

For example, resources may be differentially useful at different moments in a party's life cycle. We have seen that organizational resources can be incredibly valuable in the formative period of a party's development. Works from Africa (LeBas 2011), post-Communist Europe (Tavits 2013), and Latin America (Van Dyck 2014; Levitsky et al. 2016) have underscored this point. Organizational resources can provide a competitive advantage for new parties. Still, the extent to which there is value in maintaining those resources over time is an open question. Hale (2006) believes that an initial investment in resource capital can set a party on a path of continued electoral success. If that is the case, then the time, energy, and effort needed to maintain an organizational apparatus may seem overly costly for an electorally successful party. The value of high-cost resources may decrease as access to other low-cost resources (e.g., money, patronage, leaders) grows. It may still, however, be useful to retain high-cost resources. Subsequent chapters demonstrate that they become extremely valuable once more in the aftermath of a major national-electoral defeat. In Venezuela, AD relied upon its organizational resources to recapture an important role in the institutionalized opposition to Hugo Chávez. Without those resources, it would not have gained this strategic position of importance.

Moreover, just as resources may not be equally valuable across a party's life cycle, their value may also shift in accordance with the political environment in which a party operates. This insight underpins the work of the early party development scholars (Duverger 1972; Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995). Ideology was extremely useful for the mass-based parties that emerged after the industrial revolution in Western Europe. But programmatic rigidity became a problem – an “historical relic” (Kirchheimer 1990, 58) – for the catch-all parties that eventually came to dominate the political landscape. Resources matter for parties, but the *extent* to which they matter will vary depending upon the context. Indeed, a combination of two elements – a party's resource wealth and the current political context – best explains why some parties can survive national-electoral crisis and potentially revive, while others cannot. I develop this argument more fully in the next chapter.

Explaining the Fates of Parties

The last chapter identified the different resources that parties use to fulfill their multiple functions in a democracy. In this chapter, I examine the specific role that high-cost resources play for parties that undergo national-electoral crisis. Recall from Chapter 1 that a national-electoral crisis involves a sudden and dramatic loss of votes at the national level. This kind of crisis can happen to one party or, in the extreme case of party-system collapse, to a group of parties. While the case studies addressed in subsequent chapters examine this extreme type of national-electoral crisis, the arguments developed here will apply to any party or group of parties that experiences a national-electoral crisis. This is because national-electoral crises of any kind produce a set of common challenges that parties must face.

In what follows, I first address these common challenges. I then differentiate between the proximate need to *survive* the dramatic loss of votes at the national level and the later goal of pursuing *revival*. Parties that experience national-electoral loss will not typically turn immediately to the task of recovering national-electoral influence. They must first survive the period of hostility that follows society's rejection of them as viable electoral entities. High-cost resources, I assert, allow a party to withstand this period of hostility. They allow a party to survive.

Under certain circumstances, high-cost resources may also help a party revive. All surviving parties have an incentive to recover their national-electoral influence. Only some of them actually experience revival. A party's *capacity* to revive, defined by its resource wealth, may not align with the *opportunities* for revival, defined by the competitive logic of the post-crisis party system. When, however, the party's capacity to revive

converges with the opportunities for revival, the likelihood that a party will recover its national-electoral influence should increase. In all, high-cost resources condition the post-crisis fates of parties.

The Dual Challenge of the Post-Crisis Political System

After a national-electoral crisis, parties typically face two challenges. First, access to low-cost resources will drop. Parties that undergo national-electoral crisis incur severe financial setbacks. Electorally successful parties are privy to money from a “number of channels,” both legal and illegal (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002, 70). These include state subsidies (Ikstens et al. 2002; Pinto-Duschinsky 2002; Van Biezen 2004; Gutiérrez and Zovatto 2011) and private contributions (Greene 2002, 760). Parties that essentially disappear from national politics lose access to all of these.

Parties also lose access to patronage. This can be a huge problem. Parties that perform poorly in national elections will struggle to curry favor with voters, donors, or potential candidates (Erie 1990; Folke, Hirano, and Snyder 2011; Nazareno et al. 2006; and Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). They will be unable to credibly commit to those individuals. Especially in regions such as Latin America, where state institutions tend to be politicized (Chalmers 1977), the loss of patronage is problematic.

Finally, after crisis, a party’s reserve of elites, as well as its national leadership structure, will be debilitated and discredited. Visible party leaders will receive the brunt of citizens’ most visceral anger. Some, for example, will face prosecution and flee the country. Alan García (APRA-Peru) and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR-Bolivia) left for this reason. Other elites (i.e., former ministers, legislators, and party bureaucrats) may switch parties, form new parties, or drop out of politics altogether. A party’s centralized hierarchy will be seriously debilitated, at least in the short-term. In all, post-crisis parties lose many of the material and elite resources that parties typically use to remain active in national politics.

After a major national-electoral crisis, parties will face a second obstacle: environmental hostility (Tavits 2013). This hostility is expressed in two ways. The rejection of a party or a group of parties often brings with it a strong aversion toward parties as institutions. Citizens will be suspicious of party politicians of all stripes. But they will be particularly suspicious of the formerly predominant parties. After all, citizen anger toward those parties drove national-electoral crisis in the first place (Seawright 2012). Consequently, formerly predominant parties will experience *universal* hostility – that is, hostility directed toward parties in general. They

will also experience *targeted* hostility – or antipathy that is directed exclusively at them.

Both challenges – a loss of low-cost resources and the hostility of the post-crisis environment – significantly decrease the possibility that a formerly predominant party will immediately return to national politics after a crisis occurs. Because of this, parties tend to *survive* in the short-term and experience *revival* only when the political environment shifts and hostility eases. We therefore must consider what survival looks like and why it occurs in addition to defining and explaining party revival. In what remains of this chapter, I undertake these conceptual and theoretical tasks. First, I identify and conceptualize the different types of party survival and party revival. Second, I explain why party survival occurs. Finally, I explain the conditions under which revival is most likely to take place.

Survival versus Revival

*Party Survival.*¹ A party experiences survival to the extent that it exercises at least one of its four primary functions in the aftermath of national-electoral crisis. In other words, a party survives crisis as long as it can structure competition, govern, represent, or shape public opinion. A party that undergoes crisis cannot, by definition, perform these functions from national office. Surviving parties do not operate in the national-electoral realm. Survival, therefore, occurs in one of the two non-national-electoral realms: in the subnational level of government or in the public debate. I identify two types of survival that correspond with each sphere of party life.

1. *Survival as a subnational entity.* One form of survival occurs through electoral competition for subnational (i.e., municipal and/or regional) office. Parties that survive in this way capture high vote shares in subnational contests. They remain competitive subnational electoral entities, even though they are no longer viable contenders for national office.

Parties that remain successfully competitive in subnational elections can perform all four party functions within the subnational political system. They structure the subnational electoral process by nominating candidates, organizing campaigns, and mobilizing the local electorate (Tavits 2013; Van Dyck 2014). They take part in local government and represent their constituents. Finally, they shape local opinion on issues and

¹ Some parts of this section were originally published in *Comparative Politics* (Cyr 2016a) and have been reprinted with the journal’s permission.

policies through the local media. Parties that survive as subnational entities perform the same functions as nationally competitive parties, just at the subnational level.

Subnational electoral survivors may not be equally competitive across all subnational contests. I distinguish between two subtypes of subnational survival to reflect the scope of a party's competitiveness. A party's vote share may be reduced to a specific area or region of a country, such that the vast majority of its votes comes from that area or region. A party that survives in this way experiences *localized subnational survival*. This often entails surviving in those places where a party's support has historically been strongest. A party may also experience *nationalized subnational survival*. These survivors capture a large number of votes throughout much of the country. This entails competing in a majority of all available subnational seats and capturing a substantial percentage of those seats. What "substantial" means in any given case can vary, given the subnational political dynamics of a country. The important distinction between a localized and nationalized subnational survivor is that the former's vote share will be much more territorially concentrated.

Certainly, a localized subnational survivor may attempt to compete in more than one area. Prior to crisis, localized subnational survivors will have captured a much more nationalized vote share. This was the case with COPEI (Venezuela), as we will see in Chapter 6. These parties may, therefore, still field candidates outside of a particular region. Still, the large majority of a localized survivor's votes will be concentrated in one area of the country. Nationalized subnational survivors, by contrast, do not only field candidates in most subnational electoral contests. They actually capture large numbers of votes throughout the country. AD (Venezuela) experiences this kind of survival, as we see moving forward.

It bears mentioning that subnational survival is conditioned, to a certain extent, by a country's electoral system. In some countries, municipal elections are frequent and competitive, while regional-level positions are appointed by national government. This was the case, for example, in Bolivia between 1985 and 2005. In other cases, all three levels of government (i.e., local, regional, and national) are competitive. Parties can therefore survive at either the local or regional level, or they can survive at both levels. Generally speaking, institutional constraints, including the extent of political decentralization, will determine whether subnational survival of different kinds is possible.

2. *Survival in the public debate.* After national-electoral crisis, some parties may still receive extensive media coverage. Different media outlets

will cover their declarations and cite their opinions. This post-crisis coverage may address the party's electoral troubles. It may also deal with more substantive policy concerns. Parties that receive the latter kind of coverage remain active in the public debate.² They survive national-electoral crisis by appearing regularly in major news outlets.

A party that survives in the public debate remains a credible source for the press on policy. The press helps determine the salience of different issues for the public (McCombs and Zhu 1995, 496). It tends to cover those individuals with the most authority on a particular issue (Gans 1979; Bennett 1990). Therefore, when the press gives coverage to a party, it signals that the party remains an authoritative source on certain issues. Parties that appear in the media can, consequently, shape citizen opinion (Petersen et al. 2010; Druckman et al. 2013). This type of survival is less likely to allow a party to structure competition or govern, but it can enable a party to shape public opinion and even represent certain constituencies within a broader debate.

A party that survives in the public debate receives frequent, enduring, and substantive coverage by the media. Frequent coverage suggests that the media considers the party's opinion to be newsworthy and/or informative. Its coverage is not linked to one date, event, or individual. Survival also requires that a party receive coverage for an extended period after crisis. Public attention on any one issue is fairly short (e.g., Downs 1987). Press appearances that occur for years after the crisis are most likely due to the party's newsworthiness rather than any particular topic or event. Finally, the type of coverage matters. Is a party being cited in articles on relevant policy debates, or does it mainly appear in reference to the past? For a party to survive in the public debate, it must have the capacity to sway public opinion on central policy issues. This is only possible when a party receives coverage on those issues.

The content and extent of press coverage varies across countries (Fletcher 1994; Strömbäck and Kaid 2008). Therefore, exact parameters for measuring survival in the public debate should be developed and defended empirically. When a party's coverage is demonstrably frequent, long-lasting, and substantive, especially vis-à-vis other parties, we may conclude that it has survived as a participant in the public debate.

In the two types of survival identified above, the surviving party fulfills at least one function in a non-national-electoral realm of political life. It is

² The term "public debate" refers to those public conversations that shape how citizens think about politics (Vergara 2012).

important to emphasize here that survival is a temporary stage of a party's life cycle. As I explore subsequently, survival alone is not likely to extend a party's life for a long period of time. At some point, a party must revive by recovering its influence in national-electoral politics. If not, it will likely face continued decline.

Party Revival. Surviving parties are, by definition, unable to successfully compete in national elections. Parties must survive precisely because they cannot retain their national-electoral prowess. Revival, therefore, entails a *recovery* of the party's national-electoral strength. It denotes a return to national-electoral politics.

How do we know a party has returned to national-electoral politics? One way to define revival would be to set an electoral threshold (e.g., Rokkan 1970; see also, Madrid 2012 and Levitsky et al. 2016). Many electoral systems establish an electoral floor that a party must meet to retain its legal status. Yet, the imposition of a minimum national vote share is overly exclusive. Parties that achieve small vote percentages can be vital coalitional partners or kingmakers after a close election (Siaroff 2003; Bolleyer 2007). They can still, in other words, be influential players in national politics.

This work adopts a more expansive definition of revival. It includes parties that may not necessarily display traditional (read: electoral) signs of national prowess but that nonetheless exert significant sway on national politics. Specifically, I define revival as a recovery of national political *influence*, or what Sartori calls relevance. A relevant party has the potential to affect the party system (Sartori 1999, 16). Relevance can simply be a function of a party's vote share in a presidential or legislative election. It can also, however, be expressed in more subtle ways. An influential party may represent a major or "pivotal" player in an electoral coalition (Laver and Schofield 1998), such that its presence in a coalition is vital for the electoral viability of the coalition as a whole. Additionally, a small party can be relevant as a kingmaker (Siaroff 2003; Bolleyer 2007; Abedi and Siaroff 2011). These parties play a decisive role in the formation of a governing coalition.

A party that experiences revival must assume one of these influential roles: as an independent electoral entity, a pivotal electoral-coalitional player, or a kingmaker. In each case, the party affects how politics unfolds at the national level. This is because the party recovers its ability to exercise many of its primary functions in national politics. As a revived, independent electoral entity, a party will govern, represent, and shape public opinion from its position in national government. As a coalitional player,



FIGURE 3.1 Explaining party survival

it will have a say in campaign strategies and potential candidacies. It will also likely place some of its own party members in elected office. As a kingmaker, the party will have a decisive role in who wins and attains office to begin with. In every case, the party recovers the capacity to transform the dynamics of competition, governance, and representation, as well as to potentially influence public opinion, at the national level.

To summarize, parties may survive as localized or nationalized subnational entities. They may also survive as participants in the public debate. Each type of survival enables a party to exercise at least one or more of its primary functions in a non-national-electoral sphere of politics. Some parties that survive may also eventually recover their national-electoral relevance. They may, in other words, experience revival and recuperate their ability to exercise influence at the national level. Now that I have identified the different types of party survival, as well as party revival, I can now explain why each fate occurs.

Explaining Party Survival

After crisis, parties face two challenges. They lose access to low-cost resources, and they face considerable universal and targeted hostility. These are unpopular parties subject to considerable antagonism. Each obstacle makes the years following national-electoral crisis very difficult. Why do parties survive despite these hardships?

I argue that survival occurs when parties have access to high-cost resources, including organizational and/or ideational resources, at the time of national-electoral crisis (see Figure 3.1). Each resource enables a party to survive in different ways. Organizational resources provide visibility to the party and also enable it to organize viable local campaigns. Where a party has organizational resources, it should survive as a

subnational electoral entity. Ideational resources allow a party to remain active in the public debate. In particular, a party's brand, either in terms of its valence or its content, provides a party with the credibility to speak out on certain issues of national importance.

Organizational Resources and Survival as a Subnational Entity. A party that has organizational resources at the time of crisis, including party members, local branches, and local party committees, can use those resources to survive national-electoral crisis by retreating to and competing in subnational elections. Organizational resources serve two purposes. First, they signal to the local community that, despite disappearing from national politics, the party continues to operate locally (Wattenberg 2000, 66). Party members live and work in a given municipality. They can reach out to residents directly and address issues of local importance (Scarrow 2000, 94; Shin 2001). Where local branches remain open and committees are active, the party can engage with the community. The transaction costs associated with organizing party activities are greatly reduced.

Second, organizational resources are incredibly useful for organizing electoral campaigns (Tavits 2013; Van Dyck 2014). Locales are a central location for organizing campaign rallies, managing volunteers, and passing out campaign paraphernalia. Local party locales, together with the local party committees, are also important for coordinating campaigns across candidates and jurisdictions (Webb and Kolodny 2006). Without these resources, the party faces additional costs if it wishes to stay active and compete at the subnational level (Clark 2004). Active members also provide numerous benefits for electoral campaigns. They provide votes and financial or material support (Scarrow 1996, 42–46). They potentially serve as a fount of ideas, campaign innovations, and even candidacies. They are also more likely to participate in campaign activities (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010, 827). Finally, a presence on the ground provides the party with acute knowledge of predominant issues and concerns in the community. They can orient the party's campaign around those problems (Geser 1999), making the party more attractive to the local community (Tavits 2013; see also Denver and Hands 1997; Ward 2003).

At the national level, the costs of retaining organizational resources may outweigh their benefits (Scarrow 1994). An active militancy can pose serious programmatic burdens. Their recruitment and retention may sap the party of precious material resources, and so party leaders may eschew member recruitment in favor of greater leadership autonomy (Scarrow et al. 2000, 131). Growing ties with the state can further reduce the need for a strong organizational presence (Katz and Mair 1995). At the subnational level, however, closer ties to the community offset the costs

of organizational resources. Multi-media campaigns cannot replace the "boots on the ground" work of local campaigns. Especially after national-electoral crisis, the value of this local machinery is clear. Continued local electoral viability becomes a mechanism for post-collapse survival. It is for this reason that Tavits (2013) postulates that "local presence and involvement in local politics helps keep the party afloat even if on the national level the party is experiencing difficult times." (p. 31)

The loss of low-cost resources following national-electoral crisis means that alternative explanations of subnational electoral survival are less viable. For example, without access to national state coffers, the party can no longer rely upon vote-buying for continued subnational electoral success.³ Without a solid set of national party elites, local party committees cannot take campaign cues from above. This national leadership vacuum also obviates other mechanisms that might ensure subnational electoral success over time. For example, national control over local party candidacies and other decision-making processes becomes moot (Levitsky 2003; Kitschelt 1994).

Still, one might argue that *pre-crisis* electoral patterns better explain *post-crisis* subnational electoral results. The empirical analysis that follows offers evidence against this alternative hypothesis. In Bolivia, for example, all three parties (MNR, ADN, MIR) experienced a sudden and dramatic loss of votes at the subnational level after the 2005 election, even though the MNR had historically captured more votes in municipal elections.⁴ Despite MNR's historic competitive edge, all three parties performed poorly in the 2010 municipal election: MNR captured 1.9 percent of the vote, while MIR captured 0 percent and ADN, 0.3 percent. Indeed, all three parties lost their ability to field candidates in most municipal races.⁵ In Chapter 5, I link this poor subnational electoral performance to each party's low level of organizational

³ Evidence suggests that there is no systematic relationship between vote-buying and the subnational electoral success of parties. An ongoing project registered instances of attempted vote-buying by mayoral candidates in recent subnational elections in Latin America. Initial results reveal a low correlation between where the practice was reported and electoral success (González-Ocantos et al. 2012). Clientelism does not appear to systematically affect subnational electoral success.

⁴ MNR's average vote share in the 1995, 1999, and 2004 municipal elections was 17.1 percent. The MIR's average was 11.8 percent, while ADN's was 9.9 percent (Tribuno Supremo Electoral, Bolivia).

⁵ MNR only competed in 9.8 percent of the municipal contests despite competing in 92 percent of them in the previous (2004) election. MIR competed in zero, after competing in 77.1 percent of municipal contests in 2004. ADN's capacity to compete dropped from 30 percent in 2004 to 0.3 percent in 2010 (Tribuno Supremo Electoral, Bolivia).

resources. The parties' post-crisis subnational electoral performance does not correlate with pre-crisis electoral trends or with the historical importance of MNR versus ADN and MIR.

Additionally, one might attribute stronger subnational-electoral performance to a party's rootedness in society. Again, the empirical record suggests this is not the case. Take, for example, the stronger, subnational-electoral performance of APRA (Peru) and AD (Venezuela) vis-à-vis other parties in each country. Like the MNR in Bolivia, APRA and AD were uniquely important in their country. They were founded by prominent intellectuals, cultivated strong ties with labor, and had better mobilizational capacities than other parties (Levitsky 2003). Given their historical importance, we might expect that APRA and AD retained large numbers of party sympathizers at the time of crisis, giving them an electoral edge. Existing research, however, suggests that this was not the case. Roughly 7 percent of the population claimed to sympathize with APRA in 1989, just one year before collapse. That year, about 5 percent of the population supported AP (Seawright 2012, 93). By the time of party-system collapse APRA did not have significantly more supporters among Peruvian society.

Similarly, in 1998, 10 percent of Venezuelans claimed sympathy toward AD. COPEI's support was lower – it hovered around 3 percent that year (Seawright 2012, 92). Yet, by that time, Venezuelans no longer distinguished the two parties ideologically. They placed both parties in the same ideological position (at about a six on a scale of one to ten) (Seawright 2012, 115). The historical importance of AD in Venezuela and APRA in Peru did not give them an edge when it came to attracting voter support after party-system collapse. As we will see subsequently, the organizational wealth of parties at the time of national-electoral crisis better explains their fates as subnational survivors.

Ideational Resources and Survival in the Public Debate. To survive in the public debate, a party must receive frequent and substantive coverage by the national media. To understand why a party might survive in this way, we must first ask: Why do some parties appear in the press? As one scholar aptly put it, sources "make" the news (Sigal 1986). Parties receive coverage when they are considered credible or important sources for a particular topic.

Media coverage favors those individuals perceived as having the most authority within a given group or organization (Gans 1979; Squire 1988; Bennett 1990). As a reproducer of the status quo (Tuchman 1978), the media does not typically challenge or criticize the distribution of power and authority in society. Consequently, political elites who receive the

most coverage are those in government. Moreover, the views typically voiced on any given issue emanate from government. Even when non-government sources are used, these are typically indexed according to the views of mainstream government (Bennett 1990, 106).

A surviving party, however, is distinct, because it no longer has access to national office. This important source of authority (i.e., as a government official) is no longer available to them. Why, then, might some parties nevertheless receive media coverage? In his seminal study on deciding what is news, Gans (1979) argues that "known" sources get covered far more regularly and frequently than "unknown" sources. "Known" sources are covered for three reasons: (1) Journalists assume that the sources are familiar to the audience; (2) They received frequent coverage in the past and are well-known to journalists; and/or (3) They may not be well-known, but they occupy well-known positions, like governors or mayors (Gans 1979, 10).

In multi-party systems the media has access to and therefore tends to report on competing frames surrounding a particular issue or event. The government's preferred frame will be just one of multiple perspectives covered by the media (Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2009; Baum 2013). Where there are multiple parties, the media can potentially cover multiple views. Government officials are not, therefore, the *sole* "known" source for major media outlets. Parties both in and out of office can have a voice in framing the debate on specific issues.

I contend that a surviving party's ideational resources are vital for keeping it "known" in the aftermath of national-electoral crisis. Ideational resources help establish a party's reputation – the grounds upon which a party resonates in society. This resonance helps to promote a party's credibility when it comes to particular issues of national interest. It makes the party a likely candidate for coverage on those issues. Ideational resources are excellent tools for remaining active in the public debate.

Some parties, for example, are "known" for their clear and consistent positions on particular policies (see, e.g., Green et al. 2002; Lupu 2016). The media may turn to an ideological party when the incumbent government enacts policies that cohere with or contradict that party's own position. The same goes for a party that is broadly recognized for its unique expertise on a particular issue. Where a party is known for its expertise, then it should remain an easy, accessible source (Gans 1979; Bennett 1990) for the media, even if it is electorally weak.

Expertise and ideology often comprise aspects of a party's brand. The literature suggests that a party brand can be based on ideology (Lupu

2014), expertise (Evans 2011), charismatic bonds with a leader (Hale 2006), or other party-based traits (Hale 2006; Cyr 2012). It is what makes the party resonant in society and, by extension, among journalists. Where the party has a brand, therefore, it is more likely to continue to receive coverage on issues related to that brand.

There are two dimensions to a party brand, its content (Snyder and Ting 2002; Hale 2006; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009) and its valence (Butler and Neff Powell 2014; see also Bianco 1994 and Cox and McCubbins 2005). With respect to valence, parties can be viewed positively (e.g., as a party that can get things done) or negatively (e.g., as corrupt or self-serving) (Butler and Neff Powell 2014). In either case, we can hypothesize that the party's valence brand will make it a likely candidate for coverage when the media reports on events that tap into the valence dimension. A party viewed as corrupt or self-serving is likely to receive coverage when it is accused of corruption or opportunism. A party seen as capable of getting things done will likely be referenced when the incumbent government is, for example, accused of *not* doing enough or when it attempts to reverse policies that the former party implemented.

The party should receive coverage, too, when an issue arises that relates to the content of the party's brand. This may include, for example, policy positions that directly challenge a party's expertise or proposed laws that hue closely to a party's ideological position. We will see below that, after party-system collapse, the MNR in Bolivia received coverage by the media on articles that addressed the new government's economic policy. Because the MNR was the famous architect of the 1985 economic policy, which put into place harsh neoliberal measures, it became an authoritative source for commenting on the new government's reversal of many of these policies.

Certainly, we may also see that certain brands have little relevance in the post-collapse political landscape that emerges. If, for example, a party were known for its ties to a former dictatorship, then this brand may not be credible in a democratic setting. This was the case with ADN in Bolivia. As we see in Chapter 4, the party was known for its previous dictatorial past, despite having regularly competed in democratic elections between 1985 and 2005. That brand was not particularly useful, however, in the context of what Evo Morales' government (2005–present) proclaimed as a deepening of democracy. In all, we should see that a party's brand conditions the extent to which it receives coverage by the media in the post-crisis period. Valence- or content-based coverage should occur *despite* the

party's sudden national-electoral irrelevance. And, as long as a party is receiving active and frequent coverage by the media, it has the potential to inform and shape the public debate.

To be sure, appearing in the news is not directly equivalent to having a demonstrated impact on the opinions of voters. Still, parties that appear in the news are more likely to influence opinions than those that do not. We know that "media access is an important intervening variable between citizens and leaders" (Baum 2013, 456). Citizens construct meaning about the world, thanks in great part to their media environment (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992, 7; see also Matera and Salwen 1989; Wanta and Hu 1993; and Wanta, Golan, and Lee 2004). In general, the public perceives as more important those issues that receive greater coverage by the media (Ghanem 1997). Appearing in the national press greatly increases a party's likelihood to exercise influence.

It bears mentioning that there is a temporal logic to survival in the public debate. The capacity for a party to survive over time exclusively as a participant in the media is limited. Where a party does not recover its electoral importance at the national or subnational level, its status as a credible source will likely fade. This is in part due to the resonance of a brand for a party that, after several years, still struggles to compete electorally at the national or subnational level. Under this circumstance, the strength of the party brand will wane. New generations of voters will be unfamiliar with the party. Other parties will gain credibility based on their own governing records. Over time, the press will likely turn to these newer actors. A party that survives solely in the public debate is in a precarious medium- to long-term position.

In the short-term, however, a party's ideational resources enable it to survive in the public debate. An alternative explanation of a party's continued coverage by the press might focus on a party's past coverage. Some post-crisis parties may receive frequent coverage because they received significant coverage in the past and are well-known to journalists (Gans 1979, 10). By this account, pre-crisis coverage determines post-crisis coverage. The empirical record does not support this alternative hypothesis. All eight parties that I examined had significant governing experience, both in the executive and legislative branches, for years prior to the national-electoral crisis. They therefore would have been easy, accessible, and credible sources on multiple issues of national import (Bennett 1990). In the aftermath of party-system collapse, however, all parties became simultaneously irrelevant national political players. Yet, as we will see subsequently, the patterns of coverage following collapse are

not the same. Although MNR in Bolivia continued to receive extensive coverage following party-system collapse, ADN and MIR did not. The same is true for APRA in Peru, vis-à-vis AP and PPC. Continued coverage does not seem to be a function of a party's historical importance, either. APRA (Peru) and MNR (Bolivia) received far more coverage vis-à-vis the other formerly predominant parties in their country than AD received in Venezuela. The existence of a party brand better captures the differential patterns of coverage following national-electoral crisis.

A different explanation for a party's regular and frequent presence in the media relates to the connections that might develop over time between parties and media conglomerates. It is possible, for example, that certain party elites develop connections with media moguls during their period of national-electoral strength. Given the media's propensity to cite some sources more than others (see, e.g., Bennett 1990), these linkages would allow the party to retain privileged access to reporters. Under these circumstances, a party's connections, and not the party's status as a "known" entity, might drive its presence in the media.

To control for this possibility in my empirical analysis, I examined, where I could, newspapers that had a long-standing and well-recognized antagonistic relationship with surviving parties. The clearest case of this was in Peru. APRA has historically had a contentious and at times violent relationship with the newspaper, *El Comercio* (Bethel 1991; Henderson 1973). It is therefore unlikely that APRA developed a cozy relationship with the Miró Quesada family, which ran the paper. Peruvian academics affirm that no relationship ever existed between the paper and the party (Meléndez, March 30, 2012). Still, as we will see in Chapter 4, APRA appeared regularly and frequently in *El Comercio* during the 1990s. Given its antagonism toward the party, *El Comercio* would likely have avoided publishing stories about APRA if it felt it could. Instead, the newspaper continued to publish stories about the party at roughly the same rate as another national paper, *La República*. In at least one case of survival in the public debate, therefore, we can discount this alternative hypothesis.

Some final comments regarding my theory of party survival bear mentioning. First, parties gain and lose resources as a function of multiple factors. Party leaders may choose to streamline their resource pool in response to external pressures or because of the preferences of a particular party leader. Other parties, however, may lose certain resources against the wishes of party leaders. They may also reluctantly purge, for example, their party locales to stay out of debt. Finally, party leaders may decide

to never invest in certain resources to begin with. In the empirical analyses that follow, at least one party lost resources for each of these reasons. No single cause systematically explains the resources parties have at their disposal at the time of crisis. I therefore take each party's resource wealth as exogenous at the time of the national-electoral crisis.

Second, although I have identified and explained two types of survival, these should not be treated equally. Each type presents its own challenges and opportunities for a party. We have already asserted, for example, that survival in the public debate, on its own, is not likely to be an enduring survival type. Parties that compete for subnational office, however, may continue to do so if they carve out a meaningful place in the local party system. It is also the case, as we will see subsequently, that survival in the public debate is a much weaker type of survival. It can allow a party to remain visible and active in the public debate. But this role may not make it as attractive a coalition partner as, say, a party that captures large percentages of votes in subnational elections across a territory. The probability of revival of a party that survives exclusively in the public debate, therefore, is likely to be smaller, because the kinds of revival it can experience are fewer. To fully make this point, however, we must first explain why and where revival occurs.

Explaining Party Revival

For a party to revive, it must recover its national political influence. This is no small feat, given the post-crisis hostility it faces. Revival is complicated by other factors, however. Most prominently, a party that seeks to revive must do so in a new political environment. When a party or a group of parties loses national-electoral relevance, new parties and candidates will replace it. Revival, therefore, must take place in a changed competitive landscape. Formerly predominant parties must vie against other actors and entities who, like them, aim to maximize their electoral support.

I argue that revival occurs when the party's *capacity* to revive aligns with the *opportunities* for revival in the post-crisis party system. A party's capacity to revive is defined by the resources the party has at its disposal. The opportunity to revive is defined by the competitive dynamics of the post-crisis party system. The party system defines the value of different resources and, consequently, whether or not a party's particular resource wealth will give it an advantage vis-à-vis its competitors. Where a party's capacity for revival aligns with the particular dynamics of the party system, then we are more likely to see revival occur (Figure 3.2).




FIGURE 3.2 Explaining party revival

In adopting this logic, I follow closely in the footsteps of other scholars who explain the emergence and adaptation of political movements as a convergence of incentives, capacity, and opportunity (see, e.g., Yashar 1998; Burgess and Levitsky 2003). We cannot take the capacity and opportunity for revival for granted after a major national-electoral crisis. The *incentives* for revival, however, are assumed in my theory. A party's principal *raison d'être* is to compete in and win (national) elections. A sudden loss of that capacity should immediately provoke an existential crisis that induces party leaders to strategize about the possibility of revival.

My argument also coheres with scholars who conclude that purely electoral parties are “less well equipped to survive the vicissitudes of electoral competition” (Wolinetz 1988, 310). Electoral parties by definition lack high-cost resources, including an organizational apparatus or strong roots in society. When the vagaries of a population shift and these parties drop out of electoral favor, they will struggle to remain relevant in national politics. Electoral parties are less likely to survive national-electoral setbacks precisely because they tend to rely exclusively upon low-cost resources to compete in elections. Parties that can retain other, high-cost resources, however, have a greater likelihood of recovering from a serious national-electoral loss.

Finally, this approach aligns with scholars who view successful party reform as the result of changes in the political system (an external element) and characteristics unique to the party (an internal element) (Cross and Blais 2012, 129; see also, Harmel 2002; Panebianco 1988; Wilson 1980). Parties are endowed with a specific toolkit for revival, which I define as the resources they have at the time of national crisis. Those tools will be valuable, however, to the extent that they correspond with the specific challenges of the new competitive environment. In all, successful national-electoral revival is more likely when a party's resource wealth aligns with the dynamics of the post-crisis party system. Let us examine first the opportunities for revival before examining a party's capacity to revive in the post-crisis party system.

Assessing the Opportunities for Survival: The Post-Crisis Party System

Party revival occurs within the confines of the competitive dynamic that exists in a party system. Parties do not operate in a vacuum. They must compete against others and, hopefully, leverage some sort of advantage with which they edge out the competition. Without this advantage, revival is unlikely to occur. To understand the possibility of revival, therefore, we must first examine the party system in which the party must compete. Its dynamics will determine the type of advantage a party should have to make revival more likely.

In the case, for example, of party-system collapse, an entire party system is replaced with a new one. The nature of competition, including the number and type of actors involved, changes completely. Party revival must occur within this new competitive dynamic. Let us take as examples the countries under investigation here. In all three countries, party-system collapse was followed by the emergence of a hegemonic party or leader. Alberto Fujimori was president of Peru from 1990 until 2000. Hugo Chávez became the president of Venezuela in 1998 and remained until his death in 2013. Evo Morales, president of Bolivia after 2005, was re-elected for a third consecutive term in 2014. Empirically, party-system collapse provoked the emergence of a powerful, charismatic outsider (Levitsky 1999; Mainwaring 2006; Barr 2009) with few ties to the previous political system.

Still, the competitive landscape that emerged after collapse in each country was very different. This is because the nature of the opposition that emerged to compete against each political outsider varied dramatically. This variation is key for understanding the revival likelihood of formerly predominant parties. A surviving party is unlikely to seek revival by joining forces with the new government, whose electoral success was predicated upon its defeat (Schedler 1996; Levitsky and Cameron 2003). That same government tends to exacerbate the environment of hostility directed toward those parties. A party will not experience revival by attempting to work with antagonistic incumbents. Instead, revival is more likely to occur when they can cultivate a competitive edge within the parties that position themselves against the government. For the sake of simplicity, I call these parties “the opposition.”

A researcher analyzing party revival must, therefore, first examine the competitive landscape of the opposition in a country. Have new parties formed to compete against the hegemonic incumbent? How many? Are they national in scope, or is their extension limited to specific regions?

Are these parties becoming institutionalized over time, or do the primary competitors change from election to election? Do parties form at all, or do independent candidacies dominate? By answering these kinds of questions, we can assess the logic of competition that emerges in the post-crisis landscape and, consequently, theorize the type of advantage a party must cultivate vis-à-vis that competition.

For the purposes of the analysis that follows, I identify and characterize three different competitive landscapes that may emerge following party-system collapse. This is not an exhaustive list. It should, however, elucidate those dynamics of post-crisis competition that shape a party's capacity to revive.

1. *An atomized system.* In some cases, the post-collapse opposition may eschew formal party-building. Individuals with national political ambitions may prefer to found electoral movements (Levitt 2012) to run their candidacies. In this highly individualized, or atomized, post-crisis political landscape, independent candidacies and personalist electoral vehicles dominate national elections. Congressional lists consist of close colleagues or campaign contributors. Without a formal party structure, policy platforms are more malleable. Parties, to the extent that they exist, are active exclusively during campaign season. Little activity occurs between electoral cycles. Inter-party coordination is weak. Coordination is also absent between levels of government. At the subnational level, scattered regional movements and temporary coalitions of independents dominate elections. Subnational politics is divorced from national competitive dynamics (Vergara 2009; Zavaleta 2014). Still, the same individuals run for national office time and again. Although institutionalized parties are absent, many of the same competitors campaign from one election to the next. In this landscape, politics is atomized to the smallest individual unit: the candidate. Citizens vote for individuals, not for parties. We see this kind of post-collapse landscape in Peru.

2. *A regionalized system.* In some cases, the post-collapse opposition will be characterized by a flurry of party-building. Ambitious individuals with presidential aspirations will each found their own party. These individuals will typically have established credentials in different parts of the country. Although their parties begin as regionalized entities, each will seek to out-compete the rest to create *the* (nationalized) party that will unite the opposition and challenge the hegemonic incumbent. These party-building efforts are likely to work at cross-purposes, however, since each party will retain majority support in its regional bastion. All of the parties will struggle to compete outside of the stronghold from which

they emerged, because none can successfully compete in another's regional bastion. Opposition politics will be extremely regionalized. This kind of post-collapse landscape emerges in Venezuela.

3. *A hyper-fluid system.* Finally, in some cases, the post-collapse opposition will be extremely unsettled, so much so that few discernible patterns of competition operate. Opposition movements will rarely compete in two consecutive elections. Candidates will rarely compete in two consecutive elections. The political opposition will be diffuse and volatility, extreme. Candidate coordination may occur, such that a coalitional front emerges to compete against the incumbent. The coalition will adopt new political slogans, logos, and a name to support that candidate. It will promise to represent *the* response to the incumbent government but will not withstand its first term in office. The upshot is that, with each electoral cycle, new coalitions fronted by new candidates emerge. Where coordination around a coalition fails, multiple candidates will run. None will capture a significant percentage of the vote. In either case, opposition politics will be completely fluid. There will be little consistency in the electoral supply, in terms of parties and also candidates, from one election to the next. This kind of hyper-fluid post-collapse landscape emerges in Bolivia.

Each of these post-collapse competitive landscapes – atomized, regionalized, and hyper-fluid – presents unique challenges for parties that wish to recover their national-electoral influence. The challenges presented by each landscape also help to define the opportunities for revival. This is because the logic of competition of each is unique.

For example, in an atomized system, the electoral supply is reduced to individual candidacies. The logic of competition is one of every candidate for herself. Parties are institutionally weak, but many of the same candidates appear from one election to the next. Here, name recognition matters above all else for attracting votes (Rozas 2012, from Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). Who are the known candidates? How/why are they known? Do they have governing experience? In this kind of post-crisis party system, we can hypothesize that a party that can exploit a *reputational* advantage may be well-positioned to experience revival, especially vis-à-vis newer candidates whose own reputational currency may not yet be established.

In a regionalized system, on the other hand, the logic of competition is one of territorial concentration. Parties are strongest in specific regional strongholds. Although each party captures votes in its bastion, they all collectively struggle to nationalize their presence. Where party politics is

highly regionalized, we may hypothesize that a party that can tap into a *territorial* advantage will have a competitive edge over other parties, since these will struggle to compete outside their bastions. Specifically, if a formerly predominant party has a consistent, countrywide subnational presence, then it is more likely to outperform its regionalized competitors in national elections. Alternatively, it may be viewed as a strategic coalitional partner for parties that have attractive national candidates but lack the ability to project a country-wide campaign.

In atomized and regionalized party systems, the type of advantage that a surviving party needs to increase the probability of revival is clear. This is because the logic of competition is fairly stable. In an atomized landscape, many of the same candidates appear across electoral cycles. In a regionalized landscape, many of the same regionalized parties compete over time. In some post-crisis systems, however, it may be difficult to identify a competitive advantage. This is the case with hyper-fluid systems. Parties and coalitions change from one election to the next, as do many of the candidates running for national office. Under such a context, a territorial advantage may be useful in one election, whereas a reputational advantage may seem more valuable in the next. Where the opposition is not consistent or coherent across time, the logic of competition will be unstable. Consequently, the parameters within which a surviving party may edge out its competitors will be difficult to identify. Revival, where it occurs, should be more idiosyncratic.

To summarize, the recovery of a party's national-electoral influence occurs within a changed party system. In the examples described above, one party system replaced another. Party-system collapse produced a complete overhaul of the system. Three different political landscapes emerged after collapse: an atomized, a regionalized, and a hyper-fluid party system. I have argued that the newly formed system defines the opportunities for revival, because it will define – in most cases – a particular logic of competition. The revival of a surviving party is more likely when it has a comparative advantage vis-à-vis its competitors in the changed party system. As we will see below, a party's resource wealth largely defines that comparative advantage.

Certainly, party revival need not occur within a completely changed political landscape. A party can revive after a crisis that does not constitute all-out party-system collapse. A single party may experience a sudden loss of national votes and wish to revive. The post-crisis political landscape will still, however, condition its chances. Revival will occur only to the extent that the party can make itself relevant within the post-crisis

political landscape, either as an independent electoral entity, a coalitional partner, or kingmaker. In assessing a party's possibility of revival, therefore, a researcher must first understand and identify the opportunities for revival in the changed party system.

On this point, it is difficult to anticipate what opportunities for revival the post-crisis party system will generate. As we see subsequently, party-system collapse in Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia generated distinctive party systems. Although "outsider" politicians were elected in all three countries, the opposition that emerged against each looked very different.⁶

It is beyond the scope of this work to fully explain the significant variation in the party systems that emerged after crisis in Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Still, we can reasonably discard the possibility that the post-crisis fates of the parties themselves had a prominent role in shaping the political landscape that emerged. This is for several reasons. For one, a common trait of each post-crisis party system was the initial absence of the formerly predominant parties from that system. Party-system collapse entails the rejection of all of the major parties (Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012). Their role in shaping the post-collapse landscape, therefore, would have been negligible.

Moreover, variations in party resource wealth across the countries of study do not correlate easily with the post-crisis landscape that emerged. For example, APRA and AP in Peru and AD in Venezuela had considerable organizational resources at their disposal at the time of collapse. All three survived as nationalized subnational entities. If their subnational survival, and the organizational resources that underpinned it, influenced the post-crisis political landscape, then we should have seen similar party-system dynamics emerge in each country. Instead, Venezuela's post-crisis party system was regionalized, while Peru's was highly atomized.

It is nonetheless puzzling that similar experiences of party-system collapse produced such different post-collapse party systems. Why, for example, was Venezuela's party system so regionalized, while Peru's was atomized? One explanation might rest on the distinct institutional arrangements that underpin each system. Venezuela is a federal country, but it had long been highly centralized (Penfold-Becerra 2004). Regional elections were introduced in the late 1980s in response to growing criticisms of AD and COPEI's monopolization of (national) power. These elections created spaces for new parties to emerge and capitalize on

⁶ The origins of these differences are of theoretical interest, to be sure, and merit further investigation.

the growing discontent (Cyr and Sagarzazu 2014). Regionally popular leaders, in particular, took advantage of the gubernatorial elections to launch their national political career. This makes sense in a federal system, which creates multiple arenas for political mobilization and turns governors into important national veto players (Gibson 2004, 9). Peru's unitary system de-incentivized a similar regionalized party-building trajectory.

The timing of the birth of the opposition parties might also matter. In Venezuela, most of the regionalized parties that emerged did so before party-system collapse and, consequently, before the hostility toward political parties fully set in. In Peru, by contrast, new parties formed *after* party-system collapse and after Alberto Fujimori came to power. Fujimori was famously anti-party. So, too, was the electorate by that point (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). It therefore made sense to craft personalized candidacies in Peru, rather than undertake the difficult work of creating parties that, in the post-crisis period, were highly unpopular.

In sum, other explanations, including the timing of party formation and the institutional framework in each country, appear to better explain the unique political landscape that emerged across the countries of analysis. We can therefore treat opportunities for revival as independent from the capacity to revive. Resource wealth does not impact the opportunities for revival. It does, however, influence the party's capacity to revive in that new party system. Let us turn now to this point.

Defining the Capacity to Revive: A Party's Resource Wealth

A party's ability to revive is conditioned by the opportunities that the post-crisis party system presents. Its likelihood of revival will also, however, be a function of its capacity to take advantage of those opportunities. Here, a party's resource wealth once again enters into consideration. The stock of resources that a party has maintained are the assets that the party has at its disposal to orchestrate revival. As explained above, not all high-cost resources will be equally valuable in a particular post-crisis political landscape. Still, where the resources impart a competitive advantage, then they can raise the probability of revival.

The Resource Wealth of Parties. A party's resource wealth defines the set of tools that it has following national-electoral crisis. As explained above, national-electoral crisis provokes a sudden reduction in a party's low-cost resource wealth. High-cost resources, however, are not likely to disappear. I argue that each type of resource provides the party

with a particular advantage for competing in national elections after crisis.

Organizational resources give a party a *territorial* advantage. A party that has active militants, party locales, and local committees may exploit that organizational structure to mount a national-electoral campaign. This is especially the case when a party's organizational resources are widespread. A relatively nationalized set of organizational resources can help a party coordinate a successful national campaign.

To be sure, organizational resources will not be equally useful across all post-crisis political landscapes. They will be of limited utility, for example, in atomized systems, where most competitors run personalist electoral campaigns and where national candidacies are divorced from subnational ones. Because national politics is separate from local politics, individuals with national political ambitions will be less concerned about fielding candidates across multiple levels of government. In this environment, an organizational apparatus may seem overly costly. Why spend the time and energy coordinating a grassroots-like campaign when a savvy marketing campaign can heighten a candidate's competitive edge?

Organizational resources are more advantageous in a competitive landscape marked by parties with established regional bastions but a much weaker presence elsewhere. A party's territorial advantage, in other words, is maximized in a regionalized party system. Unlike its competitors, a party with a fairly nationalized set of organizational resources will have a visible and active presence throughout the country. The party will have the capacity to field candidates, place polling volunteers, and coordinate campaign activities throughout the country. These resources will be extremely useful as the party carves out a strategic position in national politics.

Ideational resources, on the other hand, give a party a *reputational* advantage. A party's ideology or expertise, and indeed its brand in general, can serve as a powerful communicative device to the population. Candidates that align with the party become hallmarks of that brand. Because of this, ideational resources can solve collective action and social choice problems of candidates and voters – problems that parties without an established brand will struggle to overcome (Hale 2006).

As with organizational resources, the reputational advantage of ideational resources will be most valuable in certain political landscapes. In regionalized party systems, for example, an established brand will not be as useful as a nationalized territorial apparatus. In atomized systems, however, ideational resources can provide an important competitive edge.

In this kind of system, individual candidacies predominate. Candidates distinguish themselves to the extent that they have name recognition. An unknown candidate will have a more difficult time attracting votes than a known candidate (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016).

In this atomized landscape, a party with ideational resources can provide a candidate with immediate brand recognition. To be sure, many citizens may chafe at the party's particular brand. Still, a party that is known for something will have a major reputational advantage over new candidates, parties, or movements that have not yet established their political credentials. Voters may prefer to choose the "devil they know" over the "devil they don't." Parties with ideational resources are likely to have a competitive edge when they are the known devils in a particular candidate pool.

It is unclear whether organizational or ideational resources will be advantageous for a party seeking to revive in a hyper-fluid party system. This underscores the point that the value of each resource is largely a function of the type of competitive environment in which a party seeks revival. Revival is not impossible in a hyper-fluid system. The opportunities for revival are, however, much less clear. Therefore it is hard to know what resources a party must have. Where and if it occurs, party revival will likely have more to do with the idiosyncrasies of the electoral cycle and whether party leaders can take advantage of those idiosyncrasies given their party's resource capacity.

To summarize, in assessing a party's capacity to revive, we must consider several questions regarding its resources. First, does the party have any? If so, are they ideational or organizational? Are a party's organizational resources fairly well distributed across a territory, or are they concentrated in one area? If a party has ideational resources, what is the valence dimension or content of those resources? Second, what kind of competitive advantage must a party have to revive? Is the political landscape regionalized? Atomized? Hyper-fluid? What is the party system's logic of competition? Is there one? Finally, does the resource wealth of the party provide it with a comparative advantage given the actual party system? Where there is a convergence around resource wealth and the post-crisis party system, then the chances of revival are higher than where the variables do not converge.

Figure 3.3 depicts the likelihood of a party's national-electoral revival in the three types of post-crisis party systems highlighted here. The probability of revival is highest when a party has ideational resources in an atomized system or when a party has organizational resources in a




FIGURE 3.3 National-electoral revival scenarios

regionalized system. The likelihood is much lower when a party has ideational resources in a regionalized system or organizational resources in an atomized system. In either case, the party's potential capacity remains largely unrealized, because the value of its resources is much lower. In hyper-fluid systems, revival is difficult to systematically predict, because the value of a party's ideational or organizational resource wealth is unclear.

A (Brief) Word on Resourcefulness. Resources make revival possible. Yet, not all resource-endowed parties experience revival. This is largely because the party's resources are less valuable in the post-crisis party system. Still, even if a party's resources are valuable, they must be expended to enable revival. In other words, for resources to become resourceful (Ganz 2000), individuals must exploit them. National party leaders are, consequently, indispensable for understanding revival.

Party leaders are crucial for several reasons. They are often required to cultivate resources in the first place. Leaders decide whether to invest and in which resources. These choices can have consequences on the party's ability to adapt and grow over time (Galvin 2012). Moreover, parties do not run themselves. Their national-electoral success is in large part a function of the campaign decisions and candidate choices that leaders make. As we assess whether a surviving party will recover its national influence, we must not assume away the leaders who make this happen. Jasper's

use of a Beatriz Sarlo quote is appropriate here: "Whatever is given is the condition of a future action, not its limit" (Jasper 2004, 1).

Overall, resources must be effectively exploited (Jenkins and Perrow 1977) to increase the likelihood of revival. Leaders must have the strategic capacity to expend resources. At times, organizations can out-perform their better-resourced rivals. This was the case when it came to the mobilization efforts of two unions in California (Ganz 2000). There, one union out-performed its more resource-wealthy rival, thanks to better-informed and connected leaders. Large quantities of resources are not useful if they are squandered in unproductive ways. Resources enable revival when they are deployed strategically in a campaign.

We will see subsequently that surviving parties with strategically advantageous resources in the new party system experienced national-electoral revival. In other words, there is a positive and strong relationship between a party's resource wealth, the party system in which it competes, and the party's likelihood of revival. APRA's ideational resources gave it a reputational advantage in the atomized party system that emerged in Peru. AD's nationalized organizational resources provided it with a territorial advantage in Venezuela's regionalized party system. Both parties experienced revival. The theoretical conclusion is that resources alone – and not the resourcefulness of the party leaders – enable revival. Still, identifying the individuals that utilized each party's resources is nonetheless important. There are two reasons for this.

First, the *source* of agency can differ quite dramatically. As we see subsequently, APRA's revival was due to the party's own leadership, which tapped into its brand to orchestrate its 2001 revival. These individuals used the brand to re-introduce the party and its undisputed leader, Alan García, to the country and to define the kind of leadership the country would experience if García became president. In the case of AD in Venezuela, by contrast, the leaders of *other* opposition parties used AD's nationalized territorial apparatus to sustain their nationwide campaigns. AD's revival was a function of its role as a strategic coalitional partner in a much broader oppositional movement. Non-AD party leaders were largely responsible for the party's revival.

We cannot leave the factor of agency fully aside in explaining revival, because *who* taps into the resources can affect *how* a party revives. APRA revived as an independent entity. Its own leadership orchestrated the party's revival. AD, alternatively, revived as a coalitional partner in a larger opposition movement. This difference matters. When a party's own leadership taps into its resources, the party can exercise considerable

control over the timing, nature, and strategies that underpin its attempt(s) to revive. This is not the case when leaders from other parties or groups exploit a party's resources. In the latter example, a party must depend on others to set the revival trajectory in motion. It must cede at least some control over when, how, and if revival will occur.

There is a second reason why we cannot take party leaders for granted when it comes to national-electoral revival. In some cases of revival, the party recovers its national-electoral relevance even though it has very few high-cost resources at its disposal. Where this is the case, we should expect to see that a party revives via the strategy of reinvention. In these instances, the agential factor is crucial. With few resources of any other kind at its disposal, a reinvented party must rely almost exclusively on national party leaders to be successful. Let us examine why this is the case.

Reinvention as an Alternative Revival Strategy

In the aftermath of national-electoral crisis, a party may decide against seeking revival as an unchanged entity. Party leaders may choose to reinvent the party entirely. Reinvention entails joining forces with other parties in an effort to recover their national-electoral importance. They can, for example, merge with other parties, fusing into a new, single party organization (Bélanger and Godbout 2010). They can also join a new coalition as a majority partner. In either case, the large majority of the party leadership joins the newly formed party or coalition. Reinvention allows party leaders to bypass the difficulties of surviving and reviving as an unchanged entity.

A party successfully experiences reinvention when two conditions are met. The first condition is electoral. A newly merged party or coalition must successfully compete in national elections. Its presidential candidate will be a top finisher. In congressional elections, it will capture several seats. A successfully reinvented party recovers national influence by regaining a prominent place in national government.

The second condition is temporal. A newly merged party or coalition may acquire a high vote share in one national election cycle, but this success may only be temporary. The new group may break apart almost as quickly as it came together. Coalition partners may refuse to work together. The group's congressional bench may not coordinate on policy or legislation. For a party to successfully experience reinvention, it must compete and perform well in at least two national electoral cycles. The

organization of two successive national campaigns under the same name suggests that party leaders have invested beyond their own political ambitions to forge an enduring entity. When both conditions are met, we may conclude that reinvention has been successful.

Party reinvention may not pay off as a revival strategy. A newly formed party or coalition may perform well in one election cycle, but its longer-term viability is not assured. Failure is a real possibility. Reinvented politicians, as “old” wolves in “new” sheep’s clothing, may never fully distance themselves from the past. This is especially so if they had a prominent and/or controversial role in the previous (pre-crisis) party system. Party reinvention can therefore be risky. Moreover, once a party rebrands itself under a new moniker, its fate becomes tied to that of the new party or coalition, even though its most visible leaders will undoubtedly remain linked to the past. Consequently, a reinvented party may have to address the liabilities of senescence (Barron, West, and Hannon 1994) while also facing the liabilities that come with being new (Stinchcombe 1965).

Reinvention is risky for another reason. A party that experiences national-electoral crisis will face serious environmental hostility. A party that seeks to immediately revive via reinvention must face that hostility head-on. This bet can have short-term payoffs. A reinvented party can return to government shortly after experiencing crisis. Its influence over politics can, therefore, remain quite high. A failed attempt at immediate reinvention, however, may accelerate breakdown. A party that is electorally irrelevant on its own *and also* in a new party or coalition may confront serious obstacles to remaining influential in the political system.

Given the multiple risks associated with this type of revival, why would leaders pursue reinvention? As with other survival and revival paths, reinvention occurs as a function of the party’s resource wealth. In this case, however, reinvention is the most likely option for revival when a party has *few* high-cost resources at the time of crisis. Its organizational resources will be essentially non-existent. It will also lack any ideational resources of value. Overall, reinvention should occur when party leaders have few resources to work with and therefore little to independently leverage to survive within the new party system.

Despite the lack of high-cost resources, national-electoral crisis will nonetheless provoke an existential crisis within the party. Therefore, incentives to survive and/or revive will set in. This is especially true for leaders with high personal ambition. They may decide that the best course of action for their own political aspirations will involve leaving the “old” party behind and launching something new. By adopting a new name,

logo, and manifesto, party leaders shed their former party brand and the negative stereotypes therein. They also signal their intent to adapt to the realities of the new political system (Grzymala-Busse 2002).

To be sure, resources *are* necessary for reinvention. Most importantly, party leaders become a crucial resource (see Table 2.1). With few other resources at their disposal, the strategies of party leaders, both in terms of cultivating support and forging policy, will determine the electoral and governing success of the newly formed party or coalition. Leaders may effectively harness the discontent of a segment of the population that is unhappy with the new party system. They may also alienate that constituency by pursuing policies or ideas that run counter to its interests. The success of the newly formed party will hinge largely upon the choices of party leaders.

Despite (or, perhaps, because of) the unusual power that party leaders have for reinvention, they may nonetheless feel that the pay-offs of reinvention, in terms of recovery of national political importance, are worth the risks. This is especially true when ambitious leaders feel they have enough recognition and cachet to carry it off. An individual may believe s/he escaped the wrath of the broader population that produced national-electoral crisis. By running as a candidate under a *new* party name, she may shed her former ties to the old system while retaining her own reputational currency (Bélanger and Godbout 2010). Given the unusual agency of party leaders for reinvention, this revival strategy should occur when leaders from formerly predominant parties feel that their individual popularity transcends that of the party from which they came.

The point to underscore is that a party that seeks reinvention should have very few high-cost resources to rely upon in the aftermath of national-electoral crisis. It will therefore struggle to survive on its own. Yet, it should have a leader or set of leaders that retains the support of at least some of the population. In this situation, reinvention, however risky, may be the only viable option.

Reinvention represents a completely different path to revival than that of the resource-based strategies underscored previously. The probabilities of success will, therefore, be distinct. This is because the opportunities for reinvention are different from those that condition the likelihood of revival of unchanged party entities. Revival as an unchanged entity will be successful when a party’s resource wealth is valuable in the post-crisis party system. With reinvention, however, the newly formed party system can exacerbate the effects of poor decisions or limit the impact of wise electoral choices. It will not, however, restrict the actions of those

individuals to the extent that it restricts the value of certain high-cost resources. Party leadership is crucial to reinvention precisely because of its power in making or breaking this revival strategy.

Additionally, the timing of reinvention can be crucial for the likelihood of its success. If party leaders pursue reinvention immediately following crisis, then their association with the past may be more difficult to fully shed. As a reinvented entity, citizen antagonism and hostility toward the new party may nonetheless be strong. With time, however, negative associations may diffuse. Delaying reinvention until at least some environmental hostility has passed may increase the probability of its success. On this point, too, party leadership is important. They decide if and when reinvention occurs. Although unique in its form, reinvention, like resource-based revival, depends upon the appropriate expenditure of resources within the newly formed party system.

Conclusion

This chapter has undertaken several tasks. First, it defined party survival and revival. It identified and conceptualized different types of party survival: survival as a localized subnational entity, as a nationalized subnational entity, and in the public debate. It argued that subnational survival occurs when parties have organizational resources that it can wield to compete in subnational elections. Survival in the public debate occurs when a party has ideational resources, which allow the party to remain a credible source on topics of national interest.

The chapter also explained when and where a party might experience revival. Here, resources also matter, although their value for revival is a function of the post-crisis party system that forms. Revival occurs when a party's resource wealth provides it with a competitive advantage within that party system. Its capacity to revive must converge with the opportunities presented by the post-crisis party system. In some cases, parties have few resources at their disposal beyond a set of leaders. Here, revival may occur via reinvention. As an empirical phenomenon, revival of any kind is no small feat. Yet, it happened multiple times in the post-crisis context of Andean politics.

The Resource Wealth of Parties after Party-System Collapse

The Empirical Record in the Andes

Chapter 3 argued that high-cost resources are vital for a party that wishes to survive the trauma of national-electoral crisis. They can also increase the likelihood of revival. To demonstrate the cogency of these claims, I turn to examples of party survival and revival in the Andean region. This chapter measures the organizational and ideational resource wealth of the eight formerly predominant parties in Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Understanding the resource wealth of each party is a fundamental precursor to connecting that wealth to survival and revival. The following pages, therefore, lay the groundwork for the case studies that follow in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

High-cost resources are crucial for survival, I contend, because national-electoral crisis provokes the loss of a party's low-cost resources, including money, patronage, and elites. This was indeed the case for all eight parties under investigation. During interviews, leaders from all eight parties expressed a sudden decline in material and elite assets. The constitutional reform that Chávez oversaw in Venezuela, for example, eliminated state subsidies to political parties (Lopez Maya and Meléndez 2007). COPEI leaders were quite clear about the impact this change had: "Without money ... it was very difficult to maintain the party" (Escalona, May 3, 2011). Elite resources also diminished. Neither party could renew its national leadership structure after 1998. AD's National Electoral Committee did not have the funds to organize elections, leaving the party essentially headless (Lugo, September 14, 2010) and "dismembered" (Benitez, May 2, 2011) for years.

The three Peruvian parties also faced serious elite and material deficits. In 1992, President Alberto Fujimori unilaterally closed Congress in an