisting indigenous movements, as did the MAS in Bolivia and Pachakutik in Ecuador. Finally, Eaton's chapter on the failure of party-building in the Bolivian East usefully illustrates the opposite scenario. According to Eaton, one of the reasons for the failure of the country's eastern autonomy movement to produce a viable party was the decline of the once powerful Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (CPSC).

Barndt's chapter on corporation-based parties examines a less conventional platform for party-building: private firms. According to Barndt, corporations have the potential to provide crucial resources for party-building, including finance, physical infrastructure, and personnel. In Panama, Ecuador, and elsewhere, individual corporations have not

[42] The FSLN qualifies as both an insurgent successor party and an authoritarian successor party, since it transformed into an authoritarian ruling party after seizing power in 1979.

merely financed existing parties, but have actually created their own new parties. While many corporation-based parties are personalistic vehicles, Barndt argues that some of them have the potential to institutionalize and endure.

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In sum, extraordinary conflict creates more favorable conditions for party-building than do elections and democracy. By strengthening partisan attachments, inducing elites to invest in organization, mobilizing ideologically committed activists, and generating robust sources of organizational cohesion, episodes of intense (and often violent) conflict create conditions that are more favorable for party-building than those generated by democratic institutions alone. Party-building is also more likely to succeed where politicians inherit infrastructure and collective identities from nonelectoral organizations or previous authoritarian regimes.

Table 1.2 scores our eleven successful cases on the two main variables discussed in this section. In terms of conflict, it is worth highlighting that only one of our successful parties (the PSDB) emerged under stable democracy. By contrast, three successful parties emerged in a context of civil war or insurgency, and seven emerged under authoritarian rule.[43] Of the seven parties born under (or amid transitions from) authoritarianism, five emerged under bureaucratic authoritarianism,[44] a regime type widely associated with large-scale popular mobilization, intense polarization, and high levels of repression (O'Donnell 1973; Valenzuela 1978; Collier 1979).

In terms of organizational inheritance, six of our eleven successful cases were authoritarian successor parties, and two were insurgent successor parties.[45] Two other parties, the PT and the Mexican PRD, were built upon social movements (Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). Only the PSDB and the PPD lacked a clear organizational inheritance.

[43] As noted above, Brazil's PFL was formed in 1985, shortly before the country's transition to democracy, and Chile's RN and PPD were formed in 1987 in anticipation of a transition.

[44] See O'Donnell (1973) and Collier (1979). Although there is much debate on the concept and theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism, four authoritarian regimes in South America are commonly viewed as falling into this category during the 1960s and/or 1970s: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

[45] The FSLN can be scored as both an authoritarian successor party and an insurgent successor party.

TABLE 1.2 *Cases of successful party-building: birth environment and organizational inheritance*

Party	Year of formation	Birth environment	Organizational inheritance
PT (Brazil)	1980	Bureaucratic authoritarianism	Social movements
PSDB (Brazil)	1988	Democracy	None
PFL (Brazil)	1985	Bureaucratic authoritarianism[1]	Authoritarian successor
UDI (Chile)	1983	Bureaucratic authoritarianism	Authoritarian successor
RN (Chile)	1987	Bureaucratic authoritarianism[1]	Authoritarian successor
PPD (Chile)	1987	Bureaucratic authoritarianism[1]	None
ARENA (El Salvador)	1981	Civil war/insurgency	Authoritarian successor
FMLN (El Salvador)	1992	Civil war/insurgency	Insurgent successor
PRD (Mexico)	1989	Authoritarianism	Social movements
FSLN (Nicaragua)	1979	Civil war/insurgency	Insurgent successor[2]
PRD (Panama)	1979	Authoritarianism	Authoritarian successor

[1] Created during final years of military rule in anticipation of a transition.
[2] The FSLN may also be scored as an authoritarian successor party.

Table 1.3 presents data on the regime conditions under which the 255 new parties listed in Appendix I were born.[46] Between 1978 and 2005, Latin American countries (excluding Cuba) collectively spent 318 years under electoral democracy,[47] eighteen of which can be considered populist[48]; ninety years under authoritarian rule, thirty-one of which

[46] Here we examine only the parties that can be definitively scored. Thus, our fifty-two "incomplete" cases are excluded.

[47] For the sake of simplicity, we define electoral democracy in minimalist terms, thereby including borderline or hybrid cases such as the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Guatemala in the early 1990s. Although major insurgency may occur under democracy (or authoritarianism), we treat these categories as mutually exclusive. Thus, cases of civil war/insurgency are excluded from the democracy and authoritarianism categories.

[48] Following Levitsky and Loxton (2013), we define populism as cases in which elected presidents (1) are political outsiders, (2) are elected via explicitly antiestablishment appeals that target the entire political and/or economic elite, and (3) establish a personalistic linkage to voters. It should be noted that this is a more demanding definition than those employed by scholars such as Roberts (1995) and Weyland (1996, 1999). For example, it excludes cases such as Carlos Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor in Brazil, since neither president was a true political outsider.

TABLE 1.3 *Polarization and conflict and party-building outcomes in Latin America, 1978–2005*

Level of polarization and conflict	Total country-years	Successful party-building cases
Civil war/major insurgency	78	3
All authoritarianism	90	7
Bureaucratic authoritarian	31	5
Other authoritarian	59	2
All electoral democracy	318	1
Populist presidency	18	0
Nonpopulist presidency	300	1
Total	486	11

were under bureaucratic authoritarianism[49]; and seventy-eight years under civil war or major insurgency (see Appendix II for coding of cases). Strikingly, 318 years of electoral democracy produced only one successful party. By contrast, seventy-eight country-years of civil war or major insurgency gave rise to three successful parties, and ninety country-years under authoritarianism produced seven successful parties. If we examine only bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, the numbers are even more suggestive: five successful new parties were born during thirty-one years of bureaucratic authoritarian rule.[50] Finally, although eighteen years of populism produced no new parties that are scored as successful, this outcome may be a product of how recently populism occurred in the relevant cases. For example, *Chavismo* and *Fujimorismo* are parties of recent populist origin that, in our view, stand a good chance of crossing the volume's threshold for successful party-building in the future.

A true empirical test of the argument developed here would require an analysis of the effects of a range of variables – including party system characteristics, electoral rules, economic conditions, state capacity, and contingent factors such as party strategies and leadership decisions – on all of the 255 parties listed in Appendix I. Such an analysis is

[49] Following Collier (1979: 3–5), and using our start date of 1978, country-years scored as bureaucratic authoritarian are Argentina (1978–1983), Brazil (1978–1985), Chile (1978–1990), and Uruguay (1978–1984).

[50] It is important to note that these new parties were not born during the most closed, repressive periods of bureaucratic authoritarian rule, but rather during periods of regime liberalization (Brazil's PT, Chile's UDI) or in the lead-up to democratic transitions (Brazil's PFL and Chile's PPD and RN).

beyond the scope of this introductory chapter.[51] Nevertheless, the data presented here suggest two important points. First, successful party-building is rare under all political conditions. Second, the clustering of successful cases in the civil war and bureaucratic authoritarian categories suggests the plausibility of our conflict-centered approach to party-building.

We do not claim that authoritarianism always favors party-building. Authoritarian regimes vary widely, and many of them are clearly not conducive to party-building. In some cases, authoritarianism weakens or destroys parties (Mainwaring 1999), and some dictatorships are so repressive that even clandestine organization-building is virtually impossible (e.g., Cuba). Thus, with the exception of insurgent successor parties (e.g., the FMLN), party-building under authoritarianism is most likely to occur under particular conditions, such as electoral authoritarian rule (e.g., Mexico under the PRI) or periods of authoritarian liberalization (e.g., Brazil in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chile in the late 1980s). Liberalizing authoritarian regimes appear particularly conducive to party-building, since they combine a degree of space for political activity with higher levels of popular mobilization and violence than are typically found under stable democracy.

NEW DEBATES AND ISSUES FOR RESEARCH

The chapters in this volume engage several important debates regarding the causes of successful and failed party-building – and draw attention to several new ones. This final section examines some of these debates, specifically the effects on party-building of (1) regime type, (2) the state, (3) leadership, and (4) populism.

Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Party-Building

As noted above, democracy is widely believed to be more fertile terrain for party-building than authoritarianism. Electoral and legislative institutions are said to encourage politicians to "turn to parties" (Aldrich 1995), and to foster the development of mass partisan attachments (Brader and Tucker 2001; Lupu and Stokes 2010). At the same time, freedom of association lowers the cost of partisan activism.

[51] Mustillo (2007) undertakes a large-*n* test of contending explanations of new party success and failure. However, his analysis yields few substantive results.

As this chapter has shown, however, strikingly few successful parties in Latin America have emerged under stable democracy. Van Dyck offers one possible explanation for this outcome. Because parties born in opposition to authoritarian rule (e.g., Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD) lacked access to the state and mass media, he argues that their leaders faced strong incentives to invest in territorial organization, which in turn enhanced their long-term durability. By contrast, parties that emerged under democracy (e.g., Argentina's FREPASO) could substitute mass media appeals for organization-building, which left them vulnerable to collapse. Loxton's chapter also links successful party-building to authoritarianism, albeit in a different way. He shows how conservative parties that built upon the brands, organizations, clientelist networks, and business ties inherited from previous dictatorships (e.g., Chile's UDI, El Salvador's ARENA) were more likely to succeed than conservative parties with stronger democratic credentials (e.g., Argentina's UCEDE, Guatemala's PAN). Thus, although strong parties may be critical for democracy, many of them, paradoxically, find their roots in periods of authoritarian rule.

At the same time, authoritarianism may also inhibit party-building (Mainwaring 1999; Mustillo 2007; Lupu and Stokes 2010). Greene's chapter highlights the *costs* of building parties under authoritarian rule. He argues that opposition parties with virtually no possibility of winning elections – such as the PRD and National Action Party (PAN) under PRI rule in Mexico – tend to attract mainly diehard ideologues, since pragmatists interested in advancing their careers are likely to join the dominant party. As a result, they evolve into what he calls "niche parties," which are characterized by ideological extremism and high barriers to entry for new members. Niche parties are well suited to survive under the hardships of authoritarianism. However, Greene argues that their organizational "birth defects" tend to persist and shape their behavior after democratization in ways that are detrimental to their electoral prospects. Thus, rather than targeting the median voter, niche parties such as Mexico's PRD tend to remain at the ideological extremes, thereby limiting their capacity to win elections.

Greene and Van Dyck's arguments may be more complementary than they initially appear. Origins under authoritarianism may simultaneously hinder parties' electoral performance *and* contribute to their long-term survival. It may be true that parties born under authoritarianism are more ideologically extreme, and as Greene shows, such niche orientations often persist after democratization. Both Mexico's PRD and Brazil's PT were slow to adopt vote-maximizing strategies after democratization, which

contributed to successive electoral defeats. Yet an ideological activist base may also benefit new parties. Committed cadres are often more willing to make the sacrifices necessary to build a robust territorial organization and, crucially, are more likely to "stick it out" during hard times. Thus, niche origins may have left the PT and PRD better positioned to take root and survive over the long term (and in the case of the PT, eventually win national office). For Van Dyck, then, the PRD should be viewed as a case of successful party-building. While its niche orientation contributed to a series of electoral setbacks, the party's activist-based organization also enabled it to survive those setbacks. Indeed, although the PRD failed to win the presidency through 2012, it was one of the few new left parties to take root in Latin America during the third wave.

Party-Building and the State: A Double-Edged Sword?

As Martin Shefter's (1977, 1994) seminal work showed, the state can have a powerful impact on party-building.[52] Both the relationship of parties to the state and the character of the state itself may affect politicians' incentives and capacity to invest in party organization. Yet, as the chapters in this volume make clear, the state's effects on party-building are decidedly double-edged.

On the one hand, the state has long been a key resource for Latin American party organizations.[53] Maintaining a territorial organization is costly, and most Latin American parties' access to private sources of finance such as business has historically been limited (Gibson 1996: 216–220; Schneider 2010). Thus, the activists and cadres who compose parties' grassroots organizations in the region have often been compensated with public sector jobs or access to other state resources (Morgan 2011; Grindle 2012; Gingerich 2013).[54] Indeed, as Domínguez reminds us in the Conclusion, nearly all of Latin America's most successful and enduring parties were (or evolved into) patronage-based machines. The chapter by Muñoz and Dargent highlights the degree to which party organization in Colombia and Peru had traditionally depended on patronage resources.

[52] On the state and party-building, see also Zolberg (1966), Mainwaring (1999), Hale (2006), Mainwaring (1999), and Slater (2010).

[53] See, for example, Hagopian (1996), Mainwaring (1999), Greene (2007), Mustillo (2007), Dargent and Muñoz (2011), Morgan (2011), Morgan et al. (2011), Grindle (2012), and Gingerich (2013).

[54] On how state corruption may be used to sustain party organizations, see Gingerich (2013).

In both countries, political reforms that limited national politicians' capacity to distribute patronage resources not only weakened existing parties, but also inhibited subsequent party-building efforts.[55]

Holland's chapter also highlights how the state may contribute to party-building. In the case of El Salvador, she argues that election to local office facilitated the FMLN's successful transition from guerrilla movement to party during the 1990s. Governing at the local level helped the FMLN to strengthen its organization (by providing career opportunities for cadres) and to establish a reputation for good governance. In contrast, Holland attributes the failure of Colombia's AD M-19 to the fact that it never seriously pursued subnational office.

State resources may remain central to party-building even if economic liberalization and state reform ultimately limit Latin American politicians' ability to deploy patronage resources for partisan ends.[56] In some cases, for example, public finance has emerged as a key alternative type of state resource. As Bruhn's chapter shows, public financing played a major role in sustaining Mexican party organizations beginning in the late 1990s (perhaps contributing to the PRD's consolidation), and it appears to have strengthened party organizations in Brazil (Samuels and Zucco, Chapter 12, this volume).

On the other hand, access to the state also has clear negative consequences for party-building. Politicians who hold major office can use the state as a "substitute" for parties (Hale 2006). Instead of making costly investments in organization-building, such politicians can use public resources to fund their campaigns and deploy government workers to do their campaign work (Hale 2006; Van Dyck, Chapter 5, this volume). In short, access to the state weakens politicians' incentive to construct the kind of grassroots organization that facilitates long-term party survival. Thus, although state resources may provide a useful electoral shortcut, they ultimately result in weaker organizations and less durable parties. Indeed, as Van Dyck's chapter shows, it was the new left parties that lacked access to the state during their formative periods, such as the PT and the Mexican PRD, which built the most durable grassroots organizations in third wave Latin America.[57]

[55] Morgan (2011) makes a similar argument about party collapse in Venezuela.

[56] See Greene (2007) and Hagopian et al. (2009). For more skeptical views on the decline of patronage, see Levitsky (2003), Grindle (2012), and Gingerich (2013).

[57] Similarly, Tavits' study of postcommunist parties found that organization-building was most likely among parties that were "left out of government" (2013: 155–156).

A second, less studied way in which the state may affect party-building is through its impact on governance. As Mainwaring (2006) has argued, state capacity has a powerful impact on government performance, which in turn affects governing parties' electoral performance. Where states are weak, as in much of the Andean region, government performance invariably suffers. Limited tax capacity means less revenue to spend on health care, education, infrastructure, social policy, and other public services; weak state bureaucracies yield public services that are plagued by uneven coverage, inefficiency, and corruption; and ineffective justice systems and police forces result in widespread perceptions of impunity and insecurity. Under conditions of state weakness, then, it is difficult for *any* party to govern effectively. When governments repeatedly fail to deliver the goods, the result is often a crisis of political representation, characterized by widespread voter rejection of established parties (Mainwaring 2006). It is very difficult to build a successful new party under such circumstances.

Thus, where states are weak, as in much of Central America and the Andes, new parties are more likely to fail. During the contemporary era, governing took a devastating toll on new parties such as the ID and the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE); ADN in Bolivia; Possible Peru (PP) and the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) in Peru; and the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) and PAN in Guatemala. In each of these cases, weak states contributed to widespread perceptions of corruption and/or ineffective government performance, which eroded public support and contributed to party-building failure.

Party-building is more likely to succeed where state capacity is high. Where states possess a minimum level of tax capacity and bureaucratic effectiveness, parties that win public office have an opportunity to govern well and carry out policies that strengthen their brands. Indeed, seven of the eleven new parties that took root in Latin America after the onset of the third wave did so in countries with relatively effective states: Chile, Brazil, and Mexico.

The Role of Party Leaders

Dominant personalities and charismatic leaders are widely viewed as inimical to party-building (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Weyland 1996, 1999). Politicians who mobilize support based on personalistic appeals are often reluctant to invest in party structures that could limit their power and autonomy. Moreover, because such appeals tend to be non-programmatic, personalistic parties and campaigns are generally viewed as unfavorable for partisan brand development. Indeed, Latin American

history offers numerous examples of personalistic leaders who abandoned, destroyed, or seriously weakened their own parties.

Yet scholars have paid insufficient attention to the ways in which leaders may contribute to party-building. Popular or charismatic leaders can strengthen new parties in at least two ways. First, they win votes. As Samuels and Shugart (2010) have shown, presidential systems compel parties to nominate politicians with broad popular appeal. Parties without viable presidential candidates rarely become electorally competitive, and noncompetitive parties rarely endure. In Latin America, which is uniformly presidentialist, founding leaders or leading presidential candidates have often played a decisive role in getting new parties off the ground by making them electorally viable.[58] In extreme cases, dominant personalities lay the basis for an enduring partisan brand, as in the cases of Peronism, *Fujimorismo*, and *Chavismo*. Yet even in the case of more institutionalized parties such as Popular Action (AP) and APRA in Peru; the PLN in Costa Rica; AD and the Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee (COPEI) in Venezuela; the PRD and Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) in the Dominican Republic; and, more recently, ARENA, the PT, the PSDB, and Mexico's PRD, founding leaders played an indispensable role in early efforts to mobilize popular support.

Individual leaders may also act as a source of party cohesion. As Van Dyck (2014b) argues, party leaders who combine external appeal and internal dominance may help bind new parties together during the critical formative period. Party founders with undisputed internal authority, such as Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in APRA, Lula in the PT, Roberto D'Aubuisson in ARENA, Jaime Guzmán in the UDI, and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in the Mexican PRD, were able to adjudicate conflict within their parties, as their word was effectively law. In such cases, the leader's external electoral appeal further reduced the likelihood of schism, as the prospect of competing without the leader's coattails discouraged other party elites from defecting. In effect, then, charismatic leaders may substitute for established partisan brands and institutional mechanisms of dispute resolution during parties' formative periods (Van Dyck 2014b).

Most theories of party-building downplay the role of leaders. Political scientists often avoid placing individual leaders at the center of their analyses for fear of excessive voluntarism. In presidential democracies, however, the electoral appeal of individual leaders can be a crucial means of mobilizing the support necessary for new parties to take off. Popular leaders hardly ensure party institutionalization; in fact, they often hinder it. But

[58] Dix (1989) makes a similar point.

without a popular leader at the top of the ticket, new parties are unlikely to take off in presidential democracies, making long-term success unlikely.

The Paradox of Populism

Populism, in which personalistic outsiders use plebiscitary means to mobilize mass electorates against the entire political and/or economic elite,[59] is also widely viewed as inimical to party-building (Hawkins 2010; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Weyland 1996, 1999). Populists often adopt an explicitly antiparty appeal (Barr 2009; Weyland 1996, 1999). As presidential candidates, for example, Argentina's Perón, Peru's Fujimori, Venezuela's Chávez, and Ecuador's Correa attacked established parties as corrupt and unrepresentative entities that stood in the way of "true" or "authentic" democracy, and in power took steps to weaken existing parties. Moreover, populists tend not to invest in building strong parties, preferring personalistic vehicles instead. Perón, Fujimori, Chávez, and Correa relied heavily on personalistic and plebiscitary appeals, and at times circumvented, undermined, or discarded their own parties.

Yet if populists weaken parties in the short run, they may – however indirectly and unintentionally – strengthen them in the long run. Successful populism almost invariably polarizes societies, and in many cases, it generates sustained social and political conflict.[60] Successful populists such as Perón, Haya de la Torre, Fujimori, and Chávez earned intense support among large (usually lower-income) sectors of society, while at the same time triggering the intense opposition of other (usually middle- and high-income) sectors (de la Torre 2000; Hawkins 2010). In Argentina, Peru, and more recently Venezuela, the result was intense, prolonged, and sometimes violent polarization between populist and antipopulist movements that eventually created the bases for strong partisan identities and organizations.[61]

Thus, although populist experiences do not immediately give rise to strong parties, they may create the raw materials for party-building in the future. Intense polarization between populist and antipopulist forces tends to produce clear (if personalized) brands, powerful partisan identities and subcultures, and large activist bases that, even if initially organized as loosely structured "movements," may eventually form the basis for mass

[59] This definition draws on Barr (2009) and Levitsky and Loxton (2013).
[60] See James (1988), Collier and Collier (1991), de la Torre (2000), and Hawkins (2010).
[61] On the case of Argentine Peronism, see James (1988), McGuire (1997), Levitsky (2003), and Ostiguy (2009b).

party organizations. This process clearly occurred in the case of Peronism, is likely to occur in the case of *Chavismo*, and may be occurring in the case of *Fujimorismo* (Levitsky and Zavaleta, Chapter 15, this volume).

STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME

The volume is organized as follows. Part I presents three perspectives on the development of party–voter linkages and party brands in contemporary Latin America. Chapter 2, by Kenneth M. Roberts, examines how the neoliberal critical juncture of the 1980s and 1990s reshaped the axes of party system competition and, consequently, opportunities for party-building in the region. Roberts finds that because of the dramatic region-wide shift toward market-oriented policies during this period, and the pressures that this put on left-leaning parties in office to engage in "bait-and-switch" tactics to implement such policies, one of the keys to success for new left parties, paradoxically, was losing elections and remaining in the opposition. Chapter 3, by Noam Lupu, introduces a new theory of party brand development that focuses on the centrality of programmatic differentiation and consistency. It then applies this theory to the cases of FREPASO in Argentina and the PT in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s, showing why brand development failed in the former but succeeded in the latter. Chapter 4, by Juan Pablo Luna, argues that in the context of high levels of inequality and social fragmentation, successful parties must appeal to diverse socioeconomic groups through what he calls "segmented, harmonized linkages," whereby they simultaneously employ a range of programmatic, clientelistic, and symbolic appeals.

Part II examines challenges of organization-building in contemporary Latin America, focusing on the role of the state and political regimes. Chapter 5, by Brandon Van Dyck, argues that, paradoxically, in third wave Latin America, successful new left parties were more likely to emerge in adverse, authoritarian contexts than under stable democracy. Left parties born under authoritarianism lacked regular access to the media and the state during their formative periods and thus had incentives to build strong organizations, which increased the likelihood of long-term party survival. Chapter 6, by Kenneth F. Greene, examines the flipside of being born under conditions of adversity. Greene argues that parties born in opposition to dominant party regimes (e.g., the Mexican PRD) tend to become ideologically extreme "niche parties" that have difficulty appealing to electoral majorities after democratization. Chapter 7, by Paula Muñoz and Eduardo Dargent, highlights the continued importance of

patronage resources in Latin America. The chapter shows how political reforms that limited party leaders' access to patronage in Colombia and Peru not only weakened old party organizations, but also hindered the construction of new ones. Chapter 8, by Kathleen Bruhn, examines the impact of public financing, offering some initial evidence that generous public financing – as exists in Brazil and Mexico – may help new party organizations consolidate.

Part III examines the role of organizational inheritance. Chapter 9, by James Loxton, focuses on authoritarian successor parties. Drawing on an analysis of new conservative parties in Chile and El Salvador, Loxton argues that new parties that inherit brands, organizations, and other resources from outgoing dictatorships are more likely to succeed than ideologically similar parties of more democratic origin. Chapter 10, by Alisha C. Holland, examines insurgent successor parties in Colombia and El Salvador. Holland argues that such parties were more likely to take root when they used their inherited resources to capture local office, since this allowed them to consolidate their organizations and build a reputation for good governance. Chapter 11, by Raúl L. Madrid, looks at the obstacles to ethnic party-building in Latin America. Madrid argues that limited resources and fluid ethnic identities make ethnic party-building difficult, but that ethnic parties are most likely to succeed when they inherit the organization of preexisting indigenous movements and make inclusive appeals that he calls "ethnopopulism." Chapter 12, by David Samuels and Cesar Zucco Jr., examines the success of the PT in Brazil in forging large numbers of partisan identifiers, and argues that one of reasons for the party's success in this area was its strategy of recruiting civil society activists and opening branches in areas of high NGO density. Chapter 13, by William T. Barndt, examines the increasingly widespread phenomenon of corporation-based parties, or parties that are built upon the finance, infrastructure, and brand of large private firms.

Part IV examines two failed cases of party-building and one prospective case. Chapter 14, by Kent Eaton, examines the failure of Bolivia's eastern autonomy movement to produce a viable conservative party in the 2000s. Eaton's explanation focuses on the Morales government's successful wooing of eastern economic elites and the decline of the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (CPSC), the once powerful civil society organization that might have served as the backbone of such a party. Chapter 15, by Steven Levitsky and Mauricio Zavaleta, asks why no successful party-building has occurred in post-Fujimori Peru. The chapter argues

that party system collapse had a path-dependent effect, whereby politicians learned how to win elections without parties and developed a set of informal institutions that effectively substituted for party organization. Chapter 16, by Jorge I. Domínguez, examines party-building scenarios in a hypothetical posttransition Cuba. Domínguez argues that party-building outcomes are likely to be heavily shaped by the fate of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) and the character of the transition itself.

The Conclusion, also by Domínguez, places the volume's chapters in historical perspective by reexamining the sources of success and failure in earlier generations of Latin American parties.

Appendix I

New Parties Formed in Latin America, 1978–2005[1]

Outcomes	Number of cases
Successful[2]	11
Unsuccessful	244
Flop[3]	202
Marginal[4]	20
Flash[5]	20
Personalistic[6]	2
Incomplete	52
Successful[7]	12
Marginal[8]	40
Total	307

[1] We include all parties created between January 1, 1978 and December 31, 2005 that received at least 1 percent of the vote, by themselves or in coalition, in at least one national legislative election. Parties must be national in orientation, competing for seats in more than one province. We include parties created via schisms from preexisting parties, as well as new parties created via the fusion of two or more preexisting parties. However, we exclude preexisting parties that changed their name between 1978 and 2005 but otherwise remained intact (e.g., Brazil's Democratic Social Party [PDS], formerly the National Renewal Alliance [ARENA]), as well as preexisting parties that divided into two parties but reunited between 1978 and 2005 (e.g., the Chilean Socialist Party). A party's birth year is the year of its creation, not the year legal status was granted. In a few cases in which we could not obtain information about the birth year, we use the first year the party competed in elections. Cuba is excluded.

[2] A party is scored as successful if it wins at least 10 percent of the vote in five or more consecutive national legislative elections *and* survives after its founding leader has ceased to be a viable presidential contender (due to death, forced or voluntary retirement, or abandonment of the party). Elections must be held at least two years apart from one another.

If two legislative elections are held within two years of one another (e.g., Guatemala 1994 and 1995, Peru in 2000 and 2001), both elections count, but parties must win 10 percent or more of the vote in at least *six* consecutive elections to be scored as successful. A party must receive 10 percent or more on its own in at least one national legislative election; once it has done so, subsequent elections in which it participates in alliances that win at least 10 percent of the vote are treated as meeting the 10-percent threshold.

[3] A party is scored as a flop if, either by itself or in coalition, it wins between 1 percent and 10 percent of the vote in at least one national legislative election but subsequently dissolves, merges into another party, or falls below 1 percent of the vote prior to reaching five consecutive national elections. We borrow the term "flop" from Mustillo (2009).

[4] A party is scored as marginal if, either by itself or in coalition, it wins between 1 percent and 10 percent of the vote in five or more consecutive national legislative elections *or*, over the course of five consecutive elections, it wins between 1 percent and 10 percent, falls below 1 percent, and then returns to between 1 percent and 10 percent. Elections must be held at least two years apart from one another. If two legislative elections are held within two years of one another, both elections count, but parties must win 1 percent or more of the vote in at least *six* consecutive elections to be scored as marginal.

[5] A party is scored as a flash party if it wins 10 percent or more of the vote in at least one but fewer than five consecutive national legislative elections, and then falls permanently below the 10-percent threshold.

[6] A party is scored as unsuccessful (personalistic) if it wins at least 10 percent of the vote in five consecutive national legislative elections, but then collapses or becomes marginal soon after its founding leader has ceased to be a viable presidential contender (due to death, forced or voluntary retirement, or abandonment of the party).

[7] A party is scored as incomplete (successful) if it has won at least 10 percent of the vote in one or more consecutive national legislative elections, including the most recent one, but has not yet reached the five-election threshold.

[8] A party is scored as incomplete (marginal) if, by itself or in coalition, it has won at least 1 percent of the vote in one or more consecutive national legislative elections, including the most recent one, but has not yet competed in five consecutive elections.

Argentina

Party	Birth	Outcome
Unión del Centro Democrático (UCEDE)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Humanista (PH)	1984	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Blanco de los Jubilados (PBJ)	1987	Unsuccessful (flop)
Fuerza Republicana (FR)	1988	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia (MODIN)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Grande (FG)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente País Solidario (FREPASO)	1994	Unsuccessful (flash)
Política Abierta para la Integridad Social (PAIS)	1995	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Nueva Dirigencia (ND)	1996	Unsuccessful (flop)
Acción por la República (AR)	1997	Unsuccessful (flash)
Izquierda Unida (IU)	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Unidad Federalista (PAUFE)	1999	Unsuccessful (flop)
Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (ARI)	2001	Unsuccessful (marginal)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Polo Social	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Autodeterminación y Libertad (AyL)	2001	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Recrear para el Crecimiento (Recrear)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Propuesta Republicana (PRO)	2005	Incomplete (marginal)

Bolivia

Party	Birth	Outcome
Ofensiva de la Izquierda Democrática (OID)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Izquierda Nacional (MIN)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda (FRI)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Barrientista Revolucionario (PRB)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Vanguardia Obrera (VO)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Indio Túpac Katari (MITKA)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Socialista-1 (PS-1)	1979	Unsuccessful (flop)
Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN)	1979	Unsuccessful (personalistic)[1]
Movimiento Indio Túpac Katari-1 (MITKA-1)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza de Fuerzas de la Izquierda Nacional del MNR (AFIN-MNR)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Unido (MNRU)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Katari de Liberación (MRTKL)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente del Pueblo Unido (FPU)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA)	1988	Unsuccessful (flash)
Frente Unido de Liberación Katarista (FULKA)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Izquierda Unida (IU)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS)	1989	Unsuccessful (flash)
Eje del Acuerdo Patriótico (EAP)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril (VR-9A)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alternativa del Socialismo Democrático (ASD)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Renovadora Boliviana (ARB)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR)	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)	1995	Incomplete (successful)
Vanguardia Socialista de Bolivia (VSB)	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP)	2000	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Libertad y Justicia (PLJ)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente de Unidad Nacional (FUN)	2003	Incomplete (marginal)
Alianza Social (AS)	2005	Unsuccessful (flop)

[1] ADN won at least 10 percent of the vote for more than five consecutive national legislative elections, but collapsed after the death of its founder, Hugo Banzer, in 2002.

Brazil

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT)	1979	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)	1980	Successful
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)	1981	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Liberal (PL)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido da Frente Liberal/Democratas (PFL/DEM)	1985	Successful
Partido Verde (PV)	1986	Incomplete (marginal)[1]
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)	1988	Successful
Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (PRN)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Trabalhista Renovadora (PTR)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (PRONA)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Progressista Reformador (PPR)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Progressista (PP)	1993	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Progressista/Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PP/PPB)[2]	1995	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Social Cristão (PSC)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL)	2004	Incomplete (marginal)

[1] Although the PV formed in 1986, it did not cross the 1-percent threshold until the 2002 general election. Thus, we score the PV as incomplete (marginal).

[2] The PPB formed in 1995 as a merger of the PP and PPR (both est. 1993). In 2003, the PPB changed its name to PP.

Chile

Party	Birth	Outcome
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)	1983	Successful
Partido Humanista (PH)	1984	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Renovación Nacional (RN)	1987	Successful
Partido por la Democracia (PPD)	1987	Successful
Unión de Centro Centro (UCC)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Nacional de los Independientes (ANI)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Acción Regionalista (PAR)	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)

Colombia

Party	Birth	Outcome
Frente por la Unidad del Pueblo (FUP)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Nuevo Liberalismo (NL)	1979	Unsuccessful (flash)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Frente Democrático (FD)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unión Patriótica (UP)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Nacional Conservador (MNC)	1986	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Popular (FP)	1991	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Democrática Movimiento 19 de Abril (AD M-19)	1990	Unsuccessful (flash)
Movimiento Unión Cristiana (MUC)	1991	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Salvación Nacional (MSN)	1991	Unsuccessful (flop)
Laicos por Colombia (LC)	1991	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Social Indígena/Alianza Social Independiente (ASI)	1991	Incomplete (marginal)[1]
Compromiso Cívico y Cristiano por la Comunidad (C4)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Fuerza Progresista (FP)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Comunal y Comunitario (MCC)	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Cívico Seriedad por Colombia (MCSC)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Ciudadano (MC)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Convergencia Popular Cívica (CPC)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Nueva Fuerza Democrática (NFD)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Cambio Radical (CR)	1998	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Movimiento Independiente de Renovación Absoluta (MIRA)	2000	Incomplete (marginal)
Movimiento Unionista (MU)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Voluntad Popular (MVP)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Convergencia Ciudadana (CC)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Integración Regional (MIR)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Integración Popular (MIP)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Nacional (MN)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Nuevo Liberalismo (NL)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Renovación Acción Laboral (MRAL)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Progresismo Democrático (MPD)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Popular Unido (MPU)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Colombia Siempre (CS)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Equipo Colombia (EC)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Apertura Liberal (AL)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Por el País que Soñamos (PPS)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Colombia Democrática (PCD)	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)
Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA)	2005	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (PSUN/Partido de la U)	2005	Incomplete (successful)
Partido Verde (PV)	2005	Incomplete (marginal)

[1] Although the ASI was formed in 1991, it did not cross the 1-percent threshold until the 2010 general election. Thus, we score the ASI as incomplete (marginal).

Costa Rica

Party	Birth	Outcome
Pueblo Unido (PU)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Acción Democrática Alajuelense/ Alianza Patriótica (PADA/AP)	1978	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Alianza Nacional Cristiana (PANC)	1981	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Independiente Nacional (MIN)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Nacional Democrático (PND)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Acción Laborista Agrícola (PALA)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Fuerza Democrática (FD)	1992	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Libertario (ML)	1994	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN)	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Renovación Costarricense (PRC)	1995	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Demócrata (PD)	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC)	2000	Incomplete (successful)
Frente Amplio (FA)	2004	Incomplete (successful)
Restauración Nacional (RN)	2004	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Accesibilidad sin Exclusión (PASE)	2004	Incomplete (marginal)
Patria Primero (PP)	2005	Unsuccessful (flop)

Dominican Republic

Party	Birth	Outcome
Unidad Democrática (UD)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Trabajadores Dominicanos (PTD)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Fuerza Nacional Progresista (FNP)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Acción Constitucional (PAC)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido del Pueblo Dominicano (PPD)	1984	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Revolucionario Independiente (PRI)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Demócrata Institucional (PDI)	1986	Unsuccessful (flop)
Bloque Institucional Social Demócrata (BIS)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Social Dominicana (ASD)	1991	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza por la Democracia (APD)	1992	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Renacentista Nacional (PRN)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Unidad Nacional (PUN)	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata (PRSD)	2004	Unsuccessful (flop)

Ecuador

Party	Birth	Outcome
Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Izquierda Democrática (ID)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Demócrata (PD)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Pueblo Cambio y Democracia (PCD)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriana (PRE)	1982	Unsuccessful (personalistic)[1]
Coalición Nacional Republicana (CNR)	1984	Unsuccessful (flop)
Liberación Nacional (LN)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País (MUPP-NP)[2]	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Independiente Liberación Provincial (MILP)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Ciudadana Nuevo País (MCNP)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Cambio y Dignidad (CD)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimientos Sociales Independientes (MSI)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Acuerdo Provincia por Nuevo País (APNP)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Gente Nueva (GN)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Libertad (PL)	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Patria en Solidaridad (MPS)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Integración Provincial (MIP)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Transformación Democrática (TD)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (PSP)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)

[1] The PRE was the personalistic vehicle of Abdalá Bucaram (Freidenberg 2003), who was removed from the presidency for reasons of "mental incapacity" in 1997 and subsequently went into exile in Panama. The PRE remained above 10 percent of the vote through the 2002 election, as Bucaram promised his imminent return to Ecuador. However, following his abortive return to Ecuador in 2005, and after being refused amnesty on multiple occasions, the likelihood of Bucaram returning to Ecuador and seriously contending for the presidency became exceedingly slim. He ceased to be a significant political actor after 2006, and as a result, the PRE declined into marginality. Given the PRE's failure to remain viable after its leader's political exit, we score it as unsuccessful (personalistic).

[2] Often called simply "Pachakutik."

El Salvador

Party	Birth	Outcome
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA)	1981	Successful
Acción Democrática (AD)	1981	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Orientación Popular (POP)	1981	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Auténtico Institucional Salvadoreño (PAISA)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Liberación (PL)	1985	Unsuccessful (flop)
Convergencia Democrática (CD)	1987	Unsuccessful (flash)
Movimiento Auténtico Cristiano (MAC)	1988	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)	1992	Successful

(*continued*)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Movimiento de la Unidad (MU)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Renovador Social Cristiano (PRSC)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Liberal Democrático (PLD)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Demócrata (PD)	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Unión Social Cristiana (USC)	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Centro Democrático Unido (CDU)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Popular Republicano (PPR)	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Renovador (MR)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Fuerza Cristiana (FC)	2002	Unsuccessful (flop)
Acción Popular (AP)	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)
Cambio Democrático (CD)	2005	Incomplete (marginal)

Guatemala

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Socialista Democrático (PSD)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Emergente de Concordancia (MEC)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Democrático de Cooperación Nacional (PDCN)	1983	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unión del Centro Nacional/Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN)	1984	Unsuccessful (flash)
Acción Democrática (AD)	1984	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Cívico Democrático (FCD)	1984	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (MAS)	1986	Unsuccessful (flash)
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)	1989	Unsuccessful (flash)
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)	1989	Unsuccessful (flash)
Alianza Popular Cinco (AP-5)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Reformador Guatemalteco (PREG)	1991	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unión Democrática (UD)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Desarrollo Integral Auténtico (DIA)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Progresivo (PP)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Libertador Progresista (PLP)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala (FDNG)	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
La Organización Verde (LOV)[1]	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Reformador (MR)[2]	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)	1998	Incomplete (marginal)
Movimiento Principios y Valores (MPV)[3]	1999	Unsuccessful (flop)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Patriota (PP)	2001	Incomplete (successful)
Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE)	2002	Incomplete (successful)
Partido Unionista (PU)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)
Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA)[4]	2002	Incomplete (successful)
Alianza Nueva Nación/Alternativa Nueva Nación (ANN)	2003	Incomplete (marginal)
Democracia Social Participativa (DSP)	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)
Transparencia	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)
Centro de Acción Social (CASA)	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)

[1] Formerly the Unión Reformista Social.
[2] Formerly the Partido Laborista Guatemalteco.
[3] Formerly Acción Reconciliadora Democrática.
[4] Formerly the Partido Solidaridad Nacional (PSN). In 2003, the PSN, along with the PP and the MR, formed a coalition called GANA. The PP and the MR subsequently left the coalition, and in 2005 the PSN – the only remaining member – renamed itself GANA.

Honduras

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Unificación Democrática (PUD)	1992	Unsuccessful (marginal)

Mexico

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Demócrata Mexicano	1979	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Verde Ecológico de México (PVEM)	1986	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional	1987	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Mexicano Socialista (PMS)	1988	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)	1989	Successful
Partido del Trabajo	1990	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Movimiento Ciudadano (MC)[1]	1998	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Democracia Social (PDS)	1999	Unsuccessful (flop)
México Posible	2003	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Socialdemócrata (PSD)[2]	2005	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Nueva Alianza	2005	Incomplete (marginal)

[1] Formerly Convergencia por la Democracia.
[2] Formerly the Partido Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina.

Nicaragua

Party	Birth	Outcome
Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense (MDN)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)	1979	Successful
Partido Conservador Demócrata (PCDN)	1979	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Socialdemócrata (PSD)	1979	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Popular Conservadora (APC)	1984	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Demócrata de Confianza Nacional (PDCN)	1986	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN)	1987	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Neoliberal (PALI)	1987	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Liberal Independiente de Unidad Nacional (PLIUN)	1987	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Nacional Conservador (PNC)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Integracionista de América Central (PIAC)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Acción Nacional Conservadora (ANC)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Conservador Nicaragüense (PCN)	1991	Incomplete (marginal)
Unión Demócrata Cristiana (UDC)	1992	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN)	1993	Incomplete (marginal)
Proyecto Nacional (PRONAL)	1995	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista (MRS)	1995	Incomplete (marginal)
Camino Cristiano Nicaragüense (CCN)	1996	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Unidad Cristiana (MUC)	1997	Incomplete (marginal)
Alianza por la República (APRE)	2004	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN)	2005	Unsuccessful (flash)

Panama

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)	1979	Successful
Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (MOLIRENA)	1981	Unsuccessful (flash)
Partido de Acción Popular (PAPO)	1982	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Nacionalista Popular (PNP)	1983	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Liberal Auténtico (PLA)	1988	Unsuccessful (flash)
Partido Renovación Civilista (PRC)	1992	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Misión de Unidad Nacional (MUN)	1992	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento de Renovación Nacional (MORENA)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Papa Egoró (MPE)	1993	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Solidaridad (PS)	1993	Unsuccessful (flash)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Liberal Republicano (LIBRE)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Panameñista Doctrinario (PPD)	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Liberal Nacional (PLN)	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Cambio Democrático (CD)	1998	Incomplete (successful)

Paraguay

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Patria Libre (PPL)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Encuentro Nacional (PEN)	1991	Unsuccessful (flash)
Partido País Solidario (PPS)	1996	Incomplete (marginal)
Movimiento de Renovación Nacional (MORENA)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Patria Querida (PPQ)	2001	Incomplete (marginal)
Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos (UNACE)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)
Frente Amplio (FA)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)

Peru

Party	Birth	Outcome
Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT)	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (UNIR)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Izquierda Unida (IU)	1980	Unsuccessful (flash)
Unidad de Izquierda (UI)	1980	Unsuccessful (flop)
Frente Democrático de Unidad Nacional (FDUN)	1984	Unsuccessful (flop)
Izquierda Socialista (IS)	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Obras	1989	Unsuccessful (flop)
Fujimorismo[1]	1990	Incomplete (successful)
Frente Independiente Moralizador (FIM)	1990	Unsuccessful (flash)
Frente Popular Agrícola del Perú (FREPAP)	1990	Unsuccessful (flop)
Renovación Nacional (RN)	1992	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Unión por el Perú (UPP)	1994	Unsuccessful (marginal)
País Posible/Perú Posible (PP)	1994	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Renacimiento Andino (RA)	1996	Unsuccessful (flop)
Somos Perú (SP)	1997	Unsuccessful (marginal)
Partido Solidaridad Nacional (PSN)	1999	Incomplete (successful)
Avancemos	2000	Unsuccessful (flop)
Avanza País (AP)	2000	Unsuccessful (flop)

(*continued*)

Party	Birth	Outcome
Solución Popular (SP)	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Humanista (PH)	2001	Incomplete (marginal)
Proyecto País	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Todos por la Victoria (TV)	2001	Unsuccessful (flop)
Alianza para el Progreso (APP)	2001	Incomplete (marginal)
Fuerza Democrática (FD)	2004	Unsuccessful (flop)
Justicia Nacional (JN)	2004	Unsuccessful (flop)
Cambio Radical	2004	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP)	2005	Incomplete (successful)
Restauración Nacional (RN)	2005	Incomplete (marginal)
Partido Socialista (PS)	2005	Incomplete (marginal)

[1] *Fujimorismo* has changed its name multiple times since its formation in 1990. Originally Cambio 90, it subsequently competed under the labels Nueva Mayoría (1995), Perú 2000 (2000), Vamos Vecino-Sí Cumple (2001), Alianza por el Futuro (2006), Fuerza 2011 (2011), and Fuerza Popular (2016).

Uruguay

Party	Birth	Outcome
Nuevo Espacio	1994	Unsuccessful (flop)
Partido Independiente (PI)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)

Venezuela

Party	Birth	Outcome
Nueva Alternativa	1978	Unsuccessful (flop)
Independientes con el Cambio (ICC)	1983	Unsuccessful (flop)
Convergencia	1993	Unsuccessful (flash)
Movimiento V República/Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (MVR/PSUV)	1997	Incomplete (successful)
Patria Para Todos (PPT)	1997	Incomplete (marginal)
Apertura a la Participación Nacional	1997	Unsuccessful (flop)
Proyecto Venezuela	1998	Unsuccessful (flash)
Integración y Renovación Nueva Esperanza (IRENE)	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Renovación	1998	Unsuccessful (flop)
Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT)	1999	Incomplete (marginal)
Primero Justicia (PJ)	2000	Incomplete (marginal)
Por la Democracia Social (PODEMOS)	2002	Incomplete (marginal)
Unidad Popular Venezolana (UPV)	2004	Unsuccessful (flop)
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro (MRT)	2004	Unsuccessful (flop)

Appendix II

Level of Conflict/Polarization in Eighteen Latin American Countries (1978–2005)

Argentina
1978–1983 – Authoritarianism (bureaucratic authoritarianism [BA])
1983–2005 – Democracy

Bolivia
1978–1982 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1982–2005 – Democracy

Brazil
1978–1985 – Authoritarianism (BA)
1985–2005 – Democracy

Chile
1978–1990 – Authoritarianism (BA)
1990–2005 – Democracy

Colombia
1978–2005 – Civil war/major insurgency

Costa Rica
1978–2005 – Democracy

Dominican Republic
1978–2005 – Democracy

Ecuador
1978–1979 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1979–2002 – Democracy
2002–2005 – Populism

El Salvador
1978–1980 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1980–1992 – Civil war/major insurgency
1992–2005 – Democracy

Guatemala
1978–1996 – Civil war/major insurgency
1996–2005 – Democracy

Honduras
1978–1982 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1982–2005 – Democracy

Mexico
1978–2000 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
2000–2005 – Democracy

(*continued*)

Nicaragua
1978–1979 – Civil war/major insurgency
1979–1981 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1981–1989 – Civil war/major insurgency
1989–2005 – Democracy

Panama
1978–1989 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1989–2005 – Democracy

Paraguay
1978–1989 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1989–2005 – Democracy

Peru
1978–1980 – Authoritarianism (non-BA)
1980–1992 – Civil war/major insurgency[1]
1992–2000 – Populism
2000–2005 – Democracy

Uruguay
1978–1985 – Authoritarianism (BA)
1985–2005 – Democracy

Venezuela
1978–1998 – Democracy
1998–2005 – Populism

[1] From 1990 to 1992, Peru simultaneously experienced insurgency and populist government. Since major insurgencies tend to be more polarizing than populism, we score Peru as a case of civil war/major insurgency, not populism, during this period.