TOTALITARIAN and AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES



Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes

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

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—Juan J. Linz

Further Reflections on Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes

Facing the prospect of the publication of a study written twenty-five years ago, inevitably I feel ambivalent.[1] So much has happened both intellectually and on the political scene that there is the temptation to rewrite, extend, and add to the original text. At the same time, I feel that the original work has value just as it was written in 1973–1974. Within the limitations of space imposed then by the editors of the *Handbook of Political Science,* the work is in some way the centerpiece of a trilogy including *Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Linz, 1978)* and *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The three cover the period between 1914 and 1989, which François Furet (1999), Ernst Nolte (1987), and Eric Hobsbawm (1994) have analyzed as the shortened twentieth century and the age of totalitarianism.

The 1978 book and my work on fascism (Linz, 1976, 1980) could be seen as part of the present book insofar as they contribute to our understanding of why and how democracies broke down and nondemocratic regimes became established, as well as why some democracies survived. The work on democratic transitions could well be the last chapter, since it deals with the crisis of the regimes studied in the present book, their breakdown, and the transition to stable or fledgling

*All citations in this chapter refer to the notes and bibliography (pages 38–48) following the chapter. In subsequent chapters, citations refer to the notes and bibliography at the end of the book.

democracies. Although my writings on fascism were not related to the German debate on the theory of fascism as an alternative to the study of authoritarianism (Kraushaar, 1997), I hope they contribute to our understanding of one of the great antidemocratic movements of this century. I underline the focus on fascist movements, since I share, to a large extent, De Felice's (1975) distinction between fascism as a movement and as a regime.

Many scholarly efforts to substitute fascism for totalitarianism as a category for describing or understanding the Nazi regime were based largely on Marxist, more or less sophisticated theories of fascism. Simultaneously, new empirical comparative research on fascist movements—their successes and failures, their leaders, members, and social bases—was in progress from a non-Marxist or strictly historical perspective (Lacqueur, 1976; Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust, 1980; Griffin, 1991; and the monumental work by Stanley Payne, 1995, that also includes the fascist regimes until their demise). My own writings on fascism were part of the latter effort.

The relatively short section on sultanistic regimes in the original *Handbook* essay has been expanded by Houchang Chehabi and myself (1998) in a long introduction to a collection of essays dealing in detail with that type of regime. Sultanism is a regime type that should be seen as clearly distinct from authoritarian regimes in their various manifestations, a point that escaped some readers of my original work. Mark Thompson (1995) has written an excellent monograph on the Marcos regime in the Philippines from this perspective.

When I wrote on totalitarianism in the early 1970s, the intellectual community was questioning the concept and ready to abandon it for good and bad reasons. Among the latter was the largely hopeless debate about the association of the concept with the polemics generated by the Cold War, ignoring its intellectual origins before World War II. Another mistaken reason was that the concept did not allow us to differentiate Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism. I never doubted the need for such differentiation, and I hope that I contributed to an appreciation of it in the *Handbook* essay. But I also felt strongly that a simple dichotomy between democratic regimes and nondemocratic rule obscured the distinctiveness of the totalitarian phenomenon.[2] More recently, Sartori (1993) has argued against a simple dichotomy of democratic and nondemocratic regimes.

A legitimate reason for questioning the concept of totalitarianism, one that I tried to take into account, was that by the 1970s and thereafter

it did not adequately capture the political reality of Soviet-type regimes. I paid attention to this fact by reviewing the growing literature on changes in communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. But I did not formulate as clearly as I would later the distinctive characteristics of what I call "post-totalitarian political systems." In part this was the result of my sheer exhaustion after undertaking the comparative analysis of all types of nondemocratic regimes; but it also was due to the nature of a contribution to a handbook intended to reflect the state of the art. (A few scholars tried to apply my analysis of authoritarian regimes to late communist systems, an approach that could contribute some insights, but one that I found misleading.)

With the liberalization in Eastern Europe, scholars and activists there discovered the Western literature on totalitarianism (Rupnik, 1984). There was a strange resurgence of the totalitarianism approach being applied to systems that at one time were clearly totalitarian but that, in my view, were now better analyzed as post-totalitarian (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Thompson, 1998). Although in the West some scholars wanted to ditch the concept of totalitarianism as politically tainted by the Cold War—these scholars emphasized the positive aspects of communism compared to the totally negative view of fascism and particularly Nazism—paradoxically, but understandably, opposition forces in Eastern Europe (with the significant exception of several authors writing on Poland [Djilas, 1993; Staniskis,1986]) were discovering the fruitfulness of the totalitarianism perspective. In fact, many opponents of authoritarian regimes, for example in Spain, felt that to characterize the regimes as authoritarian—instead of totalitarian—would serve to legitimize them.

Since my thinking about the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes was initially a reflection of my knowledge of the politics of Franco's Spain—particularly from the late 1940s to the early 1960s—a number of critics in Spain have stressed the totalitarian character or tendencies in early phases of the Franco regime (Ramírez, 1978). Some did not ever surrender the totalitarian label for the regime, perhaps because they felt that it gave greater moral legitimacy to their opposition. Ironically, this position is the reverse of that held by those who would question the category totalitarian as a result of the Cold War. I never would deny the totalitarian ambitions of the Spanish Falange and the totalitarian tendencies of the Franco regime during the hegemony of the Axis powers in Europe. I would, however, stress the legacy of limited pluralism in the origin of the regime, which Franco

subordinated to his personal power and designs. This personalization frustrated the creation of a true and modern totalitarian regime. Javier Tusell's (1988) excellent study of Franco during the Civil War tells us much about the origins of Franco's power and his regime, which made genuine totalitarianism unlikely, except in the event of an Axis victory in World War I (and perhaps the displacement of Franco).[3] I also refer the reader to Stanley Payne's (1987, 1999) excellent history of the Falange during the Franco years, which shows the complex relation between the Caudillo and the party, and to my own work on the transformation of the single party (Linz, 1970). In addition, studies of the elites of the regime have described in detail its limited pluralism (Miguel Jerez, 1982; Amando de Miguel, 1975; Viver Pi-Sunyer, 1978).

As I developed in my essays in Daalder (1997) and Söllner et al. (1997), my commitment to the concept of totalitarianism is based on an intellectual need to distinguish a particular historical form of regime and society from other nondemocratic polities. It is not based as much on the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism, which I considered from the start to be obvious, nor on Hannah Arendt's emphasis on terror, but focuses instead on a regime form for completely organizing political life and society.

The historian François Furet (1999) reiterated the need to retain totalitarianism as a distinctive type when he wrote:

> Stalinized Bolshevism and National Socialism constitute the two examples of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes. Not only were they comparable, but they form a political category of their own, which has become established since Hannah Arendt. I am well aware that this notion is not universally accepted, but I have yet to discover a concept more useful in defining the atomized regimes of societies made up of individuals systematically deprived of their political ties and subjected to the "total" power of an ideological party and its leader. Since we are discussing an ideal type, there is no reason why these regimes must be identical or even comparable in every way; nor need the characteristic in question be equally prominent throughout the history of such regimes. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia were two different universes. Nazi Germany was less totalitarian in 1937 than it was in 1942, whereas Stalinist terror was more virulent before and after the war than during the war. But this does not preclude the possibility that both regimes, and they alone, set in motion the destruction of the civil order by the absolute submission of individuals to the ideology and the terror of the party-state. It was only in these two cases that the mythology of the unity of the people in and by the party-state, under the leadership of an infallible Guide, killed

> millions and presided over a disaster so complete that it destroyed the history of two nations, the Germans and the Russians, making their continuity all but inconceivable. . . .
>
> From a "totalitarian" perspective, the relation between the two regimes refutes the apparent simplicity of their comparison along ideological lines. Nazi Germany belonged to the family of Fascist regimes; and Stalin's Russia to the Bolshevik tradition. Hitler imitated Mussolini; Stalin followed Lenin. Such a classification is supported by the history of ideas, or of intentions, for it distinguishes two revolutionary ambitions—one founded on the particular, the nation or the race, the other on the universal, if we accept that the emancipation of the proletariat prefigures that of all humanity. This classic point-by-point comparison of the two ideologies does not rule out the possibility that either one of them constituted a closed system, based on an immanent interpretation of human history and offering something like salvation to all those suffering the ravages of bourgeois egoism. (pp. 181–181)

I never would question the need for systematic comparison and the highlighting of the specific differences (as well as similarities) between the Soviet- and Nazi-type regimes within the genus totalitarianism. Nor do I dispute the need for a nuanced comparative analysis of communist totalitarian systems, particularly between the Soviet Union and China and also between those two giants and other systems like Cuba, North Korea, Cambodia, and the East European countries. I have insisted that Poland was, for many years before 1989, closer to the authoritarian regime type than the totalitarian or the standard post-totalitarian. The limits on terror in Cuba influenced my thinking toward the view that totalitarianism did not necessarily require terror on the scale of the Soviet Union, and the same would be true for the DDR (East Germany).

Totalitarianism and Post-totalitarianism

In the case of the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent other East European communist regimes, scholarly questioning of a simplified model of totalitarianism, together with the realities of the post-totalitarian regimes, led to the emergence of more sociological- and economics-based analyses to replace the political approach. The emphasis of modernization theory, in particular, was on industrialization, occupational and educational development, welfare state policies, and a presumed social contract between rulers and the people. At a later stage, attention

turned to the failures of the modernization model of economic and social change: first, stability was attributed to the success of modernization; later, crisis and a breakdown to stagnation and the loss of dynamism and the capacity for innovation (Müller, 1997). In these perspectives, political and institutional structures, which in my view were and continued to be central, lost salience.

I would never argue that the more sociological and economic analyses were not legitimate (and to a greater or lesser extent, empirically valid); but I do argue that they did not provide the key to understanding political stability or crisis in these regimes. Totalitarianism was stable—not only due to coercion, though that was an important factor—during periods of both economic hardship and growing economic success, and post-totalitarianism survived for a long time during the increasingly serious signs of crisis. That crisis, particularly in Eastern Europe, became more acute after Khrushchev's 1956 "secret" speech denouncing Stalin; and changes in those communist regimes ultimately were conditioned by a change in the Soviet leadership. That leadership, after considerable delay, initiated a political response that aimed at reform. But, somewhat as de Tocqueville wrote about the *ancien régime,* when reform finally was seriously considered, the crisis became even more acute. The unintended consequences of Gorbachev's actions did not lead to the survival of a reformed system, but to the break-up and breakdown of the the Soviet Union (Brown, 1996). The regime collapse, while perhaps accelerated by social and economic changes, ultimately was triggered by the political decisions of the political leadership—a leadership that long ago had lost faith in the totalitarian utopia and its ideologically defined goals, lost the capacity to mobilize the masses, and lost the will to use violence when challenged on the periphery of the system (Friedheim, 1993). The loss of capacity to use force fits into a Paretian type of analysis, and the loss of ideological faith at different levels can be analyzed in terms of Weberian concepts of legitimacy.

In my work with Alfred Stepan (1996) on the transition from post-totalitarianism to democracy (which did not include the failed democratizations), we limited ourselves to distinguishing post-totalitarian regimes from both authoritarian regimes and the previous totalitarian regime. We did not enter into a detailed analysis of the change from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism, although we did point to different paths and degrees of change in the different European communist countries. Certainly much of the sociological literature on social changes in those countries, the structure of the economy (as analyzed, for example, by Zaslavskaya's [1984] Novosibirsk School), and the politico-administrative structures

(like the work of Jerry Hough [1977]) would be relevant in this context. A systematic comparative study of society, economy, and politics in the post-totalitarian phase in different countries deserves top priority. The study of the legacy of the earlier totalitarianism on that phase and the continuing legacies from totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism in the new and the failed democracies would be challenging.

The lesson to be learned from the study of the politics of post-totalitarianism is, to quote Klaus Müller (1997) in his work on neototalitarianism theory, "the stress it lays on domination and its specific irrationalities, variables which were indeed neglected by mainstream sociology and, after the Soviet breakdown, are ignored by liberalist optimism of neoclassic reform programs."

Was Fascist Italy Totalitarian?

I have been hesitant to characterize the Italian fascist regime as totalitarian, even though the term was invented by opponents of the regime to characterize it and assumed later by the fascists themselves (Petersen, 1996). I wrote of "arrested totalitarianism" to indicate not only the clearly totalitarian intention and conception of the fascists, but also the limitations that Italian society and certain institutions—the monarchy, the army, the church—imposed on its ambitions. Unlike Hannah Arendt, I did not reach that position on the basis of the limited terror, the smaller number of victims (particularly deaths after the takeover of power, until the later years of the war), since I had not included terror as a defining element of totalitarianism. However, more recent work by Italian scholars on the ideological commitment, the workings of the regime, the weakness of the institutions putting any limit on the party hegemony, and the personal power and sacralization of Mussolini could convince one of the more totalitarian character of the regime. Mussolini's statement quoted on pages 166–167 of this book was perhaps more an excuse for his failure than a description of the circumstances under which his regime developed for many years.

As Emilio Gentile (1986) summarizes the position of the great scholar de Felice:

> Fascism was never completely totalitarian; firstly, because it did not adopt mass terror and the concentration camp system; secondly, because it did not impose the supremacy of the party on the State, but brought about, instead, the "depoliticization" of the PNF (Partito Nazional Fascista) and its subordination to the State and to the *duce;*

> finally, because it never aimed "at a complete transition from the State based on right to the police State." In short, the fascist political system should be defined as an "imperfect totalitarianism." (pp. 200–201)

Gentile, however, writes:

> There has been a fascist conception of totalitarianism, and this cannot be overlooked. Once one attributes a "totalitarian tendency" to fascism, which distinguishes it from traditional authoritarian regimes, one then has to study how this tendency originated, how it was formed in reality, and how it operated to modify reality, conditioning the lives of millions of men and women in the process. The failure of fascist totalitarianism is not a proof of its non-existence. The gap between myth and achievement is not an argument against the importance of myths in the politics of fascism and in its conception and mode of organization of the masses. (p. 201)

He concludes:

> Consequently, an exact classification within one or other category is not possible. If authoritarian fascism characterized the construction phase of the "regime," it was totalitarian fascism, developing in fascism's second decade in power, which provided the dynamism and the goal of "transforming the State." (p. 203)

Placing Other Nondemocratic Regimes

I never intended the *Handbook* essay to be an exhaustive comparative analysis of all nondemocratic regimes, partly due to the lack of prior monographic research and, in a few cases, difficulty in finding an adequate conceptualization (for example, in the complex and fluid case of Mexico). In the meantime, it has become easier to incorporate Japan and Cuba in the discussion.

Japan

Japan, between the failure or breakdown of party democracy (Scalapino, 1953) and the postwar democratization under Allied supervision, had not been included in the comparative study of nondemocratic regimes. Much of the debate among scholars hinged on its characterization as a fascist regime—military fascist, emperor fascist—from

more or less Marxist perspectives. That approach fails since there was no fascist movement, no fascist civilians taking power, and the reception of only some parts of fascist ideology. The commitment to the imperial legitimacy, including even the formal Meiji constitution among other factors, limited the possible rise of true fascism. However, as Kasza (1995, 1999) has pointed out, the global fascist *Zeitgeist,* while not producing a fascist movement and party state in Japan, had considerable impact on some of the policies of the military-bureaucratic-intellectual elites who assumed power between 1937 and 1945 and on some efforts at social mobilization. Kasza, describing this authoritarian, *Kakushin* (i.e., renovationist) right, has noted its similarities with authoritarian mobilizational policies on the right (and the left) in other countries. Indeed, he argues for the characterization of certain authoritarian military-bureaucratic regimes as *Kakushin* regimes. His review of the literature on Japanese politics in the 1930s once more shows the need to keep totalitarian and authoritarian regimes distinct, as well as the importance of the fascist *Zeitgeist* (and models) without overextending the term "fascist" to characterize a wide range of nondemocratic and noncommunist regimes.

Cuba

Although the *Handbook* essay was written when the Castro regime had consolidated its power, it did not include a reference to Cuba except in a long footnote. I likely found the topic too close and too polemical at the time. Most of the early studies of the revolution focused on its utopian elements, its social achievements, and the hopes associated with breaking free of dependency on the United States and pursuing independent economic development and even industrialization. Later the focus was on the hostility to U.S. imperialism. Even when some analysts had already noted the frustration of hopes for democracy, the positive social changes and popular support and mobilization were seen to compensate. The massive outmigration (12 percent of the population, mostly to the United States and Spain) limited the scale of repression, although a recent summary shows the extent of state terror and the similarity to the Soviet model in the patterns of repression, including the harsh punishment of former revolutionaries turned dissidents (Fontaine, 1997). Almost no scholarly effort was made to place the system in a comparative perspective. The hostility to the concept of totalitarianism precluded its use, although in my view the basic elements

were there. I see the indisputable charismatic appeal of Castro and his links with the Latin American tradition of *caudillismo* as no obstacle to characterizing the institutionalization of the regime and its policies as totalitarian. The question is to what extent the charisma and the nationalist appeal are still the basis of what we might characterize as a post-totalitarian regime.

Castro's political survival after the fall of the communist regimes that had supported him has raised questions of whether, when, and how a transition to democracy will take place in Cuba. The many papers on the subject focus on the creation of capitalist enclaves, particularly in tourism, the greater tolerance of private economic activity, the dollarization of part of the economy, occasional tolerance of some dissidence, the new *modus vivendi* with the Catholic Church after years of conflict, and some speculations about the attitude of the armed forces. The analyses and speculations turn on the nature of the post-totalitarian character of the regime and the potential for transition (Mujal-León and Saavedra, 1977; Krämer 1993, 1995; Centeno and Font, 1996).

Cuba presents us therefore with an almost complete cycle, from the revolutionary overthrow and abdication of a sultanistic dictator, to a provisional government that some hoped would lead to democracy, to the consolidation of a dictatorship that in the 1970s could fit perfectly into the totalitarian type, to a process of transition to post-totalitarianism by decay, societal conquest, and partial and reluctant liberalization (Perez-Stable, 1999). Some of the best conceptual analyses deal with this last phase, characterized as charismatic or *caudillo* post-totalitarianism. While the earlier phases—the takeover by Castro, the failure of the provisional government, and particularly the totalitarian phase—were not placed in a comparative perspective, the opposite is happening with the post-totalitarian phase.

Traditional Authority as Distinct from Modern Authoritarian Regimes

Also in the category of "other nondemocratic regimes" are some of the traditional monarchies. These include Saudi Arabia; some like Kuwait with oligarchic democratic institutions; Morocco and Jordan, now perhaps starting processes of democratization; Nepal until the democratic transition in 1990–1991; and Bhutan. Without analyzing the politics of these countries, I want to note that the basis of legitimacy of the nondemocratic rule is traditional (at least for parts of the population and the elites), and that therefore these regimes should not be confused with modern authoritarian regimes.

There are those who call Latin American authoritarian regimes or sultanistic regimes "traditional"; some even do so in the cases of Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal. This interpretation is fundamentally flawed, however, since the basis of legitimacy in the regimes is not traditional dynastic legitimacy.

Excursus on the Scholarly Literature of Recent Decades

In the twenty-five years since publication of the *Handbook of Political Science*, much has been learned about some of the nondemocratic regimes around the world. It would be foolish to attempt to summarize those developments here, since there are other works that accomplish that task. For example, Volume 2 of the *Traité de science politique*, edited by Madeleine Grawitz and Jean Leca (1985), includes excellent essays by L. Ferry and E. Pisier-Kouchner, P. Ansert, K. D. Bracher, H. Carrère d'Encausse, and J. L. Domenach on different totalitarianisms and by G. Hermet on authoritarianism. The recent essay by Archie Brown (1999) is an excellent source of work done in the United Kingdom. It is impossible to refer in this limited space to the flood of books and articles on Nazi rule that have appeared; the anthology edited by Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (1983) offers an interesting selection and a selected systematic bibliography. More recently, Eckhard Jesse (1996) has compiled an outstanding reader that includes writings on totalitarianism from different perspectives.

With the exceptions I have already noted and a few others, the work in the last twenty-five years has been mostly excellent historical monographs and descriptive country studies. With the opening of the Soviet archives, we can expect additional work along these lines. Such work would allow us to understand better the different phases of Soviet totalitarianism from its inception after the revolution to the Stalinist period, the real meaning of Khrushchev's reforms (which can be seen either as a process of liberalization or as an attempt to revitalize totalitarianism without terror), the years of detotalitarianization (by default more than by intent) under Brezhnev (Bialer, 1980), and the active reforms by Gorbachev that led to the breakdown of the Soviet Union and to democratization.

While Italian archives have been open for decades, political scientists have not added much to our systematic knowledge of the nature and transformation of Italian fascist rule, from a theoretical perspective,

that would allow us to understand better why totalitarianism was ultimately arrested in Italy. We do have, however, the monumental historical work of Renzo de Felice and the interesting writing of another historian, Emilio Gentile, mainly on the ideological origins of the regime. The Franco regime also has been the subject of excellent historical research that illuminates some of the origins of its limited pluralism, as well as excellent studies of the regime's elite. For Portugal, the work of Antonio Costa Pinto places Salazar's regime in the broader context of authoritarian European politics and the rise of fascism, focusing on Portugal's small fascist party and its fate under authoritarian rule. Manuel de Lucena (1976) has written an excellent study of Portuguese corporatism. There is still much scholarly work to be done by historians and social scientists on the nondemocratic regimes in Latin America, beyond the recent focus on transitions to democracy.

There have been some valuable newer studies of authoritarian nonfascist and even antifascist regimes: Ben-Ami (1983) on the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in Spain; Kluge (1984) on Austria; Lucena (1976), Wiarda (1977), Schmitter (1979), and Costa-Pinto (1995) on Portugal; Özbudun (1995) on Turkey; Paxton (1972) on Vichy France; Stepan on Brazil (1973) and Peru (1978); Wynot (1974) on Poland; Lieven (1973) on the Baltic states; Jowitt (1978) on Romania; Liddle (1996) on Indonesia; Winckler on China (1999). The most important contribution to the debate on the new authoritarianism in Latin America, largely generated by O'Donnell's thesis of bureaucratic authoritarianism, is the book edited by David Collier (1970), with contributions by, among others, Albert Hirschman and Fernando Henrique Cardozo. The breakdown of military regimes in South America and Greece has led to new thinking about the military in authoritarian regimes. Alfred Stepan (1988) formulated the distinction between regimes in which the "hierarchial" military assumed power through its top leadership and those where a "nonhierarchical" military (i.e., officers of lower rank) assumed power, displacing their superiors, as happened in Greece. This distinction became very important in the analysis of the role of the military in the transition to democracy and particularly the problems of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

The various transitions—to democracy, to an uncertain future of nonconsolidated democracy, or to failed democratization processes—together with the end of hopes for the democratization of some authoritarian regimes in the third world have created conditions for an objective, intellectual analysis of regimes in comparative politics. For example, the

three volumes of *Democracy in Developing Countries* on Africa (1988), Asia (1989) and Latin America (1999), edited by Larry Diamond et al., cover developments in countries that have experienced both authoritarian and democratic rule, by country experts.

Some Thoughts on the Origins of Totalitarianism

The reader of my work—and that of most of the contributors to the volumes that Alfred Stepan and I edited on the breakdown of democracy—would realize that we should not overestimate the capacity of antidemocratic leaders and the success of antidemocratic mass movements, but instead take into account the failures of democratic governments and leaders, their inability to confront their opponents in defense of liberal democracy, and, for some, their semiloyalty to democracy.[4] From that perspective, the taking of power by Mussolini (Lyttelton, 1987) and Hitler was not inevitable, nor were the October Revolution and Lenin's rise to power. Totalitarianism was not the inevitable outcome of the European crisis created by World War I and even less the outcome of the Great Depression. It was one of the possible fruits of modernity; but democracy was another. The victory of communism in Russia and the communist threats in Europe met with different responses, some democratic and some authoritarian, and not—*pace* Nolte (1987)—an inevitable struggle between fascism and communism.

A healthy corrective to any overdetermined view of the history of the twentieth century is the reading of Henry A. Turner's (1989) counterfactual history based on the assumption that Hitler died in a car accident in the summer of 1930. This thoughtful exercise makes excellent reading, providing us with much food for thought. Had that death occurred in 1930, it would have prevented me from writing many of the pages of this book. Still remaining, however, would be the question of the development of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. And it would not have assured an earlier consolidation of democracy in many European and Latin American countries and in Japan.

The Shortened Century of Totalitarianism

The history of the origins of the political disasters of the "short century" should start with 1914, World War I and its aftermath. As Hobsbawm

(1994), François Furet (1999), Ernst Nolte (1987), and Karl Bracher (1984) emphasize, the old bourgeois order was shattered by the guns of August. Without the war there would not have been the split of socialism between Bolsheviks and Social Democrats, nor the rise of Italian interventionist nationalism, Mussolini and fascism, the German radical left, and the Nazi success in destroying Weimar democracy. Certainly, the intellectual roots of the ideological response to the war and its aftermath were there, as Bracher, Mosse, Gentile (1975), Sternhell (1978), and Furet among others stress. The war generated among respectable intellectuals, as Mommsen (1997–1998) has shown, a nationalist-chauvinist, militarist reaction that may be difficult to understand today. With the mass slaughter, its revolutionary aftermath, the new nationalisms, and the displacement of millions from their homes, the war desensitized people to the violence and horrors to come, a point eloquently made by Hobsbawm.

That legacy became articulated and institutionalized in the great antidemocratic movements and the regimes studied in this book. In the common matrix of the war and its aftermath, the intellectual seeds of revolutionary Marxism, irrationalist philosophy, social Darwinism, and racism would bear new and poisoned fruit. (A more complete discussion would include an analysis of those origins, but the works cited should allow the reader to fill that gap.) The generational composition of the founders and top elites of fascist and communist parties all over the world, and certainly of the German Nazi and communist parties, reflects the centrality of the experience of World War I, in contrast to the older elites of the Christian Democrats and even more the socialist parties (Linz, 1978, pp. 43–47, especially Table 1).

Reading Furet and a number of other works of intellectual and cultural history gives us considerable insight into why totalitarianism seduced so many outstanding minds—though not always for long. There is no fully equivalent work on the attraction of fascism, although there is a useful review by Hamilton (1971) and the writings on Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, and Gottfried Benn and on the fascist graduates of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Rubinstein, 1990). Would those regimes have had the same success without that appeal to intellectuals? Possibly yes, considering their appeal to common men, the desire for security, and above all the fear that their terrorism created. We should not forget their ability to mobilize participation through the single party and the administered mass organizations, nor the gratification derived from, or dependent on, on that participation. Within the scope of my

early work it was not possible to convey sufficiently the importance of that "democratic" participatory dimension.

Nolte (1987) has rightly stressed the importance of the fear of revolution in Europe in generating reactionary sentiments. That fear was stimulated by the unsuccessful but bloody revolutionary attempts and the widespread revolutionary rhetoric in the socialist movement, by the efforts of communist emissaries to kindle revolution, by the conflicts in the new nations bordering on the Soviet Union, and by the militias and army officers involved in repressing revolution, many of whom turned against even the democratic governments that were successfully stopping revolution.

Anticommunist, antirevolutionary sentiments were an essential component of the antidemocratic wave in Europe (not always led by the fascists). Fascism and Nazism were the beneficiaries of that response to communism, but anticommunism, in my view, was not the only, and in many cases not the most important, ideological basis and appeal of fascism. Nazism was not just anticommunism. Hitler's racism may have been reinforced and legitimized by an emphasis on the Jewish leadership of some of the revolutionary movements of the time, but it had prewar and deeper intellectual and cultural roots. Fascism was a more complex phenomenon and movement than anticommunism. As any reader of the work of Gentile (1975) knows, Italian fascism's antiliberal, antibourgeois, even anticlerical elements, as well as its overall style, are not the reaction to communism or the result of "learning" from the Soviet experience, as Nolte argues in his scholarly but one-sided analysis.

While anti-Semitism and the Holocaust occupy a central and unique place in the analysis of Nazi ideology, it should be considered as part of a broader racist ideology: "a full blown system of thought, an ideology like Conservatism, Liberalism" (Mosse, 1985, p. ix). That racism was reflected in the mass murder of gypsies and in the sterilization of the German children of black soldiers (World War I). Such social-Darwinist eugenic thinking was part of a larger body of scientific thought, which had a broad appeal beyond Germany and counted many followers in the democratic left. (We tend to forget the scientific and pseudoscientific pedigree of racist thinking, of Gobineau, Vacher de Laponge, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and the eugenic movement.) Even when Nazism, as other fascist movements, was fundamentally nationalist (and therefore "particularistic" rather than "universalistic," to use Furet's terminology), its racism was in a sense "universalistic," ready

to sacrifice the nation and those citizens not identifying with the racist-biological myths, and attempting to mobilize racists beyond its borders. The racist-eugenic utopia was something quite different from nationalism (Mosse, 1983).

Liberal democrats, however, should not ignore the contribution of the "civil war" atmosphere in the crisis of democracy that made possible the fascist and particularly the Nazi appeal: there was an atmosphere generated by the rhetoric of the class struggle, the futile violence of German communist party (KPD) activists, the growth of the communist parties, and the ambiguity toward liberal democracy of some sectors of the socialist movement. Anticommunism could lead, and did lead in a number of countries, to authoritarian regimes and to repression, but not to a totalitarian system with its revolutionary efforts at social transformation. Also, a number of democracies, some incorporating the socialist parties into the government, were able to oppose both fascism and communism. The totalitarian ambitions of fascists, the totalitarian dimension of Italian fascism, cannot be understood as a reflection of anticommunism. The radical and fully totalitarian rule of Hitler adds Nazism's distinctive anti-Semitism and even more broadly conceived racism to fascist ideological elements and the Italian model. Indeed, Nazi racism went beyond the characteristic nationalism of fascist movements. (In this context, it is significant that "neofascist" groups and skinheads today do not connect that much with the fascist legacy, but instead use Nazi symbolism in their violence against foreigners).

The Totalitarian Temptation

Writing from the perspective of the year 2000, looking back at the forms politics has taken in the twentieth century, what strikes me most, besides the horrors and the inhumanity, is the enthusiasm, the hopes, the commitment, and the idealism generated by communism and fascism, including Nazism. The same has to some extent been true for anticommunism and antifascism. In contrast, the much weaker appeal of democracy in the first half of the twentieth century—in spite of its successes—and the measured hopes—and even disillusionment (*desencanto,* or *Entzauberung*)—associated with it in the last quarter are striking. The appeal of totalitarianism contrasts with the generally passive acceptance of authoritarian regimes and the apathy, opportunism, and cynicism in the response to sultanistic rule. The capacity for deception and

temptation by totalitarianism is only equaled by its tragic legacy. Only work focusing more than my own does on the ideological dimension of totalitarianism, as seen sometimes in films, newsreels, and literature, can capture the basis for the political institutions discussed.

National Cultures and Authoritarianism

An issue that I did not deal with sufficiently in the *Handbook* is the inclination of some scholars to explain totalitarianism as the result of unique historical legacies. During World War II this was a popular interpretation of Nazism by politicians, historians, and psychologists focusing on Germany's historical uniqueness, the Prussian legacy, Lutheran political thought and ethics, a particular kind of national character, etc. Richard Hamilton (1995) has articulated well some of the difficulties with cultural arguments about the success of Nazism. I never sympathized with such interpretations, and the development of German democracy after the war only confirmed my skepticism. There were similar approaches in attempting to explain Leninism and Stalinism (Arnason, 1993). More recently, the historian Richard Pipes (1984, 1990) has argued that an exploration of Soviet totalitarianism "must be sought not in socialism but in the political culture which draws on socialist ideas to justify totalitarian practices," as summarized by Klaus Müller (1997, p. 32). Daniel Goldhagen's (1996) work on the roots of Hitler's holocaust in German anti-Semitism, which created a great deal of controversy (Schoeps 1996), is in the same tradition.

The emphasis on the Russian cultural matrix leads to a paradoxical effort to stress a discontinuity between Leninism and Stalinism. The argument is that many of Stalin's policies reflected a break with the leftist ideological heritage and led to a rightist-nationalist regime that reconstructed traditional authoritarian patterns and implemented repressive ethnic policies. With that line of thinking, the concept of totalitarianism can encompass both Nazism and Stalinism. The latter can even be interpreted as a variant of fascism; and in that way, the original Marxist-Leninist ideology can be saved from responsibility for totalitarianism. A new falsification of history, by ignoring the Leninist roots of totalitarianism, would serve to cover the failure of the communist utopia revealed with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1996) may encourage a revival of such cultural explanations of nondemocratic rule. However,

considering the example of Confucianism, the democratic politics of contemporary Taiwan and South Korea make such a culturalist perspective questionable (Stepan, 2000). Obviously, I do not totally dismiss such approaches—as long as they are not given a dominant place, and cultures and religions are not considered homogeneous and unchangeable. But a cast-iron political culture interpretation in my view is untenable. Perhaps I am allergic to such interpretations because they recall many writings on the incompatibility of Catholicism and democracy and the inherent propensity for authoritarianism in the Spanish culture, ignoring a wealth of other social, economic, and political factors.

Mass Society and Totalitarianism

I have kept my distance from the mass-society perspective in explaining totalitarianism, which probably is my main reason for not agreeing with Hannah Arendt's analysis. This reluctance is based on the facts about the rise of Nazism in German society stressed by Rainer Lepsius (1993) and Sheridan Allen (1984), among others, but also on the theoretical-empirical critique of the concept by Theodor Geiger (1954) and Salvador Giner (1976) and, going farther back, Simmel's analysis of the individualizing consequences of modernity. Many, if not most, of the people who joined the Nazi movement were not lone individuals, but did so as members of "civil society" groups taken over by Nazi activists or went to Nazi rallies with friends.

The successes of totalitarian movements were not the result of alienation generated by a "mass society," of the loneliness of individuals in modern industrial or capitalist societies. In fact, in some cases those successes were facilitated by the integration of individuals into close groups that rejected the larger more complex and open society. Some of those groups, like the Italian veterans (the *Arditi)* and the German *Freikorps,* had been formed on the basis of close emotional relations developed during World War I and the violent postwar years. The "mass society" approach to some extent reflects the search for an alternative to the "class society" and class conflict view of disappointed Marxists.

However, the mass-society perspective does help us to understand the success of totalitarian rule once consolidated. The destruction of civil society—which could not function without the freedoms guaranteed by the liberal state based on the rule of law (the *Rechtsstaat*)—the

penetration of society by mass organizations controlled by a single party, and the fears generated by repression and terror certainly isolated individuals and facilitated mass manipulation and mobilization. Even such primary groups as the family and circles of friends were threatened. The diary (1918–1921) of a young French intellectual, Pierre Pascal, who joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, reveals how a contemporary, engaged observer perceived the impact of totalitarianism on society:

> A unique and heady spectacle: the demolition of a society. This is the very realization of the fourth psalm of the Sunday vespers, and the Magnificat: the powerful cast from their throne and the poor man lifted from his hovel. The masters of the house are confined to one room, and each of the other rooms houses a family. There are no more rich people: only poor and poorer. Knowledge no longer confers either privilege or respect. The former worker promoted to director gives orders to the engineers. Salaries, high and low, are getting closer to each other. The right to property is reduced to the rags on one's back. Judges are no longer obliged to apply the law if their sense of proletarian equity contradicts it. Marriage is merely registration with the civil authorities, and notice of divorce can be served by postcard. Children are instructed to keep an eye on their parents. Sentiments of generosity have been chased out by the adversity of the times: the family sits around counting mouthfuls of bread or grams of sugar. Sweetness is now reputed to be a vice. Pity has been killed by the omnipresence of death. Friendship subsists only as camaraderie. (quoted in Furet, 1999, pp. 102–103)

The difficulties in re-creating civil society even in new post-totalitarian democracies show the lasting impact of a "flattened social landscape" (Marc Howard, 1999).

Totalitarianism and "Democracy"

The relation between democracy, as I have defined it, and totalitarianism remained underdeveloped in the *Handbook,* but today it deserves further thought. My earlier position was determined by the fact that totalitarian rule had not ever been established by free choice in a competitive electoral setting, contrary to the misinterpretation (if not outright lie) that Hitler came to power as the result of a free election. However, I have not thought enough about the possibility of the democratic decision of a majority to do away with the freedoms that are the

essence of democratic government—a possibility that we should not dismiss lightly. As de Tocqueville cautioned, democracy as a supreme value, without giving equal or greater value to freedom, can be risky. Certainly, the probability is that a functioning democratic system will not lead to an unfree, nondemocratic political system, but we can not exclude that frightful possibility. In our enthusiasm for the victory of democracy, as Daniel Bell warned me, we should not forget that freedom is as important as (if not more important than) democracy—that is, government by those elected by the people. The liberal freedoms certainly are important as an instrumental requirement for democratic political processes, but above all they are valuable in themselves. We should not forget that both fascism (especially Nazism) and communism were profoundly antiliberal, but claimed to be "democratic" in a way that authoritarian regimes did not.

The Centrality of Ideology

The reading of François Furet's *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century,* with its focus on ideology (and in passing, fascism) and the ideological manipulation of antifascism and later, anti-anticommunism, is perhaps the best complement to the political-science analysis in this book. Nolte in a sense does the same with how anticommunist sentiments were used by fascism. Both extremist ideologies sought to obscure the realities of their respective totalitarian systems, gaining support from those who should have been their enemies—liberal democrats, social democrats, Christians, nationalists, and above all bourgeois and (although it might sound strange to those weaned on the Marxist theories of fascism) capitalists—and who were seen by both ideologies as enemies to be destroyed. This deliberately created confusion led many to see the shortened twentieth century as one of conflict between communism and fascism—as Nolte does with great knowledge but also simplification—ignoring the roots of fascist thought before the October Revolution and of Nazism in a tradition of racist thinking, social Darwinism, pseudo-biological science, and anti-Semitism.

The differing ideologies are, of course, one of the main distinctions between communism and fascism. What are striking, however, are the similarities in communism's and fascism's commitment to ideas, their use of ideas to derive policies (sometimes very concrete measures,

even in realms otherwise remote from politics such as art, music, scientific debates), their fanatic effort to implement those policies, the murderous consequences, and the extent to which large numbers of cadres, party members, and citizens believed in them.

No one will question that the ideologically grounded and argued debates among the contenders for Lenin's mantle up to the purges in the 1930s were part of a gigantic and ultimately murderous power struggle. But it would be a mistake to ignore the seriousness of the debates, the intellectual articulation of the positions. That Stalin finally became the despot he was and the only source of ideological formulations could be seen as the deterioration of the ideological pillar of totalitarianism and the strengthening of another (i.e., the concentrated monopoly of power in the leader and his trusted lieutenants, who control the apparatus of the one-party state and its organizations).

It is the centrality of ideological belief that made so devastating to the system Khrushchev's 1956 revelations, the loss of faith in the communist utopia and its replacement with an emphasis by the leadership on "really existing socialism," and the realization by common people of the "living lie." This in spite of the ritual reiteration and recitation of ideology and the remaining loyalty of some cadres, activists, and fewer and fewer intellectuals. The crisis of totalitarianism and the drift into post-totalitarianism is largely, but not only, a crisis of the ideological way of thinking. However, the "wooden language" of the regime had become a mentality for the apparatchiks and even citizens, which survives today in the new democracies.

I want to emphasize that ideology shaped the behavior and actions of social groups and individuals operating from widely varying motives. As Kershaw (1991, p. 74) put it, these actors "shaped the progressive dynamic of Nazi rule by interpreting Hitler's *presumed* wishes without any need for close central direction. At the same time, it allowed the functional importance of Hitler's ideology to be seen less as concrete aims to be implemented than as interpreted, utopian 'directives for action' integrating different forms of social motivation and gradually coming into focus as realizable objectives without the necessity of close steerage from the dictator himself." This was probably even more true for Stalin, as Bialer (1980) noted when writing about "preemptive obedience." In any case, the ideology, intentions, and actions of the dictator, while far from unimportant, are insufficient to explain the processes in totalitarian systems. They are admittedly more important than I recognized in the *Handbook*—where I did not make

reference to the growing biographical literature on political leaders—but certainly much less important than is claimed by those who want to put all the weight on the leaders' personalities.

The real conflict was between freedom and liberal democracy on one side and the two revolutionary totalitarianisms on the other, as Raymond Aron and K. D. Bracher, among many others, emphasized. The underlying perspective of my own work is part of that tradition, except that I also include the noncommunist and nonfascist authoritarian and sultanistic threats to freedom as part of the political and social history of the twentieth century.

One of the shortcomings of the *Handbook* essay is that I did not, because of space limitations, consider how nondemocratic political regimes affected other spheres of society: religion, intellectual life, the arts (Antonova and Merkert, 1995; Council of Europe, n.d.), the bureaucracy, and the military, as well as the daily lives of ordinary citizens. My lack of reference to "economic" society was more deliberate, since it would have required a different expertise and probably another book.

Political Religion, Religion, and Regimes

If—the constant if—I had been writing a book rather than a contribution to a *Handbook,* I would have devoted considerable attention to the relation between political regimes and religion. I have done so in several subsequent essays, mainly on the "*nacional-catolicismo*" in the context of the Spanish authoritarian regime (Linz, 1992a, 1993, 1997a).

While the literature to which I referred in the *Handbook* made use of the concept of "political religion" or at least noted the pseudo-religious element in totalitarian politics, I did not incorporate that concept in my analysis. However, two volumes edited by Hans Maier and Michael Schäfer (1997a) have reviewed classical writings on totalitarianism, emphasizing this dimension and applying the approach to concrete phenomena. My own contribution to those volumes (Linz, 1997) explores the whole range of relations between political regimes and religion, covering aspects neglected or underdeveloped in the *Handbook.*

Though I share some of the reservations expressed about the concept of political religion, I probably would agree with several themes linked to the debate on the subject to which Hans Maier (1996) has made an important contribution. One is the fundamental hostility of totalitarian regimes to existing organized religion: the effort to destroy it—as in the

Soviet case—or at least to limit, control, or manipulate religious institutions. This is compatible with pragmatic, cynical, or vague invocations of defending religion, like the "positive Christianity" of the Nazi program or Hitler's invocation of *Vorsehung* (providence). I also would agree that the success of totalitarian movements was greater in secularized societies, and that religious ties resulted in some capacity to resist. And I would accept that, despite the secularization of the fascist regimes, some of their leaders and especially some ideologists used a language and symbolism derived from religious traditions, making them profane.

It is worth notice that a contemporary observer like Thomas Mann perceived the common element of sacralization. Mann wrote in his diary (October 1, 1933):

> The honor guard of the Storm Troops posted like statues in front of the Feldherrenhalle is a direct and unabashed imitation of the guard the Russians keep in front of Lenin's tomb. It is the "ideological" arch-enemy they are imitating—as they do in their films—without reflecting, perhaps without even being aware of what they are doing. The similarity, in the *style of our time,* is far stronger than any rational differences in "ideology." (quoted by Furet, 1999, p. 526)

Even in Italy, as Emilio Gentile (1996) and the more ethnographic study by Mabel Berezin (1997) show, this process went far. Totalitarian regimes tried to fill the emotional vacuum created by secularization with political rituals and liturgies derived from or inspired by religion. What is more difficult to ascertain is to what extent leaders, party organization members, and ordinary citizens succumbed to those pseudoreligious efforts to give meaning to their lives, and the extent to which participation in those rituals evoked feelings comparable to those of religious rituals. I am quite skeptical on the first point, except for the ideologists themselves and some leaders; but I would consider the second quite relevant in understanding the hold of totalitarian movements and regimes on some of their supporters.

Fascism and Totalitarianism

I subscribe to the idea of a generic fascism as a type of political movement, ideology, and style, of which Nazism was a distinct (and even somewhat aberrant) variant. This does not, however, lead me to equate the Nazi and the Italian fascist regimes as a single type of totalitarianism. Some scholars reject any encompassing conception of fascism,

though they many emphasize the commonalities among fascist regimes. Others reject the usefulness of any analysis that does not consider each case as unique. Still others conflate ideology, movements, and regimes under the category "fascism" (generally extending it to a wide range of rightist-conservative-capitalist antidemocratic parties and regimes). In this regard, the Italian political theorist of the democratic left, Norberto Bobbio, has formulated it well: "I agree with De Felice; fascism is a historical phenomenon; we can compare it with Nazism in spite of all the differences we know, but we can not attribute the characterization of 'fascism' to whatever authoritarian regime. There are dictatorships of a military nature, which insofar as they are autocratic regimes are also oppposed to democratic regimes, but they are not fascist" (1996, p. 29). Paradoxically, those who overextend the term "fascism" come to a position not too different from Ernst Nolte's in *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg* [The European Civil War], which treats the conflict between communism and fascism as the key to European history.[5] This position, in contrast to the perspective maintained by Bracher (1976) and myself, forgets that the great conflict in this century was between those two ideological movements and modern liberal democracy based on the rule of law. The recognition of that conflict has been the source of analyses by Aron and Bracher, among many others. In the present book, another intellectual source of the emphasis on the distinctiveness of totalitarianism was my need to describe and understand the whole range of nondemocratic and antiliberal regimes and the differences among them.

The reader of this book and of my essays on fascism will understand that I find myself more in agreement with François Furet in his *The Passing of an Illusion* than I am with Nolte. The two Western totalitarianisms had their own distinct origins and ideological bases, and it would be a mistake to interpret fascism as a reaction to communism, thereby ignoring its fundamental antiliberalism (as well as other "anti" positions) and its distinctive appeal. In fact, there were fascists in various countries who perceived an affinity with the communist revolution in Russia in their common hatred of liberal, parliamentary, bourgeois-plutocratic, and victorious democracies; for some, Stalinism was a kindred Russian national revolution.

Human Rights, State Terror, and Mass Murder

A major breakthrough in recent years has been the greater focus on human rights, on totalitarianism's terrible legacy of inhuman repression

and on the new forms of authoritarian repression, state terror, and violence. However, the rich scholarly literature and solid official reports make little reference to any typology of regimes (Courtois et al., 1998). I have to confess that in an essay trying to link the typology of regimes and the terrible manifestations of inhumanity by states in the twentieth century I was, in many respects, inconclusive (Linz, 1992b). Totalitarianism certainly explains some of the worst violations of human rights, but totalitarian tendencies and regimes have not always led to the same type of state terror and repression—and certainly other nondemocratic regimes have contributed their share to the terrible legacies of the last century. The systematic analysis of the most obvious data on the mass murders, deaths, and jail sentences, the concentration camps, Gulags, and political prisoners, should be complemented with a comparison of the mechanisms of political and social control: the size of police forces; the recruitment, number, and activities of paid and "unofficial" informers; the presence of party activists that might be informers and the way they exercised pressures; the "political tests" for employment, travel, and educational opportunities. Even among communist countries there seem to have been significant differences. The mechanisms of control probably differentiated totalitarian regimes as much as the more obvious horrors of repression.

Although politics and ideological justifications are at the core of the explanation of the horrors of the twentieth century, microresearch on victims and their persecutors in various countries has shown the use by individuals of the machinery of repression for their personal goals, vendettas, and settling of private accounts. The paradox of the "privatization" of violence has been highlighted by Jan Gross (1988) and documented in many studies (e.g., Kalyvas). However, it is the absence of a liberal democratic *Rechtsstaat* that made this possible.

In this context, I want to mention Alexandra Barahona de Brito's *Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America* (1997) and her important observation on the South American military regimes:

> Finally, the level of "totalitarian" penetration in these regimes was not uniformly distributed. At one level, these regimes were typically authoritarian given their rhetorical adherence to democratic legalistic values, given their more porous quality, given the presence of limited pluralism, and their daily political and diplomatic confrontation with the values and rhetoric of the opposition and of the international community. It was only sections of the military institution which developed the totalitarian logic more fully in their implementation of repression. One saw a repressive ideological dynamic or "pockets"

> within the military which operated according to a totalitarian logic. The "closer" to the repressive apparatus and the "further" from the limited pluralism at the regime level, the more the totalitarian elements of the ideology dominated and the more the totalitarian repressive dynamic took hold.
>
> These coexisting tendencies occasioned paradoxical results. On the one hand, the totalitarian dynamic led the Armed Forces, so attached to legal conventions, to violate their own laws; on the other, it led them to attempt to pass constitutions which aimed at "protecting democracy." Thus, although the Uruguayan military tortured almost one-third of their population, they forced President Bordaberry to resign for his desire to destroy the traditional parties by abolishing them. In Chile, one could be abducted by an illegal and official nonexistent Comando Conjunto, but one's criminal abductors took the trouble to fill out forms with the relevant information.
>
> The more the totalitarian ideology penetrated the Armed Forces, the worse the repression. Thus, the differences in repressive methods were partly shaped by the intensity and extension of the penetration of the totalitarian ideology within the Armed Forces. This is particularly clear when one compares Uruguay and Chile with Argentina. It is widely accepted that the penetration of this ideology in Argentina was the greatest of the three countries. Here, the total institutionalization of repression within the structures of the Armed Forces, together with the intensity of this ideological outlook, made repression the worst in the Southern Cone, as the military became more of a totalitarian institution or organization than it did in any other case.

This again shows how actual regimes combine elements in "mixed forms" that would fit more into one or another of the ideal types developed in the *Handbook* essay. In this case, regimes that in their dominant characteristics would be considered "authoritarian" had a totalitarian conception of repression. The same would be true of the strong sultanistic tendencies in Ceauşescu's Romania and in North Korea, which we would otherwise define as totalitarian, and of the sultanistic component in Suharto's rule in Indonesia.

Opposition and Resistance

One gap—among many—in my work is the neglect of the unsuccessful, but not nonexistent, dangerous and heroic resistance against totalitarianism. Over the years, an extensive scholarly historical literature on the resistance—*Widerstand*—against Hitler's rule has been published. Some interesting conceptual distinctions have been made between passive

withdrawal, the assertion of autonomy by institutions and individuals, activities planning for a different future, and conspiratorial activities toward the overthrow of the regime (Hoffmann, 1979; Schmädeke and Steinbach, 1985). There also is an extensive literature on dissidents, particularly intellectuals and artists, in post-totalitarian regimes. In an essay on "Opposition In and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain" (Linz, 1973), I analyzed the different types of semi-opposition, alegal (tolerated) opposition, and illegal (persecuted) opposition in authoritarian regimes. Richard Löwenthal (1983) distinguishes among political opposition, societal refusal, and ideological dissent. Broszat (1987) has developed an interesting contrast between *Widerstand* and *Resistenz*.

The need for Soviet military intervention in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1978 to support and reequilibrate totalitarian rule after the death of Stalin is evidence of the limits or failure of totalitarian control (Ekiert 1996). The different forms of dissidence, opposition, and resistance deserve more attention. The demobilization of opposition and reequilibration of those regimes, however, represent the start of post-totalitarianism.

A question that might have been pursued further and explored more systematically in the *Handbook* essay is at what point, when, how, and by whom the establishment of totalitarian rule could have been prevented, arrested, or overthrown. Such a counterfactual analysis could help us to understand better the conditions and circumstances that made totalitarian control of society possible.

Totalitarianism and Daily Life

Since publication of the *Handbook,* a new perspective has led to much solid empirical research by historians, particularly on Nazi Germany, focused on a wide range of aspects of the daily lives of individuals. Working conditions, local community life, the letters of soldiers from the front, etc., are increasingly documented by what is called *Alltagsgeschichte* (Peukert, 1984, 1987). That literature in part has been used against the totalitarianism approach, arguing for the limits of Hitler's power and highlighting peoples' ways of evading the politicization of everyday life, but arguing also for individuals' spontaneous and unthinking assent to and participation in the policies of the regime against "racially inferior" people, Jews, and foreign workers.

In my view, these important contributions do not call into question the distinctive characteristic of a totalitarian regime (in contrast to other types of nondemocratic rule), nor the shaping of society, behavior patterns, and values by the system. They only question a simplistic view of totalitarianism that extrapolates from an ideal type a society totally penetrated and shaped by those in power. The essay by Henry A. Turner (1999), based on the diary of Victor Klemperer (1995), shows well how ordinary citizens expressed their discomfort with the regime—specifically its persecution of Jews—in little ways, as well as the fear surrounding those actions. It also puts a limit to the view that coercion and state terror (always latently present) were always overt and omnipresent. Certainly, people in their everyday lives—unless they were part of a targeted group (or an object of the hostility, for whatever reason, of those with access to power)—did not think of how their society was being ruled, just as people in a democratic free society do not see their daily lives shaped by the values of a free society. In a nondemocratic and particularly in a stable totalitarian society, many ordinary people are not necessarily aware of their lack of freedom; for them, that is the way life is. However, simultaneously and for a wide range of reasons (including personal benefits), many people are actively committed to building and sustaining such a society. After the fall of the system, they will claim (and even believe) they were just "ordinary" people ruled by an indeterminate and remote "them."

The Intellectual and Political History of the Totalitarianism Debates

I believe that some of the most important contributions in the last few years to our understanding of totalitarianism have come from writings on the intellectual history of the concept and from the debates that work has generated. A book could and should be written on the intellectual and ideological history of these writings and debates. The works edited by Alfons Söllner (1997) and Hans Maier (1997) provide many of the needed elements. Moreover, we have the surveys by Wipperman (1997) and Gleason (1995). Gleason's book, while its title (*Totalitarianism*) suggests an updating of work on totalitarian regimes, really responds to its subtitle, *The Inner History of the Cold War*—that is, to the use of, and the political polemics surrounding, the term. The collection of essays edited by Evelyne Pisier-Kouchner (1983) provides us with a

review of the analyses of Trotsky, Kautsky, Althusser, Castoriades, and Besançon, among others.

But a truly comprehensive book would have to discuss not only works by social scientists, but also literary writing ranging from Koestler's *Darkness at Noon,* Silone's *School for Dictators,* and Orwell's *1984* to Solzhenitsyin's *The Gulag Archipelago.* There is also an extremely rich body of autobiographical writings, mainly by former communists, that includes efforts at intellectual conceptualization and analysis. There are a few works—significantly few—by former fascists or fascist dissidents. The ideological, pseudo-scholarly efforts of intellectuals who identified with totalitarian regimes (and their contortions to hold their places in and under such regimes)—Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Huber, and the numerous Italian fascist jurists come to mind—would deserve to be included. François Furet, in *The Passing of an Illusion,* offers many insights into the delusions of such intellectuals. The pages (116–124) he devotes to Gyorgy Lukács convey well that overriding ideological commitment of a brilliant thinker: Lukács "never missed a chance to align himself with what was going on in the Bolshevik party," and he was so captive of the *idea* of the Soviet Union that it annulled his knowledge of its history.

An interesting chapter in the study of totalitarianism—one without any parallel in the case of authoritarian regimes—is the fascination with communism (including Stalinism and Stalin as a leader) (Marcou, 1982) and fascism, and even Nazism, of so many distinguished intellectuals, writers, and artists living in free societies. That response provides us with many insights into the nature of totalitarianism and its appeal.

Last, but not least, there are foreign "political pilgrims" (Hollander 1981) impressed by the positive aspects of such regimes. The *Handbook* essay makes little or no reference to them.

The outside responses to the Soviet and the Nazi totalitarianisms were shaped by those regimes' respective use of antifascism and anticommunism to cover up their distinctive characteristics, and at one point or another to gain the sympathy or tolerance of liberal democrats who otherwise would have been hostile to them. At the time of the Cold War, "anti-anticommunism" served the same purpose. Each of those "ideological" myths had a kernel of truth, but obscured the true nature of the two totalitarianisms. Since my student days in Spain, I have been familiar with Koestler, Monnerot, Merleau-Ponty, and Carl Schmitt. That intellectual baggage shaped my thinking, although it might not be reflected in the footnotes limited to the more scholarly literature.

Types of Regime and the Transition to Democracy

I have found the clear distinctions among modern forms of politics—democracy, totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism (as a distinctive type of nondemocratic rule), authoritarian regimes in all their varieties, and sultanistic regimes or regimes with strong sultanistic tendencies—to be extremely fruitful in understanding the patterns of transition to democracy as well as, or even more, some of the problems of democratic consolidation. In this regard, I refer the reader to my collaboration with Alfred Stepan on *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.*[6]

The type of regime that we (Linz and Stepan, 1996) briefly delineate and use in our analysis of European postcommunist transitions to democracy is explicitly linked to the analysis of totalitarianism in the present book. It shares the general approach of focusing on the political—the structure and use of power—rather than the social, economic, or even cultural factors, though the latter three of course should not be neglected. It does not explain the change in and from totalitarianism in terms of the emergence of new social strata like managerial elites and technicians, or the spread of education, or social mobility, or the functional requirements for economic efficiency. Those changes certainly took place, but they did not directly change the political system. In my view, it was the cadre's loss of ideological commitment, which set in after de-Stalinization, that was decisive. The decay, the ossification and ritualization of an ideology that could not serve as a mobilizing utopia, in the end meant that the cadres, particularly at the middle and lower levels, did not feel legitimized to use the intact and large coercive apparatus in a crisis situation. Negotiation with demonstrators and meetings (some public) of regime leaders and the oppositon were the consequence. The nomenklatura—hierarchical, bureaucratized, aging, sometimes corrupt, recruited to the end using political criteria—was in general unable to formulate innovative responses to the problems confronting the society. However, in the end, one of its members, Gorbachev, would start *perestroika* and *glasnost* to reform and shake up the system, abandon the outer empire, and allow electoral mobilization in nationalist peripheries, with the consequences we all know. It was clear that there was no plan to return to totalitarianism; but neither was there the intention to make a transition to Western-type democracy (Di Palma, 1995). It was a new dynamic setting and conflicts within the elite that accelerated the process of breakdown and transition to democracy or pseudodemocratic politics.

My and Stepan's thinking on post-totalitarianism should not be understood as a theory of neototalitarianism. We incorporated into our

analysis not so much the social and economic changes before and after Gorbachev as the political changes that contributed to the breakdown of the Soviet-type regimes, particularly the political crisis in the relation of the rulers with the society and within the ruling elite. An analysis of the post-totalitarian phase—in its variations over time and across countries—is in our view particularly useful to understanding the difficulties post-totalitarian new democracies confront in the transition phase and especially during consolidation. It is unfortunate that we could not devote even more attention to the distinctive characteristics of post-totalitarianism. We believe that the development of societies—economies, intellectual life, religion, civil society—in new democracies with a post-totalitarian past, in contrast to those with an authoritarian past, proves the relevance of totalitarianism as a distinctive form of domination. It also should caution against cultural-civilizational interpretations of Russian history and of the history of some Eastern European countries.

In Eastern Europe, the different types of post-totalitarian regimes, as we analyze in some detail in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* underwent processes of liberalization (initiated by members of the elite) or confronted a more or less significant and mobilized civil society that had submitted before to the lies of the regime, whether passively or coerced. The regime elite in some cases tried to save as much as it could by substituting one leader for another, by negotiation, and ultimately by giving up power peacefully, having lost faith in its right to rule and its capacity to mobilize the party and its organizations.

The course of totalitarianism had gone full circle from the initial ideological-utopian impulse to the loss of ideological legitimacy. In the absence of free democratic electoral legitimation, what basis was there left on which to demand obedience? (The case of East Germany was even more dramatic: if it was not to be a socialist state, why should it exist at all?) Everything that had made totalitarianism so powerful and frightening had decayed, eroded, disintegrated; but its legacy has been a flattened society, which finds it difficult to articulate itself in the framework of democratic political institutions and a market economy.

The Primacy of Politics

In the nineteenth century there was an uneasy equilibrium between the primacy of economic and political change. The bourgeoisie was making an economic revolution—industrial, agrarian, and service—and

demanding political change. At the same time, as Schumpeter noted, that revolution was in a sense protected by the political legitimacy of the preindustrial political structures. The constitutional monarchies were a result of the compromise between the ascendant bourgeoisie and the traditional structures.

The shortened twentieth century (1914–1989) was dominated by *politique d'abord*—to use the term coined by Charles Maurras—of Bolshevism, fascism, and Nazism with the terrible and destructive consequences we know, and even democracy and its Keynesian policies after World War II. It was a time in which everything became politicized and all hopes were centered on political action.

Now, at the turn of the century, the indisputable success of the capitalist market economy—under whatever regime—has opened the door to a neoliberal economic view of politics that ignores the importance of institutions and political legitimacy.

The primacy of politics led to power as an end in itself, its maximization in the society and among nations, military expenditure rather than consumption. The absolute primacy of the economy, property, and market can lead to private consumption, but the neglect of collective goods. There is a need for a balance between politics and economy, made possible (but not assured) by democracy.

From the "Age of Totalitarianism" to the "Age of Democracy"?

As we move away in time from the concrete institutional, social experience of totalitarianism—and as the concept is being less questioned—attention turns to a more philosophical perspective. What does it all mean? How much did it define a historical period, between World War I and 1989? What does it tell us about human nature, modernity, and our values? These are great and difficult questions.

It is logical that, after 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union, a broader—although still European—approach would become central in the intellectual debate. This is an approach that goes far beyond the "political science" perspective found in the *Handbook* essay, but it is highly relevant to it. From different perspectives and implicit value judgments, the works of Bracher, Furet, Nolte, and Hobsbawm are relevant to the debate on totalitarianism, the usefulness of the concept, and the differences as well as the similarities of totalitarian systems.

Were I to write a much longer essay, I would enter into those debates and highlight my agreements (considerable with Furet) and disagreements (more with Nolte and less so with Hobsbawm). In view of the horrors of Auschwitz and also the Gulag, the questions first raised by Hannah Arendt appear as more central than ever in a comparative study of regimes. The monstrosity of inhuman rule, in a historical-moral perspective, was the central fact of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the ultimate crisis of the totalitarian ideologies, movements, and regimes may not be the end of that tragic story.

In the *Handbook* essay I certainly was wrong in my pessimism about the possibility of peaceful, orderly, even formally constitutional transition from nondemocratic regimes to democracy. At the time I was writing, in 1974, there had been only the Turkish transition after World War II and the Colombian power-sharing agreement (*concordancia*), and no one could foresee the pattern of transition initiated in 1976 in Spain that would be followed by so many countries in later years.

The twentieth century was the age of totalitarianism, true; but it also was the age of democracy, the consolidation and expansion of political—and to some extent, social—democracy. It was the age of decolonization and the end of colonial imperialism, the age of the emergence of new independent states, some democratic, most nondemocratic. The century will be remembered for the inhumanity of man toward fellow human beings, but also for the universal declaration and assertion of human rights. (The first characteristic sadly does not seem to be a monopoly of totalitarianism.) No better evidence for the gigantic historical change in the last twenty-five years can be found than the fact that in mid-1974, according to Larry Diamond (1999), there were only 39 democracies in the world—that is, only 27 percent of the existing independent states—and by the beginning of 1998 the number of electoral democracies (in which governmental offices are filled through competitive multiparty elections that place incumbents at real risk of defeat) had increased to 117, or 61 percent of the by then larger number of independent states.

However, our joy at the progress of the last quarter-century must be tempered by the fact that of these 117 formal democracies, only 81 (69.2 percent) could be characterized by Diamond, using the Freedom House ratings, as "free." In a significant number of countries, for example 93 in 1993, the freedom scores were declining (compared to improving scores in 18 countries). If I were to write a book on comparative democracies, it would have to include a section on failed transitions to democracy,

defective or pseudodemocracies, which I would rather characterize as "electoral authoritarian" regimes—mostly ethnocratic, often plebiscitarian—where a democratic façade covers authoritarian rule, often with sultanistic components.

When I was writing in 1974, there were many "democracies" with adjectives such as "organic," "people's," "tutelary," "basic"—and it was the nondemocratic regimes, their ideologists and partisans, who were using those terms to describe themselves; many of those regimes are analyzed in this book. In the middle 1970s and through the 1980s, a clear consensus seemed to emerge about which governments deserved to be called democratic. In the 1990s, confusion again set in—but this time caused by the very scholars committed to democracy, a result of their desire to see democracy progress and their hopes for democratic developments below the state level. New adjectival democracies are labeled "pseudo," "semi," "illiberal (electoral)," or "delegative"—but these terms are in fact being used to describe nondemocratic regimes (or in a few cases, low-quality democratic governments) (Merkel, 1999; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Collier and Adcock, 1999). The fact that these nondemocratic regimes do not fit into the basic types of nondemocratic polities leads to such conceptualizations; I myself surely have fallen into this trap. Thus, I would urge the search for conceptual clarity. We might positively value some aspects, by no means all, of these new regimes, but we should be clear that they are not democracies (even using minimum standards). To avoid confusion, I propose the addition of adjectives to "authoritarianism" rather than to "democracy": for example, electoral authoritarianism, multiparty authoritarianism, center authoritarianism with subnational democracy. These are only suggestions, and I have yet to work out more precise concepts and to define the dimensions needed to clarify this growing number of regimes.

A somewhat different question is the quality of political democracy. We see governments resulting from free and fair elections and attempting to rule according to a constitution, committed to the rule of law, and respecting human rights. We might not have doubts about the democratic convictions of their leaders, but they may govern with a state apparatus that does not respond to their demands. We see countries where those who hold power at the local level behave as if immune to the laws of the state (in several federal states); countries where the police and the military in charge of maintaining law and order are unresponsive to liberal values (and where their reorganization and

retraining cannot be achieved easily); countries where terrorists and insurgents contribute systematically to a spiral of violence and counterviolence (even though their demands could instead be expressed peacefully and there are democratic institutions in place to respond to them), preventing citizens from exercising their democratic rights. The quality of democracy depends on the quality of the state—bureaucracy, judiciary, police, military—and of all major social forces and actors, something that a democratic government cannot assure in the short run. In addition, democratic institutions and civil rights cannot always lure disloyal and violent oppositions into the arena of peaceful democratic politics.

Any analysis of the quality of democracy in "third wave" democracies (Huntington, 1994) has to take into account that totalitarian systems did not create only political institutions (and in the communist systems, a command socialist economy), but also shaped the entire social life and culture. It is that legacy—difficult to define, conceptualize, or describe—that cannot be ignored. The former Soviet Union is different in this respect from Eastern Europe and even the Baltic republics, since at least one or two generations of Soviet citizens were socialized in that totalitarian and post-totalitarian society. Fortunately, Nazi totalitarianism, lasting less than a generation, could not have the same impact.

The Future of Nondemocratic and Illiberal Rule

A question that the reader might pose, and to which I am very hesitant to reply decisively, is: "What is the future of nondemocratic politics at the turn of the millennium?" I can not avoid stressing that we should not be overly optimistic. There have been a significant number of failed transitions to democracy. There is still a lot of uncertainty about the development of Cuba and some of the postcommunist Southeast Asian countries, as well as North Korea, where totalitarianism seems to combine with sultanistic elements. The strong sultanistic components of Suharto's authoritarian regime leave a difficult legacy for the transition to democracy in Indonesia. And although China is undergoing some significant processes of liberalization, in my view it is still a post-totalitarian communist regime; contrary to the hopes of many of my colleagues, the emergence of capitalism does not yet assure a transition to democracy.

What probably has changed is that, with one exception, there are no nondemocratic regimes that appeal to intellectuals as there were for those born in the first part of the twentieth century. The one exception is Islamic fundamentalism, which found a first state-institutional embodiment in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocate differing policies and incumbents are often defeated (Chehabi, 1998). In the early 1980s, Iran's Islamic regime held great attraction for Muslim activists worldwide: it seemed to combine popular participation with a commitment to cultural authenticity, the rule of the *shari'a,* and opposition to Western imperialism. But the inability of the regime to deliver on its promises of a better life for its citizens has led to widespread disenchantment within the country, while the inconclusive ending of the war against Iraq and the growing Shi'ite sectarianism in Iran's foreign policy have dampened enthusiasm for the Iranian model elsewhere in the Muslim world (Roy, 1994).

The failure of the Iranian model of nondemocratic rule to maintain its appeal among Muslims does not mean that other forms of Islamic nondemocratic rule cannot attract adherents. Afghanistan's Taliban, for example, seems to exert an ideological influence that can be detected in such places as the Caucasus. Moreover, the end of ideology, or better, the crisis of ideology, has not, outside of Western Europe, meant the end of the ideological appeal of nationalism, which has led to new forms of ethnocracy, sometimes dressed in democratic form. It is difficult to say whether new forms of nondemocratic rule have emerged, except perhaps for plebiscitarian, pseudodemocratic, ethnocratic authoritarianism with significant sultanistic strains, particularly in the periphery of the former Soviet Union. We cannot exclude the authoritarian tendencies in some Latin American presidential democracies with strong populist traditions, such as Peru under Fujimori and Venezuela under Chavez. In other parts of the world, the real question is the consolidation and stability of the state under whatever political regime, preventing what could be called *chaocracy*—the rule of chaos, the mob, mercenaries, militias—without a central authority with the monopoly of violence.

Class and ideological conflict were the main causes of authoritarianism and totalitarianism in the past. The crisis of ideology—the defeat of fascism and the disintegration of communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—and the economic revolution in many parts

of the world have reduced those bases of authoritarian responses. However, the salience of nationalism is likely to create, in many multinational states, conflicts leading to authoritarian rule and repression, as is the case when dominant nation-builders try to integrate ethnic and cultural minorities into a nation-state (ethnocratic polities) and when different minorities claim the right of national self-determination and secession. Overpopulation and inequalities in development produce massive migrations that threaten the sense of national identity and economic interests, leading to discrimination and the repression of outsiders. I therefore see in nationalism in its different manifestations one of the main sources of authoritarianism in the future. What is not clear is what institutional forms these authoritarian responses will take.

In a paradoxical way, political and cultural nationalism is a not unlikely response to economic globalization, to the expansion of a worldwide market economy and certain cultural patterns of the consumer society associated with it. While that economic transformation may be necessary, even inevitable, and probably to a large extent (although not for everybody) beneficial, I am not so optimistic about its positive effects in the political realm. Will economic globalization assure the expansion and consolidation of liberal political democracy? I sometimes feel that we might fall into the trap of a "white Marxism"—a belief that a free-enterprise, liberal economic infrastructure assures the development of a liberal political democracy.

The use of violence—power "out of the barrel of the gun"—in the twentieth century created a political order based on an existential and deadly friend-foe distinction. At the turn of the century, that distinction is still there, in a sense privatized in the hands of independent entrepreneurs of violence who mix personal ambitions, greed, ethnic hatred, and religious fanaticism. Typically, these mobilizers of violence are unable to create political order in a larger political realm, but they are able to resist any effort to subdue them. The result is chaocracy, enclaves of unlimited power without legitimating (true or false) myths. The situations in Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda, the rule of the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka, to some extent the Taliban in Afghanistan, the guerrillas in Colombia, the KLA in Kosovo (barely checked by NATO and the UN) all approach this model. We are not dealing with states, regimes, political systems, but with something new that certainly has little to do with the types of politics analyzed in this volume.

My present intellectual interests are focused on the comparative study of political democracies in all their varieties, particularly their

institutional forms: presidential and parliamentary, unitary and federal, and specifically the relationship of federalism, democracy, and nation. I hope, perhaps believe, that the totalitarian illusion—temptation—will not be repeated. But who is to tell whether—after the failures of real democracies, the existence of many "bad" democracies, the unsolvable problems in many societies—in a few decades the dream of a homogeneous, egalitarian, conflictless (by eliminating the sources of conflict) polity will be resurrected. The power of the idea of the nation in the context of a world that is globalized economically, and to some extent culturally and politically, could serve as the basis for a new mobilizing effort by a demagogic leadership—a leadership propelled by resentment and cloaked in a response to the injustice in the world.

As I read the *Handbook* essay today, I confess that I probably erred in being pessimistic about the possibility of nonviolent transitions to (liberal) democracy and about the spread of democracy around the globe. I would not like to underestimate again the potential for change toward freedom and democracy. However, the title of *Democracy's Victory and Crisis* (Hadenius, 1997) reflects my own feelings. The growing literature on "defective democracies" (Merkel, 1999) (almost all of them nondemocratic regimes with an electoral façade), delegative democracy, the disillusionment with democracy, and a renewed debate about the quality of democracy (which tends to disregard the enormous gains in freedom and human dignity thanks to even far from perfect democracies) should make us wonder about the "victory" of democracy. Fortunately for all of us, there is (with the exception noted above) for now no alternative form for organizing political life that is attractive to intellectuals, students, young people—no alternative that is firing their imaginations. Perhaps we have learned the insight of Hölderlin (1970, p. 607, my translation):

> You accord the state far too much power. It must not demand what it cannot extort. But what love gives, and spirit, cannot be extorted. Let the state leave that alone, or we will take its laws and whip them to the pillory! By Heaven! he knows not what his sin is who would make the state a school of morals. The state has always been made a hell by man's wanting to make it his heaven.

Notes

1. The reader should keep in mind that the chapters that follow were written at the request of the editors of the *Handbook of Political Science,* Fred

Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. The material therefore is centered on the political dimension of regimes and hence makes only limited reference to such issues as social structure, economic development, economic institutions—capitalist or socialist—and religious traditions. I initially was given only a few pages in the *Handbook*, but I bargained constantly to expand the essay. My argument was that in the other contributions to the six volumes there was almost no reference—and even less, an extended discussion—of any aspects of nondemocratic regimes. The chapters on executives and legislatures, on parties, etc., were focused exclusively on liberal democracies—at a time when the majority of the world's population was living under nondemocratic rule.

2. I have written an essay (in Söllner, 1997) on how I came to formulate the distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. I note there how the term *totalitarianism* was used in the 1930s in Spain (applied to both communism and fascism by a leftist bourgeois politician) and how Francesc Cambó, a Catalanist politician, formulated a distinction in his wartime diary (published many years later) between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

3. Manuel Azaña, the leader of the bourgeois left and president of the Republic, wrote in 1937 (in the middle of the Civil War):

> When one speaks of fascism in Spain, my opinion was this: There are or may be as many fascists as one may wish. But a fascist regime, there will be none. If the movement of force against the Republic were victorious, we would fall into a military and ecclesiastical dictatorship of the traditional type. For many "watchwords" translated and many labels they might use. Swords, chasubles, military parades and homages to the Virgen del Pilar. On that side the country does not produce anything else.

Azaña was right, although fascism contributed to the distinctive and, in a way, the modern character of the authoritarian regime. The regime was a failed and largely defeated totalitarian attempt.

4. There has been an extensive literature on the conditions for and the breakdown of democracies, which I cannot review within the scope of this piece. Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle De Meur (1994) offer an original systematic comparison of different theories, including my own work. A major contribution is Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (1992).

5. Incidentally, the conflict between fascists (and other authoritarians) and communists (and other revolutionary groups), particularly their militias, could be considered part of a civil war, but not so the extermination of entire social or ethnic groups. A civil war is a violent conflict between two or more groups that are part of the same social or political body. The total exclusion of groups of people as "insects" or a "disease," and their physical destruction, goes beyond civil war. Civil war implies groups fighting, with one perhaps winning, but not a conflict with a defenseless group that has no chance to offer resistance.

6. There is the ever growing literature on the transitions from nondemocratic regimes to democracy (or sometimes failed transitions), including O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), Di Palma (1990), Przeworski (1991), Higley and Gunther (1992), Huntington (1994), von Beyme (1994),

Offe (1994, 1997), Shain and Linz (1995), Linz and Stepan (1996), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Diamond (1999), Merkel and Puhle (1999), and Merkel (1999).

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1

INTRODUCTION

Variety and Prevalence of Nondemocratic Regimes

We all know that governments are different and that it is not the same thing to be the citizen or subject of one or another country, even in matters of daily life. We also know that almost all governments do some of the same things, and sometimes we feel like the pure anarchist, for whom all states, being states, are essentially the same. This double awareness is also the point of departure of our intellectual efforts as social scientists.

We obviously know that life under Stalin or Hitler, even for the average citizen but particularly for those occupying important positions in their society, was different than for citizens living in the United Kingdom or Sweden.[1] Without going to such extremes, we can still say that life for many people—but perhaps not that many—is different in Franco's Spain than in Italy. Certainly it is for a leader of the Communist party in either country. As social scientists we want to describe in all its complexity the relationship of people to their government and to understand why this relationship is so different in different countries. Leaving aside consideration of personal documents—the memoirs of politicians, generals, intellectuals, conspirators, and concentration camp inmates—and the literary works inspired by the human experience of man confronting power, often brutal and arbitrary power, we will consider the work of social scientists who have, by observation, by analysis of the laws, the judicial and administrative decisions, the records of the bureaucratic activities of the state, by interviews with leaders and sample surveys of the population, written excellent monographs on politics

in many societies, trying to describe and explain how different political systems work.

Political theorists have given us the framework to ask relevant questions. However, we cannot be satisfied with even the best descriptive studies of political life in a particular society at a particular time. We, like Aristotle when he confronted the diversity of constitutions of the Greek polis of his time, feel the need to reduce the complexity to a limited number of types sufficiently different to take into account the variety in real life but also able to describe those elements that a certain number of polities share. Such an effort of conceptualization has to ask why these polities share some characteristics and, ultimately, what difference it makes. The classification of political systems, like that of other aspects of reality—of social structures, economic systems, religions, kinship structures—has been at the core of social science since its origins. New forms of political organizations, of creating and using power and authority, and new perspectives derived from different values have inevitably led to new classifications. The intellectual task is far from easy, confronted as we are with the changing political reality. The old terms become inadequate. As Tocqueville noted when he wrote about "a kind of oppression which threatens democratic nations that will not resemble any other form previously experienced in the world": "It is something new, I must therefore attempt to define it for I cannot name it." Unfortunately, we have to use names for realities that we are just attempting to define. Worse even, we are not alone in that process, since those who control political life in the states of the twentieth century also want to define, describe, and name their political system—or at least to define it according to what they want it to be or what they want others to believe that it is. Obviously the perspectives of scholarship and of political actors will not always coincide, and the same words will be used with different meanings. This makes the need for conceptual clarity even more imperative. In addition, societies differ not only in the way they organize political life but in the relations of authority in spheres other than politics. Certainly those who consider dimensions of society other than government more important for the life of people would prefer a conceptualization of the variety of societies in which politics would be only one and perhaps not a very important dimension. Our concern here is, however, the variety of political systems as a problem in itself.

One of the easiest ways to define a concept is to say what it is not. To do this obviously assumes that we know what something else is, so

that we can say that our concept is not the same. Here we shall start from the assumption that we know what democracy is and center our attention on all the political systems that do not fit our definition of democracy. As Giovanni Sartori (1962a, pp. 135–57) noted, as he was reviewing the use of terms like totalitarianism, authoritarianism, dictatorship, despotism, and absolutism which over time had been opposed to democracy, in modern times it has become more and more difficult to know what democracy is not. We feel, however, that the work of many scholars has at least provided us with a definition of democracy that fits a large number of political systems sufficiently similar in the way of organizing political life and the relationship between citizen and government to be described by a single definition. We shall therefore deal here with the political systems that share at least one characteristic, that of not being like those we shall describe with our definition of democracy. Thus, we shall deal here with nondemocratic political systems.

This basic duality has been described traditionally with terms like "polycracy" and "monocracy," "democracy" and "autocracy." In the eighteenth century "absolutism" and "despotism" became the descriptive and ideological terms to describe governments that were free from restraint *(legibus solutus)*, even when there was an ambivalence such as the term "enlightened despotism" reflects. Late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century, after constitutional governments had been established, at least on paper, in most Western countries and liberalism and the *Rechtstaat*—"state of law"—had become the symbol of political progress, the new autocratic forms of rule were generally called dictatorships. In the twenties Mussolini adopted Giovanni Gentile's neoidealist conception of the state as an "ethical" and "totalitarian" state, and as he said: "The armed party leads to the totalitarian regime. . . . a party that governs totalitarianly a nation is a new fact in history."[2] Only shortly later the term would find echo in Germany, more among the political scientists like Carl Schmitt (1940), writing in 1931, than among the Nazi leadership. The success of the word was easily linked with the famous work by General Ludendorff (1935), *Der Totale Krieg*,[3] which turned around the old Clausewitz conception of "war as a continuation of politics with other means" to conceiving of peace as a preparation for war, politics as continuation of war with other means. An influential writer, Ernst Jünger (1934), at that time also coined the phrase *"Totale Mobilmachung."* Soon this idea of total mobilization would enter the political discourse and even

legal texts like the statutes of the Spanish single party with a positive connotation. Already in the thirties, political scientists like Sabine (1934) would start using it for the new mobilizational single-party regimes, fascist and communist. Robert Michels (1928, pp. 770–72) already in 1928 would note the similarity between the Bolshevik and the fascist parties. Trotsky (1937, p. 278) in 1936 would write: "Stalinism and fascism, in spite of a deep difference in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena. In many of their features they show a deadly similarity." And many fascists, particularly left fascists, would feel strongly the affinity between their ideals and those of a national Russian communism led by Stalin.[4] It was therefore not left to the liberal critics of the fascist powers and the Soviet Union to discover those affinities and the usefulness of a concept that would cover these two novel political phenomena. As we shall see, only recently a reaction has set in against the overextension and misuse of the concept, as well as its intellectual fruitfulness. Already in the thirties, however, some theorists who favored authoritarian, antidemocratic political solutions but were hostile to the activist mobilizational conceptions of the totalitarian state and were concerned about the autonomy of the state from society, even a society mobilized by a single party, formulated the contrasts among the authoritarian state, the totalitarian state, and what they called the neutral liberal democratic state (Ziegler, 1932; Voegelin, 1936). Those formulations did not find echo in political science after World War II. With the cold-war transition to democracy of some authoritarian regimes like Turkey and Brazil and the initial democratic form taken by the new independent nations, it appeared as if the dichotomy between democracy and totalitarianism could serve to describe the universe of political systems or at least the polar extremes toward which other systems would tend. It was at this point that the regimes that could not be classified either as political democracies or totalitarian systems tended to be conceived of either as tutelary democracies, that is, as regimes that have adopted the formal norms of a democratic polity and whose elites have as a goal the democratizing of their polities even though they might be unclear as to the requirements, or as traditional oligarchies surviving from the past (Shils, 1960). Even so, the regimes that found themselves between these two types, oriented either toward a democratic future or a traditional past, required the formulation of the type of modernizing oligarchies. Significantly, in that case the description focused more on the goal of economic development than on the nature of the political institutions to be created or maintained.

Only a few years later the great hopes for democracy in Latin America, particularly in the more developed republics of South America and those created by the apparently successful transfer of British and French democratic constitutions to former colonies that became independent, were disappointed. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes like Spain and Portugal unexpectedly survived the defeat of the Axis. Political scientists would discover that such regimes could not be understood as unsuccessful totalitarian regimes, since many, if not all, of their founders did not share a totalitarian conception of society and the state; they functioned very differently from Nazi or Stalinist regimes; and their rulers, particularly in the Third World, did not keep up the pretenses of preparing the nation for democracy with temporary authoritarian rule. They increasingly rejected explicitly the liberal democratic model and often pretended to mutate the Leninist model of the vanguard party for building the new states or nations. Soon social scientists would discover that the ideological pronouncements and the organization charts of the parties and the mass organizations in almost all cases did not correspond to any reality, as in the past the pseudofascism of Balkan, Eastern European, and Baltic states had not corresponded to the German or even the Italian model. Inevitably those developments would lead to the formulation, with one or another emphasis, of the idea of a third type of regime, a type *sui generis* rather than on a continuum between democracy and totalitarianism. On the basis of an analysis of the Franco regime, particularly after 1945, we (Linz, 1964) formulated the concept of an authoritarian regime distinct from both democratic governments and totalitarian systems.

Our analysis here will focus on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that share at least one characteristic: they are nondemocratic. Therefore we shall start with a brief statement of an empirical definition of democracy that will allow us to delimit the subject of our research. We shall turn to the rich theoretical and empirical research on totalitarian political systems over the last decade as well as to the recent critiques of that concept in order to delimit the types of regimes that we shall call authoritarian by what they are not. However, those three types do not exhaust fully the types of political systems existing in the twentieth century. There are still a number of regimes based on traditional legitimacy whose nature we would misunderstand if we would classify them together with the modern authoritarian regimes established after the breakdown of traditional legitimacy or after a democratic period. We also feel that it would not be fully fruitful to consider certain types of

tyrannical, arbitrary rule exercised by an individual and his clients with the help of the praetorian guard, without any forms of organized participation in power of institutional structures, with little effort of legitimation of any sort, and in pursuit of more private than collective goals, in the same category with more institutionalized authoritarian regimes in which the rulers feel that they are acting for a collectivity. We therefore decided to deal with this type of regime separately, calling it "sultanistic," even when it shares some characteristics with those we have called authoritarian. The case of dual societies, in which one sector of the society imposes its rule on another, by force if necessary, while allowing its members to participate in political life according to the rules of political democracy except for excluding from discussion the issue of the relationship to the dominated group, supported by a wide consensus on that issue, poses a special problem. We have labeled that type of regime "racial democracy," conveying the paradox of democracy combined with racial domination. Recent developments in Eastern Europe after de-Stalinization and even some trends in the Soviet Union have raised the question of the nature of the post-Stalinist communist regimes. We have found that the emerging regimes in Eastern Europe have many characteristics in common with those we have described as authoritarian, but their more or less recent totalitarian past and the commitment of their elites to some elements of the totalitarian utopia makes these regimes quite distinct. We shall discuss them as a particular case of authoritarian regimes: as post-totalitarian.

The two main dimensions that we shall use in our definition of the authoritarian regime—the degree or type of limited political pluralism under such regimes and the degree to which such regimes are based on political apathy and demobilization of the population or limited and controlled mobilizations—lead us to distinguish a number of subtypes. Those subtypes are based fundamentally on the type of participants in the limited pluralism and on the way in which they are organized, as well as on the level and type of participation. We shall distinguish: bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes; those forms of institutionalization of authoritarian regimes that we shall call "organic statism"; the mobilizational authoritarian regimes in postdemocratic societies, of which the Italian Fascism was in many ways an example; postindependence mobilizational authoritarian regimes; and finally the post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes. Certainly these ideal types in the Weberian sense do not fully correspond to any particular regime, since political systems are built in reality by leaders and social forces with contradictory

conceptions of the polity and subject to constant changes in emphasis and direction. Regimes are the result of contradictory manifest and latent tendencies in different directions and therefore are all mixed forms. However, some regimes approach more one or another type. In that sense it would be difficult to locate precisely each country even in a particular moment in time within the boxes of our typology. Therefore our table and figure in this paper have to be taken as suggestive of a political attribute space in which regimes can be placed.

Social scientists have attempted to classify the independent states of the world using some operational criteria (Shils, 1960; Almond and Coleman, 1960; Almond and Powell, 1966; Huntington, 1970; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Moore, 1970b; Lanning, 1974).[5] Political change, particularly in the unstable states of the Third World, obviously has quickly dated many of those classifications. In addition there has been little consensus on the few theoretical efforts to classify political systems into any more complex typology, largely because there are few systematic collections of data relevant to the dimensions used in formulating the typologies and because the politics of many countries has not been the subject of scholarly research. There is, however, considerable consensus on the countries considered by Dankwart Rustow to be democratic systems and by Robert Dahl to be polyarchies and those characterized as competitive by the contributors to the 1960 review of Politics of the Developing Areas. Many of those studies show that only between one-fourth and one-third of the political systems of the world at any time were political democracies. Robert Dahl, Richard Norling, and Mary Frase Williams (Dahl, 1971, Appendix A, pp. 231–49), on the basis of data from the *Cross Polity Survey* and other sources on eligibility to participate in elections and on the degree of opportunity for public opposition using seven indicators of required conditions, scaled 114 countries into 31 types. On the basis of those data, gathered around 1969, they classified 29 as polyarchies and 6 as near-polyarchies. The list of Dankwart Rustow (1967), which coincides with that of Dahl except for Mexico, Ceylon, Greece, and Colombia, included 31 countries. Both lists omit a few microstates that would qualify as polyarchies.

Among the 25 countries whose population in 1965 was over 20 million people only 8 at the time were considered polyarchies by Dahl and one, Turkey, a near-polyarchy, to which the list of Rustow would add Mexico.[6] If we consider that among those 25 countries Japan, Germany, and Italy for a considerable part of the first half of this century

were under nondemocratic governments and that among the 5 largest states in the world only the United States and India have enjoyed continuously democratic rule since their independence, the importance of the study of nondemocratic political systems should be obvious. In fact, in some parts of the world even fewer are democracies. Only 7 countries, mostly small ones, of the 38 African nations that gained independence since 1950 remain multiparty states in which elections are held and parties can campaign. Seventeen of those 38 nations by 1973 had a military chief of state and 64 percent of the 266 million inhabitants in them were under military rule (Young, n.d.). Even in Europe, excluding the USSR and Turkey, only 16 of 28 states were stable democracies, and 3, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus, face at this moment an uncertain future. Of the European population west of the Soviet Union, 61.5 percent live under democracies, 4.1 percent live under unstable regimes, and 34.4 percent live under nondemocratic political systems.

There is certainly considerable diversity among democracies—diversity between those like the United States, where there have been continuous popular elections since 1788, and those like the Federal Republic of Germany, established in 1949 after twelve years of Nazi totalitarianism and foreign occupation; between states based on majority rule, like the United Kingdom, and those based on complex arrangements among ethnic religious minorities which combine competitive politics with the unity of the state, as in Lebanon; between highly egalitarian societies, as in Scandinavia, and a country with the inequality of India. Despite all those differences, the political institutions of these countries have many similarities that allow us to consider them democracies. That basic similarity becomes apparent when we consider the heterogeneity in the list of the 20 largest nondemocratic countries. No one would doubt that the Soviet Union, Spain, Ethiopia, and South Africa are politically more different from each other than are the United States and India, to take extreme cases, or to stay within Europe, Spain and East Germany. It shall be our task in this chapter to attempt a conceptualization that will allow us to make some meaningful distinctions among that great variety of political systems that no stretching of the concept would allow us to consider competitive democracies and under which at least half of humanity lives.

Certainly the richest countries, the 24 whose gross national product per capita around 1965 was over 1,000 U.S. dollars, were democracies—with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Hungary, and the special case of Kuwait; but already among

the 16 ranking behind them with over $500 per capita only 7 could be considered stable democracies. We are not therefore dealing only with poor, underdeveloped countries or with countries arrested in their economic development, since among 36 countries whose growth rate was above the mean of 5.1 percent for the period 1960–65 only 12 appear on Dahl's list of 35 polyarchies or near-polyarchies. If we were to take only those with a high per capita growth rate for the same period, that is, over 5 percent, only 2 of 12 countries would be on that list of Dahl.

Therefore, in spite of the significant relationship discovered between the stability of democracy in economically developed countries and the higher probability that those having reached a certain level of economic and social development would be democracies, there is a sufficient number of deviant cases to warrant a separate analysis of types of political systems, social systems, and economic systems. There is no doubt that certain forms of political organization, of legitimation of power, are more likely in certain types of societies and under certain economic conditions than others and that some combinations are highly unlikely. We feel, however, that it is essential to keep those spheres conceptually separated and to formulate distinct typologies of social, economic, and political systems. Unless we do so, important intellectual questions would disappear. We would be unable to ask, What type of social and economic structure is likely to lead with greater probability to the establishment of certain types of regimes and their stability? Nor could we ask, What difference does it make for the social and economic structure and its development to have one or another regime? Is there a greater likelihood of the society and perhaps the economy to develop under one or another type of political system?

Certainly there is no one-to-one relationship between those different aspects of social reality. Democratic governments are certainly compatible with a wide range of social and economic systems, and the same is true for the variety of autocratic regimes. In fact, in only the recent past German society has been ruled by the unstable Weimar democracy, Nazi totalitarianism, and the stable Bonn republic. Undoubtedly the social and economic structures were considerably affected by those different regimes, in addition to other factors, but the political differences were clearly greater than those in the economic and even the social structure. It is for this reason that we shall center our attention on the variety of political systems without including in our conceptualization dimensions more directly relevant for a typology of societies or of economic systems.

We cannot emphasize enough how important such an analytical distinction is for raising meaningful questions about the relationship between polity, society, and economy, to which we should add a fourth aspect, the cultural and religious realm.

Democratic Governments and Nondemocratic Polities

It is relatively easy to define democratic government without implying that the social structure and social relations in a democratic state should enter into the definition.[7] We shall call a political system democratic when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule; a democratic system does this without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference by norms requiring the use of force to enforce them. The liberal political rights are a requirement for that public contestation and competition for power and for the expansion of the right to participate in elections for an ever increasing number of citizens an inevitable consequence. The requirement of regular intervals excludes from the definition any system in which the rulers at one point in time might have derived their legitimacy from support in a free contest but refuse to be accountable at a later date. It clearly excludes certain plebiscitarian authoritarian regimes, even if we should accept the honesty and freedom of choice in the original plebiscite. The requirement that all effective political offices should be directly or indirectly dependent on the election by the citizens excludes those systems in which a traditional ruler, through inheritance, retains powers not controlled or mediated by a popularly elected assembly or in which nonsymbolic offices are for life, like Franco as head of state or Tito as president of the Republic. A wide range of political freedoms that guarantee the freedom of minorities to organize and compete peacefully for the support of the people are essential, even when there are some legal or even de facto limits, for us to state that certain systems are more or less democratic (Dahl, 1971). Nondemocratic regimes, however, not only impose de facto limits on minority freedoms but establish generally well-defined legal limits, leaving the interpretation of those

laws to the rulers themselves, rather than to independent objective bodies, and applying them with a wide range of discretion. The requirement that no citizen should be excluded from participation in elections, if that exclusion requires the use of force, takes into account the fact that the expansion of citizenship has been a slow and conflictual process from censitary suffrage to universal male suffrage and finally to the inclusion of women and young adults, as pressures developed from those sectors demanding the expansion of suffrage. Systems that at one point in time allowed more or less restricted participation but refused, using force, to expand it to other groups would be excluded on that count. South Africa would be a prime example of a political system that decades ago might have qualified as a democracy but by excluding permanently and in principle the blacks from the electorate and even depriving the Cape Town Coloured of their vote has lost that characteristic. Whatever element of democratization the development of internal party democracy in a single-party regime might represent, the limitation of "citizenship" to the members of a single party, that is, to those agreeing with certain basic political preferences and subject to party discipline and exclusion from it, would not qualify the regime as democratic. Certainly a system with internal party democracy is more democratic than one without it, one in which the party is ruled by the *Führerprinzip* or "democratic centralism," but the exclusion from participation of citizens unwilling to join the party does not allow us to classify the political system as democratic.

In our definition we have not made any reference to political parties, because in theory it is conceivable that the competition for power could be organized without them, even though we know of no system without political parties which would satisfy our requirements. In theory, competition for leadership could take place among individuals within narrow constituencies, without organizations of some permanence committed to particular principles, aggregating a wide range of issues across many constituencies, which we call parties. This is the *theory of organic or corporative democracy,* which holds that representatives should be elected in primary social groups where people know each other and share common interests, presumably eliminating the need for political parties. In a later section on organic statism we shall discuss in detail the theoretical and empirical difficulties in the creation of a free competition for power in so-called organic democracies and the authoritarian character of such regimes. Therefore, the freedom to form political parties and of parties to compete for power

and not a share in power offers a prima facie test of the democratic character of the government. Any system in which a party is de jure granted a special constitutional and legal status and its offices are subject to special party courts and granted special protection by the law, in which other parties have to recognize its leadership and are allowed to participate only insofar as they do not question that preeminent position or have to commit themselves to sustain a certain social-political order (beyond a constitutional framework in which free competition for power at regular intervals can take place by peaceful means), would not qualify. It is fundamental to keep clear the distinction between de facto predominant parties obtaining overwhelming support, election after election at the polls, in competition with other parties, from hegemonic parties in pseudo-multiparty systems. It is on this ground that the distinction between democratic and nondemocratic regimes cannot be made identical with single and multiparty systems. Another criterion often advanced for the distinction between democratic and nondemocratic regimes is that alternation in power provides a presumption of democracy but is not a necessary condition (Sartori, 1974, pp. 199–201).

The criteria mentioned allow an almost unequivocal classification of states as democracies without denying democratic elements to other states or the presence of de facto ademocratic or antidemocratic tendencies in those so classified. Only in a few cases has disagreement among the scholars about the facts about the freedom for political groups and competition among them lead to doubts.[8] Further evidence for the validity of the distinction is the resistance of nondemocratic regimes that claim to be democracies to introducing just the elements listed here and the ideological contortions into which they go to justify their reluctance. The fact that no democracy has been transformed into a nondemocratic regime without changing one or more of the characteristics listed is further evidence. Only in rare cases has a nontraditional regime been transformed into a democracy without constitutional discontinuity and the use of force to remove the incumbents. Turkey after World War II (Karpat, 1959; Weiker, 1963 and 1973), Mexico (if we accept the arguments of those who want to classify it as a democracy), and perhaps Argentina after the 1973 election are cases in point. The borderline between nondemocratic and democratic regimes is therefore a fairly rigid one that cannot be crossed by slow and imperceptible evolution but practically always requires a violent break, anticonstitutional acts, a military coup, a revolution, or foreign intervention. By

comparison, the line separating totalitarian systems from other nondemocratic systems is much more diffuse, and there are obvious cases in which systems lost the characteristics that would allow us to define them as totalitarian in any meaningful sense of the term without becoming democracies and in a way that does not allow the observer to say exactly when and how the change took place. Despite our emphasis on the importance of retaining the distinction of totalitarian and other nondemocratic types of polity, these have more in common with each other than with democratic governments, justifying nondemocratic as a more general comprehensive category. It is those regimes that constitute our subject.

A Note on Dictatorship

One term often used to designate nondemocratic and nontraditional legitimate governments, both in the literature (Sartori, 1962b), and common usage, is "dictatorship." From its historical origins in Rome as *dictator rei gerundae causa,* designating an extraordinary office limited and foreseen in the constitution for emergency situations—limited in time to six months, which could not be extended, or in function to carry out a particular task—the term "dictatorship" has become a loosely used term of opprobrium. It is no accident, as Carl Schmitt (1928) and Sartori (1962b, pp. 416–19) have noted, that even Garibaldi and Marx should still have used it without that negative connotation.

If there is a point in conserving the term for scientific usage today, it should be limited to describe emergency rule that suspends or violates temporarily the constitutional norms about the accession to an exercise of authority. Constitutional dictatorship is the type of rule that is established on the basis of constitutional provisions for situations of emergency, especially in the face of widespread disorder or war, extending the power of some offices of the state or extending their mandate beyond the date it should be returned to the electorate through a decision taken by constitutionally legitimate authority. Such an extraconstitutional authority does not necessarily have to be anticonstitutional, that is, a permanent change of political institutions. But it might well serve to defend them in a crisis situation. The ambivalent character of the expression "constitutional dictatorship" has led Sartori and others to prefer the term "crisis government" (Rossiter, 1948). In fact, the revolutionary committees that have assumed power after the breakdown of

traditional rule or authoritarian regimes with the purpose of calling free elections to restore democratic regimes, as long as they have remained provisional government without the ratification by an electorate, can be considered dictatorships in this narrow sense of the term. Many military coups against traditional rulers, autocratic governments, or democracies in the process of breaking down, due to efforts to assure a fraudulent continuity in power through manipulation or delay of elections, gain broad support on the basis of the commitment, initially honestly felt by some of the leaders, to reestablish free competitive democracy. The difficulty in the extrication process of military rule, so well analyzed by Samuel Finer (1962) and Huntington (1968, pp. 231–37), accounts for the fact that more often than not such military rule creates authoritarian regimes rather than assures the return to democracy. Overt foreign *domination* for the purpose of establishing the condition for democracy by ousting from power nondemocratic rulers would be another very special case. Japan, Austria, and West Germany after World War II would be unique examples, since certainly the Allied High Commanders and Commissioners were not democratic rulers of those societies (Gimbel, 1968; Montgomery and Hirschman, 1968). But their success might also have been due to quite unique circumstances in those societies not likely to be found everywhere. In this restricted sense we are talking only about those dictatorships that Carl Schmitt (1928) has called *"Kommissarische Diktatur"* as distinct from the ones he called "sovereign dictatorships."

In the world of political realities, however, the return to constitutional democracy after the break with democratic legitimacy, even by so-called constitutional dictatorship or by the intervention of monarchs or armies as moderating power in emergency situations, is uncertain. One exception is perhaps national-unity governments in case of war, when all major parties agree on postponing elections or avoiding real electoral competition to assure almost unanimous support to the government to pursue a united war effort. Dictatorship as extraordinary emergency power limiting civil liberties temporarily and/or increasing the power of certain offices becomes hard to distinguish from other types of autocratic rule when it lasts beyond a well-defined situation. The political scientist cannot ignore the statements of those assuming such powers even when he or she might have doubts about their honesty or their realism in their expectations of devolving power to the people, because those statements are likely to have permanent consequences for the legitimacy of nondemocratic rule so established. The

political scientist cannot decide *a priori* but only *ex post facto* that the rule of an individual or group was actually a dictatorship in this narrow sense of the term as derived from its historical Roman meaning. Dictatorships of this type are more often than not bridges toward other forms of autocratic rule, and it is no accident that the kings of the Balkan states that broke with constitutional rule should have been considered royal dictatorships rather than a return to absolute monarchies. Once the continuity of traditional legitimacy has been given up for democratic forms, the return to it seems to be impossible. Dictatorship as interim, extraordinary authority all too often is perpetuated in more or less institutionalized forms of authoritatrian rule. Let us not forget that already the Roman constitutional institution was subverted and transformed into a more permanent authoritarian rule when Silla became in 82 B.C. *dictator reipublicae constituendae* and Caesar became in 48 B.C. dictator for a limited time and in 46 B.C. for ten years. Caesarism has been since then a term for the subversion of constitutional government by an outstanding leader.

We shall reserve the term dictatorship for interim crisis government that has not institutionalized itself and represents a break with the institutionalized rules about accession to and exercise of power of the preceding regime, be it democratic, traditional, or authoritarian. The temporary suspension of those rules according to rules foreseen in the constitution of a regime shall be called crisis government or constitutional dictatorship.

2

TOTALITARIAN SYSTEMS

Toward a Definition of Totalitarianism

In view of the central place in the study of modern noncompetitive democratic regimes of totalitarianism it seems useful to start with some of the already classical definitions of totalitarian systems and, after presenting them, attempt to push our knowledge somewhat further along the lines derived from the criticism they have been subject to (Jänicke, 1971; Friedrich, 1954; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965, S. Neumann, 1942; Aron, 1968; Buchheim, 1968a; Schapiro, 1972a, 1972b; Seidel and Jenkner, 1968). Carl Friedrich has recently reformulated the original descriptive definition he and Z. K. Brzezinski (1965) had formulated, in the following way:

> The features which distinguish this regime from other and older autocracies as well as from heterocracies are six in number. They are to recall what by now is a fairly generally accepted set of facts: (1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party commited to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police and three kinds of monopoly or more precisely monopolistic control; namely, that of (a) mass communications, (b) operational weapons, and (c) all organizations including economic ones, thus involving a centrally planned economy. . . . We might add that these six features could if greater simplicity is desired lie grouped into three, a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police and a monopoly of the three major forms of interpersonal confrontation in industrial mass society. Such monopoly is not necessarily exercized by the party. This should be stressed at the outset in order to forestall a misunderstanding which has arisen in some of the critical commentaries

> in my earlier work. The important point is that such a monopolistic control is in the hands of whatever elite rules the particular society and thereby constitutes its regime. (Friedrich, 1969, p. 126)

Brzezinski has offered a more essentialist definition emphasizing the ultimate end of such systems when he writes:

> Totalitarianism is a new form of government falling into the general classification of dictatorship, a system in which technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement for the purpose of affecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions, proclaimed by the leadership in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population. (Brzezinski, 1962)

Franz Neumann (1957, pp. 233–56) has provided us with a similar set of defining characteristics.

Let us stress that in these definitions the terror element—the role of the police, of coercion—is not central as, for example, in the work of Hannah Arendt (1966). In fact, it could be argued that a totalitarian system could be based on the identification of a very large part of the population with the rulers, the population's active involvement in political organizations controlled by them and at the service of their goals, and use of diffused social control based on voluntary, manipulated involvement and a mixture of rewards and fears in a relatively closed society, as long as the rulers could count on the loyalty of the armed forces. In some respects, communist China has approached this type of totalitarianism, and the Khrushchev experience of a populist rationalization of party control described by Paul Cocks (1970) would fit such a model.

Explicitly or implicitly those definitions suggest a tendency toward the destruction of the line between state and society and the emergence of "total" politicization of society by political organizations, generally the party and its affiliates. However, this dimension that differentiates totalitarian systems from various types of authoritarian regimes and particularly from democratic governments is unlikely to be fully realized and, consequently, the problem of tension between society and political system, while reduced, is far from disappearing under such systems. The shaping of the individual, the internalization by the mass of the citizens of the ideology, the realization of the "new man" of which

ideologists talk are obviously even more unlikely, even when few social systems, except religions, have gone as far in this direction as the totalitarian systems.

The dimensions that we have to retain as necessary to characterize a system as totalitarian are an ideology, a single mass party and other mobilizational organizations, and concentrated power in an individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not accountable to any large constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by institutionalized, peaceful means. Each of those elements can be found separately in other types of nondemocratic systems and only their simultaneous presence makes a system totalitarian. This means that not all single-party systems are totalitarian, that no system in which there exists a fair competition for power between freely created parties can be totalitarian, and that no nondemocratic system without a single party, or more specifically an active single party, can be considered totalitarian. As Friedrich admits in his revised version, it is not essential that ultimate power or the largest amount of power should be found in the party organization, even when it seems highly improbable that such a single mass party and the bureaucracy controlling it should not be among the most powerful institutions in the society, at least in relationship to its members and to the common citizen.

There are certainly dictators—Caesaristic leaders, small oligarchies like military juntas, or coalitions of elites within different institutional realms not accountable to the members of their organizations and institutions—whose power we would not call totalitarian. Unless their power is exercised in the name of an ideology guided to a greater or lesser degree by some central ideas, or *Weltanschauung,* and unless they use some form of mass organization and participation of members of the society beyond the armed forces and a police to impose their rule, we cannot speak of a totalitarian system but, as we shall see later, of authoritarian regimes. Whatever its unity, infighting might exist in the top leadership around and under the top leader and between organizations created by the top leadership. Such group politics does not emerge from the society or take place between institutions or organizations that existed before taking of power. The conflicting men, factions, or organizations do not derive their power from structures of the society that are not strictly political, even when those engaged in such struggles for power might have closer links with some sectors of society than with others. In this sense it seems impossible to speak of class conflict in a Marxist sense in totalitarian systems. The initial power

positions from which the competitors attempt to expand their base by linking with the diversity of interests in the society are part of the political system—political organizations like the party, affiliated mass organizations, regional organizations of the party, the party militia, or government and police bureaucracies. In stable totalitarian systems preexisting institutions like business organizations, the church, or even the army play a secondary role in the struggle for power, and to the extent that they participate they are brought in to support one or another leader or group within the political elite. Their leadership is not a legitimate contender for political power but only for influence on particular decisions and rarely capable of veto power. In this respect, the subordination of the military authority is one of the distinctive characteristics of totalitarian systems in contrast to other nondemocratic systems. To this day, no totalitarian system has been overthrown or changed fundamentally by the intervention of the armed forces, even when in crisis moments one or another faction might have reinforced its power by the support of the military.

Only the highly political People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China (Joffe, 1965, 1971; Pollack, 1974; Schurmann, 1968, pp. 12–13; Gittings, 1967) and the army in Cuba (Domínguez, 1974; Dumont, 1970) might have played such a role. It is only in a very relative sense that we can speak of particular leaders or factions or bureaucracies within the power structure as representing the managers, the farmers, linguistic or cultural groups, the intellectuals, and so on. Whenever leaders or groups represent to some degree the interests of such sectors of the society, they are not accountable to a constituency, do not derive their power base fundamentally from it, generally are not recruited from it, and often are not even co-opted as leaders emerging from such social groups. The destruction or at least decisive weakening of all the institutions, organizations, and interest groups existing before a new elite takes political power and organizes its own political structures is one of the distinguishing characteristics of totalitarian systems compared with other nondemocratic systems. In this sense we can speak of monopoly of power, monism, but it would be a great mistake to take this concentration of power in the political sphere and in the hands of the people and the organizations created by the political leadership as monolithic. The pluralism of totalitarian systems is not social pluralism but political pluralism within the ruling political elite. To give one example: the conflicts between the SA and the SS, the DAF (Labor Front) and the party, the four-year plan organization of Goehring and the Organization

Todt of Speer, were conflicts within the Nazi elite and between its organizations. They certainly looked for and found allies among the military, the bureaucracy, and sectors of business, but it would be a great mistake to consider any of those leaders or organizations as representatives of the pre-Nazi structures of German society. The same could probably he said about the struggles among factions within the Politbureau or the Central Committee after the death of Stalin.

However, it might be argued that in a totalitarian system that is fully established and in power for a long time, members of the political organizations, particularly the party, become identified through a process of differentiation and division of labor with particular policy areas and are likely to identify increasingly with particular economic or territorial interests and represent their aspirations and points of view in the formulation of specific policies, particularly in peacetime, when no single goal is all-important, and at the time of succession or leadership crisis. Once basic decisions about the nature of the political system have been settled, preexisting social structures destroyed or decisively weakened, and dominant leaders displaced, a transformation of the system allowing a pluralism limited in scope and autonomy is not unlikely to take place. At that point, the degree of vitality of the ideology and the party or other organizations committed to its dominance and the strength of the leaders at the top will be decisive in characterizing the system as some variety of totalitarianism or as being transformed into something different. Certainly such transformations within totalitarian systems are not without tension and strain and therefore may be characterized by cyclical changes rather than a smooth continuous evolution.

Any typology of totalitarian systems will have to take into account the relative importance of ideology, party and mass organizations, and the political leader or leadership groups than have appropriated power—and the cohesion or factionalization of the leadership. In addition, it will have to analyze how those three main dimensions link with the society and its structure, history, and cultural traditions. Different totalitarian systems or phases of the same system might be characterized as more ideological, populist, or bureaucratic, depending on the character of the single party, and more charismatic, oligarchical, or even feudal, depending on the structure of the dominant center of power. The absence of any of those three factors or their weakening beyond a certain point will fundamentally change the nature of the system. However, the variety among those three dimensions certainly allows for quite different types of totalitarian systems.

It is the combination of those three dimensions that accounts for many of the other characteristics we are more likely to find in totalitarian than other nondemocratic systems. However, some of those other characteristics are neither necessary nor sufficient to characterize a system as totalitarian and can be found in other types of political systems.

In summary, I shall consider a system totalitarian when the following characteristics apply.

1. There is a monistic but not monolithic center of power, and whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the preexisting society.
2. There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them. The ideology has some boundaries beyond which lies heterodoxy that does not remain unsanctioned. The ideology goes beyond a particular program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, and interpretation of social reality.
3. Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of "parochials" and "subjects," characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers.

This third characteristic brings a totalitarian society closer to the ideal and even the reality of most democracies and basically differentiates it from most "nontotalitarian nondemocratic systems." It is this participation and the sense of participation that democratic observers of totalitarian systems often find so admirable and that make them think that they are faced with a democracy, even a more perfect democracy than one in which citizens get involved in public issues only or mainly at election time. However, the basic difference between participation in a mobilizational regime and in a democracy is that, in the former, in each realm of life for each purpose there is only one possible channel

for participation and the overall purpose and direction is set by one center, which defines the legitimate goals of those organizations and ultimately controls them.

It is the constant feedback between the dominant, more or less monistic center of decision making, undergirded by the ideological commitments that guide it or are used or manipulated by it, and these processes of participation for those ideological purposes within those controlled organizations that characterizes a totalitarian system.

It should be possible to derive other characteristics frequently stressed in describing totalitarian systems from the three we just sketched, and we shall do so in discussing in more detail some of the main scholarly contributions to the study of specific totalitarian systems. Here we might give a few basic examples. The tense relationship between intellectuals and artists and the political authorities,[9] in addition to being the result of the personal idiosyncrasies of rulers like Hitler and Stalin, is certainly the result of the emphasis on an ideology and the exclusion by the commitment to it of other systems of ideas or the fear of the questioning of the values implicit in the ideology, particularly the collective and public goals versus individual and private ones. Privatized, inner-oriented man is a latent threat, and certainly many forms of aesthetic expression search for that orientation. The same is true for the exacerbation of the normal conflicts between church and state to conflicts between religion and politics.[10] The importance of ideology also has positive aspects, in the sense of making education a highly valued activity, making selective cultural efforts and their mass diffusion highly desirable. This is in contrast to most traditional autocracies, with the exception of religious indoctrination in religious autocracies and scientific and technological education in secular autocracies. Propaganda, education, training of cadres, intellectual elaboration of the ideology, scholarship inspired by the ideology, rewards for intellectuals identified with the system are more likely to be important in totalitarian than in other nondemocratic systems. If we ignore the limited content of that effort, the limitations or denial of freedom, we find here a certain convergence with democratic systems, in which the mass participation in political life requires also mass education and mass communications and assigns to intellectuals an important, even when not always welcome, role.

The concentration of power in the leader and his collaborators or a distinct group of powerholders, formed by their joint participation in

the struggle to gain power and create the regime, their socialization in the political organizations, or their co-optation from other sectors (keeping in mind criteria of loyalty and/or identification with the ideology), necessarily limits the autonomy of other organizations like industrial enterprises, professional groups, the armed forces, the intellectuals, and so on. The sharing to greater or lesser degree of the belief in the ideology, of the identification with its symbols, and the conviction that decisions should be legitimized or at least rationalized in terms of the ideology, separates this group from those more skeptical or disinterested in the ideology and from those who, because of their calling, like the intellectuals, are most likely to question those ideas. However, it also brings them close to those who, without challenging their power, are willing to elaborate the ideology. The element of elitism so often stressed in the analysis of totalitarian systems is a logical consequence of this search for a monopoly of power. It is also a source of the bitterness of many conflicts within the elite and the ostracism or purge of those who lose the struggle for power. Power, more than in democratic societies, becomes a zero-sum game.

The commitment to ideology, the desire for monopolistic control, and the fear of losing power certainly explain the propensity toward coercive methods in such systems and the likelihood for continuing terror. Therefore, terror, particularly within the elite rather than against opponents or even potential opponents to the system, distinguishes totalitarian systems from other nondemocratic systems. The size of the society, stressed by Hannah Arendt, and the degree of modernization in terms of technology linked with industrialization, stressed by other scholars, are not as important as ideological zeal in explaining the drive for positive commitment rather than apathy of subjects or just external conformity of bureaucrats.

The nature and role of the single party is obviously the most important variable when we come to analyze in behavioral terms the impact of totalitarian systems on different societies. The importance assigned to the party organization, the specialized political organizations emerging from the party, and the mass organizations linked with it account for many of the basic characteristics of such systems. Foremost, their capacity to penetrate the society, to be present and influential in many institutional realms, to mobilize people for large-scale tasks on a voluntary or pseudo voluntary basis rather than just for material incentives and rewards allows such systems to carry out important changes with limited resources and therefore to serve as instruments

for certain types of economic and social development. It also gives them a certain democratic character, in the sense of offering to those willing to participate (accepting the basic goals of the leadership rather than advancing alternative goals) a chance for active participation and a sense of involvement. Despite the bureaucratic character of the state and of many organizations and even the party, the mass membership in the party and in related sponsored organizations can give meaning, purpose, and a sense of participation to many citizens. In this respect, totalitarian systems are very different from many other nondemocratic systems—authoritarian regimes—in which the rulers rely fundamentally on a staff of bureaucrats, experts, and policemen, distinct and separate from the rest of the people, who have little or no chance to feel as active participants in the society and polity beyond their personal life and their work.

The party organization and the many minor leadership positions in it give many people a chance to exercise some share in power, sometimes over people who in other hierarchies of the society would be their superiors.[11] This obviously introduces an element of equality undermining other stratified structures of the society while introducing a new and different type of inequality. An active party organization with members involved in its activities also increases enormously the possibilities of control and latent coercion of those who are unwilling to join or are excluded. Many of the energies that in a democratic society are channeled into political life, but also into a myriad of voluntary associations that take an interest in collective goods, are used by totalitarian systems. Much of the idealism associated with collective orientation rather than self-orientation (idealism that in the past went into religious organizations and now in liberal democratic society goes into voluntary groups) is likely to be found in the party and its sponsored organizations, together, obviously, with the opportunism of those attracted by a variety of rewards and access to power or the hope of having it. This mobilizational aspect is central to totalitarian systems and absent in many, if not most, other nondemocratic systems. Some of the kind of people who in a totalitarian system become zealous activists on many of the tasks assigned to them by the leadership in other nondemocratic systems would be passive subjects only interested in their private narrow goals or alienated in view of the lack of opportunities for any participation in efforts directed at changing their societies. Certainly much of the attraction that the totalitarian model has comes from this participatory mobilizational dimension of the party and the mass organizations. But also much of the alienation and negative feelings

about such systems are due to the absence of choice for the average citizen between alternative goals for the society and the limited freedom or lack of freedom in choosing the leadership of such organizations due to the bureaucratic character derived from norms like the leadership principle or democratic centralism.

Other characteristics often noted in describing totalitarian systems, like their expansionist tendencies, are much more difficult to derive from their more central characteristics. There is obviously an indirect relationship, since the emphasis on an exclusive ideology makes the persistence of alternative ideologies and belief systems a latent threat. However, much will depend on the content of the ideology, and certainly the character and direction of the expansionism will be shaped more by that than by other structural features.[12]

A search for conformity, a proscription of most forms of dissidence, particularly those that can reach larger segments of the population and that involve any attempt of organization, a reduction of the private realm, and considerable amount of half-free if not enforced participation are almost inevitable in totalitarian systems. The massive and/or arbitrary use of terror as we find in the concentration camps, the purges, the show trials, the collective punishments of groups or communities do not seem essential to a totalitarian system. However, we can say that it was not accidental that some of those forms appeared under Hitler and Stalin, that they were distinctive and widespread as they have not been in any democratic system, and that they should have been qualitatively and quantitatively different from other nondemocratic systems, except in their periods of consolidation in power either during or immediately after a civil war. Terror is neither a necessary nor sufficient characteristic of totalitarian systems, but there seems to be a greater probability that it should appear under such systems than under others, and certain of its forms seem to be distinctive of certain types of totalitarian systems. Some authors have rightly spoken of totalitarianism without terror.

Early studies of totalitarianism, particularly Sigmund Neumann's (1942) *Permanent Revolution,* emphasized the role of a leader. The fascist commitment to the *Führerprinzip* and the exaltation of the *Duce,* together with the cult of personality around Stalin, certainly made this an obvious element in a definition of totalitarian systems. However, in recent years we have seen systems that on many counts are still totalitarian in which we do not find such an undisputed leader at the top or

a comparable cult or personification of leadership. On the other hand, there are many nondemocratic systems that would not fit into the type we have delineated above in which a single leader occupies a comparable place and the cult of personality has gone as far. Therefore we can legitimately say that the appearance of a single leader who concentrates vast amounts of power in his person, is the object of a cult of personality, and claims a charismatic authority and to a greater or lesser extent enjoys it among the party members and the populace at large is highly probable in totalitarian systems but not inevitable or necessary for their stability. Succession crises that some scholars thought threatened the stability and even survival of such regimes have not led to their downfall or breakdown even when they have been very critical for them.[13] It could be argued that the emphasis on personal leadership is characteristic of totalitarian systems of the fascist type, and this is certainly true of Italy and Germany as well as of some of the minor fascist regimes, but the role of Stalin in the Soviet Union shows that it was not a feature exclusive to fascist regimes. Obviously if we should argue, as some dissident communists and some left fascists do, that Stalin was the Russian functional equivalent to fascism, the difficulty would disappear. But this seems a sophistic solution. At this point we can say only that there is a higher probability that such leadership will appear in totalitarian systems than in other nondemocratic systems. Changes in the relationship between leadership, ideology, and organized participation are the variables likely to offer the best clue for the construction of the typology of totalitarian systems and for an understanding of the processes of consolidation, stability, and change—and perhaps breakdown—of such systems. It might be overambitious to attempt to formulate some propositions about those interrelationships among those relatively independent variables for any totalitarian system; and certainly only a theoretical-empirical analysis of particular types and even unique cases will facilitate such a theoretical effort at a higher level of abstraction. With all the risks involved, we shall attempt to sketch some directions in which such an analysis might move. Let us stress from the beginning that the relationships are likely to be two way without any of them being ever fully unidirectional, since unidirectional relationships would change decisively the nature of the system and bring into question the independent character of each of the variables, but also that the flow of influence of the variables might be stronger in one or another direction.

Ideology and Totalitarianism

As some of the scholars have noted, totalitarian systems might be considered ideocracies or logocracies, and Inkeles (1954) has developed the notion of totalitarian mystique to convey the importance of ideology as a powerful independent variable in such systems.[14] There can be no doubt that totalitarian leaders, individuals or groups, in contrast to other nondemocratic rulers, derive much of their sense of mission, their legitimation, and often very specific policies from their commitment to some holistic conception of man and society. Ideologies vary much in the richness and complexity of their content and in the degree to which they are closed, fixed, and can be action-related. The study of ideologies as systems of ideas, of meanings, and of the internal logical or emotional connections between those ideas is obviously essential to understanding different totalitarian systems. Such a study can be done from different perspectives: intellectual-cultural history, sociology of knowledge, and social psychology. The initial commitment of a ruler or ruling group to an ideology imposes constraints, excluding a greater or smaller number of alternative values, goals, and styles of thinking, and sets a framework limiting the range of alternative policies. There can be no question that an intellectually elaborate ideology like Marxism provides a more complex and heterogenous as well as rational starting point for ideological elaboration than the more simple, emotional, and less intellectually fixated elements of fascist ideology. Some of those who question the usefulness of the totalitarian approach to the study of fascist regimes and of Nazism do so because they question the ideological character of those movements reducing their ideas to those of their founders and rulers and engaging in purely pragmatic power seeking and opportunist manipulation of symbols. The existence of a printed and fixed and to some degree unambiguous corpus of writing of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, which can be doctored, partly suppressed, and reinterpreted but not fully abandoned, certainly differs from those regimes in which the leader or group in power claims identification with much less elaborate ideas or is in the process of giving ideological content to his rule. The autonomy or heteronomy in the control of ideological formulation is obviously a key to the autonomy and stability of different totalitarian systems and is one of the sources of conflict between them when they attempt to derive their legitimacy from identification with an ideological corpus. The hypothesis may be advanced that a fully autonomous totalitarian system cannot exist without almost

full control over the formulation or interpretation of the ideological heritage or content. In this respect different fascist regimes found themselves in a better position in relation to the hegemonic powers in their camp than did the Eastern European communists, and the regimes of China and Cuba found themselves in a better position than those of other minor communist states. The heteronomous control of the ideological content of Catholic thought by a universal church and specifically by the Pope is one of the most serious obstacles to the creation of a truly totalitarian system by nondemocratic rulers claiming to implement Catholic social doctrine in their states. Among other factors this is one that has prevented the Austrian "clerical-fascists" and the regimes of Franco and Salazar from pursuing further the path toward totalitarianism (Linz, 1964, p. 303).

Ideologies in totalitarian systems are a source of legitimacy, a source of the sense of mission of a leader or a ruling group, and it is not surprising that one should speak of charisma of the leader or the party, for at least important segments of their societies, on the basis of that element. Many of the differences between systems or within the same system over time are to be understood in terms of the relationship of people in those positions to the ideology. However, while the ideology imposes some constraints, more or less narrow, on the rulers and their actions, the relationship is not one-sided, and much of the effort in such systems goes into the manipulation, adaptation, and selective interpretation of the ideological heritage, particularly in the second generation of rulers. Only a complete change in the relationship to the ideology—its substitution by pragmatic policy formulation and the acceptance of heteronomous sources for ideas and central policies, of evidence clearly and explicitly in conflict with the ideology—will lead to changes away from the totalitarian model. The ruling group might very well reach the conclusion that a fixed ideology limits its choices too much and that a scholastic reinterpretation of the texts can go only so far, but the fact that a simplified and vulgarized version of the ideologies has been central to the indoctrination of the middle levels of cadres of the single mass party and even the membership will certainly make it difficult to abandon certain policies and sometimes create real crises of legitimacy. The autonomy and importance of the party organization compared to the personal power of the leader or a small oligarchy is to some extent a function of the importance of the commitment to the ideology. Inversely, the constraining character of the ideological commitments for the ruling group is likely to be directly related to the active

life of the party—intraparty discussion, elaboration of party thought, cadre training activities, agitprop activities, and so on. Important ideological changes rather than just manipulation of the ideology require some activation of the party structure and thereby impose pressures on the ruling group, contribute to crises within it, and might lead to important changes in its composition. Obviously, changes in the relationship between the ruling group or leader and the party organization, like those achieved by Stalin as first secretary, also make possible changes in the ideology and the displacement of those in the ruling group who had devoted their energies to the intellectual elaboration of the ideology and policies derived from it rather than to the development of an organizational base. The displacement and elimination of the original Bolshevik intellectual ideologists by the apparatchiki identified with Stalin certainly contributed to the debasement of the Marxist-Leninist ideological heritage. This process had some interesting parallels in fascist regimes, with the displacement of Rosenberg by Himmler and Bormann and of Gentile and Bottai by Starace. Such processes are not without consequences for the system, since the capacity to mobilize the loyalties of intellectuals, students, and young idealistic activists in the party and the mass organizations is to some degree a function of the capacity for creative ideological development as well as for continuity. This might account for waves of ideological fervor and with them mobilization of new members in some sectors of the regime. The intellectual elaborations sponsored by the SS, often neglected by scholars, might be a good example. The simultaneous weakening and ossification of the ideology and the party organization obviously tend to isolate the ruling group, weaken the dynamism of the society, and create a certain power vacuum that tends to be filled by more coercive bureaucratic control and the reliance on a more praetorian police. Ultimately this could lead to the transformation of a totalitarian system into other forms of authoritarianism.

The Totalitarian Party

The unique syndrome of totalitarian political systems resulting from the importance of ideology, the tendency toward a monistic center of power, and the emphasis on mass participation and mobilization finds its purest expression in the totalitarian party, its dependent organizations and affiliates, and the functions they perform in the society. The

totalitarian party, as a unique type of organization, distinguishes most clearly the modern forms of autocracy from any traditional absolutist regime and from a great variety of other nondemocratic governments. Mussolini was right when he wrote: "The party that governs a nation totalitarianly is a new fact in history; similarities and comparisons are impossible" (Aquarone, 1965, p. 577).[15] In the mid-thirties Mihail Manoïlesco (1938), a Rumanian scholar and cabinet member sympathetic to authoritarian regimes, wrote one of the first comparative analyses of single parties, including, together with the fascist parties that enjoyed his sympathies, the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republican party. The index of his book reflects some of the permanent intellectual problems in the study of such parties: the ideological-historical context in which they are born, their functions in the process of taking power and consolidating it, in established regimes the complex relationship between party, state, and nation, their organizational characteristics, and their special legal status. At that time there were six single ruling parties. Today their number has multiplied manifold and we are conscious that there are many different types of established single-party systems. In addition, in a number of communist countries, including China, one cannot speak of one-party systems but of dominant leading parties and subordinate parties under their aegis. The theoretical model of the totalitarian party has been widely imitated, but only under very special circumstances can we say that the single party is a totalitarian party. In many democracies we find parties that more or less explicitly have the goal of doing away with party competition. Such parties often by extension have been called totalitarian but we feel this is a misleading use of the term, since only after taking power can such a party realize its ambitions. In fact, it is debatable whether a party that shares an ideology and certain organizational characteristics with totalitarian parties would not be forced to function differently if it came to power in a stable democracy and might even become a loyal opposition or a legitimate participant in democratic politics.

The concept of the totalitarian party itself reflects some of the inherent tensions and ambivalence of the term, and it is no accident that some of the parties, particularly of the fascist and nationalist type and including many Nazi theoreticians, tried to substitute the word "party" by others like "movement." Party underlines that the organization is only part of the political life, while the adjective totalitarian indicates the more or less utopian goal of encompassing the whole individual, the whole society. Communist parties based on the Leninist conception

of the vanguard party have always emphasized this part character. For example, Article 126 of the Stalin Constitution:

> The citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the right to unite in public organizations, trade unions, cooperative societies, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical, and scientific societies. And the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class, working peasants, and working intelligentsia voluntarily unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build a Communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both societal and governmental. (Meyer, 1965, p. 107)

The party is therefore a minority, a vanguard in communist terminology, an elite in that of the fascist. In most communist countries it represents somewhat less than 5 percent of the population, and even where it is larger than that it does not get close to 25 percent.[16] Totalitarian parties fit the definition of party of Max Weber:

> The term "party" will be employed to designate associations, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment. The end to which its activity is devoted is to secure power within an organization for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members. These advantages may consist in the realization of certain objective policies or the attainment of personal advantages, or both. (1968, Vol. 1, p. 284)

The goal of power within an organization highlights a major problem in the study of totalitarian parties, the relationship between party and state. In spite of all the bureaucratization of parties, the oligarchic continuity of leadership, and even the legally privileged status of its leaders and members, parties are deliberately distinct from the organization of a state, its offices and bureaucracy, whatever degree of overlap between their leadership. In the USSR ministers of the Soviet government have frequently not been members of the highest bodies of the Politbureau and even the Central Committee, and men highly placed in the party have never held government office. Fraenkel (1941), in his analysis of early Nazi rule, even when emphasizing some different aspects, spoke of the dual state. In principle, therefore, the totalitarian party retains the function of expressing the demands, aspirations, interests of the society or particular classes of society. In this sense it is

a modern phenomenon, inconceivable without the duality of state and society. Despite the tendency of the totalitarian party to become a closed group, incorporated by law into the administrative staff, the formal criterion of voluntary solicitation and adherence distinguishes parties from state bureaucracies, modern or patrimonial, and from most modern armies. Membership involves whatever the psychic, social, and economic pressures to join there are, for example for civil servants, a commitment to a voluntary identification. It is no accident that a member of the Hitler cabinet would for reasons of conscience refuse even an honorary membership in the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) (Peterson, 1969, p. 33).[17] This part character contrasts with the totalitarian goal expressed in a 1958 edition of the official *Primer of Soviet Philosophy:*

> Only the party expressing the interest of the entire nation embodying its collective understanding, uniting in its ranks the finest individuals of the nation, is qualified and called to control the work of all organizations and organs of power. The party realizes the leadership of all state and public organizations through its members who work in these organizations and who enter into their governing organ. (Schurmann, 1968, p. 109)

Hitler (1924–26) in *Mein Kampf* expressed this ambition of totality of the party in this revealing text:

> Every philosophy of life, even if it is a thousand times correct and of highest benefit to humanity, will remain without significance for the practical shaping of a people's life as long as its principles have not become the banner of the fighting movement which for its part in turn will be a party as long as its activity has not found completion in the victory of its ideas and its party dogmas have not become the new state principles of a people's community. (p. 380)

Ideas valid for the whole community or a class cannot be realized without a militant organization. Significantly, the party had to conquer and retain the power in the state. The state is an indispensable means for its realization but no totalitarian leader conceives that the state could realize his utopia. It is significant that only in Italy, where the Fascists tended, after taking control of the state, to subordinate the party organization and its leaders to Fascist state officials and where the corporativist ideology offered an alternative way to organize society, the possibility of dissolving the party would be discussed briefly. Despite the

constant use by the Fascists of the term "totalitarian," the Fascist conception of the party as an organization of the political administrative forces of the regime, as a voluntary civil militia, at the order of the *Duce*, at the service of the Fascist state, tended to undermine the totalitarian conception of the party and make it more comparable to the many single parties created by a ruler or ruling group from above.[18]

The totalitarian party is a mass party. It is not just an organization of officeholders based on the co-optation by a ruling group of officials, local notables, army officers in civilian garb, and perhaps some functionaries and a few office-seeking members, as many single parties in authoritarian regimes can accurately be described. It is also not an organization based on indirect membership in trade unions, cooperatives, professional associations, and so forth. Certainly, totalitarian parties have a close relationship with such functional organizations. The NSDAP, for example, made a clear distinction between the party as a cadre and membership organization, its divisions *(Gliederungen)*, the Hitler Youth *(Jugend)*, the SA, the SS, and the large number of affiliated organizations *(angeschlossene Verbände)*, that is, professional and interest groups including the giant labor organization, the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (DAF) (Orlow, 1973, pp. 6–7, 92). Those organizations for the communists are transmission belts, and as Stalin put it:

> To forget the distinction between the advanced detachment and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the advanced detachment to raise ever wider strata to this most advanced level means merely to deceive oneself. (1924, p. 174)

As one *Gauleiter* (regional head of the party) representing the popular Nazi farmers organization, the *NS Landvolk*, put it, the purpose of the *NS Landvolk* is not to represent the farmers but to make National Socialists out of them (Orlow, 1973, p. 59). Membership in theory and very often in practice involves much more than paying dues, like in many democratic parties and even social democratic parties. It is no accident that the definition of party membership should have been one of the basic disagreements between Martov and Lenin, between the Mencheviks and the Bolsheviks, by requiring personal participation in one of the party organizations. The acceptance by the party member of party discipline and the intolerability of any criticism undermining or obstructing the unity of action decided on by the party, extended even to activities outside of politics in the professional sphere, even in conflict

with the hierarchical authority relationships in the state or the army, characterize totalitarian parties. Admission to membership is not automatic; parties reserve for themselves the right to admit or to reject. They often establish a probationary or candidate period, formally grant different rights to new members and provide for expulsion, which means, as the statutes of the PNF *(Partito Nazionale Fascista)* stated, "The Fascist who is expelled from the party must be outlawed from public life" (Aquarone, 1965, p. 510). Deliberate planning of the composition of the membership and purges by the leadership characterize those parties,[19] and, consistent with the conception of the organization as voluntary and self-regulating, there is no recourse in the absence of other parties against the decision to any outside authority or court despite the privation of political citizenship (Rigby, 1968; Buchheim, 1958). Many positions in the state and societal organizations are formally or de facto accessible only to party members.

Totalitarian parties are bureaucratic in a way that even the most bureaucratized democratic parties are not. As Lenin stated it in *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:*

> The party link must be founded on formal "bureaucratically" (from the point of view of the disorganized intellectual) worded rules strict observance of which alone can guarantee us from the willfulness and the caprices of the circle spirit, from the circle scramble methods which are termed the free "process of the ideological struggle." (Daniels, 1969, p. 11)

The life of the party is regulated by innumerable rules. Written norms are constantly enacted, extensive files are kept, decisions go through channels, and party officials control that apparatus. Both at the center and at the periphery there is a large number of full-time officials, who often have distinctive training and sometimes with privileged legal status and enjoy not only power but other rewards comparable to those of civil servants; in addition there are others who exercise leadership functions on a part-time basis. In the Communist party the expression "cadre" is used to designate party members who exercise leadership roles with distinctive ranks included in the *nomenklatura* (list of key job categories and descriptions used in elite recruitment) (Harasymiw, 1972). In the case of the Nazis the equivalent was the *Hoheitsträger,* the political leadership of the party from the *Gauleiters* down to the local leaders. In 1934, in Germany, the territorial cadre organization, *Politische Organisation,* had 373,000 functionaries for a party membership of

some 2.5 in million, while the Weimar Social Democratic party, with 1 million members, needed only 10,000 (Orlow, 1973, p. 42). At that time the Hitler Youth had 205,000 functionaries and the NSDAP, including all its affiliates, had 1,017,000, not all of them necessarily party members. Jerry F. Hough (1971, p. 49), on the basis of the size of the apparatus of various city and district party committees, estimates the number of party apparatchiki in the Soviet Union between 100,000 and 125,000. A 1956 breakdown of party membership by occupation in China lists 1,039,419 "organs," which seems to refer to party members employed full-time in the party bureaucracy among the party's 10.7 million members. The penetration by the party into the society to perform the multiple functions assigned to it is achieved by a large number of functionaries close to the masses, the heads of cell and local organizations. The figures for the NSDAP in 1939 show 28,376 leaders of local groups, 89,378 cell leaders, and 463,048 block leaders, without counting those of the affiliated organizations. Obviously the degree of ideological consciousness, dedication to political activity, and willingness of these cadres to put loyalty to the party ahead of other loyalties vary enormously from party to party and over time. However, we cannot underestimate the degree to which the cadres of a party are perceived by the members as leaders and by the citizens as representatives of the power of the party, for good and evil, to help them solve many problems (like a ward heeler in urban America) or to supply information to those in power about their doings and attitudes (Inkeles and Bauer, 1959, p. 321–37). Nor can we ignore the sense of participation in politics, in a collective effort, or the petty gratifications of these leaders, which are so characteristic of totalitarian systems. It is this cadre structure that allows totalitarian parties to pursue successfully their functions, and many of the achievements in transforming the society have to be attributed to the cadres. Without them the mobilization for the large number of campaigns, actions, problems, policies, would be impossible. Even if the party did not play a decisive role, as it does in communist systems, in the management of the society and the economy, the availability at short notice of such cadres and those they can influence or control can assure a massive and visible expression of support for the regime in plebiscitarian elections and mass rallies. If we keep in mind the findings about opinion leaders as mediators between the mass media and the individual in democratic societies and the impossibility of creating any comparable network of personal influences, except in some cases the churches, we can understand the success of

propaganda, the appearance of enthusiasm and support and the pervasive conformity in totalitarian systems. Many of those who in pluralistic societies devote their time and energy to diverse voluntary associations do so in totalitarian societies in the activities of the party and its affiliated organizations, often with the same motivation and sincerity. Their actions contribute to the efficacy of the system and through it to its legitimacy. It is the absence of either pluralistic or single-party forms of voluntary participation and of a complex organizational network that characterizes most authoritarian regimes (except for short periods of mobilization through single parties).

Since the totalitarian party assumes a growing number of functions of a technical character in the management of complex industrial societies, the cadres experience a slow process of transformation, not infrequently accompanied by reversals, in the course of the stabilization of totalitarian systems. Initially, the cadres are recruited from the old fighters, the people who joined the party while it was in the opposition and sometimes in the illegal underground, who often made great sacrifices for the cause. Their loyalty, except for those disappointed by the absence of a second revolution, tends to be unquestionable but their competence to manage large-scale organizations in normal rather than exceptional circumstances is often limited. If the party wants to retain its momentum and not abdicate its revolutionary ambition and become dependent on the civil service, it has to recruit and socialize those who are experts and in due time train loyal party members as experts. The creation of party schools (Orlow, 1965; Scholtz, 1967; Ueberhorst, 1968; Mickiewicz, 1967), the promotion of activists from the youth organization through educational channels and through stages in different sectors of party activity into elite positions, the efforts to commit and even to compromse in the party those with expert knowledge are some of the techniques used. The dilemma of red or expert, which has been central to the Communist parties in power, is a perfect example. In the case of communist regimes the problem is compounded by the fact that the party plays a decisive role in the management of industry, agriculture, and services. The problem of preventing red expert cadres from also becoming professionals with a less political conception of their role, particularly devoting less attention to the social and political mobilization dimension of the party, has been particularly well analyzed in the Chinese case by Franz Schurmann (1968, pp. 75–76, 163–67, 170–72; Townsend, 1972). The Italian PNF, despite some efforts to create party schools, never fully faced this dilemma, due to the limited ideological

thrust of the movement, the compatibility of its authoritarian nationalism and corporativism with a reliance on the state, and Mussolini's identification with the state, whose ministries and prefectures he had taken over, leaving to the party officials a secondary role. We do not know how the Nazis would have ultimately solved this dilemma, except that the social recruitment by the party before takeover and the ideological affinity of conservative, nationalist, authoritarian experts allowed the Nazis the partification of many sectors of the society. Even so, the men in the administration of the party felt unhappy about the situation and made generally unsuccessful attempts to train the Nazi elite in special schools. The irrational, romantic, anti-intellectual, militaristic, genetic, and racist components of the ideology were an obvious obstacle for the training of party men as experts. The SS as an elite within the party, with its pseudoreligious, pseudofeudal, semisecret, and terroristic character, opted for a process of co-optation and compromise in the "order"; these were men who had made their career not in the street fights and propaganda activities of the party before 1933, but in the establishment (Krausnick, 1968; Höhne, 1969). We do not know how a stable Nazi regime, victorious in the war, would have handled this problem. We know, however, how the Soviet Union and other communist countries have, in the course of their longer and more stable, peaceful development, moved toward combining *partiinost* ("partyness") with expertise. What we do not know exactly is the answer to the question raised so well by Jerry F. Hough (1971, pp. 47–92) of to what extent the apparatchiki of the contemporary Soviet Union in their multiple functions and career lines, with their professional education and expertise, their frequent shifts from state administration to party work, share a distinctive ideological outlook, and have common interests, have a different party perspective than their counterparts in the governmental and economic hierarchies. As he writes:

> It would certainly simplify the comparative study of political systems if we could assume that the elite members of the institutional groups which comprise "the gigantic bureaucracy party organizational complex" in a country such as the Soviet Union represent essentially their own interests and not those of farmers, workers, and clerks whom they supervise. (Hough, 1971, p. 89)

Franz Schurmann, in the context of his analysis of the Cultural Revolution in China, has suggested the need to make a distinction between professional and expert when he writes:

> Expertise means a technical capacity (e.g., in science, technology, or administration). Professionalism means commitment to an occupational position. I have noted that two elites appeared to be developing in China, the body of organizational leaders with political status deriving from ideology and the professional intellectuals with status deriving from education. If occupational position gives rise to status, then professionalism will lead to the formation of elites. The accusations directed against "the authoritarian clique following the capitalist road" have aimed at the elite status, and not at the expertise. That has also been at the root of the attacks on the tendencies for a professional officer corps to develop. The intellectuals are the men of expertise in China, its scientists, technicians, and administrators. There are, have been, and undoubtedly continue to be tendencies toward the formation of an expert elite. However, since the brunt of the attack of the Cultural Revolution was on the Party, of gravest concern to Mao Tse-tung and his followers was the emergence of a professional red elite—that is, an elite whose power and status derived from Party position. (Schurmann, 1968, p. 565)

The commitment in a totalitarian society to the ideology of "politics takes command," to the control and preferably guidance of the society by a group of dedicated people committed to collective interests and to a utopian vision (however muddleheaded it is), accounts for the basic ambiguity in the role of the cadres of a party. It might well be that what starts as total politicization through the mobilization of a party might end, except for permanent revolution against the party or within the party, in the administration of a post-totalitarian society with its limited bureaucratic pluralism.

Party Leadership

Many scholars in their analysis of totalitarian parties have emphasized as the ultimate key to our understanding the role of the leader, be it the *Duce, Führer,* or First Secretary, and the unique concentration of power in his hands and the cult of personality, *Führerprinzip,* the distorted interpretation of democratic centralism that from the top down permeates the party (Schapiro, 1972a; Tucker, 1965; Vierhaus, 1964).[20] Others go even further and find the explanation in the unique personalities of men like Hitler and Stalin.[21] It would be an obvious mistake to ignore those factors, but the question will still remain, Why were those men capable of exercising such power and how did those principles emerge and become accepted by their staff and many party members? Michels (1962; originally published 1911) in his sociology of the modern party lists

many of the factors that account for the exercise of such power, which are far from absent in competitive democratic parties but do not have the same consequences due to the pluralism of parties. Rosa Luxemburg in 1904 already noted that "the ultra centralism advocated by Lenin is not something born of the positive creative spirit but of the negative sterile spirit of the watchman" (Daniels, 1969, p. 12), and Trotsky felt that Lenin would have the party and its prescribed theology substitute for the mass movement in order to force the pace of history, concluding prophetically:

> These methods lead, as we shall yet see to this: the party organization is substituted for the party, the Central Committee is substituted for the party organization, and finally the "dictator" is substituted for the Central Committee. (Daniels, 1969, p. 13)

He concludes that the complicated task of cleaning out deadwood and bourgeois thinking "cannot be solved by placing above the proletariat a well-selected group of people, or still better one person and with the right to liquidate and demote." Those tendencies toward an all-powerful leader and the destruction even of a collective leadership are perhaps, as recent trends show, not inevitable in a communist party. They were, perhaps, in fascist parties, given some of their basic ideological orientations—the voluntarism, irrationalism, and appeal to emotion so congruent with the appeal to charisma, the admiration of military organization and leadership, the appeal of the great man in history idea, and in the German case the romantic yearning for a saviour with particular virtues based on a fascist, feudal, or Germanic imagery. However, it should be noted that fascist party statutes provided for elected leadership and that one of the few changes in *Mein Kampf* from the first edition was a radical formulation of the *Führerprinzip*.[22] The commitment to an indisputable ideology that expresses inexorable laws of history with substantive rather than procedural content makes the emergence of that kind of leadership more likely. Such commitment can easily justify the search for unanimity and the outlawing of any opposition within the party. The degree of free discussion before reaching a decision and the tolerance for loyal support of dissenters not convinced in such a context would depend on the personality of the leader or leaders rather than, in a more relativist conception of politics, based on normative limits of authority and pragmatic skepticism. The leadership principle, the charismatic demand of obedience, and the truly charismatic or

pseudocharismatic loyalty of the followers are congruent with the totalitarian party but perhaps not inevitable. The model of concentration of power in a rational bureaucratic organization, the creation of a single center of decision making, is often used in describing such regimes. In fact, the contrary is true, and Franck, the Nazi governor of Poland, was right in stressing the anarchy in Hitler's rule. No centers of power challenging the authority of the leader are allowed to emerge, but the struggle for power between subleaders and organizations is one of the central characteristics of totalitarian systems, tolerated, if not encouraged, by the leader, following a policy of divide and rule. In a pure totalitarian system that struggle takes place mainly within the party and its affiliate organizations, which seek alliances with pretotalitarian structures or the emerging social interests of complex societies. As Orlow (1973, pp. 7–12) has noted, Hitler subcontracted (with the understanding that the contract could be terminated at will) segments of his authority to his individual agents, rather than to officers or institions, on the basis of intensely personal relationships. Since, on the same principle, those agents developed strong power bases with different interests and goals and with poorly defined areas of competence, conflicts between them were endemic and required either arbitration by the *Führer,* or by those able to speak in his name, or efforts of coordination by creating complex interdependencies between agencies, new organizations under someone the rivals could agree on, or the like. The system, despite the appearance of monocentrism, could not be further from rational bureaucratic organization principles, and only arbitrary interventions of the leader or his spokesmen could disentangle it. In the German case the importance of certain ideological elements derived from the romantic idealization of the Middle Ages and the hostility to law contributed to giving it, as Robert Koehl has noted, a feudal aspect (Koehl, 1972), understanding by feudalism, in the words of Coulborn, a system in which "the performance of political functions depends on personal agreement between a limited number of individuals . . . since political power is personal rather than institutional, there is relatively little separation of function" and in which "a dispersal of political authority amongst the hierarchy of persons who exercise in their own interests powers normally attributed to the state, which are often in fact derived from its breakup." In other systems in which the emotional bond between the leader and most of his followers was less stable than in the case of Hitler, the political process approached more the model of court politics in a degenerate patrimonial regime. Sometimes the

withdrawal of direct intervention of the leaders leads to stalemates, greater bureaucratization, and rationality, but as long as the leader retains legitimacy and/or control of coercion he can impose his will without being restrained by norms or traditions. This is one among the many factors accounting for the unpredictability so often noted in the analysis of totalitarian politics. It is also one of the factors that ultimately may account for the instability of pure totalitarianism and the emergence of post-totalitarian patterns, the rejection of the cult of personality and the emergence of collective leadership, and the search for greater rationality in the allocation of competencies by the leadership that has experienced working with such a leader. It accounts for an effort to institutionalize the charisma of the leader in the party as a corporate body.

Functions of the Party

The totalitarian party, however, is defined not only by its unique structure but by its functions. Functions obviously change from one period in the development of the regime to another. They are different in the stage of creating a power vacuum in a previous regime, particularly a democratic one, in the takeover phase, the phase of consolidation (often combined with considerable tactical compromises with the existing power structure, social interests, and pretotalitarian institutions in a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern to neutralize them), in the phase of purging itself from those co-opted in that consolidation process, in the renewed efforts of mass mobilization followed by more stable domination of an atomized society (Kornhauser, 1959; Dallin and Breslauer, 1970), to a final phase of administering society without basis for principled opposition but facing complex policy decisions heading to a moderate degree of pluralism among decision makers even within the party. The scholarly literature focusing on politics in totalitarian regimes rather than on the process of their establishment, particularly in the case of Nazi Germany, and the more monographic work on particular policy areas make us more conscious of those phases and the very different functions performed by the party and its organization in each of them. It is impossible to summarize here in a comparative perspective these problems, and therefore we have to describe the functions of the party without taking into account the high and low tides in their performance (Orlow, 1973).

Foremost among its functions is the politicization of the masses, their incorporation in-cadration, integration, conscientization, and conversion, and their reciprocals, the detachment from other bonds, the destruction of the autonomy of other organizations, uprooting of other values, and desocialization. This process is achieved by a mixture, which is very different in various totalitarian systems, of propaganda, education, and coercion. It is here where the different styles of totaitarian systems become most visible. There is an abyss between the brutal regimentation of the Nazis in their mass organizations and the sophisticated combination in China of coercion in the land reform and the "speaking bitterness," the small groups organized by party cadres and activists for thought reform, propaganda, and coercion, in very different proportions in different phases (Townsend, 1972; Schurmann, 1968). This function of integration and conscientization also accounts for the importance assigned in such parties to the youth organization as the recruiting ground for future leaders and to counteract the socializing influences of family and church (Brandenburg, 1968; Klönne, 1957; Kassof, 1965; Germino, 1959). The in-cadration of masses not ready to join the party and participate in its many activities is to be achieved by the many functional organizations to which people have to belong to achieve other ends. In the case of Nazi Germany, this, given the large number of organizations and their high rate of penetration into their constituencies (which contrasts within the theory of mass society of Kornhauser, 1959, as Lepsius, 1968, has noted), required either the destruction or the infiltration and *Gleichschaltung* of those organizations. An example: the *Doppolavoro* and *Kraft durch Freude* organizations of leisure time in Italy and Germany show how even the free time can, by voluntary participation on apolitical grounds, be used for political socialization. In the case of less developed countries one of the great achievements of totalitarian parties is to create such functional organizations that can serve as transmission belts. It is important to stress that participation is not passive but involves active engagement in campaigns for the benefit of community, from welfare to beautification, sports to culture, and, in developing countries, for production on the basis of moral incentives. Organizations like a voluntary or compulsory labor service, *Arbeitsdienst*, capture motivations such as in the United States led young people to join the Peace Corps. Brigades of volunteers also serve as a recruiting ground of activists and future leaders. In fact, one of the threats to the totalitarian ideological socialization

is that many participants become more interested in the substantive functions of such organizations and activities than in ideological schooling (Pipping, 1954, pp. 324–25). In a stabilized totalitarian society the careful screening and indoctrination of educators obviously lowers the saliency of these socialization functions of the party and probably weakens the responsiveness of those tired of indoctrination.

The integrative function explains the importance assigned to elections and plebiscites in totalitarian systems and their use to test the effectiveness of the party and its mass organizations in their success of getting out the vote.[23] Voting is not just a duty but an opportunity to express publicly, visibly, and preferably joyously the identification with the regime. Many types of authoritarian regimes less concerned with democratic legitimation and ideological conversion just put off elections or tolerate apathy as long as their candidates get elected.

The second central function of the totalitarian party is the recruitment, testing, selection, and training of the new political elite. This is obvious in the phase of the struggle for power in opposition, underground, revolution, and civil war. In the process of consolidation, cooptation into the party of experts and people of the establishment swells its ranks, often leading to the closure of admission and even purges of the newcomers (Rigby, 1968, pp. 178–81; Aquarone, 1965, pp. 379–81; Orlow, 1973, pp. 202–5; Buchheim, 1958). Ideally, once the party has consolidated itself in power, the recruitment should take place through socialization in the youth organizations, a so-called *leva fascista,* literally "fascist draft," by which those who graduate from the youth organizations are admitted into the party. The compulsory or at least mass character of those youth organizations, however, limits their effectiveness as a selection mechanism, and more stringent and specialized systems of recruitment tend to be devised. The dilemma of expert versus red and the search for the red expert often leads to lateral entry, particularly through active participation in party-affiliated mass organizations. Success of the party ultimately depends in a stabilized totalitarian system on its capacity to attract people in different sectors of society who are loyal to the regime but uninterested in political activism, contact with the masses, and political responsibilities. Recruitment and cadre selection in a stabilized totalitarian system finds itself between the Scylla and Charybdis of professionalization, with the consequent loss of representativeness by emphasizing educational requirements, and the promotion of activists without qualification with the risk of incompetence. The efforts to combine a broad recruitment, particularly

in communist systems from the working class in the factories, with rapid and intensive training in party programs in organizational and managerial skills reflect this dilemma (Rigby, 1968, pp. 115–25; Ludz, 1964 and 1970). In communist systems the important role of the party in the management of production and economic planning makes this problem central. It also accounts for the more rapid routinization of totalitarianism in advanced industrial communist societies.

One major function of totalitarian parties is to control a variety of specialized functions that can become independent, nonpolitical centers of power. The party is a recruiting ground for the political commissars in the army (Kolkowicz, 1967 and 1971), and in this respect it is interesting to remember that the Nazis in the last period of their rule were moving to partify the army (Orlow, 1973, pp. 460–62). The importance of coercion of opponents in the struggle to gain power, the tradition of secrecy developed in the period of illegality under repressive regimes, the international tension that has often surrounded the new regime, and the emergence of many of them in a civil war lead to an almost projective fear of subversion, conspiracy, and aggression, and consequently to a propensity for terror. Since a defense of order involves political considerations, a strictly professional police is largely inadequate, and therefore the politicization of police forces and the creation of party militias are characteristic of totalitarian systems. The organizations involved tend to be heavily recruited through party channels.

However, the main function of the party is to be present in the many sponsored organizations and those that have been taken over—trade unions, cooperatives, professional and interest groups. In a socialized economy this control function acquires a special sense. There is a great variety in the way of conceiving this "leading and guiding function" of the party, and volumes have been written on the shifting conception of the relationship between party and society, both in ideology and practice, particularly in communist countries.

Even among the Nazis, as Orlow (1973, pp. 14–16) has pointed out, two conceptions of the role of the NSDAP emerged, identified with Hess, the "representative of the *Führer*," and Ley, the head of the Party Organization Office and the Labor Front. The key terms in the differing approaches were "control" and "*Betreuung*" ("welfare, taking care"), signaling two different ways of responding to a complex, sophisticated, industrialized society, ways that largely remained intact during the years of struggle for and after the seizuire of power. According to Ley, the synthetic party community, *Gemeinschaft*, created

in the course of the struggle, should merge with the remaining, now politicized segment of the German social organism and form a *Volksgemeinschaft,* a people's community, through *Betreuung* ("taking care of the needs of the people through a politically motivated welfare state"), emphasizing less the elite status of membership and the cadre organization by ultimately fusing the party with the Labor Front into a single mass organization. His opponents felt that far from becoming a *Volksgemeinschaft,* Germany should remain a society *(Gesellschaft)* in which the key activity of the party was controlled through a tightly knit centralized organization with an elite co-opted membership and a fanatic but technically and administratively competent functionary corps. Neither of the two conceptions won the endorsement of Hitler, but basically the regime was closer to the second alternative.

State and Party

The important role of the party in providing leadership to many affiliated or sponsored organizations that control other institutions should not lead us to forget that the main function of the party is to fill political offices at all levels of government through elections or appointments. Since the officeholders in totalitarian systems, in contrast to competitive political systems, are assured their position as long as they enjoy the confidence of the party, basically the party has its own extensive and often specialized bureaucracies and the relation between government and party is central to these systems. The extent to which the party in government is or is not independent from the party as an organization, attempts to subordinate or ignore the party, or the party organization attempts to give orders to its representatives at all levels of government is perhaps the most interesting question in the study of totalitarian parties. Only when the party organization is superior or equal to the government can we speak of a totalitarian system.[24] Without that tension the system degenerates into bureaucratic authoritarianism, losing its linkage with the society and much of its mobilization and dynamic potential. Mao's statement that the party is the instrument that "forges the resolution of the contradiction between state and society under socialism" is a very exact formulation of this novel phenomenon (Schurmann, 1968, p. 112). The superiority of the state apparatus even when manned by party members characterizes a pretotalitarian phase of the regime, a failure of the totalitarian drive, as in the case of Italy, or the transition to a post-totalitarian system. It is fundamental

to remember that in the Marxist ideological tradition there is no legitimacy in the postcapitalist society for the state apparatus and that ultimately the utopian stage will represent the withering away of the state. What is less known and almost deliberately forgotten is that Hitler in *Mein Kampf* expressed his hostility to the state and the traditional German *Staatsgläubigkeit.* As he writes:

> It is therefore the first obligation of the new movement standing on the ground of the folkish world view to make sure that the conception of the nature and purpose of the state attains a uniform and clear character.
>
> Thus the basic realization is: that the state represents no end but a means. It is, to be sure, the premise for the formation of higher human culture, but not its cause, which lies exclusively in the existence of a race capable of culture. . . . thus the precondition for the existence of a higher humanity is not the state but the nation possessing the necessary ability . . . of course as I have said before, it is easier to see in state authority the near formal mechanism of an organization, than the sovereign embodiment of a nationality's instinct of self preservation on earth. (1924–26, p. 391)

The chapter goes on from here into a rambling discourse on race, biological selection, and a socialization informed by those values. The radical community is basically counterposed to the state, particularly a state like the German that does not coincide with that community. As Hannah Arendt (1966, pp. 257–66) rightly noted, the totalitarian movements cannot be understood without reference to the hostility to the state, and to conventional patriotism and the substitution by a loyalty to a larger social unit. She rightly links totalitarianism with the pan-movements that appeared in Central and Eastern Europe, where state and national boundaries did not tend to coincide like in the West. Hitler, born Austrian, deserter from the Imperial Army, serving in that of his adopted country, Germany, clearly reflects this disjunction between state and broader social community. The international proletariat and the identification of socialism in one country with leadership of a world political movement beyond its borders is the Marxist equivalent. In this context the ideological and organizational development in Italy and in Mussolini's mind put inherent limits to a totalitarian development. Hitler's confused idea in the second book of *Mein Kampf* of a distinction between subjects and citizens of the state, which found its legal expression in the Nuremberg racial laws, differentiates his regime from both the civic culture of democracies and traditional and authoritarian conceptions of the state.

The Party in Theory and Reality

The description of both manifest and latent functions of the party we have presented is based largely on the ideological conception, programatic statements, ideal typical descriptions, and research on the overlap between parties and other institutions. The question is, To what extent do party cadres, particularly at the middle and lower levels, and party members behave as expected? There are obvious variations from one totalitarian system to another, from one period or phase to another, which monographic research, particularly studies of regional and local life under such regimes, is revealing every day.[25] The research points out that, for a variety of reasons, there is considerable degree of policy diversion, that is, alteration of policies from within the power structure in directions not wanted by the rulers. It also shows that particularly on the periphery the local organs of the party, far away from the centers of ideological infighting at the top, might concentrate their attention on a function that appears in the theory of totalitarian parties but tends to be less emphasized, to represent the interests of the constituencies before higher-up party, and government, bureaucracies. This point has been particularly emphasized by Jerry F. Hough (1969) for the Soviet Union, but a reading of literature on Nazi local party activities would probably show the same pattern, even when in a more limited sphere, in view of the function of the Soviet party in the economy. The representation of the interests of territorial communities (perhaps facilitated because of a relatively centralized system with a national policy and monocentrism for major decisions) by the local party organizations, is not unlike democratic parties and democratically elected lower government units. Less divided over and involved in overall policy formulation and resource collection, they can agree on demanding as much as possible from the center for the benefit of their constituents. Successful, influential, old-time party leaders can act as mediators between a variety of local, special, and even private interests and the higher bureaucratic structures, and this, as in democratic government, is obviously an opportunity for corruption and for diversion of policy.

Somewhat similarly, the ideologically assigned functions of a party at the higher levels become often secondary to those of bureaucratic infighting between organizations, both in the party and in the government controlled by party officials, interested, like their civil servants, in protecting the autonomy of the organization from the party. Totalitarian politics, despite its mobilizational component, very often gets clogged

down in endless bureaucratic infighting, which in the German case, given the very personal direct relations of many of the top leaders with Hitler, led to feudal infighting and court politics and consumed most of the energies of the elite. Thus the limited span of attention of the top levels of leadership, even their work habits, the shifting goals and policies often hastily decided, run counter to any image of totalitarian politics as an efficient machine frictionlessly transmitting decisions from the top to the bottom. However, a superficial reading of Edward Peterson's book (1969) *The Limits of Hitler's Power* should not lead us to forget that many, and particularly the really important, wishes of the *Führer* were ultimately implemented without the possibility of any effective opposition to them, and that the "rule of anticipated reactions" made the whole system responsive to decisions congruent with the image of his power and his basic policies, or of those close to him. In a sense, an image of an all-powerful leader making all the decisions is empirically false, but in another sense it is true, since the men chosen by him or tolerated around him will act in such a system largely as they think he expects them to do. In this sense, contrary to finding in the total power of the leader an alibi for the party and other organizations, they have to share in the responsibility for decisions (Speer, 1971, pp. 649–50). Without them there cannot be even the attempt to create a totalitarian society, nor can there be the attempt without the responsiveness to their expectations of a large number of middle and lower cadres, party members, and citizens whatever the motivation, even if as minimal as the security of the individual and his or her family. The lesser commitment of many of the top leaders to such a total control for the sake of certain utopian goals of social mobilization, and as a result the lesser commitment throughout the structure of the state, explains that Italian Fascism never reached the level of control and mobilization that the pronouncements of the *Duce* and the legal enactments would lead us to expect. This in turn might have been a reflection of the degree to which Italians felt more strongly other loyalties and interests, even particularistic ties embedded in the culture, than loyalty to the PNF. In our discussion of the conditions for the emergence of totalitarianism we shall note some of the social, economic, cultural, and psychological conditions that make it possible for a totalitarian organization to approach even remotely its utopian self-image that has served us to construct the ideal type. We have seen, however, that it is dangerous to lose sight of the degree to which a limited number of political systems, in particular historical phases, approach the totalitarian utopia, both for evil and for good.

Communist and Fascist Parties

There are many important differences between communist and fascist totalitarian parties, not only in the ideology and policies, as we noted before, but in the organizational structure. The most important difference is the emphasis in the fascist parties on the *Führerprinzip* (Vierhaus, 1964; Nyomarkay, 1967; Horn, 1972), specifically in the Nazi case, which contrasts with the democratic component of democratic socialism, whatever similarities emerged in practice in the Stalinist period. The different ideological and formal principle is of central importance. Some degree of internal party democracy is possible in communist parties and there is ideological basis for those who want to move in that direction, while there was none in the National Socialist case.

Another major difference between the national socialist totalitarian party and Stalinist parties is the formal institutionalization of paramilitary organizations like the SA and the SS. Already the Italian Fascists had attempted, with the creation of the *Milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale* (MVSN), to absorb the more unruly elements of the party *squadrismo* and to give a legal and institutional basis to the repression in support of the regime. In Italy its subordination to the head of the government and the coordination with the army for the appointment of officers did not allow it to become a real political army. The evolution of the SA (Werner, 1964) and particularly the SS (Höhne, 1969; Krausnick et al., 1968), which in the course of the war became a real party army, parallel to the army of the state but not subject to its control and influence, was one of the basic differences with Italy that assured the turn toward totalitarianism of the Nazi regime. There have been similar tendencies in communist countries, but the total control by the political leadership of the regular army and its politicization, as well as the politicization of the police, have prevented the emergence of organizations of violence as part of the party and distinct from those more professional organizations. The difference, while congruent with the ideological romanticization of violence in fascism and the nationalist admiration for the armed forces, can also be explained by the different process of takeover of power. The fascist parties emerged in liberal democratic societies that allowed the opponents a large degree of freedom of organization and tolerated, if not indirectly encouraged, for a variety of reasons (reaction to communist revolutionary attempts or fear of a highly organized and mobilized working class, illegal rearmament in violation of the Versailles treaty), the emergence of paramilitary

organizations and armed party groups. Once the fascist leadership had taken over a state thanks largely to the violence and the threat created by those organizations, it was not ready to disband them even when they were forced to compromise with the establishment, particularly the military, which was suspicious of them. Such a compromise and fear of a second revolution led in Germany to the bloody purge of the SA in 1934, which, however, initiated the rise of the SS and, contrary to formal promises to the army, broke the monopoly of armed forces (Mau, 1953). Those organizations based on a voluntary recruitment attracted a strange mixture of violence-prone persons—fanatical idealists, mercenaries, and sadists—who nonetheless could feel, on the basis of elaborate rituals, the comradeship of the barracks; the romantic, pseudofeudal rhetoric of "loyalty is mine honour" plus their rejection by civil society produced a sense of being the vanguard of the movement, a mixture of monastic and chivalry order. It was this organization that implemented the most monstrous aspects of the totalitarian utopia. As Himmler said:

> These measures could not be carried out by a police force consisting simply of officials. A body which had merely sworn the normal official oath would not have the necessary strength. These measures could only be tolerable and could only be carried out by an organization consisting of the staunchest individuals, of fanatical, deeply committed National Socialists. The SS believes it is such an organization, considers that it is fitted for this task and so has assumed this responsibility. (Buchheim, 1968b, p. 366)

In the communist countries the party was born in secrecy without opportunity to organize freely—and even less so its strong arm. The takeover of power took place either in societies in which the existing establishments had disintegrated or under the sponsorship of the Soviet army. In most cases the takeover required a more or less prolonged civil war often mixed, like in China or Vietnam, with a national independence struggle. In such circumstances the party acted as a core organizing element of a new army, the Red Army, the People's Liberation Army, and in the areas controlled by the revolutionaries the party was able to establish its own police, the *Cheka,* and its successor organization staffed by loyal party members. Neither the army nor the police had to compete with organizations created before the takeover, with their distinct professional status and self-conception and therefore perceived as unreliable from a political point of view. Even though there

is evidence of idealization of the role of the *chekist,* there was no need to develop a distinctive ethos for the instruments of coercion and make them elitist, voluntary, ideological organizations (Barghoorn, 1971). It was possible to conceive of them as part of the state apparatus, intimately coordinated with the party but never equal or potentially superior to the party mass organization. It is no accident that the revolutionaries in the SA would have preferred a militia type of army in which they would have played a leading role and that a segment of the SS, the Waffen SS, showed tendencies to drift apart from the more terroristic *Verfügungstruppe* and were less interested in ideology, seeking ultimately the respectability of the armed forces. In authoritarian regimes with totalitarian tendencies, particularly with a fascist party, the failure to build an independent armed militia to challenge the monopoly of force in the hands of the army and traditional police corps is one of the best signs of the limit to the total politicization and control of the society.

Excursus on Terror

The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is one of its defining characteristics, but certainly regimes differ widely in the amount, type, and ways of using coercion. Totalitarian systems, at least in some of their phases, have been characterized by massive coercion—police acting unrestrained by any outside controls, concentration camps and torture, imprisonment and executions without proof of guilt, repressive measures against whole categories of people, the absence of public trial and even any opportunity for defense, the imposition of penalties totally out of proportion to the actions of the accused, all on a scale without precedence in recent history (Solzhenitsyn, 1973).

Political terror, defined by Dallin and Breslauer (1970, p. 7) as "the arbitrary use, by organs of the political authority of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such use or the arbitrary extermination of such individuals or groups," has certainly characterized totalitarian rule. This has led Hannah Arendt (1966, p. 474) to define totalitarianism as "a form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking." However, it is undeniable that the forms of coercion we have mentioned and political terror can be found in political systems that otherwise, without stretching the term, could not be called totalitarian (Chapman, 1970). Certainly, nondemocratic systems not characterized

by "the logicality of ideological thinking" have shown their capacity for terror and the violation of the most elementary human rights. We only have to think of the rule of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, where the arbitrary terror exercised by one man did not have or need ideological justification and was not characterized by modern forms of political mobilization.

On the other side, we can conceive regimes with the characteristics we have used in defining totalitarianism, and which distinguish them from those we characterize as authoritarian, without political terror. Certainly in such regimes we cannot expect the political freedoms enjoyed by a citizen of a democracy, but we can expect limits on the arbitrary power of the police, certain legal, particularly procedural, guarantees, and a return to the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege,* which makes it possible for those not willing to take the risk of violating the laws to enjoy a modicum of security. Even with laws that punish behavior considered legal in other societies, like publishing criticism of the government, associating for political purposes or the defense of interests, participating in strikes, etc., the definition of such acts as crimes, the exclusion of retroactive application of the law, combined with a mininium of procedural guarantees for the defendant, independence of the judiciary from direct intervention of the authorities, and restraints on the police, would allow the citizen who does not contest the regime to live without fear. A regime with those characteristics could still be highly monopolistic in its power structure, be guided by ideological commitment, and demand and reward active participation in its organizations. It would be, in our view, totalitarianism without terror. Its legal system would be repressive rather than liberal but certainly different from Stalinism or the rule of the SS under Hitler. The Soviet Union in recent years, with the introduction of what is called "socialist legality," is moving in this direction (Barghoorn, 1972, Chapter 10; Lipson, 1968; Weiner, 1970; Berman and Spindler, 1972).

To summarize our argument, while terror acquired a unique importance in totalitarian systems, many of its manifestations are not absent in regimes that lack many of the characteristics used by most authors to characterize totalitarianism, and we can conceive of particularly stabilized systems with all the characteristics of totalitarianism except widespread and all-pervasive terror. It is for that reason we have not included terror in our definition of totalitarianism.

We cannot ignore, however, the distinctive forms and scale of repression under totalitarianism and have to raise the question: Was the

terror that accompanied it, without being a necessary consequence, a likely result of that type of regime rather than of the personality of men like Stalin and Hitler? We would argue that the system made those leaders possible but not inevitable. We also have to ask if and why terror in those systems had some characteristics not found elsewhere. Does the terror of different totalitarian systems differ? Which were functions and consequences of terror? Can we distinguish different types of terror, corresponding to different phases in those regimes? These and other questions would bring us closer to an answer to the question, How was it possible? In addition we shall ask the question, What forms does terror and coercion take in authoritarian regimes? Are they different, and if so, can we link the differences to the characteristics defining totalitarian and authoritarian regimes?

Coercion in totalitarian systems has shown the following characteristics: (1) its unprecedented scale, (2) its use against social categories without consideration of guilt for specific acts, (3) the disregard for even the appearance of legal procedures, the formalities of the trial, and the opportunity for some kind of defense, in imposing penalties, (4) the moral self-righteousness and often the publicity surrounding it, (5) the extension of the terror to members of the elite, (6) the extension to members of the family of the accused not involved in the crime, (7) the emphasis on the intent and social characteristics of the accused rather than on his actions, (8) the use of organizations of the state and/or the party rather than of so-called uncontrolled elements, and the size and complexity of those organizations, (9) the continuing and sometimes growing terror after the consolidation of the regime in power, and (10) the nonexclusion of the leadership of the armed forces from the repressive policy.

In addition, with the all-important position of the party in the society, a new form of sanction emerges: the exclusion from party membership, the purges that affect decisively the life chances of people and their social relations.

The scale in number of lives lost, man-years in concentration camps, and people arrested and subject to limitations of freedom of movement not resulting from strictly military operations is unique in modern repressive societies. While there can be debates about the exactness of statistical estimates, the magnitude is beyond discussion. Conquest (1968) has brought together the scattered evidence on the number of arrests, executions, and prisoners and death in camps and the estimates that can be derived from population census data. The estimate

for executions in the late 1930s runs into around 1 million persons. Calculations for the number of inmates in camps around 1940 range between 6.5 and 12 million, depending on the year and the method of estimate. Taking the conservative figure of an average over the period 1936–1950, inclusive of an 8 million population of the camps and a 10 percent death rate per annum, we get a total casualty figure of 12 million dead. Adding to them the million executions of the period, the casualties of the pre-Yezhov era of Stalin's rule (1930–1936), those sent to camps who died, and the 3.5 million victims of the collectivization, Conquest reaches the figure of 20 million dead in 23 years of Stalin's rule. The figures for China in the consolidation phase are lower, but Mao admitted in February 1967 that in the first five years of communist rule some 800,000 "enemies of the people" had been killed, while others estimate the number between 1 and 3 million, that is, between $^1/_3$ and $^1/_2$ of 1 percent of the population (Dallin and Breslauer, 1970, p. 55). Reitlinger (1968, pp. 533–46) estimates that the number of victims of the Nazi "final solution of the Jewish problem" ranges between 4.2 and 4.5 million persons, with a total loss of Jewish life estimated at 6 million. It Italy, despite strong tendencies toward totalitarianism, terror except in the struggle for power and the short-lived Republic of Salo period was more limited. The Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State sentenced over the years 33 persons to death, of whom 22 were executed, and tried 5,619, sentencing 4,596 to an average of five years (Aquarone, 1965, p. 104). Undoubtedly the scale of repression in a number of regimes approaching far less the totalitarian model than Italy has been greater.

As significant, if not more, than the scale of the terror in some totalitarian systems has been its use against whole categories of people irrespective of any evidence of guilt or even intention of threatening the political system. The deprivation of human rights, wholesale arrests, and extermination as a result of deliberately formulated government policy by the agents of the state or the party of those identified, in the case of the Nazis, as Jews, gypsies (Döring, 1964), members of religious sects, biologically unfit, certain prisoners of war, or sectors of the population of occupied territories (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1958) and, in the case of communist countries, as belonging to certain social categories that could be labeled counterrevolutionary, like landlords, the clergy, and kulaks, and as members of ethnic groups on the basis of collective guilt (Conquest, 1960), have been unique in modern times. In those cases, the victims did not need to be personally guilty of any

acts against the state or the social order, nor did their persecutors have to attempt to make a case against them based on any charges, trumped up or real, nor could they represent in many cases any real threat even if they had wanted to do so. Their fate was the result of ideological preconceptions, often, like in the case of Hitler, formulated before coming to power, which deprived those people of their human character and linked the creation of a better society with their destruction. The holocaust was in the eyes of a Himmler (Bracher, 1970; Krausnick et al., 1968) a painful duty at the service of historical tasks for which future generations would be grateful.

In every political system there are miscarriages of justice, violations of procedural guarantees, obstacles to an adequate defense, biased courts, unfair trials, as well as illegal violence against political opponents ordered or condoned by those in power. But the systematic, large-scale, formally organized imposition of penalties, including death, without even the semblance of an adversary procedure and in the absence of an emergency situation, has been characteristic of totalitarian systems. The power of the special boards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Soviet Union, on the basis of the 1934 statute, effective until 1953, to sentence people in absentia and without trial or counsel to labor camps is only one example. The executions ordered by the *Führer* without intervention of any regular or extraordinary courts that began with the purge of the SA leadership and other opponents in "the night of the long knives" in 1934, legalized by a law as emergency defense of the state, officially of 77 persons but perhaps three times as many, was only the beginning of the legalization of lawlessness (Bloch, 1970; Bracher, 1970; Mau, 1953). The terror of totalitarianism is not only the perversion and misuse of justice in the courts or the unofficial tolerance for illegal acts of the authorities that we find in many authoritarian regimes, and sometimes in democracies, but the normative institutionalization of such practices and their ideological justification sometimes even in the learned commentaries of jurists. The writing of Soviet and Nazi legal theorists, sometimes men of intellectual distinction—like Carl Schmitt—reflect and articulate that break with a long legal tradition. When Vyshinsky, the attorney general of the USSR, wrote in 1935,

> The formal law is subordinate to the law of the revolution. There might be collisions and discrepancies between the formal commands of laws and those of the proletarian revolution. . . . This collision

> must be solved only by the subordination of the formal commands of law to those of party policy (Berman, 1963, pp. 42–43),

he was expressing a thought that we will not find so frequently and authoritatively stated in any authoritarian regime.

The most striking characteristic of terror under totalitarianism and perhaps the explanation for its pervasiveness and scope is the moral self-righteousness with which it is justified by the rulers and their supporters, sometimes publicly, other times in the inner circle. Often it even conflicts with more pragmatic goals of the system. The nonpurely instrumental character of the terror derived from the passion for unanimity, the ideal of conflictlessness, the need to eradicate totally social groups defined as evil as a historical task, the explicit rejection of traditional moral standards that would make other men hesitate or feel guilty, and the demand of abdication of personal responsibility constitute some of the unique characteristics of totalitarian terror (Arendt, 1963; Cohn, 1966; Jäger, 1967; Barghoorn, 1971; Dicks, 1972). They ultimately are derived from the strength of ideological commitments. They also explain why many of the agents of terror could be otherwise normal men in their daily life, rather than psychologically defective persons. Let us not forget that Khrushchev in his secret speech of February 1956 concludes, after his appalling revelations and his negative portrayal of Stalin's personality, saying:

> Stalin was convinced that it was necessary for the defence of the interests of the working class against the plotting of the enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the working class, the interests of the working people, the interests of the victory of Socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interests of the Party, of the working masses, in the name of defence of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy. (Conquest, 1968, p. 66)

Another unique feature is the extension of the terror to members of the elite, in fact, the harsher punishment particularly under Stalin of those who had made the revolution with him and those who had positions of responsibility and whose loss of favor or trust in other systems would lead to their demotion, return to private life, and often to powerless but well-paid or prestigeful sinecures. In the case of Stalin, the victims were not only Soviet citizens but the leaders of foreign Communist

parties living in the USSR and the satellite countries (Kriegel, 1972; Oren, 1973). Few data could tell the grim story of political terror better than those of Weber (1969, pp. 36–37) on the fate of the 504 leading cadres of the German Party (KPD) before Hitler: of the 136 who died violently, 86 (17 percent) were victims of the Nazis and 43 (9 percent) of Stalinist and East German purges. Members of the elite that lose in the struggle for power, even when they cannot represent a real threat, are to be destroyed, dishonored, and under Stalinism made to confess crimes they did not commit and to become nonpersons even in the writing of history (Leites and Bernaut, 1954; Brzezinski, 1956; Kriegel, 1972; Levytsky, 1974). As a result of the subordination of the military to the political leadership and the capacity of the party or police units to challenge the monopoly of force of the army, even the military leadership cannot escape political repression and a nonmilitary jurisdiction. The figures given by Conquest (1968, p. 485) for the Stalinist purges—3 of the 5 marshalls, 14 of the 16 army commanders Class I and II, 60 of the 67 corps commanders, 136 of the 199 divisional commanders, and about half of the officer corps, some 35,000 either shot or imprisoned—are testimony of that capacity. In the case of Germany, 20 generals of the army executed among 675 do not represent comparable figures, particularly considering the actual involvement in the plot of July 1944 against Hitler, but show the capacity to punish even in wartime the high command (Zapf, 1965, p. 164). Another unique characteristic is the extension of legal responsibility to the members of the family of the accused irrespective of complicity in their acts, both in the Nazi *Sippenhaft* (arrest of the family) and in the provisions of Article 58 (i.c.) of the criminal code of the RSFSR that punished "in the event of flight abroad of a member of the armed forces, the adult members of his family if they assisted him . . . or even if they knew about the crime but failed to report," and made "the remaining members of the family, and those living with him or dependent on him at the time of the commission of the crime liable to exile to the remote areas of Siberia for a period of five years" (Conquest, 1968, p. 558). The Nazi taking away the children of those involved in the 20th of July plot and the praise given to members of the youth organizations ready to denounce their parents are examples of the disregard for family bonds under totalitarian terror.

The ideological basis of totalitarian coercion leads to a rejection of legal formalism even in the definitions of crime, in the formulation of the accusation by the prosecutors, the argumentation of the judges of

their sentences, and the variations in the punishment. Rather than strict laws and draconian but clearly established penalties, the tendency is to introduce subjective considerations, diffuse standards, and unpredictable sentences more dependent on who the defendant is than on his legally typified actions. Even the harshest military summary justice, by contrast, tends to be formalistic and even legalistic, paying little attention to the motive and not trying to justify its decisions except on the basis of repressive legislation and inarticulated, pragmatic considerations. Political justice in totalitarian regimes tries to show the base motives of the actor, to punish his intention rather than just his acts. The punishment is to reflect substantive ideological criteria, like the *gesunde Volksempfinden* ("the healthy sense of the people") or "socialist legal consciousness," and the pedagogical and exemplary rather than retributional aspects. The emphasis on the actor and his motive rather than the act itself is closely linked with the consideration given to the social background of the defendant and the ideological characterization of entire social groups. This explains the paradox that legal positivism in authoritarian settings serves the repressive state and in totalitarian systems is substituted by a sociological conception of law with legal positivism becoming an obstacle to the desires of the rulers (Schorn, 1959; Staff, 1964; Johe, 1967; Weinkauff, 1968).

Another tendency is the greater implication of the whole society in the repressive process, which is not left in the hands of a professional police and the courts but tends to involve actively or passively many members of the society through participation in the party and its formations, typically commanding those among high-status groups who had joined the SS to a tour of concentration camp duty, by making party members informers on their neighbors, by widespread publicity of selected political trials, and particularly in China through participation of the whole community in the process of repression—the "speaking bitterness" against landlords and efforts toward "thought reform" with the participation of the work group or the community. The Moscow show trials, the great purge, and the trial before the *Volksgerichtshof*—People's Court—of those involved in the plot against Hitler and their propagandistic exploitation are examples of this pattern without many parallels in authoritarian regimes (Travaglini, 1963). This does not exclude on the other hand the utmost secrecy surrounding other manifestations of the terror. Without accepting the thesis of Hannah Arendt that terror under totalitarianism increases with the consolidation of the regime and the weakness of its opponents, we can say that it

certainly is not limited to or greatest in the takeover stage, as it tends to be in most authoritarian regimes. Perhaps because terror is not just instrumental in the way that Lenin and Trotsky conceived it when the latter wrote:

> The question as to who is to rule . . . will be decided on either side not by references to the paragraphs of the constitution, but by the employment of all forms of violence . . . war like revolution is founded upon intimidation, a victorious war generally destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army intimidating the remainder and breaking their will, the revolution works in the same way, it kills individuals and intimidates thousands. (Dallin and Breslauer, 1970, p. 77)

That type of terror in the takeover stage would be found in most authoritarian regimes, particularly when confronted with a well-organized opponent whose defeat is not assured, as in the case of Spain after the Civil War or in Chile today.

Totalitarian terror acquires its unique character from the centrality of ideology for many of those participating in it. As Hitler had remarked, "Any violence which does not spring from a firm spiritual base will be wavering and uncertain, it lacks the stability which can only rest in a fanatical outlook." However, it would not be possible without the organizational resources provided by the cadres and activists of a party committed to the defense of the regime. Without those factors it would not reach the intensity and scope or the systematic character that it can but does not necessarily reach under totalitarianism. Terror under some authoritarian regimes can be widespread, and under those that we shall call sultanistic, equally if not more arbitrary, but as we think we have shown it is likely to be very different.

In accounting for that difference one major factor is that in most authoritarian regimes the repressive function is left to the armed forces, which, while far from reluctant to use violence and expeditious methods of justice, tend to have a bureaucratic mentality emphasizing rules and procedures and none of the interest of intellectually more sophisticated men in motives and ideological justifications and little desire to explain their actions to the people and to gain their support. Unfortunately, we have no comparative analysis of political trials under different types of political systems to capture the different styles of the proceedings under totalitarianism and authoritarian regimes. A reading of the reporting in the mass media and systematic observation would certainly reveal some of the basic differences.

In totalitarian systems the independence of the regular courts is likely to disappear and their politicization to be the goal of the regime (Wagner, 1968), while most authoritarian regimes tend to leave to the regular judiciary its traditional degree of independence while they shift the politically relevant cases to special courts, generally the military justice (Toharia, 1974). We find here another example of the breakdown of the differentiation between state and society, politics and administration under totalitarianism.

There are undoubtedly major differences in the forms of repression under different totalitarian systems that should not be ignored but that we cannot fully develop here. It is not always clear to what extent those differences are due to national culture and legal traditions, to the idiosyncrasies of the leadership, to the patterns of behavior acquired in the process of takeover of power, and last but not least to a learning process based on the experience of similar regimes preceding them. Nazi and communist terror are certainly different in many respects, and despite many similarities between communist regimes, Stalinist and Chinese methods differ in many fundamental respects. In Cuba the possibility of emigration (estimated to be 7.1 percent of the population) to Spain and the United States probably limited the need for repression (Fagen, Brody, and O'Leary, 1968). The Nazis, having come in to power in a society whose institutional order had not been destroyed, initially relied much more on manipulated spontaneity and uncontrolled but planned actions than on the normal machinery of the state, which they only slowly transformed to serve their purposes. It also meant the emergence of a dual state and ultimately a parallel state of the SS, as well as a much greater secrecy surrounding their actions. The Nazis never developed the same urge to have the victims confess their guilt and to recognize the rightness of those in power. The self-criticism of the victims of the purges under Stalin has no parallel in Germany. Undoubtedly the communist conception of man as perfectable and the biological determinism underlying the Nazi ideology account in part for the difference. The Chinese, with their idea of the recuperability through "thought reform" and "coercive persuasion" even of class enemies, tend toward a "voluntarism" and "activism" and an emphasis on consciousness that substitutes a sophisticated assault on the individual's identity through self-criticism, confession, self-degradation, punishment, and rehabilitation for strictly physical punishment (Lifton, 1968; Schein, 1961; Townsend, 1972; Vogel, 1967). In this the Chinese carry to the ultimate consequences certain tendencies implicit in

the Soviet party. The contrast between Soviet Stalinism and the Chinese communists might also reflect the different process of conquest and consolidation in power, the different relationship to the rural masses in both systems. The patterns of behavior acquired during the revolution and the civil war by the *chekists* could be extended under Stalin to the kulaks by basically urban cadres and created the habits of brutality that would be institutionalized in the *Yezhovshchina*. Perhaps the Chinese also became aware of the fact that certain forms of terror provoke hostility that only terror can repress, that is, of the dysfunctional consequences of terror. Finally, the experience of Stalinist terror accounts for the efforts of the post-Stalinist leadership in the Soviet Union to do away with his excesses, to introduce forms of "socialist legality" while maintaining patterns of coercion very different from those in most authoritarian regimes through the creation of comrades courts and other forms of popular participation in enforcing social and political conformity (O'Connor, 1963; Lipson, 1967). The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution in Cuba, with their multiple social functions, also represent a system of collective vigilance capable of arresting those threatening the political order (Fagen, 1969). Undoubtedly, the 110,000 CDR, with 2 million members, represent a capacity of political integration, socialization, and organizational implementation of various programs that goes far beyond the vigilance activities for which they initially were created to face the counterrevolutionary challenge in the 1960s, but their presence in each neighborhood and work place contributes to providing the coercive organs of the state and party with information it would otherwise not have. In the last analysis, the compliance and efficacy of consolidated totalitarian systems is likely to depend more on such a penetration of the society and the coercive atmosphere it can provide than on the police and indiscriminate terror. It could be argued that initially the Stalinist form of terror was the result of the loss of revolutionary enthusiasm combined with low capacity to satisfy demands and the lack of penetration of the Communist party in many rural areas. Paradoxically, it could be argued that coercive compliance under totalitarianism is more likely to be achieved by the penetration of the party and its mass organizations in the whole society along Chinese lines than the excesses and the surplus of Stalinist police terror.

The great question on the prison walls and one that has no easy answer is, Why? Why did terror take the forms it took, how was it possible to create the machinery to implement it, and why was no one able

to stop it? Dallin and Breslauer (1970), those who have written about the great purges (Leites and Bernaut, 1954; Brzezinski, 1956; Conquest, 1968; Gliksman, 1954; Kriegel, 1972), and those who have written on Nazism and the SS (Bracher, 1970; Arendt, 1963, 1966; Cohn, 1966; Krausnick et al., 1968; Höhne, 1969; Dicks, 1972) have all asked these questions. The answers, sometimes conflicting, cannot be discussed in detail here. Undoubtedly terror and its different manifestations have to be explained differently in the variety of systems and historical situations. Any political system established by a minority or even a majority against the will of others who decided to use force to oppose its consolidation will turn to a greater or lesser extent to terror. The greater the conviction of those involved in the conflict and the weaker the support in the whole political community in the absence of a normative framework regulating conflict accepted by both sides, the more coercion. Violence has its legitimate place in revolutionary thought and tends to go with a takeover of power as "measures of suppression and intimidation towards determined and armed counter-revolution," to use Trotsky's words, and "the scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing else but power based directly on violence unrestrained by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules," to use Lenin's expression (Dallin and Breslauer, 1970, pp. 10–11). Without theorizing as much about it, any counterrevolutionary would agree within those formulations substituting the word counterrevolution by revolution. The takeover phase directed at breaking the backbone of the opposition and punishing those collaborating with it, particularly in a civil war, leads to mass violence without concern of hurting innocents. The weakness of the minority attempting to impose a new order is likely to heighten its repression. Terror in turn leads to counterterror and the consequent spiral of violence. The justifications then formulated create the "habit of violence" among those involved in the repression. At this stage the terror can be seen as purely instrumental, even when many of its manifestations go far beyond such a "means-end" relationship to become ends in themselves, as a purifying act carried out by idealists or as a source of gratification of the base motives of its agents. But terror continues and even in many political systems, particularly totalitarian ones, it seems to increase to become more rationalized and bureaucratically controlled when the regime seems most consolidated and counts on at least a passive compliance of most of the population. Dallin and Breslauer (1970) and many others have attempted to explain the continuity and rise in terror by describing its

functions for the regime in this new phase, in which the regime attempts to achieve a decisive breakthrough toward critical goals. The more a regime attempts to transform the social order to create the "new man," to change the values of the people, and the greater the speed with which it attempts to achieve those ends, the greater the perception of the resistance to those changes, the more terror. They describe this period as a mobilization phase. The fewer the positive incentives in terms of rewards and the greater the deprivations required to implement the policies of the ruling elite, the greater the terror in the mobilization phase. We find this type of analysis among those who argue that the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union, which required the transformation of the rural economy and society and consequently deprivations for the peasantry, was at the root of Stalinist terror. In such a view terror is still instrumental and rational, at least for those who accept the goals of the rulers and their timetable as valid and cannot conceive alternative ways to achieve the same goals. Those assumptions undoubtedly do not remain unchallenged and are not easy to prove or disprove. It is certainly difficult to argue that the goals achieved justified the cost in human misery, but it is possible to think that rulers could feel the need to sacrifice one generation for the sake of goals highly valued. Here the ideology, "the spiritual base," of which Hitler spoke, becomes decisive in the fanatical implementation through terror, and we can find here the root of the high probability of terror in totalitarian systems. In this context the emphasis has been on the functions of terror in establishing the monopoly of authority and organization, eliminating all autonomous subgroups, destroying physically and morally not only actual but potential opponents, creating an atomized society in which individuals feel unable to trust others, disrupting even the most elementary solidarities like the family and friendship, creating a widespread sense of personal insecurity leading to compliance and even overcompliance (Moore, 1954). Terror is conceived as social prophylaxis (Gliksman, 1954) and as educational—"unfreezing" the individual's perceptions, assumptions, and attitudes, particularly in the Chinese conception of "thought reform," with a combination of public accusation, confession, and reeducation in small groups. Significantly Kriegel (1972) subtitles her book *La Pédagogie infernale*. It is no accident either that the imagery used in describing the victims so often refers to the opponents as carriers of sickness; we have only to think of the expressions used by Hitler (Jäckel, 1972) to describe the Jews and Mao Tse-tung's view of "the citizen as a patient in need of treatment."

In one case the cure required the destruction of its carrier, in the other a complex process labelled "coercive persuasion." In either case the victims are not considered normal members of the community. The "passion for unanimity" that follows from the commitment to a single belief system, a single hierarchy, and the concomitant definition of orthodoxy and heterodoxy requires the use of coercion within the elite and particularly against intellectuals. Since the right policy goals are presumably linked to the orthodox political beliefs, that kind of terror becomes presumably functional to their implementation. A latent function that often is neglected in the analysis but has been noted particularly for the SS state is that of compromising those connected with the terrorist system and even many ordinary citizens, to assure ultimately their loyalty as fearful accomplices.

The emphasis on those functions runs the risk of making the whole process far too rational and purposive, ignoring that it has a dynamics of its own that cannot be explained by the alleged functions in the mobilization phase. First of all, one cannot ignore the carryover of the habit of terror from the revolutionary takeover period among policemen and activists, nor can one ignore the personal grievances and vendettas and just plain human nastiness that find a now-legitimate outlet. The bureaucratic apparatus itself ends having to justify its existence, and compliance and overcompliance with directives from above produce more and more victims. The assignation to the labor camps of certain economic functions ends creating the need to supply more inmates (Dallin and Nicolaevsky, 1947). The criticism, the hatred, the resistance created by terror and the fear that they arouse in its agents in turn spiral the wave of terror. Finally the Khrushchev speech reminds us of the personality of the top leader and the obedience he can find as a major factor in initiating and maintaining a system of terror. In view of all those noninstrumental reasons for widespread terror we should not overestimate the extent to which it is a prerequisite for the deep social transformations that totalitarian systems want to achieve. That is why we can conceive similar totalitarian systems and comparable social transformations with very different amounts, degrees, and forms of terror, and the same would be true for authoritarian regimes. A frightening and rationally difficult to explain characteristic of Nazi and Stalinist terror was the degree to which it was unnecessary and even dysfunctional for the achievement of the goals those systems had set themselves, the extent to which it had become an evil end in itself (Nove, 1964). This also accounts for the fact that the "decompression"

of terror could be introduced relatively easily in the post-Stalin era without serious threats to the system, except in its Eastern European periphery, without a radical change in the nature of the political and socioeconomic system and probably with considerable gains in legitimacy. Certainly the introduction of calculated rather than arbitrary forms of coercion allows for new and before-unknown expressions of dissidence (Tökés, 1974) and with it the need for renewed coercion, but it should not be forgotten that those manifestations of dissidence were made possible by the end of terror. Undoubtedly, as Dallin and Breslauer (1970, p. 90) note, terror may generate alienation, and the abandonment of terror may paradoxically permit the expression of such alienation in the form of organized resistance or revolt, or more mildly in various forms of dissidence. This is why the phase of decompression is a dangerous one for totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that have been highly coercive and not able to create stable bases of legitimacy. Often, if it were not for the fears of the members of the elite of becomming themselves victims of terror and probably for the loss of faith in the ideological commitment, we would expect an increase in coercive measures after such a liberalization phase.

The Internal Dynamics of the Totalitarian System

A systematic analysis of the relative independent contribution of ideology, party, and ruling group or leader to the legitimacy, the formulation of policies, and the mobilization of the population in different totalitarian systems might be one way to conceptualize different types of totalitarian systems and to understand better the processes of change within them. Without ignoring the significance of the other factors we might then distinguish ideological totalitarian systems, power-centered ones, of which those in which the leadership principle becomes dominant would be a specially important subtype, and party-centered ones, which might vary from more bureaucratic to more populist-participatory. We might suggest very tentatively that the dynamics of such regimes move from a highly ideological phase, in which often there is a spectre of a second revolution of those ideologically committed but disappointed with the compromises the leadership had to make with reality in the process of consolidation of power, to more personalized leadership or oligarchic control. In a second phase a more instrumental attitude toward ideology, despite protestations to the contrary, is likely.

In a later one the staff of the ruling group, to assure its continuity, safety, and a certain degree of predictability, tries to limit the power of the leader or ruling group and institutionalize it within the party organization by various attempts of rationalization of the party along a variety of strategies, from populism to an emphasis on technical expertise, and ultimately to the development of more reciprocal links between the middle levels of the party organization and the larger society and its differentiated structures. The more remote the ideological initial thrust and commitment becomes and the more scholastic the use of the ideology, the more the system will either turn to personal power or, once the staff in a Weberian process proceeds to the routinization of charisma and its institutionalization in the party, toward a process of deideologization. This process in turn should open the way to nontotalitarian forms of autocratic rule, though sometimes the rule would be threatened by ideological revivals. This process has to some extent been described in the recent literature on "post-totalitarian" Soviet-type politics[26] as the emergence of the "administered society" by Kassof (1969), "organizational society" by Rigby, the "regime of clerks or bureaucratic politics" by Brzezinski, less descriptively as post-totalitarian by Tucker, and "populist totalitarianism" by Paul Cocks. In the same direction we find a model in which leaders in the party organization, the mass organizations, and other bureaucracies establish for the formulation of policies closer links with different interests. A model for the emergence of group politics is a limited pluralism not only of political factions and organizations but of a variety of economic and professional and even class or regional interests, which ultimately should lead to the transformation into a kind of system that would no longer deserve the name of totalitarian. Gordon Skilling in his work has very hesitantly and imprecisely described the kind of system that might emerge this way in the womb of a totalitarian system. However, there would be some serious difficulties with such a transformation, given the importance of the ultimate legitimation of the system in the absence of a linkage with the ideology or a more aggregating central political organization like the party (and in the absence of true and independent choices by the population giving a democratic legitimacy for such a mixture between technocratic and interest group power). Unfortunately, the number of cases in which we could observe and study such a life cycle of totalitarian systems is limited, due to the relatively recent instoration of a number of them, the imperfect realization of the totalitarian model due to the resistance of the society to its implementation in

other cases like Fascist Italy, and the premature disappearance of the Nazi regime.

Those changes are likely to be associated also with the very different composition in terms of social, educational, and career background of the ruling elite and the middle-level cadres in such systems. They are likely to have some interesting correlation with the types of legitimacy formulated by Max Weber. After an initial phase, which in some respects we should consider pretotalitarian, in the center of ideological formulation some type of charismatic authority is likely to appear supported by a group of disciples. The weaning of the belief in the uniqueness of the leader or of his immediate successor might give rise to a combination of patrimonial bureaucratic features, which can degenerate into the sultanistic type, while the post-totalitarian phase would show a combination of patrimonial bureaucratic characteristics with the emergence of legal authority, and a distrust or fear of the reemergence of charismatic leadership together with attempts to institutionalize the charisma in the party. The institutionalization of interest or group politics might lead, as it seems to have happened in the case of Yugoslavia, to the emergence of certain forms of corporative representation on an occupational basis, for which obviously the ideology of the Soviets provides a legitimacy not available for an individualistic representation that would be closer to the model of competitive democracy. The party organization might fight back in this context by reinforcing the more plebiscitarian elements of direct mass participation. In this context it is interesting to note that even those totalitarian systems that dabbled with corporative ideological elements in their totalitarian phase were suspicious of corporative organic representation and that the party leadership rejected such tendencies to reinforce the more charismatic plebiscitarian component.

Totalitarianism of the "Left" and the "Right"

Many critics are right in noting that works using the totalitarian model tend to focus on formal similarity in the way power is organized, created, and used, somewhat like the term democracy is used to cover such different political social systems as Scandinavia, Italy, and the United States, neglecting the content of the policies formulated and implemented through institutions that in other respects might have considerable similarities. To some extent the critics are right in noting that

the emphasis on how things are done tends to neglect for whom and to whom. Unfortunately the literature comparing different totalitarian systems, particularly communist and fascist, is not rich. Talmon (1961, pp. 6–8), in a few pages, has stressed some basic differences in the ideological assumptions of both totalitarianisms, and Groth (1964) has attempted a more empirical analysis of some basic differences, noting at the same time some of the difficulties for a systematic analysis. While it might sound scholastic, we cannot avoid an emphasis on some of those methodological problems that he could not fully resolve.

The first difficulty lies in the fact that fascist totalitarian systems, particularly the only one that strictly speaking can be called totalitarian, had a short life span compared to the Soviet Union. Is a totalitarian system in the process of consolidation, like that of Hitler before World War II, comparable to a regime in its second and third decade, like Stalin's Soviet Union? A second difficulty is to isolate the impact of war on the German, and to a lesser extent the Italian, society. Were certain features of the Nazi regime a result of the war? Did the war accelerate the process toward totalitarianism or was it a temporary obstacle? Would we have had to wait to see the development of the regime after the war to evaluate better its totalitarian potential?

Another series of methodological difficulties emerge from the analysis of fascism. To what extent is Nazism a very special type of fascism or a model example of fascist regimes? To what extent were the ideological commitments of fascism realizable in a complex, advanced society with a long history of institutionalization and with masses of the population, to which fascism wanted to appeal, largely preempted by previously successful political movements, particularly socialism and Catholic social movements, limiting therefore its appeal to other strata of society? The left fascists, whose ideological formulations have recently received more attention (Kühnl, 1966), were aware of this problem. Other fascist movements with the more popular and less middle-class or uppermiddle-class support, like those in some Balkan countries (Nagy-Talavera, 1970) and Peronism (Germani, 1965, 1973; Kirkpatrick, 1971), arose in societies where part of the lower classes had not developed such strong partisan loyalties. An analysis in terms of the initial social base of fascist parties limited to the Italian and the Nazis, as we find in Marxist literature, obviously ignores the possibility of a broader *Volksgemeinschaft* and a less class-bound fascist movement. There is also an ambivalence built into the analysis about the degree to which a totalitarian party in power reflects in its

policy its original social composition and class appeal (Schoenbaum, 1967; Dahrendorf, 1967; Kele, 1972). Here again the length of the German experiment imposes serious limitations on the comparison.

Much of the value of the comparison depends on the narrowness or inclusiveness of the policy areas considered. It is significant that those who argue for the similarity of the systems pay special attention to the coercive aspects of the regimes, their impact on the legal systems and the role of the judiciary, their relation to education and youth, some of the impact on the family, and perhaps more than anything else on mass media, culture, and the arts, and the relation to religion. On the other hand they are very sketchy on the relationship between the national socialists and the economy, aspects like the role of owners, managers, and planners, as well as the role of the government and party-related sector, in economic policy formulation and the direction of production (Schweitzer, 1965; Mason, 1968; Milward, 1966; Eichholtz, 1969; Hennig, 1973). Even more complicated is the analysis of the impact of totalitarian systems on the distribution of income and power between social classes and particular social groups in relationship to economic decisions and daily work life (Schoenbaum, 1967; Schumann, 1958; Uhlig, 1956; Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckholn, 1956; Inkeles and Bauer, 1959; Lipset, 1973; Lipset and Dobson, 1973). It is in this area where Groth and other authors find essential differences, arguing that fascist totalitarianism did not intend to change the class structure, while communism deliberately aimed at such a change. The argument is obviously easy to make if we consider exclusively the variable of private ownership of large enterprises but ignore the separation between ownership and control and the degree to which such control shifted into the hands of state or party-related bodies.

Given the initially different basis of the Communist party and the supporters of the Bolshevik Revolution in the Soviet Union and those supporting the rise to power of Hitler, the social composition of the elites of both regimes was very different, with the working class providing fewer of the leaders among the Nazis than among the Bolsheviks, particularly at the middle levels (Linz, 1976; Lerner, 1966; Zapf, 1965). We know how the leadership of the Soviet Union in recent years has changed considerably in its composition (Farrell, 1970b; Barghoorn, 1972), but we cannot know what that of a second generation Nazi elite would have been. Certainly we could have expected a certain amount of convergence of the two systems, given the greater emphasis on education and with it a certain transmission of positions within the

intelligentsia in the Soviet scene, while in Germany the Nazification of the whole society would perhaps have provided for a broader recruitment of the elite and a disposessing of some of the traditional strata whose values and style were in conflict with the Nazis.

The question of the elite composition, however, has to be kept quite separate from that of distribution of income and other advantages among major social strata like managers, employees, workers, and farmers as well as nonproductive groups like youth and the old. Such a comparison in societies in which many advantages are not distributed through wages and salaries is particularly difficult, and much research needs to be done in the comparison of political and social systems, holding constant economic development levels, the business cycle, and relations of international dependency even within ideological blocs. Undoubtedly such differences cannot be deduced simply from the social composition of the political elite or from the continuity in certain positions of the old elite. Nor are such differences in a modern economy exclusively dependent on the distribution of property.

The fact that the Soviet Union was built on a war-ravaged country after a revolution that had often physically destroyed the old social structure obviously contrasts with the composition of Nazi rule on a society that acquiesced in its taking of power and therefore did not need to be restored and rebuilt to the same extent.

An obvious difference between communism and fascism is the latter's almost insane commitment to nationalism, even pan-nationalism, against the state when its frontiers do not coincide with the nation, in contrast with the ideological internationalism of the Bolsheviks and the formal commitment to federal, multinational states. In practice, however, this rigid ideological distinction, which served the fascists to attack communism even while admiring many aspects of it, is not such a neat criterion to distinguish the two types of totalitarianism. Totalitarian Russia and China have not given up the appeal to national loyalties and traditions, particularly in the Stalinist patriotic war, and the Soviet leadership has not neglected its national interest in relation to other communist countries, which in turn have increasingly strengthened their legitimacy, like Rumania (Jowitt, 1971), by turning to nationalism without either democratization or liberalization. On the other side, in the original fascist movements, particularly in some of the German left National Socialists, some strains of Italian Fascism, and in the ideologists of the SS, we find elements of internationalism (Ledeen, 1972; Kluke, 1973).

Obviously the racism in Nazism was a crucial difference between its totalitarianism and that of the Soviet Union, but the emphasis on the Nordic or Aryan race was latently in conflict with the traditional conception of nation. Fascism in a number of its manifestations was not racist or even anti-Semitic, except the Hungarian Arrow Cross and the Rumanian Iron Guard. Fascist leaders were even capable of identifying with non-Western fascist movements (Kühnl, 1966). In fact, fascism was not exclusively European. The lack of success of Japanese fascists (Maruyama, 1963; Morris, 1968) confronted with the bureaucratic, military, authoritarian state and the failure of Chandra Bosse's Indian fascism as well as of Latin American fascism of the Brazilian *Integralistas* (Trindade, 1974), have obscured this fact. Even when communist anti-Semitism under the label of anti-Zionism and anticosmopolitanism is not racist and is a minor feature in its politics—and some of the appeals to non-Western races by the Chinese are more a part of political-economic conflict—those secondary strains show how the apparently neat distinction on this ideological dimension between the two historical antagonists is not so neat.

A major difference in the ideological formulations of both movements can be found in the emphasis on elitism and the leadership principle, with its charismatic connotation in fascism from its beginning in contrast to the fundamentally democratic commitments of communism, even in the form of democratic centralism. However, the Stalinist version of cult of personality led to considerable convergence but its ultimate ideological illegitimacy was important for the reforms of Khrushchev. The "vanguard" notion of the party in turn introduced an important elitist element reinforced by the special education of party schools. In making this important contrast we should, on the other hand, not forget that leadership in the fascist doctrine and party statutes initially had a democratic legitimation rather than a purely traditional one, even when democracy was to be limited to the party. The elitism of race, party, and followers of the leader ultimately was based in fascism on an idea of identity with the nation, the *Volksgemeinschaft*. This ultimately introduced into traditional status- and class-based societies certain egalitarian features, like the use of the second person in its familiar form among party members irrespective of rank, the subversion of traditional status and class differences by a new hierarchy in the party, and the sense of solidarity across class lines expressed symbolically. Actually, fascist regimes, given their social base and the unrevolutionary way in which they generally took power, did not fully

activate those commitments and therefore in reality the two systems were very different. Both ideologies ultimately pursued, by different ways, a classless society rather than an institutionalization of class conflicts as it has become characteristic of societies under democratic governments. The critics of totalitarianism have seized on this aspect, stressing the negative side of a mass society undifferentiated, subordinated, and manipulated by the rulers, but in doing so have neglected the appeal that this renewed sense of community had for those living in societies in which class conflicts had become bitter, societies in which it was obvious that the dictatorship of the proletariat was not to be, in the sense of Marx, the dictatorship of the majority but of the minority, since important segments that Marx would have considered proletarian, like the white-collar workers, did not want to consider themselves proletarians.

The contrast between communism and fascism highlights both the importance of certain ultimate social and philosophical assumptions that differentiate them and also certain common responses to modern society and the strains it imposes with its pluralism, conflict of interests, absence of a shared comprehensive system of values after secularization. Those ultimate differences in intellectual origins, however, became crucially important for the different development of both systems and the basis of immanent critique. In turn, the relationship between the ideology and the realities of the society in which it was to be implemented politically, as well as the way in which the two movements came to power, made for very different consequences for different social strata. The realities of fascist and communist rule cannot be confused, whatever affinity at some level of analysis we might find in the ideological assumptions. However, some of those ideological assumptions were very important for the way of organizing political power and thereby to the common totalitarian features: the role of ideology, the concentration of power in a ruling group, the role of the party, and the emphasis on mobilization.

For a better understanding of both systems, however, it is interesting to compare specifically how those three aspects differ between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

Probably the most important difference between communism and fascism can be found in the nature of the ideology and the way in which it affected the political process. We do not accept the position of those who deny to fascism the character of an ideology and reduce it exclusively to the arbitrary pronouncements of the leadership adapting

ideas to Machiavellian power seeking. Recent work on fascism, particularly Gregor, Mosse, Nolte,[27] has again delineated clearly the difference between fascism and other political ideologies. The reader of fascist ideology and literature, party programs, and slogans can certainly distinguish them from other ideologies like conservatism or Catholic corporativism, to mention two of a certain affinity (Schmitter, 1974; Wiarda, 1973a, 1973b, 1974), the same way that he can distinguish a Marxist-Leninist formulation from the variety of African socialism and similar ideologies of the Third World. The fact that fascism is a latecomer on the political scene and therefore defines itself largely in negative terms as antiliberalism, anticommunism, anticlericalism, anti-internationalism, antiproletarianism, etc., should not obscure the fact that there was a distinctive style, rhetoric, and sensibility that had a positive appeal in its time. The argument that an antirationalist conception and emphasis on action and emotion rather than intellectual and scientific thought cannot constitute an ideology ignores the fact that much of modern and respected philosophy and thought has an irrationalist strain. A more serious difference is that communism links with the work of Marx, who in addition to being a man of action was a philosopher and a learned social scientist. Despite the use by fascists of the name and the ideas of a number of philosophers, thinkers, and writers, none achieved similar importance for them and therefore no thought formulated before and independently of taking power became equally binding as a source of legitimacy and criticism within the movement. This, together with the irrationalist emphasis on action, not fully absent from Leninism, allowed infinitely wider scope to political opportunism and therefore made fascist totalitarianism much less an ideocracy and more the rule of a leader and his loyal followers, more often than not without ideas. Totalitarianism in both cases meant manipulation of the ideological heritage, in the case of Stalin even the elimination of the intellectuals in the movement, like Bukharin, in the case of Hitler the loss of influence of Rosenberg, or in that of Mussolini, of Gentile. The enshrinement of Marx and Lenin and of their printed work, however, ultimately allows some intellectual criticism and further elaboration of communist thought and thereby of vitality of the ideology. The ultimate ideas underlying both ideological movements are a lasting part of our intellectual heritage and respond to some needs of modern man, but undoubtedly Marxisms, being closer to a modern science of society and economy, offers a better basis for the formulation of rational policies. Even when some outstanding intellectuals

could feel a temporary sympathy or affinity with fascism (Hamilton, 1973), fewer could explain away its negative aspects; and the absence of a corpus of thought like that of Marx ultimately limited its appeal beyond committed followers and party hacks. The fact that Marx could be interpreted in a noncommunist-democratic and even liberal-humanist direction makes it possible for the non-Marxist-Leninist and particularly for the non-Stalinist to appreciate the ideology of communist systems. This in turn can be and has been a stimulus for ideological evolution, polycentrism (Labedz, 1962; Laqueur and Labedz, 1962; Drachkovitch, 1965; Shaffer, 1967; Triska, 1969), and therefore tension with a strict totalitarianism. In Nazism the combination of social Darwinism and totally unscientific racism with an irrationalist voluntarism in the hands of an uneducated autodidact led to a parochial and crude ideology whose implementation brought out the worst potentialities of ideological totalitarian rule. This makes it difficult to conceive a post-Hitler evolution.

The difference between the two totalitarianisms is based not on the fact that one has an ideology and the other does not but on the different quality of the two ideologies. This allows us to separate communism from its worst manifestations under Stalin but makes it almost impossible to separate national socialism from Hitler and his final solution. The fact that the fate of non-Nazi fascism became tied during the war to the leader of the fascist camp in a way that communism after Yugoslavia, China, and Cuba is not tied to the Soviet Union and Stalin is decisive for the future of both ideologies. We are likely to find fascist ideological elements in many nondemocratic regimes, but it is doubtful that we will find a true fascist regime and even less a true fascist totalitarianism. The lack of success of neofascist parties cannot be explained only by military defeat and discrimination against its representatives.

In spite of important similarities in the conception and organization of the totalitarian parties in communist and fascist systems, there are important differences between them that should not be neglected, differences that are not exclusively a result of the different social composition of the membership and/or elite and the different social, economic, political, and historical contexts in which they came to power. The organizational conception of the Bolsheviks, after all, emerged out of the mass socialist parties more or less linked with the trade union movement of nineteenth-century Europe; and the Leninist conception of an elite of professional revolutionaries was an adaptation to the particular circumstances of czarist autocracy, even when it became rationalized in

terms of incapacity of the working class masses to go beyond trade union consciousness (Schapiro, 1965; Daniels, 1969; Meyer, 1957). Fascist parties, in contrast, emerged out of the experiences of World War I and/or as a response to the success of communist parties. The war experience of the *arditi*, the *Frontkämpfer*, was the basis of the emphasis on military models of organization and discipline, the "community" of elite units, and the love of uniforms and symbols, exalted by the ideology. Reinforced by organizational forms and social composition, including the young and the veterans, the movement turns from instrument into an end in itself. The romantic element of the *Bund*, a sociological category invented by Schmalenbach to distinguish a type of group from both *Gesellschaft* ("association") and *Gemeinschaft* ("community"), is characteristic of fascist parties (Duverger, 1963, pp. 124–32). The ideological concern for personalized relations based on a search for meaning, a rejection of individualism, etc., reflects the concerns of the secularized bourgeoisie for a modern society without its insecurities (Merkl, 1975). It leads in the Nazi case to emphasize the pseudoreligious and therefore the ritual, the indoctrination, the style, the creation of a feeling of membership. A distinction, in military terminology, between a first and a second line, between the active militant member of the fascist squad and the regular party member, introduces into the party the elitist element and is the source of the characteristic heterogeneity of organizations in fascist totalitarianism. In Germany, with the pseudoreligious groups of the *völkisch* movement, with its romantic, mystic images of peasant-military democracy, medieval teutonic knights, and its semilegal or illegal paramilitary *Kampfbünde*, combined with Hitler's hate-love attitude toward the Jesuits, this tendency reaches it paroxysm (Gamm, 1962). There is nothing comparable in communist countries to the plurality of organization, with distinctive uniform styles and outlook—the party, the SA, the SS, and ultimately the internal divisions within the SS—that we find in Germany. The Red Guard always remained basically instrumental rather than an elite of the party superior to the regular member. This plurality of organizations introduces into Nazi totalitarianism an element of heterogeneity and thereby of feudal rather than bureaucratic characteristics (Koehl, 1972). The infighting of the elites is not only of individuals but of political organizations, not of factions necessarily identified with different sectors of the society or the administration but of political organizations tied together only by their identification with the leader. Another consequence was that the terror became even more directly tied with the party with the strange fusion between the police and a party elite, the SS.

Ideological components reflected in organizational forms reinforce the fundamentally antidemocratic and antipopulist character of Nazism. They also reinforce the cult of masculinity, which, separating men and women, has a latent homosexual component. Without using the Nazi exaggeration, this style element also explains why in none of the fascist parties women would play a prominent role compared to some of the communist movements. The organizational form of the militia party organization also made it difficult for fascist parties to maintain their drive when they were out of power, to become electoral opposition parties, and accounts for the urgency they felt to gain power rather than to disintegrate. This kind of activism of the SA man or the *squadristi* could not be maintained in the same way as could the loyalty of party members and voters of a communist party. The organizational form of the militia party organization also accounts for the initial collaboration of army officers, their active involvement in fascist parties, but also for the suspicions and even hatred by the army of some fascist movements, reflected for example in the suppression of the Iron Guard by Marshall Antonescu. The exclusivist character of such paramilitary political organizations also accounts for the very different way the fascists and communists handled membership in the party of army officers in active service; the communists drove to affiliate officers with the party (Weinberg, 1964; Berghahn, 1969; Messerschmidt, 1969), while Franco went to the opposite extreme, making all officers party members. It is also at the root of the emergence of a party army like the Waffen SS, which cannot be compared to the special NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) troops under Beria, since such units did not have an equally ideologically justified status in the communist system. The multiorganizational structure of Nazism and the elitism within the elite movement led to a multiplication of channels of recruitment and an internal differentiation, which contrasts with the model of monolithic authority of some descriptions of totalitarians. Nazi career lines took place not within the party and through missions of the party in different organizations but within the feudal structure of party organizations, in turn characterized by identification with different subleaders. However, this multiplicity, which some have likened to feudalism and others have described as a quasi-anarchy, while menacing the unit of the ruling group during the period of Hitler (who benefitted from playing one off against the other) and particularly after Hitler, did not imply the kind of pluralism we find in authoritarian regimes, or even the type of group politics that Skilling and others want to see in posttotalitarian communism. The articulation of these leader-follower structures and

bureaucracies with the rest of the society was quite different. It was based not on functional specialization and a division of labor like that of party workers with experience in agriculture or industry but on personal linkages and affinities of style, cutting even more across the social structure than do factions in the communist party. The comparison between totalitarian and semitotalitarian parties shows how organizational principles are related to the ideology and interact constantly with it.

The characteristics of the ruling group and particularly the role of the leaders are probably the most important differentiating variables between totalitarian systems but also the least theoretically relevant. Historical context, particularly the process of taking power and consolidating it, and personality factors stand out more. These obviously are less susceptible to generalizations, more idiosyncratic, and to certain extent accidental. It is difficult to say to what extent the patterns of interaction between Stalin and his intimate collaborators and that of Hitler were a reflection of the ideology and the organizational forms or of their personalities. The fact that Stalin had been only one among the initial leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution, far from loved by many of his peers who he wanted to make subordinates, accounts for the deep-seated suspicions in the relations and for the fact that purges affected much of the leadership of the politbureau (Schueller, 1966; Levytsky, 1974). In contrast, Hitler over a number of years in the opposition had been able to shape the party, and the departure of the dissidents had left only the loyal comrades; even so he felt the need to purge Roehm and his SA leaders. Where the difference between the two ruling groups might become more apparent is in the relationships between the top leader, his lieutenants, and the rank and file. Those relationships obviously depend very much on the process of growth of the party and the leadership group, as the works of Orlow (1973) and Nyomarkay (1967), the description of the relationship of the *Gauleiters* with Hitler by Peterson (1969), and the works on communist elites in Eastern Europe and in China (Farrell, 1970b; Barton, Denitch, and Kadushin, 1973; Beck, 1970; Lewis, 1963; Scalapino, 1972) show. The date of joining the party, the shared experiences like jail, the international brigades, or regional party organizations, guerrilla versus underground activity in the cities, fusion of related parties or organization, etc., become important factors in understanding the internal life of movement parties. They are—and this shows the importance of the political socialization

and organizational experiences—generally more important than elites. They also account for the different climates and styles of different totalitarian systems within the communist camp as well as among the fascists.

As Groth has stressed, the alliances made in the process of taking power have considerable impact on the system at least until its full consolidation and maturity. The fact that the fascists and Nazis came to power through a silent revolution under pseudolegal forms (Linz and Stepan, 1978), with the support of institutions and parties that hoped to use them for their own purposes and with a passive support or at least submission of many potential antagonists, accounts for a more complex relationship with the pre-takeover social structure than in communist systems that gained power by revolution, civil war, or support of the Soviet army (Seton-Watson, 1967; Gripp, 1973, pp. 19–39). Many of the differences between totalitarian systems, both communist and noncommunist, can be explained by how they gained power and their strength and cohesion before gaining power (Huntington, 1970, p. 14). The type of society in which they took over the government and the circumstances under which they did so also account for the more or less totalitarian character of their rule and, in cases like Italy and Spain, for the failures to establish a fully totalitarian regime despite the ambition of many fascist leaders. The coexistence between fascist and prefascist or pseudofascist, if not antifascist, elements naturally affected the ideology, the organization, and the character of the party and its affiliates and many of its policies in the process of consolidation in power. The relative ease with which fascists gained power in contrast to the Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav, and even Cuban communists accounts for the much greater range of policy diversion even under the Nazis, so well described by Peterson (1969). We could establish some interesting parallels in Eastern European communist countries, particularly in the case of Poland, where the relative weakness of the Communist party and the strength of the Church led to patterns very different from those of Hungary. Azrael (1970a) in his analysis of the varieties of de-Stalinization, Zvi Gitelman (1970) in his "Power and Authority in Eastern Europe," and Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky (1968) in their "Communism and Economic Development" have convincingly shown how the background of the society and the process of taking power and consolidating it have modified the nature of communist regimes. For our comparative

purposes, however, we do not have a communist regime created by a silent revolution taking power by semi- or pseudolegal processes within a competitive democracy and once in power transforming its rule into a nondemocratic control except Czechoslovakia (Korbell, 1959). It would be interesting to see if in such a system there would develop some forms of cooperation between the preexisting institutions and elites in the Church and the managers and the military that would lead to a less total transformation of the social structure than other communist regimes have carried through. In the case of fascist regimes and particularly Nazism it is always difficult to distinguish the coincidence of interests between pre-takeover institutions and groups, the shared ideological commitments, the co-optation and corruption of those institutions by the yielders of political power, and the cooperation obtained by the coercion and fear. Certainly those factors all operated at one time or another, and the differences between totalitarian systems often are based on focusing on one or another phase of such systems. The persistence of pre-takeover social structures, institutions, and interests and the conservative character of the system, which Groth rightly stresses, would be true for the early years of Nazi rule and perhaps the first years of the War but not after July 20, 1944, and it might have disappeared after victory in World War II or under a Himmler or Bormann succession of Hitler and the elimination of other leaders like Goering.

As in all macrosociological phenomena, generalizations are made difficult by the fact that previous experiences are known. Scholars studying Chinese communism, Eastern European collectivization, terror in the Soviet Union and China, etc., all note how the knowledge of the Stalinist period has led communist rulers elsewhere to modify their tactics and attempt to avoid some of the worst features of Stalinism, to invent other methods of social control emphasizing, for example, voluntarism and thought control rather than police terror (Schurmann, 1968, pp. 311–13). In this sense it becomes dangerous to overgeneralize from any historical experience, and certainly no totalitarian system will be fully identical to any that has preceded it in time except when it is, like some Stalinist Eastern European systems for a short time, a dependent system. In this sense every totalitarian system—every political process—carried out by people who know about the recent past will not be identical to a previous one. No attempt of model building can ignore the historicity of macrosocial phenomena.

The Critiques of the Concept of Totalitarianism and Some Suggested Alternatives

In recent years important contributions have been made to the critique of the writings using the term "totalitarianism" and suggestions have been made to replace it by other concepts. With the exception of the use of the term "mobilization regimes" or "parties," none of the latter has gained equal acceptance. The critique has many valid points that should be extremely fruitful in a more careful elaboration of the model of the totalitarian system and even more so in advancing our knowledge of the variety of totalitarian systems in time and space. A somewhat systematic exposition of the many critiques and a sifting of their valid contributions and their less useful negative aspects seems to be a first step in preparing the ground for future thinking and research by those who want to retain the term.

Explicitly or implicitly many of the critics stress that the concept was formulated and gained acceptance in the context of the cold war with a pejorative evaluative connotation and that its polemic significance makes it intellectually useless (Barber, 1969; Curtis, 1969; Spiro, 1968; Burrowes, 1969). However, this could be said about many of the most important concepts in political science, and the alternative would be to renounce all the terms that have entered the political discourse and struggle and to formulate a distinctive formal terminology, which would lead to the opposite accusation of being scholastic and ivory-towerish and difficult for the layperson to understand. Another alternative would be to use the terminology used by the actors to describe their systems with their evaluative connotations and to describe the realities so often covered up by those terms. Neither of those solutions seems adequate. The critics, in addition, forget that the term "totalitarian" was formulated before the cold war (Jänicke, 1971) and that many scholars and politicians—and not only liberal democrats—had discovered the common elements between fascist and communist systems: Robert Michels is just one distinguished name among the scholars, and on the political scene there are the left wings of a number of fascist movements and some dissident communists. The critics also forget that the term "totalitarian" was formulated and accepted without negative connotation by many fascists. Therefore the critique is rather, Can the same term be used to describe certain common features of fascist and communist regimes rather than to be limited to fascism, in

which case we might not need the term? Certainly the concept has become associated, particularly in some definitions, with some of the most negative aspects in the evaluation by most people of those regimes, specifically terror, neglecting those that can be considered more positive from a variety of value perspectives. It is no accident that Hannah Arendt should practically limit the use of the term to the rule of Hitler and Stalin. If, however, it should turn out that a number of political systems in addition to those two share a sufficient number of characteristics to distinguish them from other autocracies, we should be allowed to retain the term. Ultimately, much hinges on the interpretation of the rule of those two men as being the result either of their idiosyncratic personalities or of the possibilities that the particular form of organization of political life and the ideological assumptions justifying it offered them.

The critics are on solid ground when they reject the indiscriminate use of the term to describe all nondemocratic systems or at least all those the author does not like, a critique that also would deprive us of any scholarly use of the term "fascism." Certainly if the term has any use it is to describe a very specific type of autocracy and not to serve as a synonym for dictatorship, despotism, or just nondemocratic regimes. There are certainly regimes we would not in any meaningful use of the term call totalitarian which from most value perspectives would be considered equally or more negative than the rule of Hitler, especially the rule of Trujillo.

Another argument of revisionists is to stress that some of the features used in characterizing totalitarian systems are also found in societies under different political systems, including advanced Western democracies. Similarly, the work of Barrington Moore (1965, pp. 30–88) on totalitarian elements in preindustrial societies has shown the usefulness of the concept totalitarian beyond the study of the political systems we would call totalitarian. Certainly a distinction between totalitarian political systems and totalitarian elements in other systems is a fruitful one, but does not invalidate characterizing as totalitarian those systems in which totalitarian elements are dominant and central to the political system. The recent critique of liberal democracy by the new left certainly introduces confusion in the use of the term "totalitarian" but indirectly is evidence of its usefulness (Marcuse, 1964, 1969).

Another criticism is that totalitarianism refers only to a reality that has been metamorphosized by time. Regimes that have been vanquished to the realm of historical controversy and others that have undergone

fundamental changes seem to relinquish the term to the field of historical scholarship, like those of feudalism, absolute monarchy, enlightened despotism, and the police state. In that case the question would be: Is the study of such systems only of historical interest, or are they close enough to our own political life and reality to be significant in understanding contemporary political systems in a way quite different from the concept of feudalism (using the term in a strictly historical sense)?

Much of the criticism justifiably centers on the number, different character, and lack of precision of the definitions. Unfortunately that criticism can be directed against most concepts in political science dealing with complex phenomena. Certainly the different definitions and descriptions have contributed to our knowledge by highlighting different dimensions of the phenomena and probably providing elements for further conceptualization, distinguishing types of totalitarian systems that share only a limited number of crucial common characteristics. The effort of Benjamin R. Barber (1969) to classify the phenomenological and essentialist definitions is useful but somewhat scholastic. Most such definitions underline some of the qualitative or quantitative dimensions on which the political systems that are to be subsumed are different from a variety of others. Certainly the more descriptive rather than essentialist definitions make it easier to identify empirically a particular system as totalitarian, or at least as more or less totalitarian. Certainly most of the scholars have not gone very far in operationalizing the dimensions to the extent that would allow an empirical researcher to make an unambiguous decision that a system at any particular point in time is or is not totalitarian or to transform an attribute space into a continuum allowing measures of totalitarianism using some qualification of a series of indicators. This has been and certainly is one of the great obstacles in the use of the concept. One possibility, naturally, is to conceive totalitarianism as an ideal type, which will not correspond exactly to any concrete historical reality. In fact, some of the essentialist's definitions include normative elements in the minds of the leaders of totalitarian parties and the ideologists of what a totalitarian political system and a society dominated by it should be, rather than what it is likely to be. As we have seen and Giovanni Sartori (1962a) has stressed, this is also true for the concept of democracy and perhaps is inherent to many political science concepts. To some extent our insights into the nature of totalitarian systems will come from an analysis of these tensions between the ideal type and the reality it partly describes. It is no accident that some

of the essentialist concepts would be acceptable to the leaders that have shaped those systems and often, from their value perspective, do not involve a negative connotation as some of the more descriptive concepts almost inevitably do.

A much more substantial criticism is that the term "totalitarian" attempts to cover too much, to characterize political systems that on many important aspects are fundamentally different. The burden of proof must be on those who advocate the term to show the extent to which some communist systems, at least in some of their phases, share a sufficient number of important characteristics with the Nazi system to warrant the inclusion under a common concept, to show that both subtypes respond to some similar preconditions in their emergence, and that the use of the concept allows us to understand better the way they handle some invariant problems of political life. It is also the burden of advocates of the concept to show that the systems so characterized share characteristics that differentiate them from other types of autocracies which would not be highlighted without the use of such a concept. Much of this has been and can be done, but it also demands as a counterpart more thorough analysis of the basic differences between totalitarianism of the Stalinist era and that of the National Socialists or Fascists. This has unfortunately not been done systematically in the literature.

A more thorough analysis of the subtypes of totalitarianism—communist, fascist, and perhaps nationalist—and of stages of development of totalitarian systems and the modification of soviet totalitarianism in different social contexts, especially the USSR, China, some of the Eastern European communist states, and perhaps Cuba, should lead us to a more elaborate typology of totalitarian systems. It also should bring the term "totalitarianism" down from its fairly high position on the ladder of abstraction to produce middle-range theories (Sartori, 1970a). The most general and abstract construct of a totalitarian system should serve as a point of reference to understand and describe better the various subtypes of communist and fascist systems and to contribute to a theory about the processes leading to the consolidation and establishment of a totalitarian system and those leading to their transformation, like the recent efforts by Azrael (1970a) to understand types of de-Stalinization, or post-totalitarian systems in communist countries.

A serious limitation of some of the definitions of totalitarianism has been the static and rigid character of many of the conceptualizations, which ignored the dynamic element, the tensions inherent in the

ideal and almost normative models, the resistance that societies offer to the full development of the totalitarian system, and therefore the stages, phases, degrees, of totalitarianism. A central theme on the agenda of the study of totalitarianism has to be the study of change in and of them. Unfortunately for the scholar, the limited time that the most pure totalitarian fascist system existed and the fact that there was no successor regime to Hitler, in contrast to the long period of Soviet rule and the variety of communist systems, make it difficult to formulate generalizations about the processes of change in totalitarian systems rather than only within communist totalitarian systems.

A very different type of criticism is one we might label "historicist," which underlines the unique social or cultural preconditions and traditions of the country in which regimes we labelled totalitarian emerged. The "Slavophile" interpretation of Soviet communism[28] or the analysis of the unique German political, cultural, and social history that accounts for the rise of national socialism[29] are powerful alternatives to a political science conceptual analysis. Certainly scholars have made important contributions stressing the continuities between modern totalitarian systems and the premodern or preindustrial traditions of their societies. Others have rightly stressed how the unique personality of certain leaders accounts for some essential features of the political systems they created or shaped. Some would go so far as to argue that without those leaders those systems would never have emerged, particularly in the cases of Mussolini and Hitler, to which we certainly could add the role of Lenin in the victory of bolshevism. However valid such an approach might be to a point, it is certainly not fruitful to reduce such a complex historical phenomenon as national socialism or Stalinism to their personalities and to treat them as accidents not requiring explanation by social scientists. In this respect the Marxist or Marxist-Leninist inability to explain in general categories, in their case sociological/economic, the phenomenon of Stalinism stands in clear contrast to their scientific ambitions. Obviously it should be the task of any in-depth analysis of the systems under the rule of these men to attempt to describe the impact of their personal leadership on the system and to separate the more structural components from the more idiosyncratic ones. Probably the specific form that terror took under Stalin cannot be fully explained without reference to his personality. However, the historicist critique of totalitarianism as a conceptual approach is implicitly a critique of any effort of social science conceptualization of ultimately unique historical phenomenons. While such a critique can moderate the

illegitimate claims of social scientists, it cannot be accepted without loss of knowledge and of understanding of social phenomena.

A more fruitful criticism comes from those scholars who have studied carefully the reality of totalitarian rule, particularly at the local level and due to the openness of the archives in Germany. Those scholars have rightly stressed, as has Edward N. Peterson (1969), the limits of Hitler's power, the heteronomy rather than monism of power, the changing role of the party and other organizations struggling for power, the diversion of decision making, the survival of opposition in and under the system—the islands of separateness, as Inkeles called them. These are facts that are incompatible with some of the more simplistic and overdrawn characterizations of totalitarian systems. But those scholars who emphasize them risk losing sight of the forest for the trees, missing the more central tendencies that differentiate the systems from other autocracies. The work of Skilling (1973a) stressing the group politics element in communist systems, particularly after Stalin, is a welcome corrective of overstatements of the monism of such regimes, as long as it does not fall into the pitfall, stressed by Sartori, of neglecting the essential difference between such relatively pluralistic group politics within the framework of a totalitarian or even an authoritarian system and analogous processes in democratic regimes.

The theories of convergence between the Soviet Union and the United States, summarized by Alfred G. Meyer (1970), more or less explicitly question the usefulness of the totalitarian category. By pointing out common tendencies and problems in advanced industrial societies, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States—the similarity in bureaucratic organizations, large-scale economic units, certain types of economic decision making and military organization, the similar impact of such societies on common people and the resulting psychological attitudes of conformity, powerlessness, etc.—these theories represent a welcome corrective of a tendency to make black and white contrasts between societies. However, much of the writings in this direction focus more on the similarities in social structure than in political institutions. Ideological motives are not absent, nor are the desires to overcome the cold war or, particularly among some new-left critics, to question both advanced, industrial, democratic and communist societies from a distinct value perspective. These analyses, while discovering the similarity in certain key decision-making processes at the top—the kind of processes analyzed by Mills in his *Power Elite*—and certain similarities in the daily life of common citizens in their factories or in their

dealings with bureaucracies, tend to ignore some of the fundamental differences in a whole middle range of decision making, institutions, and roles in different political systems.

Undoubtedly the most serious challenge to the construct of totalitarianism comes from the difficulty of defining in clear operational terms the difference between totalitarian systems and other types of autocracy, particularly in empirical terms, because of the difficulty of documentation. The problem is much more complex than the problem of defining the boundaries between competitive democracies, as we define them, and various transitional authoritarian regimes. It is certainly more difficult because the changes are more likely to be matters of degree and generally do not involve the discontinuities created by revolutions, coups, or foreign intervention which with rare exceptions have characterized the transition between democracy and authoritarian regimes or totalitarian systems.

The critique of theories of totalitarianism has not been limited to questioning those theories; there are some attempts to offer alternative conceptualizations. In some cases it is difficult to distinguish clearly the alternative concepts from the old definitions of totalitarianism. Others, like Tucker's (1963) concept of "mobilization regimes," seem to us to fall into some of the same difficulties that the critics of the loose use of the term "totalitarian" have noted, specifically, covering too wide a range of autocracies and ignoring important differences among them. In addition, the term "mobilization," as Azrael (1970a, pp. 136–37) has noted, is in itself ambiguous, is used as a distinctive criterion rather than as one of a number of dimensions to characterize political systems, and is very difficult to use empirically. Other attempts of conceptualization, like Meyer's (1967) "administrative totalitarianism," "totalitarianism without terror," or "rationalization" and "populist totalitarianisms" describing certain features of post-Stalinist Russian political life, are more fruitful but do not imply a rejection of the broader category of totalitarianism. Other conceptualizations, like that offered by Rigby (1969) of "traditional market and organizations societies," seem to deal more with social and economic systems than with political systems. Certainly the alternative concepts offered in recent years have not gained as wide an acceptance as the old concept of totalitarianism.

The efforts of the critics have not led us to give up some concept of totalitarianism, even though we might accept the suggestion of finding another term less loaded with the connotations that have become attached with it through the rule of Hitler and Stalin, which might be

considered quite unique. The critics have, however, made evident that the term should not be used loosely if it is going to be of any use, that a theory of totalitarianism or totalitarianisms does not exhaust the understanding and description of particular historical political systems, that there is urgent need for careful systematic comparison between totalitarian systems to discover their common and their differential elements, that we need a typology of totalitarian systems, and that the theory has to include a more dynamic analysis of change within and of totalitarian systems rather than, as up to now, theories about the origin of totalitarianism. Certainly much of our thinking and research has been centered on the rise of totalitarian movements and the takeover of power after the breakdown of democracies, particularly the rise of fascism. Even in the case of the Soviet Union there has been little theorizing about how the system evolved from the February Revolution to the dominance of the Bolsheviks, the displacement of other radical parties (Schapiro, 1965; Daniels, 1969) from Lenin to Stalin, and at what point we can consider the system totalitarian and why it should have become so. A comparative study of the rise to power of autochthonous communist movements in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam would certainly tell us more than some of the more abstract models like Kornhauser's *Politics of Mass Society* (1959). The military defeat of fascism and particularly Nazism has prevented scholars from analyzing change in totalitarian systems after succession crises, but since the death of Stalin and de-Stalinization an analysis of the dynamics of change in and of totalitarian systems has become imperative. In addition, more monographic research and theoretical conceptualization of nondemocratic regimes that cannot be meaningfully labeled totalitarian should help us in conceptualizing more precisely different types of autocracy. The discovery of multiple dimensions that distinguish types of totalitarianism and clarify the distinction between totalitarianism and other nondemocratic regimes should also allow us a more complex evaluation of such regimes. Certainly totalitarian systems must have many positive features that make them attractive to people who are not ignorant of some of their worst features. The ultimate result of the criticism should be a more complex theory of totalitarianisms rather than the initial model of a totalitarian system. In the same way, contemporary political science is beginning to think about types of democracies and the internal dynamics of democratic regimes rather than of a single type (identified preferably with one or another of the great Anglo-Saxon democracies).

The Conditions for Nondemocratic, Particularly Totalitarian, Systems in Modern or Modernizing Societies

A superficial analysis would suggest that the absence of the conditions making competitive democracies possible and stable[30] would be the first answer to the question of what conditions must exist for nondemocratic regimes and more specifically for totalitarianism. However, this might not be true even for nondemocratic regimes, since those, as the critics have noted, have appeared in countries that according to many analysts should have had a high probability of having democratic regimes. Obviously the introduction of the time dimension, analyzing the conditions that existed when the regimes were installed rather than at any specific point in time, would have eliminated some apparent exceptions. If we accept the distinction between a variety of nondemocratic regimes and the totalitarian systems, we still have to answer the question, What are the specific conditions for totalitarianism? A more fruitful accounting scheme would require answers to the questions that follow.

1. A first step in the analysis would be to specify the conditions leading to the crisis and final breakdown of pretotalitarian regimes, distinguishing various types of nondemocratic regimes and democracies, since at least one of the most outstanding models of totalitarianism emerged in a former democracy. It is perhaps this aspect that has been studied best by scholars, particularly the outstanding work of Bracher and his collaborators Sauer and Schulz on the rise to power of Hitler (Bracher, 1957; Bracher, Sauer, and Schulz, 1960), the works on the crisis of Weimar democracy (Matthias and Morsey, 1960; Eschenburg, 1966; Conze and Raupach, 1967; Kaltefleiter, 1968; Lepsius, 1968, 1971; Jasper, 1968), as well as the excellent study of the process at the local level by Allen (1965). The less theoretical but richly informative studies on the rise of fascism in Italy (De Felice, 1965, 1966b, 1968), the origins of the Spanish Civil War,[31] the end of party government in Japan (Scalapino, 1953), the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia (Feith, 1962), and some of the studies of the fall of Latin American democracies, particularly Brazil in 1964 (Schneider, 1971; Stepan, 1971), should allow the formulation of some model or theory of the breakdown of democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1978). However, the analysis of the crisis and the breakdown of democracy does not tell us what kind of regimes will emerge or what conditions will make for

its consolidation and stability. In fact, ignoring the cases of reequilibration of democracy, like France in 1958, in only one of the cases mentioned was the outcome a pure totalitarian system and in another an incipient one. Breakdown of democracy therefore is not identical with the establishment of totalitarianism, but it can be one of the conditions. It should not be forgotten, however, that the other outstanding model of totalitarian system did not result from the breakdown of a relatively stabilized democracy, since the regime born in the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia can certainly not be considered a minimally institutionalized democracy.

2. A question that coincides in part with that of the crisis and breakdown of democratic regimes is the analysis of the conditions leading to the emergence and growth of antidemocratic mass parties.[32] Since such parties have appeared and gained widespread support in a number of democracies without having been able to provoke or contribute decisively to their breakdown, the study of the emergence of fascist and communist parties and their appeal, organization, leadership, policies, legal and illegal activities, etc., can contribute only one element to the causal chain. In fact it might be misleading to speak of totalitarian parties, since the term can refer only to the type of political system such parties might intend to create, and we know that a number of them have been unable even after the breakdown of democracy to create totalitarian systems. Some parties committed to ideologies and to some degree to models like the Soviet Union, which would lead us to label them totalitarian, in democracies of sufficient stability over long periods of time might undergo a process of change that could in the long run make them legitimate participants in a democratic political system.[33] The case of Italy in the near future might be particularly interesting from this perspective (Blackmer, 1968; Blackmer and Tarrow, 1975).

3. If the breakdown of democracy and even the existence of a party committed to an ideology and having many of the organizational characteristics that should make it the single party of a totalitarian regime are not sufficient to establish such a regime, we have to ask an additional question: Which are the conditions that lead to the establishment of a more or less totalitarian system rather than to other forms of nondemocratic government once a democratic regime has broken down? Given the definition of totalitarian system, it is highly unlikely that such a system will be created in a short time, and therefore we can expect a period of transition of nondemocratic rule that does not be-

come fully institutionalized and leads to the emergence of a totalitarian system. In this sense it is more difficult to date the establishment of totalitarianism than the breakdown of democracy. Therefore the most important and specific question that has to be raised is: How does a nondemocratic situation or regime develop the specific features we have identified as totalitarian? How do the ruling groups conceive totalitarian institutions or is it an accident that they should have developed such a model of society? What factors make some of them successful and prevent other groups from transforming their political systems and societies into truly totalitarian systems?

4. What accounts for the stabilization and persistence of totalitarian systems over longer periods of time? In this context it is important to note that to this day no totalitarian system has been overthrown by force internally, but those that have lost some of their distinctive totalitarian characteristics have done so by a complex process of transformation.

5. Is totalitarianism a stable type of political system like democracy or many traditional forms of autocratic rule? And if not, which are the factors leading to transformation into other forms of nondemocratic rule?

The first two questions are not specific to the problem of totalitarianism but to the problem of the breakdown of democracies and the emergence of potential leaders and parties that could, under favorable circumstances, become the core of a totalitarian system. It seems difficult to conceive an analysis of the conditions making for the emergence of the more specific features of a totalitarian system without reference to the particular subtypes, most importantly by the communist and fascist ones. In addition it becomes difficult to analyze those conditions without explaining why in some situations in which there were many elements favoring the establishment of a totalitarian system this was not possible. In this respect the comparison of the evolution of the Nazi regime and that of Mussolini would be extremely revealing, as would be a comparison of the evolution of the different communist systems, particularly in the Stalinist phase. Many of the analyses of these processes were written at the time or shortly after the event and therefore could assume that certain conditions were unique to the societies under study, when events years later would show that some similar processes would be possible in very different societies. In this respect it is interesting to see how the initial interpretation of the rise of fascism and the consolidation of Mussolini in power looked for distinctive characteristics of Italian society and history, and interpretations of a

number of relatively underdeveloped countries of Eastern Europe and Turkey asserted that similar developments would not be possible in advanced industrial societies and particularly in Germany, in spite of the strength of the National Socialist party (Borkenau, 1933; Matossian, 1958). The literature derived from the experience of Germany and the Soviet Union, in turn, underlined certain characteristics of industrial society that would seem irrelevant in the case of China. Perhaps it would be better to proceed through the analysis of particular cases of successful and unsuccessful drives toward totalitarianism, and only after the variables most relevant in each case have been analyzed to attempt a generalization at a higher level of abstraction.

Just as the analysis of the conditions for the instoration of democracy, has to face the problem of endogenous processes as distinct from exogenous factors, so does the analysis of totalitarianism.[34] We cannot forget the external imposition of democratic systems in the case of Italy, Germany, and Japan after World War II, even when there were many endogenous factors favorable for the success of the regime so instored (Dahl, 1971, pp. 189–201). In the case of Stalinist totalitarian or semi-totalitarian systems we also have to be aware of such exogeneous factors like the presence of the Soviet army. Those cases, however, show how important the endogenous factors were for the full consolidation of such a regime when we consider the later evolution of the different Eastern European countries.

Cutting across many of the questions we have raised, we encounter different intellectual perspectives, the contribution of different disciplines, and a variety of theoretical approaches, which, unfortunately, have not been applied to all cases but only to some so that it is impossible to test their validity for others. For example, in the literature on the origins and the development of Nazi totalitarianism we have a number of studies that emphasize psychological variables, culture, personality, even psychoanalytical perspectives (Greenstein, in the original *Handbook,* Vol. 2), but relatively few studies have applied the same perspective to the rise and consolidation of power of Stalin. Marxism has provided the students of fascism with many of their hypotheses, but few have applied a Marxist theoretical perspective to Stalinism. Most of the theoretical orientations and hypotheses developed for the cases in which totalitarian systems consolidated themselves in power have not been tested, *a contrario,* in those cases where the drive toward totalitarianism was unsuccessful or only partly successful. We shall deal with those theories in other sections in accounting for the emergence of

a variety of types of authoritarian, but not totalitarian, regimes, which should complement our review of the theories on the origins and conditions for totalitarianism.

Two Historico-Sociological Analyses: Wittfogel and Barrington Moore

Some of the analyses of totalitarianism, rather than focusing on the particular historical crisis that led to the breakdown of a predecessor regime, the concurrent social disorganization, and the rise to power of a new elite with a totalist commitment, place the problem in a macrohistorical context of basic socioeconomic and organizational structures resulting from a long evolution. Outstanding works in this tradition are Wittfogel (1957) and Moore (1966). For Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism,* as a form of total power resulting from the requirenment of a bureaucratic rule to regulate the use of water in the societies he calls hydraulic—described by Marx as the "Asiatic mode of production"—serves as a basis for despotic institutions. Societies in which "the state is stronger than society" limit the development of autonomous secondary groups of political significance and lead to the development of a stratification system based on political control rather than property, that is, bureaucratic capitalism and landlordism. Significantly, in his view, communist scholars have ignored Marx's analysis of this type of society, presumably because it could serve to interpret contemporary realities in the communist world. The theory has not remained unchallenged, particularly by Eberhard with respect to the role of the Chinese gentry (for a review see Eisenstadt, 1958).

More directly linked with contemporary political realities—though in my view there are important missing steps—is the thesis of Moore (1966) about alternative paths to modernity in his *Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy,* significantly subtitled: *Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* The first path has been the great revolutions and civil wars that led to the combination of capitalism and Western democracy. The second route has also been capitalist, but culminated during the twentieth century in fascism. Germany and Japan are the obvious cases, called the capitalist and reactionary form, revolution from above due to the weakness of the bourgeoisie. The third route is communism, exemplified in Russia and China, countries in which the great agrarian bureaucracies inhibited the commercial and

later industrial impulses, even weaker than in Germany and Japan. The then-large remaining peasantry provided the destructive revolutionary force that overthrew the old order under communist leadership, which later made the peasants its primary victims. The ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were the decisive factors in determining the political outcome.

The fusion of peasant grievances with those of other strata has been decisive for revolutions, but the success of revolutions has been negative for peasants although decisive in creating new political and economic conditions. Those revolutions have been the result of the absence of commercial revolution in agriculture led by the landed upper classes and the survival of peasant social institutions into the modern era, with consequent stresses particularly when traditional and capitalist modes of pumping surplus out of the countryside were added to each other. This and the loss of functions of the landlord with the growth of centralized monarchy was the cause of revolutions. One outcome was conservative modernization and fascism, with a separation of government from society and modernization from above at the expense of the lower classes after unsuccessful attempts at parliamentary liberal democracy. In it the landed upper class will use a variety of levers to hold down a labor force on the land.

Moore's effort—to whose richness in specific analyses, complexity, and limitations we cannot do justice—by offering an explanation of the conditions for democracy, fascism, and communism, places the problem of nondemocratic politics in an ambitious historical framework worth testing and refining (Moy, 1971). In our view the neglect of the smaller European democracies that did not undergo the great revolutions, the equation of Japanese authoritarian rule with Nazi totalitarianism under the common label "fascism," and the ambiguous answer to the question Why democracy in India? pose serious problems to his analysis. Even greater are the problems raised by the time gap between the agrarian developments in Germany in the nineteenth century and the rise of Nazism to power in the thirties, the neglect of the tensions created within urban industrial society with the rise of an organized working class, and the impact of World War I and its aftermath on the middle classes. The same would be true for the impact of war and defeat on the semitraditional agrarian societies of Russia and China in making possible the rise to power with opportune peasant support of communist revolutionaries, a process not explainable exclusively in terms of socioeconomic structure and labor repression.

3

Traditional Authority and Personal Rulership

Introduction

The main types of modern political systems—democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian—are at the center of our attention in this chapter. There are, however, still political systems that would not fit, by any stretching of concepts, into those three main types, particularly various forms of traditional authority (sometimes combined, it is true, with more modern bureaucratic-military elements). Traditional rule of more or less patrimonial or feudal character still enjoys considerable legitimacy, even though its future is in doubt. Those traditional elements are even more important at the regional and local level in many countries in the Maghreb, Southeast Asia, and Subsaharan Africa. On the periphery of the modern Western world, particularly Latin America after independence, under formally democratic constitutions, forms of non-strictly traditional personal rulership emerged: *caudillismo* and the oligarchic rule of local notables, landowners, and políticos, sometimes in alliance with a more modern center, a system known as *caciquismo*. In fact, the combination of traditional and modern elements in economically underdeveloped countries with an unmobilized population (sometimes ethnically and culturally distinct like the Andean and Middle American Indians) and with limited civil liberties made possible what we might call "oligarchic democracies," often alternating with more open authoritarian rule (for example in Peru, see Bourricaud, 1967). In a few societies relatively unique circumstances allowed the emergence of more centralized, in some respects more modern forms of personal rulership (to use the expression of Guenther Roth, 1971) not based on

tradition, or charisma, or organized corporative institutions, or a modern single party. We shall discuss this type of highly arbitrary personal rule as "sultanistic," borrowing the term from Max Weber.

The regimes just mentioned—*caudillismo, caciquismo,* oligarchic democracy, sultanistic—show many similarities with those we label authoritarian (*strictu sensu*). The coercion and fear under sultanistic regimes reminds one of totalitarianism but the roots and function of the regimes are radically different. All this leads us to discuss these types of political systems separately in the next few pages.

Traditional and Semitraditional Legitimate Authority

It is beyond our scope to review the extensive literature on premodern political systems, except for brief references to the few states still under traditional rule and to the persistence of traditional elements, legitimation, and institutions in partly modernized systems. Political anthropologists, particularly the students of African politics, have significantly broadened our understanding of how the state and primitive political systems emerge.[35] Historians, and in their footsteps sociologists, have made major advances in the systematic typological and comparative study of a multiplicity of political forms—from gerontocracy, patriarchalism, and patrimonialism to kingship in different societies, from ancient city-states like the Greek polis in its various manifestations to the medieval city-states of the Renaissance.[36] Feudalism in the West, in Japan, and elsewhere, the evolution of representative institutions and estate societies in the West and the centralized traditional polities (particularly the bureaucratic empires), and the emergence of the modern state have been the object of historical and social science scholarship for decades. The great political and legal thinkers, moralists, and churchmen throughout the ages have added their perspectives. Thus many disciplines have contributed to our understanding of that variety of *premodern, predemocratic political forms* which with few exceptions were autocratic and devoid of a free and peaceful competition for power among all the members of the political community, even less among all the inhabitants of a political unit.

That scholarship has crystallized, notably in the work of Max Weber, in a series of typological and analytical concepts of more than historico-descriptive value for the social scientist, concepts that are of great use in understanding contemporary political systems, particularly

those in transition from tradition to modernity in the non-Western world. The historico-sociological scholarship has also contributed much to our understanding of the historical, institutional, and legal conditions for the emergence of representative institutions and, with them, of liberal democratic regimes. The persistence of traditional political culture, most evident in the great non-Christian civilizations, and the role of religious values and institutions in many societies make the understanding of the traditional political culture essential in the study of diverse regimes.[37] Authoritarian rule outside of communist countries, and perhaps even in them, in non-Western and largely rural societies cannot ignore the traditional elements in their politics. These elements are apt to be strongest at the local community level, and scholars focusing on the authoritarian structures at the center—single parties, military establishments, bureaucracies—risk underestimating the extent to which government and politics take place in traditional or mixed institutions according to traditional values, legitimated by religion and tradition, through traditional channels, and at the margin or outside the controls of central authorities. The growing body of scholarship on politics at the local, tribal, community, or regional level in those countries is likely to correct or, more exactly, to complement the description of both democratic and authoritarian governments in many parts of the world.

The small and diminishing number of Third World traditional political systems whose rulers enjoy continuing legitimacy and govern through patrimonial bureaucracies, feudal authoritative structures, tribal organizations, or some combination of traditional forms should be distinguished from those in which such elements have been mixed with nontraditional, generally Western institutions, often in uneasy coexistence. Some of those relatively pure traditional politics have shown considerable stability as compared with semimodern states, though it is difficult to say if it is the persistence of traditional legitimacy beliefs, the traditional or premobilized social structure, or isolation and economic underdevelopment (or in the Middle East disproportionate wealth) that accounts for the stability of the regimes, for example, of the emperor of Ethiopia (Perham, 1947; Hess and Loewenberg, 1964; Levine, 1965; Abraha, 1967; Hess, 1970), and the king of Nepal (Rose and Fisher, 1970), or some of the kings, emirs, and sheiks on the Arabic peninsula. Even after their formal overthrow or abdication such rulers may continue to exercise power under pseudomodern forms copied from the West. Yet Thailand (Wilson, 1962; Riggs, 1967) and

Iran (Binder, 1962; Zonis, 1971), two Asian countries never subject to colonial rule, have commingled modern authoritarian or democratic forms and the remnants of traditional legitimacy to sustain apparently stable social orders without undergoing radical breaks with tradition. Malaysia too is proof that such partial continuity with the past is not fully incompatible with the introduction of democratic institutions (Milne, 1967), even when the number of semitraditional regimes with bureaucratic-military-authoritarian governments seems to be growing. Traditional authority of monarchs and their patrimonial bureaucracies has and can facilitate the introduction of modern political institutions, a process with historical precedents in Japan in the Meiji restoration or the more recent institution of democracy under the American occupation.[38] Traditional authority can persist in mixed political systems but there is no evidence that it can be fully restored once elements of discontinuity have appeared. Attempts at restoration may only lead to various forms of neotraditional authoritarian rule, often, as in the case of Morocco,[39] with considerable instability.

The societies of the Maghreb exemplify very well how a historical heritage of a traditional, precolonial political and social structure and its transformation under different patterns of colonial rule, in turn partly a response to preconquest structures, can affect political developments after independence. The excellent study by Elbaki Hermassi (1972) comparing national development, both political and economic, in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria explains how the dominance of the monarchy, the party, and the army in each case is the result of structural factors and elite development, elite coalitions, and cleavages resulting from that historical background, precolonial and colonial. Hermassi shows how the Moroccan monarchy proved too powerful to be weakened by the political parties and too entrenched to allow expansion of the political system. He notes, following Samuel Huntington, three possible strategies open to the monarchy: to reduce its authority and promote movement toward a modern constitutional monarchy, to combine monarchical and popular authority in the same political system, or to maintain the monarchy as the principal source of authority and minimize the disruptive effects on it by the broadening of political consciousness (Huntington, 1968, pp. 40–91). The king attempted the third by assuming personal command of the army and the police and placing the ministry of interior in the hands of a former head of his private cabinet. This solution has led to a quasi-vizierial system without having opted initially for a purely vizierial or purely ministerial system.

This unstable arrangement based on a council dominated by nonparty technicians, not responsible before political groups—which could make their work impossible—and not committed by collective responsibility for the government, ultimately forced Mohammed V and his successor, Hassan II to vizierial governments with their members separately designated and individually responsible to the king, to use the description of Zartman (1971).

The rejection of the second strategy—direct monarchical rule leavened by some popular participation, for example, by the *Istiqulal* party and a variety of organized interests represented in the National Assembly—led to the split of the nationalist movement and the formation of a new opposition to the regime. To play off this new opposition the king summoned counterelites, such as the supporters of the rural Berber cause and the advocates of pluralism (who argued that the complexity of Moroccan society made one-party rule unworkable and a royal arbitrator a necessity). After the elections under a constitution promulgated in 1962 gave the monarchical forces only 69 seats of 144, the king suspended the constitution and reverted to government through his ministry of interior, first under a state of emergency and later under a new fundamental law that legalized his absolute power. The regime, as the repeated attempts to overthrow it and its ineffectiveness in economic policy making show, finds itself largely isolated from the political elite. It is an interesting example of the impossibility of return to stable traditional rule after a period of considerable political mobilization. In the Moroccan case the situation was compounded by the absence of success in economic development due largely to the constraints imposed by the limited power basis of the regime.

Hermassi's analysis of the historical development of Morocco before independence exemplifies well the kind of conditions that can lead to the stalemate of neotraditionalism. Colonial rule often reinforces traditional social structures and institutions at the same time as it produces the mobilization of new social forces in a struggle for independence. In the nineteenth century the Maghrebi states were all characterized by patrimonialism—private appropriation of army and administration, total discretion in appointments of officers, dynastic appropriation of the land, and imitation of the same traits in the provinces. Even so, the personal exercise of power was to greater or lesser extent circumscribed by religious and traditional restraints. Another constraint on the patrimonial domination emanated from the tribal grounding of the rural society, which created constant problems

in territorial and social unification for the state apparatus. In Morocco the state remained dependent on armed tribes until the middle of the nineteenth century, and the establishment (*Makhzen*) remained a rudimentary organization dependent for its effectiveness on the existence of a venerate personage, an institution unto himself, the sultan. Patrimonial rule faced the almost unsolvable problem of maintaining in a quasi-subsistence economy a taxation system capable of meeting the needs of the bureaucracy and the army. The resultant rebellion of the notables and the grand chiefs in the marginal zones left the sultan no other recourse but to make use of French assistance to maintain his empire. Thereafter, colonization interrupted any autonomous form of political and economic development, whether feudalistic, capitalistic, or whatever.

The French, entering each of the three Maghreb societies at different times with different methods, manipulated the existing tensions to their advantage, maintaining and at the same time changing the traditional social structure. While in Tunisia the Berber element had almost disappeared and in Algeria had continued to be 30 percent of the population, with half of those Berbers being rural, it represented 40 percent of the Moroccan population and two-thirds of the total rural population. The nineteenth century was a period of change in which the sultan attempted to stabilize his control over the tribes using firearms, his religious monopoly, and the conflict between *Bled el Makhzen*, or "land of government," and *Bled es-Siba*, or "land of dissidence." This territorial conflict, in which the intensity of tribal connections, difficulties of communication, and the oscillation between nomadic and sedentary forms of life had sheltered marginal populations from the central power, eventually evolved from a twofold to a threefold cleavage. This change came about with the institutionalization of intermediary powers of chiefs, who presented themselves to the regime as integrators of anarchical tribes and to the tribes as an ultimate resort against a fatal submission. Those chiefs eliminated local, more or less democratic institutions and substituted a personal despotic patrimonial form of government. The sultanate had to limit the arbitrariness of its notables and encourage intermediary chiefs to face dissident units without letting their power become strong enough to be a temptation to disloyalty in times of crisis. In doing so the sultanate seized on traditions of political legitimacy in Islam, meeting the aspirations of rural Muslims by emphasis on individual charismatic authority of a descendant of the prophet and gaining urban legitimation by seeing that no

investiture was actually carried out without the notables and religious scholars (*Ulama*) assenting and making binding arrangements in the name of the community. As Geertz (1968) has noted, the Alawites in Morocco managed to combine in their sultanate principles of political and religious organization that remain antithetic in most parts of the Muslim world. The religious legitimacy extended even to the marginal population officially considered politically dissident.

In Morocco the French administered neither directly nor through a partial control, as in Tunisia, but by a complicated administrative structure that dissociated the symbols of legitimacy, the loci of power, and the instrument of authority. The monarchy was preserved; administration lay in the hands of Europeans, who acted in the name of the monarchy, and a body of qaids formally appointed by the sultan. The French protected the Berber qaids and their tribal solidarities, encouraging chieftaincies and keeping alive the old Marabout confraternities. In contrast to Tunisia, Morocco did not continue in the process of centralization of government, due to the absence of tribal segmentation and dissent. Nor did the French destroy the existing administration, as in Algeria, where they had arrived much earlier and erased all existing signs of Algerian sovereignty in the name of an ideology of integration, making the indigenous population a dust of individuals. The protectorate policy in Morocco was based on using the ancient ruling cadres instead of dissolving them. The greater functional weight of the Moroccan monarchy compared with the Tunisian dynasty led the French to undertake the modernization of the sultan's administrative apparatus. The tribes, which for a long time had refused to submit to France, were willing to surrender to the French-supported sultan, bringing the unexpected benefit of unification of the society, to the advantage of the monarchy. The traditional religious universities of Morocco and Tunis were left undisturbed, and the learned strata of the old turban cities continued to exert leadership in a way that was impossible with the deculturation of Algeria. The homogeneity and openness to cosmopolitan influences in Tunisia and the greater historical weakness of the bey compared with the sultan of Morocco undermined the bey's authority and permitted the creation of a secular one-party state engaged in considerable mobilization. In Morocco the Berber Dahir of 1930, which attempted to isolate the Berber rural society through the maintenance and restoration of customary law and legalization of the dual conception of the land of government and the land of dissidence, thus structuring the divisions between Berbers and Arabs, led against their goals

to the emergence of modern nationalism. The protest movement expressed the liberals' fear of partition of their society but also enlisted the support of politico-religious leaders, who, with the backing of urban bourgeois families and in the name of primordial Islam, clustered their energies around the restoration of integral power in the hands of the monarch. French-sponsored educational institutions for the sons of urban bourgeois families and Berber students, a military academy oriented to the children of rural notables, and the persistence of traditional Islamic education further divided the elite. The nationalist movement, *Istiqlal,* was led by a coalition of heterogenous elites, whose aims were approved by the sultan. Simultaneously accused of capitulation by some nationalists and of obstructionism by the French, reproached by Chief El Glawi of being the king only of the *Istiqlal* and the marginal elements of turban society, Mohammed V became allied with the national elites. This led to counteralliances from the apparently civic to the fundamentally primordial, particularly around the rural notability. To counteract the growing turban opposition, the French attempted to ruralize politics by expanding the suffrage. Within the boycott of the elections by the *Istiqlal,* the French began a policy of reactivation of tribal dissidence combined with the repression of the urban elite. Mobilization of religious chiefs and qaids, and through them of traditional masses, against the sultan effected his deposition and exile. Nothing better might be imagined to bring together such diverse factions as the Marxists and the *Ulama* for the restoration of the monarch in place of the broader goals of independence, forcing even the sultan improvised by the French to demand the return of the legitimate ruler. Through this complex process the monarchy emerged as the major beneficiary of independence, with the national elite forced to a secondary role, and the unitary party drowned in a morass of pluralistic tendencies. As Geertz notes (1968, p. 78), "there is probably no other liberated colony in which the struggle for independence so centered around the capture, revival, and renovation of a traditional institution." At the same time the rapidly expanding state power undermined the traditionalist, scripturalist, Islamic forces.

The Moroccan case well exemplifies trends found in different degrees and forms in many transitions from colonialism to independence, trends sometimes masked by semi- or pseudomodern authoritarian forms. The particular historical development in the colonial policy of segmentation, traditionalism, and praetorianism, the structural incapacity of the elite to undertake rural mobilization, and the functional weight of

the monarchy resulted in the unstable and ineffective semitraditional system we have described above. Unfortunately, we cannot extend ourselves in the comparative analysis that Hermassi develops with Tunisia, one of the most stable and successful mobilizational single-party systems, and with Algeria, where the colonial rule, most destructive of indigenous society due to its direct rule, the large white settlement, and the deculturation, probably created the difficulties of political institutionalization that have led to the rule by the army. His analysis shows how important a thorough understanding of the historical background, precolonial and colonial, is to a grasp of the diversity of authoritarian regimes emerging in non-Western societies. The example of Morocco should indicate how superficial some of the typological efforts to understand such regimes can be. It also shows, considering the degree to which the countries of the Maghreb share a common Islamic culture and common European influences, the limits of a cultural interpretation underlying so many area approaches to comparative politics and the importance of structural, social, historical, and economic factors.

Sultanistic Regimes

We encounter a few regimes based on personal rulership (Roth, 1971) with loyalty to the ruler based not on tradition, or on him embodying an ideology, or on a unique personal mission, or on charismatic qualities, but on a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system. The binding norms and relations of bureaucratic administration are constantly subverted by personal arbitrary decisions of the ruler, which he does not feel constrained to justify in ideological terms. In many respects the organization of power and of the staff of the ruler is similar to traditional patrimonialism as described by Weber (1968, pp. 231–32). But the lack of constraint derived from tradition and from continuing traditional legitimacy distinguishes it from the historical types of patrimonial rule. The staff of such rulers is constituted not by an establishment with distinctive career lines, like a bureaucratic army or civil servants, recruited by more or less universalistic criteria, but largely by men chosen directly by the ruler. They are neither "disciples" nor old fighters of a movement party or conspiratorial group. They are often men who would not enjoy any prestige or esteem in the

society on their own account but whose power is derived exclusively from the ruler. Among them we very often find members of his family, friends, cronies, business associates, and men directly involved in the use of violence to sustain the regime. The army and the police play a prominent role in the system, but assassination, attacks, and harassment against opponents are often carried out privately with the knowledge of the ruler but without using the police or the courts. Certainly such arbitrary use of power and the fear of it can also be found in the worst phases of totalitarianism. However, there is an essential difference between these regimes and totalitarian systems: the lack of ideological goals for the society on the part of the ruler and his collaborators as well as of any effort of mobilization of the population in a mass single party. The personalistic and particularistic use of power for essentially private ends of the ruler and his collaborators makes the country essentially like a huge domain. Support is based not on a coincidence of interest between preexisting privileged social groups and the ruler but on the interests created by his rule, the rewards he offers for loyalty, and the fear of his vengeance. The boundaries between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler become blurred. He and his collaborators, with his consent, take appropriate public funds freely, establish profit-oriented monopolies, and demand gifts and payoffs from business for which no public accounting is given; the enterprises of the ruler contract with the state, and the ruler often shows his generosity to his followers and to his subjects in a particularistic way. The family of the ruler often plays a prominent political role, appropriates public offices, and shares in the spoils. It is this fusion between the public and the private and the lack of commitment to impersonal purposes that distinguishes essentially such regimes from totalitarianism. The economy is subject to considerable governmental interference but not for the purposes of planning but of extracting resources.

The position of the officials derives from their purely personal submission to the ruler, and their position vis-à-vis the subjects is merely the external aspect of this relation, in contrast to bureaucracies, both civil and military. Even when the political official is not a personal dependent, the ruler demands unconditional administrative compliance, for the official's loyalty to his office is not an impersonal commitment to impersonal tasks that define the extent and content of his office, but rather a servant's loyalty based on a strictly personal relationship to the ruler and an obligation that in principle permits no limitation. In this description we have paraphrased some of Weber's description of patrimonial

officialdom. Those officials enjoy little security; they are promoted or dismissed at will and enjoy no independent status. They may even, in extreme cases, be subject to dishonor and persecution one day and return to the graces of the ruler the next. The legal and symbolic institutionalization of the regime is pure facade and likely to change for reasons external to the system, like the availability of models enjoying legitimacy abroad.

Such regimes are obviously dependent on the economic situation, since the rewards the ruler can offer to his staff depend on it, and opposition to his regime is likely to come from disappointed members of the staff rather than from social strata, institutions, or political organizations of the regime. The sudden collapse of such regimes as well as their equally sudden reestablishment manifest the fundamental instability of such domination based on force.

Such regimes are unlikely to be established in advanced industrial societies but are compatible with an agrarian economy with commercial and some industrial enterprises. Their stabilization and continuity require a certain degree of modernization of transportation and communications as well as of the military and police organizations, to provide the funds to sustain the rule and to prevent threats to it from the periphery. The isolation of the rural masses, their lack of education, and their poverty are probably necessary to assure their passive submission, which results from the combination of fear and gratitude for occasional paternalistic welfare measures made possible by a modicum of economic development. The rulers' policies are likely to encourage certain types of capitalist enterprise, particularly commercial and plantation types, but can be a serious obstacle to rational calculability, required by enterprises with heavy investments in fixed capital and oriented toward a consumer market. It is also probable that a small-sized country with few urban centers might facilitate this type of rule, making difficult the emergence of alternative elites and of uprisings in the periphery. Certainly the regimes of Trujillo (Wiarda, 1968; Galíndez, 1973; Crassweller, 1966) and Duvalier (Rotberg, 1971; Diederich and Burt, 1969; Fleischman, 1971), which in many ways fit this model, were made possible by the fact that the Dominican Republic and Haiti are on an island, which, combined with their economic dependence on export crops, facilitated both the control of resources like trade and the isolation from external threats.[40] Outside of underdeveloped economies and societies, sultanistic regimes, like some traditional autocracies, have a chance of survival only when they can dispose of considerable

economic resources produced by enterprises that do not require a modern industrial labor force and entrepreneurial class, a modern administration, urbanization, expansion of education, etc. Obviously, easily exploitable natural resources whose production is in the hands of one or few enterprises with high profits can provide the resources for such a regime. In the case of Trujillo,[41] the limited modernization of the country under his longtime rule facilitated both the appropriation of resources and the use of some modern techniques of control that most nineteenth-century Latin American *caudillos* could not count on, making their rule so often unstable and often contested by other *caudillos.* The discovery of oil in Venezuela certainly made possible the consolidation of the rule of the *caudillo* Gómez and later of Pérez Jiménez, even when at that point Venezuelan society had already reached a level of complexity that ultimately made his rule impossible despite some populistic components. The plantation economy of some Central American republics has also served as a basis for such regimes. However, it would be a mistake to consider such regimes as the inevitable result of the economic structure, ignoring many other factors contributing to their emergence and stability, including the interests in "order" of foreign investors that have established stable "business" relations with the ruler.

This type cannot be always neatly distinguished from other types of authoritarian regimes, particularly those without a real single party. But certainly any student of the Dominican Republic or Salazar's Portugal, to take just two relatively small countries, becomes immediately sensitive to the fundamental difference between two types of authoritarianism. The rule of a Stalin or Hitler would never have produced the admiration and loyalty of the masses, and even of intellectuals and foreign observers identified with very different types of regimes, if they had not put their rule at the service of impersonal purposes. Under totalitarianism, even when some of the members of the ruling group like a Göring enjoy life and when corruption is not absent, the rule of a Stalin or a Hitler was not directed at the personal enrichment of the ruler and his family, nor was power exercised simply in the benefit of the ruling group. In fact, under such a sultanistic system what is at stake is the maintenance and futherance of the privileges, not of the social class or stratum, but of a group of power holders, often by exploiting even the privileged landowners, merchants, or foreign capitalists who buy their peace in that way.

Obviously, the costs of such a regime fall mainly on the masses of the population, since the privileged are likely to revert their contributions to the maintenance of the system back onto the masses, who lack of any organization to resist exploitation due to the atomization created by the autocratic rule and whose only recourse is to turn to the benevolent paternalism of the ruler. Sometimes the ruler, out of status resentment and to consolidate his power against economically or socially privileged oligarchies or institutional groups like the army officers, might combine his rule through patrimonial officials and mercenaries with populistic gestures. This seems to have been the pattern of Duvalier in Haiti in his exploitation of racial and social tensions.

The overthrow of sultanistic authoritarian regimes without considerable prior social and economic change is not likely to lead to anything but another sultanistic regime or at best to more rational authoritarian rule with the support of the privileged oligarchies. However, with outside support it is not impossible that a revolutionary regime, which might have some totalitarian features, could emerge, while the transition to a stable democracy seems extremely difficult. Batista's Cuba is a very special case, since it shared many of the characteristics of the model just described, even though it also had some of those of the authoritarian regime, combining the rule of the military with that of politicians and interest groups (Solaún, 1969). The fact that Batista was ruling over a country with many modern characteristics in its urban sector contributed to its basic illegitimacy and its ultimate downfall when its military could not suppress the Castro rebellion. The unwillingness of the establishment of Cuban society—parts of the judiciary, the Church, etc.—to support Batista's rule made his overthrow and his flight possible without a real civil war, which is more likely to accompany revolutionary challenges against traditional autocratic rule, like in Yemen, or nonsultanistic authoritarian regimes.

Caudillismo and Caciquismo

In nineteenth-century Latin American politics the disintegration of larger political units and the difficulties of establishing a new type of legitimate rule led to the rule of *caudillo*—"chieftain"—politics. *Caudillaje* politics has been defined by Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen by the following four characteristics:

> (1) the repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; (2) the lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices; (3) the use of violence in political competition; and (4) the repeated failures of incumbent leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains. (Woolf and Hansen, 1967, p. 169)

It was a system that emerged with the broad diffusion of military power among wide strata of the population, as it could not be found in modern Europe, and that deranged the predictable interplay of hierarchical class relations. Its base was the traditional *hacienda,* the labor and economic dependencies based on it, the social ties of kinship and friendship, and a personal capacity for the organization of violence (Gilmore, 1964). It was an essentially unstable system, due to the limited resources to impose one's rule, the competition among *caudillos,* the instability of personal loyalties. This instability and changes in the international economic situation as reflected in Latin America led to "order and progress" dictatorships, exhibiting many *caudillo* features but achieving greater centralization, more stable relations with certain social forces, and international links, of which the Mexican Porfiriato (1876–1911) was a prototype. The "order and progress" dictatorship was on the boundaries between the sultanistic and the military-bureaucratic authoritarian regime. However, at the local level the power structures that served as the basis of *caudillaje* became the support of *caciquismo, coronelismo* systems (Kern, 1973), which were based on alliances between central power holders and those at the local level who "delivered" the votes in exchange for patronage, pork barrel, or just exemption from interference in their arbitrary or paternalistic authority over laborers, tenants, and local government.

Caciquismo has been defined by Kern and Dolkart (1973, pp. 1–2) "as an oligarchical system of politics run by a diffuse and heterogenous elite whose common denominator is local power used for national purposes." Its base is predominantly agrarian but not exclusively so, since professionals, merchants, industrialists, and urban bosses of political machines are often involved. The basis has been "strong local power organized pyramid-fashion so that the 'boss' systems or 'chiefdoms'—*cacicatos*—interlock with one another to form the political infrastructure in many Luso-Hispanic states," with a restricted oligarchy of nationally influential men at the top connected consciously through social ties, formal and informal, with the local *caciques.*

Such structures, through constant transformations,[42] have survived under both authoritarian and semidemocratic regimes at the center up to our days. Sultanistic authoritarianism reproduces at the national level some of the worst features of local nineteenth-century *caciquismo,* perhaps due to the absence of some of the social controls by a local community.