



Gender and Representation in Latin America

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CHAPTER

5 Women in Political Parties: Seen But Not Heard

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Abstract

Jana Morgan and Magda Hinojosa examine women's representation within parties as leaders, candidates, and officeholders and find that these positions are increasingly accessible to women. They argue that candidate selection procedures are important for women's presence within parties, while gender quotas and ideology matter less than we might expect. They also evaluate whether parties advocate for women's issues or employ strategies to articulate women's concerns. They find that even as descriptive representation has advanced, parties rarely offer substantive linkages for women. As a result, women are less likely to identify with parties than men. To improve women's descriptive representation in parties, they argue for better candidate selection processes, candidate training programs, and increased state funding for female candidates. To advance substantive representation, they advocate for parties to craft policy and organizational ties with women and to align gender issues with existing partisan divides, thereby integrating rather than isolating gender issues.

Keywords: Latin American politics, gender inequality, party ideology, party leadership, gender quotas, women in politics

Subject: Politics, Comparative Politics

Nadine Heredia. Susana Villarán. Keiko Fujimori. It is impossible to speak of Peruvian politics today without mentioning the names of these women, who currently lead or have recently led political parties.¹ Across the region, women occupy seats of power within parties: Cecilia Romero occupies the top seat in Mexico's *Partido Acción Nacional*, Isabel Allende leads Chile's *Partido Socialista*, and Mónica Xavier headed Uruguay's *Frente Amplio* from 2012–2016. Women are increasingly being *seen* as political actors within parties, but are they *heard*? To what extent does female presence in parties translate into making them effective agents for women's interests? This chapter presents data on women's representation within parties and discusses how this descriptive representation has generally not been associated with gains for the substantive representation of women's interests.

Latin American parties and party systems are an eclectic mix of types of organizations (e.g., mass parties, elite parties, personalist vehicles); linkage strategies (e.g., programmatic, clientelist, etc.); and patterns of interactions (e.g., conciliatory vs. conflictual, institutionalized vs. inchoate) (Kitschelt et al. 2010;

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Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Parties serve as the primary conduits for representation in democratic systems (Hagopian 1998). However for women, “parties constitute one of the most important barriers . . . to access formalized political power” (del Campo 2005, 1705). Despite the vital role of parties for representation, little work has examined how parties impose formal or informal obstacles to women’s descriptive or substantive representation, and the literature has overwhelmingly overlooked how parties behave as gendered institutions. And while parties have the potential to play a pivotal part “in correcting the current gender imbalance” in representation (Hinojosa 2012, 12), the limited existing work in this area typically focuses on individual parties or countries without attention to the significant variation in women’s representation across parties. We tackle these important issues head on.

This chapter first examines causes, by exploring women’s representation within political parties as leaders, candidates, and officeholders. We find that Latin American parties are increasingly accessible to women. Women like Nadine Heredia and Isabel Allende now lead parties, and women are obtaining other powerful (and visible) positions within parties and as representatives of their parties in public office. But are these women heard? Here there is less reason for optimism. Few parties prioritize or even maintain organizational ties to women’s groups, and women’s concerns rarely figure prominently in party platforms. While a handful of party systems in the region feature parties that take progressive stances on social issues primarily affecting women, many countries have no party speaking out on such issues. Given these patterns, it is not surprising that women are much less likely to identify with parties than their male counterparts, and women’s descriptive representation has done little to counteract this trend. The consequences, therefore, for women’s substantive representation are dire. The full incorporation of women into political parties remains a challenge; the final section of this chapter provides suggestions for political parties to incorporate women into their organizations both descriptively and substantively.

Causes: Women’s Underrepresentation in Political Parties

We begin by assessing the extent to which Latin American parties offer opportunities for women to participate within their organizations.² Academic work examining women’s representation within parties has been limited (but see del Campo 2005; Franceschet 2005; Macaulay 2006). While data on candidates and officeholders are more accessible, the difficulty in collecting information on female party membership and leadership has limited our understanding of women within parties. Thus there is a considerable gap in our knowledge of both the causes of women’s representation within parties and the consequences these patterns have for the ways that women relate to parties and policymaking.³ Because parties often act as gatekeepers that control who gains access to positions of political influence, structure the kinds of issues that achieve salience in the political arena, and serve as the principle avenues through which citizens obtain voice and influence in the formal policy process, understanding women’s ability to attain positions of influence within parties offers important insight into the dynamics of women’s descriptive and substantive representation not only in political parties but across many domains of politics and policymaking.

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Women in their parties: Leadership posts and women’s sections

In order to examine women’s representation within parties, we draw on original data from GEPPAL, the Gender and Political Parties in Latin America database, compiled by the Inter-American Development Bank and International IDEA, which is a uniquely comprehensive source of cross-national data on women in parties. The database provides information for all parties that obtained a minimum of 5% representation⁴ in the lower (or only chamber) of congress in eighteen Latin American countries for 2009, which allows us to assess the variation that exists across countries and parties.

The degree of women's representation in these leadership positions offers an indication of parties' commitment to gender equality (Sacchet 2009a). But, as Table 5.1 demonstrates, women are less likely than men to be represented in the highest echelons of power, both as leaders within parties and as nominees for and representatives in national-level public office. Women's presence in parties' highest national-level executive committees (column 1), averages just 23% across the region despite the fact that a significant number of parties have instituted internal quotas to boost women's representation in these positions.⁵ We observe tremendous variation here both across countries—with Panama averaging just 13% and Costa Rica at 41%—and within countries. For instance, in Costa Rica, the best overall performer, *Partido Unidad Social Cristiana* (PUSC), reports women in just 25% of its leadership posts while *Partido de Liberación Nacional* (PLN) boasts gender parity. On the opposite end of the spectrum, some parties in the region reported no women in their organization's top decision-making body. Of course, these data only tell us whether women occupy leadership positions; they do not offer insight into women's actual influence. And not all of these positions are equal, as Teresa Sacchet has indicated, "women tend to be selected for positions that are labour-intensive but not for those of real political clout." (Sacchet 2009a, 158).

Table 5.1 Women's Participation in Latin American Parties

	% Leaders, Female (Total Leaders)	% Congressional Candidates, Female	% Legislators, Female (Total Elected)	Existence of Women's Section
ARGENTINA				
<i>Afirmación para una República Igualitaria</i>	44% (9)	39%	50% (14)	
<i>Partido Justicialista</i>	12% (75)	38%	36% (67)	✓
<i>Partido Socialista</i>	31% (13)	44%	36% (33)	✓
<i>Propuesta Republicana/Compromiso Cambio</i>	20% (5)	38%	50% (6)	✓
<i>Unión Cívica Radical</i>	12% (24)	40%	29% (17)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	17%	40%	37%	
BOLIVIA				
<i>Movimiento al Socialismo</i>	60% (10)	20%	14% (72)	✓
<i>Poder Democrático y Social</i>	—	17%	19% (43)	
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	40%	19%	17%	
BRAZIL				
<i>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira</i>	14% (37)	15%	5% (66)	✓
<i>Partido Democrático Trabalhista</i>	14% (21)	11%	4% (24)	✓
<i>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro</i>	17% (12)	11%	10% (89)	✓
<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>	33% (27)	12%	8% (83)	✓
<i>Partido Progressista</i>	8% (90)	8%	7% (41)	✓

<i>Partido Socialista Brasileiro</i>	23% (31)	13%	22% (27)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	16%	12%	8%	
CHILE				
<i>Partido Demócrata Cristiano</i>	18% (11)	11%	10% (20)	✓
<i>Partido por la Democracia</i>	20% (10)	26%	24% (21)	✓
<i>Partido Radical Social Demócrata</i>	8% (12)	0	0 (7)	✓
<i>Partido Renovación Nacional</i>	0 (7)	16%	16% (19)	
<i>Partido Socialista</i>	10% (10)	29%	20% (15)	✓
<i>Unión Demócrata Independiente</i>	15% (13)	8%	12% (33)	
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	13%	14%	15%	
COLOMBIA				
<i>Partido Cambio Radical</i>	0 (6)	17%	10% (20)	
<i>Partido Conservador Colombiano</i>	18% (11)	11%	3% (29)	
<i>Partido Liberal Colombiano</i>	30% (10)	13%	11% (35)	✓
<i>Partido Social de Unidad Nacional</i>	— (11)	15%	14% (29)	
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	34%	13%	9%	
COSTA RICA				
<i>Acción Ciudadana</i>	33% (3)	49%	41% (17)	✓
<i>Liberación Nacional</i>	50% (6)	44%	40% (25)	✓

<i>Movimiento Libertario</i>	44% (9)	42%	17% (6)	✓
<i>Unidad Social Cristiana</i>	25% (4)	44%	40% (5)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	41%	45%	38%	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC				
<i>Partido de la Liberación Dominicana</i>	12% (24)		24% (96)	✓
<i>Partido Reformista Social Cristiano</i>	16% (31)		14% (22)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	14%		19%	
ECUADOR				
<i>Movimiento País o Acuerdo País</i>	25% (12)	49%	41% (59)	
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	17%	48%	33%	
EL SALVADOR				
<i>Alianza Republicana Nacionalista</i>	23% (13)	15%	12% (32)	✓
<i>Frente F. Martí para la Liberación Nacional</i>	—	37%	31% (35)	✓
<i>Partido de Conciliación Nacional</i>	—	27%	0 (11)	✓
<i>Partido Demócrata Cristiano</i>	—	31%	20% (5)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	25%	26%	19%	
GUATEMALA				
<i>Gran Alianza Nacional</i>	9% (23)	18%	8% (37)	
<i>Partido Patriota</i>	15% (33)	13%	10% (29)	✓

<i>Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza</i>	25% (28)	16%	18% (51)	
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	16%	19%	12%	
HONDURAS				
<i>Partido Liberal de Honduras</i>	31% (13)		24% (62)	✓
<i>Partido Nacional de Honduras</i>	33% (12)		21% (56)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	38%		24%	
MEXICO				
<i>Partido Acción Nacional</i>	12% (17)	33%	23% (206)	✓
<i>Partido de la Revolución Democrática</i>	50% (18)	28%	21% (127)	✓
<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i>	22% (36)	30%	16% (103)	✓
<i>Partido Verde Ecologista de México</i>	18% (11)	30%	53% (19)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	23%	31%	22%	
NICARAGUA				
<i>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional</i>	—	32%	32% (38)	✓
<i>Movimiento Renovador Sandinista</i>	22% (9)	21%	20% (5)	✓
<i>Partido Liberal Constitucionalista</i>	22% (9)	20%	8% (25)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	20%	28%	19%	
PANAMA				

<i>Cambio Democrático</i>	20% (10)	12%	17% (12)	✓
<i>Partido Político Panameñista</i>	7% (15)	3%	0 (21)	✓
<i>Partido Revolucionario Democrático</i>	11% (9)	14%	8% (26)	✓
<i>Unión Patriótica</i>	18% (17)	20%	25% (4)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	13%	12%	8%	
PARAGUAY				
<i>Asociación Nacional Republicana</i>	13% (90)	16%	7% (30)	✓
<i>Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico</i>	15% (55)	18%	10% (29)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	16%	26%	11%	
PERU				
<i>Cambio 90</i>	29% (7)	37%	38% (13)	
<i>Partido Aprista Peruano</i>	27% (15)	36%	22% (36)	✓
<i>Partido Nacionalista del Perú</i>	43% (7)	43%	33% (45)	
<i>Partido Popular Cristiano</i>	25% (16)	39%	29% (17)	✓
<i>Unión por el Perú</i>	35% (26)	43%	33% (45)	✓
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	31%	39%	30%	
URUGUAY				
<i>Asamblea Uruguay-Frente Amplio</i>	13% (15)	19%	12% (8)	
<i>Mov. de Participación Popular-Frente Amplio</i>	13% (15)	16%	15% (27)	

<i>Partido Nacional-Alianza Nacional</i>	0 (5)	13%	5% (21)
<i>Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio</i>	39% (23)	31%	18% (11)
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	19%	21%	10%
VENEZUELA			
<i>Movimiento Primero Justicia</i>	20% (41)	13%	0 (—)
<i>Partido Socialista Unido</i>	32% (31)	17%	18% (143)
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	21%	15%	18%

SOURCE: Data compiled by authors from GEPPAL Database: <http://www.iadb.org/research/geppal>.

NOTE: The data contained here are for 2009. We present data *only* for those parties that obtained 5% of seats both in the elections immediately prior to 2009 (when GEPPAL collected their data) and in the most recent elections as of February 2015. When available for the most recent elections, data was obtained from Adam Carr's Election Archive: <<http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>>. For Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, legislative breakdown by political party was obtained from each country's legislative website. All websites were accessed in February 2015. "% Leaders, Female" refers to the percentage of female members of the party's national executive committee. The national averages are weighted based on the total seats on each party's national executive committee (not relative party size). "% Congressional Candidates, Female" refers to the percentage of female candidates that were nominated for lower houses/single houses of the congress. "% Legislators, Female" refers to the percentage of female legislators in the lower house/single house of the congress. "Existence of Women's Section" refers to whether a women's section exists according to party statutes, as recorded in GEPPAL. The data was not available for the following parties: Chile's *Unión Demócrata Independiente*, Ecuador's *Movimiento País o Acuerdo País*, and Uruguay's *Partido Nacional-Alianza Nacional*.

Of course, presence in party leadership is not the only avenue for women's descriptive representation; some parties in the region maintain women's sections that might offer some opportunity for influence (as shown in the final column of Table 5.1). Moreover, there is considerable variation in the role these women's sections play, while some offer meaningful opportunities for representation, others merely serve as tokens or even as institutions meant to keep women in subservient roles "isolated from the main partisan structures" (Friedman 2000; Sacchet 2009a, 155; Saint-Germain and Metoyer 2008). In fact, the presence of women's sections does not enhance women's opportunities to fill influential party leadership positions, obtain candidacies, or get elected to office (Roza 2010). Regardless, Roza argues that these sections can have an impact and that "the profile of many women's units throughout the region is changing, from the traditional conception that assigned women's sections functions that mirrored their roles in the private sphere to sections charged with promoting gender equality and equal opportunities" (Roza 2010, 200).

p. 81 Women's sections may prove a double-edged sword, capable of advocating for women, yet also ↵

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keeping women away from true nuclei of power. Thus far, however, women's sections remain a largely untapped resource for identifying and recruiting female candidates and promoting women's interests within parties.

Parties and women's representation as candidates and officeholders

How frequently do parties nominate women for elected office? How often are female candidates successful? Data in Table 5.1 provide insight into the variation that exists across and within countries (even where national quota laws are in effect), presenting the percentage of each party's nominees and elected legislators who were women. The cross-national and within-country variation is significant and does not neatly follow patterns that might be predicted by the distribution of legislated gender quotas. In Chile, absent quotas,⁶ female candidacies range from none to nearly 29%, and women's representation in the lower house ranges from zero to over 20%. In Brazil, which uses weak gender quotas, we still observe considerable variation with the *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (PTB) having no female representation, while nearly a quarter of *Partido Socialista Brasileiro* (PSB) deputies were women. While gender quotas have had transformative effects on legislatures in the region (see Schwindt-Bayer and Alles, chapter 4, this volume) and to a lesser extent on women's representation in subnational government (see Escobar-Lemmon and Funk, chapter 6, this volume), women's incorporation into politics is often hampered, as the introductory chapter notes, by "other candidate selection, electoral, appointment, and arena-specific rules and norms."

Considering female candidacies together with women's abilities to gain seats illuminates conditions under which female candidacies are (un)successful. While women's representation as officeholders frequently mirrors their presence as candidates, the correlation is not perfect and deviating cases can be instructive. For example, in a closed-list system, if female candidacies outpace female officeholders this likely indicates that parties are placing women in unelectable spots. In open lists, a gap between female nominees and female officeholders could indicate voter bias against women. Additionally, if parties nominate women who are electorally unsuccessful, parties may be making rhetorical commitments to women's representation by selecting female nominees without making concomitant organizational changes designed to increase women's electability, such as providing women with the training or financing necessary to compete.

Somewhat surprisingly given that, as the introductory chapter explains, leftist parties have long been seen as promoting women into politics, women's representation as nominees and elected officials does not appear to be associated with the ideological positioning of their party. In a statistical analysis, Roza (2010) found that left parties were no more likely than those on the right to nominate or elect women, a conclusion also supported by Htun (2005). While left parties have more women in leadership than those on the right, this has not translated into more candidacies or elected positions for women. Like quotas, ideology offers an inadequate understanding of the variation we see.⁷

We have sparse information on women's participation as candidates and officeholders by party at the subnational level in Latin America (see, however, Escobar-Lemmon and Funk, chapter 6, this volume). While recent work has examined women's representation as candidates and officeholders in subnational legislatures by party (Barnes 2016) and in local elections (Hinojosa 2012; Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012; Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014), this research has been largely constrained to single-country studies. The unfortunate lack of data on women's electoral participation at the local level may mask some of women's political incorporation, since women may participate more locally where they see themselves as

“tending the needs of [their] big family in the larger *casa* of the municipality” (Chaney 1979, 21) and where participation may be more compatible with family responsibilities.⁸

What can parties do? Strategies to increase women’s descriptive representation

While parties often lament the dearth of qualified or interested women to explain their failure to identify female nominees and their inability to meet external (or even internal) quotas, this supply side argument appears to have little merit. In Latin America, changes in women’s domestic roles as well as increases in women’s educational attainment and labor force participation are indicative of a large and growing pool of political talent, which parties could access (Hinojosa 2012). Additionally, parties frequently point to gender bias by voters as a rationalization for lack of female representation, but research on Latin American parties suggests voter bias is limited (Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014). Despite parties’ claims to the contrary, neither supply-side nor demand-side factors explain women’s underrepresentation. Instead, recent research has emphasized that candidate recruitment and selection processes are essential to explaining women’s underrepresentation as both candidates and officeholders (e.g., Baldez 2004; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2008; Hinojosa 2009, 2012; Roza 2010). Indeed more academic attention needs to focus on the role parties have played in limiting women’s political representation in Latin America.

These gendered patterns of candidate selection, which frequently snub capable women, are at odds with gender quota laws now common throughout the region. Since Argentina first adopted a gender quota in 1991, the use of quotas spread quickly through Latin America—today, only Guatemala lacks quotas for national elections.⁹ Quotas have had important implications for women’s representation in Latin American legislatures (see chapter 4 in this volume), but they have also shaped parties’ candidate selection procedures and internal recruitment practices across the region. Where parties are reticent to overhaul old recruitment and nomination strategies, meeting gender quotas has proven challenging (Hinojosa 2012). Parties have actively defied quota provisions, especially where effective enforcement mechanisms are lacking. Where parties fear sanctions for failing to comply, they “exploit loopholes in order to violate the spirit—if not the letter—of the laws” (Hinojosa and Piscopo 2013). For example, parties have tried to meet quota obligations by nominating women as alternates (*suplentes*) rather than titleholders (*titulares/principales*); in Mexico, where the law forbade this practice, parties imposed upon female titleholders to resign in favor of male alternates following the election (Hinojosa and Gurdíán 2012).

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On the other hand, some parties have instituted their own quotas to address women’s underrepresentation in positions of power, and in many cases, party-level affirmative action measures pre-date national quotas. However, internal quotas have rarely yielded the expected results, as parties often fail to comply with their own rules. In Latin American parties that apply gender quotas to internal leadership posts, women on average occupy 19% of executive committee seats, while women fill 18% of leadership posts in parties without such measures (Roza 2010, 117).¹⁰ Rather than strengthening women’s representation, these measures frequently provide only lip service to gender equality.

Parties have taken other steps to address women’s descriptive underrepresentation, such as providing women training to encourage their leadership potential and promote their effectiveness as candidates. By 2009, 65% of the parties included in the GEPPAL database were specifically training women, and some parties had rules in place to reserve a portion of their funding to promote female candidacies. While none of the largest parties in Argentina, Ecuador, or Guatemala have funds dedicated to training women, all four major parties examined in Costa Rica do, as do three of five Colombian parties and two of five Honduran parties. Some quota legislation has provided incentives for parties to engage in this type of training. For example, the Colombian quota rewards parties that nominate women by extending additional state funding (Hinojosa and Piscopo 2013), and the new Chilean quota will provide financial resources to parties based on

the number of women they elect, incentivizing the nomination of women and the promotion of strong female candidacies.

While women comprise half the Latin American electorate, they remain minorities within parties. Women are inequitably represented in party leadership positions, and parties have underutilized or marginalized women's sections. The extreme variation in women's access to candidacies and elected positions is evidence that gendered candidate recruitment and selection procedures coexist with and contradict quota legislation aimed at leveling the playing field.

Consequences for Women's Substantive Representation in Parties

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Despite some uneven progress for women in terms of descriptive representation within their political parties, women often find little substantive voice in the region's parties. To flesh out this claim, this section takes on two primary questions. First, to what extent do parties in the region serve as meaningful arenas of representation by advocating for women's issues or employing strategies designed to incorporate women's concerns? Second, to what extent and through which mechanisms do women in the region connect to parties? To address these motivating questions and thereby assess the extent to which Latin American parties offer substantive representation for women, we consider several kinds of evidence including expert surveys, the content of party programs, and public opinion data.

A considerable body of research has focused on exploring the ways in which subaltern groups in Latin America attain representation through parties. Analyses of party linkages with unions and the working class have long been a mainstay of this scholarship (Collier and Collier 1991; Levitsky 2003), and recently attention has turned to analyzing how the urban poor, the informal sector, and historically marginalized racial and ethnic groups (do not) find voice through parties (Anria 2016; Birnir 2007; Morgan 2011; Roberts 2003; Van Cott 2005). And while extensive work has analyzed how women attempt to achieve influence through social movements and women's organizations (Baldez 2002; Ewig 1999; Jaquette 1994), little research has focused on the extent to which parties link to these organizations or represent women's substantive concerns (despite parties' significance for promoting or inhibiting advancement of these interests [Osborn 2012]). The few studies that have analyzed Latin American *parties'* substantive ties with women focus on a few countries or issue domains, limiting our ability to assess regional patterns or draw broad conclusions (Haas 2001; Htun and Power 2006; Macaulay 2006).

This deficit in scholarly attention may be partially attributable to patterns discussed below, which indicate that most parties have made few overtures toward representing women's distinct concerns and that the region's party systems rarely manifest left-right polarization on feminist issues. Existing scholarship suggests that parties give little attention to women's issues when developing platforms or legislative agendas. When parties have reached out to women, they have primarily done so to advance party goals, not prioritize women's concerns (Haas 2001; Hipsher 2001, 140–146; Sacchet 2009a). Even in the rare system like Brazil where party elites hold (pro- and anti-) feminist attitudes that polarize along the left-right divide, tangible progress on feminist issues is limited (Htun and Power 2006). At the same time, women's organizations often favor autonomy over ties to parties, which they have perceived as gendered institutions that subordinate women's interests to other concerns (del Campo 2005; Franceschet 2005). In fact, Latin American parties are frequently depicted as barriers or gatekeepers as opposed to champions of women's concerns (Blofield 2006; Franceschet 2005, 85–90; Macaulay 2006). When women have advanced their substantive interests, they have done so most often through women's movements or through networks of individual female legislators collaborating across party lines, typically promoting descriptive representation or feminine concerns that affect all women (Haas 2010; Hipsher 2001, 150–156; Sacchet

2009a). Such cross-party or extra-party strategies have often proven more effective than working through parties, which are gendered institutions that tend to thwart rather than advance women's representation.

Here we flesh out the claim that Latin American parties have largely failed to develop substantive appeals designed with women in mind. The findings suggest that few parties maintain organizational ties to women's groups; women and their concerns rarely figure prominently in party platforms; and many countries feature no parties with feminist stances on issues like abortion and divorce. Supporting the argument made in the volume's introductory chapter, parties throughout Latin America remain gendered institutions in and through which women have made only limited gains. Perhaps not surprisingly then, women in the region are much less likely to identify with political parties than men.

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Limited party efforts to connect with or advocate for women

To examine the extent to which parties strive to offer meaningful representation for women, we consider two potential linkage strategies (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Luna 2014). The first concerns party organizational ties to women's groups; the second emphasizes policy-based appeals. Organizational linkages through trade unions, business associations, or civil society groups have historically offered a major mechanism for interest representation in many Latin American party systems (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Morgan 2011). Parties often develop formal or informal organizational ties to groups that aggregate major interests, with the simultaneous goals of solidifying their electoral base, maintaining societal control, and offering representation or privileged access to certain sectors of society. Emblematic of this pattern are the close ties between organized labor and some parties of the left and between business or religious interests and some parties of the right (Collier and Collier 1991; Gibson 1996). As women's organizations have emerged and achieved (varying degrees of) influence across the region, parties may endeavor to form organization-based linkages with potential female supporters.

To explore parties' use of organizational ties as a mechanism for connecting to women, we use data from the Duke University Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) expert survey. Two questions in the survey considered party organizational linkages. The first asked country experts which group each party connected to most strongly overall, and the second asked which type of group each party used to distribute benefits to supporters. Experts selected responses from a list of six groups: unions, business and professional associations, religious organizations, ethnolinguistic organizations, neighborhood organizations, and women's organizations. Table 5.2 lists all parties identified by at least one expert as having either type of organizational linkage to women's groups.¹¹ It is immediately apparent that few parties prioritize women as a target for this sort of linkage. Only seven parties in the region (from five countries) have strong ties to women's groups, and fifteen utilize women's organizations to distribute benefits. In more than a third of the countries, not a single expert identified even one party as prioritizing either sort of organizational linkage with women.¹² Of the nineteen parties with some ties to women's organizations, five supported a female presidential candidate in the election immediately preceding and/or immediately following the expert survey.¹³ Numerous others that backed female candidates do not appear on the list, including those that supported Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Argentina), Noemí Sanín

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(Colombia), Laura Chinchilla (Costa Rica), and Martha Roldós (Ecuador). Thus, experts were not especially likely to identify parties with female presidential candidates as having ties to women's groups.¹⁴ Likewise, parties with more women in party leadership (see Table 5.1) were no more likely to be viewed as connecting to women's organizations—only three parties with ties to women's groups surpass the regional average female share of party leadership posts: *Partido Socialista Brasileiro* (Brazil), *Alianza Republicana Nacionalista* (El Salvador), and *Fujimoristas* (Peru). Thus, having women in positions of leadership within parties and as

party nominees for president seems to do little to promote party organizational ties to women's organizations.¹⁵

Table 5.2 Latin American Parties with Linkages to Women's Groups

Country	(1) Parties with strong ties to women's groups ^a	(2) Parties that use women's groups to distribute benefits to supporters ^b
Argentina	—	—
Bolivia	—	—
Brazil	—	<i>P. Progressista (PP)</i>
	—	<i>P. Socialista Brasileiro (PSB)</i>
Chile	<i>Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)</i>	<i>Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)</i>
		<i>Partido por la Democracia (PPD) (2)</i>
Colombia	—	<i>Polo Democrático Alternativo</i>
Costa Rica	—	—
DR	—	—
Ecuador	—	—
El Salvador	—	<i>ARENA</i>
		<i>FMLN</i>
Guatemala	<i>P. Patriota (PP)</i>	<i>P. Solidaridad Nacional (PSN)</i>
	<i>P. Solidaridad Nacional (PSN)</i>	
Honduras	—	—
Mexico	—	<i>P. Verde Ecologista de Méx. (PVEM)</i>
Nicaragua	<i>Liberal</i>	—
Panamá	<i>P. Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)</i>	—
	<i>P. Arnulfista (Panameñista)</i>	
Paraguay	<i>P. País Solidario (PPS)</i>	<i>P. País Solidario (PPS)</i>

	—	UNACE
Peru	—	<i>Alianza por el Futuro (Fujimoristas)</i>
	—	<i>Frente del Centro (AP, Somos Perú)</i>
Uruguay	—	<i>P. Nacional</i>
	—	<i>P. Colorado</i>
Venezuela	—	—

SOURCE: Author's calculations based on Duke Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) expert survey data, collected May 2007 through February 2009.

NOTE: Only parties receiving at least 5% of the vote in the most recent legislative election are listed. Some parties with more than 5% of the vote may have not been included in the DALP data, which include only those parties with seats in the legislature at the time of the expert survey. Where parties or alliances have changed names since the time of the survey, the name at the date of the survey is listed here, with additional identifying information in parentheses. Numbers in parentheses after party name indicate number of experts that listed women's organizations, if more than one.

- a Based on a question asking experts to identify the type of organization with which each party maintained the strongest ties: 1) unions, 2) business and professional associations, 3) religious organizations, 4) ethnic or linguistic organizations, 5) urban or rural neighborhood associations, and 6) women's organizations. Listed parties are those for which at least one expert specified women's organizations as their first mention.
- b Based on a question asking experts to identify the type of organization each party trusted most as their agents to select recipients and deliver benefits to their electoral base, using the same set of response options as above. Parties listed are those for which at least one expert specified women's organizations as the most important channel for benefit distribution.

A closer examination reveals that surprisingly few parties with ties to women's organizations are on the left; rather many maintain right-leaning tendencies, including Chile's *Unión Demócrata Independiente*, Peru's *Fujimoristas*, and Uruguay's *Colorados*. The only left-leaning parties identified as prioritizing ties with women's groups are Paraguay's *Partido País Solidario*, Brazil's *Partido Socialista Brasileiro*, Chile's *Partido por la Democracia*, Colombia's *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, and El Salvador's *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*. For most of these parties, linkages with women's groups are benefit driven, not substantive. Thus, in the few parties with ties to women's organizations, these linkages most likely occur either through conservative/religious groups or via material benefits rather than substantive feminist appeals.

Latin American parties also do not generally emphasize women's concerns during election campaigns. Although women constitute a large portion of the electorate (with female turnout matching male turnout throughout the region), issues such as domestic violence, female employment, and educational opportunities for women rarely figure prominently in campaign platforms. Analysis of recent platforms issued by major parties in four countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—support this claim.¹⁶ Using the campaign platforms for all the parties/candidates that contested the most recent presidential election in each country,¹⁷ we conducted content analysis to identify how often each manifesto mentioned terms related to women and gender. We also assessed the number of times these terms were used specifically with reference to issue positions, as opposed to generic uses like “the men and women of

Argentina.” As a point of reference, we also counted terms related to employment, an economic issue typically emphasized by left-leaning parties.

p. 89 Table 5.3 presents the percentage of words in each manifesto that falls into three categories—total gender mentions, relevant gender mentions, and total employment ↵

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mentions.¹⁸ Chile’s *Partido Socialista*, with Michelle Bachelet as its nominee, is the only party for which women’s concerns were a major focus and mentions of gender slightly surpass employment references. Since taking office, this rhetorical emphasis has translated into policy, with Bachelet pushing feminist goals including gender quotas and abortion reform. Apart from this exception, the evidence emphasizes how women’s issues receive considerably less rhetorical attention in party manifestos than employment concerns. In fact, the majority of parties in the table mentioned jobs and employment twice as often as they referenced women. One party, Argentina’s *Frente para la Victoria*, made absolutely no mention of women or gender, despite having Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as its candidate. Thus having a female candidate at the helm does not consistently promote greater attention to women’s concerns.

Table 5.3 Frequency of Attention to Women's Issues in Major Party Manifestos: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay

Country	Year	Party (Candidate)	Gender mentions (Total) ^a	Gender mentions (Relevant) ^b	Employment mentions (Total) ^c
Argentina	2011	<i>Frente Amplio Progresista</i> (Binner)	0.14%	0.12%	0.30%
	2011	<i>Frente para la Victoria</i> (Fernández de Kirchner)	0	0	0.56%
	2011	<i>Unión Cívica Radical</i> (Alfonsín)	0.12%	0.07%	0.19%
Brazil	2010	<i>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira</i> (Serra)	0.11%	0.08%	0.16%
	2010	<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i> (Rousseff)	0.13%	0.02%	0.44%
Chile	2013	<i>Partido Socialista – Nueva Mayoría</i> (Bachelet)	0.16%	0.13%	0.14%
	2013	<i>Unión Demócrata Independiente—Alianza</i> (Matthei)	0.08%	0.05%	0.21%
Uruguay	2014	<i>Frente Amplio</i> (Vázquez)	0.16%	0.13%	0.26%
	2014	<i>Partido Nacional</i> (Lacalle)	0.02%	0.01%	0.16%

SOURCE: Author's calculations based upon original party programs provided by the Comparative Manifestos Project. Manifestos are from the most recent presidential election for which data are available.

NOTE: Parties included are those that contested the second round runoff, with the exception of Argentina where no second round was needed, and the top three vote-getters are included.

- a Cells indicate the percent of total words in the manifesto that were from the following gender-related term list: *mujer, género, femenino, sexo*.
- b Cells indicate the percent of total words in the manifesto that were from the gender-related term list and that were used in a context dealing with women's issues (as opposed to just mentioning women in a general way).
- c Cells indicate the percent of total words in the manifesto that were from the following set of employment-related terms: *empleo, desempleo, trabajo*.

Among countries and parties in the region, this particular subset of party systems might be especially likely to include campaign platforms advocating on behalf of women's concerns. Three of the elections analyzed featured female candidates—Fernández de Kirchner (Argentina), Bachelet (Chile), and Rousseff (Brazil). Each of these party systems have serious competitors on the left, with left or center-left parties victorious in the analyzed elections (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009), and these countries are among the more

developed, secular, and gender-egalitarian in the region.¹⁹ If the platforms from this set of campaigns largely failed to prioritize women's concerns, it is unlikely that the more male-dominated candidacies and right-leaning party systems in the rest of the region would break from this pattern (Ewig 1999; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Moore and Vanneman 2003; Morgan and Buice 2013).

In examining the discussion of women's concerns more closely, several platforms, including those of Binner in Argentina, Bachelet in Chile, and Vázquez in Uruguay, maintained consistently feminist stances when discussing issues of particular relevance for women. In other cases, such as Uruguay's *Partido Nacionalista* and Argentina's *Unión Cívica Radical*, the discussion focused on feminine issues pertaining to women's traditional roles in the private sphere. This pattern offers some evidence of a left-right divide with more left-leaning parties favoring feminist articulations of women's concerns and right parties focusing on feminine issues. But across the board, women's issues of either type take a back seat to other concerns, and even having female presidential candidates at the helm has only rarely led to the transformation of party priorities toward feminist or even feminine concerns, a pattern that aligns with the expectations described in chapter 1 of this volume.

Expert surveys concerning party issue positions also support the view that many party systems fail to prioritize feminist concerns. The DALP survey asked experts to identify parties' positions on abortion rights, and Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) had experts evaluate parties' social policy stances pertaining to abortion and divorce as well as homosexuality and euthanasia. Table 5.4 displays all parties that experts identified as progressive on these issues. Less than half the countries have parties that favor

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abortion rights for women, and among those listed, only Colombia and Mexico feature parties with strong pro-choice stances. When considering a broader set of social policies (some of which are not women's issues), more parties appear progressive. However, even using this measure, seven systems lack even a single party taking permissive stands on issues like divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. On the abortion issue specifically, having women in positions of party leadership seems to make a difference. All the parties evaluated as taking feminist positions on abortion had either a female presidential candidate in the most recent election or women occupying at least one-third of party leadership posts, well above the regional average of 23% (GEPPAL 2014).²⁰ This pattern regarding abortion suggests that women's presence in parties has opened limited space for representing women through parties on this specific issue, providing some support for the argument made in the introductory chapter, which expects arenas like parties to provide more maneuvering room for advancing women's interests than other arenas of representation.²¹ However, aside from the abortion dimension, we observe little correlation between female party leadership and pro-female advocacy by parties.

Table 5.4 Latin American Parties with Progressive Positions on Women's Rights

Country	Parties with progressive stances on abortion ^a	Score, 10-pt scale	Parties with progressive stances on social issues ^b	Score, 20-pt scale
Argentina	<i>Frente para la Victoria</i>	3.7	<i>Frente para la Victoria</i>	6.5
			<i>Unión Cívica Radical</i>	7.4
Bolivia	—		—	
Brazil	<i>Partido Socialista Brasileiro</i>	3.4	<i>Partido Socialista Brasileiro</i>	5.7
	<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>	3.8	<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>	5.4
Chile	<i>Partido por la Democracia</i>	2.8	<i>Partido por la Democracia</i>	4.0
	<i>Partido Socialista</i>	3.2	<i>Partido Socialista</i>	3.5
Colombia	<i>Polo Democrático Alternativo</i>	2.1	<i>Polo Democrático Alternativo</i>	4.0
			<i>Partido Liberal</i>	7.6
Costa Rica	<i>Movimiento Libertario</i>	3.9	<i>Movimiento Libertario</i>	7.1
DR	—	—	—	
Ecuador	—		—	
El Salvador	—		<i>FMLN</i>	6.3
Guatemala	—		<i>Encuentro por Guatemala</i>	7.6
Honduras	—		—	
Mexico	<i>PRD</i>	1.8	<i>PRD</i>	4.5
Nicaragua	—		—	
Panamá	—		—	
Paraguay	—		<i>Partido País Solidario</i>	3.0

Peru	—		—	
Uruguay	<i>Frente Amplio</i>	3.4	<i>Frente Amplio</i>	5.7
Venezuela	—		<i>MVR (PSUV)</i>	7.2

SOURCE: Abortion data from DALP expert survey, collected May 2007 through February 2009. Social issue data from Wiesehomeier and Benoit Parties and Presidents in Latin America expert survey, collected 2006–2007.

NOTE: On both items, lower scores indicate more progressive stances. Only parties receiving at least 5% of votes in the most recent election are included.


- a Question asked experts to place parties on a 10-point scale where 1 indicates strong agreement with the statement that “The woman has the right to decide whether or not to interrupt her pregnancy” and 10 indicates agreement with the statement that “Life is sacred, only God should decide.” Parties are shown if expert scores averaged less than 4.
- b Question asked experts to place parties on a 20-point scale where 1 indicates the party favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and euthanasia, and 20 indicates the party opposes liberal positions on these issues. Parties are included here if expert scores averaged less than 8. Exact score shown in parentheses.

Overall, just a small set of Latin American parties connect with women through organizational linkages, prioritize women’s concerns in their platforms, or take feminist policy positions. Thus, many women may view parties as failing to promote substantive representation on matters that specifically concern them.

Gender gaps in partisan ties

Given parties’ relative inattention to women and their concerns, it is not surprising that women across the region are significantly less likely than men to identify with a party. Based on data from the AmericasBarometer survey in eighteen Latin American countries, 38% of men and 34% of women indicated that they sympathized with a party in 2014,²² and this statistically significant gender gap dates to the mid-2000s.²³ We also calculated the gender gap in partisanship for each country, presented in Figure 5.1. Negative values indicate women sympathize with parties at lower rates than men. Only in Panama are women significantly more likely than men to affiliate with a party, while Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala maintained negative gender gaps. In these systems, women were significantly less likely to identify with a party than were men, despite the fact that half these countries had women heading a major party’s ticket in the most recent presidential election.

Figure 5.1




Gender Gap in Partisan Identification, 2014. Note: Negative values reflect lower levels of partisan affiliation among women than men. Black numbers indicate a significant gender gap; gray numbers indicate insignificant gap.

*Woman was a major presidential candidate in closest election preceding or during 2014.

p. 93 To explore whether these gaps in partisan identification might be explained by gender differences in socialization experiences, levels of economic and personal autonomy, civic and political engagement, ideology, or gender attitudes, we use data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer²⁴ to conduct hierarchical logit analysis of partisan affiliation in eighteen Latin American countries. The intent is to assess how the gender gap varies after taking account of these potential explanations, drawn from previous research seeking to explain gender gaps in other attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Desposato and Norrander 2009; Klein 1984; Manza and Brooks 1998; Morgan 2015; Morgan and Buice 2013), as well as scholarship analyzing Latin American partisanship (e.g., Baker et al. 2016; Domínguez and McCann 1995; Lupu 2015; Medina Vidal et al. 2010; Morgan 2007; Pérez-Liñán 2002). In essence, we evaluate how the gender gap changes after controlling for each of these potential sources' difference between women and men. Figure 5.2 summarizes the results of this analysis, focusing on the effect of being female. The first row presents the coefficient for being female controlling for a basic set of individual demographics as well as some country-level features frequently thought to explain cross-national variations in partisanship.²⁵ The analysis reveals a significant negative effect for female estimated at -0.27 .

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Figure 5.2



Multivariate Analysis of Gender Gaps in Partisanship Notes: Figure displays coefficient for female from hierarchical logit analysis of party affiliation in 18 Latin American countries, using 2012 LAPOP data. Negative values indicate that women are less likely to identify with a political party than men—traditional genders gaps.

*Gray bars indicate effect with p-value < 0.05. **Black bars indicate effect with p-value < 0.01.

All models include random coefficients for respondent sex as well as contextual-level controls for polarization of the party system, effective number of parties in the system, and whether the survey was conducted within 6 months of a national election, the decision to include or exclude these contextual variables has no effect on the gender gap. Models 2–9 include demographic controls for respondent age, rural residence, church attendance, education, household wealth, and skin color.

Model 1 includes sex plus contextual controls and individual demographics. Model 2 adds mother’s education. Model 3 drops mother’s education and includes parenthood. Model 4 drops parenthood and adds measure of autonomy—employment, marriage and gender equality in household incomes. Model 5 drops the autonomy measures and adds measures of media attention, political knowledge and civic engagement. Model 6 drops the engagement items and measures of left-right ideology, ideological extremism, and ideological proximity to closest party in system. Model 7 drops ideology items and adds measures of attitudes about women’s political leadership, abortion and views of female employment. Model 8 includes all variables in previous models except mother’s education. Model 9 includes all items, except the attitude measures and mother’s education.

Rows 2 through 7 present the logit coefficients for being female—that is, the effect being a woman has on partisan affiliation—after introducing six sets of individual-level independent variables. These variables assess how differences in demographic characteristics and childhood socialization (row 2), adult socialization (row 3), autonomy (row 4), political and civic engagement (row 5), ideology (row 6), and gender attitudes (row 7) shape the size and significance of the partisan gender gap. Row 8 depicts the coefficient based on all of these categories, and row 9 shows all the categories except gender attitudes. Examining the direction and significance of the coefficient for respondent sex in models 2–9 reveals that the gap in partisan identification cannot be fully explained by gender differences in these factors. In every model, being a woman is associated with significantly lower odds of identifying with a party.²⁶


p. 95 Only in model 5, which controls for news attention, political knowledge, and civic engagement, do we observe a decline in the size (but not the significance) of the coefficient, suggesting a small amount of the gender gap is explained by differential levels of civic and political engagement between men and women. But much of the gap remains unexplained. Conversely, in model 6, which controls for left-right ideology, ideological extremism, and ideological proximity to a major party in the system, the magnitude of the sex coefficient goes back up. Even though women are *more* likely than men to be ideologically proximate to a major party and *less* likely to be ideologically extreme—two factors associated with higher rates of partisan identification—women remain significantly less likely to affiliate with a party. This pattern aligns with evidence presented above suggesting parties fail to advocate for policy concerns that are particularly relevant for women. Regardless of their different levels of education, employment, autonomy, or engagement, women are significantly less likely to affiliate with parties than men, even though women are generally ideologically closer to viable parties. Women seem to see parties as less concerned with the issues that interest them or as failing to deliver in ways that matter for their lives.

Moreover, evidence from the AmericasBarometer regarding men and women's divergent preferences suggests that if parties pay attention to men on gender issues, they are likely to be ignoring women. Latin American women hold more feminist stances than men with regard to employment equality, gender quotas, and abortion rights.²⁷ The gap in attitudes toward women's employment is particularly wide and achieves significance in all but two countries in the region, Ecuador and Panama.²⁸ Yet among female respondents, support for employment equality has no significant relationship with partisan identification under any model specification. This issue, where women's interests diverge most from those of men and the majority of women hold feminist views, plays no role in motivating partisan attachments. This evidence lends further support to the claim that women's detachment from parties is at least somewhat rooted in their limited substantive representation through the region's party systems.

These conclusions align with previous research suggesting that many Latin American women do not find substantive representation within the existing set of political options and instead opt for descriptive representation, even when female candidates hail from ideologically distant parties (Morgan 2015). Additional analysis based on the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey, which included questions about party efforts to distribute clientelist benefits, reveals that women are also less likely to be targeted as the beneficiaries of clientelism. Parties are neglecting women in this simplest exchange.

We also considered how contextual factors pertaining to variations in women's economic opportunities and descriptive representation across the region might shape the observed gender gap in partisanship. However, we found no effects for the Gender Inequality Index, secularism, female labor force participation, presence of a female presidential candidate, percentage of female party leaders, and percentage of female legislative candidates (both based on GEPPAL data). Including these country-level indicators had no effect on the gender gap, and interacting them with the respondent's sex revealed that none influenced men and women's partisanship differentially.²⁹ The only contextual-level variable with a significant effect was the share of professionals who are women. Interacting the presence of female professionals with the respondent's sex reveals that having more women in higher status employment helps alleviate the gender gap in partisanship. As depicted in Figure 5.3, the gap in partisanship disappears in countries where women constitute at least 53% of professional workers. Four countries in the region surpass this threshold: Panama, Uruguay, Argentina, and Venezuela. Thus while the overall picture concerning women's substantive representation via parties is grim, this evidence suggests that having substantial female presence in higher-status jobs is associated with a slightly different dynamic, wherein women feel less disconnected from the political system. Society-wide female empowerment in the economic realm translates into greater political empowerment.

Figure 5.3



Effect of Being Female Conditioned on Share of Female Professionals

NOTE: Solid line indicates estimated effect; dotted lines indicate 90% confidence interval.

Challenges to Women’s Full Incorporation by and within Parties

p. 97 Women today are visible actors within political parties. The data presented here on women’s descriptive representation within and by parties points to an ever-increasing presence of women, but variation in women’s access to candidacies and legislative positions suggests that parties have tremendous power to either incorporate or ignore women. Too many women are being left behind because parties are willing to disregard them. Women’s gains are largely the result of gender quota laws that have *required* parties to seek out female candidates, but women continue to face parties that ignore their participation. Women within parties are suffering from neglect. Parties do not proactively adopt recruitment practices that would allow them to attract women. Likewise, parties fail to connect with women’s groups and do not actively promote policies that appeal to women. This neglect appears to have substantive implications. The gender gap in party identification is evidence of the disconnect between women and parties in the region, and few factors, with the exception of women’s economic empowerment (through professional employment) and informational empowerment (through media exposure), seem to bridge this gap.

What can be done to promote the full incorporation of women both descriptively and substantively? Candidate recruitment and selection procedures underlie efforts to increase descriptive representation. With regard to descriptive representation, parties must first create and maintain gender-disaggregated membership rolls, which will allow them to identify female talent. Second, parties can establish search committees charged with recruiting women for internal leadership positions or external candidacies. Parties with women’s sections engaged in promoting equality can task these organizations with drawing up lists of potential candidates and forging relationships with organizations promoting women’s interests, which may offer a broader recruitment pool. Third, quotas should also require parties to allocate funds for female candidate training and support. After all, quotas succeed not when they generate candidates, but when they beget legislators.

Women's substantive incorporation requires that parties address women's issues in their platforms and integrate women's concerns into their policymaking efforts. However, women's policy concerns appear largely absent when analyzing party platforms, and few parties take feminist stances in policy debates surrounding issues like abortion and divorce, which have profound implications for women's lives. Parties of the left, in particular, are well primed given their ideological affinities to construct promising relationships with organizations that advance women's policy concerns, but they are no more likely than parties of the right to nominate women, promote organizational ties with women's groups, or attract female partisans. In fact, women's ideological and policy interests seem largely disconnected from the contours of partisan contestation—although women are on average more ideologically proximate to parties than are men, women are less likely to affiliate with parties and less likely to vote. Moreover, female voters in Latin America frequently fail to see their concerns as integrated into existing axes of debates concerning ideology and policy (Morgan 2015). Thus women's concerns seem largely orthogonal to the established patterns of party competition, and as a result many women remain on the sidelines. This disconnect between women's concerns and the contours of policy debates suggest that parties must take intentional steps to craft policy and organizational linkages with women and to integrate women's priorities into their policy goals. Efforts in this vein could help move party systems toward aligning gender issues with existing partisan divides. Promoting this alignment would help assimilate women's issues into established patterns of competition and facilitate the pursuit of pro-female policies, rather than isolating gender issues from traditional debates that typically focus on economic, distributional, and security concerns.

p. 98 Existing research on women's descriptive and substantive representation has largely overlooked political parties. Future work must identify the obstacles that exist within parties that prevent women's advancement in positions of power, assess the degree to which women are allowed to exercise power once they access leadership roles within party organizations, and explore whether women are able to wield positional power the way that their male counterparts do. Additionally, we should examine the extent to which accessing power via quotas marginalizes women within their parties, as Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) indicate. Moreover, the role that women's sections play within parties has been vastly understudied, and more work must be done to uncover the evolving role of these groups. We must also give attention to understanding why greater descriptive representation for women has, thus far, not translated into more meaningful substantive representation by parties. In other regions, women's issues map onto the left-right divide, which has the potential to facilitate articulation of women's concerns in policymaking, but most Latin American party systems fail to politicize women's issues, which often relegates them to the sidelines of political debate. In considering women's substantive representation, we should explore instances of success and failure to understand how women's concerns may become politicized and articulated through parties or whether extra-party mechanisms for representation (e.g., social mobilization) may be more effective.

Women's gains are clearly documented. Greater numbers of female candidates and legislators, however, should not obfuscate the fact that women remain underrepresented descriptively and that women's substantive concerns have been largely ignored by political parties. Women may be seen, but they are still not heard.

Notes

1. Heredia is president of *Partido Nacionalista Peruano*, Villarán is president of *Partido Descentralista Fuerza Social*, and Fujimori is president of *Fuerza Popular*.
2. There have been a few women-only parties in Latin America. Roza (2010) documents fourteen women's parties, which emerged between 1900 and 1970, often to promote female suffrage efforts.
3. We especially need more work examining "feminist groups who refuse all forms of interaction with parties" (Franceschet

- 2005, 12) and how this affects women's representation within parties.
4. For countries in which fewer than five parties surpassed this threshold, data for the five largest parties were collected.
 5. The national executive committee represents each party's highest administrative authority; these go by a variety of names (e.g., *Comité Ejecutivo Nacional* or *Directorio Nacional*). Average is a simple cross-national average.
 6. Chile adopted a gender quota in 2015 that will first be applied in the 2017 elections.
 7. This may be because parties of both left and right fail to represent women's issues and policy priorities, a point developed below.
 8. The spread of subnational quotas has also led to increases in women's local level representation in recent years. Some work has indicated that parties are less likely to meet their internal quotas at the subnational level (see Sacchet 2009a).
 9. Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have not yet applied national level quotas, but will be doing so in upcoming elections. Venezuela previously used a gender quota, but it was ruled unconstitutional in 2000; in 2015, the National Electoral Council decreed that a gender quota would be applied in the December elections.
 10. The differences are not statistically significant.
 11. Chile's *Partido por la Democracia*, a party with a record of providing opportunities for women (Franceschet 2005, 77, 98–99), was the only party for which multiple experts specified women's organizations as the most important group.
 12. By contrast, multiple experts identified many parties as having ties to unions and business associations.
 13. These parties are Brazil's *Partido Progressista* and *Partido Socialista Brasileiro*, which supported Rousseff in 2010; Chile's *Partido por la Democracia*, which backed Bachelet in 2006; Panama's *Partido Revolucionario Democrático*, which supported Herrera in 2009; and Peru's *Fujimoristas*, which backed Chávez in 2006 and Fujimori in 2011.
 14. Four women were elected president during the period under consideration (2005–2012); several others were major party nominees. But many parties that supported these candidates did not have ties to women's groups.
 15. This pattern does not align with the argument made in the introduction to this volume, which anticipates that parties are an arena in which women's presence is expected to promote women's issues.
 16. The Comparative Manifestos Project graciously provided the party manifestos.
 17. In Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the most recent election was a runoff. In Argentina, Fernández de Kirchner won outright, so we present data for the top three competitors in the first round. For Brazil, the same two parties contested the 2010 and 2014 runoffs. Manifestos were only available for 2010, and we use those data here.
 18. See notes in Table 5.3 for list of gender and employment-related search terms.
 19. Based on data from the UNDP's Human Development Report and the AmericasBarometer survey.
 20. This is similar to the finding in Schwindt-Bayer and Alles, chapter 4 (this volume), where female legislators are more likely to support abortion rights than are male legislators.
 21. The only caveat is the case of Colombia's *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, for which we lack data concerning the gender composition of the party's executive committee.
 22. This gap is statistically significant, $p < 0.01$.
 23. The question taps partisan identification: "At this time, do you sympathize with a political party?" Data from GEPPAL, which offer party membership rates by gender for eight countries in the region, do not point to a similar gender gap in membership. However, party membership rolls are frequently unreliable. This, together with the lack of region-wide data, limits our willingness to draw strong conclusions from GEPPAL membership data.
 24. We use the 2012 survey because it included several questions about gender norms and attitudes not asked in 2014.
 25. This model, as well as all subsequent models in the figure, includes a random coefficient for respondent sex as well as contextual-level controls for polarization of the party system, effective number of parties in the system, and whether the survey was conducted within 6 months of a national election. Including these variables allows for more accurate model specification but has no effect on the observed gender gap.
 26. Additional analysis, which we do not present here, also indicates that most of these factors do not have differential effects among women and men. The only significant interaction with respondent sex is for attentiveness to news, which reduces the gender gap.
 27. While women in the region are on average more supportive of reproductive rights than men, there are several countries where the reverse is true.
 28. The question asks whether men should be given priority for employment when jobs are scarce.
 29. Full results available upon request.