After Corporatism

Party Linkages with Popular Sector Organizations in Neoliberal Latin America

Brian Palmer Rubin

INTRODUCTION

Democratic representation is fundamentally shaped by linkages between political parties and interest organizations. In mid-twentieth-century Latin America, the major innovation in party–organization linkages was corporatism, a system that incorporated peak-level labor confederations into political parties. As corporatism has decayed in recent decades, efforts by new left-wing parties to broaden organizational linkages have redefined who has a voice in policymaking. The most successful leftist parties formed since 1970 innovated in the types of linkages that they built with interest organizations, including labor and other corporatist "insiders," as well as populations that were excluded from earlier corporatist institutions. For instance, the PT (Workers Party) in Brazil built a novel coalition between a dissident labor movement and a spectrum of urban associations and NGOs that emerged in the later years of this country's military dictatorship. And the Bolivian MAS (Movement for Socialism) swept to power in the 2000s during a cycle of protest combining indigenous movements, neighborhood associations, and organized labor.[1]

The linkages constructed by these late-twentieth-century parties – as well as other successful leftist parties in Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela – contrast with the ways that the organized popular sectors had been incorporated into mid-twentieth-century mass parties. The earlier labor-mobilizing parties in Argentina, Peru, Mexico, and

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[1] For expansions of the many acronyms used in this chapter, see chapter appendix.

Venezuela built ties with labor-market insiders that were hierarchically organized into peak-level confederations, and with similarly structured peasant confederations in the latter two cases. These linkages conferred extensive "inducements" to the organizations through mandatory membership requirements, state subsidies, preferential access to welfare state benefits and, most centrally, a voice in economic policy – yet also introduced important "constraints" over organizations' activities (Collier and Collier 1979). In contrast, contemporary parties of the Left built ties with a wider variety of organizations, including economic interests that were excluded from corporatism, such as landless peasants, informal sector workers, and the unemployed, as well as identity and territorially rooted groups like squatters' associations and indigenous movements. Further, linkages today tend to be decentralized, intermittent, and transactional compared with the complex and intimate institutional arrangements under mid-twentieth-century state corporatism (Collier and Handlin 2009).

Given this transformation, what degree of political influence is afforded to today's popular sector organizations through party linkages? A skeptic may point out that even the most highly "linked" contemporary parties, such as the PT and MAS, do not rely on these organizations to the same degree as mid-twentieth-century mass parties depended on organized labor. Campaigns are increasingly driven by mass media appeals and direct clientelistic ties between parties and voters rather than mass mobilization through party-incorporated organizations (Roberts 2002; Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Perhaps today's left-wing parties rely less on popular sector organizations than they did half a century ago and thus offer minimal resources and policy access in return?

A central premise in this chapter is that contemporary interest organizations continue to offer important electoral resources to political parties. Organizations coordinate networks of politically active citizens, capable of mobilizing voters and organizing ground campaigns. And organizational ties can lend ideological coherence and programmatic commitments to a party seeking to establish a "brand" (Lupu 2014) as a representative of specific class interests. At the same time, organizational linkages can be (and sometimes have been) mechanisms of inclusion for marginalized groups, offering representatives of previous outsider populations a sustainable voice in the policies that shape the well-being of the popular classes. The very fact of being recognized as constituencies and coming into regular contact with party operatives lends legitimacy to groups that had previously taken a backseat to labor-market insiders.

Crucially, these linkages shape organizations' potential to hold party allies to policy commitments. Thus, these party linkages are potential explanatory factors for the expansion of the welfare state (Garay 2016, this volume; Pribble 2013), the recognition of indigenous autonomy regimes (Yashar 2005; Eisenstadt 2011) and the adoption of novel institutions for local and sectoral policy participation (Goldfrank, this volume; Mayka and Rich, this volume).

The potential for popular sector organizations to capitalize on party linkages in this way, however, depends on the character of the linkage itself. Party–organization linkages further inclusion when they not only generate benefits for specific organizations, but also promote policies that produce "recognition, access, or resources" (Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume) for the broader populations that organizations purport to represent. I label such linkages *programmatic*. In contrast, *patronage-based* linkages, wherein the main benefits accruing to the organization are excludable private goods for members, do not further inclusion.[2]

This chapter probes the explanations for the emergence of programmatic and patronage-based party linkages in two distinct empirical terrains. First, I build a typology of party–organization linkages around the universe of successfully consolidated left-wing parties in Latin America since the 1970s (Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution], Uruguay's FA [Broad Front], and Venezuela's PSUV [United Socialist Party of Venezuela]) and inductively identify patterns of party traits that potentially shape linkage type. This exercise suggests that parties with bureaucratized structures including formal rules for incorporating organizational allies in party leadership at their founding were most successful at sustaining inclusive ties. Further, the availability of a major segment of the labor movement in the party's founding coalition bodes well for the institutionalization of spaces for programmatic influence.

In the remainder of the chapter, I analyze Mexico's PRD, a party that has achieved electoral success over its three-decade existence, despite having been formed without access to a significant segment of the labor

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[2] Elsewhere in this volume, contributors discuss *patronage* arrangements between left wing governments and popular sector populations or organizations as facets of the inclusionary turn (Dunning and Novaes, this volume; Mazzuca, this volume, Pop Eleches, this volume). Concurring with a history of scholarship on clientelism, however, I consider patronage exchange at least as fundamentally a tactic of top down coercion and demobilization as one of securing welfare for society's worse off (Scott 1969; Fox 1994; Auyero 1999).

movement. The PRD thus stands as a hard case for left-wing party building, as it relied disproportionately on outsider popular sector organizations, such as urban popular movements, peasant organizations, and indigenous organizations. I observe significant *subnational* and *over-time* variation in the patterns of linkages that the PRD has formed with these organizations, ranging from intermittent patronage-based mobilization to neo-corporatist linkages offering lasting programmatic influence.[3] I find that the emergence of durable programmatic linkages between the PRD and peasant organizations in the state of Michoacán can, in fact, be explained by the same factors associated with the "neo-corporatist" party–organization linkage type present in Brazil and Uruguay.

VARIETIES OF POPULAR SECTOR LINKAGES IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA

Collier and Collier (1991, 7) defined labor incorporation – which took place between the 1920s and 1940s in most Latin American countries – as "the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement." Incorporation had two dimensions (1991, 161): the development of state institutions for mediating labor relations, and the adoption of new modes of articulating labor into party systems. Both the involvement of the state in representing popular sector productionist interests and the formal politicization of the popular classes were novel for Latin American states, emerging from oligarchic regimes that had offered little formal representation of the popular sectors.

It is difficult to envision a comparable phenomenon today. The devotion of Latin American states to a market-led economic model compromises their ability to offer the same level and type of inducements to the organized popular sectors. And the popular sector organizations that have ascended in importance since the late twentieth century are more

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[3] The presence of multiple linkage types by the same political party has previously been limited to studies of right wing parties (Luna 2014; Thachil 2014), which have an advan tage in that they tend to sustain durable programmatic ties to "resource rich yet vote poor" (Kitschelt 2000, 849) core constituencies (i.e. the middle and upper classes), allowing them to appeal to non core popular sector constituencies with clientelist linkages. My analysis of the PRD varies in three ways: first, this is a left wing party; second, I observe linkages to interest organizations rather than to individual voters; and third, the focus is on this party's multiple linkage types across subnational units rather than across segments of the electorate.

diverse and locally rooted, offering challenges to higher-level interest aggregation. Scholars have thus depicted a decline in corporatist interest representation (the "Union–Party Hub" or UP-Hub), and the emergence of a new "interest regime." Referred to as "associational networks" (or A-Net) by Collier and Handlin (2009), the new pattern consists of a diverse array of interest organizations that are organized less hierarchically than union confederations and execute a wider variety of functions independent of the state or political parties. A-Net organizations typically represent economic groups that were outsiders under corporatism (e.g. informal sector workers, landless peasants), or geographic (neighborhood) or other groups built around non-materialist identities (indigenous, women, human rights).

While the disengagement of peak-level organizations from often-stifling corporatist ties provides greater *autonomy* over demands and strategy, the cessation of state subsidies and compulsory membership have left organizations more *precarious* (Kurtz 2004; Collier and Handlin 2009). Organizations – both those that have carried over from the corporatist period and A-Net groups – have struggled to secure financial resources, sustain ample membership rolls, and coordinate in collective activities to pressure the state. Facing these challenges, many organizations turn to external actors – quite often political parties – that offer material benefits in exchange for campaign support. When dependency on political parties reaches an extreme, the organization may convert into a clientelist machine, abandoning its programmatic goals.

Thus, party–organization linkages in contemporary Latin American democracies contain two quite distinct dynamics: programmatic interest representation and patronage exchange. Organizations further their *programmatic* goals through parties by consulting on party platforms, engaging in state consultative institutions established by party allies, and by lobbying for policies that stand to benefit not only their members, but broader populations such as small-scale farmers or citizens living in informal housing. Organizational clientelism, on the other hand, secures a source of *patronage* benefits – disaggregable distributive programs, jobs, or handouts – that the leader delivers to members as selective benefits (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015). This brokerage may ensure organizational survival, but often at the expense of the organization's programmatic influence.

Left-wing parties in Latin America today vary significantly both in the *degree* of organizational incorporation and in *type* of policy access – accentuating either programmatic influence or patronage brokerage.

Main Benefits to Organizations

	Programmatic Influence	*Patronage Brokerage*
High	Neo Corporatist *PT (Brazil)* *FA (Uruguay)*	Organizational Machine *PSUV (Venezuela)*
Low	Movement Party *MAS (Bolivia)*	Contingent Support *PRD (Mexico)*

Organizational Embeddedness

FIGURE 10.1 Varieties of party organization linkages

Figure 10.1 lays out a typology of party–organization linkages, varying along two dimensions. First is the *main type of benefit* that accrues to the organization through the exchange. Organizations may primarily receive patronage benefits, acting as intermediaries for discretionary distributive programs, government contracts, or jobs for members. In this way, organization leaders serve as the electoral brokers discussed in Stokes et al. (2013) and Dunning and Novaes (this volume). Parties may also open space for the organization to wield programmatic influence over broader economic policies. It is common for organizations to combine programmatic participation with patronage brokerage. To the degree that programmatic participation is sustained, a linkage is classified in the latter category. Second is the degree of *organizational embeddedness*, which entails how much the organization is subsumed into the party apparatus. Embeddedness increases when organizational membership confers automatic party membership or when the party–organization linkage endures long enough to acquire a "taken-for-granted" quality.

Party–organization linkages are mechanisms of social inclusion when they afford programmatic influence to the organization involved. Thus, the two subtypes represented on the left side of Figure 10.1 – neo-corporatist and movement-party – offer the promise of inclusion. The distinction between these two models lies in the degree of embeddedness of the organization in the party structure, with an important trade-off. Neo-corporatist linkages assure the organization a position in the party and in policymaking over a longer time frame, yet come at the risk of co-optation and the concomitant limits on the organization's ability to

mobilize outside the party linkage, such as through protest or support for other parties. Movement-party linkages preserve organizational autonomy, but do not guarantee programmatic representation over the long term.

The two types of linkages that principally deliver patronage benefits – represented on the right side of Figure 10.1 – do not promote social inclusion. While these patronage linkages may inject much-needed economic resources to vulnerable communities, they do so in a way that is unequal – favoring party allies – and potentially undermining programmatic representation of popular sector interests by causing organizations to specialize in patronage brokerage (Palmer-Rubin 2019).

This variation aligns with a broader typology of Latin American left parties laid out in Levitsky and Roberts (2011). "Institutionalized partisan left" parties – with mature party organizations and clear ideological positions – have historically developed with organic ties to labor and other popular sector organizations around shared programmatic goals. Brazil's PT and Uruguay's FA exhibit this *neo-corporatist* linkage type. Both parties were founded by dissident union movements, dissatisfied with the preexisting insular party structures. And these union leaders, along with allied "A-Net" organizations such as neighborhood associations and social movements, have persisted in importance both in defining party platforms and in sustaining a territorial organization.

Brazil's PT can be credited for building a new mode of corporatism for the neoliberal period. Founded in 1979 by labor leaders from the dissident CUT (Unified Workers' Central), the PT's choice to incorporate a wider swath of interest organizations was initially a party-building strategy for a party that was building from scratch in the aftermath of a military regime (Keck 1992, 90–94). As a result, the PT exhibits high organizational embeddedness, with a party structure that grants electoral posts to leaders of allied unions, social movements, rural associations, and NGOs. These institutions have persisted, albeit in a diluted form given the parallel territorial organization that that party has built and the proliferation of professional politicians during this party's thirteen years in the presidency (Hunter 2010; Gómez Bruera 2013). The PT has also been at the vanguard of programmatically incorporating popular sector organizations; this party's welfare policies build on ideas articulated by union and organizational allies (Garay 2016). And PT governments have preserved institutions for consultation with civil society leaders in policies across many sectors – including health, education, rural development, and security (see Mayka and Rich, this volume). Patronage

politics certainly also proliferates among PT allies – as these serve as intermediaries for the discretionary use of state benefits for electoral purposes (Bueno 2018). But party institutions are designed in a way to prevent patronage politics from crowding out programmatic engagement.

Uruguay's FA similarly displays a neo-corporatist linkage model – combining long-standing embeddedness of popular sector organizations in the party apparatus with functional institutions that guarantee their voice in economic policy. As with the PT, the FA was formed by an autonomous labor movement that expanded to construct durable programmatic linkages with associations of lower-class outsiders that had long been mobilized clientelistically by traditional dominant parties (Luna 2007). Also similarly to the PT, the FA innovated in participatory structures for organized civil society on the subnational level during Tabaré Vázquez's terms as mayor of Montevideo, expanding to the national level when Vázquez assumed the presidency in 2005 (Luna 2014). While the FA has certainly undergone a process of programmatic moderation and developed career politicians outside the organizational base, formal rules guaranteeing organizational participation in policy matters have forestalled a transition to an electoral machine or contingent support model (Pribble 2013; Bentancur et al. 2019).

The MAS in Bolivia emphasizes informal yet programmatically meaningful ties to a wide swath of popular sector organizations through a *movement-party* model. Among the "new political movements" highlighted by Levitsky and Roberts (2011), the MAS is unique in its origins as a bottom-up structure, in contrast to the personalistic vehicles constructed by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Lucío Gutiérrez in Ecuador. The MAS emerged from a novel coalition of post-corporatist organizations (e.g. neighborhood and indigenous movements) and traditional labor and peasant confederations (Anria 2016; Anria and Cyr 2017). Organizational allies were pivotal to the party's rise to power, organizing protests from 2000 to 2005 that led to the resignation of previous presidents, and mobilizing voters in the 2005 election that brought Evo Morales to the presidency. The MAS emphasized organizational autonomy, however, linking with these allied organizations in a more decentralized and informal mode than the FA or PT. During Morales' time in office (2006–2019), the MAS sustained spaces for core allies to shape economic policy, particularly in the rural sector. However, the party has resisted adopting formal party mechanisms to ensure their place in party leadership (Silva 2017, 99–103), leaving the organizations in a subordinate position within the party, which became increasingly driven by Morales' personal authority and discretionary pork-barrel spending.

Like the MAS, the Chavista vehicle in Venezuela has exercised "rentier populism" (Mazzuca, this volume) relying on primary resource-funded patronage and infrastructure investments in poor communities to build and maintain ties with its popular sector base. However, the PSUV features an *organizational machine* mode of linkage, typified by top-down control of *misiones* that offer services to the urban poor and a captive labor movement tied to the party through *Bolivarian Circles* (Hawkins and Hansen 2006; Penfold-Becerra 2007). In the absence of well-organized interest organizations outside the party apparatus and with the dominant labor confederation loyal to anti-Chavista currents, the PSUV's predominant popular sector linkages are to those organizations created and controlled by the party (Silva 2017, 107–11). In this way, the deployment of party-embedded urban organizations as clientelistic machines bears resemblance to an older labor-based party, the Argentine Peronist party (Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2005; Szwarcberg 2013). While these territorial organizations are deeply embedded in the party, they are afforded little space for party leadership or voice in the party platform.

Finally, the Mexican PRD exhibits an approach to popular sector organization linkages that is neither durable nor programmatic – what I have labeled *contingent support*. While the party was founded with the support of urban popular movements in the capital and has worked to build linkages with dissident labor and peasant organizations, it has neither sustained a space for these organizations in the leadership, nor offered a sustainable model for them to secure a voice influencing policy at the national level (Bruhn 1997, 214–215). These organizations remain organizationally distinct from the party, either at the behest of autonomy-preserving organizational norms or the party's disinterest or inability to integrate organizational representatives into party leadership (Wuhs 2008, chap. 6). When neighborhood organizations, peasant associations, and other popular sector organizations offer electoral support to PRD candidates, they tend to receive patronage benefits in return – preferential access to discretionary social programs and subsidies – rather than a voice in setting the party's programmatic platform.[4] Perhaps owing to the lack of embeddedness, these ties are often fragile, as organizations may throw

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[4] This organizational patronage constitutes a subset of broader clientelist electoral practices. While the use of clientelism as a mobilization tactic is most strongly associated with the formerly dominant PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), the PRD has replicated this practice in areas where it counts on sufficient base level distribution networks (Hilgers 2008; Nichter and Palmer Rubin 2015).

their support to a different party as the PRD's electoral prospects diminish.

What explains the variation in these five parties' approaches to popular sector linkages? More broadly, why do parties sometimes promote programmatic inclusion of popular sector interest organizations and other times employ these organizations for patronage exchange? Existing research on left-wing party organizations in Latin America points to several factors that might explain this outcome (Table 10.1). While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to test competing causal arguments, some patterns can be detected among the parties whose organizational linkages exhibit distinct degrees of embeddedness and programmatic influence.

First, successful parties of the Left appear to benefit from an outside-in path to power, in line with classic principles (Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988), and more recent findings that illustrate the effect of having been founded in adverse conditions (Levitsky et al. 2016; Van Dyck 2017). Successful new leftist parties in Latin America were those formed outside government, and particularly during periods of restricted competition where the parties were forced to rely on committed activists and an autonomously built base organization to remain alive. The five parties in Table 10.1 – all successful parties of the Left in Latin America founded since 1970 – emerged from such conditions. This factor appears not to tell us much about the *variation* in these parties' linkage models, however.[5]

Second, the type of *party system* from which the new party emerged also appears not to be associated with linkage outcomes, counter to a suggestion made by Handlin and Collier (2011). Neo-corporatist linkage types emerged from both a consolidated oligarchic two-party system (Uruguay) and a fragmented inchoate party system (Brazil). A commonality among these five cases, however, is that they emerged in

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[5] The PRD is the partial exception that proves the rule, having been led by defectors from the ruling PRI in coalition with minor outsider parties in a scenario highly adverse to opposition parties. The PRD is the least successful of the five, never having won the presidency and having achieved much of its electoral success either by "lending their jersey" to PRI defectors in the run up to subnational elections or by forming coalitions with the older and more bureaucratized PAN (National Action Party). The 2018 Mexican election seemed to mark the collapse of the PRD into a minor coalition party, eclipsed by MORENA (National Regeneration Movement), the electoral vehicle of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. "Internally mobilized" leftist parties in the region formed through splits in traditional parties have failed to consolidate. Examples include FREPASO (Front for a Country in Solidarity) in Argentina and Peru's United Left (Van Dyck 2017).

TABLE 10.1 *Potential explanations for variations in organizational linkage models*

Party	Current Linkage Model	Party Founding Trajectory	Party System at Founding	Party Founding Structure	Available Insider Org. Allies	Available Outsider Org. Allies
PT (Brazil)	Neo corporatist	External	Fragmented	Bureaucratic, mass organic	Large autonomous labor movement	Active urban movements
FA (Uruguay)	Neo corporatist	External	2 party dominant	Bureaucratic, mass organic	Dominant labor movement	Inactive urban associations
MAS (Bolivia)	Movement party	External	Collapsed	Movement party	Dominant labor, peasant movements	Active urban and rural movements
PSUV (Venezuela)	Org. Machine	External	2 party dominant, then collapsed	Personalistic vehicle	Fragmented dissident labor	Fragmented urban movements
PRD (Mexico)	Contingent support	Hybrid: internal and external	1 party dominant	Hybrid: movement party and personalistic	Ancillary dissident labor and peasant movements	Active urban movements

party systems with a vacuum on the Left, either because former labor-based parties had embraced neoliberalism (Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela) or because they emerged from military regimes that outlawed left parties (Brazil, Uruguay).

Two factors that do appear to be conducive to programmatic and durable party–organization linkages, however, are party founding structures and available insider organizational allies. First, mass-organic parties that were founded with bureaucratized party structures to integrate organizational allies appear better positioned to sustain organic organizational ties than organizations founded with an informal movement-party orientation. As Anria (2018, chap. 5) shows, the FA and PT adopted party rules guaranteeing representation for popular sector allies in party leadership and nomination to elected office. These significant inducements were perhaps necessary to secure the ongoing support of organizations whose resources were crucial during authoritarian periods that prevented the fledgling parties from developing their own autonomous territorial bases.

In contrast, while the MAS and PRD competed in early elections with a strong presence of organizations as their campaign base, these parties failed to institutionalize a role for organizations in party leadership structures. Instead, these parties relied on contingent alliances between organizations and parties that were strongly associated with indispensable electoral figureheads – Evo Morales (in Bolivia) and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (in Mexico). For both parties, the inability to formalize organizational alliances has increased tension between a growing electoral-professional faction and organizations that are finding fewer opportunities to influence policy or have leaders elected to office.

Second, the availability of a predominant labor faction at the party's founding appears to be associated with programmatic incorporation of popular sector allies. As Etchemendy (this volume) discusses, left-wing parties have varied in how they balance ties to organized labor and outsider organizations. These distinctions have implications for the *type* of linkages that they form. The three parties that incorporate popular sector organizations programmatically – FA, PT, and MAS – were all founded with the central participation of a major faction of the labor movement. In contrast, both the PRD and PSUV were founded in the presence of a lingering twentieth-century labor-mobilizing party that retained control over the dominant factions of organized labor and peasants (Collier 1992; Roberts 2003). For the FA, PT, and MAS, these traditional corporatist allies lend a set of well-defined demands related

to development models and redistributive policy that may be adopted by outsider organizations. Labor and peasant confederations with a history of corporatist organizing also serve as organizing "hubs" (Garay 2009), lending a set of institutions for ongoing engagement with the political party.

Interestingly, the degree of activation by outsider organizations during a party's founding or rise to power appears to have less to do with the types of linkages that it builds with these organizations. The PT, MAS, and PRD were all formed during periods of high mobilization by interest organizations corresponding to political and economic crisis, yet these three established quite distinct linkage models. In contrast, the FA rose to power during a period of relative quiescence for urban interest organizations, yet built some of the more durable and successful institutions for organizational programmatic participation. Perhaps beyond a certain minimum organizational presence among outsider populations, the strength or activity level of these organizations matters less than the presence of insider organization allies and an appropriately structured party. This finding adds a caveat to Etchemendy's (this volume) contention that high levels of protest by territorial (i.e. outsider) organizations during the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s determine whether these organizations are included in parties' "interest coalitions." My argument goes a step further in predicting when these ties to popular sector organizations confer programmatic representation, which did occur in the Bolivian and Brazilian cases, but not in Venezuela or Mexico, even though all four of these featured high levels of outsider activism in the neoliberal period.

Ultimately, the trait shared by the three new left-wing parties that managed to construct programmatic linkages in the late twentieth century (PT, FA, and MAS) were their ties to traditional insider groups – labor and peasants. In a sense, therefore, the success of these parties is more attributable to traditional mobilizing structures and offers few clues about left-wing linkages in an A-Net-dominated interest arena. In contrast, the PRD serves as an illustrative test case for the plausibility of a twenty-first-century mass-based party.[6] This case allows us to observe the prospects for the construction of an organizationally rooted left-wing party in the

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[6] The PSUV certainly classifies as another exceptional case, but one that emerged under quite distinct conditions, including party system collapse and military coup. In stark contrast to the PRD, however, the Venezuelan party's top down organization building was made possible by its control of government and an oil boom that funded previously unheard of levels of distributive spending (Mazzuca, this volume).

absence of a labor base. In the remainder of this chapter, I analyze the PRD, applying findings from this cross-national comparison to explain subnational variation in this party's approach to linkages with organizations representing popular sector outsiders.

THE MEXICAN PRD: A PARTIAL AND UNEVEN APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES

While the PRD appears to be in decline today, it is unique in the region as a successfully consolidated left-wing party formed in the presence of a persistently competitive labor-based party from the initial incorporation period.[7] When the PRD was launched, the PRI had held the presidency continuously for over sixty years and had yet to lose so much as a gubernatorial election. The leftist upstart was formally registered in 1989, after its predecessor – the FDN (National Democratic Front) – was defeated in the surprisingly close 1988 presidential election.[8] The new party was composed of three types of actors: a group of defecting PRIistas, headlined by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the 1988 presidential candidate; four previously uncompetitive leftist political parties; and social movements and minor dissident labor and peasant associations with a left-wing orientation and opposition to the PRI's hegemonic regime. The vast majority of labor and peasant unions remained firmly entrenched in the PRI's sectoral structure.

Nonetheless, PRD founders did not set out to build a noncompetitive protest party, an apt description of the right-wing PAN at that point, which had failed to pose a significant electoral threat in its five-decade history. Rather the PRD challenged for national power from the start and prioritized vote maximization over the slow process of building a territorial organization and establishing party rules to share power between party founders and organizational allies. The rapid rise to electoral relevance would take a toll, however. Over two decades after the founding of the PRD, Cárdenas lamented "maybe the error was not to work enough in the states to consolidate the (party) organization, not to dedicate enough time to organizing before other things. The electoral question

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[7] Argentina's FREPASO also was formed in the presence of the resilient Peronist party, but only survived seven years (Van Dyck 2017).

[8] The official tally counted 31% of the vote for the PRD, compared to 51% for the PRI, although the election was roundly criticized for fraud by the PRI loyal electoral authorities. See Cantú (2019) for a forensic calculation of the fraud's magnitude.

was a big distraction."[9] The original project combining Cárdenas's personal attraction with social movement backing proved unsustainable. Cárdenas lost the presidency for the second time in 1994, garnering only 17 percent of the vote, and the party failed to secure any gubernatorial victories in its first eight years of existence (Bruhn 1997, 3).

A failure to formally incorporate organizational allies was not only the result of expediency; it was also a deliberate choice for a party seeking to distinguish itself from the PRI. In a departure from the dominant party's authoritarian corporatism, party founders insisted on individual rather than corporate membership (Bruhn 1997, 173–174). In the words of Cárdenas, the goal was to "look for people to approach the party, but each person on their own. Since there is a rejection of the way that (the PRI's) corporatism was corrupted, any mode of collective membership was rejected."[10] While this decision was based on an interest in preserving autonomy for affiliated organizations, leaders of these groups were often frustrated that they had no effective voice in their party, despite the size of their organizational following (Bruhn 1997, 214–215).

The PRD's post-1997 rebirth – which led to gubernatorial victories in ten states and another close call for the presidency in 2006 – was instigated by recasting the party as an electoral-professional operation; and privileging career politicians over societal backers in party leadership, candidate selection, and territorial organization. In Kitschelt's (1989, 48–55) terms, the goals of party *pragmatists* – seeking electoral victory – were prioritized over those of party *ideologues*. This tendency was illustrated in the embracing as candidates of opportunistic PRI defectors who brought name recognition, cadres of politicians and patronage networks, if not a commitment to the PRD's ideological principles or promise to recast state–society relations.[11] If the PRD began as a hybrid of a personalistic vehicle for Cárdenas's electoral ambitions and a

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[9] Interview by author, April 26, 2010. "*Quizá el error fue no trabajar suficientemente en los estados para consolidar la organización, no dedicar tiempo a organizar antes que a otras cosas. La cuestión electoral distrajo mucho.*"

[10] Interview by author, April 26, 2010. "*buscar que la gente se acerque al partido pero igual cada quien por su lado. Como hay además un rechazo por cómo se corrompió también en la parte corporativa (el PRI), se rechaza cualquier adhesión colectiva.*"

[11] Fourteen of the nineteen PRD governors elected prior to 2018 had held office under PRI administrations prior to running with the PRD, including Cárdenas himself. Six of these held elected office with the PRI immediately before assuming the governorship, including the first four states where the PRD won the governorship after Cárdenas's victory in the Distrito Federal Baja California Sur, Chiapas, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas. These four candidates were selected during López Obrador's contentious term at the head of the party. In several cases, these candidates were chosen over others favored by state level

movement-party alliance with programmatically aligned yet organization-ally autonomous social movements, the post-1997 reboot produced a shift to a contingent support model of organizational linkage. Organizational ties came to be based primarily on the exchange of electoral support for prefer-ential access to discretionarily allocated distributive programs.[12] Linkages are renegotiated or ruptured from election to election, depending on the short-term calculus of the organizations and party leadership.

Furthermore, PRD governments have not made it a priority to institutional-ize spaces for affiliated organization participation in policymaking. PAN and PRI administrations have been at least as active in establishing participatory institutions – although these have been extremely limited in their durability and efficacy compared with experiments elsewhere in the region. Municipal devel-opment councils – designed as spaces for individual participation in budgeting and rural development policy – were short-lived and lacked resources or mandates (Caire Martínez 2009; Zaremberg 2012). And while consultative councils proliferate at all levels of government, these more often take the form of nonfunctional rubber stamp bodies or window dressing for clientelistic mobilization (Hevia de la Jara and Isunza Vera 2012). An important exception is Michoacán's Peasant Consultative Council, discussed in detail below.

This preference for short-term patronage mobilization is not equally dominant in all states, however. In fact, the linkages this party has established with state-level organizations reflect each of the four distinct linkage types laid out in Figure 10.1. As the case studies in the next section illustrate, distinct models of organizational linkages have emerged in PRD-controlled states that also vary in terms of their available linkage partners and the initial choices made about party structure.

STATE-LEVEL VARIATION IN PRD LINKAGES

This section engages in subnational analysis to illustrate the importance of party leadership and the availability of labor organizing hubs for

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party organizations and social organizations (Cazarín Martínez 2013, 401 404; García Aguilar 2013, 444 446; Solano Ramírez 2013, 365 369). In Chiapas and Guerrero, the *second* PRD governors were immediate PRI defectors, demonstrating that after holding the governorship for six years, the PRD was still unable to find gubernatorial candidates from among party ranks.

[12] In Mexico, the discretionary allocation of distributive programs such as anti poverty transfers, subsidies for agricultural or microenterprise development, and housing is commonplace at the federal and state levels and often mediated by interest organizations (Palmer Rubin 2016; Palmer Rubin et al. 2020).

Main Benefits to Organizations

		Programmatic Influence	Patronage Brokerage
Organizational Embeddedness	High	Neo Corporatist *Michoacán*	Organizational Machine *Late Mexico City (2000 2018)*
	Low	Movement Party *Early Mexico City (1988 1999)*	Contingent Support *Chiapas*

FIGURE 10.2 Varieties of party organization linkages, Mexican states under the PRD

popular sector linkage models. The subnational approach offers two advantages for examining the origins of distinct organizational linkage models. First, as in all subnational comparative work, comparing units within the same polity permits the analyst to control for a host of institutional and historical factors (Snyder 2001). In Mexico, all states share roughly similar electoral institutions and have passed through the PRI's one-party dominant regime. Second, the state level of government is the most relevant for A-Net organizations. Unlike labor unions, outsider popular sector interest organizations typically do not scale up beyond the local or state level: only the rarest cases belong to national-level networks or confederations with offices in Mexico City. State and municipal politics thus constitute the main target for mobilization of peasant, indigenous, and neighborhood organizations, be it in negotiations for patronage benefits or programmatic influence.

Of the six states in which the PRD has won consecutive gubernatorial elections at some point since its founding – Mexico City, Chiapas, Michoacán, Baja California Sur, Guerrero, and Zacatecas – I analyze the first three. The PRD held office for multiple terms in each of these three, and they also demonstrate the range of variation in the PRD's founding trajectory and relationship to interest organizations (Figure 10.2). In the national capital, an unorganized coalition of urban popular movements lent organizing capacity and ideological heft to Cárdenas's 1988 presidential campaign. This initial movement-party coalition eventually morphed into an organizational machine as the

PRD came to dominate electorally in the 2000s and urban social movements transformed into patronage intermediaries linked to rival party factions. In the southern state of Chiapas, innovative strategies used by the first PRD governor to integrate indigenous organizations into the party paid electoral dividends, but these ties failed to generate programmatic representation or a lasting role in the party apparatus due to short-term electoral pragmatism by the PRD, generating a contingent support linkage model. Finally, Michoacán, the epicenter of *cardenismo*, exhibits a neo-corporatist linkage model. This state's Peasant Consultative Council achieved modest success in fostering a shared vision for rural development policy between the PRD and dissident peasant organizations. The Michoacán case illustrates that organic linkages with popular sector organizations are achievable where the party establishes formal mechanisms for organizational leadership and the party and organization can capitalize on organizational models inherited from party-aligned unions.

Urban Popular Organizations in Mexico City

The PRD in Mexico City began with a movement-party orientation, but transitioned to an organizational machine once the party came to dominate electoral politics in the 2000s. Relationships between the new party in 1989 and urban social movements played a key role in establishing a party platform and in organizing campaign events for Cárdenas. However, organizational influence in the party and structures for participatory policymaking were never consolidated. These shortcomings can be connected to the party's neglect of formal rules for organizational allies, which it instead deployed in campaigns through ad hoc agreements. Furthermore, traditional corporatist organizations in the capital were absent from the PRD's coalition, remaining firmly in the PRI's sectoral structure.[13] Once the PRD established electoral dominance in Mexico City, surviving urban popular organizations converted into clientelistic

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[13] Labor unions concentrated in Mexico City eventually broke from the PRI affiliated labor sector, but not until the PRD had already consolidated. The most prominent examples include the unions representing telephone workers (STRM), electoral workers (SME), and social security workers (SNTSS), headliners of the UNT labor confederation formed in 1997, the same year that Cárdenas became the first democratically elected executive for Mexico City (De la Garza 2006). Further, these labor unions opted for a stance of partisan autonomy rather than organic ties with the PRD.

networks for the party, distributing public housing and other selective goods in exchange for electoral support.

The nation's capital was central to Cárdenas's territorial base in the 1988 presidential election campaign. When Cárdenas launched his campaign, he counted on the support of roughly fifty popular sector social movements, neighborhood associations, and student groups, which also presented candidates for local office under the FDN (Tavera Fenolloso 2013, 106–107). Since the 1968 *Tlatelolco* student movement, Mexico City had been a locus of activism against the authoritarian PRI regime, and urban popular movements (MUP) revived to protest the state's failure to provide needed services to displaced residents following the 1985 earthquake.[14] These social movement structures, which in 1985 had reached a consensus to stay outside of electoral politics, found an electoral ally in Cárdenas – a major politician who shared their rebuke of the PRI's neoliberal turn. An initial rapprochement between the MUP and Cárdenas occurred during late-1987 protests against the Economic Solidarity Pact, an agreement between the ruling de la Madrid administration and corporatist organizations to institute fiscal austerity as a measure to pay Mexico's foreign debt (López Leyva 2007, 185–186). Without committing to formal party affiliation, these groups endorsed Cárdenas's economic vision of *nacionalismo revolucionario* and in the months before the July 1988 election mobilized their communities in rallies on behalf of the FDN, Cárdenas's electoral vehicle.

After this initial collaboration in the 1988 campaign, factions of the MUP and the PRD agreed to sustain a loose movement-party linkage designed to protect organizational autonomy. PRD candidacies for neighborhood leadership posts were granted to several MUP leaders as

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[14] Prominent groups included the Asamblea de Barrios, Unión Popular Nueva Tenochtitlán, Unión Popular Revolucionaria Emiliano Zapata, Organización Independiente Revolucionaria Línea de Masas, and Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, all of which are often referred to jointly as the MUP. For a longer list of MUP members and other social movements that participated in the 1988 Cárdenas campaign see López Leyva (2007, 34). The Asamblea de Barrios a transformation of the Coordinadora Única de Damnificados, an organization formed in the aftermath of the 1985 earthquake participated in the creation of the PRD's predecessor, the FDN, but the majority of others were nonpartisan, only joining the electoral realm in the 1988 election (Tavera Fenolloso 2013). The Frente Popular Francisco Villa (FPFV), a radical alliance of UNAM students and squatters, opted to preserve its autonomy, refusing to support Cárdenas in 1988. In the following years, however, the FPFV broke into two factions over the question of whether to participate in Cárdenas's 1997 bid for the head of government of Mexico City. Fragmentation was a common fate for MUP organizations; at last count the Asamblea de Barrios had broken into nine separate structures (Bruhn 2013, 141 144).

"external" candidates, who saw in the party a route to power without abandoning their nonpartisan commitments. A minority of MUP organizations declared exclusive alliances with the PRD and others realigned with the PRI, which continued to control the federal and Mexico City governments (Bruhn 2013, 138–142). As the 1985–1988 cycle of protest drew to a close, most Mexico City-based social movements either disintegrated or transformed into neighborhood associations with the mandate of *gestión*, negotiating with the government for housing and services.[15]

By the time Cárdenas won his first election with the PRD, becoming Mexico City's head of government in 1997, the party had taken on a highly factionalized internal structure. The Cárdenas (1997–2000) and López Obrador administrations (2000–2005) set up novel participatory structures and democratic leadership selection rules, but these were short-lived, owing to dissatisfaction by faction leaders over control of candidacies and public resources (Hilgers 2008, 135–136). Ties based on the exchange of patronage for electoral support proved more durable. PRD governments have consistently granted MUP leaders control over public housing and other subsidies in exchange for candidacies and party leadership posts. This authority proved indispensable for solidifying brokerage roles; leaders typically grant housing only to organization members who have proven active in meetings and protests (Hilgers 2008, 142–147; Bruhn 2013, 150–152).

Indigenous Organizations in Chiapas

In Chiapas, the prevailing mode of linkages between the PRD and popular sector organizations is contingent support, the norm for the PRD nationwide. This state reflects an even less coherent approach to establishing programmatic linkages with popular sector organizations than does Mexico City owing to the former's nomination of consecutive gubernatorial candidates from outside the party. A lack of organizational stability undercut party structures that offered a path to influence for party-aligned rural organizations.

While dissident peasant and indigenous organizations who supported Cárdenas's 1988 presidential candidacy played a role in the PRD's founding, the party only posed a serious threat for the governorship with

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[15] While protest declined significantly when the PRD came into power in Mexico City, organizations still would turn periodically to demonstrations, usually to pressure the state to deliver benefits (Bruhn 2008, 123 135).

the successful campaign of Pablo Salazar in 2000. Like PRD governors who had penetrated PRI rule before him in Zacatecas, Baja California Sur, and Tlaxcala, Salazar had defected from the PRI immediately before running with the PRD. Salazar's main base of support was in Chiapas's three largest cities, where he won 65 percent of the vote in the 2000 election (García Aguilar 2013). In a highly rural state with an indigenous population of over 40 percent, the PRI candidate won over 54 percent of votes in indigenous regions. Thus, while the Chiapas PRD may have been rooted in ideologically committed rural organizations for its first dozen years, this organization was quickly swept aside by the political machine brought over from the PRI. And much like when the PRD took office in Mexico City in 1997, by the time this party won the Chiapas governorship, its linkage partners had already wound down their cycle of protest – launched around the Zapatista rebellion in 1994 – and were eager for state support to keep the organizations active. The pattern of relating to dissident rural peasant and indigenous groups through instrumental patronage accords continued with Chiapas's second PRD governor, Juan Sabines, elected in 2006, who also defected from the PRI immediately before running for governor with the PRD.

The PRD's ties to dissident indigenous organizations in Chiapas took on a contingent character – as opposed to the sustainable machine politics model in Mexico City – because the party itself failed to project a consistent approach to these organizations. Neither PRD governor had much experience working with these groups prior to reaching office and they formed linkages with rival factions of rural organizations. Furthermore, PRD rule in Chiapas was never as certain as in Mexico City. In the former, PRD gubernatorial victories came with vote margins of 5.8 and 9.7 percentage points, compared to an average vote margin of 22.5 percentage points in the four consecutive executive elections won by the PRD in Mexico City since 1997. Thus, rural organizations in Chiapas, dependent on state benefits for survival, shrewdly kept options open to support another party if the electoral winds shifted.

Once in office, Salazar embarked on a strategy to attract indigenous support by nominating local indigenous leaders for elected office and government posts. The PRD penetrated communities that had previously voted overwhelmingly for the PRI by forming alliances with leaders of indigenous associations, who often wield substantial power in their communities as brokers in patronage networks and kingmakers in local elections. These organizations – such as ARIC (Rural Collective Interest Association), CIOAC (Independent Workers and Peasants Central), and

UNORCA (National Union of Regional Autonomous Peasant Organizations) – originated in land invasions in the 1970s and were reinvigorated during the 1994 Zapatista movement.[16] Chiapas's broad spectrum of rural organizations that existed outside the PRI's sectoral structure became channels through which the state government provided patronage benefits, including agricultural subsidies, social programs, and infrastructure investments.

While indigenous organizations found an administration eager to enlist them in patronage-based electoral mobilization, Salazar proved less willing to modify state institutions to open space for institutions of indigenous governance, as the neighboring state of Oaxaca had done by adopting the *usos y costumbres* system. A former president of CIOAC and PRD congressman in the 1990s attested that the Salazar administration refused to participate in a roundtable discussion organized by indigenous leaders and the state legislature to discuss modifying the state constitution.[17] Electoral involvement also prompted a shift in the orientation of the indigenous organizations. A local PRD committee president lamented that the CIOAC – the most prominent of Chiapas's indigenous associations – lost its representative character when it became immersed in the party alliance: "Before 2000, CIOAC was a bastion of the social struggle, for social groups and leaders of the Left in Chiapas. It initiated the defense of indigenous issues and all that. But once they became part of the government the leaders became corrupt, they turned into functionaries, they were granted government positions ... So they forget about the indigenous struggle."[18]

PRD linkages with these organizations failed to institutionalize during Salazar's term, owing largely to a power struggle over control of the party's state-level organization and internal divisions in the organizations over candidacies and control of patronage benefits. Fragmentation was exacerbated under the party's second governor, Juan Sabines, who like Salazar defected from the PRI immediately before running with the PRD

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[16] The organization that spearheaded the Zapatista rebellion, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) withheld from forming party alliances.

[17] Interview by author, Margarito Ruíz Hernández, ex President, CIOAC, July 4, 2012.

[18] Interview by author, Mariano Medina López, President of PRD Municipal Committee, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, July 6, 2012. "*Antes del 2000 la CIOAC era un bastión de luchas sociales, de grupos sociales y de líderes sociales de la izquierda en Chiapas. Abrió la defensa de las cuestiones indígenas y todo eso. Pero a raíz de que se hacen del gobierno los líderes se corrompen, los hacen funcionarios, les dan puestos en gobierno ... Entonces ellos se olvidan de la lucha indígena.*"

in 2006. A political rival of Salazar, Sabines cleaned house upon assuming the governorship, favoring alternate factions of rural organizations. Party factionalism has taken a toll on organizational integrity. For instance, CIOAC has splintered into at least four factions "(with adjectives differentiating them, such as CIOAC-Histórico, CIOAC-Independiente, and CIOAC-Regional), each linked to a different faction of the PRD or other parties. The weakness of PRD incorporation of the indigenous came back to haunt the party in 2012, when Sabines – still in office – urged his allies to support the successful gubernatorial bid of Manuel Velasco, a candidate running with the Mexico's Green Party, a PRI coalition partner.[19]

Dissident Peasants in Michoacán

In contrast to Chiapas and Mexico City, Michoacán presented conditions more conducive to consolidating durable programmatic ties to organized popular sector interests. In this state, the PRD arguably had the longest and most stable period of organization building outside of office. Unlike in many states where the first PRD governors were last-minute PRI defectors without ties to the organizational base, the first two PRD governors in Michoacán were closely linked to Cárdenas himself and had thus spent twelve years building a party organization from the formation of the PRD in 1989 until this party first won the governorship in 2001. Furthermore, the supply of traditional corporatist (labor and peasant) organizations to the PRD operation in Michoacán was superior to that in any other state. Given these advantages, Michoacán represents the PRD's most successful effort to form neo-corporatist ties with popular sector organizations, in this case with dissident peasant organizations.

The PRD won the governorship in 2001 with the candidacy of Lázaro Cárdenas Batel – son of Cuauhtémoc – after two highly contested elections in 1990s when it came in second place to the PRI. Michoacán featured a diverse array of rural organizations, many of which had campaigned on behalf of PRD candidates over the preceding decade.[20] At the same time, a prominent faction within the party infrastructure was led by former leaders of the PRI's CNC (National Peasant

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[19] Interview by author, Gabriel Gutiérrez Ávila, PRD State Council member, July 9, 2012.
[20] Some of these groups predated by decades the formation of the PRD, such as UNORCA and CNPA (National Plan de Ayala Confederation). Others, such as the CCC (Cardenista Peasant Central) and UCD (Democratic Peasant Union) were founded in the late 1980s, when the emergence of the PRD offered a new interlocutor.

Confederation), loyal to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas from his years as PRI governor of Michoacán in the 1980s (Gledhill 1995, 73–78; Ramírez Sevilla 1997, 106–110). The PRD also had ties to an unusually large dissident labor coalition, including the state-level body of the CNTE (National Education Workers' Coordinator), the dissident teachers' union. Cárdenas Batel and his successor named persons with connections to these dissident organizations to the ministries of rural development and education.

PRD rule in Michoacán continued with the 2007 election of Leonel Godoy, a longtime associate of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Facing a plethora of dissident peasant organizations, linked to different degrees to varying factions of his party and prone to disruptive protest, Godoy took steps to institutionalize the participation of rural interest organizations in agricultural policy, by forming the Michoacán COCOCAM (Peasant Consultative Council). This body brought together more than thirty organizations in the state, mostly favoring the PRD, but also including the Michoacán affiliate of the CNC, the PRI's peasant sector. COCOCAM's mandate was to "promote actions to analyze and construct, with the three levels of government and the congress, the budget and public policy to promote sustainable rural development from a peasant's perspective."[21] In addition, the COCOCAM served as a site for routinized negotiation between state rural development authorities and leaders of member organizations regarding their share of yearly subsidies.

According to interviewed organization representatives in COCOCAM, the availability of this formal structure to make demands on the state reduced the need to turn to protest. As one leader explained the decline in protest activities during the Godoy administration:

It's not that we've stopped being combative. I think that instead it's that COCOCAM has allowed us to establish a closer working relationship with the government, where we've been able to reach agreements and where there hasn't been so much of a need for protest because there has been permanent, open, frank, and transparent communication. From the moment (that COCOCAM was formed), we have worked with the government on the budget for the countryside.[22]

[21] COCOCAM, Fichas Informativas. "*promover acciones para analizar y construir con los tres niveles de Gobierno y el Congreso, el presupuesto y las políticas públicas que impulsen el desarrollo rural sostenible desde la visión campesina.*"

[22] Interview by author, Carlos González López, Secretary General, CCC Michoacán, December 14, 2011. "*No es que hayamos dejado de ser más combativas. Yo más bien*

Shared electoral goals have certainly paved the way to this harmony. Of the thirty-two initial members of the COCOCAM, only the CNC and the CODUC (Coalition of Democratic Urban and Peasant Organizations) were PRI-affiliated.[23] Other organizations were either openly supportive of the PRD or eschewed party affiliation. However, even organizations in the latter group were open to establishing a working relationship with the Cárdenas Batel and Godoy administrations. Moreover, many organizations had played an active role in the 2001 and 2007 elections that brought these PRD governors into office by hosting campaign events in their villages, encouraging members to vote for the PRD, and running for local office under this party's banner.

COCOCAM was granted a formal role in several government processes, albeit without official voting or veto powers. Council statutes established that COCOCAM would analyze yearly rural development budgets for the state and suggest modifications to congress. From its first year, the practice was established that representatives of each of COCOCAM's committees – on finance, commercialization, infrastructure, and other policy areas – would hold meetings at least yearly with the top ministers in the rural development, economic development, and social development ministries. Through such outlets, council members lobbied for larger rural development budgets, more funds for small-scale farmers, and the allocation of programs to the organizations themselves. Citing the precarious nature of the peasant sector, they pushed for a crop insurance program, subsidized fertilizer, and the promotion of smallholder participation in the state's *Cruzada por el Maíz* (Crusade for Corn) program.[24]

The terms of peasant linkages with the Michoacán PRD were not exclusively programmatic by any means. COCOCAM member organizations also took advantage of the access afforded by this body to press for a larger share of distributive programs. The Godoy administration initiated a practice that became known as "the carousel," where representatives of

creo que, que el COCOCAM nos ha permitido establecer una relación de trabajo más estrecha con el gobierno donde hemos construido acuerdos y en donde no ha habido necesidad de la manifestación, porque ha habido una comunicación permanente, abierta, franca, transparente, eso, eso lo creo. Incluso desde el momento mismo (que se formó COCOCAM) junto con el gobierno hemos construido el presupuesto para el campo."

[23] Interviews by author: Omar Lando Estañol, General Director, REDCCAM, December 9, 2011; Marco Rodríguez, Technical Secretary of COCOCAM, January 25, 2012.

[24] This 82 million peso (about US$6 million) program was focused on improving production yields for corn farmers through subsidies for seeds and other inputs and training programs (Alonso Cruz, Carlos. "Contará el programa Cruzada por el Maíz en Michoacán con 82mdp," *Cambio de Michoacán*, March 6, 2009).

each of the organizations in COCOCAM would be granted yearly meet-
ings with the minister or a subminister of Michoacán's Rural
Development Ministry, at the beginning of the fiscal year when this
ministry was developing program budgets. Organization leaders reported
that these meetings were straightforward negotiations for the subsidies
that they receive from the state government.[25]

While during the period of PRD rule the CNC was one of only two
PRI-affiliated organizations in COCOCAM, in the lead up to the 2011
governor's race (in which the PRI's candidate, Fausto Vallejo was
favored) the electoral composition of COCOCAM changed markedly.
In the months prior to the 2011 election, several organizations switched
affiliations from the PRD to the PRI. Interviewed leaders cited Godoy's
poor administration or the quality of the PRI's candidate, but they also
acknowledged that the PRI's victory was likely and that they were prom-
ised distributive benefits from the Vallejo's administration if they sup-
ported his campaign.[26] One year into Vallejo's term, the council split
roughly evenly among PRD- and PRI-affiliated organizations and was
wrought with infighting as each of these factions sought to take control,
which would grant them the power to designate committee leaders who
would regularly meet with government ministry personnel. Because many
of the organizations in COCOCAM depended on state subsidies to sus-
tain collective action, their ties to the PRD were revealed to be contingent
on this party's control of the state government. Other organizations
proved to have a more durable, neo-corporatist model of linkage, as they
sustained ties to the PRD throughout the PRI's term in power.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has analyzed the process of linkage formation between
popular sector organizations and new parties of the Left in Latin

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[25] Interviews by author, Primitivo Ávalos, Coordinator of El Surco Michoacán, November
8, 2012; Valerio Celaya, Adviser for Productive Projects for UGOCM Jacinto López
Michoacán, August 16, 2012; Vicente Estrada Torres, Secretary of Political Operations
for CNC Michoacán, January 26, 2012; Carlos González, Secretary General of CCC
Michoacán, December 14, 2011.

[26] Interviews by author: Primitivo Avalos Pérez, Director, Coordinator of Agricultural
Producers El Surco, November 8, 2012; Valerio Celaya, Project Consultant, Unión
General de Obreros y Campesinos de México Jacinto López, August 16, 2012; Gilberto
González, Dirigente, Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas y Urbanas y
Campesinas, January 25, 2012.

America, with additional focus on Mexico's PRD. This party faced a particular challenge of constructing a competitive coalition on the Left without a labor base, instead relying on ties to organizations representing populations that had been excluded from Mexico's twentieth-century corporatist institutions, including urban popular movements, indigenous associations, and dissident peasant organizations. The overall picture of PRD alliances with these organizations is one of electoral pragmatism winning out over the desire to construct durable ties based on a shared programmatic orientation. The Mexican case supports my findings from a cross-national comparison of left-wing parties, which revealed that two party traits predict the formation of sustainable programmatic linkages with interest organizations: the establishment of formal rules to incorporate organization representatives in party leadership prior to the party's ascendancy as a serious electoral competitor; and the availability of a significant portion of the labor movement as a linkage partner.

While these two traits were lacking overall in the Mexican case, state-level trajectories display subtle variations. In Mexico City, the PRD's stronghold, an initial "movement-party" arrangement emerged, wherein autonomous protest groups enthusiastically channeled their support behind the ideologically driven candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. This linkage model quickly decayed, however, and was replaced by an "organizational machine" linkage model, wherein neighborhood associations allied with rival factions of the party mediated patronage benefits to mobilize their bases electorally. In Chiapas, consecutive PRD governors mobilized indigenous organizations through patronage appeals, opening space for indigenous mayoralties, but offering little potential to integrate more transformative demands into the state policy agenda. Indigenous organization ties to these competing factions served to deradicalize the movements, and ultimately failed to institutionalize as a support base for the PRD when the latter governor deployed his patronage networks on behalf of a rival party.

Finally, the state of Michoacán approximated a neo-corporatist linkage model, where dissident peasant organizations were embedded in durable linkages based on shared programmatic goals. In this state, the PRD counted on the support of dynamic dissident labor and peasant organizations. The party organization was also least factionalized in Michoacán, where Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had governed in the 1980s and exercised control over party factions to present a more cohesive electoral project. Michoacán's PRD administrations adopted an innovative consultative council to routinize contact between the state

government and the mostly PRD-allied peasant associations. This council offered a venue through which the organizations could voice demands related to rural spending priorities and the design of sectoral support programs.

The fate of Mexico's PRD holds lessons for left-wing parties seeking to consolidate in newly competitive electoral systems. If the initial incorporation under labor-mobilizing parties such as Mexico's PRI produced a dual dilemma, demonstrating a tension between the goals of both mobilizing and deradicalizing the popular sectors, the PRD's predicament reflects a distinct dilemma for parties of the Left in the neoliberal age. As these parties transition from an ideological movement orientation to electoral-professional parties, core popular sector organizations offer organizational resources that can be effective at mobilizing voters through patronage appeals. However, by deploying organizations in this way, the party risks undermining the organizations' programmatic orientation and thus their utility for projecting the party's ideological brand and promoting its policy goals. Furthermore, patronage mobilization catalyzes an instrumental orientation that often leads organizations to jump ship to a competitor if it offers a better chance at patronage benefits down the road.

This class of dilemma is not unique to neoliberal Latin America. Classic research has documented the moderating effects of party incorporation on popular sector actors that demand structural transformations to exploitative economic systems (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Collier and Collier 1991). However, the trade-off between loyalty to programmatic goals and electoral expediency may be more pronounced in a post-corporatist era where the bulk of popular sector organizing is directed by fragmented and localized neighborhood and rural organizations. Under such conditions, organizations are so vulnerable to co-optation that parties must exercise great care in building linkages that capitalize on organizations' electoral resources without undermining their transformative ambitions.

Outside of Mexico, the parties that have innovated the most in constructing and sustaining programmatic linkages with popular sector organizations – Bolivia's MAS, Brazil's PT, and Uruguay's FA – have struggled consistently over their histories to sustain this balance as well. Their relative success in doing so, however, may help explain both why these parties have been able to remain electorally competitive over an extended period and why they arguably have gone the furthest in the region to promote the social inclusion of marginalized groups.

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