PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE

The Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela

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ONLINE APPENDIX

An online appendix to this volume can be accessed at www.sup.org/partysystem collapse.

The appendix contains additional methodological discussion, supplementary figures, and supporting statistical results related to the arguments of Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8.

PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE

CHAPTER 1

PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN SOUTH AMERICA

Before the 1990s, Venezuela's two-party system was among the most stable and well-institutionalized party systems in the developing world (Coppedge 1994: 174–77). One of the two traditional parties won every fully democratic presidential election in the country's history. From the early 1970s through 1988, these traditional parties, in effect, faced no challengers, winning a combined share of at least 85 percent of the presidential vote in 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988. Over this period, the traditional parties also dominated the legislature.

In 1993, however, these established electoral patterns began to change rapidly. Both traditional parties lost roughly half of the support they had enjoyed in the previous presidential elections, and—for the first time in Venezuelan democratic history—the winner of the election was not endorsed by either of the established parties.

What began as traditional-party decline in 1993 culminated, in the 1998 presidential elections, in a party-system collapse (Dietz and Myers 2007; Morgan 2007).[1] Neither of the two traditional parties was able to get any traction for its selected candidate. One party endorsed a candidate from outside the party system early in the campaign cycle; the other waited until days before the election

to throw its support to that same outsider candidate. Thus the election became a contest between two candidates from outside the established party system. Both traditional parties have been electorally marginalized since that election.

The same election that saw the collapse of the Venezuelan traditional parties also elevated Hugo Chávez to the presidency. Subsequently, Chávez has departed dramatically from the moderate, pro-U.S. politics that were previously traditional in Venezuela, striking out instead in the direction of a bold, confrontational populist leftism (Hawkins 2011)—an approach that regularly reaches provocative symbolic heights, memorably including the moment when Chávez used a United Nations speech (on September 20, 2006) to characterize U.S. President George W. Bush as the devil (Lapper 2007: 19–20); more substantive moments of provocation include Chávez's repeated statements that he intended to construct "21st-century Socialism" and remake his country as a "Socialist Republic of Venezuela." In a country that had once been a leading U.S. ally in Latin America and a model of moderate democracy, the degree of political change represented by these events is breathtaking.[2]

In Peru during the 1980s, a less established party system also collapsed (Cameron 1994; Tanaka 1998; Dietz and Myers 2007). Three political parties had dominated the Peruvian electoral landscape starting roughly with the 1980 presidential elections. These three parties provided all of the major presidential candidates for the elections of the 1980s. They also controlled most of the seats in the legislature and won most local elections.

However, between 1985 and 1990, this three-way party system largely collapsed. From a combined 1985 presidential vote share of 85 percent, the traditional parties fell to a combined 1990 presidential vote share of only 31 percent. Indeed, neither of the two candidates who advanced to the second round of the 1990 Peruvian presidential elections came from a traditional party. In the wake of this 1990 collapse, the Peruvian traditional parties received single-digit vote shares in local and national elections for the rest of the 1990s.

During that decade, outsider president Alberto Fujimori instituted a free-market economic policy, featuring extensive privatizations and a sharp reduction in trade barriers, that substantially departed from the patterns of recent Peruvian economic history. In tandem with these economic reforms, Fujimori launched a military coup that overthrew Peru's democratic regime and dissolved the sitting Congress. He then held a constitutional convention that refounded

Peruvian democracy on Fujimori's terms. At the conclusion of a turbulent decade of personalist, anti-party electoral authoritarianism, Fujimori finally lost power in the wake of a fraudulent reelection in 2000 and a series of corruption scandals involving an ally of his: intelligence operative and dirty-tricks specialist Vladimiro Montesinos.[3]

The rise of Hugo Chávez and of Alberto Fujimori involves many convergent series of events. The personal biography of each leader is relevant, as are the stories of their tactical, ideological, and organizational preparations for electoral victory.[4] Yet, the crucial role of these factors notwithstanding, it is difficult to imagine that either man would have won power if the Peruvian or Venezuelan party systems had not been in the process of collapse. If Fujimori or Chávez had faced credible, competitive candidates from established, valued traditional political parties, then they would have faced perhaps insurmountable challenges from voters' strategic voting calculations, citizens' loyalty to the existing parties, and the resource and visibility asymmetries associated with major-party status. Party-system collapse significantly reduced those obstacles to outsider victory. Hence, understanding the process of party-system collapse is a vital part of thinking about the political origins of Chávez or Fujimori.

Latin America is a notoriously turbulent region for political parties. Among countries where no party-system collapse occurred, net electoral volatility scores—the percentage of the overall vote that changes between two specified elections—for the period from 1982 through 1995 range from a low of 17.7 percent in Uruguay to a high of 64.3 percent in Brazil (Coppedge 2001: 175). Change in a party's electoral strength is not at all unusual in the region. Furthermore, the experience of debt crises, economic restructuring, and neoliberal reform during the 1980s and 1990s was far from politically placid. Perhaps the Peruvian and Venezuelan party-system collapses were merely typical instances of political instability during Latin America's neoliberal era?

In fact, while party-system change of some kind has indeed been common in the region, party-system collapse has been rare. In some countries, collapse was not an issue because no identifiable party system exists; examples include Ecuador and Panama. In other countries, including Chile and Costa Rica, an established party system was relatively stable through the 1980s and 1990s. Still other countries, Argentina in particular, but also Mexico and Uruguay, have undergone extensive party-system change without experiencing party-system

collapse. Thus, even in the context of Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, the changes observed in Peru and Venezuela stand out as extraordinary.[5]

How did these party systems collapse? What motivated most Peruvian and Venezuelan voters to abandon the traditional parties and instead vote for outsider candidates and parties? Why did leaders within the established parties not make strategic choices that could preempt voter alienation or bring alienated voters back? Political parties play a central role in processes of democratic representation and often profoundly shape the political experiences of citizens; hence, answers to these questions about party-system collapse are integral to understanding South American politics over the past three decades.

More generally, close attention to the processes of party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela illuminates why countries may violate the widespread expectation of partisan stability. Stability in party systems is predicted by multiple, convergent lines of research. Downsian theory regarding party decision-making predicts a stable partisan offering, down to the level of consistent ideological appeals over time, because party leaders always face the same strategic incentives in their interactions with each other and the electorate: "If the distribution of ideologies in a society's citizenry remains constant, its political system will move toward a position of equilibrium in which the number of parties and their ideological positions are stable over time" (Downs 1957: 115). Sociological research on party systems posits linkages between parties and fundamental social groups such as classes and religions; party-system stability, then, results from slow rates of change in social structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990; see also Wittenberg 2006). Research on voter decision-making supports an expectation of stability in relationships of identification, relationships that either reflect hard-to-change core social identities (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) or the heuristic use of long-term information to facilitate short-term decision-making (Fiorina 1981). All three of these separate research traditions generate an expectation that party-system change should be gradual, conservative, and rare, an expectation that is only strengthened by the typical contrast in financial and organizational resources between established parties and their upstart, outsider rivals.[6] Party-system collapses clearly violate this expectation; understanding their occurrence presents the opportunity to discover the conditions under which much of the established theory regarding political parties breaks down.

1.1 EXPLAINING PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE

Perhaps in part because party-system collapse represents an anomaly from many perspectives in the broader comparative theory of parties and party systems, a number of scholars have offered hypotheses regarding the causes of collapse. These hypotheses invoke a wide range of central causes, including both attributes of electorates and features of party leadership and organization. While the existing explanations are incomplete, and in some instances misleading, many provide useful elements for the construction of this book's explanatory account, outlined in Figure 1.1.

Some scholars account for party-system collapse by reference to features of societies' social class systems. For example, Roberts, while noting that political divisions in Venezuela during the process of party-system collapse "did not follow strict class lines," argues that "Chávez's appeal was especially pronounced among the unorganized subaltern sectors of the population" (Roberts 2003: 55). Thus, while arguing that party-system collapse is not a product of conflict between labor and capital, Roberts nonetheless explains it by reference to the politicization of a growing social polarization between "elites" and "the popular sectors." In effect, he says, the lines of class cleavage have shifted since the classical populist age in Latin America—but the social and party-system crisis are nonetheless to be understood as caused by class conflicts.[7] Cameron offers



FIGURE 1.1. Causes of party-system collapse: overall structure of the argument

a parallel theoretical account, focusing on party-system collapse in Peru. Here, the relevant political cleavage is between the informal sectors and participants in the formal economy: Cameron argues that "[t]he flight from the formal economy and the breakdown of the traditional party system were two sides of the same coin" (1994: 10). Economic informality weakens established party systems, in Cameron's view, by undermining patterns of party identification, reducing ties of communication and membership between parties and society, and generating a bloc of voters uninterested in traditional ideological appeals. Cameron's and Roberts's accounts differ in the details: party-system collapse may be due to informality or to poor, disorganized segments of society more generally; and the mechanism linking social class with partisan developments may involve the politicization of a perhaps latent social cleavage or more direct political and organizational effects. These points notwithstanding, explanations of party-system collapse as caused by class conflict share a key implication: actors from the specified class, rather than intra-class coalitions defined by a universalist ideological position or other shared political attitudes, should provide the central electoral impetus for party-system collapse. If—as is shown in Chapter 5 using survey data—there are no strong class differences in propensity to vote against the traditional parties during the key elections, then collapse must instead be explained by multi-class factors such as ideologies or attitudes shared by citizens who vote against the established party system.

Another natural approach is to account for party-system collapse as ultimately caused by citizens who engage in retrospective economic voting against the established parties as a group. Building on the well-known generalization that citizens vote against incumbents who preside over periods of poor economic performance, one might suppose that, if the traditional parties alternated in power through a period of consistent or recurrent economic crisis, voters would eventually turn against the parties as a bloc. Levitsky, for example, offers a version of this hypothesis, in conjunction with a party-organizational account to be discussed below, as an explanation for party-system collapse in Peru (Levitsky 2003: 236–38).

A related hypothesis is developed by Corrales (2002). In the context of an argument regarding the causes and consequences of confrontation between presidents and ruling parties during neoliberal reform periods, Corrales highlights Pérez's 1992 decision to accede to his party's demands that reform be

abandoned. This decision undermined the credibility of the state's commitment to neoliberalism, offering "cost-bearing sectors" of Venezuelan society the freedom to oppose reform and undermine the existing political parties. This opportunity structure, Corrales suggests, accounts for "the growth of Causa-R," the electoral victory of Convergencia in 1993, and indirectly even the political career of Hugo Chávez (Corrales 2002: 157–58). Here, it is not the economic pain produced by the failure to complete neoliberal reform that generates party-system collapse, but rather the redistributive effects of that reform in combination with elite political turmoil. Nevertheless, this account shares an important feature with the simple retrospective voting approach sketched above. Because reform opponents are identified by the economic costs they suffer owing to new policies, it follows that those voters who have the most intense subjective experience of economic suffering should be at the center of the coalition that brings about party-system collapse. For either version of the hypothesis, the analysis of macro-level data in Chapter 3 and survey data in Chapters 4 and 5 fail to support this hypothesis: some countries passed through devastating economic crises without experiencing party-system collapse, and, in Peru and Venezuela, voters with different views about the economy during the key elections do not differ markedly in their rates of identification with or voting for the traditional parties.

However, this does not imply that Corrales's hypothesis regarding the causes of collapse is altogether unhelpful. The proposed causal connections among perceptions of the economy, redistributive preferences and ideology, and voting behavior all need to hold for the economic-voting hypothesis to be supported. If, instead, we regard redistributive beliefs as somewhat autonomous from experiences of costs due to economic crisis and change, we have the alternative hypothesis that voters who had leftist ideological commitments, and who saw the traditional parties as unresponsive to these preferences, may have served as the driving force behind party-system collapse in Venezuela. This is Morgan's (2007, 2011) argument, in an analysis focusing on party identification rather than vote choice. The process was driven, on this account, by traditional parties' "failure to provide adequate substantive and symbolic representation to growing sectors of society" (Morgan 2007: 84), specifically those ideologically situated toward the center and the left of society. The hypothesis that party-system collapse is driven by poor representation is central to my argument regarding

Venezuela; a modified version of this hypothesis, focusing on the center and center-right rather than the left, is important for Peru as well.

Nonetheless, the ideological representation hypothesis can be improved by paying attention to the role of corruption perceptions and to the causal importance of emotion, discussed later in this chapter. Various scholars, particularly those who study Venezuela, have offered explanations of party-system collapse that highlight the probable importance of corruption and scandals in alienating citizens from the traditional parties. Coppedge, for example, argues that party-system collapse was produced by a widespread sense of "moral outrage" (2005: 311–14), a suggestion I develop further later in this volume. In Coppedge's view, outrage was produced by a conjunction of economic crisis, corruption, and the traditional parties' role in shielding corrupt politicians and bureaucrats from prosecution. This hypothesis suggests that the central citizen actors in the process of party-system collapse should be characterized by an interaction of two attitudes: they are both particularly concerned about the state of the economy and especially troubled by problems of corruption. Once again, the analysis of national-level and survey data in Chapters 3 and 5 shows that this expectation is not fully empirically supported; perceptions of corruption alone are not strongly correlated with vote choice; and concerns about corruption in interaction with negative attitudes regarding the performance of the economy is also a weak predictor of the decision by voters to abandon the traditional parties. Thus the roles of outrage and corruption as causes of party-system collapse need some degree of respecification.

Let us turn now from voter decision-making to a discussion of partisan elites. Some scholars characterize party-system collapse as the outcome of failed elite coordination or mistaken strategy. For example, Tanaka (1998: 201–35; 2006) focuses on episodes during which congressional leaders of traditional parties adopt strategies for dealing with an outsider president that, in retrospect, are clearly ineffective. For Peru, Tanaka highlights the traditional parties' opposition to President Alberto Fujimori's eventually successful neoliberal economic reforms, a position that may have helped marginalize the parties through the next several electoral cycles. Regarding Venezuela, Tanaka focuses on traditional party leaders' decision to boycott the elections leading to Chávez's Constitutional Assembly. One may agree with Tanaka that these were counterproductive decisions from traditional party leaders' points of view and nonetheless note

that they constitute only a partial explanation of party-system collapse. Tanaka focuses on elite interactions after an outsider had already won the presidency, but avoids dealing with interactions between elites and voters during the electoral decline that led to the election of an outsider president—surely, at the very least, a central component of the puzzle of party-system collapse.[8] In this book I focus directly on the contribution of elite-voter interactions to party-system collapse—the elite coordination and strategy problems Tanaka analyzes as elements of the aftermath of collapse rather than causes of that outcome. In this sense, Tanaka's work and the analysis in this volume may be regarded as complementary.

Another body of theory traces traditional party leaders' strategic failures (however characterized) during the process of collapse to features of party organization. Dietz and Myers (2007), for example, attribute party-system collapse to patterns of either excessive or inadequate party-system institutionalization, an intriguing but difficult-to-operationalize hypothesis. More fine-grained organizational hypotheses may help fill in some of the detail. In his extended discussion of the Argentine Peronist party's survival through the repeated crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, Levitsky develops a theory of party adaptability as an inverse function of a party's organizational routinization, or adherence to established rules, procedures, and institutional decision-making structures: "routinization limits the capacity of organization to respond quickly to environmental challenges" (Levitsky 2003: 18). Levitsky's discussion of routinization has a family resemblance to Kitschelt's theory of organizational entrenchment as the party-institutional explanation for politicians' strategic failures during periods of partisan adaptation (Kitschelt 1994: 212–23). However, Kitschelt's concept is more inclusive, treating large formal membership organizations, extensive patronage, size of the party bureaucracy, and the narrowness of the intra-party ideological distribution as indicators of organizational entrenchment. Levitsky, by contrast, explicitly characterizes mass linkages as a distinct dimension of party organization, focusing on the practical decision-making power of rules and bureaucracies within a party rather than the broader range of organizational issues highlighted by the concept of organizational entrenchment. The analysis of party organizational features in Chapter 7 finds strong support for Levitsky's proposal to treat party organization at a more nuanced level of conceptualization and measurement, while also suggesting that some

dimensions of Kitschelt's theory which are relatively neglected in Levitsky's account may nonetheless be important in understanding party leaders' strategic successes and failures during the periods of crisis that, in Peru and Venezuela, led to collapse.

Thus several of the above hypotheses regarding party-system collapse contain ideas that are further developed below. Yet many of them are contradicted by aspects of the data regarding collapse in Peru and Venezuela, as subsequent chapters will show, and none of them explains the decisions of both voters and party leaders during the process of party-system collapse. Instead, each hypothesis proposes explanations at the level of voters' decisions during elections, at the level of party strategy during periods of crisis, or at an aggregate national level. A fuller explanation of party-system collapse must provide a consistent account at all three of these analytic levels. Specifically, a theory of party-system collapse requires an account of the decision-making process that leads voters to abandon the traditional parties *and* an account of the factors that prevent party leaders from adjusting their party's electoral appeals to forestall voter defection. If we adopt the familiar metaphor of democratic elections as a political market, a more complete explanation of party-system collapse must provide a demand-side account—showing how voters came to decide that outsider candidates were preferable to the traditional parties, and a supply-side account—suggesting why the traditional parties failed to anticipate and adjust to voter expectations. This study develops and tests such a joint explanation. That explanation integrates themes from many of the hypotheses mentioned above, as well as some key ideas from political psychology, to create a more complete, multivariate, and empirically rich theoretical narrative of the process of party-system collapse.

1.1.1 Voter Decision-Making and Party-System Collapse

Interactions between voters and political leaders are inherently reciprocal in nature. Nonetheless, some point of entry into this process is necessary in order to make sense of the decisions by elites and the masses that created party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela. Voter decision-making processes are an attractive theoretical starting point because voting is (temporally and causally) the final step that produces party-system collapse (see Figure 1.1). Such a collapse by definition cannot happen unless voters choose outsider candidates over those

from the traditional parties; voters are thus the final link in any causal chain leading to party-system collapse. This book argues that voters abandon party systems because corruption scandals erode patterns of party identification, and because poor ideological representation then provides a motive for turning to outsider candidates.

It is useful to start the discussion by asking why party-system collapse is an uncommon event. Why do voters so rarely decide to abandon a country's traditional parties and support an outsider candidate? Such a decision is at least as inherently risky as supporting a party with a reputation for unreliability (Downs 1957: 105–8; Stokes 2001: 8–9; Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001). Candidates from outside the established political system typically have little governing experience and often have a scant political reputation against which the credibility of campaign appeals may be evaluated. Because such candidates also usually have weak or nonexistent alliances with legislators and other national politicians, there is a serious risk of political crisis and deadlock if the outsider is elected. Furthermore, voting for a candidate who does not come from an established party carries a strong risk that one's vote will be wasted. The presidency is, after all, a one-seat office. Hence the risk-averse will face severe strategic-voting pressure against opting for a candidate who does not represent a traditionally winning party (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997). For the relatively small number of voters who are very risk-acceptant, these uncertainties may not be a substantial deterrent to supporting a candidate from outside of the traditional party system, and a single source of dissatisfaction with the traditional party system may suffice to persuade such voters to support candidates from new parties or movements (Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001).[9] However, a party-system collapse cannot be produced entirely by those who are highly risk-acceptant by nature. For the more risk-averse by temperament, either a truly powerful motive or a psychological process that produces a temporary increase in risk acceptance is needed to mitigate the uncertainties associated with a vote for a candidate from a nontraditional party. In fact, as will be discussed below, risk aversion is itself endogenous to the process of party-system collapse; citizens' attitudes toward the existing parties, and the existing social and political system more generally, may affect their broad attitudes toward the uncertainties associated with change, as suggested in the right-hand links in Figure 1.2.



FIGURE 1.2. Voters and party-system collapse: refining the argument

What kinds of motives might outweigh the uncertainties and risks of voting for a candidate from outside the traditional party system? A rational-choice approach would suggest that any motive, if held with sufficient fervor, would be sufficient. A single issue about which a voter is particularly passionate, and for which none of the traditional parties' views is acceptable to the voter, can make the traditional parties costly enough to her that she willingly bears the risk of voting for a nontraditional party. This insight seems valid; even in very established and stable party systems such as that in the United States during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, socially and politically marginal third parties proliferate, and voters seem to choose those parties for a vast array of reasons (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996).

Yet accounting for party-system collapse requires more than explaining the motives of a handful of citizens, disgruntled in a variety of sincere but unusual ways with the existing party system. Collapse is a situation in which nearly all voters decide, over a short period of time, to abandon the traditional political parties. A motive that involves unusual or only narrowly supported goals and values can lead to defections from the traditional party system, but the defections will involve a relatively small minority and thus will not substantially change the strategic-voting situation for the remaining voters.

Furthermore, for many or most sources of dissatisfaction that voters may have with an administration, a set of candidates, or even the traditional parties, numerous plausible political strategies are open other than voting for an outsider candidate. For example, consider a risk-averse voter who feels ideologically distanced from all of the traditional-party candidates. Even if a nontraditional candidate appeals ideologically to a voter, uncertainty about that candidate's electability, competence, honesty, alliances, and even the credibility of her ideological appeal itself are likely to combine to make the outsider candidate less attractive than traditional-party politicians. Similarly, for a risk-averse voter who is unhappy with the incumbent's economic management, at least two alternatives, less uncertain in comparison with a politician from outside the traditional party system present themselves. She may vote for an opposition party from within the traditional system.[10] Alternatively, she may choose to accept the inevitable assurances of the candidate from the incumbent party that the candidate's new governing team has learned from the mistakes of the past and will offer more competent economic governance.

As a final example, consider a risk-averse voter concerned that the incumbent administration is deeply corrupt. While a nontraditional candidate is almost certain to promise a corruption-free administration, candidates from the traditional parties will probably also make such promises. In addition, living as she does in a society that is plagued by repeated corruption scandals—a condition that applies to the South American countries where party-system collapse occurred—our voter will probably expect, based on experience, that even the average politician who claims to be honest is quite corrupt. She may therefore tend to disbelieve both traditional and outsider candidates' claims and therefore lack a motive for supporting the outsider over the traditional parties. More generally, it is important to bear in mind that, in Hirschman's (1970) terms, dissatisfied voters have a range of strategies related to voice and loyalty, as well as the option of exit.

To explain why voters choose exit, rather than voice or loyalty, the intuitive rational-choice framework in which voters select the party or candidate that provides the highest expected utility is insufficient; the central explanatory problem here involves understanding voters' utility functions themselves, a question for which rational-choice theory offers few systematic answers. This book develops and tests a complementary perspective on the reasons why voters act in ways that produce party-system collapse, drawing on ideas about how affect and cognition interrelate.

A great deal of research supports the hypothesis that emotions are intimately involved in the processes of political evaluation and judgment (e.g., Forgas 2000; Lodge and Taber 2000; Neuman et al. 2007). Affective evaluation of new political information may begin even before specifically rational evaluation takes place, and explicit rational evaluation of political information often results in emotional associations that persist long after the relevant information is forgotten. Citizens' political thought processes thus have constant access to emotion as an implicit running tally of past political information, a prompt to engage in rational deliberation when most needed, and a heuristic decision rule for determining when to set aside habitual standing political decisions and accept riskier alternatives (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). It seems only sensible to look to emotional considerations in developing a theory of which categories of concerns affect mainstream voters' decisions to abandon a traditional party system.[11]

Emotion does not have uniform effects on citizens' decision-making processes. Negative emotions, in particular, can differ in how they influence decision-making processes (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). Because different negative emotions can affect decision-making, we will be able to specify which categories of affect—and potentially which associated categories of cognition and real-world situations—are most likely to motivate a citizen to abandon the traditional party system during a collapse.

A key and well-studied distinction among negative emotions involves the contrast between anger and anxiety/fear. Experimental research has shown that angry individuals form more optimistic assessments of risks and are more risk-acceptant in their decision-making than their anxious or sad counterparts (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; see also Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000: 46–64). Anxious individuals, by contrast, gather more political information and base their vote choice more directly on the content of the information to which they have access (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000: 80–94; Parker and Isbell 2010). Anger and fear are among the more common negative emotions, and may be developmental primitives from which many other negative emotions emerge (Panksepp 1998: 41–58). Hence, in seeking to understand the origins of citizens' preference for party-system collapse, our attention should be focused squarely on the causes and consequences of these negative emotional primary colors. Which modes of affect lead citizens to turn their backs on their country's traditional parties and accept the risks associated with voting for outsiders with no political track record or organization? Both anger and fear likely play central roles at one stage or another of the process, with anger signaling to voters that the risks of supporting an outsider candidate are more than matched by the record of pain inflicted by the traditional parties.

Feelings of anxiety among voters are important for party-system collapse, because such feelings are connected with their decision to reject habit, seek new information, and revise standing decisions and commitments. Without such reevaluation, party-system collapse would be extremely unlikely. Instead, voters would probably rely on established habits and political identities as a basis for voting, a decision-making strategy that would reinforce the traditional party system. Hence, widespread anxiety helps set the stage for party-system collapse. The cause of such near-universal anxiety is most often a broad, multifaceted societal crisis, as suggested at the left end of Figure 1.2. When such a

crisis arises in a society, there is ample motive for a wide range of individuals to open the door to a thoroughgoing reevaluation of their political identities and habitual commitments. The analysis of cross-national survey data in Chapter 3 shows that economic crisis can play a partial role in producing the kind of anxiety that translates into doubts about the viability of the political system; presumably, a larger and more multi-faceted crisis will produce a stronger, more nearly universal sense of fear and doubt. Thus, while economic crisis cannot by itself explain party-system collapse, it can raise the stakes connected with the other issues that serve as more direct causes of collapse.

Anxiety may open the door to revisiting settled decisions, but anger plays the decisive role in movements away from the traditional party system, either at the level of voting behavior or at the causally prior level of political identity. Party identification is a particularly important obstacle to party-system collapse; if a society has a substantial number of partisan loyalists, then the traditional parties have a cushion of support that will keep them competitive even during times of difficulty, crisis, and political failure. In both Peru and Venezuela, substantial numbers of voters initially reported party identifications. So it is important to understand how voters come to revise or abandon party loyalties during periods when high anxiety and make major change a possibility.

When a society undergoes a persistent run of high-level corruption scandals, the result is a pervasive skepticism about, and hostility toward, politicians. On the one hand, corruption scandals involve by definition situations in which politicians act in favor of their own private interests at the expense of the interests of society as a whole. This aspect of scandals tends to undermine party identification when it functions as the result of stereotypes about the social groups that a given party represents (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). After all, corrupt politicians—and by inference the parties they belong to—represent only themselves. On the other hand, the positive emotional responses that serve as the engine of the "running tally" account of party identification (Fiorina 1977, 1981, Zechman 1979, Achen 1989, 1992) are also undermined by the anger that citizens quite reasonably experience in the face of serious problems of corruption. For these reasons, politicians' repeated involvement in corruption scandals is a central contributor to the erosion of identification with traditional parties, and therefore a crucial ingredient of party-system collapse, as shown in the upper line of hypothesized causal linkages in Figure 1.2.

In deciding whether to support a nontraditional party, a voter who has either lost her party identification or never formed one is confronted with the risks of supporting an outsider. What motivates such a voter to accept the uncertainties of supporting a candidate with little or no political track record who represents a party that has little or no politically relevant existence outside of its support for that candidate? As described above, anxiety is experimentally and observationally connected with risk aversion. Thus, feelings of fear and confusion related to a perceived or real decline in a country's quality of life, in general, or economy, in particular, become an ambiguous influence on decision-makers. Such anxiety surely motivates voters to seek change in the country's government. Yet anxiety will also predispose voters to avoid high-risk varieties of change. Because outsider candidates and parties are inevitably high-risk modes of political and social change, anxiety is unlikely to serve as voters' primary motivation during party-system collapse. Anger, in contrast to anxiety, increases risk-acceptance during decision-making. Therefore, anger may by particularly likely to motivate voters' final decision to abandon the traditional parties. For collapse to take place, the fear and uncertainty connected with broad societal and economic crisis must be replaced, among a substantial number of citizens, by anger—the emotion with pride of place in accounting for the voter decisions that produce party-system collapse.

The central remaining issue regarding the decisions of voters who abandon the traditional parties involves specifying the attitudes, perceptions, and issue positions that will lead them to experience political anger. Scholars have argued that the cognitions most closely associated with lasting political anger are a sense of moral injustice at the hands of specific political actors and a belief that those actors have unjustly inflicted personal harm on the voter in question (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988: 146–54; Lazarus 1991; Marcus 2002: 120–24; Lerner and Tiedens 2006: 117). Political discourse in both Peru and Venezuela strongly suggests which attitudes are likely to produce the widespread feelings of political anger necessary to generate party-system collapse. The two most salient and widespread accusations against the traditional parties, in the media and in the rhetoric of their nontraditional competitors, are that the traditional parties were riddled with corruption and that they were failing to represent important constituencies in society. Indeed, these claims merged in Chavez's repeated assertions that the traditional parties had effectively sold out Vene-

zuela's poor in order to keep more wealth for themselves and their personal networks of corrupt friends and allies, and also in Fujimori's campaign slogan promising "Honesty, Technology, and Hard Work," in implied contrast with dishonest and ideologically extreme traditional-party candidates. Perceptions that the traditional political elite is hopelessly corrupt and/or does not represent the voter ideologically are a potent stimulus for political anger and the belief that moral injustice has been perpetrated. The voter with these attitudes believes that her views on the good society are not being heard in government and that the reason is that politicians are too dishonest to care about the unrepresented individual. Thus, personal and social harm has resulted, not by chance or through incompetence or impersonal social forces, but because of the greed and dishonesty of named traditional-party politicians. The anger resulting from these points of view serves as a primary motive for the voters to abandon their party identifications and then take the lead in supporting outsider candidates, actions that result in party-system collapse. This argument is tested somewhat indirectly using survey data in Chapters 4 and 5, and more directly through an experimental design in Chapter 6.

This book's voter-side argument is that party-system collapse is brought about by persistent problems of corruption involving traditional-party politicians and a pattern of underrepresentation of some groups by the traditional party system as a whole. Corruption scandals are usually more of a problem for one party at a time than for the entire party system; collapse of the whole system requires a string of scandals involving each major traditional party. Underrepresentation, by contrast, is an inherently systemic problem: it arises when *all of the parties* simultaneously fail to speak meaningfully for an important ideological segment of the population (see also Morgan 2011). No one party can, in isolation, bring this pattern about; any movement by one party away from an important ideological constituency could simply be countered by a shift by another traditional party toward that constituency. Collapse of the system becomes a possibility when all of the traditional parties choose to neglect a major segment of the population. Thus, voter behavior during an episode of party-system collapse is produced by a conjunction of system-level and party-level explanatory factors—although the system-level pattern of underrepresentation necessary for collapse can itself be accounted for by party-level organizational dynamics.

For the remaining voters, who are not driven by the powerful combination of corruption perceptions and feelings of underrepresentation, it is helpful to distinguish between two distinct strategic situations. In some societies in the process of party-system collapse, the set of citizens who feel ideologically underrepresented may be concentrated toward one end of the spectrum of political beliefs, while in other such societies, the underrepresented may be grouped near the ideological center.

When the pattern of underrepresentation is such that those who feel excluded are toward one extreme of the belief spectrum, traditional-party voters face a problem of coordination. Should they strike a bargain with a traditional rival party, supporting that party's candidate in order to defeat the more extreme insurgent and, in the process, prevent party-system collapse by maintaining the electoral and political strength of at least one traditional party? Such a bargain may present benefits to supporters of all traditional parties, but the benefits are unevenly distributed; supporters of the traditional party that survives benefit more than do supporters of the other parties. Each party's supporters therefore have an incentive to hold out in hopes that the other traditional parties' voters will rally around their candidate. This coordination problem may, in the end, be best resolved by the appearance of a second nontraditional candidate representing the same general ideological space as the traditional parties. Established-party supporters can then embrace that nontraditional candidate as a strategy for defeating the outsider who represents the traditionally underrepresented ideological wing, without having to bear the costs of adopting a voting strategy that strongly benefits a traditional rival. Hence, in this political situation, there are strong pressures toward a full-scale party-system collapse.

For underrepresented voters who are clustered near the ideological center, the situation is different. Supporters of traditional parties on the two ideological wings clearly have little incentive to coordinate in response to any nontraditional threat; for voters on either wing, the nontraditional candidate is clearly preferable to traditional candidates from the opposite wing. Hence, patterns of elite response to the nontraditional challenge can play a decisive role in determining whether and how party-system collapse occurs (Tanaka 2006). If traditional party elites can co-opt outsider candidates into existing organizations, they may be able to revitalize the appeal of those organizations and move the traditional parties' ideological profiles toward the vacant center. Party-system collapse be-

comes harder to avoid if traditional-party leaders subordinate their organizations to alliances with outsider candidates or use indirect support for outsiders as a weapon against rivals at the other ideological pole. In such circumstances, voters near the center—particularly those whose risk acceptance is activated by anger at the combination of underrepresentation and corruption—are not presented with attractive traditional-party alternatives and are therefore likely to support outsiders, producing party-system collapse.

Because of the tactical nature of party-system collapse in this situation, the long-term party-system disruptions produced by such a collapse may be expected to be less extreme than for a collapse toward one of the ideological wings. After all, in this scenario, the established constituencies of the traditional parties continue to exist throughout the process of collapse; these constituencies are simply forced to find temporary alternatives as a response to the shifted coalition structures generated by outsider opposition and the corresponding maneuvers of traditional elites. Hence, if the outsiders' electoral attractions eventually fade, these voters will be likely to renew their connections with the traditional parties.

The discussion up to this point has remained silent on one important issue, an issue that the study in general will largely bracket: how voters decide which nontraditional candidate or candidates to support during a process of party-system collapse. Certainly, a party-system collapse could not occur if there were no supply of nontraditional candidates. Yet the history of electoral competition in Peru and Venezuela strongly suggests that there is no shortage of outsider candidates; most elections feature at least one potentially viable outsider. When the strategic space for outsider victory emerges through the processes of voter alienation described above, charismatic outsiders are often in ample supply.

Voters who have chosen to reject the traditional parties thus need to solve a coordination problem (Cox 1997) regarding the choice of which of the available outsider candidates they should support). In both Peru and Venezuela, there is evidence voters took time to explore alternative outsider candidates before settling on one or two as the electoral focal points for party-system collapse (Cameron 1994: 114–21; Molina 2004: 169–72). Unfortunately, beyond the evidence necessary for some analysis of basic ideological assessments, the data needed to resolve the question of how voters chose to focus on specific outsider candidates in Peru and Venezuela do not exist. So for the purposes of the present study, this issue must be largely disregarded. Instead, the focus is on

the logically prior decision to abandon the traditional parties, and the analysis focuses most closely on the first movers, those who abandon the traditional parties primarily because they are concerned about corruption (expressed by their loss of identification with the traditional parties) and ideological under-representation (expressed somewhat more forcefully through their votes against the traditional party system and in favor of outsider candidates).

1.1.2 Party Organizations and Party-System Collapse

While the above theory provides an account of why voters abandon traditional party systems, it raises new questions about the decision-making of leaders in the traditional parties themselves. The widespread political anxiety that sets the stage for party-system collapse may often be a product of factors at least partly outside the control of parties, such as societal violence and economic performance. However, the anger that provokes the final break with the system is a product of factors the parties can more directly manage. Party leaders can, and sometimes do, take actions to alter the ideological character of their parties (Gerring 2001); they can adopt strategies, including strict party discipline or expulsion, to distance the party from the reputation effects of corruption scandals (Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991). When the very survival of the party is at stake, some explanation is needed for why traditional party leaders would fail to anticipate voters' demands for aggressive anti-corruption politics and, especially, for more thorough ideological representation.

It is worth noting that, in turning to the role of party organizations in party-system collapse, this theoretical account adopts a more streamlined view of individual decision-making than the affect-and-cognition model adopted in considering the voter side of collapse. Indeed, this section implicitly adopts an informal rational-choice model. This theoretical difference mirrors a fundamental contrast between two kinds of real-world actors. Citizens are primarily people whose attention to politics is intermittent and often secondary to other topics. These individuals usually have relatively little direct control over political outcomes. Because they are political amateurs with comparatively little innate interest in or influence over politics, citizens frequently make their decisions using simple heuristic processes (Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). By contrast, party leaders are often or even usually political professionals. Their personal livelihood and future career trajectories are intimately related to

the flow of political tides. Such individuals have clear, self-interested motives for acquiring large amounts of information about politics and for using that information to engage in cognitive elaboration. In other words, while party leaders are unlikely to be completely rational in their political decision-making, they are substantially more likely to engage in sophisticated decision-making processes using large amounts of information, strategic thinking about the probable future consequences of present actions, and cost-benefit reasoning. For these reasons, while adhering to an unsupplemented rational decision-maker model provides an incomplete understanding of the voter side of party-system collapse, such a simplification can be a helpful way of focusing on the central issues on the party side of collapse.

How, then, has party behavior during the process of party-system collapse been explained? Levitsky's (2003) party-organizational explanations of collapse have been highlighted earlier in this chapter, as have the much more encompassing organizational hypotheses developed by Kitschelt (1994) and Myers and Dietz (2007). Although these hypotheses share the insight that too much party organization can produce strategic constraints of the kind evident in the process of party-system collapse, their details differ. In particular, whereas Myers and Dietz informally adopt a kind of unidimensional conception of party institutionalization and Kitschelt develops a unidimensional concept of organizational entrenchment that incorporates several aspects of party organization, Levitsky argues that party organizational concepts such as institutionalization need to be disaggregated, allowing separate measurement and exploration of potentially distinct causal effects of intra-party institutions and practice. In order to fully account for the patterns of party decision-making evident during the process of collapse, ideas need to be drawn from both sides of this debate. In this study I adopt Levitsky's suggestion that organizational concepts be treated at a more fine-grained and disaggregated level. However, Levitsky's agenda of explaining party trajectories in terms of the routinization of those parties' decision-making procedures is supplemented with analysis of the broader range of organizational features to which Kitschelt and others are attentive. In what follows, special attention is given to avoiding the explanatory temptation to attribute party-system collapse to idiosyncratic individuals. If a handful of powerful politicians were to be responsible for the strategic shortcomings of traditional parties during the process leading up to collapse, then an account based on the

psychological complexities of a few individuals might seem to provide a satisfactory explanation for the party's role in the collapse. Yet this interpretation is superficial. When one individual manages to implement decisions that effectively destroy a party, scholars must ask not only why that individual chose such a counterproductive strategy, but also why other intra-party actors failed to prevent the strategic blunder. The counterfactual questions involved in this kind of causal inference all but inevitably lead in the direction of a conception of single-leader dominance as a consequence of intra-party political and organizational dynamics. Hence, this study focuses on the intra-party dynamics that enable or constrain the choices of top-level national party leaders, rather than on the actual decisions of those leaders.

Beyond these theoretical considerations, cases suggest that multiple leaders, often with divergent support bases within the party apparatus, are usually involved in the intra-party contests leading to collapse. Let us consider the situation in Peru, where it is easy to emphasize the role of individual decision-makers. Each of the parties integral to the Peruvian party system of the 1980s had multiple leaders, and there are moments of strategic decision-making during the process of collapse when those leaders adopted visibly divergent positions, demonstrating that the parties were neither monoliths nor purely the patrimony of a single, supreme leader.

On the Peruvian electoral left, Izquierda Unida (the United Left), Alfonso Barrantes Lingón was obviously an influential leader. However, the limits of his leadership authority within the movement became clear in the run-up to the 1990 presidential elections. Barrantes had the strategic goal of moving Izquierda Unida toward the center in order to win the presidency—a maneuver that, if successful, might have helped close the ideological gap that proved critical to Peru's party-system collapse. Yet a substantial component of leaders within the parties involved in Izquierda Unida was hostile to such an ideological shift. These dissenting leaders eventually won the intra-party ideological contest (Roberts 1998; Cameron 1994). Barrantes, in response, split from IU, and the left finally presented two separate candidates in 1990, dividing the leftist vote and failing to appeal to the center. These developments are a central component of the Peruvian party-system collapse, and they are equally clearly not the product of a single, dominating decision-maker. A broader account that incorporates the internal organizational and political dynamics of Izquierda Unida is necessary.

On the traditional Peruvian center-right, the story is similar. The long-standing leader of Acción Popular, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, decided to subordinate his party to Mario Vargas Llosa's neoliberal and, for the Peruvian electoral context of the time, ideologically extreme right Movimiento Libertad for the 1990 elections. Acción Popular candidates at lower levels on the ticket, and other party leaders and activists, repeatedly raised concerns about the ideological tenor of the movement's campaign and the degree to which the traditional party was engulfed by anti-party actors. Yet these voices agitating for a shift to occupy the underrepresented Peruvian center and center-right lost their intra-party struggle (Florez 1992; Cameron 1994: 59–76). This organizational subordination of a traditional center-right party to an anti-party-system movement from the right wing freed up the ideological space subsequently taken advantage of by victorious outsider Alberto Fujimori, contributing substantially to party-system collapse. Furthermore, as with the splintering of Izquierda Unida, it was definitely not the decision of a single actor but involved dynamics between that actor's supporters, an outsider candidate, and a substantial range of dissenters within the party. Once again, attention to intra-party explanations is needed.

Even for the traditional party of the center to center-left, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)—the party for which the most serious case has been made that a single leader, Alan García, was responsible for the miscalculations that resulted in collapse—more than one individual was involved. After all, the party's presidential candidate in 1990, Luís Alva Castro, had repeated conflicts with Alan García starting at least as early as 1987. These conflicts are often interpreted as involving control over the party after 1990 more than ideological direction, and Alva Castro's electoral campaign broadly continued the shift toward the ideological left that García had initiated during his presidential term. However, the tension between the two leaders suggests that Alva Castro's decision-making cannot be regarded as simply an extension of, or compliance with, García's controlling leadership (Schmidt 1996: 327, 337). A more organizational and political explanation is needed for why at least two fairly independent leaders with the APRA organization made essentially similar decisions to move the party away from the largest mass of underrepresented voters in the Peruvian electorate, thereby helping produce party-system collapse.

In every Peruvian traditional party (and certainly in the Venezuelan parties, for which most scholars have found evidence of a compelling role of party

organizational factors in producing party-system collapse), the decisions that led to collapse involve multiple individuals. A broader inquiry into party organizations and intra-party politics is needed to explain party decision-making during the process of party-system collapse.

Clearly, many party-organizational variables might help cause the ideological inflexibility that makes party-system collapse a possibility, and Chapter 7 reviews a variety of perspectives. In the face of a large number of competing hypotheses, theoretical reflection about the process of party ideological change helps narrow down the possibilities. In the first place, parties are unlikely to succeed in moving to a new ideological stance if they lack experienced potential candidates who can be credibly associated with that stance. Finding such ideologically diverse high-level candidates will be easier if the base of activists and local party operatives is itself ideologically varied. A varied activist base can be used to recruit ideologically diverse local candidates, thus eventually producing a multifaceted corps of potential regional- and national-level candidates. Furthermore, a diverse base increases the probability that politicians who differ ideologically from the current stance of the central party will be able to win intra-party contests at the local or regional levels and thereby become candidates, in the process acquiring experience and a higher profile. Hence, diversity of the activist and party-operative base leads to diversity in the pool of potential candidates, which in turn facilitates ideological flexibility; when these two intra-party levels, by contrast, are dominated by a relatively homogeneous cadre of true believers in the party's current ideological line, the party naturally becomes much less flexible.

A second near prerequisite for party ideological flexibility is that the party's decision-making apparatus be sufficiently flexible that new leadership teams have a meaningful chance of winning control of the party. If the organizational apparatus within the party is not flexible in this sense, political currents supporting new ideological appeals may never have a real opportunity to contest for intra-party power. Alternatively, if figures representing such appeals do contest and win, the party's organization may be unable to accommodate itself to that development, with the result that the party may fragment internally. Drawing on research from other countries, as well as original survey data regarding party organization, I argue in Chapter 7 that the kind of organizational flexibility within parties needed to allow changes in ideological appeals is caused by two factors: a low degree of organizational complexity of the party's membership

and outreach organization, and a high flow of patronage goods through the party apparatus. In Chapter 4 I tie the latter factor to another important consideration: parties' ability to avoid the consequences of corruption scandals.

A party-system collapse will occur only when (a) the voter motives described in the previous section place pressures on a country's established parties, and (b) each of those parties has internal constraints that prevent them from effectively responding to voter pressures. In these ways this book integrates both sides of the electoral marketplace into a unified explanation of party-system collapse.

1.1.3 Party-System Collapse and Citizens' Experience of Politics

While it is important to examine the origins of party-system collapse, the consequences of collapse are equally deserving of analytic attention. When an institution that is a central pillar of democratic governance erodes, how does politics continue? Are the perhaps inevitable disruptions major or relatively minor?

In sketching an answer to these questions, it is helpful to distinguish between consequences for the political regime and the functioning of elite politics and the consequences for citizens' experience with the political process. For regimes and elite politics, the consequences of party-system collapse in South America are reasonably well known. Collapse is accompanied, almost axiomatically, by an increase in the political power of anti-party outsiders. These outsiders lack well-institutionalized groupings of elite supporters, at least initially. As a result, they have adopted the centralized, personalistic, and anti-institutional mode of governance variously described as neopopulism (Weyland 1996; Knight 1998; Collier 2001) or as delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994; see also Cameron and Levitsky 2009).

While such a leadership style has deleterious consequences for the independence and stability of political institutions, it is equally clear, although perhaps somewhat less discussed, that this mode of governance tends to polarize elite opinion and behavior. Political elites not in the president's inner circle are, under such leadership, usually excluded from political power. They often adopt highly conflictual strategies of opposition to the government. This opposition, and the government's predictable aggressive response to it, can degrade the quality of democracy—if, indeed, democracy survives at all. Because these patterns have been widely studied in both Peru and Venezuela (e.g., Cameron and Mauceri 1997; McCoy and Myers 2004; Carrion 2006), they receive little additional attention here.

About the consequences of party-system collapse for citizens' experience of politics and government, much less is known. Indeed, a wide range of consequences can be imagined. The experience of citizen power over the elite political world in the process of collapse might lead voters to see politics as far more egalitarian and open to citizen control than it was in the past. Alternatively, patterns of underrepresentation and corruption during the collapse could alienate voters from the political world altogether. Between these two extremes, there is an essentially infinite range of alternative conclusions that citizens could draw about politics from party-system collapse.

However, some of those conclusions require more citizen effort and initiative than others and are therefore perhaps less likely as widespread effects of collapse. Drawing on the well-established finding that many or most citizens tend to have relatively little information about politics and seek informational short-cuts to forming attitudes and making decisions in the political sphere (Zaller 1992), we may expect that interpretations of party-system collapse that are readily available for citizen adoption should be empirically the most widespread. Hence, inquiry into the probable effects of collapse on citizens' experience of and connections with politics turns inevitably to how political elites frame the event of collapse (Chong and Druckman 2007). Because the elites' explanations will be among the most common and cognitively easiest to understand, they should more widely adopted among citizens than less-available competing explanations.

What, then, are the prevalent elite framings of party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela? Is there a necessary link between the process of collapse and the emergence of those framings, or is the link more contingent? In fact, the process of party-system collapse almost necessarily leads to the proliferation of a frame offered by elites from outside the party system: that the state is and has been incapable of resolving society's biggest problems. Critiques of the performance of the state, after all, are integral to almost any anti-party-system actor's electoral appeal: if the state is working well, then there is little reason to take the risks associated with electing a relative political unknown.

This anti-state-capacity frame takes on different hues, depending on the ideological orientations of the anti-party system actors. Actors on the right and sometimes in the center are likely to promulgate this critique in its neoliberal version, claiming that all states are inherently less able than the market to resolve many categories of problems. Anti-party-system voices from the left, by contrast, are likely to claim that the state in its current constitution, filled with

corrupt bureaucrats and with actors whose interests diverge from those of the masses, either cannot or will not address society's major problems—and that a reformulated state would be the best solution to such problems. On both sides, anti-party-system discourse is likely to emphasize the claim that the current state cannot solve the most important problems. For inattentive or moderately attentive citizens in particular, the details of that claim and the hypothetical solutions may be less important than the simple message that the state does not work. Hence, we may expect the process of party-system collapse to reduce citizens' sense of how involved the state should be in a variety of issue areas; if the state cannot fix problems in those areas, why waste time and money trying?

Other frames that may arise in the process of party-system collapse are more contingent and depend on the kind of collapse and on a society's broader ideological environment. In particular, different messages will be sent if the ideological underrepresentation that produces collapse is in the center or toward the left or right wing. Collapses of the left are likely to produce mobilizing frames that emphasize the capacity of citizens to understand the political world and to act in ways that definitively change it. After all, such ideas have long been hallmarks of the left (Roberts 1998). Collapses where the anti-party actors are located toward the ideological center are far less likely to feature this kind of extensive mobilizing and capacity-emphasizing rhetoric, and collapses where anti-party actors lean toward the right may even involve explicitly demobilizing frames that stress the complexity of society's problems and the extent to which they are best addressed through purely private, nonpolitical action. Hence, citizens who have lived through a party-system collapse toward the left, but not those who have experienced other kinds of collapse, should experience an increase in their sense of political efficacy—i.e., their belief that they are capable of understanding and acting to change politics.

1.1.4 Conclusions

Party-system collapse is thus the result of an interaction between voters and party leaders. Voters' decision to abandon the traditional parties and produce a collapse comes at the end of a complicated causal process of economic and broader social crisis that leads to greater political awareness. Voters' change in party identification due to concerns about corruption and decision to vote for outsider candidates can best be explained by ideological underrepresenta-

tion—and ultimately by anger, which reduces the subjective importance of the risks involved in such a large departure from political convention. Party leaders, for their part, fail to adjust ideologically to voters' demands largely because of intra-party constraints, which may involve organizational entrenchment or narrow ideological distributions among activists within the party. The effects of collapse for citizens' ongoing perceptions of the political world are conditional on the kinds of messages about state and citizen capacity that become prevalent during the interactions that constitute collapse.

As is usually the case in the social sciences, this study is unable to test every component of the theoretical account above. In particular, systematic data regarding political affect are, to date, rare for Latin America. Given this limitation, the analysis here adopts an eclectic approach, using quantitative analysis of aggregate-level and survey data to test several observable implications of the theory of party-system collapse developed above and relying on experimental evidence to probe the key links among emotions, attitudes toward risk, and willingness to vote for a political outsider. This mixed strategy gives empirical roots to the discussion and provides evidence to support the theory's key propositions.

1.2 OVERVIEW

The evidence for this argument is developed through an analysis of political dynamics in Peru and Venezuela during the process of party-system collapse, and also by comparing the collapse countries with countries where the party system has survived. Of the countries where the traditional party system has transformed but not collapsed, Argentina is notable because it experienced many of the same pressures as Peru and Venezuela. These episodes of party-system change are described and situated in comparison with other party-system transformations in Chapter 2.

Chapter 3 compares the political and economic crises that form the context for party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela with the often similar crises in other Latin American democracies during the 1980s and 1990s. It tests the effects of social and economic crises on party system collapse with a time-series cross-sectional analysis of change in the vote share of Latin America's governing parties between successive presidential elections. While most scholars have argued that economic crisis deserves a central place in the explanation of

party-system collapse, this regional analysis shows that the degree of crisis as reported by aggregate statistics for each country is not a complete explanation. In comparison with the rest of Latin America, elections in Peru and Venezuela during the 1980s and 1990s produced vote shares for governing parties that are substantially different than would be expected on the basis of economic performance. However, there is some reason to believe that the broad societal crises in Peru and Venezuela did increase voter anxiety levels and expand citizens' discomfort with the existing political system, enabling the subsequent process that more actively caused party-system collapse.

Chapter 4 explores the reasons why many voters in Peru and Venezuela turned away from their standing political attachments to the traditional party system. In particular, it tests the hypothesis developed above that concerns about corruption cause the decline in voters' identification with the traditional parties that, in turn, serves as a major causal ingredient of party-system collapse. Using survey data about elections during the process of party-system collapse and a pseudo-panel analysis, the chapter shows that corruption perceptions, rather than economic evaluations or more specific opinions about neoliberal reform, are most responsible for eroding voters' identification with the traditional parties—although economic crisis remains a potentially important part of the story as a cause of the voter anxiety. That anxiety may set the stage for the observed reevaluation of patterns of party identification on the basis of information about corruption. The chapter concludes by offering empirical clues in favor of the hypothesis that corruption scandals are less damaging to identification with parties that channel a great deal of patronage through the party apparatus.

Chapter 5 analyzes the role of ideological underrepresentation in citizens' ultimate decisions to vote outside of the traditional party system. Using survey data, it shows that gaps in the pattern of ideological representation provided by the traditional parties, in combination with a loss of identification with those parties as analyzed in Chapter 4, explain the decision to defect from the traditional parties and vote for new alternatives. Economic perceptions and social class variables, central elements of competing theories, prove less important.

The theory developed above posits a deeper causal pathway, regarding affect and attitudes toward risk, that explains why ideological underrepresentation and corruption play the central causal roles in the voter-side decision-making that leads to party-system collapse. Chapter 6 subjects this pathway to experi-

mental test. In the research discussed there, a sample of Peruvian citizens are randomly assigned to conditions in which their emotional states are modified through viewing a scene from a film and listening to emotionally coordinated music. Then, they participate in a simulated election between a traditional-party candidate and an outsider. The chapter shows that the manipulation is causally efficacious: anger increases voters' probability of supporting an outsider candidate. In conjunction with the more general survey findings of the earlier chapters, these experimental results play a key role in empirically supporting the theory discussed in this chapter.

Turning to the puzzle of why party leaders made poor strategic decisions when their organizational survival was at stake, Chapter 7 uses data from an original survey of local party leaders to test the theory developed above regarding the specific organizational factors to explain why the Peruvian and Venezuelan traditional parties were less strategically flexible than the Peronist party in Argentina. The analysis discusses a range of organizational dimensions that have been hypothesized to affect parties' ideological flexibility and provides a descriptive characterization of the traditional parties in all three countries on each dimension. It then reports results from a series of statistical models to determine which dimensions best predict parties' local degree of flexibility. The evidence supports the hypothesis that organizational entrenchment, low levels of intra-party ideological diversity, and low degrees of channeling patronage through the party apparatus lead to less ideological flexibility and thus indirectly contribute to party-system collapse.

Finally, Chapter 8 considers the consequences of party-system collapse for how voters think about government and politics. Using a variety of empirical comparisons, I suggest two major ways that collapse could affect voters' attitudes. First, the pattern of crisis experienced during the process of collapse combined with the kinds of political appeals and frames that outsider candidates need in order to succeed politically can be expected to reduce voters' sense of the proper scope for state action. Second, the collapse toward the left in Venezuela, in conjunction with the regional prevalence of participatory ideologies among leftist political outsiders, led to an enhanced sense of political efficacy among citizens in Venezuela—an effect produced by collapse in one context but not necessarily a universal consequence of similar party-system transformations.

CHAPTER 2

CHARACTERIZING PARTY-SYSTEM CHANGES

Different conceptualizations of party systems and different descriptions of the recent political histories of South American countries can pose quite divergent explanatory puzzles regarding party-system collapse. Some analysts, for instance, might reject Peru as a case of collapse on the grounds that no party system existed there in the first place. Others, including Tanaka (1998, 2006), would push the date for party-system collapse at least a few years into the presidential terms of Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Both of these views would result in explanatory puzzles quite different from that addressed in this volume. Hence, before presenting the evidence for this study's explanation of party-system collapse, it may be useful to spell out the conceptual and historical considerations supporting my decision to treat the elections won by Fujimori in Peru and Chávez in Venezuela as the culminating moments leading to party-system collapse.

In this chapter, the characterization of the traditional parties and party systems of Peru and Venezuela, as well as Argentina, focuses on the intensive interactions between party elites and voters. Such interactions are an essential part of the process of party-system collapse. To highlight the aspects of collapse that involve elite-voter interaction, I use a primarily electoral concept of collapse.

Other useful conceptions of party-system collapse have, of course, been developed; these serve to highlight different aspects of Peru's and Venezuela's broader political, economic, and social transitions. The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that other conceptions are incorrect or inadequate, but rather to demonstrate how elite-voter interactions support the plausibility of the conceptions I adopt here. At the same time, the chapter offers a broad historical narrative of the party-system changes that the rest of this book analyzes in more depth.

2.1 TRADITIONAL PARTIES

In defining the concept of "traditional parties" as used in this study, it is useful to note that the term "traditional" has an established, and in the current analysis irrelevant, usage in modernization theory (see, e.g., Lerner 1958). In the context of modernization theory, tradition refers to societies that have not adopted the package of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, state formation, democratization, and so forth associated with "modernity." This meaning is entirely irrelevant to discussions of Latin American party politics during the late twentieth century. By then, most Latin American countries had undergone substantial urbanization (De Oliveira and Roberts 1998: 243–53) and significant industrialization (French-Davis, Munoz, and Palma 1998: 185–88). Furthermore, the existence of a meaningful system of political parties presupposes the establishment of a reasonably democratic political regime (Sartori 1976: 3–13). Hence, in the context of modernization theory, each of the parties under consideration here exists within a largely modern society.

For present purposes, the term "traditional" refers instead to those parties that have had the opportunity to develop a vibrant and extensive party tradition within a given electorate. More specifically, these parties have a substantial—i.e., multi-decade—history and have most often been electoral competitors with a serious prospect of forming the national government for multiple electoral cycles.

In order for a party to have the chance to develop deep roots in a country's democratic history, it must usually be relatively old; new or recent parties are not traditional in this sense. But parties may be traditional even if they experience some degree of volatility regarding organizational form or party name. What is most important is that the party unambiguously represent a tradition that is recognized by both voters and party leaders as a long-standing compo-

nent of the country's political life. For many parties, this criterion is unambiguous. When ambiguity arises, it may be resolved through an exploration of the biographies of party leaders and the historical and ideological sources the party draws on in formulating its appeals to the population. If most of the party leaders have extensive experience within the same well-defined political movement and draw on prominent ideas, texts, and historical appeals from that movement's past history, then the party may be regarded as traditional even if its name and current organizational incarnation are of more recent vintage.

Parties that persist for a long time at the margins of politics are excluded from the traditional category; while such parties may have a committed core of supporters, they have not had the opportunity to contribute enough to the country's institutional, electoral, and political history to qualify as traditional. The easiest way to distinguish persistent marginal movements from traditional parties is electoral relevance: traditional parties have often been central to electoral competition, and even serious competitors to form the government, at more than one point during the country's democratic history. For parties that have been persistently excluded from competition by authoritarian and restricted democratic regimes, these electoral considerations are too restrictive. For such parties, evidence of other forms of connection with the political mainstream, including influence during authoritarian interludes and prominence during regime transitions, can substitute for electoral evidence of relevance.

Thus, traditional parties, by definition, have been politically relevant for a substantial period of time and, as a consequence, have had the opportunity to establish firm organizational, political, and sociological ties to the electorate. Exactly because of this relatively high potential for the party to embed itself in society and the electorate, it is especially surprising when a traditional party collapses.

2.1.1 Argentina's Traditional Parties

Which parties, in each country, count as traditional according to this definition? This section gives a brief overview of the traditional parties of Argentina—the country that serves as the major case of party-system survival during crisis throughout the analysis; subsequent sections discuss the traditional parties of Peru and Venezuela. The emphasis is on the two criteria for traditional-party status described above: existence for a significant period of time before the

process of collapse, and status as a serious political force before the period of party-system collapse. Consequences of the party's history for the development of the party's organization and ties to society—hypothesized consequents of traditional-party status—are considered in Chapters 4, 5, and 7. Finally, the organizational and electoral trajectory of each party during the 1980s and 1990s provides context and specificity for the larger discussion of collapse. For each party, the short- and long-term circumstances that coincide with electoral gain and loss are sketched in these narratives.

Argentina's traditional parties are the Peronist party and the Radical party. The Peronists, officially known as the Partido Justicialista or PJ, originated as an electoral movement designed to support the 1946–55 government of Juan Domingo Perón. By the time of the reestablishment of Argentine democracy in 1983, the Peronist party was several decades from the moment of its formation, satisfying the first definitional requirement of traditional parties.

The second requirement, which can be fulfilled by demonstrating the existence of multiple rounds of serious electoral competition to form the government, was also satisfied. Peronism won elections and formed the national government during the period from 1946 until 1955 and again in 1973. Between 1955 and 1973, and after 1976, Peronism suffered almost-constant proscription and military repression (McGuire 1997: 80–93, 145–63, 170–84; Collier and Collier 2002: 484–97, 721–42). However, during this period, Peronists won important elections under different party labels, and Perón himself was often able to broker electoral victories by striking alliances with non-Peronist politicians (McGuire 1997: 80–150).

The Peronist party that was free to compete in Argentina's new democratic political regime after democratic transition in 1983 was thus a party that had experienced decades of chaos, illegality, and institutional disruption. After the Peronists were defeated by the Radicals in the presidential election of 1983, dissidents within the party launched a movement, called renewal Peronism, aimed at increasing the transparency of party decision-making procedures and expanding its electoral appeal beyond the traditional base. When the Peronists used a primary election to select a candidate in 1988 (for the first time in party history), the winner, Carlos Menem, was a charismatic, personalist leader opposed to decision-making institutions that might reduce his personal power (O'Donnell 1994; McGuire 1997: 189–90, 207–13).

Menem governed Argentina from 1989 until 1999, through the period during which Peru's and Venezuela's party systems collapsed. During that period, he introduced extensive neoliberal reforms that moved Argentina toward integration into the international market economy. This transformation at first faced some hostility from the Peronist party—which was traditionally associated with a rather interventionist ideology (Corrales 2002: 127–31). However, Menem was able to overcome this party opposition and eventually win the support of the Peronist movement for his reelection in 1995.

In the process of winning his party's support, Menem relied heavily on three factors. First, the strength of labor unions within Peronism was on the decline during the late 1980s and the 1990s. In part, this was due to the renewal Peronism movement, which attempted to limit labor influence on party decisions. This decline in union influence also reflected a shift in party organizational strategy away from unions in the direction of local patronage machines (Levitsky 2003: 107–43). Since the union movement was particularly likely to object to Menem's economic policy package, the marginalization of this actor within Peronism may have helped Menem regain control of the party. Second, Menem negotiated a kind of political truce with the Peronists by incorporating more party leaders into the government and by shifting toward a view of party leaders in the Congress as potential allies rather than obstacles to be overcome (Corrales 2002: 169–85). Third, Menem's economic policies in fact won majority support in the Argentine public by mid-1991—which Menem was largely able to maintain until late 1994 (Echegaray and Elordi 2001: 202).

The Peronists lost the 1999 election, in which Menem, as a second-term incumbent, was ineligible to run. Instead, the new president, Fernando de la Rúa, was elected as the candidate of a coalition between the Radicals, discussed below, and a nontraditional third party (FREPASO—El Frente País Solidario). However, when that government failed during an economic crisis in late 2001, the Peronists resumed control of the government. In the next presidential election, in 2003, Peronist candidate Néstor Kirchner won the presidency on a moderate leftist platform. The Peronist party thus survived the 1980s and 1990s without suffering any kind of electoral collapse.

Argentina's other traditional party, the Radicals (officially known as the Unión Cívica Radical or UCR), dates back to 1891, clearly meeting the first requirement for traditional-party status. Originally, the Radicals' primary ob-

jective was to overcome oligarchic limitations on democracy and fraudulent interventions in elections through a strategy of insurrection and electoral abstention (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 178–79; McGuire 1995: 204–6). In 1912, electoral reforms had effectively ended conservative control over electoral results, allowing the Radicals to compete seriously to form the government for the first time. Under the first free and fair presidential elections, in 1916, the Radicals won a landslide victory on the basis of party organization, patronage politics, and powerful ties to Argentina's middle classes (McGuire 1995: 206). The Radicals won two more presidential elections, in 1922 and 1928. However, economic decline associated with the beginning of the Great Depression, as well as conflict with the military, provoked a coup and the initiation of a military government in 1930—which used coercion and fraud to exclude the Radicals from power (McGuire 1995: 207–8).

During Perón's government, between 1946 and 1955, the Radicals were the primary opposition party. However, the Peronist behemoth effectively guaranteed that the Radicals would be excluded from government power until after Perón's overthrow in 1955. The military overthrow of Perón and Peronism's subsequent exclusion from democratic participation created electoral opportunities for the Radicals, who largely dominated electoral politics during democratic periods until the 1970s. Between this electoral success and the Radicals' victories before 1930, the Radical party meets the criterion of seriously competing to form the government in more than one electoral cycle.

How did the Radicals fare during the period of party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela? In the 1983 presidential elections, following a turbulent Peronist government between 1973 and 1976 and a brutally repressive military regime between 1976 and 1983, the Radicals triumphed behind leader Raúl Alfonsín and a new, moderate, pro-democratic electoral appeal that contrasted sharply with Peronism's reliance on divisive, class-political traditional symbols (Munck 1992: 205–7). However, during the economic crisis of the late 1980s, the Peronists once again won the presidency, as noted above. Subsequently, Menem's political and economic success, as well as possible popular dissatisfaction with the Radicals' cooperation in changing the constitution in 1994 to allow for presidential reelection, led to devastating electoral defeats for the Radicals through the mid-1990s, as the Radicals reached a 1995 low of 16.2 percent of the presidential vote.

In the 1999 presidential elections, the Radicals formed a coalition with a third party, FREPASO, that had split from the Peronists earlier in the 1990s. This coalition defeated the Peronists, and the Radicals became once again a governing party. However, after a wave of corruption scandals, the governing coalition fractured in 2000; furthermore, a currency crisis in 2001 (Calvo and Mishkin 2003: 100–101) led to a full-scale economic meltdown that forced the Radicals out of government by the end of the year. In the wake of this crisis, the Radical party has seen tensions at the elite and mass levels; in 2003, two of the major presidential candidates had traditional ties to the Radical party, but neither of them ran with the official party label.

No other Argentine party qualifies as traditional. Other than the Peronists and the Radicals, FREPASO was the only party to have substantial electoral success or other governmental relevance since 1983. However, FREPASO never ran another independent presidential candidate, participating instead in a coalition with the Radicals in 1999 and effectively disappearing after the 2001 political and economic crisis.

2.1.2 Peru's Traditional Parties

The oldest and perhaps best known of Peru's traditional parties during the 1980s is the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). APRA was founded in 1924 as an anti-oligarchic, indigenist, and anti-imperialist party. Like the Radical party in Argentina, APRA began its history struggling more for inclusion in the political system than for electoral victory. APRA's founder, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, was exiled from Peru for eight years after sponsoring a 1923 protest against the current dictator's decision to dedicate the country of Peru to the Sacred Heart of Jesus (Graham 1992: 25). Rather more serious was a violent revolt against the military and the state by APRA activists in northern Peru in 1932, in response to the 1931 presidential elections that APRA claimed were fraudulent (Rojas Samanez 1987: 151–52; Graham 1992: 27–29; Collier and Collier 2002: 152).

In response to this revolt, the Peruvian state banned APRA from participation in electoral politics—a ban that was enforced almost uniformly until 1962 and intermittently renewed until roughly 1978 (Cotler 1995: 328). However, government and military opposition notwithstanding, APRA frequently found ways of participating in elections and even competed seriously to form

the government on more than one occasion. In 1936, APRA struck a secret alliance with incumbent military president Oscar R. Benavides, a bargain that did not in the end result in legal recognition for APRA (Rojas Samanez 1987: 152–53). APRA also offered covert support for the civilian president elected in 1939, Manuel Prado (Collier and Collier 2002: 316).

In the 1945 elections, candidate José Luis Bustamante y Rivero formed a coalition, the Frente Democrático Nacional, which demanded the legalization of APRA and subsequently included APRA as a junior coalition member (Rojas Samanez 1987: 153; Collier and Collier 2002: 318–19). Legalization allowed APRA to consolidate ties with the labor union movement and strengthen its nationwide party organization (Collier and Collier 2002: 325–26). However, a 1948 military coup left APRA once again proscribed and out of government. The coup, organized by conservative elites, was in part a response to actions by the APRA party in government, in part an answer to rising APRA electoral success, and also a direct consequence of an APRA decision to launch a violent revolt in a city just outside of Peru's capital, Lima (Rojas Samanez 1987: 155–57; Collier and Collier 2002: 328–30). For the next eight years, a military regime once again adopted a policy of intense repression against APRA.

However, in 1956, presidential elections were held in which APRA—though still illegal—traded its support for ex-president Manuel Prado in exchange for the legalization of the party (Rojas Samanez 1987: 157; Collier and Collier 2002: 473–74). By supporting the Prado government, APRA necessarily moved away from its leftist origins in the direction of centrist ideological appeals, producing a schism in which some leftist activists abandoned the party (Collier and Collier 2002: 477–78). In exchange, however, the party was allowed to participate in the 1962 presidential elections, in which founder Haya de la Torre won a slight plurality. Nevertheless, the military vetoed the possibility of an APRA government and required new elections in 1963, in which APRA lost to Acción Popular (Rojas Samanez 1987: 157–63; Collier and Collier 2002: 697–702).

When that Acción Popular government fell to a military coup in 1968, APRA once again faced a military government and formal exclusion from the political system. This time, the military had a leftist political orientation and a desire to implement much of APRA's traditional political platform (Graham 1992: 37–60). Between the earlier schism within APRA over support for Prado and the subsequent reformist actions of the Peruvian military during the 1970s, the APRA

party that existed in 1978 when the military called elections for a constituent assembly had lost much of its left wing. That change in constituency, in combination with the dislocations caused by Haya de la Torre's death, added to the sense of crisis produced by an APRA defeat in the 1980 presidential elections.

In response, APRA initiated an intra-party renovation that included a shift in ideology away from the teachings of Haya de la Torre and toward a more pragmatic electoral appeal. The renovation project also involved the emergence of new party leadership, especially Alan García, the young leader who would serve as APRA's first successful presidential candidate, in 1985 (Graham 1992: 73–96). García's election was APRA's high point during the 1980s; within three years, his government had broken down amid economic disaster, Maoist insurgent violence, and policy conflict with the Peruvian economic elite (Graham 1992: 99–125). Following a third-place finish in the 1990 presidential elections, APRA fell to the electoral sidelines throughout the 1990s, never obtaining double-digit results in any national election. This decline serves as a central puzzle throughout the study.

After this decade-long collapse, APRA recently experienced a remarkable revival. In both the 2001 and the 2006 Peruvian presidential elections, Alan García was the second-place finisher in the first round. In 2001, García narrowly lost the second round; in 2006, he won the second round and was elected to a new presidential term. This recent renewal for APRA is a helpful reminder that party collapse—even collapse as severe and seemingly total as that suffered by APRA—need not be irreversible or permanent.

The second of Peru's traditional parties, Acción Popular, originated in 1956—once again, several decades before the beginning of party-system collapse in the 1980s. Its founder, the architect Fernando Belaúnde Terry, had served as a legislator from 1945 until 1948, under the label of the Frente Democrático Nacional, in which he was an ally of the APRA party. However, Belaúnde was alienated by the subsequent alliance between APRA and Prado, and he therefore chose to form an alternative movement (Rojas Samanez 1987: 307–9). Belaúnde's new party, Acción Popular, began with a leftist political program emphasizing economic planning, agrarian reform, education, and Peruvian nationalism (Belaúnde Terry 1960).

Under this platform, and with support from the Peruvian military, Belaúnde was elected president in 1963, following a close, second-place finish in 1962.

These successful electoral showings qualify Acción Popular for traditional-party status.

The Acción Popular government implemented a moderate land reform law in 1964 (Rojas Samanez 1987: 317–18). However, a legislative opposition coalition between APRA and the authoritarian right hampered the government, eventually resulting in a military coup that ousted Belaúnde in 1968. Belaúnde maintained an anti-authoritarian posture throughout the military government, and even refused to allow Acción Popular to participate in the military-sponsored constitutional convention of 1978 (Rojas Samanez 1987: 320–21). This posture of opposition, combined with Belaúnde's personal appeal and perhaps other factors, allowed Acción Popular to win the presidential elections of 1980.

However, the second Acción Popular government ended in economic turmoil and the rise of a Maoist guerrilla insurgent movement. These negative outcomes, in conjunction with the fact that Peru's constitution forbade the immediate reelection of Belaúnde, coincided with a sharp decline in Acción Popular's vote share in the 1985 elections. In the run-up to the 1990 elections, Acción Popular chose to support Mario Vargas Llosa's outsider presidential campaign rather than run its own candidate (Cameron 1994: 59–76). As with APRA, this electoral collapse is a major part of the outcome this study seeks to explain. During the elections of the 1990s, Acción Popular was entirely unsuccessful and has not achieved the kind of subsequent electoral resurgence that has characterized APRA.

The third traditional party in the Peru of the 1980s is a more complicated case. Izquierda Unida, the party of the democratic left during the 1980s in Peru, was not formed until just after the 1980 presidential elections—in which the fractured Peruvian left realized that it paid a steep electoral price for its division (Roberts 1998: 222). However, the various leftist parties and movements that formed this party had deeper roots reaching back into social mobilizations of the 1960s and especially the period of military government in the 1970s (Roberts 1998: 201–17).

Thus, even though Izquierda Unida never competed in a presidential election until 1985, it represented a collection of political forces that had played an important role in Peruvian politics for decades by that point, and in that sense Izquierda Unida meets the criterion of meaningful age and especially societal roots at the beginning of the period of party-system collapse. With respect to

the second criterion for traditional-party status, in place of extensive experience of electoral competition for presidential power, Izquierda Unida had relatively close ties to an unelected military government that had held power for more than a decade. Because of this history of influence, and especially owing to the relatively close connections between the leftist movements that subsequently formed Izquierda Unida and the military government, it would seem inappropriate to exclude Izquierda Unida as a traditional party even though it does not meet the same definitional criteria for that status that the other traditional parties do. This conclusion is reinforced by the important role that the parties which would subsequently form Izquierda Unida played in the 1978 constitutional convention, where these leftist groups were the second-largest bloc with 30 of the 100 total seats (Dietz 1986: 147–48).

Izquierda Unida was officially a coalition of leftist political parties. However, for nearly a decade after its founding, Izquierda Unida nominated candidates for national and local elected offices; coordinated campaign efforts; and cooperated, at least to some degree, in legislative politics. These features justify considering Izquierda Unida as a political party in analytic terms. For these reasons, this study henceforth classifies Izquierda Unida as a traditional party. Clearly, the classification decision is a close one, and Izquierda Unida could plausibly be regarded as just missing the criteria for traditional status by the time of the party-system collapse. In either case, it is clear that Izquierda Unida differs in many ways from the parties and movements that emerged during the process of collapse itself: Izquierda Unida consisted largely of experienced political actors, represented parties and ideological traditions with deep roots in Peru's political society, possessed a clear image and reputation among voters, and had a significant if less than entirely institutionalized organizational base. As such, Izquierda Unida has at least a strong family resemblance to the Peruvian traditional parties.

How did Izquierda Unida fare electorally during the 1980s, when the other two Peruvian traditional parties collapsed? Between the founding of Izquierda Unida and its split into two competing parties in 1989, the party obtained between 20 and 30 percent of the vote in the presidential and municipal elections of 1980, 1983, 1985, and 1986, thereby qualifying as a major force in the Peruvian party system of the 1980s. In its first election in 1980, the party won thirteen of Peru's 188 district mayorships, nine of which were located in the

shantytowns surrounding the nation's capital (Roberts 1998: 223). This initial electoral victory created a strategic dilemma that persisted through the 1980s and eventually formed the context for a major schism in the party: should Izquierda Unida moderate its ideological appeals in order to win elections, or should it maintain a revolutionary strategy?

For most of the 1980s, the pragmatic and revolutionary components of Izquierda Unida were able to coexist, although never harmoniously. Alfonso Barrantes, a moderate and perhaps Izquierda Unida's most electorally viable representative, was elected mayor of Lima in 1983. Barrantes implemented a range of pragmatic reforms targeted at improving the quality of life and economic position of Lima's poor (Roberts 1998: 226). This experience served as a springboard for Barrantes's 1985 presidential campaign, in which he came in second.

This successful showing in 1985 raised the possibility of an Izquierda Unida presidential victory in 1990. However, the possibility of victory itself produced a crisis that eventually split the party. Moderates within the party advocated running Barrantes as a presidential candidate once again, and also moderating the party's platform to appeal to centrist voters (Cameron 1994: 79–85; Roberts 1998: 247–48). Leftists, by contrast, worried that winning the election on a moderate platform might prevent the revolutionary changes in Peruvian society to which they were committed (Roberts 1998: 252–54). In 1989, when this strategic dilemma proved impossible to resolve, Izquierda Unida split into two competing parties, both of which received single-digit vote shares in the 1990 presidential elections and have been electorally marginalized since.[1]

2.1.3 Venezuela's Traditional Parties

Clearly Venezuela's largest and most powerful traditional party for most of the country's democratic history, Acción Democrática was founded in 1941 as the successor organization to a series of anti-authoritarian political movements from the 1920s onward (Martz 1966: 22–48). Hence, this party was at least fifty years from its founding moment when the Venezuelan party-system collapse began.

The party was first able to participate in electoral competition after a military coup in 1945, in which Acción Democrática leaders conspired with dissident military officers to displace the existing nondemocratic political regime (Martz 1966: 60–62). A year later, in October 1946, Acción Democrática and the other participants in the military takeover held elections—usually consid-

ered to have been Venezuela's first democratic vote—for a constituent assembly. Acción Democrática dominated the elections, winning 78.8 percent of the vote (Martz 1966: 69). A new constitution was promulgated in 1947, with presidential and congressional elections scheduled for December of that year. Once again, Acción Democrática won decisively, receiving 70.8 percent of the congressional vote and 74.4 percent of the presidential vote (Martz 1966: 75). The prospect of perpetual Acción Democrática electoral dominance, in conjunction with the government's policies in favor of land reform and labor union rights, provoked a military coup against Acción Democrática toward the end of 1948 (Martz 1966: 82–85; Collier and Collier 2002: 268–70).

For the next ten years, Acción Democrática was completely excluded from government power and subjected to intense repression (Martz 1966: 89–96; Collier and Collier 2002: 421–45). Both in order to regain its access to governmental power and to forestall future military coups, Acción Democrática decided to moderate its ideological position, shifting toward the political center in a process that resulted in various ideologically motivated group defections from the party throughout the 1960s (Coppedge 1994: 54–56). Furthermore, Acción Democrática signed a pact with all of the major non-Communist parties of Venezuela, called the Pact of Punto Fijo (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 44–45). With these moderating changes in place and with the initiation of a new democratic regime in 1958, Acción Democrática was able to play a leading role in Venezuelan political life. Between 1958 and 1993, Acción Democrática almost always held the largest block of seats in the Venezuelan legislature and won all but two presidential elections (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 49–53).

However, in the wake of a major economic crisis, a failed effort at neoliberal economic reforms, a series of corruption scandals, and the impeachment and removal from office of an Acción Democrática president early in 1993 (McCoy and Smith 1995: 252–56), the party began to lose substantial electoral ground. From its 1988 presidential vote share of 52.9 percent, Acción Democrática's vote fell in 1993 to a mere 23.6 percent. The party's legislative vote share experienced an equally severe decline. Five years in the political opposition did not reverse this trend; in 1998, the party was forced to abandon its own candidate shortly before the election and endorse a partisan outsider in an unsuccessful effort to defeat leftist, anti-party-system candidate Hugo Chávez Frías. Since 1998, Acción Democrática has remained at the electoral margin. As with the Peruvian

traditional parties, this collapse of a once-dominant party will be a major focus of attention throughout the remainder of this study.

COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente), the Christian-democratic party that served as the main opposition to Acción Democrática during the period between 1958 and 1993, originated as a party of Catholic protest against the Acción Democrática-dominated government in 1946 (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 46–47; Crisp, Levine, and Molina 2003: 275–76). Hence, COPEI is almost as old as Acción Democrática—and, by the 1980s and 1990s, was several decades from its founding moment. Initially electorally marginal,[2] COPEI had a major electoral breakthrough in 1968, when a splinter Acción Democrática candidacy and a strong showing by another party, the URD (Unión Republicana Democrática), created a four-way race that COPEI would win with 29.1 percent of the presidential vote (Coppedge 1994: 56; Crisp, Levine, and Molina 2003: 293). That victory cemented COPEI's role as the primary alternative to Acción Democrática in the roughly two-party system that dominated Venezuelan electoral politics during the 1970s and 1980s. COPEI therefore meets both criteria for traditional-party status.

However, following economic difficulties and a series of corruption scandals during a COPEI government between 1979 and 1984, COPEI began to lose electoral ground. Its 1978 presidential vote share of 46.6 percent stands as an all-time high; in 1983, the party's vote fell to 33.5 percent, rebounding in 1988 to 40.4 percent before falling in 1993 to 22.7 percent. In the 1993 elections, COPEI's charismatic founding figure, Rafael Caldera, left the party after personal and ideological struggles with other party leaders and launched a successful independent, anti-party-system candidacy; this division in conjunction with voter dissatisfaction may have contributed to COPEI's electoral decline (Crisp, Levine, and Molina 2003: 296–98). COPEI has not subsequently recovered; in 1998 it was unable to field its own presidential candidate and it has received single-digit vote shares in subsequent elections. The decline of COPEI is the last major party-system change emphasized by this study.

Other parties have, of course, existed during Venezuelan democratic history. For example, the URD, mentioned briefly above, was the second-place finisher in the 1958 presidential elections and received nontrivial vote shares in 1963 and 1968. This party had, however, long ceased to occupy a meaningful electoral space in Venezuela by the time of the party-system collapse; in 1988,

the URD received a mere 0.8 percent of the presidential vote (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 49). Likewise, the leftist party Movimiento al Socialismo is sometimes seen as an important component of the Venezuelan party system.[3] Yet this party never achieved a presidential vote share higher than 5.2 percent before the beginning of the party-system collapse in 1993; likewise, it only once obtained a double-digit legislative vote share during that period (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 49–51). Hence, as with the URD and other small Venezuelan parties as well as the PPC in Peru, it seems most reasonable to regard the Movimiento al Socialismo as not meeting the criteria for traditional-party status.

2.2 TRADITIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS

The previous section's overview of the Argentine, Peruvian, and Venezuelan traditional parties makes it clear that the Peruvian and Venezuelan traditional parties have undergone deeper and more prolonged cycles of electoral decline since the 1980s than have the Argentine traditional parties. Yet the focus of this study is not the collapse of traditional parties, but rather the collapse of traditional party systems. What, then, is a traditional party system?

For present purposes, a traditional party system is defined as a party system in which the traditional parties manage to dominate electoral competition. If the traditional parties control elections to the point that no other parties appear on the presidential strategic-voting landscape, then the electorally relevant parties constitute a traditional party system.

Thus, it is by no means evident that all countries during all democratic periods have a traditional party system. If short-term electoral movements consistently, if transitorily, occupy an important electoral space, then the country in question does not possess a traditional party system. Nonetheless, Argentina and Venezuela during the 1980s almost certainly had traditional party systems according to this definition; Peru's pattern of electoral competition during the 1980s also seems to meet the definition, although perhaps somewhat less prototypically than the other two countries.

During the 1980s, the Peronists and the Radicals (Argentina's traditional parties) captured between 78.7 percent and 89.3 percent of the presidential vote; no other party managed a double-digit vote share during the decade. The traditional parties' domination of the legislative arena was similar, although some-

what less pronounced (McGuire 1995: 241–46). It is therefore easy to conclude that only the traditional parties were electorally central enough that they had an opportunity to determine governmental majorities; Argentina's elections in the 1980s were controlled by a two-party traditional system.[4]

For Venezuela, the case is perhaps even clearer. During the 1970s and 1980s, the two traditional parties jointly captured between 85.4 percent and 93.3 percent of the presidential vote, as well as between 74.6 percent and 79.5 percent of the legislative vote. During that period, no other party ever received more than 12.9 percent of either the presidential or the legislative vote (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 49–51). In light of this electoral dominance by Acción Democrática and COPEI, Molina and Pérez describe the 1973–88 period as an "attenuated two-party system," noting that Venezuela during the 1970s and 1980s meets the definitional criteria of a two-party system but also that some small leftist movements persisted at the margins of electoral competition (1998: 11–13). However, these marginal parties did not play any significant electoral role until the 1990s; hence, Venezuela meets the definition of a traditional party system.

Peru's party system of the 1980s was substantially weaker than those of Argentina or Venezuela. The three parties identified as traditional in the previous section, APRA, Acción Popular, and Izquierda Unida, did manage to dominate electoral competition for much of the 1980s (Cotler 1995: 336). As such, they meet this study's definition of a traditional party system. Nonetheless, both Acción Popular and Izquierda Unida were relatively uninstitutionalized parties, as discussed above. Furthermore, electoral competition during the 1980s did not consist of a routinized, three-way struggle among these parties. Instead, competition during the early 1980s was primarily between APRA and Acción Popular; during the mid- to late 1980s, the electoral focus shifted to a contest primarily between APRA and Izquierda Unida. These factors make the Peruvian parties of the 1980s seem less system-like, and have led some scholars to conclude that Peru during the 1980s had an inchoate party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995b: 19).

As an additional argument in favor of this study's classification of APRA, Acción Popular, and Izquierda Unida as forming a traditional party system, it may be worth noting that the party system did possess some of the traits mentioned above as important, but not definitional, in traditional party systems. In particular, each of these traditional parties did have meaningful ties to specific

sectors of Peruvian society. Furthermore, as Charles D. Kenney argues, "although this party system never became well institutionalized, its almost complete collapse surprised most observers" (2004: 43). It may, of course, be useful to bear in mind that there were differences among the party systems—in terms of institutionalization, ties to social sectors, and party structure. However, in spite of substantial volatility and organizational weakness, Peru's electoral competition during the 1980s meets this study's definitional criteria for the existence of a traditional party system.

2.3 PARTY-SYSTEM COLLAPSE

Having discussed the traditional parties and party systems of Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela, one final conceptual issue remains: what is meant by "party-system collapse"? For the purposes of this study, a party-system collapse is a situation in which all the parties that constitute the traditional party system simultaneously become electorally irrelevant.

Operationally, the requirement that the decline of all parties be simultaneous is taken to mean that the collapse must occur over a period of not more than two electoral cycles. This operationalization excludes episodes of party-system change in which the major, established parties are gradually replaced by new parties. Rather, attention is focused on moments when all parties suffer at once—a form of change that is more catastrophic and surprising, and hence a more profound violation of the expectation of party-system stability discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

In addition, the criterion of electoral irrelevance, central to the idea of party-system collapse, will be regarded as met whenever a party fails to achieve either the first or second place in a presidential election. In a traditional party system with more than two parties, the parties that count as electorally relevant according to this definition will generally rotate from election to election; in two-party systems, the relevant parties are constant across electoral cycles. Presidential elections are emphasized, rather than legislative vote shares, because the president—and not the largest legislative party—forms the government in a presidential system. According to Duverger's Law, presidential elections with only a single round of balloting will tend to produce results in which only two candidates receive a meaningful vote share (Cox 1997: 69–98); alternatively,

some political systems explicitly impose extra relevance on the two leading candidates, sending only these two candidates into a second round of balloting.[5] Under either institutional system, it therefore seems reasonable to consider parties that fall outside of the first two slots to be less electorally relevant.

In both Peru and Venezuela, the electoral decline of the traditional parties continued after the moment that this study identifies as the terminus of the party-system collapse. One might well therefore argue for a later date in both cases, highlighting the coalitional and electoral decisions that led the greatly weakened traditional parties of Peru after 1990 and Venezuela after 1998 to all but disappear in subsequent rounds of political competition. However, for present purposes, the definition offered above keeps the focus more squarely on the process of elite-voter interaction that dramatically weakened the party systems and set the stage for the traditional parties' subsequent elite and electoral troubles.

2.3.1 Concepts of Electoral Change

Party-system collapse, as defined here, is a particularly extreme form of party-system change. Indeed, party-system collapse is such an extreme form of party-system change that the Peruvian and Venezuelan collapses are two of very few clear examples of party-system collapse in recent democratic history; the breakdown of the Italian party system during the 1990s (Bardi 1996; Morlino and Tarchi 1996) probably also meets the definitional criteria advanced here, and party-system changes in Bolivia may also qualify. As an extreme category on the underlying dimension of party-system change, collapse is more important to understand than its empirical frequency would suggest, both because it is normatively important in light of the unusually extreme institutional disruption that it represents and because—as a kind of theoretical extreme—it may provide insights into the study of less intense forms of change.

It is worth emphasizing that specific parties may be deeply transformed by varieties of party-system change that fall far short of collapse. For example, Argentina's Peronist party changed dramatically during the 1990s (see, e.g., Murillo 2001; Levitsky 2003), even as the party system that it anchored survived. This study focuses on change at the system level, so such party-level transformations emerge as a potential explanation of system persistence or change, rather than a definitional component of such system outcomes.

This section briefly reviews a collection of important kinds of party-system trajectories along a continuum of degrees of party-system change, a continuum for which collapse represents one terminus. Empirical examples of each kind of trajectory are provided, both to illustrate the relationships between the various types and the concept of party-system collapse, and to implicitly compare well-known party-system episodes with the cases of party-system collapse discussed below.

Stable Election Even when a party system is stable, there is typically some degree of change in each party's vote share from election to election. For example, during the 1950s, in the middle of the period when European party systems were described as "frozen" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50), parties' vote shares did change somewhat from election to election. Between 1953 and 1957, the German Christian Democrats were able to increase their vote share from 45.2 percent to 50.2 percent; likewise, between 1956 and 1958, the French Communists' vote share fell from 25.9 percent to 19.2 percent. Even during a highly stable period, it is a mistake to expect total electoral immobility. Nonetheless, stable elections are characterized by a relative lack of change—both in the organizations that make up the party system and the relative electoral success of each.

In Latin America, stable elections—even in countries with relatively established party systems—often feature higher levels of electoral volatility. For example, between 1978 and 1983, at the peak of the Venezuelan traditional party system, Acción Democrática's presidential vote share surged from 43.3 percent to 58.4 percent. Similarly, between 1958 and 1962, the presidential vote share of Costa Rica's Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) increased from 42.8 percent to 50.3 percent, the generally stable character of Costa Rica's party system notwithstanding (Yashar 1995: 82–91). Yet because neither of these elections signaled a major, permanent change in electoral alignments or relative partisan strength, it seems safe to characterize them as essentially stable elections. Party-system collapse must entail a substantially greater amount of change.

Realignments Realigning elections (also called "critical elections") are elections in which "the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate" (Key 1955: 4).[6] While the concept of realignment has been applied to a range of varieties of party-system change (Sundquist 1983: 19–34), for the present purpose of differentiating among

degrees of party-system change, I use the term realigning election to refer to moments in which the electoral balance shifts in a dramatic and lasting way among the parties within a given party system.[7]

By this definition, the changes in U.S. partisan coalitions and, to some extent, levels of support described by Carmines and Stimson (1987) as a consequence of civil rights legislation during the 1950s and 1960s would count as episodes of realignment. Likewise, the periods during the first half of the twentieth century in which the labor union movement was incorporated into the traditional party systems of Uruguay and Colombia (Collier and Collier 2002: 271–313) would seem to meet the definition. Party-system realignments certainly transform the politics of a country. Nonetheless, there is a degree of organizational continuity in a realignment that clearly differentiates it from party-system collapse.

Replacement of One Party Even more dramatic change occurs in a party system when one of its constituent parties disappears and is replaced by a new organization. This kind of change preserves the numerical format of the party system, but it typically requires substantial revision of party loyalties by voters, and it may force politicians to revisit their own party affiliations.

One famous example of an episode of partisan change that resulted in the replacement of one party within the existing party is the displacement, in the United States between about 1852 and 1860, of the Whig party by the Republican party (Aldrich 1995: 126–56; Holt 1999: 726–985). The replacement of liberal parties by socialist labor parties in the United Kingdom (McKibbin 1974; Tanner 1990) and elsewhere would also seem to fit in this category.

As with realignments, party-system change involving the replacement of one party entails a great deal of social, political, and electoral disruption. Nevertheless, in this form of party-system change, one or more major parties do persist organizationally; hence, replacement of a single party is a less drastic form of change than party-system collapse.

Expansion/Contraction of the Party System In the discussion to this point, each form of party-system change has maintained the existing numerical format of the party system; in a two-party system, for example, one party may be replaced or the relative strength of the parties may change, but the system still has exactly two major parties. However, some episodes of party-system change involve an expansion or contraction of the party system. One or more established parties

may disappear without being replaced; alternatively, emerging parties may force their way into the party system without eliminating the existing parties.

In Europe, the emergence of left-libertarian (see Kitschelt 1989) and radical-right (see Kitschelt and McGann 1997) political parties since the early 1980s fits into this category of party-system change. Established parties of the center-left and center-right have not generally disappeared in the face of these new partisan challengers, yet the emergence of these parties has certainly forced some restructuring of party systems. In Latin America, the emergence of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrático (PRD) as legitimate, electorally relevant competitors to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) is a clear example of rather dramatic change by expansion of the party system (Greene 2002; Mizrahi 2003). During the 1990s, Argentina also experienced an expansion of the party system, when the Peronists and the Radicals were joined by the FREPASO movement (Seligson 2003). The scope of these party-system changes notwithstanding, expansions or contractions of a party system preserve at least some of the established parties and therefore entail a less complete change than a party-system collapse.

Replacement of More Than One Party Perhaps the most dramatic form of party-system change short of collapse is the replacement of more than one party. This occurs when, in a multiparty system, several parties crumble simultaneously and are electorally displaced by new competitors. However, at least one established party remains intact. Because of the scope of change in multiparty replacements, the numerical format of the party system often changes as well.

A fascinating example of the replacement of more than one party occurred in Canada's 1993 elections. For decades before 1993, three parties had dominated Canadian electoral competition: the Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic parties. However, the Progressive Conservative party's share of the national vote fell from 42.9 percent in 1988 to only 16 percent in 1993. At the same time, the New Democratic party's national vote share fell from 20.4 percent in 1988 to a mere 6.9 percent in 1993. The Liberal party persisted through this transformation, and two new parties quickly established themselves as medium- to long-term members of the Canadian party system: the Reform and Bloc Québécois parties (Carty 2002: 351–58). Clearly, a party-

system crisis of this magnitude is rather close to a party-system collapse; only one Canadian party remained effectively intact through 1993. Yet that party was able to lead the government, providing a degree of stability lacking in a full-scale party-system collapse.

Party-System Collapse Party-system collapse, as defined above, is clearly distinct from, and more disruptive than, the other forms of party-system change considered here. Aside from the South American cases, one of the best examples in recent decades of a party-system collapse is the transformation of the Italian party system in 1994. That year, two of the three traditional Italian parties fell into electoral irrelevance; the Socialists fell from a national vote share of 13.6 percent in 1992 to 2.2 percent in 1994, while the more powerful Christian Democrats fell from 29.7 percent in 1992 to 11.1 percent in 1994. The third traditional party, the Communists, underwent meaningful electoral decline during roughly the same years, although that party did not reach the same depths as the other two (falling from 26.6 percent in 1987 to 16.6 percent in 1992, and then rebounding somewhat to 20.4 percent in 1994) (Bardi 1996). This simultaneous crisis of all the traditional parties seems to be a transformation of the same magnitude as that experienced in Peru during the late 1980s and in Venezuela during the 1990s. The following sections characterize those transformations in a more systematic way.

2.3.2 The Evolution of Presidential Vote Shares

As discussed earlier, Peru and Venezuela suffered a party-system collapse during the 1980s and 1990s, while Argentina—in spite of substantial political, economic, and even electoral turmoil—did not. These contrasts, as well as comparisons with the more stable Latin American party systems of Chile and Costa Rica, become even clearer when shown as aggregate electoral outcomes. Figure 2.1 shows how the combined vote share of the traditional parties in presidential elections evolved in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela between 1962 and 1998.

In Venezuela and Peru, party-system collapse is represented by the precipitous drop in vote share starting in the mid-1980s in Peru and in the early 1990s in Venezuela.[8] For both countries, this free-fall ended in a near-zero vote share. Clearly, Peru and Venezuela underwent party-system collapse. However, none of the other three countries in Figure 2.1 suffered a party-system collapse; even



FIGURE 2.1. Traditional party presidential vote share, 1962–1998.
SOURCE: Data drawn from the Political Database of the Americas (a data collection available online at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/) and from the electoral institutes of each country. The traditional party system in Chile consists, for the purposes of this chart, of the Christian Democrats; the Socialists and their offshoot party, PPD; and a set of parties of the right that change somewhat over time. The Costa Rican traditional parties are Liberación Nacional (PLN) and Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC).

in Latin America during the neo-liberal period, party-system collapse was far from an everyday event.

Why, then, did the party systems of Peru and Venezuela collapse? The next chapter begins the process of presenting the evidence in favor of this study's theory of how voter and party-leader interactions, centrally involving variables related to voter affect and to patterns of party organization, can generate such dramatic party-system transformations. Before moving definitively to that argument, it will be worthwhile to briefly consider two aspects of South American politics that variously provide easily eliminated alternative explanations for collapse or an alternative framing of the outcome of this study.

2.4 TWO ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF COLLAPSE

Two aspects of Peruvian and Venezuelan political history during the late twentieth century have received extensive attention, even though neither provides

a particularly compelling explanatory account of party-system collapse. Some scholars have argued that poor institutional design at the level of the political regime or electoral law causes party-system collapse; although such institutions are important for understanding any number of outcomes, the discussion below argues that they do not play a central role in collapse in these countries. It is also worth noting that both Peru and Venezuela experienced serious periods of political violence during the process of party-system collapse, a fact that might be seen as a candidate explanation for party-system collapse but is perhaps more sensibly understood as an outcome related to collapse.

2.4.1 Regime and Electoral Institutions

Although some analysts argue that regime and electoral institutions play a role in determining a country's degree of vulnerability to party-system collapse, the evidence that institutional factors are central to the causal story of South American party-system collapse is unpersuasive. Institutional discontinuities, such as significant expansions of the franchise or regime transitions, are indeed a powerful predictor of electoral volatility in general (Roberts and Wibbels 1999), but the franchise was universal in both Peru and Venezuela before the period of party-system collapse, and neither country was in the first years of a transition away from authoritarianism. Some analysts have instead proposed a more specific relationship between vulnerability to party-system collapse and some potentially problematic electoral institutions (Tuesta Soldevilla 1995: 61–79; Kenney 2004: 59–70).

The influence of regime and electoral institutions should of course be taken into account in considering any party-system phenomenon, if only to rule them out as central causes. To demonstrate the problems with regarding Peruvian and Venezuelan regime and electoral institutions as central to the explanation of party-system collapse, this section briefly describes the institutional arrangements in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela.

All three countries—and indeed every other Latin American country—have presidential systems. On the one hand, presidentialism might be seen as facilitating party-system collapse because it creates a winner-take-all prize (the presidency) that allows new, outsider parties to defeat the traditional parties without having to develop legislative institutions and an extensive network of credible parliamentary candidates. On the other hand, presidentialism may

impede party-system collapse by increasing the electoral barriers to entry; meaningful participation in the government in strong presidential systems often requires all-out victory, not just winning enough seats to become a viable coalition partner. In any case, it is worth pointing out that the Italian party-system collapse occurred in a parliamentary system; evidently collapse does not require presidential institutions. There are thus both theoretical and empirical arguments against presidentialism as a crucial enabling factor for party-system collapse; presidential systems may experience party-system collapse differently than parliamentary ones, but collapse seems to be possible under both institutional arrangements.

Beyond the simple dichotomy of presidentialism and parliamentarism, Latin American political regimes can also be classified according to the extent of presidential powers (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997: 40–52). There is substantial variation among Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela in terms of presidential power. Argentina's president is potentially dominant over the legislature, having decree powers and a strong veto threat. Peru's president, at the time of party-system collapse in 1990, was able to be proactive with respect to legislation, possessing decree powers on fiscal issues and a weak veto. Venezuela's president, by contrast, was institutionally potentially marginal, with no veto capacity and no decree powers unless specifically legislated (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997: 49; Carey, Amorim Neto, and Shugart 1997: 441–42, 456–57, 459–60). However, in spite of the limited formal powers of the presidency, Venezuelan presidents were in practice highly powerful because they enjoyed substantial informal authority and the support of highly disciplined political parties. As a result, Venezuelan presidents "are allowed to exercise great authority subject to very little oversight" (Crisp 1997: 192). Both of the countries that experienced party-system collapse thus had presidencies with weaker formal powers than the Argentine president. However, when informal powers are taken into consideration, the comparison is not as clear. It may be possible that an institutionally relatively weak presidency contributed causally to party-system collapse. However, most accounts of Peruvian and Venezuelan politics during the 1980s and 1990s give substantial weight to the decisions and actions of the presidents, suggesting that this institutional factor probably has limited value as an explanation for collapse.

It can also be argued that federalism facilitates party-system collapse by providing parties and movements outside the traditional party system with local

governing opportunities and the chance to develop a reputation for competence and honesty. Yet degree of federalism does not line up neatly with party-system collapse; both Argentina and Venezuela have fully federal formal institutions, while Peru was essentially unitary during the 1980s (Wibbels 2000: 699–700). Moreover, practical politics in Venezuela may have been more centralized than the formal institutions would suggest. In any case, the life histories of outsider candidates during the process of party-system collapse in Peru and Venezuela suggest that the opportunity for local governing experience may not have been essential. Some important actors in party-system collapse did have experience in local or regional government before moving to the national political stage; Andrés Velásquez and Henrique Salas Romer, two important Venezuelan presidential candidates from outside of the traditional party system, had previously served as governor. On the other hand, Hugo Chávez, the anti-party-system candidate who won the Venezuelan presidency in 1998, had no prior governing experience; nor did Mario Vargas Llosa, a major candidate from outside of the Peruvian party system in 1990, or Alberto Fujimori, the victorious outsider candidate in Peru's 1990 elections. Federalism is therefore not a central explanatory consideration for party-system collapse, although it is possible that collapse may occur differently and have divergent consequences for future political dynamics in federal as opposed to unitary states.

A further institutional factor that might serve as the basis for an alternative explanation of party-system collapse is the permissiveness of a country's legislative electoral system—but once again, this factor seems both theoretically and empirically unsuited to serve as an important part of the causal story. First, the theoretical linkage between the permissiveness of legislative electoral institutions and party-system collapse is ambiguous. Permissive electoral institutions give parties outside the traditional party system the opportunity to more easily obtain legislative representation, but they also make it more difficult for established parties to fall to a position of electoral irrelevance. Second, there is relatively little empirical variation among Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela in the permissiveness of legislative elections. The mean legislator in Argentina and Peru during the 1980s was elected from a district of nine members, while the mean legislator in Venezuela was elected from a district of eleven members (Cox 1997: 309–11). Hence, this institutional factor also fails as an important cause of collapse.

Finally, in this discussion of institutions the two-round Peruvian presidential election system deserves some attention. Some analysts (e.g., Tuesta Soldevilla 1995: 76–79) suggest that the rule stipulating a two-candidate run-off if no candidate receives 50 percent of the vote in the first round of elections facilitated Peru's party-system collapse by making it easier for outsider candidates to get into the second round and win in a forced choice between the top two candidates. However, this argument is difficult to accept. In the 1980 and 1985 elections, both of the top two candidates were from traditional parties; no outsider candidate had the chance to advance to the second round until the election in which the party system collapsed, in 1990. In the 1990 elections, however, both of the candidates who advanced to the second round were from outside the traditional party system; the second round thus simply reinforced the electorate's expressed preference for a choice among outsider candidates, rather than between an outsider and a representative of the traditional party system. Hence, it is problematic to assign a major causal role to this institutional feature in explaining party-system collapse.

In light of these difficulties in accounting for party-system collapse on the basis of institutional factors, the analysis below devotes little direct attention to the institutional context. Any extension of this book's argument to institutional contexts, such as that of the Italian party-system collapse in 1993, that do not share the broad features of the South American pattern of relatively strong presidentialism and moderately proportional representation would thus require close attention to the potential consequences of institutional difference.

2.4.2 Protests, Coups, and Political Violence

Both Peru and Venezuela went through important episodes of political uprising, protest, and violence during the 1980s and 1990s. Causal relationships between such political disruption and violence and party-system collapse are inevitably somewhat tangled; surely the factors that caused party-system collapse must be interconnected with those that caused a substantial proportion of the Venezuelan population to support an attempted military coup, or that caused a politically meaningful, if hard to measure, number of Peruvians to support a violent guerrilla movement. Voting for a nontraditional party is certainly a less extreme expression of dissatisfaction with the political status quo than engaging in acts of protest or even political violence, but the contrasts

in motivation may well reflect differences in degree, rather than differences in kind. Hence, I make no attempt to speculate about the causal weight of episodes of political protest and violence in producing party-system collapse. Even so, political protest and violence were a central component of the atmosphere of crisis in both Peru and Venezuela before party-system collapse, so a brief review of the relevant events is in order. Furthermore, the patterns of political protest and violence in both countries involve a substantial emphasis on themes related to corruption, policy choices, and ideology—a fact that provides significant circumstantial evidence that such issues are quite important to at least a large minority of the population within each country, and therefore indirectly supports this book's central argument that party-system collapse is caused by anger deriving from concerns about these issues.

As part of a package of neo-liberal economic reforms, Venezuela's Pérez government on February 27, 1989, implemented a nationwide 10 percent increase in the price of gasoline and a 30 percent increase in bus fares.[9] Protests against the hike in bus fares (which may have been exacerbated by unofficial fare increases imposed by individual bus drivers) began early in the morning in downtown Caracas, in bedroom communities surrounding Caracas, and in several other major Venezuelan cities. By noon, the bus stop protests had developed into riots that involved forcible closures of roads and highways, tire burning, and throwing of stones through the windows of cars and businesses. The government failed to respond to the riots, which spread through all major Venezuelan urban areas. By the next morning, what had begun as protest against an increase in bus fares had developed into widespread looting and a total shutdown of urban transportation grids.

At noon on February 28, the government made its first move in response to the riots: a television announcement calling for peace and stating that violence would not be tolerated (Sanin 1989: 27–29). When this statement proved ineffective, President Pérez and his cabinet appeared on television to announce that a curfew would be enforced from 6:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. for the next several days. The police and the army enforced the curfew and violently repressed the riots. This protest episode, commonly called the Caracazo, ended on about March 4; the official death toll of the riot was about 400 people, a clear majority of whom were Venezuelan citizens killed by the military (Ochoa Antich 1992). In addition to the costs of the Caracazo in economic damage and lives lost, the

event represents, for many Venezuelans, as a historical dividing line between the period of peace that began in the 1970s and the political and social turmoil that predominated during the 1990s.

In response both to the popular discontent expressed during the Caracazo and still prevalent in broad social groups (Norden 1996, Norden 1998; Myers and O'Connor 1998) and to dissatisfaction within the military about the direction of national affairs (Aguero 1995; Trinkunas 2002), groups within the Venezuelan military attempted coups against the Pérez government in February and November 1992. When both coup attempts failed to achieve their military objectives, their leaders surrendered and were imprisoned. However, two of the leaders developed sufficient popularity via these coup attempts that they were able to play major roles in national politics after their release from prison: Oscar Arias Cárdenas, who was the second-place candidate in the 2000 presidential elections, and Hugo Chávez, who has been the president of Venezuela since the party-system collapse in 1998.

Even after the major protest episode of February, 1989—i.e., the Caracazo, and these coup attempts—Venezuela continued to experience a high level of political protest throughout the 1990s.[10] Protest numbers peaked temporarily at about 1,100 per year around 1993. They then surpassed 1,200 per year after the party-system collapse in 1998. Even the lower levels of protest recorded between 1995 and 1998 represent a dramatic increase from the very low levels of protest observed during the 1970s and 1980s (López Maya, Smilde, and Stephany 2002: 14–20). Hence, even though the riots and coup attempts of the 1989–92 period were never repeated, the atmosphere of political crisis and confrontation in the country persisted—and this atmosphere was a fundamental component of the experience of politics during the period leading to party-system collapse in Venezuela.

Peru's experience with political violence during the years before the party-system collapse in 1990 was even more intense than Venezuela's. Instead of riots and coup attempts, Peruvian political violence primarily took the form of conflict between guerrilla groups, which often adopted terrorist tactics, and the military and police forces of the Peruvian state.[11] A group called the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru played a minor but meaningful role in these conflicts (McCormick 1993), but by far the most important guerrilla movement in Peru during the late twentieth century was Sendero Luminoso,

a Maoist insurgent movement that, at its peak, had 10,000 full-time combatants, the support of about 15 percent of Peru's population, and some degree of control over almost a third of Peru's municipalities (McClintock 1998: 73–81).

Sendero began as a radically militant, primarily rural splinter group within Peru's traditionally factious political left. Starting in 1980, the group put its Maoist rhetoric regarding the importance of violence and the armed struggle into action, initiating a guerrilla war against Peru's newly democratic regime. As the state clumsily repressed Sendero, initially killing far more people than the guerrillas did, the insurgent group increased its strength and acceptance within the central Peruvian Andes.

Sendero's strategy was to construct an insurgent, Maoist alternative state organization that could gradually win the loyalty of Peruvian citizens until the Peruvian state finally collapsed and was replaced by the guerrillas. This construction of an alternative state was accomplished in part by direct enforcement of the law in Sendero-controlled areas, with offenders often executed in dramatic and gruesome manner. Sendero also directed its violence against its enemies, broadly defined to include agents of the state, political party activists, and popular-organization leaders.

In the late 1980s, Sendero turned its focus from a primarily rural struggle to a greater emphasis on attacking Peru's capital city, Lima. The insurgents were able to establish operating bases on the outskirts of the city, and for several years succeeded in carrying out dramatic, high-profile attacks within the city.

The Peruvian state during the 1980s was unsuccessful in repressing Sendero's guerrilla onslaught. The guerrilla group was able to consistently expand its operations and area of control throughout the decade. Furthermore, army brutality in response to the insurgent threat had significant costs in terms of popular legitimacy. Not until the capture of Sendero's leader, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992 (two years after party-system collapse) was the Peruvian state able to make meaningful progress in restraining the guerrilla threat.[12]

These acts of political protest and violence are central components of recent Peruvian and Venezuelan history. Furthermore, these episodes illustrate the high stakes that people in both countries attached to political outcomes during the period of party-system collapse. Themes of ideology and policy helped motivate political contention within both countries, as did excessive government responses to protest and political violence. Voting for parties from outside of

the traditional party system was clearly not the only avenue for opposition to the political establishment; protest and violence offered strategies that could complement or displace electoral expressions of dissatisfaction. Hence, while this study's focus on party-system collapse captures an important dimension of political dissent within Peru and Venezuela, it is not (and perhaps could not be) comprehensive in this regard.

With the descriptive and conceptual apparatus of this chapter assembled, all is now prepared for a presentation of the evidence in support of the theory of party-system collapse developed in the previous chapter.