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Authoritarian Regimes

Toward a Definition of Authoritarian Regimes

In an earlier essay we attempted to define a variety of nondemocratic and nontotalitarian political systems as authoritarian if they were

> political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. (Linz, 1964, p. 255)

This definition was developed by contrasting those systems both with competitive democracies and with the ideal type of totalitarian systems (Linz, 1964, 1970a, 1973a, 1973b). It implies clear conceptual boundaries with democratic polities but somewhat more diffuse ones with totalitarianism, since pre- and post-totalitarian situations and regimes might also fit the definition. A further delimitation is the exclusion of traditional legitimate regimes, on account of the different sources of legitimacy of the leadership, or oligarchies ruling authoritarianly. The type of regimes we have labelled sultanistic-authoritarian regimes have much in common with those we intend to cover with our definition of authoritarian but differ from them in the importance in sultanistic-authoritarian regimes of arbitrary and unpredictable use of power and the weakness of the limited political pluralism. For other reasons we find it convenient to exclude from our definition the nineteenth-century semiconstitutional monarchies, which were halfway between traditional

legitimate and authoritarian rule (with monarchical, estate, and even feudal elements mixed with emerging democratic institutions), and the censitary democracies, where the restricted suffrage represented a step in the process of development toward modern competitive democracies based at least on universal male suffrage. The oligarchic democracies that, particularly in Latin America, have resisted pressures toward further democratization through the persistence of suffrage limitations based on illiteracy, control or manipulation of elections by *caciques*, frequent recourse to the moderating power of the army, undifferentiated parties, etc., find themselves on the borderline between modern authoritarian regimes and democracy. They are closer to democracy in their constitutional and ideological conception but sociologically more similar to some authoritarian regimes. Our delimitation by exclusion still leaves us with a large number of contemporary political systems fitting our definition and therefore requiring, as we shall see, the characterization of a number of subtypes.

Our concept focuses on the way of exercising power, organizing power, linking with the societies, on the nature of the belief systems sustaining it, and on the role of citizens in the political process without, however, paying attention to the substantive content of policies, the goals pursued, the *raison d'être* of such regimes. It does not tell us much about the institutions, groups, and social strata forming part of the limited pluralism or about those excluded. The emphasis on the more strictly political aspects exposes the concept to some of the same criticism of formalism advanced against a general concept of totalitarianism, or for that matter of democracy. We feel, however, that by characterizing regimes independently of the policies they pursue we tend to deal in a distinctive way with problems faced by all political systems, for example, the relationship between politics and religion and the intellectuals. The conditions for their emergence, stability, transformation, and perhaps breakdown are also quite distinct. The general and abstract character of our definition makes it even more imperative to go down on the ladder of abstraction into the study of the variety of subtypes, as we shall do here.

We speak of authoritarian regimes rather than authoritarian governments to indicate the relatively low specificity of political institutions: they often penetrate the life of the society, preventing, even forcibly, the political expression of certain group interests (as religion in Turkey and in Mexico after the revolution, labor in Spain) or shaping them by interventionist policies like those of corporativist regimes.

In contrast to some analysts of totalitarianism, we speak of regimes rather than of societies because the distinction between state and society is not fully obliterated even in the intentions of the rulers.

The pluralistic element is the most distinctive feature of these regimes, but it cannot be strongly enough emphasized that in contrast to democracies, with their almost *unlimited* pluralism, their institutionalized political pluralism, we are dealing here with *limited* pluralism. In fact, it has been suggested that we could also have characterized these regimes as of limited monism. In fact, these two terms would suggest the fairly wide range in which those regimes operate. The limitation of pluralism may be legal or de facto, implemented more or less effectively, confined to strictly political groups or extended to interest groups, as long as there remain groups not created by or dependent on the state which influence the political process one way or another. Some regimes go even so far as to institutionalize the political participation of the limited number of independent groups or institutions and even encourage their emergence without, however, leaving any doubt that the rulers ultimately define which groups they will allow to exist and under what conditions. In addition, political power is not legally and/or de facto accountable through such groups to the citizens, even when it might be quite responsive to them. This is in contrast to democratic governments, where the political forces are formally dependent on the support of constituencies, whatever de facto deviations the Michelsian "iron law of oligarchy" might introduce. In authoritarian regimes the men who come to power reflecting the views of various groups and institutions derive their position not from the support from those groups alone but from the trust placed in them by the leader or ruling group, which certainly takes into account their prestige and their influence. They have a kind of constituency; we might call it a potential constituency, but this is not solely or even principally the source of their power. A constant process of co-optation of leaders is the mechanisms by which different sectors or institutions become participants in the system, and this process accounts for the characteristics of the elite: a certain heterogeneity in its background and career patterns and the smaller number of professional politicians, men who have made their career in strictly political organizations, compared with the number of those recruited from the bureaucracy, technically skilled elites, the army, interest groups, and sometimes religious groups.

As we shall see, in some of these regimes an official or a single or privileged party is one more-or-less important component of the limited

pluralism. On paper such parties often claim the monopolistic power of the totalitarian parties and presumably perform the same functions, but in reality they have to be kept clearly distinct. The absence or weakness of a political party often makes lay organizations sponsored by or linked with the Church, like Catholic Action or the Opus Dei in Spain, a reservoir of leadership for such regimes not too different from their function in the recruitment of elites of Christian democratic parties (Hermet, 1973). The single party more often than not is what the Africans have called a *parti unifié* rather than a *parti unique*, a party based on the fusion of different elements rather than a single disciplined body (Foltz, 1965). Often such parties are a creation from above rather than from the grass roots, created by the group in power rather than a party-conquering power like in totalitarian systems.

In the definition of authoritarian regimes we use the term "mentality" rather than "ideology," from the distinction of the German sociologist Theodor Geiger (1932, pp. 77–79). For him ideologies are systems of thought more or less intellectually elaborated and organized, often in written form, by intellectuals, pseudointellectuals, or with their assistance. Mentalities are ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide noncodified ways of reacting to different situations. He uses a very graphic German expression: mentality is *subjektiver Geist* (even when collective); ideology is *objektiver Geist*. Mentality is intellectual attitude; ideology is intellectual content. Mentality is psychic predisposition, ideology is reflection, self-interpretation; mentality is previous, ideology later; mentality is formless, fluctuating—ideology, however, is firmly formed. Ideology is a concept of the sociology of culture, mentality is a concept of the study of social character. Ideologies have a strong utopian element, mentalities are closer to the present or the past. Ideological belief systems based on fixed elements and characterized by strong affect and closed cognitive structure, with considerable constraining power, important for mass mobilization and manipulation, are characteristic of totalitarian systems. In contrast, the consensus in democratic regimes is based on a procedural consensus, the commitment to which acquires some of the qualities of ideological beliefs.

The utility and validity of the distinction between mentality and ideology has been questioned by Bolívar Lamounier (1974). He notes that as an actual political variable, as cognitive forms of consciousness actually operative in political life, particularly in the communication process, they are not really that different. He feels that the distinction

implies a hasty dismissal of the ruling ideas of authoritarian regimes as an object worth study. Nothing could be further from our intent. He rightly notes the effectiveness of symbolic communication, the multiplicity of referential connections between symbol and social reality, in authoritarian regimes.

Much of the argument hinges on the philosophical assumptions about the definition of ideology, an aspect into which we shall not go. Both ideologies and mentalities as characterized above are part of a broader phenomenon of ideas leading to action-oriented ideas—which are an aspect of the institutionalization of power relationships for which Lamounier prefers to use the term "ideology."

The important question is, Why do ideas take a different form, different coherence, articulation, comprehensiveness, explicitness, intellectual elaboration, and normativeness? On those various dimensions ideologies and mentalities differ. Those differences are not without consequences in the political process. It is more difficult to conceive of mentalities as binding, requiring a commitment of the rulers and the subjects irrespective of costs and of the need of coercion to implement them. Mentalities are more difficult to diffuse among the masses, less susceptible to be used in education, less likely to come into conflict with religion or science and more difficult to use as a test of loyalty. The range of issues for which an answer can be derived from them, the degree of precision of those answers, the logic of the process of derivation, and the visibility of the contradictions between them and policies are very different. Their constraining power to legitimate and delegitimate actions are very different. The student of an authoritarian regime would be hard pressed to identify explicit references to ideas guiding the regime in legal theorizing and judicial decisions in nonpolitical cases, in art criticism and scientific arguments, and would find only limited evidence of their use in education. He or she certainly would not find the rich and distinctive language, the new terminology and esoteric use of an ideology, all difficult to understand to the outsider but important to the participants. Nor would he or she find in the libraries stacks of books and publications of an ideological character elaborating endlessly and in a variety of directions those ideas.

Let us admit that the distinction is and cannot be clear-cut but reflects two extreme poles with a large gray area in between. Certainly bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are likely to reflect more the mentality of their rulers. In others we are likely to find what Susan Kaufman (1970) has called a programmatic consensus and in others a

set of ideas derived from a variety of sources haphazardly combined to give the impression of being an ideology in the sense we have described in the totalitarian systems. Certainly the authoritarian regimes on the periphery of ideological centers feel the pressure to imitate, incorporate, manipulate dominant ideological styles. This can often lead scholars to serious misunderstanding of such regimes, to misplaced emphases. The real question to ask is, What power arrangements seem to prevent ideological articulation in such regimes? In our view the complex coalition of forces, interests, political traditions, and institutions—part of the limited pluralism—requires the rulers to use as symbolic referent the minimum common denominator of the coalition. In this way the rulers achieve the neutralization of a maximum of potential opponents in the process of taking power (in the absence of the highly mobilized mass of supporters). The vagueness of the mentality blunts the lines of cleavage in the coalition, allowing the rulers to retain the loyalty of disparate elements. The lack of an assertion of specific, articulated, and explicit commitments facilitates adaptation to changing conditions in the nonsupportive environment, particularly in the case of authoritarian regimes in the Western democratic sphere of influence. The reference to generic values like patriotism and nationalism, economic development, social justice, and order and the discreet and pragmatic incorporation of ideological elements derived from the dominant political centers of the time allow rulers who have gained power without mobilized mass support to neutralize opponents, co-opt a variety of supporters, and decide policies pragmatically. Mentalities, semi- or pseudoideologies reduce the utopian strain in politics and with it conflict that otherwise would require either institutionalization or more repression than the rulers could afford. The limited utopianism obviously is congruent with conservative tendencies.

Such regimes pay a price for their lack of ideology in our sense of the term. It limits their capacity to mobilize people to create the psychological and emotional identification of the masses with the regime. The absence of an articulate ideology, of a sense of ultimate meaning, of long-run purposes, of an a priori model of ideal society reduces the attractiveness of such regimes to those for whom ideas, meaning, and values are central. The alienation of intellectuals, students, youth, and deeply religious persons from such regimes, even when successful and relatively liberal compared with totalitarian systems, can be explained in part by the absence or weakness of ideology. One of the advantages of authoritarian regimes with an important fascist component was that

this derivative ideology appealed to some of those groups. But it also was one of the sources of tension when the disregard of the elite of the regime for those ideological elements became apparent.

In theory we should be able to distinguish this content of ideas of the regime, including its style, from the ideas guiding or influencing the political process as an actual political variable. It could be argued that the first aspect, to which we will be looking for the objectivization, is ultimately less central than the subjective appropriation, the various forms of consciousness actually operative in political life. However, we feel that the distinction between mentality and ideology is not irrelevant for the way in which they affect activities and communication processes in politics and society. The complex interaction between both levels of analysis precludes any a priori statement about the direction in which the relationship operates. Probably in totalitarian systems the actual political processes are more deeply affected by the content of the ideology, while in authoritarian regimes the mentalities of the rulers, not having to be equally explicit, might reflect more the social and political realities.

The elusiveness of mentalities, the mimetic and derivative character of the so-called ideologies of authoritarian regimes, has limited the number of scholarly studies of this dimension of such regimes. Only interview studies of the elites and surveys of the population, of great sophistication given the limited freedom of expression and the obstacles in the communication processes, make this an important dimension in the study of such regimes. The typology of authoritarian regimes we will present relies more on the character of the limited pluralism and the degree of apathy or mobilization than on an analysis of types of mentalities.

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In our original definition we emphasized the actual absence of extensive and intensive political mobilization but admitted that at some point of the development of such regimes there could be such mobilization. The characteristic of low and limited political mobilization is therefore a factual characteristic on which such regimes tend to converge, for a variety of reasons. As we shall see in the discussion of the subtypes, in some regimes the depoliticization of the mass of the citizens falls into the intent of the rulers, fits with their mentality, and reflects the character of the components of the limited pluralism supporting them.

In other types of systems the rulers initially intend to mobilize their supporters and the population at large into active involvement in the regime and its organizations. Their public commitments, often derivative ideological conceptions, push them in that direction. The historical and social context of the establishment of the regime favors or demands such a mobilization through a single party and its mass organizations. The struggle for national independence from a colonial power or for full independence, the desire to incorporate into the political process sectors of the society untapped by any previous political leadership, or the defeat of a highly mobilized opponent in societies in which democracy had allowed and encouraged such a mobilization lead to the emergence of mobilizational authoritarian regimes of a nationalist, populist, or fascist variety. In reality there is a likelihood of convergence of regimes starting from such different assumptions following quite different routes. That convergence should not, however, obscure many important differences derived from those origins in terms of the type of pluralism emerging, the legitimacy formulae chosen, the response to crises situations, the capacity for transformation, the sources and types of opposition, etc.

Ultimately the degree of political mobilization and with it the opportunities for participation in the regime of those among the citizens supporting it are a result of the other two dimensions used in the definition of authoritarian regimes. Mobilization and participation ultimately become difficult to sustain unless the regime moves in a more totalitarian or democratic direction. Effective mobilization, particularly through a single party and its mass organizations, would be perceived as a threat by the other components of the limited pluralism, typically the army, the bureaucracy, the churches, or interest groups. To break through those constraining conditions would require moves in the totalitarian direction. The failure to break through those conditions and the limited pluralism standing in the way to totalitarianism has been well analyzed by Alberto Aquarone, who quotes this revealing conversation of Mussolini with an old syndicalist friend:

> If you could imagine the effort it has taken me to search for a possible equilibrium in which I could avoid the collision of antagonistic powers which touched each other side by side, jealous, distrustful one of the other, government, party, monarchy, Vatican, army, militzia, prefects, provincial party leaders, ministers, the head of the Confederazioni [corporative structures] and the giant monopolistic interests, etc. you will understand they are the indigestions of totalitarianism,

in which I did not succeed in melting that "estate" that I had to accept in 1922 without reservations. A pathological connecting tissue linking the traditional and circumstantial deficiencies of this great, small, Italian people, which a tenacious therapy of twenty years has achieved to modify only on the surface. (Aquarone, 1965, p. 302)

We have described how the maintenance of equilibrium between those limited pluralisms limits in reality the effectiveness of the mobilization to a single party and ultimately has to lead to the apathy of the members and activists, since such a party offers limited access to power compared with other channels. Underdevelopment, particularly of a large rural population living in isolated areas and engaging in subsistence agriculture, often linked with traditional or clientelistic power structures integrated into the unified party, despite the ideological pronouncements, the organization charts, and the machinery of plebiscitarian elections, does not create a participatory political culture, not even controlled or manipulated participation.

As we shall see in more detail, the authoritarian regimes that emerge after a period of competitive democratic participation that created an unsolvable conflict in the society opt for depoliticization and apathy, which is felt by many citizens as a relief from the tensions of the previous period. Initially this is the apathy of those defeated by the new regime, but in the absence of a disciplined totalitarian mass party and its mass organizations combined with terror, little effort will be made to integrate them to participate in the system. As the tensions and hatreds that produced a mobilization for the system diminish, the supporters are also likely to lapse into apathy, which often the rulers might welcome to avoid pressures to make good the promises they made in the process of mobilization.

The absence of an ideology, the heterogeneous and compromise character, and often mimetism of the guiding ideas, and above all the mentality of the rulers, particularly military elites, bureaucrats, experts, and co-opted politicians of pro-regime parties, are serious obstacles in the process of mobilization and participation. Without an ideology it becomes difficult to mobilize activists for voluntary campaigns, regular attendance at party meetings, face-to-face propaganda activities, etc. Without an ideology with utopian components it is difficult to attract those interested in politics as an end in itself rather than a means for more pragmatic and immediate interests. Without ideology the young, the students, the intellectuals are not likely to get involved in politics and provide the cadres for politicization of the population.

Without the utopian element, without the appeal to broader constituencies that would require a participatory pluralism rather than the limited, controlled, and co-opted pluralism of elites, the appeals based on a consensual, nonconflictive society, except in moments of upsurge of nationalism or of danger to the regime, tend to reduce politics to administration of the public interest and to the de facto expression of particular interests.

The limited pluralism of authoritarian regimes and the different share that the tolerated pluralistic components have in the exercise of power in different moments lead to complex patterns of semiopposition and pseudoopposition within the regime (Linz, 1973a). There is semiopposition by groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group and that engage in partial criticism but are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime. Without being institutionalized such groups are not illegitimate, even when they lack a legal framework in which to operate. They might be highly critical of the government and some aspects of the institutional order, but they distinguish between these and the leader of the regime and accept the historical legitimacy or at least necessity of the authoritarian formula. There are groups that advocate different emphases and policy, groups that join in supporting the establishment of the regime but in the hope of achieving goals not shared by their coalition partners. There is dissidence among those who initially identified with the system but did not participate in its establishment, typically the Young Turks of the regime, and among those within the regime who want to work for goals that are not illegitimate, like the restoration of a previous regime initially announced but never realized. There are those who had stronger ideological commitments but accepted seeing them postponed to gain power against an enemy, those with a foreign model and/or even loyalty from which the rulers attempt to distance themselves, and in the late stages of such a regime those who oppose its transformation, specifically its liberalization and the abandonment of its exclusionary character. Semiopposition is likely to appear among men of the older generation who joined in the establishment of the regime to pursue goals they had already formulated before the takeover. But it also appears among the intellectuals and the young, particularly students who have taken seriously the rhetorical pronouncements of the leadership and who in addition find that there are no effective channels for political participation. Not infrequently the semiopposition within the regime becomes an alegal opposition. It has given up hope of transforming the regime from the

inside but is not yet ready to move into illegal or subversive activities and finds intermittent tolerance sometimes based on the personal ties established in earlier years. The weakness of the efforts of political socialization and indoctrination in authoritarian regimes also accounts for the fact that when the third generation, never incorporated in the regime, discovers politics it might turn to an alegal opposition. The autonomy left by the regime to certain social organizations, the limited efforts of liberalization and increased participation in the regime organizations, and the relative openness to other societies create opportunities for the emergence of an alegal opposition, which sometimes serves as a front for an illegal opposition that is ready to infiltrate the organizations of the regime, rejecting the moral qualms about participating in it held by other opponents. Opposition is often channeled into formally apolitical organizations of cultural, religious, or professional character. In multilingual, multicultural societies, where the regime is identified with one of the national groups, cultural manifestations such as the use of languages other than the official language become an expression of opposition. The special position of the Catholic Church in many societies under authoritarian rule and the legal status of many of its organizations in the concordats between the Vatican and the rulers allow priests and laymen a certain autonomy to serve as a channel for opposition sentiments of social classes, cultural minorities, generational unrest, etc., and for the emergence of new leaders. In the case of the Catholic Church the transnational character, the moral legitimation of the relatively wide range of ideological positions by the refusal on the part of the Pope to condemn them, the legitimacy for moral prophetic indignation against injustice, particularly after Vaticanum II, together with the concern of the hierarchy for the autonomy of religious organizations and the freedom of priests account for the role of religious groups in the politics of authoritarian regimes. Paradoxically, the Church has provided the regimes through its lay organizations with elites but has also protected its dissidents and occasionally played the role described by Guy Hermet (1973) as tribunicial against the regime by being witness of moral values against abuses of power. The Church as an institution that will outlast any regime, even those with which it becomes identified in the particular historical moment, is likely to disidentify and regain its autonomy when signs of crisis appear. The same is true for other permanent institutions that might have retained considerable autonomy under authoritarian rule, like the judiciary or even the professional civil servants.

Let us emphasize here that the semioppositions—the alegal but tolerated opposition, the relatively autonomous role of various institutions under conditions of semifreedom—creates a complex political process of far-reaching consequences for the society and its political development. The liberalization of authoritarian regimes can go far, but without a change in the nature of the regime, without the institutionalization of political parties, is likely to be quite limited. The semifreedom under such regimes imposes on their opponents certain costs that are quite different from those of persecution of illegal oppositions and that explain their frustration, disintegration, and sometimes readiness to cooptation, which contribute to the persistence of such regimes sometimes as much as does their repressive capacity. The ambiguity of opposition under authoritarian regimes contrasts with the clear boundaries between regime and its opponents in totalitarian systems. However, let us emphasize that the limited pluralism, the process of liberalization, and the existence of the tolerated opposition, in the absence of institutional channels for political participation and for the opposition to reach the mass of the population, allow a clear distinction between authoritarian and democratic regimes.

Before closing our general discussion of authoritarian regimes we want to call attention to one difficulty in their study. In a world in which the great and most successful powers are and have been either stable democracies or communist or fascist political systems, with the unique attraction given to them by their ideologies, their organizational capacity, their apparent stability, their success as advanced industrial nations or in overcoming economic backwardness, and their capacity to overcome international second-rank status, authoritarian regimes are in an ambiguous position. None of them has served as a utopian model for other societies, except, perhaps for special historical reasons, Nasser's Egypt in the Arab world. Possibly Mexico, with its combination of the revolutionary myth and the pragmatic stability of its hegemonic party regime, could serve rulers as a model. None of the authoritarian regimes has fired the imagination of intellectuals and activists across the borders. None has inspired an international of parties supporting such a model. Only the original solutions attempted by the Yugoslavs have created a noncritical interest among intellectuals. Under those circumstances authoritarian regimes and their leaders have felt constrained to take the trappings of the appealing totalitarian models, avoiding or unable to incorporate the substance of the model. Only the

thirties, as we shall see, with the ideology of corporativism combining a variety of ideological heritages and linking with Catholic conservative social doctrine, seemed to offer a genuine nontotalitarian and nondemocratic ideological alternative. The visible failure of such systems, the fact that no major power followed that route, the diffuse boundaries between conservative or Catholic corporativism and Italian fascism, and, finally, the disengagement of the Church from its commitment to organic theories of society have ultimately undermined this third model of politics. Authoritarian regimes, whatever their roots in the society, whatever their achievements, are ultimately confronted with two appealing alternative models of polity, which limit the possibilities of full and self-confident institutionalization and give strength to their opponents (Linz, 1973b).

The Problem of a Typology of Authoritarian Regimes

The social science literature offers many ideas for developing typologies of such regimes: Almond and Powell's (1966) distinction of conservative, modernizing, and premobilized authoritarian systems, of which respectively Spain, Brazil, and Ghana would be examples, and the many inchoate typologies in the chapters of Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (1970) in their analysis of the dynamics of established one-party systems, particularly Huntington's distinction between exclusionary and revolutionary one-party systems and between revolutionary and established one-party systems. Nor should the pioneer effort of Edward Shils (1960), distinguishing tutelary democracies, modernizing oligarchies, and traditional oligarchies, be forgotten. Giovanni Sartori, in an unpublished study of political parties, with his unexcelled ability to make clear logical distinctions has differentiated the variety of party state systems, that is, noncompetitive-party systems, distinguishing one-party and hegemonic-party systems and, further down on the ladder of abstraction, totalitarian and authoritarian parties, single or hegemonic parties, and finally ideological and pragmatic parties (Sartori, 1970b). The four-fold typology of single-party ideologies of Clement Moore follows. (See Table 4.1.)

It is based on a distinction between instrumental and expressive functions, whose operationalization seems to offer certain difficulties. The distinction resulting between totalitarian and chiliastic systems is

particularly hazy, and it is not fully clear why the tutelary should be considered instrumental and the administrative expressive (Moore, 1970b).

It is, however, far from our intention to dismiss or ignore such typologies that highlight certain aspects of authoritarian regimes and that might be particularly valuable for the analysis of such regimes in the new and old states of the non-Western world or certain cultural areas like Africa south of the Sahara.

Since many authoritarian regimes have been founded by military coups and are headed by military men, it would seem that a typology distinguishing military and nonmilitary authoritarian regimes would be fruitful, distinguishing further the political nature and purpose of the military intervention in assuming power. Certainly the writers on military in politics like Finer (1962) and the many specialists on Latin America and the Middle East have made valuable contributions to our understanding of authoritarian regimes. However, a category of military authoritarian regimes would include too many, quite different regimes, as the mention of the names of Ataturk, Pétain, Franco, Perón, Nasser, Odria, Medici, and Cárdenas suggests. Military regimes, with some significant and interesting exceptions, undergo a process of civilization, if they are stable, and the military origin or military background of the head of state does not tell us enough about their nature. Military men can carry out a deep cultural revolution like Ataturk, important social and economic changes like Nasser, displace traditional regimes like they did or prevent a continuing process of change toward democracy and perhaps social revolution after a break

Table 4.1 Transformation Goals

Functions	Total	Partial
Instrumental	Totalitarian	Tutelary
	Stalinist Russian, Maoist China, Nazi Germany, "Stalinist" East Europe	Tunisia, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Ataturk's Turkey
Expressive	Chiliastic	Administrative
	Fascist Italy, Nkrumah's Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Cuba, Ben Bella's Algeria	Mexico

within tradition with a counterrevolutionary intent, like Franco. Certainly the military mentality of men at the top would give such regimes certain common features, which, however important, are not sufficient for any meaningful typology.

Scholars are likely to be confused in studying authoritarian regimes because of the frequent inauthenticity of their claims. Since the founding group or leader has no or few ideological commitments before taking power except some vague ideas about defending order, uniting the country, modernizing the nation, overthrowing a corrupt regime, or rejecting foreign influences, they find themselves without ideological justification, without ideas attractive to the intellectuals, removed from the mainstream of international ideological confrontations. In that vacuum the rulers will search for acceptable symbols and ideas to incorporate them into their *arcana imperi*. Those ideas are likely to be the ones dominant at the time and congruent within the "march of history." It is no accident that Ataturk should have chosen progressive, secularist, democratic ideas and symbols; that the Eastern European royal dictators, bureaucrats, and officers, and Franco, should have mimicked fascism; that contemporary authoritarian regimes should claim to be socialist and to introduce "democratic centralism" or "participatory democracy" and "workers' councils" rather than corporativism. No scholar should accept such claims at face value—not that the claims are irrelevant, since such initially vague commitments largely condition the international response to such regimes and influence their later development, opening certain possibilities and excluding others (Linz, 1973b). However, it would be dangerous to base our classifications on those claims. Actual policies and the operation of political institutions might be very similar despite such pseudoideological differences, and the similarity in mentality of the rulers might make possible an understanding and affinity between leaders of systems apparently dissimilar.

The ideological elements used, far from central to the understanding of such systems, would allow us to distinguish the following main types.

1. Authoritarian regimes claiming to carry out basic processes of modernization, particularly secularization and educational reforms, to create the preconditions for constitutional democracy like that of the more successful Western nations. Regimes born in the eve of World War I, like Turkey and Mexico, were committed to such a pattern, which was reflected in the institutional rules, ignored in practice, but ultimately is making possible an evolution in that direction.

2. Fascist- or semifascist-nationalist authoritarian regimes.
3. Authoritarian regimes that we shall characterize as "organic statism," attempting to link with the Catholic corporativist social doctrine mixed with fascist elements but distinct from the fascist-populist-nationalist totalitarian conceptions. Often these types of regimes that attempt to institutionalize a particular type of pluralism have been confused with fascism, and the term "clerical fascism" reflects both the bias of the observers and the ambiguity of that type of authoritarianism in the late twenties and early thirties.
4. The authoritarian regimes born in the aftermath of World War II in the newly independent states claiming to pursue a different national way toward participation, including a single party or subordinating the existing parties, characterizing their regimes as tutelary democracies, like Sukarno in Indonesia, or institutionalizing "basic democracies" in Pakistan.
5. More recently, African new nations and Islamic countries rejecting traditional religious conceptions of authority, impressed by the success of communist countries and sometimes searching for their sympathy, have claimed to be socialist, to build mass parties and to reject Western individualism for a new sense of community based on identification with the leader and the party. In the case of Islamic countries an attempt has been made to link those ideological imitations with a genuine national cultural tradition, the Islamic notion of community, sometimes fusing modern ideas with traditional religious conceptions. It is no accident that some political scientists like James Gregor should have noted some of the similarities between African socialism (and similar ideologies) and fascism in semideveloped agrarian societies in the thirties (Gregor, 1968 and 1974a).
6. Communist post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes, described by Gordon Skilling as "consultative authoritarianism, quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism, democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism and anarchic authoritarianism."

Despite the usefulness of the six types briefly delineated above, except for the sixth one, I would argue that this is not the most fruitful approach to the development of a typology of authoritarian regimes as defined above.

Toward a Typology of Authoritarian Regimes

If our definition is useful, it should also allow us to develop subtypes of such regimes. The limited pluralism, as opposed to the tendency toward monism, should lead us to typologies taking into account which institutions and groups are allowed to participate and in what way, and which ones are excluded. If rejection of mobilization along totalitarian lines or failure to achieve such mobilization distinguishes such regimes from totalitarianism, the reasons for and the nature of the limited mobilization should provide another dimension of a typology. Since mentalities in contrast to ideologies are elusive to study, that dimension, particularly due to the importance of mimicking of ideologies, should turn out in practice to be less helpful. Even when in theory it should provide important elements for typologies. (See Figure 4.1.)

The limited pluralism of authoritarian regimes takes a variety of forms, and within it different groups or institutions take a more or less preeminent place. The participation of groups in political power is

Figure 4.1   Typology of Authoritarian Regime

controlled by certain social forces and channeled through different organizational structures. On that account authoritarian regimes range from those dominated by a bureaucratic-military-technocratic elite that preexisted the regime, to a large extent, to others in which there is a privileged political participation and entry into the elite through a single or dominant party emerging from the society. In other regimes we find that a variety of social groups and institutions defined by the state are created or allowed to participate in one or another degree in the political process under the forms we shall call "organic statism," which often is ideologically described as corporatism not organic democracy. A very special case of limited pluralism is the one in which a large part of the society is excluded from organized participation in influencing major decisions on the basis of an ascriptive characteristic like race or ethnicity while other citizens enjoy the political freedoms of democracy, except insofar as advocating the inclusion into the body politic of the excluded segment of the society. We shall discuss this very special type of authoritarian regime under the paradoxical label of "racial democracies."

If we turn to the other dimension of our definition of authoritarian regimes—the limited participation, the controlled participation, the tendency toward political apathy of most citizens and the toleration or encouragement of such apathy—we find that in bureaucratic-military-technocratic regimes there are few, if any, channels for participation of the mass of the citizens and that the rulers have no particular interest in even manipulated participation. On the other hand we have regimes that attempt to mobilize the citizens to participate in well-defined, more or less monopolistic channels created by the political leadership, most characteristically through a mobilization of single or dominant party and its dependent mass and functional organizations. Insofar as such a single party is not conceived to exclude other organizations and institutions from a limited political pluralism and does not thoroughly penetrate them, we are dealing with an authoritarian regime. Such regimes would then be characterized as mobilizational authoritarian regimes and in this respect would be different from both bureaucratic-military-technocratic regimes and those we have labeled organic statism. They would also be different from the much freer political pluralism within the privileged racial community of the racial democracies.

Taking into account the circumstances under which such relatively mobilizational authoritarian regimes have appeared historically, we have two main types. In the first type the mobilizational single party or

dominant party has emerged from the society in the course of the struggle for independence from foreign domination and has established in the process of taking power a dominant position, which it will protect from any competitors that might emerge either by outlawing the political freedoms that would lead to the emergence of other parties or by co-opting or even corrupting the leaders of such potential competitors. Initially such regimes are based on a considerable mobilization and, under conditions different from those of postcolonial underdeveloped societies, could move in a totalitarian direction but, for reasons to be analyzed later, become authoritarian regimes in which the originally mobilizational party becomes one important component in the structure of power. The second main type of mobilizational authoritarian regimes can be found in postdemocratic societies, in which a purely bureaucratic-military rule or one based on the representation of a well-defined, limited number of social groups and institutional interests in organic statism is not feasible because of the expectation of a large part of the society of some form of opportunity for participation for the average citizen. In addition, such regimes emerge when the struggle to exclude from the political process particular sectors of the society, to destroy the organizations of those sectors, has required something more than a coup d'état, when a mobilization was necessary to proceed with the exclusion of those sectors by the creation of a mass party, a variety of mass organizations, and even coercive organizations beyond the bureaucratic structures of the police or any army. This kind of exclusionary mobilizational authoritarian regime in postdemocratic societies was one of the outcomes of the fascist mobilization of a variety of interests and ideological and emotional commitments among the citizens of the democracies in crisis in the Europe of the interwar years. To the extent that such mobilizational authoritarian parties and movements aimed at a totalitarian monopoly of power and *Gleichschaltung* of a variety of social groups, interests, and organizations and a total political neutralization of others like the churches and armed forces, but did not succeed in so doing, we can speak of defective or arrested totalitarian systems. Since the process of establishing a truly totalitarian system is not achieved the day of takeover of power, we can also characterize as an authoritarian situation the pretotalitarian phases of certain political systems.

Finally, the way in which the limited pluralism in certain political systems emerges after a period of totalitarian rule leads us to speak of the post-totalitarian societies as a very distinct type. In such systems the dominant position of the party has not fully disappeared. The limited

pluralism of other institutions, groups, and interests that share or influence political power is to a large extent emerging out of the social and political structure created by the new regime rather than from the preexisting society, politics, and history. To the extent that these groups are not simply parts of the single-party, controlled political structure and that the competition for power among them is not simply the result of bureaucratic or factional infighting within the elites and the institutions of the system but links with broader segments of the society, we are dealing with post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes. However, the legacy of organizational patterns, political culture, and memories of the past of the totalitarian period makes such regimes distinct from those listed before.

It would be surprising if the types we have derived from our analysis of the nature of the limited pluralism and the degree and type of participation or apathy would not also have some affinity with different ways of articulating ideas to legitimize the system. Certainly such ideas are least articulated intellectually in the case of the bureaucratic-military rule; it is in those cases that we can speak mostly of mentalities of the rulers and should pay least attention to the ideological formulations offered, which are likely to be simple and often derivative. In contrast, the mobilization of authoritarian regimes, particularly when they assign an important role to the single or dominant party and attempt to encourage the participation of at least a certain number of citizens in that party, is likely to rely on ideological formulations. Those ideological formulations, while they do not play a role comparable to the role of ideology in totalitarian systems, are an important factor in the political process. However, it is their relative lack of articulation and complexity and often their derivative character that contribute to the relatively rapid decay of the mobilizational component, that is, of the role of the party and of mass participation. This process was particularly visible in many of the African one-party states, that initially appeared as regimes based on an ideology and moving in a direction that would have placed them closer to the totalitarian systems that some of their leaders might have thought as a model. The outcome has been obviously to bring many mobilizational authoritarian regimes closer to either the bureaucratic-military type or the organic-statism type. Only in the mobilizational-postdemocratic-exclusionary authoritarian regimes in Western societies with a fascist party that had become an important political force before taking power did ideology remain an important independent factor that could not be fully reduced to what

we have described as mentality. This is even truer for the post-totalitarian systems, for those we have called defective or arrested totalitarianism systems, and the pretotalitarianism phase of some regimes.

In the following pages, therefore, we will describe in some detail the characteristics of a variety of types of authoritarian regimes, the conditions for their emergence, some of the consequences of the political processes, and the lives of citizens of those types. Let us note here that they have not been logically derived from the dimensions of our concept of authoritarian regimes, but derived largely inductively from an extensive descriptive literature on such regimes, which did not offer a comparative typological conceptualization. We feel, however, that the types inductively derived fit our definition of authoritarian regimes and that the salient differences used to characterize them are found along the dimensions of the definition.

Congruently with our emphasis on the relatively well defined boundary between nondemocratic and democratic systems, in terms of our definition, only those systems we have conceptualized as racial or ethnic democracies could at one point or another have been considered democratic, that is, as long as they did not need to use considerably repressive force to prevent the excluded racial group from demanding participation and do not increasingly have to do so with the members of the privileged racial community who would advocate such an extension of political rights. On the other hand, the boundary between authoritarian regimes and those approaching the ideal type of a totalitarian system is much more difficult to operationalize. This fact is reflected in the need we felt to describe as types of authoritarian regimes posttotalitarian political systems, the defective or arrested totalitarian regimes, and the pretotalitarian phases of another set of regimes.

To some extent the bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes, which have developed neither a more complex institutionalization of the limited pluralism in the form of organic statism or a single party contributing to the recruitment of the top-level elite serving as an instrument of control and as a channel for participation of citizens so motivated, are in some ways the paradigmatic authoritarian regimes. They are those furthest removed from any similarity to democratic political systems but also from modern totalitarianism. The question might be raised: Which of the other types more closely approach the model of democratic politics? In some respects it might be argued that the opportunities for participation in political life and through it access to positions of power in mobilizational authoritarian regimes bring those

closer to the ideal type of democratic politics. On the other hand such mobilizational organizations like the single party and the various mass organizations controlled by it are an obstacle for the survival and political influence of the pluralism in the society, and to that extent will run counter to the freedom of organization for social and political purposes that characterizes democratic policies in societies. On the other hand, organic statism, by institutionalizing, even when in a controlled form, the existing social pluralism and incorporating it into the political process without creating or granting a monopoly to a single political organization, is closer to the social pluralism that develops spontaneously within a free society but at the cost of broader opportunities for participation of average citizens in contrast to various elites. In this respect organic statism is further removed from the idea of citizen participation than are the more mobilizational regimes. On one or another count both mobilizational authoritarian regimes and organic statist regimes are therefore clearly distinct from democratic regimes and societies. Even more difficult to answer is the question to what extent either of these types has potential to transform itself into a competitive democracy. It could be argued that the organic statism leaves more freedom for the articulation of specific interests and more autonomy to institutions, makes less effort to politicize in a particular direction the mass of the citizens, and therefore creates a society that is better prepared to accept the unlimited pluralism, the multiple and conflicting leadership of democratic politics. However, within the framework of organic statism, the privileges granted to the recognized organizations and institutions are likely to lead their leadership to perceive the opportunities for political mobilization of citizens through political parties as particularly threatening and therefore to cling to the authoritarian framework to defend them. In contrast, a mobilizational authoritarian regime, if it feels that the single or dominant party has penetrated the society sufficiently to be assured, even in a more competitive framework created by the extension of political freedom of its dominant position might be tempted to explore the possibility of retaining its power within such a framework. In fact, an initial chance of retaining its dominant position might encourage, given the legitimacy of competitive democracy, a slow transformation in that direction. In the long run or by a miscalculation such a move could ultimately lead to the installation of competitive democracy. A mobilizational authoritarian regime also retains institutionally and ideologically the principle of direct participation of individual citizens in the political process, a

principle that is essential to competitive democracies. In view of this we can understand that the Turkey of Ataturk, in which a bureaucratic-military regime had become a single-party, moderately mobilizational authoritarian regime, could transform itself after World War II into a competitive democracy. The same would be true to some extent for the transformation of Estado Novo in Brazil into a populist democracy in which the elites of the preceding authoritarian regime could continue playing an important role. Mexico would be another case in point.

Some observers have placed considerable hope on the development of internal democracy within single parties in mobilizational authoritarian regimes and particularly in post-totalitarian regimes. We feel that the possibilities of transformation into competitive democracies of such regimes are more dubious than those observers have thought, since ultimately that participation through the single dominant party assumes a commitment to the party, its program and ideology, and the exclusion of any opportunity for alternative competing political conceptions that would be a requisite for competitive politics and that could always be rejected on the basis that there are opportunities for political participation within the boundaries of the party and its mass organizations.

Unfortunately we cannot develop at any length, with the information available and the space given to us, an analysis of the many regimes that are on the borderlines between the ideal types we have described. Many of the regimes combine in a more or less planned or accidental way elements from the different types, giving more or less importance to one or another in different phases of their history. It would seem that many authoritarian regimes are established as bureaucratic-military but after consolidating themselves in power explore the other alternatives and attempt with more or less success to transform themselves into organic-statist regimes and, generally unsuccessfully, into mobilizational regimes. On the other side many regimes that start as mobilizational authoritarian, either postindependence or postdemocratic, seem to drift into a combination of bureaucratic and organic statism, when they are not overthrown by a combination of military and bureaucratic power that soon rules with the help of technocratic elites and attempts to institutionalize some degree of organic statism. Each phase in the development of authoritarian regimes, from their emergence of the preauthoritarian society, their installation, their search for legitimate models to imitate, their hesitant efforts of institutionalization, is likely to leave an imprint on the system. Authoritarian regimes in reality, therefore, are likely to be complex systems characterized by

heterogeneity of models influencing their institutionalization, often contradictory models in uneasy coexistence. It is this that accounts for the difficulty to subsume particular regimes under the types we shall describe here. Certainly many of the regimes, being nondemocratic, at one or another point in time would be closer to one or another of the types described. This fact is to some extent neglected in our emphasis on the analysis of the developmental aspect, the genesis of such regimes, and their location on a particular point in time in relationship to the preceding or subsequent regime. It is no accident that years after having been established such regimes are still, in the view of their rulers, in a constituent stage, that constitutional law after constitutional law is being enacted, and that the political edifice remains unfinished for a long time, giving hope to a variety of political forces of building it according to their particular blueprints. Paradoxically, democratic regimes seem to have a shorter period of constitution making, which prejudges in many, often unexpected, ways the future development of the regime. Paradoxically, the phase of installation of a new democracy offers to the democratic elites the temptation to use their power to constitutionalize their political preferences, with the result that social forces weak at that point in their organization in competing for political power might later be placed in the situation of having to challenge the constitutional order using the freedoms that democracy grants them. The rationalistic streak in Jacobinic democracy in this respect contrasts with the often very pragmatic way of creating political institutions in authoritarian regimes. Perhaps here we might find one of the clues to the relative stability of many authoritarian regimes despite considerable change in the regime and the instability of newly established democracies in the same societies.

Our effort to conceptualize and understand the variety of authoritarian regimes—strictly defined—encounters considerable difficulties due to the tendency to study political systems, outside of both the Western democratic world and communist systems, within the framework of geographic cultural areas like Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa rather than using analytical categories.[43] On the other hand, the tendency of scholars to group the Eastern European communist countries for comparative analysis and to specialize in the study of communist politics has led them to ignore potential comparisons with noncommunist authoritarian regimes.[44] Similarly, the dominant attention to Nazi Germany in the study of interwar fascist Europe has led to the neglect of the authoritarian regimes of the twenties and

thirties as a distinct type of polities, leaving us mainly with excellent historical accounts but few systematic studies. In that context the neglect of Portugal, the most long-lived authoritarian regime in a Western society, is striking.[45] On the other hand, the analysis of many authoritarian regimes has been limited by the perspective introduced by a one-sided emphasis on the origins of such regimes as cases of military intervention in politics without further analysis of their functioning after having been established by a coup. The lack of a broader comparative perspective has been particularly damaging in the case of Latin America, where a regional grouping on the basis of certain cultural, historical, and international politics has prevented scholars from potentially fruitful comparisons with Latin-European politics, for example, the comparable economic and social development of some of the more advanced Latin American countries and those of Europe and the important ideological influences coming from Europe.

More recently the overemphasis on sociological categories, very often based on relatively simple indicators of economic development, and even more recently simplified Marxist analyses have led to a neglect of the most distinctively political variables in the study of many political systems of the Third World. The same is true for the emphasis in the literature on grand theories of political development or modernization, often at a high level of abstraction, which do not build bridges between the descriptive case studies and empirical comparative research, focusing on particular variables and their interrelationships. Lately the quantitative global studies based on the data, of dubious quality for these types of political systems and societies, accumulated in the data banks have tended to ignore the differences between types of political systems by treating them all on a single continuum of social-economic development, political development, and democratization used in a very loose sense of the term, leading to findings of specious scientific accuracy.

These various intellectual perspectives certainly have not encouraged scholars to undertake systematic comparative studies of a limited number of political systems with middle-range theoretical problems, or paired comparisons, or the systematic collection of hard data for comparisons.

We would argue that such a middle-range comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes in different cultural and geographic areas and under the influence of different ideological systems should allow the scholar to identify more clearly the distinctive impact of cultural traditions as well

as of ideological models rather than attributing to both or either of them patterns that might be found in a great variety of systems where those variables might not be present.

Obviously there is considerable overlap between the study of authoritarian regimes and of the processes of political development, particularly in the so-called Third World of economically underdeveloped societies and new states, since so many of them are neither competitive democracies nor communist totalitarian systems. Since there is a chapter in the [original] *Handbook* (Chapter 1) devoted to political development, we have deliberately neglected this fruitful perspective.

1. Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarian regimes in which a coalition predominated by but not exclusively controlled by army officers and bureaucrats establishes control of government and excludes or includes other groups without commitment to specific ideology, acts pragmatically within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality, and neither creates nor allows a mass single party to play a dominant role are the most frequent subtype. They may operate without the existence of any parties, but more frequent is the creation of an official government-sponsored single party, which, rather than aiming at a controlled mobilization of the population, tends to reduce its participation in political life even in a manipulated form—to use the fortunate expression of Schmitter (1974), "to occupy political space." In quite a few cases such regimes allow a multiparty system but make sure that the elections do not offer an opportunity for a free competition for popular support, even among the limited range of parties allowed, and attempt by a variety of manipulations, going from cooptation and corruption to repression, to assure the collaboration, subservience, or ineffectiveness of such parties (Janos, 1970a).

In the more polemic literature such regimes tend to be labeled fascist, particularly since in the years between the two World Wars they adopted some fascist slogans, symbols, and style elements and when possible co-opted some of the more opportunist elements of the fascist movements in their countries. Some countries in Eastern Europe were led by geographical and foreign-policy imperatives to align with the Axis powers, who often preferred them to more sincere, and therefore nationalist, fascist movements like the Iron Guard in Rumania. The essentially pragmatic character of such regimes allowed some of them to be allied with the Western democracies against their rising fascist neighbors (Seton-Watson, 1967). The prominent role of the army as a

supporter of the regime and the fact that many officers played an important role in those regimes in which the army as an institution did not assume power lead other authors to describe them as military dictatorships. Some of them were born as military dictatorships, and the military continued in a few of them to play the dominant role, but it would be a mistake to ignore the much more complex political structure and the important role of civilian leaders, mainly higher civil servants but also professionals and experts as well as politicians of the precoup parties, in such regimes (Janos, 1970a; Roberts, 1951; Tomasevich, 1955; Cohen, 1973; Macartney, 1962). In many of them traditional institutions like the monarchy and to a much lesser extent the Church, or premodern social structures like large landowners, aristocratic or bourgeois, played an important role, but it would be a mistake to describe such systems as traditional. To start with, the traditional legitimacy of the monarchy in the countries with such regimes with a few exceptions was and is relatively weak (Clogg and Yannopoulos, 1972). In a number of them it had been established only a few generations back and the kings came from an alien royal house. In one case, that of Iran, the dynasty has been established by a successful general after a coup. It is very doubtful that in most of these regimes any significant sector of the population gave its allegiance to such rule, on account of the sacredness of tradition, of a belief in the divine right of kings, or strong loyalty to a dynasty like that of feudal retainers. Even the traditional social structures like the aristocratic landholders were often more the beneficiaries of the rule of more modern elites recruited from other social strata, who generally exercised political power and often attacked some of the symbolic privileges of the traditional ruling strata that often saw their power limited to the rural communities. In the typology proposed by Edward Shils, and let us not forget it, formulated mainly for non-Western developing nations, such regimes would logically fall into the category of traditional oligarchies. While the borderline between the type of regime we are describing and the more traditional oligarchies and the purely traditional political systems is somewhat difficult to define, it should not be forgotten that a large number of the powerful leaders of such regimes do not come from the families of the traditional oligarchy and have no strong ties with them. Their policies, while not attacking seriously the privileges of the traditional oligarchy, serve a much greater variety of social groups.

In terms of the Weberian types of legitimacy, such regimes tend to be very mixed. Very few of their supporters think of the man heading the government, or of the single party, as a unique personality endowed

with a mission and as having a personal attraction that would deserve the label of charismatic leadership. More often than not the personalities at the head of the government are, in their own style, their own conception of their task, and in the appeal they have to their supporters, acharismatic if not the opposite from charismatic, or sometimes pseudocharismatic. While we find many features in the exercise of their rule that we could call patrimonial or characteristics of a patrimonial bureaucracy, the element of traditional legitimacy is too weak to fall into the pure type of traditional authority in the Weberian sense. Redefined in the sense of personal rulership, as has been done in the work of Guenther Roth, quite a few would fit that characterization. Despite the many arbitrary elements in the exercise of authority not only in relationship to an illegal opposition or just opponents and critics of the system, such regimes made and make a considerable effort to operate within a legalistic framework: enacting constitutions modeled after the Western liberal democratic type, holding on as long as possible to pseudoconstitutional parliamentary forms, using and abusing legal procedures and the courts, and above all demanding obedience from civil servants and officers not on the ground of an identification with their policies, programs, or charisma but on the basis of legal authority. This legalism, congruent with the training of many of those holding power—civil servants and politicians of a previous, more liberal democratic period—often leads to odd contradictions in such regimes. It assures surprising areas of individual freedom but also accounts for some of the more outrageous misuses of power, like political assassination, the execution of opponents while "attempting to escape" (rather than after a trial or, like in totalitarian systems, a show trial), and the use of private violence with the connivance of the authorities. Rather than "revolutionary legality," we find the distortion or perversion of legality.

In the typology offered by Shils these regimes would sometimes, if we were to trust some of their programmatic statements, appear as tutelary democracies. But probably the majority would fit the type of modernizing oligarchies that he proposes, particularly when they make their appearance in preindustrial societies with a low development of the urban bureaucratic, professional, and commercial middle classes. In other cases it would be misleading to speak of modernizing except in a relative sense. Certainly some of the men who take control of such systems are higher civil servants, quite often experts in fiscal matters, committed to tax reforms, a certain degree of government intervention in the economy, and encouragement of industrialization without, however,

creating a large-scale public sector (Janos, 1970a, pp. 212–16). Their policies are pragmatic and responsive to business cycles and the international economic system and therefore are likely to use a variety of measures often not too dissimilar from those of countries with other political systems.

Such regimes have appeared in societies that had an incipient industrialization and not highly modernized agriculture and consequently had a large rural population, generally of poor peasants and/or farm laborers or tenants. They have appeared in those societies that, despite their now low level of economic development, generally were characterized by considerable urbanization, particularly in a capital city, by an expansion of education beyond what we could expect in terms of economic development, and therefore by the growth of a stratum of middle-class professionals seeking government employment or dependent directly or indirectly on government activities, a stratum in which we would find both intelligent upwardly mobile persons and others who were downwardly mobile trying to hold on to their social status. While other social groups might have been the beneficiaries of the policies of such regimes, particularly some of the wealthier rural strata or the few well-connected business sectors, the main support for the regime and the recruiting ground for the elites of the system were found largely in what the students of Eastern European societies like Seton-Watson (1967) called state bourgeoisie and Linz and De Miguel (1966a) in the study of Spanish society have called *clases medias,* in contrast to bourgeoisie with its connotation of a stratum linked with a modern economy. The middle-class coup of José Nun (1968) would also fit to some degree into this model.

Politically such regimes made their appearance in societies in which liberal democratic institutions, particularly parliamentary institutions, had been introduced but no true party system attracting the loyalties of the population had emerged and/or the parties were unable to produce stable governments. The incapacity of the parties to mobilize democratically the population outside of a few urban centers reflected the persistence of landlord power in some parts of the country, the low level of education of the masses, and clientelistic politics at the local level. However, in contrast to the nineteenth century, they had been sufficiently mobilized to create a threat to a system of traditional oligarchic rule through parties of notables.

In Eastern Europe the peasant parties that emerged as powerful political movements after World War I, stimulated by mobilization in the war, the hopes and results of agrarian reform, the expansion of suffrage, the self-consciousness of the peasantry when confronted with what

they perceived as the wickedness of urban life particularly of a bour-
geoisie oriented toward foreign life styles, appeared as a threat to the
crown, the old liberal political oligarchies tied with landlords, fi-
nanciers, large merchants, and a few industrialists. In some cases (like
Croatia) such parties also threatened the state-supporting ethnic-cul-
tural community (like the Serbs). The leaders of the peasant parties,
when confronted with the world depression and its impact on the farm-
ers, could not find satisfactory solutions. Their support failed, and in
some cases more aggressive fascist movements competed for their con-
stituency and contributed with their violence to the crisis atmosphere.
The bind of agricultural countries in the process of industrialization in
relation to advanced industrial nations created unsolvable problems
(Roberts, 1951). The moral intransigence of peasantist leaders did not
contribute to consensual solutions. The outcomes were the royal dicta-
torships and an alternation between elections allowing participation of
all parties but assuming the victory of some, the outlawing of some and
toleration for others, and sometimes the creation of a single national
party with the participation of many politicians of the old parties and
some co-opted from the opposition parties, peasantist or fascist. Ulti-
mately the tensions led to military takeovers, in the case of Rumania
first incorporating the Iron Guard and later brutally suppressing it.

In the more economically, socially, and culturally advanced soci-
eties the dislocations produced by war and/or the model of foreign
revolutions created pockets of protest and in crisis moments revolution-
ary attempts condemned to failure or waves of terrorism and counter-
terrorism. The experience of a revolutionary threat gave to many of the
systems a strong counterrevolutionary and reactionary character.

The purpose of such regimes is to exclude from independent, un-
controlled opportunities to participate in power and to organize to that
effect the masses demanding a greater share in the goods of the society,
particularly workers, farm laborers and underprivileged peasants, and
sometimes religious, ethnic, or cultural minorities. Such systems allow
more or less pluralism within other sectors of society and assure a
prominent role to the military and the bureaucrats capable of enforc-
ing that exclusion and implementing policies that will prevent the ex-
cluded strata from exasperation. In that process they are unlikely to in-
troduce major structural changes in the society, but often they will also
limit the power, organizational capacity, and autonomy of privileged
elites: business, professional groups, foreign capitalists, even the

churches, and in rare cases the army. Some quotations of a study by Manuel Lucena (1971) of the Portuguese regime selected by Philippe Schmitter (1973a) reflect the ambivalent relation of such systems, even of one of the most conservative and least "populistic" ones, with the class and economic structure. He writes, for example:

> The State, in the course of this (evolutionary) process, dealt with capitalists with a velvet but heavy hand. Using capitalism it remained ahead (but not brilliantly) of most capitalists. It assisted the most powerful, but it also obstructed them. It captured all of them, large and small in the thickest of regulatory nets. Finally, it is itself, a large entrepreneur, against the wishes of its founder, but in agreement with the imperative laws of the economic system. . . . One must never forget that, especially in its beginnings, this (corporatist) system was a creature of the State. It was not created by the dominant class which had to be carefully reassured. . . . Portuguese corporatism controls the sphere of labor without, however, obeying that of capital. It is the State which created *de toutes pieces* their forced agreement which benefited capital. The latter had neither unity nor clear ideas. And, it does not always show itself properly appreciative. . . . The New State has been the avant garde of a bourgeoisie that did not support it. (Lucena, 1971, pp. 56, 75bis, 126, 292)

Such regimes generally emerge after a period of liberal democracy has allowed a more or less high level of mobilization of the underprivileged strata. They will vary in the degree of autonomy they are ready to grant the more privileged, in social economic terms, strata, in view of the threat that dominance of those strata might represent for those who have assumed the task of protecting the regime and themselves from the revolutionary radical claims of the underprivileged. Depending upon the strength of the regime, traditional notables would be allowed a share in power. Economic development will determine to what extent those controlling the means of production will be allowed a place in the coalition or dominant influence. The degree of preauthoritarian regime mobilization of the underprivileged will largely determine the degree to which those committed to the maintenance of the system—bureaucrats and military—will play a dominant role and the extent to which they will attempt to incorporate them through controlled organizations for the underprivileged, official trade unions, corporative organizations, or populist or fascist-type parties. We will discuss those types of authoritarian regimes later. Despite their initially

reactionary purpose and the conservative character of many of their supporters, they are not unlikely to engage in social welfare and economic development policies, thereby often threatening or limiting the interests of the economically privileged and powerful. As Philippe Schmitter has shown in his use of the Bonapartist model as developed by Marx, such authoritarian regimes can go far in making the state itself completely independent and breaking the political power of the middle class, daily anew, protecting at the same time the material power of those strata.[46] Obviously, where there is a politically unmobilized or secure and contented peasantry, such a stratum provides much support to such regimes. The limits imposed on the economically privileged strata and the obstacles placed on the free articulation of the interests of most of the middle class, particularly its intellectually most sophisticated sectors and sometimes including sectors of the bureaucracy and the army, lead to the paradox that such regimes are more threatened in their stability by the strata that brought them to power and that largely benefit of their rule than by those excluded from the limited pluralism.

Another problem that many of the liberal democratic regimes had been unable to solve were the deep-seated ethnic and nationality cleavages, particularly in Eastern Europe, where every country had its irredenta abroad and its more or less oppressed minorities at home, sometimes loyal to a neighboring country. Such nationality conflicts reinforced chauvinistic nationalism and the political role of the army. As Janos (1970a) and Nagy-Talavera (1970) have shown, the social position of the Jews in a number of Eastern European societies, particularly their overrepresentation among those with university education in societies with large-scale intellectual unemployment, created strong feelings of anti-Semitism. The important role of the Jews in the financial and business elite in some of the countries contributed to the popular anti-Semitism, while on the other hand it favored secret coalitions that corrupted political life.

It is no accident that in Hungary and Rumania the true fascist movements, with a populist ideology attempting a mobilization of the masses and succeeding like the Arrow Cross in gaining the support of many workers in Budapest and the Iron Guard mobilizing peasants of the least developed areas of Rumania, should have been the most active and dangerous opposition movements to those bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. The fact that in both Hungary and Rumania some of the more dispossessed social groups had not become identified with a Marxist protest movement before the establishment of an authoritarian

regime allowed the fascists to appeal to them, something they could not do in some of the more socially and economically advanced and integrated countries, like Spain. Therefore, the co-optation of fascism into the authoritarian regime depended more on the external situation, its own weakness, and a desire to share in power rather than to present the oligarchic structure with the challenge of a national fascist revolution. It is no accident either that some of the fascist leaders would come from an ethnically marginal background and that some of the fascist movements would be appealing to nationalities that were not part of the ruling oligarchical authoritarian elite, like the Croats in Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.

Andrew Janos has very well summarized some of the factors that account for

> the survival of pluralism in the face of totalitarian tendencies inherent in the ideology of the single party. If and when revolutionary movements seize power in an insufficiently mobilized society, or in a society in which the commitments of the mobilized strata of the population are sharply divided, the new elite may be forced to seek at least temporary accommodations with autonomous groups and organizations. Thus the emerging one party state will often be totalitarian in ideology and form, but not in reality. On the other hand, the precepts of the revolutionary ideology will militate against bargaining, compromise and reconciliation, and the development of institutional mechanisms for the resolution of conflict. In such political contexts (the term "system" appears to be inappropriate here) tensions between ideology and structure will produce considerable randomness in the political process and may result in recurrent attempts by competing groups to eliminate one another from the political scene. These types of party state are pluralistic *de facto* but not by custom or by explicit agreement. This is pluralism by default and not by design. If one may borrow a term from the vocabulary of administrative theory, they are neither pluralistic nor monolithic but "prismatic." By definition these prismatic configurations of political forces are unstable and they best be conceived of as representing a transitional stage in the process of political change. The prismatic condition of a polity may lead to full-fledged totalitarianism, intraparty institutionalization, a multiparty system, or further and complete disintegration, to mention only some of the possible alternatives. (Janos, 1970a, p. 233)

As we will see later, in more complex societies, with higher levels of social mobilization, a Catholic intellectual tradition, and less concern about complex links between foreign and internal policy, stabilized military-bureaucratic authoritarian regimes moved further in their

institutionalization, in the explicit break with liberal-democratic constitutional forms, and in the incorporation of the old political elite. Some opted for various mixes between what we shall call organic statism and experimentation with mobilizational single parties of fascist inspiration. This was the case of Spain in 1926, Portugal in the early thirties, Austria in 1934, Brazil under Vargas, 1937–1945, and Spain under Franco.[47]

The victory of the allied powers in World War II provided countries faced with the task of nation building and the crisis of modernization with two basic political models: Western competitive democracies and movement regimes after the Soviet model. Those two powerful paradigms seemed to exclude the bureaucratic authoritarian pattern developed in the interwar years in the then new nations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Initially only Portugal appeared as the survival of the bureaucratic authoritarian reactions to the failure of democracy in interwar Europe. The defeat of fascism had discredited any mobilizational single-party authoritarian regime not based on the model of the Communist vanguard party. Certainly the Franco regime,[48] with its mixture of bureaucratic authoritarianism with weakened fascist-single-party-mobilizational elements and the later (1942) developments of organic statism, survived ostracism by the United Nations. Argentine nationalism, reacting to foreign pressures and to the opportunities created by a new working class emerging from industrialization due to wartime import substitution, led to the transformation of a military-oligarchic regime into a populist authoritarianism with some fascist components in the form of Peronism. That model was not without attractiveness to young Latin Americans dissatisfied with unsuccessful or oligarchic democracies, but for some time political scientists could predict that with economic development, social and cultural modernization, the professionalization of traditional armies, and the shift of the Church from a democratic corporativism to Christian democracy, the countries of the Western hemisphere would move toward competitive democracy. The successful transfer of democratic institutions in India led those unaware of the long and complex historical process leading to the creation of Indian political institutions by the Congress party (after all, the party was founded in 1885 and participated in representative semisovereign institutions since 1937) to hope for a similar transfer in the other areas being decolonized by Britain. The initial deviations from that transfer model were sometimes interpreted as transitional stages that would ultimately prepare society for democracy as tutelary democracies. However,

two decades later those hopes would be shattered in a few places by a successful revolution, like in Cuba, or by a combination of a national struggle for independence and social revolution, first in China and particularly in North Vietnam, and by the attempt to create mobilizational single-party regimes in Africa and Arab countries.

More unexpectedly, the optimistic model of social-economic developments increasing political pluralization and as a result of it the likelihood of political democracy was to be disproved in two of the most advanced Latin American countries. Guillermo O'Donnell (1973), building on the earlier work of Stepan (1971, 1973) on Brazil, on the basis of a case study of Argentina in recent decades has advanced an alternative model linking a higher state of economic and social development with the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism aimed at excluding activated popular sectors, particularly urban working classes, on the basis of the coalition between a new type of military elite—the incumbents of technocratic roles in the public and private sectors, in the more dynamic and efficient sectors—with the support of social strata threatened by mobilization. As Stepan has shown, technocratic roles in the military, the bureaucracy, and the modern enterprises share a common view of the requirements for development, particularly the need to exclude and deactivate the popular sector, and have international linkages with similar elites in advanced industrial societies, which have led them to a favorable assessment of their combined social-problem-solving capabilities and to a greater control of crucial sectors of their societies. Their emerging coup coalition will aim at reshaping the social context in ways envisioned as more favorable for the application of technocratic expertise and for the expansion of the influence of social sectors that they have most densely penetrated as a result of modernization.

O'Donnell notes with some hesitation the similarities between this model and that of the developing societies on the periphery of the industrial heartland of Europe in the interwar years, but the relative weight of the experts, technocrats, and new managers, with their emphasis on development rather than economic stability and protectionism, would suggest some important differences. They might be characterized as military-technocratic-bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in contrast to the more bureaucratic-military-oligarchical authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe. There are other differences not stressed by O'Donnell but worth notice, like the absence in the former type of regime of even a weak monarchical legitimacy capable of shifts in

policy in crisis situations (particularly as in Rumania and Yugoslavia, but also Spain under Primo de Rivera). Another difference is the absence of nationality, linguistic, and cultural conflicts, which both strengthened and weakened Eastern European and Balkan authoritarian regimes. However, in our view a basic difference is the absence of fascist coalition partners or models to mimic that on occasion gave a legitimacy to those regimes among intellectuals, students, and youth. The crisis of Catholic corporativist ideology compounds the problem of institutionalization of the new bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Both authoritarian responses share the fear of revolution from below, stimulated by radicalized intellectuals, a fear that was stimulated in Europe by the Russian and Hungarian communist revolutions, the peasant populist mobilization in Bulgaria, and isolated revolutionary or pseudorevolutionary outbreaks in other European countries. In Latin America in the mid-60s the Cuban Revolution and the minor efforts of guerrilla or peasant mobilization stimulated by it, particularly by Che Guevara, contributed to that fear. More realistically, important segments of the more advanced Latin American societies were concerned about the pressures coming from a popular sector, initially mobilized from above by preceding populist authoritarian regimes that had created organized forces like trade unions and parties linked with them capable of expressing their demands in democratic or quasidemocratic political systems after the fall of the Estado Novo and Peronism. In our view O'Donnell neglects to emphasize the impossibility of controlled mobilization by modernizing elites after fascism had been discredited and in societies in which populist authoritarian regimes had (perhaps incorporating fascist elements) achieved a nationalistic, more or less antioligarchical mobilization. The demobilization of those forces required coercion, like in Brazil, or produced an unstable authoritarian regime, like in Argentina, where the costs of coercion as well as those of an open society seemed too high, leading to a constant experimenting between exclusion and co-optation, particularly in the quasi-democratic stage that preceded the coup by General Onganía in 1966 and that was resumed in the last stages of bureaucratic military rule before the recent election that brought the Peronistas to power.

O'Donnell has described at length and documented carefully the structural constraints at a particular level of economic development in the specific Latin American international economic-dependency relation and their social consequences that lead to an unsolvable problem and what he calls (following Apter) a "ceiling effect," which seems to

leave no other way out than bureaucratic authoritarianism. We cannot summarize here his dynamic model in all its richness, which can serve as an example of how the analysis of the conditions and processes leading to the emergence of authoritarian regimes should be done, combining economic, sociological, and political analysis. Nor can we present his comparative analysis of the conditions contributing to the instability of that solution in the Argentine case and its temporal stability and success in Brazil. Space also excludes an analysis based on the work of Alfred Stepan (1973) of the factors accounting for the different types of authoritarian institutionalization achieved by the military that took over power in Brazil in 1964 and in Peru in 1968. Their analyses, those by a distinguished group of Brazilian scholars, and the recent study by John S. Fitch III (1973) of the variety of patterns of military intervention in Ecuador have advanced our knowledge of the conditions leading to authoritarian regimes under the leadership of the army far beyond the traditional literature, with its liberal perspective of "generals versus presidents," and beyond the cultural-historical interpretations of Latin American politics. The model of O'Donnell tends to overemphasize the structural constraints and to underestimate the possibilities of political engineering (to pick up an idea of Giovanni Sartori, 1968). He also underestimates the possibility of responsible democratic leaders preventing the crisis situation that crystallized the coup coalition, gave it an apparent legitimacy, and broadened its initial basis of support. Alfred Stepan's brilliant analysis of the fall of Goulart (Stepan, 1971) and the comparison with several crises preceding it that did not lead to a change of regime is complementary and in part corrective of the macropolitical, social, and economic model of O'Donnell.

A sophisticated documented and reasoned analysis of modernization of South America, examining critically the indicators and the internal heterogeneity of societies and the degree of modernization in centers, suggests that the higher and lower levels of modernization are associated with nondemocratic political systems, while political democracies are found at the intermediate level of modernization, with the exception of Peru. Argentina and Brazil, contrary to the expectations of many analysts, have moved toward bureaucratic authoritarianism in a period that Venezuela and with some reservations Colombia moved toward democracy, while Chile, despite economic difficulties, still seemed to be holding on to its embattled democracy.

Brazil and Argentina moved in the mid-60s to exclude the already-activated urban popular sector (working class and segments of the

lower middle class) from the national political arena by refusal to meet the political demands made by the leaders of this sector and denying its leaders access to positions of political power from where they could have direct influence on national decisions. Exclusion can be achieved by direct coercion and/or by closing the electoral channels of political access. Those attempts have varying degrees of success. At one extreme the political deactivation of an excluded sector may be achieved; it becomes politically inert through destruction of its resources (especially its organizational basis). At the other extreme this deactivation might not be achieved. These countries moved from an incorporating political system that purposefully attempted to activate the popular sector and allowed it some voice in national politics in a period of populism and horizontal industrialization, to exclusion. They were countries in which the world crisis of the thirties and World War II accelerated the emergence of domestic industry and an urban working class, which changed the distribution of political power away from the nationally owned agrarian areas producing exportable goods and the largely foreign-owned network of financial and export intermediaries. The basis of that process was a broad populist coalition, led by powerful leaders like Vargas and Perón, against the old oligarchies and the highly visible foreign-owned firms mediating the international-domestic market and the traditional policies of free trade. The coalition favored industrialization and the expansion of the domestic market. Socially it meant the broadening of the functions of the state and providing employment for many middle-class, white-collar workers and technicians. Nationalism and industrialization appealed to the military, benefitted the urban workers, fostered migration to the urban centers, extended the market economy, raised consumption levels, and increased unionization and benefits for the domestic-consumption-oriented agrarian sectors. The traditional export-oriented sector, provider of international currency, lost its traditional hegemony and the government extracted a significant portion of its income to redistribute for the benefit of domestic expansion and consumption. The economic importance of exports, however, allowed this sector to retain political influence disproportionate to its decreasing share in the gross national product. Nationalistic-populist policies never went much further than recurring deprecation of the oligarchy and expropriation of the more visible symbols of foreign presence. Industrialization was horizontal or extensive, and few inroads were made into the production of intermediate and capital goods; a consequence was a heavy dependence on imports of

those goods as well as of technology. After an exhaustion of the easy stages of industrialization based on substitution for imports of finished consumer goods, import substitution proved to be an import-intensive activity in a period of erratic prices for exports that aggravated the poor productivity of the export sectors, which were paying the bill for the populist policies. This led to severe foreign exchange shortages. At the same time, Vargas and Perón encouraged workers' unionization as the basis for allegiance and to facilitate governmental control over newly incorporated segments of the popular sector. Even though union leaders were dependent on those leaders, the urban popular sector was given its first chance to have an effective weight in national politics and to bargain within the populist coalition, developing a high degree of organization. Initially all participants in the populist coalition were receiving payoffs roughly proportionate to their expectations in a period of exultation and hope for takeoff into sustained growth. However, the economic dynamics, described before, led to an end of the expansion. Horizontal industrialization left a schedule of supply, which included a disproportionate share of consumption and luxury items as well as a myriad of small producers coexisting with a few big firms, under an umbrella of minimum competition and maximum state protection. Consumption expectations consolidated, and vertical industrial projects became more dependent on capital and technology transfers from abroad and an increasing penetration of technocratic roles, which consolidated linkages of dependency with originating societies from which such roles had been transplanted. A new need for a high degree of stabilization and predictability in the social context was perceived with growing modernization. After reaching in this way the high point of modernization of their centers, new problems emerged that led to the breakdown of populist or developmentalist alliance. The need to clear the market of marginal producers, eliminating restrictions on the more technologically advanced or more capital intensive and financially powerful enterprises, combined with appeals to nationalism and preservation of the social peace, led to opposition to expert advice, stabilization plans, and the interests of more powerful producers. This issue had special significance for the military and *técnicos* in strategic points for national economic planning and decision making. In more open democratic political systems, like those that succeeded Vargas, with distributionist-populist economic policies, the electoral weight, the capacity to strike, demonstrate, and disrupt, and intensified political activation were perceived as profoundly threatening by most other social

sectors. As a result, most propertied Argentine and Brazilian sectors agreed that the popular sectors' demands were excessive, both in terms of consumption and power participation, and that capital accumulation would be impossible if they were not controlled. The class component of the polarization led to the acceptance of a political solution that supposedly would eliminate such threats, which became particularly (we might say disproportionately) salient with the spector of socialist revolution that arose with the Cuban Revolution. The changed mentality of the officer corps, as the result of antisubversive training in the United States, and the impact of French military thinking on political-warfare and civic-action doctrines led to the national-security doctrines that included socioeconomic development as a response to internal subversion. The deterioration of the income of the large salaried middle class during the years preceding the 1964 and 1966 coups led to their disaffection from a formally democratic system and their response to a law and order appeal. The popular sector, suffering from unfavorable income redistribution, engaged in increasing political activation to obtain decreasing returns. The demands-performance gap and the differentiation-integration gap led to the situation that Samuel Huntington described as "mass praetorianism" (Huntington, 1968, pp. 192–343). Political institutions, partisan parliaments, which had never been particularly strong, were further weakened and the executive became the primary focus of a flood of demands. Governments were victimized by and collaborated in "praetorianism." The situation became a stalemate, with high levels of unrestrained conflict; sharp differences in demands, the weakness of government preventing the implementation of any policy, and concern for survival in office led to sequences of policies designated to placate the more threatening political actors with little concern for general problem solving. Competition was increasingly zero-sum, gains were precarious, and the threshold for a definitive crisis was reached when most of the political actors focused on changing the rules of the political game altogether instead of trying to obtain gains within the existing rules. The existing political system had reached its ceiling.

The process of modernization in a variety of sectors had led to the emergence of technocratic roles, particularly in larger organizations of persons trained in techniques of production, planning, and control. The incumbents of those roles have expectations derived from role models of the "originating" societies. This new group has been particularly important in the discussion by Brazilian social scientists of social change,

some of whom speak of a techno-bureaucracy. Their consciousness and their expertise convince them that by molding the social context to serve their own aspirations they would at the same time improve the social situation. Potential planners and civil servants yearn for governments that will follow their advice and grant them effective decision-making power. In addition—and in this development Latin America in the sixties probably differed from the European developments in the twenties and thirties—these elites met in a new context, new business schools and advanced military schools like the *Escola Superior de Guerra* in Brazil, and new opinion-making publications emerged. As Stepan (1973) has shown, a new mentality appeared. The training of these elites emphasized technical problem solving, a rejection of emotional issues, a perception of the ambiguities of bargaining, of politics as hindrances to rational solutions, and a definition of conflict as dysfunctional. A common technical language, or jargon, facilitated communication, and the density of interaction of this group despite the small numbers led them to play a dominant role in the new coup coalition rather than, like in less modernized contexts, to withdrawal from political involvement. High confidence in their capabilities for governing led to their crucial influence in the 1964 Brazilian and the 1966 Argentine coups.

In a highly modernized context, the attempt to exclude and eventually deactivate the popular sector in the absence of the possibility of offering psychological or economic payoffs inevitably required strong and systematic coercive measures. Bureaucratic authoritarianism—eliminating political parties and elections and the political personnel sensitive to the demands of the popular sector, domesticating labor unions by co-optation, if not by coercion, and attempting to bureaucratically encapsulate most social sectors to maximize control—was the answer. Bargaining and interest representation would be limited to leaders at the top of these organizations, and spontaneous modes of demand formulation as well as dissent would have no legitimate place.

O'Donnell links his model with that offered by Barrington Moore (1967) as the third historical path toward industrialization, in addition to the bourgeois and communist revolutions, a path that involves the coalition of the public bureaucracy and the propertied sectors (including a subordinate industrial bourgeoisie) against the peasantry and an emerging proletariat. It is a conservative reaction to the strains of advancing industrialization and to a weak push toward parliamentary democracy and the entry of the masses into the political scene. Such

regimes attempt to consolidate traditional forms of domination in the rural areas and accelerate industrialization, minimizing the chances of social revolution. Incidentally, we might note that here Barrington Moore and O'Donnell converging with him coincide with the insightful analysis by Franz Borkenau (1933) of the conditions for the rise of fascism. Borkenau characteristically linked fascism with the problems of semideveloped societies reaching the point of industrialization as latecomers and therefore combining the natural tensions created by change from rural to urban society, from small to modern enterprise with its new type of discipline, with the diffusion of socialist political demands, which threatened the development of national capitalism in a way that it did not in the early industrializing societies.

After developing this general model O'Donnell analyzes the differences between Brazil and Argentina after the successful military coups, particularly the different degrees of coercion applied. For him the difference can be found in the fact that in Argentina the level of activation was higher than in Brazil, even though the rate of increase in the precoup period was lower. While in Argentina the impulse came mainly from below, with the governing Radicales not encouraging it, in Brazil the inducement for political activation came from above in the Goulart government. The Peronista allegiance was perceived by established sectors as relatively less threatening than the suggestion of socialist tendencies among Brazilian governing personnel, a perception that fostered an initially tighter degree of cohesion in the ruling coalition as well as an increase in the influence of its more *antisubversive* and *"efficientist"* members. The hostility of the Radicales in power against the Peronistas led the unions and Peronistas to welcome the 1966 coup for a short period before the policy implications of the new political system were spelled out, a factor that delayed and lessened the degree of coercion, while in the Brazilian case the initial antagonistic position of the populist sector led to a more coercive response. The result was the success in the deactivation of the popular sector in the Brazilian case and the retention of the relatively high level of political activation in the Argentine modern area and accounts for the different degree of consolidation of the two systems.

In bureaucratic authoritarian regimes the incumbents of technocratic roles tend to emphasize those aspects that their socialization has best taught them to measure and deal with. Reality may be confounded with hard data indicating performance, like growth in GNP, diminished inflation, and fewer strikes, neglecting hard-to-decode information

coming from noisier channels for the expression of popular preference and the fact that those achievements have been made at the cost of repression, income redistribution, elimination of national entrepreneurship, liquidation of political institutions, increased poverty of the urban and rural popular sectors, and alienation of intellectuals and students. However, if the indicators to which those elites are sensitive show satisfactory performance, the political rule will be easily rationalized, the assessment of their capabilities for solving problems reinforced, and the coalition consolidated. This accounts for the hardening and *continuismo* in the Brazilian system and the fact that in the Argentine case influential members of the original coalition seem willing to attempt a return to democracy in view of the blatant failure of the system using the set of indicators preferentially monitored. The coups that deposed Generals Onganía and Levingston and the election that the Peronists won after the interregnum of Lanusse are a reflection of the different success, in the opinion of the ruling elites, of the postcoup regimes in Brazil and Argentina. This does not mean that the effort of extrication of the military and the democratizing of bureaucratic authoritarian rule are assured success. Nor does the relative success in certain respects of the Brazilian military-technocratic-bureaucratic authoritarian regime imply that it has found a stable institutional form and legitimacy (Linz, 1973b). The strains caused by recent developments do not exclude the possibility that some military officers might appeal to domestic entrepreneurs and organized labor, using nationalistic pleas and promises of protectionist and more distributionist policies, in their efforts to reconstruct the political system along populist lines, even when in O'Donnell's opinion the chances for such solutions are slim.

He recognizes that his model stresses unidirectional effects, produced by socioeconomic factors on the political side, and the need for further research on the effects that political action can have on socioeconomic factors. Our feeling is that his analysis, while rightly underlining the negative political consequences of bureaucratic authoritarianism, tends to underestimate the broader social impact that success in economic development of the technocratic elite can have through a trickling-down process from the initial beneficiaries to larger population segments, and the possibility for such regimes to selectively implement welfare policies through the expansion of social security and enforced company paternalism, particularly in favor of critical urban working-class sectors, once an initial accumulation stage has been achieved. Even Marxist critics admit that this has been the case in

Spain, and survey data show that large segments of the society (except significantly in the most modern and highest-income regions) show a feeling of improvement, which, however, might result in heightened expectations and tensions at a later date but which also carries with it a change in the pattern of social and class relations.

On the basis of my analysis of the Spanish case I would argue that the problems of stabilized bureaucratic authoritarianism are likely to be derived more from its ambiguous legitimacy and the difficulties of political institutionalization than from economic constraints and their impact on the society. I would particularly emphasize that in the Western world, in the absence of an ideological single party, important elites use either the competitive liberal democracies or the dynamic single-party mobilizational regimes as ideals assuring participation of citizens. The international linkages with stable democratic advanced industrial societies, while contributing through the linkages of the technocratic elites to the emergence and/or success of those regimes, at the same time also constantly undermine their legitimacy through the critique to which they subject them and through the cultural influences that conflict with their values. While contributing to the basis of their success, they in the same process contribute to the basis for future crises; while justifying their existence on technical and economic grounds, they every day contribute to undermining their legitimacy by offering to their citizens an alternative political model and by encouraging them not to give their full allegiance to the authoritarian regime, not to give up hope for a democratic political development. Even with considerable achievements, bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in the West might not be assured the same stability as post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, partly due to the different nature of their linkage with a hegemonic power in whose sphere of influence they find themselves.

Excursus on military intervention in politics. Our analysis of authoritarian regimes with a military component could be misleading without a reference to other aspects of the military in politics. First of all, not all interventions are aimed at the creation of such regimes, nor do they all lead to their establishment. Secondly, it would be wrong to derive the motives of the officers and the circumstances leading to the overthrow of a democratic regime from the nature and politico-social functions of the regime, established with the military's help, ignoring "internal," specifically military, factors—the mentality of officers, institutional

interests, organizational problems—that shaped the military's response to the actions of political leaders. It is because of this that it often is difficult to predict the course to be followed in political, economic, and social matters by a military junta after taking power. Thirdly, we should not forget that more often than not it is the civilians who call at the barracks for support either to overthrow or defend constitutional government, and that in many societies the civilian and "democratically" enacted constitutions attribute to the military a "moderating" power that "legitimizes" their intervention. Ultimately, even weak democratic governments in crisis situations become dependent on military support. Fourthly, the role of the military in internal politics does not exhaust the topic of civilian-political-military relations, since there is the whole problem area of the role of the military in international affairs and the pressures for military and political considerations and leadership in the conduct of war, so brilliantly formulated by Clausewitz (1911; originally published 1832) which will not concern us here. Nor can we devote the attention it merits to the question of the relation between different regimes and their armed forces (Huntington, 1956, 1964), or to the complex process of extrication from power and civilization of the military after interventions in politics. All these themes would certainly deserve another chapter.

The analysis of military intervention has shifted between two perspectives: one emphasizing the characteristics of the military establishment motivating and facilitating its intervention, with little concern for the actions of other actors in the political and social system; the other emphasizing that the most important causes are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society (Fitch, 1973). There is also a difference in emphasis between those who center their attention on the level and type of social and political development and the importance of certain cultural traditions—sometimes summarized under the label of "political culture"—and those who turn to a more careful analysis of the particular historical crisis leading to a specific intervention—the process of formation of a coup coalition, the broadening of its support and neutralization of potential opponents—and the distinctive political outcome of the intervention. Others tend to ignore or dismiss the explicit justifications and pronouncements of the participants, searching for the "real" interests of the military—as a social group or as an "instrument" or "representative" of social and economic interests. Another difference found in the

literature is between those who stress the political strengths of the military and those who note their political weaknesses. In addition, the increasing importance of global political conflict—the cold war and patterns of international dependency, the links established between the military of different countries (through training, military missions, expeditionary forces, supply of weapons, diffusion of military doctrines)—leads to increased emphasis on the role of foreign influences (Einaudi, 1969; Pauker, 1963). In part those differences reflect the fact that much of the literature is centered on the role of the military in particular parts of the world or countries, but there are also differences between comparative and sometimes quantitative analyses (Schmitter, 1973a; Nordlinger, 1970; Putnam, 1967) and case studies, as well as ideological and cultural preconceptions. The scarcity of systematic, theoretically oriented empirical case studies has often led to premature generalizations. Certainly all the perspectives noted should be taken into account even when one or the other might be more fruitful in the study of particular cases.[49]

The different dimensions of the problem are also likely to be of different importance in different phases of the process: the period preceding the formation of a conspiratorial group, the phase of the expansion of its appeal, the crucial period of the decision to act, the immediate aftermath of a coup, and the political process in the months and years after taking power. In fact, the main actors—within the military—at each of those stages might be quite different persons reflecting different outlooks. It is important to realize that it is difficult, if not impossible, to explain why any particular coup occurred by reference to the propositions advanced by cross-national statistical analyses in order to answer the question why some countries have higher incidence of coups than others. In the analysis of a set of variables in which the meaning of any detail depends on its relation to the whole context of which it is a part we are confronted with a higher degree of complexity than can be easily dealt with by cross-national regression analysis.

It would be risky to say that any state is immune to overthrow and even more so to a change of government under pressure of the military, but certainly political systems have quite different probabilities of maintaining subordination of the armed forces to the political leadership. In serious political, social, or economic crises, defeat in war or loss of prestige, irrespective of types of regime the military are likely to play a more influential role. With wars, or the possibility of war, as well as any potential internal disorder, it will probably increase. Different parties or

factions are likely to find greater sympathy among officers, and the interests of the armed forces are likely to find a more or less responsive ear among them. However, in certain societies the political role will not easily go beyond the threshhold of insubordination, while in others that point will easily be reached. Among the models, based on different patterns of value congruence and/or control mechanisms, that have assured a high probability of subordination we find the aristocratic, the liberal, the traditional professional, and the communist, formulated by Huntington (1956, 1964).

There are, however, two models that involve a high probability of military intervention in politics and with it the establishment of authoritarian regimes, described by Alfred Stepan (1971, 1973) as the moderating pattern of civil-military relations and the new professionalism. Neither of them represents a deviation from a well-established pattern of subordination of military to political authority resulting from exceptional crisis situations in the body politic but an institutionalized response that is likely to be successful when a broad consensus develops among the leadership of the armed forces that the circumstances are such as to legitimize their intervention. To Stepan's two models we might add a third, attentivism, in which the military stand outside the political process without an explicit commitment to any regime, as a neutral power, making their loyalty or support of governments in crisis situations conditional and avoiding any support that would divide the armed forces. This was the position of von Seckt under the Weimar Republic (Carsten, 1967; Vogelsang, 1962) and of Franco in the thirties (Payne, 1967), a position that undermines the authenticity of democratic regimes and indirectly can contribute to their breakdown.

The liberal model based on objective civilian control is impossible as long as civilian groups are unwilling simply to accept a politically neutral officer corps and as long as there are multifarious civilian groups anxious to maximize their power in military affairs. It is also unlikely when the professional goals of the military as an instrument in international conflict are questioned or are of limited relevance. Under those circumstances the moderating pattern appears. In it the norms encourage a highly political military whose political acts are nonetheless limited to certain boundaries. The key components in this pattern of civil-military relations have been summarized by Stepan (1971, p. 64) as follows:

1. All major political actors attempt to co-opt the military. A politicized military is the norm.

2. The military is politically heterogeneous but also seeks to maintain a degree of institutional unity.

3. The relevant political actors grant legitimacy to the military under certain circumstances to act as moderators of the political process and to check or overthrow the executive or to avoid the breakdown of the system, especially one involving massive mobilization of new groups previously excluded from participation in the political process.

4. Approval given by civilian elites to the politically heterogeneous military to overthrow the executive greatly facilitates the construction of a winning coup coalition. Denial by civilians that the overthrow of the executive by the military is a legitimate act conversely hinders the formation of a winning coup coalition.

5. There is a strong belief among civilian elites and military officers that while it is legitimate for the military to intervene in the political process and exercise temporary political power, it is illegitimate for the military to assume the direction of the political system for long periods of time.

6. This rough value congruence is the result of civilian and military socialization via schools and literature. The military doctrine of development is also roughly congruent with that of parliamentary groups. The military officers' social and intellectual deference facilitates military co-option and continued civilian leadership.

In this model, found frequently in Latin America in the past and even formalized in constitutional provisions about the role of the army, the propensity to intervene is not pathological, as it would be if the agreed model were the liberal one, but normal. That propensity correlates with the cohesion of the relevant political strata; the propensity is high when civilian cohesion is low, low when civilian cohesion is high. The success of the coups is related to the degree of public legitimacy ascribed to the executive and the military. A typical situation of low cohesion of relevant political strata is given by the frequent conflicts between the president and the legislature, heightened in recent decades by the different electoral and popular bases of support for populist national leaders and legislators with local bases of power. Under the circumstances the attitudes of pro-regime strata toward executive become decisive. Good indicators of that lack of cohesion of relevant civilian strata are the low percentage of votes of winning candidates,

the absence of a broad consensus on a compromise candidate, the belief in the legitimacy of the institutions (particularly of the executive and the conformity of his actions with the constitutional provisions) and in the personal qualifications of the president, the trust in his willingness to abide by legal or conventional rules, for example the exclusion of *continuismo,* his respect for the autonomy of institutions including the armed forces, which becomes decisive for the response of the armed forces in a crisis situation (Fitch, 1973; Solaún, 1973). In a context in which the military activists, for or against the government, are always in the minority, that minority needs to convince the great majority of officers who are either strict legalists or simply nonactivists. Activists do not wish to risk bloodshed or military splits, so they wait until a consensus has developed. Public opinion, or at least some form of expression of public opinion (as reflected for example in the editorials of leading independent newspapers), and the position of influential social groups become decisive to convince the military itself. The success or failure of attempted coups is closely correlated with that legitimation. The moderating pattern is dependent on the belief in the constitutional forms of government itself, on a military confident that the crisis could be effectively resolved by returning the government to civilian control, and on the belief that the military had no legitimacy to rule in comparison to civilians. Under such circumstances the military do not create or at least aim to create a new regime but an interim regime of exception, which has a lot in common with the Roman concept of dictatorship. The leniency with the opponents, both civilian and military, not joining in the coup and the readiness of those defeated to abandon office without resistance allowed in the past the moderating pattern to function without a permanent discontinuity in regime legitimacy.

In the last decade some of the conditions that made the moderating pattern possible have disappeared. The degree of mobilization that populist presidents, democratic or semiauthoritarian, had achieved and with it the real or misplaced confidence in their capacity to challenge the moderating role of the military have increasingly prevented the bloodless coup and the easy extrication from power. The prolonged ineffectiveness of civilian leadership, the emergence of increasingly difficult-to-solve problems, the growing social unrest and problems of public order characteristic of what Huntington has called praetorian politics, which give encouragement or tolerance to the articulation of demands that cannot be satisfied by the system operating within the

constraints of the institutions, have all led to the emergence of a new pattern of intervention. A new professionalism, very different from that of the military in advanced stable societies with major foreign-policy responsibilities, has emerged. The success of revolutionary warfare techniques against conventional armies and the subsequent diffusion of ideas of counterrevolutionary internal warfare created a new type of social and political consciousness among the military. Confronted with the need or the possibility of having to fight against internal subversion that articulated demands that appeared just and could not be satisfied by the civilian authorities and whose suppression required political skills, the military expanded the scope of their preoccupations. Criticism of the uselessness of costly military establishments led to the involvement in civic action projects that made officers aware of the problems created by underdevelopment. A new type of training in military educational institutions changed the scope of attention and professional capacity of the military. That training, contact with other societies, and interaction with other elites, particularly experts and managers, led to the new professionalism in internal security and national development. The consequent role expansion led the military, when they perceived failure of civilian leadership, not to intervene in the moderating pattern but, once they believed in their capacity to rule and distrusted the politicians, to assume power *sine die.* In addition, their perception that the political leadership was mainly an instrument of special interests, of well-organized groups be they latifundia owners, exporters and foreign investors, or the trade unionists and activist intellectuals, led them to feel that their duty was to assume power to objectively serve the national interest. The new professionalism has led to the establishment of authoritarian regimes that in response to different national contexts pursue quite different policies, as the cases of Brazil and Peru exemplify, but in both cases do so in response to similar assumptions about the role of the army in societies in crisis.

2. Organic Statism

Authoritarian regimes pursuing quite different policies in terms of class interest and organization of the economy have attempted to go beyond the bureaucratic-military-technocratic authoritarian rule by a controlled participation and mobilization of the society through "organic structures." The rejection of the individualistic assumptions of liberal democracy, combined with the desire to provide an institutional channel for

the representation of the heterogeneity of interests in modern or modernizing societies, while rejecting the model of class conflict, has led to a great variety of theoretical-ideological formulations and attempts to implement them through political institutions. Such attempts have been conceived as an alternative to the mobilizational single party, as an instrument or complement to single party rule, or even as a way to link a single party with society.

In competitive democracies political parties serve to articulate and aggregate a wide range of interests rather than serving as a channel for very specific interests. Political parties aiming at holding power have an inevitable tendency to search for a majority, either by representing a cross section of society agreeing at least *pro tempore* on certain goals, like the modern catchall parties, or maximizing their support in a social class or otherwise numerous sector of a society. Only parties with limited access to power identify with specific interests, as Max Weber noted for the parties in Imperial Germany, except for minor parties in a fragmented multiparty system, which generally act as minor allies of major parties. Single parties in this respect are, once again, closer to the assumptions underlying democratic politics. It is therefore not surprising that authoritarian conceptions born in a climate of rejection of political parties, of the bitterness of ideological partisan conflict in unstable democracies but in societies of some degree of economic and social complexity and having reached a certain level of political mobilization, should turn to corporativist solutions.

The ideological heritage of nineteenth-century counterrevolutionary conservatism, with its rejection of both individualistic liberalism and state absolutism and its ideological identification with the Middle Ages—the response of preindustrial strata like artisans, peasants, and sometimes even professionals to advancing industrial and financial capitalism—gave rise to a variety of corporativist ideologies (Schmitter, 1974; Manoïlesco, 1936; Elbow, 1953; Bowen, 1947; Pike and Stritch, 1974). The antiliberal, anticapitalist, and antistatist—specifically of the secularizing state—response of the Catholic Church in encyclicals like the *Rerum Novarum* was another stream contributing to its appeal (Azpiazu, 1951; Vallauri, 1971). The syndicalist tradition in the labor movement, which rejected the authoritarianism of Marxism; the persistence of the state as an instrument of oppression; and the cooptation of the social democratic labor movement by participation in electoral and parliamentary politics also contributed to the search for formulas of participation through independent councils of producers at

the factory and community level which would freely agree, through pacts that could be revoked, to create larger organizations. Even some democratic liberals, fearful of the growing power of the state and of the anomie of lonely isolated individuals as a result of the growing division of labor and the crisis of traditional institutions, felt that corporative professional organizations could serve social control (Durkheim, 1902). The availability of conservative antirevolutionary, Catholic, syndicalist, and liberal solidarist traditions had its fruits in the crisis of the twenties and thirties. Italian and other fascists, in theoretical formulations, laws and learned legal commentaries, and efforts of institution building, made corporativism an influential political-ideological current.[50]

It is conceivable in theory that corporativism would have offered an alternative way to organize free and spontaneous participation to that through election of individuals or candidates of parties to a national parliament on the basis of territorial constituencies. Actually, "organic democracy" in contrast to individualist "inorganic democracy" of parties has in every case been combined with authoritarian imposition and lack of accountability of the rulers to the ruled. The reality of corporativism has been defined by Philippe Schmitter (1974) as

> a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized and licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (p. 93)

In ideal-type terms he contrasts this system with the pluralism in democracies described as

> a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered, and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled . . . by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories. (p. 96)

Obviously, in reality we do not find these pure ideal types; interest pluralism in democratic societies often takes corporativist characteristics,

and the reality of corporativism in authoritarian regimes has some tolerance for unfettered pluralist tendencies, particularly for business and professional interests.

Why should corporativism have become identified with authoritarian regimes, become, as Alfred Stepan has aptly characterized it, organic statism? Three reasons seem to account for it: first, logical and practical difficulties in organizing political life exclusively as an expression of "corporate" interests; secondly, the socio-political purpose pursued in the particular historical-social context in which such solutions have been implemented; and thirdly, the nature of political community and the state as well as the intellectual and legal traditions on which the idea of the state is based.

The theoreticians of organic democracy all emphasize that people are naturally members of numerous groups based on primary social relations, at the work place, farmers' cooperatives, professional associations, universities, neighborhoods, parishes, etc., in contrast to artificially created larger groups, like political parties, which divide people in those primary contexts and lead to the emergence of professional politicians, party bureaucrats remote from the life of the citizen. Why not organize representation on the basis of such primary units? Obviously the representatives of such more or less face-to-face groups would be close to the people and subject to their daily control. Social science research has shown that contrary to the expectations of those theories, private governments are characterized by strong oligarchic tendencies and membership apathy.[51] Leaving this aside, the question arises, How can participation in larger units of decision making, required in urban industrial societies with large-scale organizations interacting with other large social, economic, and political units, be organized on this basis? The theory responds with multi-tier, that is, indirect, elections within a series of constituencies based on grouping such primary units up to a national chamber of corporations (Aquarone, 1965; Fraga, 1959; Fernández-Carvajal, 1969, pp. 77–124; Esteban, 1973, pp. 127–255) or a series of specialized chambers. In principle it should be possible to organize a national democratic polity on this indirect democracy basis, even when accountability of the national leadership to the individual citizen would seem difficult to achieve. However, a number of false assumptions make the model questionable: foremost, that such primary units share common interests rather than being internally conflictual; secondly, that there should be no cleavages crosscutting on a national level those units of greater saliency than the

common interest of their members—that neighbors should have more interest in local problems than in, let us say, secularization versus clericalism, or war and peace, and those issues would not divide the society and require representation. If such broader issues would exist in the society, we could assume that ultimately, particularly at the national level, parties based on the aggregation of a large number of issues would emerge without the corporatively elected representatives having any basis to make their decision and without having been chosen on account of their position on them.

Even more serious is the problem of delimiting in a rational way the constituencies and the share in representational power to be attributed to them. To recognize spontaneously emerged, preexisting organizations would show the very unequal organizational mobilization of various interests, and therefore the state inevitably assumes the task of defining noncompetitive and functionally predetermined categories by certifying them or licensing them and granting them a representational monopoly. Even more difficult is the decision of what weight to assign in the decision making to the variety of organized interests. There are no obvious criteria for such a decision. The number of members would make impossible the representation of functionally important groups of numerical insignificance. The weight in the economy (a criterion used in assigning seats in the Yugoslav chamber system) again disenfranchises numerically important but economically weak sectors, like agriculture in semideveloped societies. There is no easily defensible criterion to assign representation to noneconomic, nonoccupational interests, and ultimately even the best decisions would be subject to constant revisions with changes in the economic and social structure which would make the conflicts about reapportionment in inorganic democracies children's play. The authoritarian decisions by the state, that is, by bureaucrats and/or ruling political groups, would in all cases predetermine the nature and composition of the decision-making bodies, which would then be anything but an organic outgrowth of the society. Whatever deviations from fair representation almost inevitably exist in democracies based on population and territorial constituencies (except for a single national constituency with strict proportional representation), they are incomparably smaller than those that even the most rational and equitable corporative system of representation would produce.

Sociologically, as Max Weber (1968) noted in a short section on "representation by agents of interest groups," any such system has as a

latent function to disenfranchise certain strata.[52] As he notes, it is possible for such a system to be extremely conservative or radically revolutionary in its character. It can be the former by distributing mandates among the occupations and thus in fact disenfranchising the numerically superior masses, or the latter by openly and formally limiting suffrage to the proletariat and thus disenfranchising those strata whose power rests on their economic position (the case of a state of soviets). It is this that has recommended corporative representation to authoritarian regimes, particularly in societies in which the masses of workers, farm laborers, and peasants are a potentially majority support for mass class parties. This and the opportunity for electoral manipulation with indirect, multi-tier, elections accounts for the realities of political systems based on such principles. In addition, interests are often highly antagonistic and hence majority voting among elements that in status and class affiliation are highly heterogeneous is exceedingly artificial. The ballot as a basis of final decision is characteristic of settling and expressing the compromise of parties. It is not, however, characteristic of occupational interest groups. In addition, on many issues representatives of interests would have no reason to have an opinion and therefore they would be logically willing to exchange their vote on most issues for measures favoring their narrow specific interests. In such a context power ultimately ends up in a ruling group that organizes the system, delimits its constituencies, assigns the share in representation, arbitrates conflicts between interests, and decides all those issues on which the representatives have no basis for choice. Even in systems ideologically committed to organic democracy, the realities can be better described as "state organicism," with bureaucratic-military-technocratic elites and/or the leaders of a single party having the largest share of power. The corporative structure at best becomes one element in the limited pluralism of such authoritarian regimes. However, even weak corporative structures represent a limit, particularly at the grass-roots level, to the monistic ambitions of a disciplined political elite attempting to mobilize a society for its utopian purposes. It is therefore no accident that there should have been in the fascist regimes ambivalence and tension on how far those institutions should have been developed at the cost of the power of the single party, and that the Nazis, with their perception of plebiscitarian, classless *Volksgeminschaft*, should have rejected early the corporativist ideas of German conservatism (Rämisch, 1957).

No political system has made the highest and most powerful decision-making bodies—the cabinet and head of government—accountable

to its corporative-type legislatures (Aquarone, 1965; Fraga, 1959; Fernández-Carvajal, 1969). In our sense of the term there has not been any democracy without political parties, even though in pure theory popular participation could be organized through corporative constituencies and elections rather than parties.

Once the ideas of institutionalized or tolerated class conflict and of a classless society in its utopian ideological versions of Marxism or Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* are rejected, the idea of building political institutions through corporate interest representation becomes an obvious alternative. It is one that is particularly tempting for bureaucratic, military, and technocratic elites that reject the idea of open conflict and believe in a rational, ultimately administrative solution of conflicts of interests but are not guided by a utopian vision of society but by pragmatic considerations. It should allow the expression of the heterogeneity of interests, of the pluralism of society, but also serve to limit the conflictual expression of that heterogeneity, particularly in the form of class conflict. De facto the emergent systems had many elements of class imposition.

It is no accident that the National Socialists, impelled toward a more totalitarian model of society, after toying with corporativist ideas of a *Ständestaat* should have rejected it, and that democratic parties, inclined to create second chambers based on corporative principles like the *Reichswirtschaftsrat* or the *Conseil Economique et Social*, ultimately never infused real life into those bodies. In all political systems we find some elements of corporativism, of institutionalized and regulated representation of interests, particularly economic and occupational, but only in authoritarian regimes has a serious effort been made to organize a political regime according to a corporativist ideology. In reality those authoritarian regimes claiming to be corporativist have ultimately been bureaucratic, technocratic, or single-party mobilizational authoritarian regimes. However, corporativism—organic democracy—has served as an important ideological alternative to competitive democracy. It has been an important component of the institutional pluralism of regimes ruling over a society that had reached a level of social and economic complexity and social and political mobilization that could not be managed by sheer administration, and thus needing to provide for some opportunity for political participation but unable to create or sustain an ideological mass party led by a politically conscious elite or vanguard. It was also a solution particularly congruent with an economic system that rejected a free-market, entrepreneurial

capitalism but also public ownership of all the means of production and centralized planning. The disillusion in a number of European and Latin American societies with liberal democracy and a pure capitalist economic system was fertile ground for the acceptance by many groups, including business elites, of corporativist solutions.

There have been and exist a significant number of authoritarian regimes that have turned to ideas of organic democracy to legitimize their rule and to organize a more or less limited participation of carefully delimited and weighted sectors of the population. Theoretically the Portuguese Estado Novo built by Salazar, with its weak single party created from above, is the purest case of such a regime (Schmitter, 1973a). There, as in Austria (Voegelin, 1936; Diamant, 1960; Busshoff, 1968) between 1934 and 1938 under Dollfuss (Bärnthaler, 1971), and in Spain under Franco after a pretotalitarian fascist period,[53] the rulers, using a Catholic ideological heritage combined with the Italian Fascist experience, created systems with a component of organic democracy. Mussolini, linking originally with the syndicalist tradition, reinforced by the intellectual heritage of rightist nationalists, and searching for the approval of Catholics, built a corporativist superstructure that served conservative interests well by disenfranchising a highly mobilized working class and providing a channel for the complex interest structure of a relatively developed society. The strong pretotalitarian tendencies of many Fascist leaders and the conception of an "ethical state" above interests derived from an idealistic tradition, however, created an uneasy balance between the corporativist and the single.party mobilizational components of the regime.[54] Authoritarian regimes in Latin America, particularly of the populist variety, found corporativist policies particularly congenial (Wiarda, 1973a, 1974). The absence of widespread political mobilization of a large working class organized by socialists or other independent labor movements before the assumption of power allowed rulers like Vargas (Schmitter, 1971), Cárdenas, and to some extent Perón to use corporativist interest representation, including powerful trade unions in their authoritarian regimes. The Mexicans, through the sector organization of the party and its reflection in candidate selection for legislature and other offices, have also incorporated into a dominant party structure corporative elements (Scott, 1964). Nowadays the military in Peru are attempting an interesting experiment of the same character by encouraging the creation of the *Sinamos (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Mobilización Social,* "national system of support to social mobilization") in several spheres like (Cotler, 1972;

Palmer, 1973; Malloy, 1974): the *pueblos jóvenes* and urban slums; rural organizations; youth; labor organizations (trade unions and labor communities); cultural; professional; and economic (cooperatives, self-managed enterprises). In an initial phase after the Russian Revolution the ideas of soviets (councils of workers or of workers, peasants, and soldiers) had considerable attraction for revolutionaries who rejected the Marxist social democratic party, which had been ready to participate in parliamentary democratic regimes, as a method to disenfranchise other sectors of society and to provide a particularly effective arena to revolutionary activists ready to displace the leadership of other leftist parties and movements (Kool, 1967). However, ultimately the vanguard party dispensed with this form of participation. Yugoslavia, with workers' management and local self-government, has also created a system of chambers of corporative character, which complement the political structure based on the party and its functional organizations and the revolutionary oligarchy.

It is important to emphasize that many pluralistic systems with competitive democratic political institutions and parties institutionalize or encourage directly or indirectly corporative arrangements to handle particular problems, especially in the field of management and labor relations. Many have attempted to complement the political chambers with advisory corporative chambers, but they generally have lacked vitality when interest groups were divided along political, ideological, or religious lines. Only in the Scandinavian democracies (Rokkan, 1966) and in some of the consociational smaller European democracies, particularly Austria, have these institutions gained a considerable share in power. This has, perhaps, been possible because of the high degree of overlap of a moderate, centripetal, multiparty system with the basic interest cleavages in the society and the integration between party system and interest-organization system. However, we should not forget the basic difference between the presence of corporative tendencies in systems based on the political pluralism of parties and in systems claiming to organize the political process through corporative structures. Nor should we ignore the differences between such organizations having grown out of the society, even when often encouraged and privileged by the state, and those authoritatively created by the state. The first development is the result of a liberal period, sometimes historical continuity, and a culture and economic development encouraging the "art of association"; the other is a result of imposition in the absence of those factors or of control of them by one sector of society holding authoritarian power.

In spite of all the ideological emphasis on corporativism and organic democracy, none of the regimes identifying themselves as "organic" has renounced to a single party, which often results from a fusion of a variety of antidemocratic organizations and/or is created from above. Those single parties in Europe—with the exception of Fascist Italy—were weak organizations, while in Latin America, perhaps because of the oligarchic character of previous political systems, the new officially created parties—often closely linked with the corporative structures like "recognized" trade unions—became important institutions capable of survival after a transition to more democratic politics.

3. Mobilizational Authoritarian Regimes in Postdemocratic Societies

The Western European democratic revolution initiated in the eighteenth century spread liberal democratic institutions to societies of very different economic, social, cultural, and institutional development. In many of them there was no possibility of returning to traditional legitimate rule after political revolutions and often major social and economic changes. In a number of them the sequence of development crises—state-building legitimation, participation, incorporation of new social forces, representation in legislative organs, and ultimately share in executive power—cumulated in a short period of time. More often than not economic development did not keep pace with political change. Protest ideologies formulated in more advanced societies diffused and new movements combined demands for redistribution and participation with the hostility to the changes resulting from early industrialization and disruption of traditional economic and social patterns (Borkenau, 1933). Other countries, particularly those that had not experienced the Protestant Reformation and the disestablishment of religion that went with religious pluralism in earlier centuries, faced a crisis of secularization. Some like Italy and Germany as latecomers to statehood, whose boundaries did not coincide with those of the culture nation, experienced a heightened need for a sense of national cohesion (Allen, 1975). The success of the United Kingdom and France and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Belgium in the colonial expansion created in other medium-sized powers the consciousness of the "proletarian nation." The loss of the last remnants of Spain's empire and the English veto of Portugal's expansion also created crises of national consciousness. The coincidence of these quite different but cumulated

crises through the period of rapid political democratization, particularly
in the absence or weakness of traditionally legitimate institutions and
elites, prevented the successful and slow institutionalization of demo-
cratic political processes capable of incorporating the demands of new
social groups awakened to class or cultural consciousness. In contrast to
the Eastern European societies, those of Western Europe already before
World War I had experienced the introduction of liberal freedoms, con-
stitutional or semiconstitutional government, and an increasing impor-
tance of modern political parties, including Marxist, syndicalist, and
Christian labor movements. The crisis caused by war interventions, post-
war economic dislocations, and the psychological impact on the under-
privileged masses of the Russian Revolution and with it the split of the
socialist movement led to the delegitimation and ineffectiveness of de-
mocratic regimes in process of consolidation. In contrast to the less po-
litically, economically, and socially developed Eastern European nations,
purely bureaucratic-military-oligarchical authoritarian solutions could
not be the response to the crisis. It could not be because even the oli-
garchic institutions of the establishment had accepted the notion that pol-
itics could not be reduced to administration and realized that a purely co-
ercive repression was condemned to failure because in all social classes,
including the privileged middle class, democratic ideas had gained con-
siderable loyalty. In such societies the crisis of democracy would lead to
new political formulas including the plebiscitarian pseudodemocratic
component: the mass single party. On the other hand, those societies had
reached a level of development and complexity that made it difficult for
the leadership of such a single party to move in a totalitarian direction,
except in the case of Nazi Germany. It is no accident that the first mani-
festation in Europe of a plebiscitarian, nonliberal authoritarian solution
to the crisis of democracy should have been Bonapartism, considering
that France was the country of Europe in which revolutionary change
had brought the biggest break with traditional authority and had led to
the highest political mobilization with the 1848 revolution. It is no acci-
dent that some Marxists like Thalheimer (1930) should have turned to
Marx's analysis in the *Eighteenth Brumaire* to understand the novel au-
thoritarian regimes created by fascism.[55]

The crisis of European societies at the end of World War I led to
the emergence of two political movements that broke with the liberal
democratic systems that seemed on the ascendancy: Leninism and fas-
cism. Both were based on the rule by the minority, by an elite, self-
appointed to represent the majority, the proletariat or the nation, at the

service of a historical task. Parties led by a self-confident elite defined not by ascriptive characteristics or by professional achievements but by its will to gain power and to use it to break through social and historical constraining conditions, appealing for the support of the masses but unwilling to allow them to interfere in the pursuit of its goals. The strength of the democratic heritage of Marxism and the scientism of Marxist social science, while allowing a break with the liberal tradition, assured the persistence of an ideological commitment to democracy. Fascism as a nationalistic response to the ideological internationalism of Marxism, by linking with other ideological traditions of the nineteenth century—romantic irrationalism, social Darwinism, Hegelian exultation of the state, Nietzschean ideas, Sorelian conceptions of the role of the myth, imagery of the great man and the genius—turned explicitly antidemocratic (Gregor, 1969; Nolte, 1969; Weber, 1964). In contrast to other conceptions of authoritarianism as a modern response to the crisis of society, it searched for a new and different form of democratic legitimation, based on the emotional identification of the followers with the leader, in a plebiscitarianism that had found its first postrevolutionary manifestation in Napoleonic Caesarism. In a complex way we cannot analyze here, fascism combined and perverted many strains of Western intellectual tradition that directly or indirectly put into question the assumptions of liberal democratic pluralist society and politics.

The special circumstances of Italian society after World War I led to the emergence under the leadership of Mussolini of a new type of nontraditionalist, popular antidemocratic movement, initially carried by a small number of activists recruited among the interventionists; nationalists; the veterans of the war who found reintegration into civil society difficult; a certain type of intelligentsia heady with nationalism, futurism, and hostility for the clientelistic politics of Giolittian *transformismo* and for the selfishness of the bourgeoisie; together with revolutionary syndicalists who had discovered their national identity (De Felice, 1966a, 1969, 1970; Delzell, 1970). The poet D'Annunzio discovered a new style, new symbols for this generation of rebels (Hamilton, 1971). It was, however, the mobilization of the Italian working class by a Maximalist social labor movement, unable to implement a revolutionary takeover of power and still unwilling to follow a reformist path toward integration into democracy in the making, that created the conditions for success of this minority of activists. The red domination of the northern Italian countryside, which scared landowners and

wealthier peasants, and occupation of factories in the industrial centers, particularly Torino, led a scared bourgeoisie to join and support the incipient movement (Salvemini, 1961). Its leaders, hostile to the socialists on account of their anti-interventionism and to the workers who had stayed in the factories and received with hostility the returning veterans, were ready for the alliance. The ambivalent attitude of the state and its representatives toward the terrorist activities of the *squadrismo*, the failure of the reformists to turn to support the demo-liberal state, and the tensions between the old liberal parties and both the socialists and the new democratic Christian populist party, combined with the ruthlessness and opportunism of Mussolini, led the new movement to power. A new and multifaceted ideology, a new form of political action, and a new style had been born and would find echo in much of Europe (Nolte, 1966, 1968a; Laqueur and Mosse, 1966; Rogger and Weber, 1966; Woolf, 1969; Carsten, 1967; Kedward, 1969; Hayes, 1973) and even in Latin America (Trindade, 1974) and Asia (Maruyama, 1963; Morris, 1968). Initially it was possible to conceive of fascism as a peculiar outcome of the Italian crisis (De Felice, 1966a, 1969, 1970; Nolte, 1967). Later, even as far as the 1930s, it could be interpreted as a response to the problems created by late and unsuccessful economic development and modernization (Borkenau, 1933). But with the success of Hitler it became necessary to explain it in terms of certain basic characteristics of Western society (Nolte, 1967, 1969; Gregor, 1968, 1974a, 1974b; Woolf, 1968; Turner, 1972).

In the context of our analysis of types of political systems we cannot enter into an analysis of the variety of forms the fascist antidemocratic ideology and movement took, nor an explanation of the conditions for its success (Lipset, 1960; Nolte, 1968a; Linz, 1976). The nature and definition of fascism itself is a subject of lively debate. We would characterize fascism as an ideology and movement defined by what it rejects, by its exacerbated nationalism, by the discovery of new forms of political action and a new style. The anti-positions of fascism are essential to its understanding and its appeal, but they alone do not account for its success. Fascism is antiliberal, antiparliamentarian, anti-Marxist, and particularly anticommunist, anti- or at least aclerical, and in a certain sense antibourgeois and anticapitalist; while linking with the real or imagined historical national tradition, it is not committed to a conservative continuity with the recent past or a purely reactionary return to it but is future-oriented. Those negative stances are a logical outcome of its being a latecomer on the political scene, trying to

displace liberal, Marxist, socialist, and clerical parties and win over
their supporters. They are also the fruit of the exacerbated nationalism
that rejects the appeal to class solidarity across national boundaries and
puts in its place the solidarity of all those involved in production in a
nation against other nations, seizing on the notion of the proletarian na-
tion: the poor countries against the wealthy plutocracies, which hap-
pened to be at that time also powerful democracies. Communist inter-
nationalism is defined in this context as the enemy. The latent hostility
to a church that transcends the national boundaries and whose devisive
effect on the national community with the struggle between clerical
and secularizers interferes with the goal of national greatness, hostil-
ity that becomes bitter hatred in cases like Nazism, is another logical
consequence that differentiates the fascist from other conservative anti-
democratic parties. To the extent that modern capitalism is, particularly
in its financial institutions, part of an international system, fascists tend
to idealize preindustrial strata like the independent peasant, the artisan,
and the entrepreneur, particularly the founder directing his own firm
(Mosse, 1964; Winkler, 1972). Masonry, as an organization emphasiz-
ing links across nations and closely identified with the liberal bour-
geois, secularized strata that created the democratic liberal regimes, is
another obviouus enemy. Anti-Semitism in the Europe of the turn of
the century, particularly Eastern Europe (Pulzer, 1964; Massing, 1949),
had a long tradition, and wherever there were Jews fascism seized on
those tendencies, stressing the anational, cosmopolitan character of the
Jews and particularly of Zionism.

Those negative appeals, however, had a kind of distorted positive
counterpart. The anti-Marxism is compensated by an exultation of
work, of the producers of *Faust* and *Stirn*, "hand and brain," in that
way appealing to the growing white-collar middle class, which rejected
Marxist demands that it should identify with the proletariat (Kele,
1972). The populism of fascism leads it to support welfare-state poli-
cies and to engage in loose talk of national socialism, socialization of
the banks, etc., which justifies in fascist authoritarian regimes eco-
nomic interventionism and the development of an important public sec-
tor in the economy. The anticapitalism that appeals to precapitalist and
petit bourgeois strata is redefined as hostility to international financial
stock exchange and Jewish capitalism and as exultation of the national
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. The emphasis on a national common good,
which rejects the assumptions of individualism, is easily combined
with hostility to the free play of interests of economic liberalism and

finds expression in protectionist and autarchic economic policies that appeal to industrialists threatened by international competition. The hostility of a secularized intelligentsia of exacerbated nationalists to clerical politics and their competition with Christian democratic parties for a similar social basis account for the anticlericalism that gets combined with an affirmation of the religious tradition as part of the national, cultural, historical tradition. Already the Action Française in secularist France had taken this path, appealing to the Catholics who rejected the secularizing, liberal democratic state. The Iron Guard, the only successful fascist movement in a Greek Orthodox country, confronted with the denationalized, secularized bourgeoisie and an influential Jewish community, was the fascism that most directly linked with religious symbolism. In the case of Germany the confused programmatic statements about positive Christianity and the identification of many Protestants with a conservative state religion were used by the Nazis, but ultimately the racist ideology became incompatible with any commitment to Christianity (Lewy, 1965; Buchheim, 1953). The antireligious stands of Marxism and particularly communism in the Soviet Union allowed the fascists to capitalize on the ambivalent identification with the religious heritage. The anticlericalism facilitated the appeal to secularized middle classes unwilling to support the clerical and Christian democratic middle-class parties, while their antiliberalism, anti-Masonic, and even anti-Semitic stands, combined with their anticommunism, facilitated the collaboration with the churches when they came to power. The antibourgeois affect, the romanticization of the peasant, the artisan, the soldier, contrasted with the impersonal capitalism and selfish bourgeois rentiers, appealed to the emotional discontent of the sons of the bourgeoisie, the cultural critics of modern industrial and urban society. The rejection of the proletarian self-righteousness and the bourgeois egoism and the affirmation of the common national interests above and beyond class cleavages exploited the desire for interclass solidarity developed among veterans of the war (Linz, 1976; Merkl, 1975) and the guilt feeling of the bourgeoisie, and served well the interests of the business community in destroying a labor movement that threatened its privileges and status. The populist appeal to community against the pragmatism of society, *Gemeinschaft* versus *Gesellschaft,* had considerable appeal in democratic societies divided by class conflict and mobilized by modern mass parties.

The deliberately ambiguous and largely contradictory appeals we have just described would have been, and were, unsuccessful in those

societies in which war and defeat had not created a serious national crisis. In the defeated nations or those, like Italy, being victors, felt unjustly deprived of the fruits of their victory, an upsurge of nationalism was channeled by the new parties. The efforts to establish an international political order through the League of Nations under the leadership and to the benefit of the Western, capitalistic, plutocratic democracies became another issue in the armory of the fascists. The lack of coincidence between the national-cultural boundaries and those of the states, the irredenta on the borders, and the existence of nationalities that had not become nation-states, combined with the pan-nationalist movements, were another source of strength for fascism, particularly in the case of Nazis.

Fascist ideology had to reject totally the assumptions of liberal democratic politics based on pluralist participation, the free expression of interests, and compromise among them rather than the assertion of the collective interests above individuals and classes, cultural and religious communities. The obvious distortion of the idea of democracy in the reality of the early twentieth century and the incapacity of the democratic leadership to institutionalize mechanisms for conflict resolution provided the ground for the appeal of fascism. On a less lofty level, all the interests threatened by a powerful labor movement with revolutionary rhetoric, particularly after some of its revolutionary attempts had been defeated, could support the fascist squads as a defense of the social order. In societies that had reached the level of political, economic, and social development of Western Europe, that defense could not be left to the old institutions—the monarchy, the army, the bureaucracy, and the oligarchical political elites. In that context the fascist ideology offered a new alternative, which promised the integration of the working class into the national community and the assertion of its interests against other nations, if necessary through military preparedness and even aggression (Neumann, 1963). This position would appeal to veterans not reintegrated into civil society and army officers and would neutralize the armed forces in the course of the struggle for power.

Neither the ideological appeals nor the interests served by or expected to be served by fascism are sufficient to account for its rapid success. Fascism developed new forms of political organization, different from both the committee electoral-type of parties and the mass-membership, trade-union-based socialist parties, as well as the clerically led religious parties. It was the type of organization that, like the communist counterpart, offered an opportunity for action, involvement,

participation, breaking with the monotony of everyday life. For a generation that had lived heroic, adventurous actions of war and even more for the one that had lived that experience vicariously, due to its youth, the *squadrismo* and the storm troopers offered welcome relief. Many of those who found their normal careers and education disrupted by the war and economic crisis, and probably some of the unemployed, provided the party with many of its activists, whose propaganda and direct action in support of specific grievances—of farmers to be evicted, peasants onto whom the labor unions were imposing the employment of labor, industrialists threatened by strikers—gained them support that no electoral propaganda could have achieved. This new style of politics satisfied certain psychological and emotional needs like no other party could except some forms of cultural protest and to some extent the communists.

Finally, fascism is characterized by a distinctive style reflected in the uniforms—the shirts—which symbolized the break with bourgeois convention, the individualism of bourgeois dress; and the mass demonstrations and ceremonies, which allowed individuals to submerge in the collective and escape the privatization of modern society. The songs, the greetings, the marches, all gave expression to the new myth, the hopes, and illusions of part of that generation.

This ideal-typical description of fascism as a political movement ignores national variants in ideology, appeal, social basis, and alignments on the political scene. We cannot go into the complex question of whether National Socialism, with its extreme racism, its biologic conception of man, fits into the broader category of fascism (Nolte, 1963; Mosse, 1964, 1966), particularly since many fascists felt quite critical of Nazism and many Nazis felt ambivalent toward Mussolini and his movement (Hoepke, 1968). Our view is that National Socialism, particularly the northern left wing of the movement, rather than "Hitlerism," fits into the more general category (Kühnl, 1966). Nazism did not reject the identification as fascism, but it also acquired unique characteristics making it a quite different branch of the common tree into which German ideological traditions (Mosse, 1964; Sontheimer, 1968; Lukácz, 1955) had been grafted and one that had its own distinct fruits.[56] The strength of that branch growing with the resources of German society made it an appealing competitor of the first fascist state.

The ambiguities and contradictions of the fascist utopia, combined with the inevitable pragmatic compromises with many of the forces it initially criticized, account for the failure of the model, except in Italy

(to a certain point) and in Germany. To have been successful the initial nucleus would have had to gain support in all strata of the society and particularly among the working class in addition to the peasantry. However, the organizational penetration, except perhaps in Hungary, Rumania, and (if we consider Peronism as a deviant of fascism) in Argentina, of the socialist, communist, and anarcho-syndicalist (in Spain) labor movements was such that such hopes were condemned to failure. In some countries the Catholic peasantry, middle classes, and even many workers had identified with clerical and/or Christian democratic parties in the defense of religion and found in the social doctrine of the Church an answer to many of the problems to which fascism presumed to be a response. Unless deeply scared by unsuccessful revolutionary attempts, disorganized by continuous economic crises—inflation, depression, unemployment, and bankruptcies—or uprooted by war, the middle and upper-middle classes remained loyal to old parties (including, before the March on Rome, most of the Italian south) in countries like France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the UK (Linz, 1976; Kaltefleiter, 1968; Lepsius, 1968). Fascism's success in these countries was a minority, largely generational phenomenon, strengthened in nationalist border areas and gaining broader support in crisis periods. The heterogeneous basis and the failure to gain strata to which its appeal was directed, ultimately explainable by its latecomer role on the political scene, led the leaders to an unremitting struggle to gain power and to a policy of opportunistic alliances with a variety of established groups and a- or antidemocratic conservative forces, which in turn hoped to manipulate its popular appeal and youthful activist following for their own purposes. In societies that had experienced a serious crisis but no political, social, and economic breakdown comparable to czarist Russia, this meant that the way of power was open only in coalition with other forces, particularly the conservative authoritarian parties like the Partito Nazionalista in Italy and the DNVP in Germany, the powerful antilabor interest groups, and the army, and by neutralizing the churches. Such groups well entrenched in the establishment and the state could provide men more capable of governing than were the activists of the first hour. The result was the establishment of authoritarian regimes—with a seriously limited and muted pluralism—with a single party whose rule ranged from fairly dominant and active, approaching in some moments the totalitarian model, to regimes in which it was only a minor partner in the coalition of forces, or absorbed like in Portugal, or suppressed, like in Rumania. Only in

Germany would the party and its many—and competing—organizations become dominant. In all of them fascisim introduced a mobilizational, populist component, a channel for some degree and some types of voluntary political participation, a source of ideological discontent with the status quo and justification for social change, which differentiates authoritarian mobilizational regimes from other types. Even where that mobilization was ultimately deliberately demobilized, like in Spain (Linz, 1970a), the half organic-statist, half bureaucratic-expert-military authoritarian regime emerging after the 1940s would never be the same as for example the regime of Salazar, where fascisim as we have characterized it never had taken root.

The struggle against a powerful, particularly a social democratic, labor movement and the effort to undermine the authority of a democratic state exacerbated the romantic love for violence into an end in itself and generally, consciously or unconsciously, transformed the movement into an instrument of vested interests (often verbally and even sincerely denounced), transforming the "national integrative revolution" into hateful counterrevolution. The Marxist interpretation (Abendroth, 1969; Mansilla, 1971; *International Journal of Politics,* 1973; Galkin, 1970; Lopukhov, 1965[57]), while inadequate to explain the emergence of the ideology, its complex appeal, and its success in capturing the imagination of many youthful ideologists and misunderstanding the motivation of the founders and many leaders, is largely right in the analysis of the "objective" historical role played by fascism (F. Neumann, 1963). This obviously does not mean to accept the thesis that the fascists were the hirelings of capitalism based on subsidies that started coming only when the party had gathered strength and in proportion to its success relative to other anti-Marxist parties, or that fascism was the last possible defense of capitalism, or that in power it only and always served its interests. Even less does it absolve the Marxist movement of having undertaken and failed in revolutionary attempts to gain power in relatively democratic societies or of holding onto a maximalist revolutionary rhetoric that mobilizes its enemies and prevents the democratic governments from functioning effectively—a policy that prevents the government from imposing the order desired by those supporting it, while not making a serious effort to impose (at least in part) the policies favored by those movements by participating actively in democratic policymaking by either supporting or even entering government. Fascism, among other things, is a response to the ambivalence of the Marxist ideological heritage toward the importance

of political institutions, toward "formal" liberal democracy, toward reform rather than revolution. Mussolini reflected this dialectical relationship when he said that if the red menace had not been there it would have had to be invented. The anti- or at least ademocratic behavior of the left made possible the more effective one of the right, even when in turn the manipulative attitude of the liberals toward democratic institutions explains the reaction of the left.

Fascist-mobilizational authoritarian regimes are less pluralistic, more ideological, and more participatory than bureaucratic-military or organic-statist regimes with a weak single party. They are further from "liberalism" and closer to "democracy," further from individual freedom from political constraint but closer to offering citizens a chance to participate, less conservative, and more change oriented.[58] Probably the greater ideological legitimacy and the greater mobilization of support made them less vulnerable to internal opposition and overthrow than other types of authoritarian rule, and in fact only external defeat destroyed them.

4. Postindependence Mobilizational Authoritarian Regimes: Theory and Reality

Mobilizational authoritarian regimes have appeared in states gaining independence from colonial rule or asserting themselves against foreign dependency. Countries in black Africa[59] and the Maghreb,[60] among the countries of the Third World, provide examples of this type. Contrary to the expectations of many political scientists, not many have proven stable over the last decade, particularly since 1964 military coups swept civilians from office in many of them (Bienen, 1968, 1974; Lee, 1969; C. E. Welch, 1970; Young, n.d.). In others a process of decline set in, leading in many places to a no-party state (Wallerstein, 1966; Potholm, 1970, pp. 272–96; Bretton, 1973).

Single-party mobilizational authoritarian regimes created by political leaders emerging from and mobilizing the grass roots, and not from above by the ruler, were possible in societies of low economic development, particularly with the relatively egalitarian peasant rural structure, where the modern economic elite was small and often composed of foreigners or members of an outside ethnic group and where the colonial rulers had not allowed or encouraged the growth of a professional middle class, a civil service with distinctive status and honor, and a professional army (Apter, 1963). In the case of sub-Saharan

Africa one might add the absence of a native hierarchically organized religious leadership. Colonial rule had often destroyed or, in the case of indirect rule, discredited traditional precolonial authorities, at least for the emerging urban-educated, more modernized sectors. In this context a new nationalist leadership emerged among those trained abroad or in the few educational institutions created by the colonial power, sometimes encouraged by the parties of the left in the metropolis as leaders of trade unions or representatives in emerging self-government institutions and stimulated by a few nationalist intellectuals and their contacts abroad (Wallerstein, 1961; Hodgkin, 1961; Carter, 1962; Coleman and Rosberg, 1964). These leaders sometimes seized successfully the representation of grievances of the native population, the workers and peasants affected by the dislocations of the traditional order resulting from economic change or the introduction of Western legal institutions and in some cases European settlement. The colonial rulers confronted with those incipient movements shifted between repression and co-optation, policies that, particularly when inconsistently applied, contributed to strengthening this emerging nationalist leadership. The desire for independence, at least initially, obscured the importance of other cleavages; the underdevelopment and the foreign character of the modern economic sector limited the importance of class politics. In the representative assemblies elected shortly before or immediately after independence the representatives of the nationalist movements obtained pluralities or majorities, which they often expanded by co-opting those representing more particularistic constituencies like tribal, religious, or traditional groups. Initially there was hope that the transfer of British or French constitutional arrangements would lead to new democratic states. However, soon after independence the actions of the opposition, or the perceptions of them by the leaders of the governing party; the governing party's conception of nation building as excluding peripheral, sectional, tribal demands (particularly in states with artificial boundaries imposed by the colonizers); the difficult economic problems; and the problems caused by new expectations of the people led those leaders to prevent, limit, or exclude free political and electoral competition. In many of the states created by decolonization, independence and statehood became symbolically identified with a leader and his party, who often claimed a charismatic authority, which was recognized by his followers. The weakness of traditional authority and the lack of understanding of the complexities of legal rational authority made the emergence of at least a semblance of charismatic

leadership possible. The artificial character of many of the state bound-
aries, the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the population,
the great difference in social development of the few urban centers and
coastal areas and the rural periphery, and the weakness of administra-
tive institutions led the leaders of the new independent states to believe
that their party could serve as a nation-building instrument. Faced with
the problems of national integration, the not-always loyal opposition,
and the fear of foreign influences, the dominant party, in the context
of a political culture that had not institutionalized liberal democratic
values, soon became a single party.

Significantly, some of the leaders rejected the idea of a single
monolithic party: "We are against the *parti unique*. We are in favor of
a unified party [*parti unifié*]," to use the expression of Senghor (Foltz,
1965, p. 141). Many leaders of dominant parties encouraged the entry
into the party of leaders with a strong regional, communal, tribal, or
sectional following who initially supported the defeated opposition
parties or were prominent in them. They bring into the loosely orga-
nized *parti unifié* their following and electorate.

In analyzing African one-party systems and their mobilizational ca-
pacity, we should keep in mind some facts stressed by Aristide R. Zol-
berg (1966, pp. 15–33) about their penetration in the society. In Ghana
the first test of the strength of the Convention People's party (CPP)
came in the 1951 election, two years after its founding, in which it ob-
tained 92 percent of the votes cast in Accra, 94 percent in other mu-
nicipalities where elections were direct, and 72 percent of grand elec-
tors of other areas. However, in the five municipalities, 64 percent of
the qualified population registered to vote and, of these, 47.2 percent
voted. Hence, the voters represented about 30 percent of the eligible
population, itself somewhat smaller than the total number of adults.
This was a startling achievement but one that cannot be taken as an in-
dication of territorial saturation by the CPP. Similarly, Zolberg notes
that in the Ivory Coast the organization of Houphouet-Boigny (the
PDCI) in 1946 obtained 94 percent of the votes in the election to the
territorial assembly, which amounted to 53 percent of the eligible elec-
torate that had registered, but since the electorate was a very restricted
one these votes represented about 6 percent of the estimated adult pop-
ulation. In 1952, in an election that the headers acknowledged to be
fair, Houphouet-Boigny's opponents obtained only 28 percent of the
votes cast and the PDCI represented only 33 percent of the enlarged
electorate. A similar calculation leads to an estimation of the support

for Leopold Senghor's party in Senegal, with 68 percent of the votes cast in 1951 and similarly in 1952, of perhaps 10 to 15 percent of the adult population. Certainly such voting strength is not comparable to that achieved by mass parties, democratic or antidemocratic, in critical elections preceding the breakdown of several European democracies, particularly the massive vote for the NSDAP in the early thirties. Such figures should have given pause to those who feared or hoped for a totalitarian control by a movement regime and its leaders in African states, including Ghana, where the rhetoric, the organization charts of the party, and the cult of the leader gave the impression of moving in such a direction.[61]

The single-party regimes in the newly independent nations, given the social structure and the economic development, could not extract enough resources to sustain their vision of radically transforming the society by organizational methods. The collecting of dues or taxes to sustain those organizations was unfeasible. The few politically conscious and relatively educated leaders were needed to staff the government and numerous agencies, to the detriment of the party oragnization. Primordial and personal loyalties deflected the party organization in the periphery from the tasks that the center wanted to assign to it. The discrepancies between the ideological rhetoric (Friedland and Rosberg, 1964) and the achievements and realities of politics, together with the discontent of new generations, particularly those returning from abroad and not finding positions of power commensurate to their ambitions, often created factional tension with the youth organizations, trade-union leadership, etc., which could be best avoided by placing less emphasis on the party. The ideological formulations were largely derivative, ambiguous, and in contradiction with the pragmatic policies to which the leadership felt bound by social and economic realities, and therefore did not provide clear and immediate goals to the membership. As a result, the single party, rather than becoming a totalitarian instrument of mobilization, the monistic center, became one more factor in the power structure, achieving only limited participation. Ironically, it has been argued that single parties had the best chances of survival in the least mobilized, most backward societies, like Mali (Snyder, 1965) and Tanzania (Bienen, 1970), rather than in countries like Ghana with greater resources, where, as a result, an inflationary process of demand formation is likely to develop (Zolberg, 1966, pp. 145–50). In very backward societies revolutionary blueprints affecting the modern sector of the economy caused little disruption.

Another alternative was the transformation of the single party from a disciplined, ideological mass movement into a flexible machine that maintained solidarity among its members by appealing to their self-interest while allowing for the play of factions and for recurrent reconciliation, relying characteristically on the attraction of material rewards rather than enthusiasm for political principles. Leaders who some observers and perhaps some sectors of their society had conceived of as charismatic appeared to others as political bosses. The opportunities for corruption contributed further to the crisis of the ideological single party but often cemented a machinelike organization. While the opposition and the dissidents had to be silenced, there was no need, given their numbers and their resources, for the type of paramilitary organizations developed in the advanced European societies by fascist parties. The coercion would also take the form of machine politics (Zolberg, 1966, 1969; Bretton, 1973).

Few mobilizatonal single parties retained any function only a few years after independence. Those that had not been ousted by military coups experienced considerable transformation. The typologies initially formulated (Morrison et al., 1972; Hodgkin, 1961; Carter, 1962) have been misleading because they were often based on images that the African parties wanted to convey to the world and themselves. They are based on relatively formal structures, that is, they relate to real phenomena but are limited to an account of how they would work if they worked according to the normative expectations of the elites. The people who articulated those ideologies were often not very close to the center of power within the party. However, the single party often remained as an objectified, tangible symbol of the unity of the society. From having been a means, the political monopoly becomes a self-justifying goal. As Zolberg (1966, pp. 62–63) has noted, the mood underlying the emphasis on the single party in such essentially plural societies as those of Africa is somewhat like that of the Jacobins when faced with the *Fédérés*. The faith in planning, in rational control of the economy, rather than in a complex and little visible process like the market, is parallel to and reinforces the symbolic commitment to community. Zolberg in *Creating Political Order* (1966) has noted the functions that can be performed by machine parties appealing to the self-interest of members, allowing for the play of factions and recurrent reconciliation, and providing for formal and informal representation of a multitude of relatively modern and not-so-modern groups in the society, including those based on common origin and on explicit economic

and political interests. Its informal inner workings allow patterns of behavior and norms that might otherwise be dismissed as unmodern, allow participation to individuals who do not possess expert or bureaucratic skills but are interested in politics, and sustain a powerful central authority while the party remains popular, facilitating a contact between the mass and the leadership.

One hope of some single-party leaders was that they would provide a channel for democratic participation of the population without the tensions of multiparty systems in integrated societies. In this context, the attempt of Nyerere to use TANU, the Tanganyika African National Union, for the establishment of a democratic one-party state, with the sponsorship of two candidates by the party in national legislative elections, has been particularly interesting (Bienen, 1970; Hopkins, 1971). The experiment of TANU not as an elite but as a mass party through which any citizen of good will can participate in the process of government is faced with a dilemma well formulated in this official report: "To insist on narrow ideological conformity would clearly be inconsistent with the mass participation in the affairs of the party which we regard as essential" (Bienen, 1970, p. 242). On the other hand, if membership involves no political commitment of any kind, TANU would become coextensive with the nation and would cease to function as a political party in any serious sense.

Preselection of candidates within the party but competition between them should allow the people to reject an individual without appearing to reject TANU. But the initial idea of Nyerere, that TANU hold completely open elections in which patriotic individuals could run as candidates, was not accepted. In fact, tendencies have appeared demanding a more elitist and tightly organized TANU, imposing qualitative criteria for membership. In September 1965 the voters in the former Tanganyika, except in five constituencies, could choose between two candidates with the result that 22 out of 31 officeholders were unsuccessful and 16 out of 31 MPs lost. The lack of clear relationship between success or failure and the share of votes received in district preference polls in the party suggest that while only those close to the party could run, they did not enjoy oligarchic control of the outcome, in an election in which 50 percent of the adult population voted. Tanzania is an interesting experiment of combining a single-party system with a freedom of choice for the electorate (Cliffe, 1967). The open, rather than ideological and disciplined, mass-party character of TANU combined with the importance of local concerns in the electorate and the

absence of deep, mobilized nationwide cleavages seem to have made it possible. However, it is dubious that any experiment of a democratic one-party state could succeed in an urban industrial or even semi-industrial society.

5. Racial and Ethnic "Democracies"

With this deliberately paradoxical concept we want to refer to regimes in which the political process among those belonging to a racially defined group, particularly a minority of the population, satisfies our definition of democracy but permanently excludes another racial group (or groups), legally or by de facto coercive means. That exclusion does not allow us to fit such regimes into our definition of democracy. The Republic of South Africa is the prime example of such a regime. In many respects regimes that exclude from a limited pluralism a large part and even a majority of population on the basis of race could be described as racial oligarchies or authoritarian regimes. On account of the importance of the ideology of apartheid and the pervasive impact of the racial caste system on the daily life of citizens, including the racial dominant minority, the level of political and social mobilization against potential dangers to its supremacy, and the actual and, even more important, the future need for coercion to maintain the status quo, those regimes could be considered pretotalitarian or totalitarian in potential. Why should we then label them as racial democracies and place them in our attribute space on the borderline with democratic regimes? This paradox is reflected in the ranking of South Africa among 114 countries, according to eligibility to participate in elections and degree of opportunity for public opposition, in scale type 14 (when the least opportunity ranks 30), far above most authoritarian regimes in the world (Dahl, 1971). The paradox is the result of the strange juxtaposition of two societies and political systems, which in the utopian ideology of the defenders of apartheid would be parallel and separate but which inevitably, due to a number of economic, social, and historical constraints, find themselves in a castelike hierarchical relation sustained politically by authoritarian and ultimately coercive domination.

This type of relation has been characteristic of colonial rule[62] and still survives in the few territories under colonial government but diverges from it in several respects. The rule is not exercised in the name of a metropolitan government through its appointed agents ideologically and legally for the benefit of the whole population but is exercised in

the name and actually for the benefit of a self-governing racial minority The history of colonization in a few areas of the world led to sizable white settlements in areas where large nonwhite populations were not decimated, where racial prejudices, sometimes supported by religion and ideology and the migration of families rather than males ready to establish sexual relations with the natives, created castelike societies based on race. Those white settlers brought with them values and institutions in the mainstream of the liberal democratic tradition. In this respect they were like the societies described by Louis Hartz (1964) that resulted from fragmentation of Western European empires, particularly the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Those traditions and their institutionalization, sometimes with the support of and other times against the metropolitan authority, could have led to the establishment of stable democracies, particularly considering the economic resources available in the case of South Africa. As long as the native population was socially nonmobilized, under traditional authority structures maintained as indirect rule, nonurban and illiterate, unexposed to Western culture, religion, and mass media, and more or less resigned to that marginal and subordinate status, the white settlers could develop representative institutions and enjoy civil liberties and the rule of law. The result was the development of a competitive party system, parliamentary government, and many of those characteristics that still in 1968, using ten characteristics of political life among the white population, place South Africa very close to the polyarchies.

However, the racism of the whites, the numerical proportions of whites and nonwhites in the population, the economic, social, and cultural inequality between the races, the fears resulting from racist prejudice and the demographic and other inequalities between the races, and the inevitable polarization resulting from the initial segregation and rejection of a policy of integration have prevented the emergence of any form of multiracial nation and consequently multiracial democratic state (Thompson, 1966; Van den Berghe, 1967; Adam, 1971; Potholm and Dale, 1972). Even the limited participation of the Cape Town Coloured in the electorate and representative institutions was slowly restricted and practically eliminated through a complex and long legal process. The metropolitan power was unwilling and/or unable (in the case of Rhodesia) to impose some form of multiracial democracy. The tensions between the large, long-time resident, Afrikaans-speaking whites and the more recent English-speaking population, based on the memories of the Great Trek and the War of 1899–1902 and

the persistent differences in social structure, economic power, religion, and culture, led to the mobilizations of the white Afrikaners behind the Nationalist party and its policy of apartheid. It also accounts for the electoral weakness of moderates and the practical insignificance of the Progressive party and the enlightened minority among the elite opposing that policy. The enactment over the years of repressive legislation, culminating in the general law amendment acts of 1963 and 1965, has banned and served to destroy any African opposition to full white domination and second-class citizenship. The exclusion from the electorate of the 68.3 percent Bantus, 9.4 percent Coloureds, except for a small minority allowed to elect four representatives, and the 3 percent Asians, requiring after the Sharpeville incident an increasing use of force, places South Africa according to our definition among the nondemocratic regimes. On the other hand, the persistence of liberal democratic institutions, a wide range of civil liberties, and of parties competing for power in free elections among the white minority justifies the label "racial democracy." The political freedom among whites is based on the unity among whites, on the widespread consensus among them on the policy of racial domination, and particularly on the support by a majority of the electorate of the Nationalist party.

A racial democracy, however, is not only an authoritarian rule over the nonwhites but inevitably leads to increasingly authoritarian rule over those whites who question the policy of the majority and increasing limitations and infringements of the civil liberties and political expression of the dissidents. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Public Safety Act of 1953, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of the same year, the Prison Act of 1959, the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963, etc., in their loose formulation include restrictions that can be and have been increasingly applied to white dissidents who protest against the law or support any campaign against it, reflecting the policy approved by the majority. Ultimately racial democracy leads to authoritarian rule with majority support regularly expressed through elections, allowing democratic political competition on nonracial issues and guaranteeing, at least for the time being, other freedoms like the equality of the Afrikaans and the English languages.

The supporter of the South African regime would argue that this description is incomplete and even distorted. He would stress that apartheid in principle, even when not perhaps in its present practice, implies the separate development of racial communities, in fact of separate nations, in their own area with their own democratic self-government.

Ignoring for the moment the difficulty of applying that model to the populations intermingled in the great urban centers without a distinct territorial basis, particularly the Asians, most of the Coloured, and a very large proportion of the Bantu population, the attempts to create democratic, nonwhite states have not and are not likely to succeed to fit our definition of democracy. The case of the Transkei, in which 400 white inhabitants were deprived of a say in local government, consistent with the ideology that non-Africans may not become citizens, does not fit. It does not fit not only because of the presence in the legislative assembly of the 4 paramount chiefs and 60 chiefs of the Transkei, among whom vacancies are filled by the regional authorities subject to the confirmation of the state president, in addition to 45 elected representatives, but because of the number of important legislative subjects excluded from its competence, among them the amendment of the Transkei Constitution enacted by the South African Parliament. The basic law is therefore similar to that of a colony under the system of dyarchy, in which the metropolitan power retains control over everything that is vital while allowing the indigenous people the qualified management of a limited range of local affairs mainly through the medium of chiefs, whom the metropolitan power can influence in many overt and covert ways.

Even ignoring that fewer than 40 percent of the African inhabitants of the republic are physically present in Bantu areas, in which, according to government policy, such black racial democracies would be established, the fact that constitutionally they would have only a share in power and no institutionalized mechanisms to participate in the decision making for the whole South African Republic would not allow us to call the African Bantustans parallel democratic political units. The development of a Coloured representative council and of an Indian representative council and the stripping of provincial and municipal authorities of many of their powers over nonwhites, considering the powers allocated to the departments of the central government and the share of power assigned to such councils and the executive committee chosen by them, show the legal and de facto limits to the experiment of a single state with segregated racial communities, whatever degree of formal self-government allowed to them. The social and economic realities in South Africa, described at greater length in the chapter by Duane Lockard (Volume 6 of the original *Handbook*), particularly the social and economic interdependence among the races in the urban economy, and the legally established inferiority of the nonwhites are

even more impressive evidence of the authoritarian character of white racial "democracy."

Ultimately the political future of South Africa and Rhodesia depends on the level of political consciousness and the intensity of opposition and resistance of the nonwhite, particularly the African, majorities. That opposition by definition has to be principled and disloyal, illegal or at least alegal, and is more unlikely to be violent. Its strength and character will largely depend on the external support and the response of white South Africans. Open and violent conflict between the races, particularly with foreign support, would transform white racial democracy into a strictly authoritarian majority rule over dissident whites, which, considering the widespread support for apartheid, the strong consensus of the Afrikaners, and the support given to the policy by the Dutch Reform Churches, could lead to a totalitarian system with majority support, formal democratic institutions, and a strong component of legalism, based on a radical racist ideology.

Fortunately, the social and historical conditions that have led to the establishment of the racial democracy in South Africa are not found today in many parts of the world. Outside of Rhodesia, where the Salisbury government declaring its independence from Britain has established a similar regime, few colonies presented the combination of the large white settler population surrounded by a majority of nonwhites and having no intention or possibility of returning to the metropolitan homeland. Only Algeria, with a little over a million Europeans, many of them born there, many without roots in metropolitan France, among 8.5 million Maghrebi nationals, could have led to such a regime if the colons and the OAS had succeeded against the Algerians and the French. Perhaps in Angola could the white settler population, independent from metropolitan Portugal and under South African influence, have been tempted to establish such a regime. The American South, if it had gained its sovereignty in the war of secession, would have been another case. Undoubtedly other racially, ethnically, religiously, or culturally multinational or community societies in the non-Western world could in the future develop political forms similar to the racial democracies. But today some are experimenting with multinational democratic regimes or with a variety of authoritarian regimes with little semblance of democracy for any of the national groups. In most of them the low level of social mobilization and political organization, and consequently of coercive capacity of any group, is more likely to lead to political fragmentation and secession.

Multiethnic democracies without consensus. Paradoxically, Israel (Fein, 1967; Eisenstadt, 1967), with its democratic political culture, its democratic institutions, including proportional representation, which maximizes party pluralism, and the equal vote for all citizens, faces a future somewhat similar to the racial democracies in spite of the commitments of its leaders. It exemplifies the difficulties of creating a democratic, multiethnic, multicultural, and multilinguistic state when there is a dominant community conscious of its identity facing a demographically important minority also attached to its identity, separated by great cultural, religious, linguistic, and economic social differences. Only class and other divisions that could lead to majorities cutting across communal boundaries would make possible a democratic multinational state with real rather than formal equality of Jews, Arabs, and other minorities. Such a development in Israel, however, would run counter to the basic assumptions that have led to the creation of a Jewish state by the Zionists and of the religious characteristics introduced by the disproportionate influence of the minor religious parties in the policies of the dominant coalition since statehood. Only the cultural-ideological secularization of the state would make possible its acceptance within a democratic framework by the Arab minority and the return of the Palestinians and their loyalty to the state. It could be argued that a more federative structure that would leave considerable self-government to areas inhabited by each cultural community could, under democratic rule, facilitate such a development; but this ignores a basic presupposition of any democratic political system: the loyalty to the state and the rejection of any loyalty to another political system across its borders, any thought of secession, and any responsiveness to irredentist appeals from the outside. Those conditions do not seem likely to develop in the immediate future in Israel and in a number of other multiethnic, multicultural states whose boundaries cut across cultural, ethnic, or linguistic communities. Under such circumstances the participation of the minority in the national political process, even with full citizen rights, is likely to be partial, conditional, and suspect both to the state-sustaining majority and to those in the minority actually or potentially disloyal to it. Democratic institutions under such circumstances can work well within the majority community, particularly as long as it feels threatened, but it will be the democracy of the privileged. It could be argued that the formulas devised in those democracies not based on the strict application of majority of rule, called by Lijphart (1968a, 1968b, 1969) "consociational," should be able to handle

such problems, but any reader of the now extensive literature on such systems (Daalder, 1974; McRae, 1974) is conscious of the numerous requirements for their success, unlikely to be found in many cases like that of contemporary Israel.

The case of Northern Ireland (Rose, 1971; Lijphart, 1975), with its formally democratic constitution and more or less real guarantees for political freedom for those willing to recognize its regime, is another example of the practical impossibility of making democratic processes work in divided societies without loyalty to the constitution and the regime on the part of the minority and a willingness of a large part of the majority to face the fact that a formally democratically legitimated majority rule under such circumstances becomes oppressive and has to turn to increasingly authoritarian responses.

Paradoxically, nationalism, the doctrine of self-determination of nationalities and cultural communities, born historically in the West at the same time as democratic ideals and with increasing social mobilization of the whole population, has become incompatible with democracy in many societies. The first victim of that process was a multinational Austro-Hungarian empire, which assured under autocratic rule a considerable degree of coexistence to its national components but which almost inevitably fell apart in the process of democratization. There is no easy solution within the framework of traditional democratic theory of government for the problem of permanent self-conscious minorities rejecting a common loyalty to the state and its institutions for the sake of independence or secession to join another state. The fact that in many parts of the world such communities do not coincide with any meaningful geographic boundaries, that they live interspersed in their cities or enclaves without geographical continuity, often leads to conflicts that are solved by authoritarian means or at least by the limitation of freedoms de jure or de facto for those in the minority questioning the legitimacy of a state. Their permanent frustration is likely, under certain conditions, to lead them to turn in their desperation to violence, against both members of the dominant community and those in the minority willing to participate in a democratic framework in more or less consociational formulas, reinforcing the authoritarian response of the majority. Democracy seems to have been more successful in the institutionalization of class conflicts, in the channeling through parties of economic interest conflicts and even of conflicts between religion and secularism, than in the resolution of conflicts among ethnic, linguistic, and cultural communalism. Such

conflicts are one of the important factors accounting for the emergence and, paradoxically, the stability of many nondemocratic regimes (Fishman, 1968).

Racial democracy represents a theoretically interesting case of transition from democratic liberal institutions to authoritarian rule without discontinuity and by formal democratic procedures. Theoretically, other oligarchic democracies based on a restricted suffrage could have followed the same path when confronted with growing demands for expansion of political participation from the lower classes. However, the different level of social integration in racially homogeneous communities, despite other deep cleavages, and the consequent sense of community have prevented the combination of democratic liberal forms with minority rule. In such societies, inevitably, a minority of the politically privileged classes advocated the expansion of political rights and those opposed had to make concessions or give up any semblance of democratic freedoms, even within the privileged sector of the society. This provides indirect evidence for the difficulties and instability of attempts of partial liberalization and democratization within authoritarian regimes, like internal democracy in a single party. Ultimately, without a relatively rigid barrier like race defining those with the right to participate and those excluded and without an extraordinary fear of all those who deprive others of citizen rights, it becomes impossible to limit participation beyond the level of social mobilization without explicitly authoritarian institutions. However, as the case of ethnic-cultural-religious minorities shows, the extension of suffrage alone does not assure real opportunities for political participation nor real social integration and loyalty to a state needed for stable democratic politics.

6. "Defective" and "Pretotalitarian" Political Situations and Regimes

In an effort to understand the dynamics of nondemocratic political systems we have attempted to define totalitarianism fairly strictly, to keep it clearly distinct from the variety of authoritarian regimes. However, the transitions between both types do not involve the same basic discontinuity and, with rare exceptions, violent breaks, revolutions, civil wars, and military coups as do the transitions from democracy to authoritarianism. The diffuseness of the boundary is reflected in the increasing use of terms like "quasi-totalitarian," "post-totalitarian," "rationalized-totalitarian," "totalitarianism without terror," etc., to describe the gray zone between both. Our typological effort has been

based on the assumption that in the process of instoration of nondemocratic governments some basic initial characteristics determine if the outcome will be closer to the totalitarian or the authoritarian pole. The analysis of the breakdown of competitive democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1978), traditional regimes, or colonial rule should tell us something about the dynamics leading to one or another outcome. We have also emphasized how the initial characteristics of the leader or group taking over power—their ideology or mentality, their organizational base in the existing social structure or in a new mass movement or conspiratorial party, and perhaps personality—prefigure, together with situational variables, the outcome. Since the complex structure of a totalitarian political system is not developed in a short time, except in societies suffering extreme disorganization after prolonged war, foreign occupation, or civil war, we can posit a stage that might be best described as pretotalitarian. We know still little about the way in which new, revolutionary rulers break through constraining conditions, to use the expression of Otto Kirchheimer (1969, pp. 385–407), and the circumstances under which they fail. We still need a theory of consolidation of new regimes. It is noteworthy that an insightful fascist politician, the Spaniard Ramiro Ledesma Ramos (1968, first printed in 1935), in a political essay comparing European one-party states, including the Soviet Union in the mid-30s, should have devoted much of his attention to the constraining conditions that, unless overcome, limited, in his view, a real totalitarian revolution. We would consider as pretotalitarian those situations in which there are important political, social, and cultural factors favorable to a totalitarian outcome; basically a situation in which there is a political group of sufficient importance pursuing a totalitarian utopia but that has not yet fully consolidated its power and given the system its institutional structure; a situation in which institutions like the armed forces, the churches, business organizations, interest groups, notables or tribal rulers, the courts, or even a monarch, not clearly committed to a system excluding all pluralisms even though largely favoring a limitation of pluralism, still retain considerable autonomy, legitimacy, and effectiveness; and a situation characterized by an uneasy balance in which predictions go one way or another, where some expect the totalitarian movement to be co-opted by the preexisting social structure, while others look forward to or fear its ultimate success.

The reader of early descriptions of the Nazi system—particularly those by Marxists, which emphasize the multiple compromises the regime made with the conservative structures of German society, particularly the

bureaucracy and the military (F. Neumann, 1963) and even, in some accounts, with the churches, and the betrayal of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary ideals against modern industrial and financial capitalism, large-scale cartels, department and chain stores, etc.—should keep in mind descriptions of the Soviet Union in one of the phases of its consolidation. For example, this summary by Jeremy R. Azrael:

> After a brief period of left wing militancy, the revisionism of "Bread, Land, and Peace" gave way to the far-reaching compromises of the New Economic Policy or NEP. The free market was revived; concessions were made to foreign investors; material incentives were restored to their paramount position; and individual peasant proprietorship was actively encouraged. Similarly, "workers' control" and "workers' management" were drastically curtailed, and administrative efficiency, technical rationality, and stringent labor discipline became hallmarks of official policy. In the same vein, the regime granted more authority to holdover "bourgeois specialists" and ordered communist executives to solicit and defer to expert advice. Moreover, these developments were accompanied by definite symptoms of decay within the party itself. In particular, there was a manifest decline of "class vigilance" and revolutionary ardor among the rank and file members of the party, and the upper strata of the party showed clear signs of "regrouping" into administrative pressure groups and bureaucratic cliques. (Azrael, 1970b, p. 263)

Had the Soviet regime been destroyed at this point, the capacity of the revolutionary forces to transform Russian society and to move toward the totalitarian utopia would certainly have been questioned. It also explains that many observers at the time predicted quite different outcomes than Stalinism. The very different interpretations of Hitler's rule in early years reflect that same intermingling. The uneasy balance between such contradictory tendencies might be prolonged for many years, with moves in one or another direction, as was the case with Fascism in Italy.

A typical pretotalitarian situation is that in which a party that is bent toward more or less totalitarian control with its mass organizations and, in the fascist case, its paramilitary organizations can exercise pressures on a government in which its leaders participate in coalition with representatives of other parties.[63] Such a coalition was formed in Italy after the March on Rome and in Germany by a presidential decision under the chancellorship of Hitler, with the participation of the authoritarian-nationalist DNVP and with Papen as Vice Chancellor. The parties participating were either opposed or semiloyal to the democratic regime, or, in the case of Italy, minority representatives of other parties willing

to collaborate in a compromise with the Fascists. In Germany the Enabling Act, by which the parliament, under pressure, and with the exclusion of the Communists and the opposition of the Socialists, granted the government extraordinary powers and attempted to tie those powers to the continuity of that particular coalition government as an authoritarian "presidential government." The change represented the last break with Weimar constitutionality. In Eastern Europe after 1945 the pressures of the Soviet Union, its military presence, the desire for national unity in face of the Germans, the availability of collaborationist socialists, and the compromise between Western allies and the Soviet Union led to the formation of coalition national front governments in which all antifascist parties participated according to a prearranged proportion, not necessarily reflecting their strength in the electorate and parliaments after elections (Kase, 1968; Seton-Watson, 1968; Ionescu, 1967; Oren, 1973). Such still nominally "constitutional" governments often proceed to outlaw some parties (communist or fascist, or those presumably guilty of collaborating with them), restrict civil liberties (generally with the ministry of interior in the hands of the dominant party), and co-opt some leaders of the different parties, politically neutralizing others, ending with the dissolution of all or most parties and the fusion of some—or sections of some—in the totalitarian-bent party (Korbell, 1959). The relative weight and the linkage of those co-opted elements with independent power bases is obviously decisive for the ultimate totalitarian or authoritarian outcome. In economically or militarily dependent countries, foreign influences become decisive at this stage (Black and Thornton, 1964; Triska, 1969).

In those situations the coalition partners find themselves in the position of wanting to oppose some of the policies of the totalitarian-bent party but in doing so allowing that party to question their loyalty to the government and the new regime and facilitating its goal of ousting them. On the other hand, approval or passivity in face of policies of which they disapprove contributes to legitimating the transition to every day more authoritarian rule and to preventing an active opposition by institutions or social groups still capable of it. In such situations there is much room for opportunists ready to join the stronger armies by advocating the fusion of their party with the increasingly dominant coalition partner. This was the case with many conservative authoritarian organizations in Germany and with parts of the socialist parties that fused into communist-dominated united parties, like the East German *Sozialistische Einheitspartei* (SED). In a number of com-

munist countries this phase of national front is still reflected in a multi-party system under the leadership of the communists, with the minor parties serving to co-opt representatives of other groups and in the post-Stalinist phase serving as controlled channels for the representation of certain interests and as a legitimizing facade. A system in which the development toward totalitarianism is arrested and stabilized and in which the forces aiming at totalitarian control become one—often very important—component of the limited pluralism of the regime, their ideology affects considerable spheres of social life, and participation in their organizations is significant, might be described as "defective totalitarianism." The term "pretotalitarian," in contrast, might be reserved for the (more or less prolonged) phase leading to the instoration of a totalitarian system. Situations in which the strength of prototalitarian forces is reversed might be labelled "arrested totalitarianism."

The analysis of Spain as an authoritarian regime (Linz, 1964) has tended to emphasize the variables that led to the ultimate failure of the totalitarian tendencies within the Falangist movement, but it should be possible to reanalyze Spanish politics in the later phases of the civil war and the first years after 1939 as a defective totalitarian system. In many respects the insightful analysis by Ernst Fraenkel (1941), *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship,* could be considered a study of the pretotalitarian aspects of the Nazi regime. The study of pretotalitarian situations and defective totalitarian regimes in connection with the theory of the process of consolidation of new regimes would be a step toward a better understanding of the uniqueness of totalitarianism and at the same time would prevent us from underestimating the totalitarian tendencies that often accompany the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Such an underestimation is perhaps one of the weaknesses of my analysis of the Franco regime as an authoritarian regime.

Historical studies like the monumental work by Bracher, Sauer, and Schulz on the Nazi *Machtergreifung,* the history of fascism in the biography of Mussolini by De Felice (1965, 1966a, 1968), Leonard Schapiro's (1965) *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy,* and Robert V. Daniels's (1969) *The Conscience of the Revolution* would be the obvious sources together with studies of systems whose totalitarian potential was weaker, like Robert Scalapino's (1953) *Democracy and Party Government in Pre-War Japan* (there are, unfortunately, few works of similar importance on the years after takeover in other nondemocratic systems). They could be the basis for a theory of emergence and consolidation of totalitarianism rather than authoritarian regimes. Such a theory

would complement those analyses that focus on social, cultural, psychological, and political crises preceding the breakdown of democracy. It would also tell us the extent to which totalitarianism is not predetermined but is the result of critical choices made in such a transition period.

7. Post-totalitarian Authoritarian Regimes

The death of Stalin and the consequent de-Stalinization both in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries that had followed the Soviet model led to changes in those political systems which rightly made political scientists question the applicability of the classical model of a totalitarian system. Research on interest groups in Soviet politics (Skilling and Griffiths, 1971; Janos, 1970b), on specific processes of policymaking (Ploss, 1965; Stewart, 1968), on the changing composition of the Soviet elite (Armstrong, 1967; Fischer, 1968; Farrell, 1970a; Fleron, 1969, 1970; Barghoorn, 1972; Beck, 1970), on intellectual life and the expression of dissent or contestation (Barghoorn, 1973) have shown important changes from the Stalinist model despite some signs of "neo-Stalinism." The comparative study of East European Communist regimes (Brzezinski, 1960; Brown, 1966; Skilling, 1966, 1973a; Ionescu, 1967; Schöpflin, 1970) has also highlighted the increasingly differentiated development in response to national-cultural, historical, social-structural, and economic factors. The Czech spring of 1968 and the reforms proposed by and under Dubcek (Zeman, 1968; Gueyt, 1969; James, 1969; Remington, 1969; Tigrid, 1969; Windsor and Roberts, 1969; Skilling, 1970, 1973b) and before that the independent evolution of Yugoslavia from the administrative phase to self-management have raised the question of the condition and limits of change in Soviet-type political systems. The terms "liberalization" and "democratization" have been used freely, often interchangeably, and unfortunately with little precision. It is indicative of the train of thought of the discussion that the question could be raised: "Is Mexico the future of East Europe?" (Croan, 1970). It could be argued that those changes indicate a tendency in political systems that at one point in time could have been considered approaching the totalitarian model to show some of the characteristics we have used to characterize authoritarian regimes. This would be congruent with our emphasis on the relatively open and diffuse boundary between totalitarian systems and authoritarian regimes.

However, we feel it would be misleading to consider post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes as having the same characteristics as those

that never were conceived by their founders to become totalitarian or that never went beyond a "defective" totalitarian stage despite the efforts of some of their founders. The totalitarian phase, even when imposed from the outside, as in some of the East European people's democracies, has left many structures—political as well as economic and social—that can be transformed but are unlikely to disappear and has created an image of a type of polity to which some of the elites still feel attached and whose "positive" aspects they might wish to retain or attain. It also has left memories, particularly of its worst features—the terror and the purges—which condition the responses of those participating in the political process and therefore affect the evolution of those systems. It is on these grounds that we find it unnecessary to consider post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes a distinct type, obviously with considerable national variations. The alternative would be to argue that the processes of change taking place after Stalin are really only a more visible manifestation of patterns already present (which would imply that totalitarianism was never as total and that the concept can be applied to the present reality too, despite changes, or that it never had any validity) or to deny any basic change. The vexing question, How much change in the system is required for change *of* the system? is obviously empirically difficult to answer, particularly when scholarship in the past might have been blind to deviations from the utopian totalitarian model and in recent years might have been too eager to see change and overestimate its importance. Unfortunately, for a more comparative analysis of what we might call "routinization" of totalitarianism—of its transformation—we are limited to communist countries, since none of the fascist totalitarian states were allowed by their military defeat to undergo such a process. There was no post-Hitler Germany, with Himmler executed, Dönitz as *Führer* displacing Bormann with a coalition of army officers loyal to the Reich, and civil servants and industrialists supporting some reasonable *Gauleiter* as head of the party.

For those who interpret Soviet totalitarianism as a reflection of Stalin's paranoic personality it is easy to consider the totalitarian phase as a passing aberration, and this might well be true for some of the most monstrous aspects of the system. This has been the official line of the de-Stalinizers. Implicit in this interpretation is a denial of a pretotalitarian character to Leninist rule and a totalitarian intent in Bolshevik revolutionary ideology. For the social scientists such an approach seems unsatisfactory or at least incomplete. They are likely to emphasize changes in

the external environment, in the social-economic structure confronting the successors of Stalin: the complexity of managerial and technical decision making requiring greater rationality, decentralization, autonomy of experts, substitution of ideological *apparatchiki* by others with more education and expertise, fewer constraints with greater economic development, etc. Those writing about the convergence of postindustrial societies would certainly emphasize these factors and support the argument with reference to the role of economists and the reforms advocated by them in the process of change. Others, including some Soviet authors, would note the different international environment of a Soviet Union surrounded by allies in Eastern Europe, safe behind the atomic deterrent in a world in which the capitalist enemies find themselves challenged in the Third World and in which the mutual interests of security dictate a détente. To those factors we might add the emerging polycentrism of communism showing alternative and creative solutions linking with different national, cultural, and political traditions, which makes the original model of the first socialist state more questionable (Blackmer, 1968). The position taken by powerful nonruling communist parties toward changes in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European sphere of influence would be another factor. Certainly in the Eastern European countries the shift toward greater independence as national communist states, as the case of Yugoslavia shows, was decisive in the change. However, Rumania shows that a more nationalist policy within the bloc is not necessarily accompanied by deep internal changes (Jowitt, 1971). Without denying the decisive importance of all or some of these factors in the particular development toward post-totalitarianism in communist countries, I would agree with Gordon Skilling when he writes:

> No doubt there *are* social and economic forces at work which encourage interest group activity in the USSR. It seems clear, however, that this later development has been the consequence of certain conscious decisions of individual leaders and other participants in Soviet political life, decisions which were not necessarily pre-determined and which might be reversed in the future. The rise of group activity under Khrushchev was, in the first place, the result of an initiative from above, representing an effort by Stalin's successor to make the political system more rational in its process of decision making and more responsive to the actual needs and demands of the people, especially of the influential elites. (Skilling and Griffiths, 1971, p. 403)

The work of Max Weber provides indirectly interesting insights into the process at work. In his analysis of charismatic authority he noted that its character is specifically alien to everyday routine structures, the strictly personal character of social relationships involved. He continued:

> If this is not to remain a purely transitory phenomenon, but to take on the character of a permanent relationship, a "community" of disciples or followers, or a party organization, or any sort of political or hierocratic organization, it is necessary for the character of charismatic authority to become radically changed . . . it cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.
>   The following are the principle motives underlying this transformation: (a) the ideal and also the material interest of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples, the party workers, or others in continuing their relationship . . . but they have an interest in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material point of view, their own position is put on a stable everyday basis. (Weber, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 246)

In the subsequent discussion of the routinization of charisma particularly after the succession crisis, Weber notes that a process of traditionalization or of legalization takes place and that one of the possible outcomes is a greater bureaucratization. For Weber, one of the decisive motives underlying all cases of the routinization of charisma is naturally the striving for security, the objective necessity of adapting the order and the staff organization to the normal everyday needs and conditions of carrying on administration, and the necessity that there should be some definite order introduced into the organization of the administrative staff itself.

There can be no doubt that the desire for security in the top elite after Stalin, the surrogate Stalins, and the experience of the purges, decisively influenced the top elite's decisions. The weakening of the police as a key political factor, perhaps its neutralization by the army, the emphasis on collective leadership and the rejection of the cult of personality, the distrust of an emerging powerful leader that led to the ouster of Khrushchev, the desire even on his part to use the procedures of the party statutes to resolve the leadership crisis, the growing concern for socialist legality, are all reflections of this desire for security

in the top elite. Some of those changes were made easier by the formal rules and the conception of leadership institutionalized before Stalin, and in this respect it is doubtful that a post-Hitler *Fuhrerstaat* would have had as easy a transformation. The desire for security, however, also explains the reaffirmation of the role of the party, the reactivation of the party as a source of legitimacy of the leadership, even the slowing down of the de-Stalinization and of efforts to revise it, as well as the decisive reaction to the Czech reform. To be stable, post-totalitarianism can reject the totalitarian heritage only selectively and gradually, if it is not to lead to a revolutionary outbreak that could lead to a radical change of the system, endangering the continuity in power of the elite. The literature suggests, even when it provides only limited and indirect evidence, that the cleavages between conservatives and reformists cut across practically all organizations, groups, opinion milieux, or whatever units of analysis are used, largely along generational lines. There seems to be a difference between this and the crisis of succession or approaching succession in authoritarian regimes, in which in addition to such crosscutting and generational differences we find a greater tension between the elements constituting the limited pluralism of the regime on a more institutional basis, possibly with some of them breaking out of the system and contributing to its final crisis or overthrow (Linz, 1973a). Significantly no one expects in any of the communist countries a military intervention or coup that would establish a noncommunist regime.

Once the great break through constraining conditions had been accomplished, with destruction of traditional society by war communism, the secure establishment of Communist party rule without any need to share power with other leftist parties, collectivization of agriculture and forced industrialization, destruction of the sanitary cordon intended by the West, and a more complex society requiring greater expertise and consequently autonomy of individuals and groups had emerged, the leadership was probably right in assuming that a system could be run more efficiently and equally securely without the constant affirmation of moral political unity, emphasis on ideological orthodoxy, fear of "groupism," constant assertion of the power of the party, and the recurrent mobilization for radical changes. The fact that, perhaps due to Stalin's idiosyncrasies, the totalitarian effort had been accompanied by massive terror even against the elite, obviously legitimated a transition to what Tucker (1963) has called an "extinct movement regime" and others "administrative totalitarianism" (Kassof, 1969) or

"rationalized totalitarianism" (Cocks, 1970). The transition to a post-totalitarian state implies less emphasis on the goal culture and greater concern for the functional requisites of the social system. This allows a process that had been described as liberalization: the emergence of group interest, or at least the expression of it by a few outstanding individuals (Skilling, 1971, p. 382); "the free expression and collision of opinions" while rejecting "groupism" (*gruppovshina*); the ideological recognition of "non-antagonistic contradictions"; and the effective and to some extent visible manifestation of group influences in decision making (Skilling, 1971, p. 401). A limited monocentrism, a less ideological politics, and a greater tolerance for depolitization show a tendency toward an authoritarian regime. Let us note that while most non-communist authoritarian rulers insistently warn against the return of political parties, rulers of the Soviet Union warn against "groupism" and factionalism—a recognition of tendencies within the party—showing the different starting points of change. These processes are accompanied by bureaucratization and professionalization, tendencies that run counter to the ideological tradition of participation and mobilization of the party activists and the citizens, a tradition that is potentially suspicious of the emerging social pluralism and legitimizes demands for greater participation. The initial post-totalitarian legitimacy of an emerging authoritarian regime is therefore likely to be questioned, not only by neo-Stalinists but by those wanting to return to some of the hopes in the Marxist-Leninist tradition for a more socially egalitarian, active, and participatory society. It is possible that some of the different paths followed after de-Stalinization and the tensions in this period are the result of these two, somewhat different, pressures. In fact, contrary to what many analysts believe, liberalization and "democratization" (in the sense of greater participation) are in tension. This is because, as other authoritarian regimes show, the pursuit of both tendencies would lead ultimately to a nonauthoritarian regime, endangering the position of the present ruling elite, but also because of an ideological heritage ambivalent on this point.

Richard Lowenthal has formulated very well the contradictory pressures leading to post-totalitarian authoritarianism when he writes:

> The Communist Party can no longer claim that its task is to use state power to transform the social structure in accordance with its utopian goals; it knows it must react to the pressures and demands of society. But wishing to keep its monopoly of power, it is not resigned to

conceive of government as a mere representative of the needs of so-
ciety—for a truly representative regime would have to be a pluralistic
regime, permitting independent organized groups to struggle for their
opinions and interests and to reach decisions by coalitions and com-
promise. Rather, the postrevolutionary party regime sees itself as an
indispensible, authoritative, arbiter of society's various interests, rec-
ognizing their existence but regulating their expression and limiting
their representation while retaining for itself the ultimate right of de-
cision. Unable to continue its revolutionary offensive against society
and unwilling to be reduced to a mere expression of the constellation
of social forces at a given moment, it is neither totalitarian nor demo-
cratic, but authoritarian: it is on the defensive against the forces of
autonomous social development, a guardian clinging to a role after
his ward has reached adulthood. (Lowenthal, 1970, pp. 114–15)

It might be argued that the emergence of post-totalitarian tenden-
cies after stabilization of the revolutionary regime in China, specifi-
cally bureaucratization of the party, etc., led Mao, the old revolutionary
still formally in power, to reverse the trend with the mobilizational re-
sponse of the Great Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards, as the
analysis of Schurmann (1968) suggests. Let us not forget that Khrush-
chev combined the detotalitarianization of the thaw with the revitaliza-
tion of the party and new efforts to engage citizens in political partici-
pation, through activities like the citizens' courts and the activation of
local volunteers, people's guards (*druzhiny*), and the Komsomol in
functions of social control described by Leon Lipson (1967). To the ex-
tent that the mass of the population and the more active sectors of it
share many of the values of a deprivatized, collectively oriented soci-
ety, they might question the tendencies toward greater autonomy advo-
cated by intermediate strata and support more consensually than ter-
roristically imposed totalitarian tendencies. This would account for the
quite different post-totalitarian character of the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic compared to those societies in which the
totalitarian phase was much shorter and was largely imposed from out-
side and in which pluralistic elements of the pretakeover society and
culture had survived.

In the literature we find a variety of attempts to conceptualize and
describe post-totalitarian communist systems which reflect some of the
dilemmas pointed out above.[64] Since the Soviet Union was in many
ways, under Stalin, the most totalitarian, it is still not clear how far it
will move in the authoritarian direction. In fact, it could be argued the
Stalinist regime in its last stage had become a system characterized by

considerable conservatism, inflexibility, inertia, and stagnation, which ran counter to the mobilizational aspects of a totalitarian movement regime. The kind of "late totalitarianism" characterized by a highly ritualized adherence to ideological formulae, a curbing of utopian expectations, extreme bureaucratic rigidity and few organizational innovations, a theoretical and actual downgrading of the party relative to the state and the police, and highly formalized popular participation with little real involvement could be conceived as a "totalitarian authoritarianism."

From that baseline the post-Stalinist development showed two somewhat different tendencies, one reflected in the scholarly discovery of interest and group politics and the other, well described by Azrael (1970a), "a populist model of rationalized totalitarianism" initiated by Khrushchev with his extensive use of the policy of "public participation." In this line we find the creation of so-called nonstaff party commissions by the district and city party committees, consisting of party volunteers who were not on the paid rosters of the party apparat assisting in the review of admission, discipline, and appeals. This contrasted with the pattern since 1934 in which such questions had been the privileged domain of party secretaries. Those instructors were also to observe party members who had been disciplined for "endlessly looking after their words" (Cocks, 1970, p. 172), an excellent example of why democratization and rationalization in the Soviet sense could not be equated with liberalization. Another example is control function assigned to "Komsomol Searchlight" detachments, of which in 1964 there were more than 260,000 groups and 500,000 posts of assistants (Cocks, 1970, p. 172). These activities under the Party State Control Committee (PSCC) implementing the policy described as *obshchestvennye nachala* (Cocks, 1970, pp. 165–66), or "public principles," with its dimension of "public participation" was naturally regarded with distrust by the *apparatchiki* and the economic managers. This trend toward "communist self-government" was reexamined and curtailed after the fall of Khrushchev by his successors, who turned toward a more bureaucratic formula for rationalization, deemphasizing the voluntarism and the populism with a turn to *nauchnaia organizatsiia truda* ("scientific organization of labor"). This policy, linked with another component of the Leninist tradition, his enthusiasm for scientific management, and practically with the needs of a socialist economy meant in practice an emphasis on retraining of party and government workers. The new spirit was reflected in a greater concern with information gathering and office organization, and technological aides aimed at

administrative reform from above by experts. Cocks, whom we are following in this analysis of Soviet policies, concludes: "The alliance of economic managers and party bureaucrats which was forged out of the common interest and desire to maintain their own institutional structures against democratic intrusions and mass pressures, gives no guarantee of being long-lasting" (Cocks, 1970, p. 185). Zvi Gitelman also reflects this tension when he writes:

> Clearly the role of the party is a more delicate issue for systems opting for authentic participatory strategies since those opting for national performance strategies could retain the structure and the political position of the party while altering the content of its ideology, thus making it a party of "experts" for example. (Gitelman, 1970, p. 261)

This alternative course leads toward what Allen Kassof (1969) has called "the administered society, totalitarianism without terror." The aim was well expressed in 1969 by the editors of *Partiinaia Zhizn* as "systematic and fundamental control prevents mistakes and slips, holds people in constant state of creative stress and does not leave room for such manifestations as placidity, complacency, and conceit" (Cocks, 1970, pp. 186–87). Cocks notes that there is some tendency to fuse the two main trends we have just been discussing, to strike a balance between the populist and the bureaucratic formulas for rationalization. All this leads us to the question, How post-totalitarian (ignoring obviously the Stalinist idiosyncrasies and terror) is Soviet society?

Gordon Skilling's extensive writings and a number of monographic studies on policymaking and local politics have emphasized the role of group conflict. Much of the discussion hinges on what is meant by groups and to what extent the five types that he mentions—"leadership groups or factions, official or bureaucratic groups, intellectual groups, broad social groups, and opinion groups"—are comparable to the groups we discover in pretotalitarian or stable authoritarian regimes. He rightly notes that the first question is that of legitimacy or, rather, the presumed lack of legitimacy of political groups in Marxist-Leninist theory. There is obviously a thin line between the existence of such groups de facto and the limited legitimacy granted to them in pure authoritarian regimes. Certainly the talk about "nonantagonistic contradictions" opens the door to convergence. Skilling lists three additional major considerations: the question of group autonomy in the defense of its interest and opinions, the extent to which political groups

have become organized or institutionalized, and the range of purposes and specific objectives of such groups. These dimensions lead him in a comparative analysis of communist systems to a classification of communist states in five types, to which in passing he adds the pre-totalitarian (pre-Stalinist) phase. Let us quote briefly his characterization of these types.

> In the quasi-totalitarianism state political groups are treated in theory as illegitimate, and in practice are severely limited in their capacity for independent action. In some cases, the leadership consciously sets out to destroy political groups, in others to infiltrate and emasculate them. If organized groups such as trade unions exist, they are manipulated and controlled by the leadership and do not articulate the interests of their constituency. In general the official groups, especially the party, are superior in power and influence to the intellectuals who are bereft of any real power. Even the official groups are relatively weak and are used as instruments by the leadership. (Skilling, 1970, pp. 222–23)

As he notes, this category coincides with totalitarianism except for the definitions that overstress the monopoly of power and make terror an essential characteristic. Stalin's Russia from 1929 to 1953, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia after 1947–48, and Albania to the present might be in this category.

A second type may be called "consultative authoritarianism," to use the term suggested by Peter Ludz (1970) in reference to the German Democratic Republic, in which Skilling would include Rumania (Jowitt, 1971), Bulgaria (Oren, 1973), and in certain respects Hungary in the sixties, Poland (Wiatr, 1967; Lane and Kolankiewicz, 1973) after March 1968, and the Soviet Union after Khrushchev. In it:

> When group activity occurs spontaneously and expresses fundamental opposition, it is firmly repressed, and the dominant role of the top leadership is kept intact. Although the police remain an important force, the prominent position they held in the quasi-totalitarian state is occupied here by such bureaucratic groups as the party and state administrators. These grounds are valued for their expertise and thus acquire an opportunity to articulate their own and other groups' interests. There is also an increasing willingness to bring some of the professional groups, such as the economists and scientists, into the decision making process, although the party apparat continues to play the superior role, both in theory and in practice. Creative intellectuals . . . are subject to strict control but occasionally slip the leash and

> assert their own viewpoint. Broader social groups continue to be impotent, and their interests are expressed, if at all, by more powerful official groups. (Skilling, 1970, p. 223)

Skilling notes how in response to particular crises and wishes of the leadership this type moves back and forth. Probably in terms of our general typology at a higher level of abstraction, this type is still closer to the totalitarian pole using our definition.

The third category of Skilling is "quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism," in which he includes Hungary and Poland during the thaw of 1953–56, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, and Czechoslovakia and Poland in the mid-1960s. He characterized this type

> as distinguished by a greater degree of group conflict, resulting usually from the initiative of the groups themselves. Although the party leadership remains the dominant factor in politics, there is greater interaction between the leaders and political groups and greater likelihood of some influence by the latter on the political process. Group conflict is often accompanied, and may be encouraged, by sharp factional conflicts among the leaders and serious divisions of opinion within the party as a whole. Although bureaucratic groups, especially the party hierarchy, remain powerful, they cannot entirely exclude the intellectual and opinion groups in general from participation. Both types of group show a greater determination to express interests and values in opposition to the party line, advancing alternative policies, criticizing official decisions and actions, and in some cases challenging frontally a whole series of official policies. Ironically, these active groups continue to be for the most part noninstitutionalized, whereas organized groups such as the trade unions remain impotent. (Skilling, 1970, p. 224)

It is in this context that we find for the first time a preregime institution mentioned as a significant group, the Catholic Church in Poland. His effort to locate a number of communist countries in the typology shows the instability of this type but also its frequency. It is perhaps the most dominant type of post-totalitarian communist regime.

A fourth type, characterized as "democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism," includes Czechoslovakia between January and August 1968 and Yugoslavia after the break with the Soviet Union and most particularly after 1966. They are systems in which "with the endorsement of the leadership, political groups were to a substantial degree institutionalized and they played a significant role in policy making" (Skilling, 1970, p. 225). Czechoslovakia under Dubcek represents

an interesting example "in which both centrally directed change designed and elaborated by the party leaders and powerful spontaneous forces from below with considerable freedom of expression, particularly for change oriented intellectual groups articulating a wide variety of group interests and opinions," a revitalization of dormant associations like trade unions and even distinctive opinion groups like the "club of the non-party committee" urged alternative policies on the leadership and even institutional change (Skilling, 1973a). However, the Soviet invasion cut short this development. Yugoslavia, in a more gradual way over the fifties and sixties, moved toward this type through the decentralization of public administration and the introduction of workers councils, institutionalizing expressions of local and regional interests and giving representation of economic interests in elected assemblies, on the basis of a kind of corporativism. Skilling suggests that this pluralistic development affected the cultural and intellectual sphere less in Yugoslavia than in Czechoslovakia and even in a short period in Hungary and Poland.

Yugoslavia, which would deserve more discussion in this context, would be in our basic typology an authoritarian regime, and the different degree of autonomy granted to various groups and their institutionalization fits well with our notion of limited pluralism (Neal, 1957; Hoffman and Neal, 1962; Zaninovich, 1968; Horvat, 1969; Barton, Denitch, and Kadushin, 1973). However, we should not ignore the opportunities for participation provided by self-management and workers' control (Roggemann, 1970; Pusić, 1973; Supek, 1973) and the potential for mobilization of the League of Communists. This participatory element is in conflict with bureaucratic and technocratic tendencies (Milenkovitch, 1971) and should—in principle—counteract the pressures of nationalism. A sign of the legitimacy gained by the new institutions is that criticism is often articulated in terms of discrepancies between ideal and reality of self-management. Yugoslavia also exemplifies that in the dynamics of authoritarian regimes there might be two alternative paths: one, liberalization, which might benefit particularly intellectual, cultural groups, opinion groups, making the pool from which the professional politicians are recruited more heterogeneous; and another path emphasizing more the ideology, retaining an important function for the party but allowing a greater democratization at the local and factory level. From this perspective a comparison of Yugoslavia with the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) regime in Mexico and even with Franco's Spain would be fruitful. It is our

assumption that stable communist regimes created by a national revolution, fully independent of the USSR, are more likely to progress in the direction of partial democratization than of liberalization. Posttotalitarian, and in the case of Yugoslavia postadministrative-phase, independent communist regimes are likely to take this form. Or perhaps, if the break through the constraining conditions has not yet been achieved and the original ideologically committed leadership is still in power, the form will fit the Chinese model with its antibureaucratic mobilizational features under the cultural revolution.

It is this last model that is described by Skilling as "anarchic authoritarianism," in which few of the groups that clashed in the cultural revolution were institutionalized or "legitimate." Also they were permitted and even encouraged by Mao, using spontaneous and coercive methods that had little in common with the organized processes of group action in Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. It is this last type in Skilling's classification that seems less useful. His typology raises a basic question, which is not easy to answer: Under what conditions does "quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism" become "democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism"?

John Michael Montias's (1970) "Types of Economic Systems," based on three coordinates—the degree of mobilization for the promotion of regime goals of participants in the system, particularly of peasants, workers, and employees by lower-level party cadres; the degree of reliance by central authorities on hierarchically transmitted commands for furthering regime goals; and the relative importance of markets for producer goods—makes little reference to other political and cultural changes in communist systems. However, in view of the central importance of the organization of the economy in the development of communist politics, the changing role of the party in the economy, the nature of incentives as they affect the citizen, the sources of discontent, etc., it would be most interesting to relate his types with other political changes. On the basis of the three mentioned coordinates, he distinguishes four main types of socialist economic systems: (1) mobilization, (2) centralized administered, and (3) decentralized administered, both of which are characterized by having hierarchically structured bureaucracies for affecting the party's economic policies, and (4) market socialist. The mobilization system, high on the mobilization coordinate and on that of command, is certainly in the economic sphere the most congruent with totalitarianism. This probably would be true for a mobilization system not relying heavily on hierarchically transmitted

commands as it might have existed in China in the Great Leap Forward campaign. It seems reasonable that the post-totalitarian authoritarian systems will ruin the economy either as decentralized administered systems or in the form of market socialism.

In connection with the typology offered by Montias the question might be raised whether a totalitarianism aiming at a utopian transformation of society in spheres not directly related to the economy and social structure but to cultural and religious values, the mobilization for an imperialist policy, and changing the status structure rather than the class structure (as it was in the case of the Nazis) was totalitarian with an economic policy that would not fit in the mobilizational or centralized administrative system types. Perhaps this was the case because the German economy at that time was much further advanced. It seems, however, that given the close interconnection between the political and economic system in communist societies, changes in the economic system toward greater autonomy of various units will tend to have also political consequences. Montias in his analysis stresses that the transitions from one to another type of economic system are reversible and that there are cases of remobilization. He also seems to suggest that the dismantling of centralized systems and particularly the shift to market socialism is hard to achieve without "revolution from above" buttressed by suitable changes in ideology. In that context he notes that in Yugoslavia the ideological support for the economic reform was provided by inveighing against state capital monopoly and bureaucratization, which were made to be hallmarks of Soviet "degeneration," a process that did not take place in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the reforms were grafted to the old system. Without a change in political leadership it seems that the transformation to market socialism could not occur. Certainly the question of the relative weight of economic developments, social changes, and strictly defined political factors, in the process of transition from totalitarianism to a variety of post-totalitarian systems, deserves further analysis.

Certainly a number of social, economic, political, and historical variables would account for these different developments in post-totalitarian communist states, but as the case of Czechoslovakia shows, the international linkages with the Soviet Union are a far from negligible variable. We should not forget either, in any comparative analysis, the different ways in which the communists achieved power in different countries: the combination of national and social revolution in China, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, Cuba, and Albania; and the largely externally imposed

rule in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and East Germany. Nor can we neglect the characteristics of the Communist party before taking power: its size, its respectable showing in free elections in Czechoslovakia, and the ways in which it had developed in exile, illegality, and resistance in other countries like the Southern Balkans. In the case of East Germany the transition of a society from one totalitarian system to another obviously contributed to its stability, despite the discontent and the competition with the Federal Republic that before the Berlin Wall undermined its development. Nor can we ignore the demonstration effect of changes in one communist country on others, particularly the impact of the Yugoslav example and in a quite different direction of the Chinese.

In the short run we would argue that the stabilized Soviet sphere of influence, the Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the détente with the United States should discourage those favoring a more open discussion of political institutional alternatives and questioning the dominant role of the party. On the other hand the complexity of tasks undertaken by the political system and the party should, in a less tense atmosphere and with greater economic resources, favor a more participatory authoritarian regime, in which at the local level, perhaps at the factory level, a certain decentralization would be combined with a freer participation of those loyal to the system. This would favor a "democratizing authoritarianism" at the lower levels and the "consultative authoritarianism" of Peter Ludz at the higher level rather than a further institutionalization of "quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism." It would favor economic rather than political reform even when these are obviously difficult to separate in communist states. Despite the convergence in many respects with other types of authoritarian regimes, particularly the "mobilizational one-party states" in the Third World and some of the "statist-organic authoritarian regimes" in the Western sphere of influence, we do not expect them to evolve in the same direction. In the West the pressures for liberalization are likely to be stronger than those for greater participation, while in the East those for liberalization are likely to be curtailed and those for participation, strengthened, at least at the lower levels, where they can be controlled. It depends very much on the values of the observer which of these two developments he or she would consider closer to the model of competitive democracy. But neither is likely to head ultimately to competitive democracy. The possibility of a reversal of post-totalitarian authoritarianisms in the communist world to "populist" or

"bureaucratic" totalitarian tendencies cannot be excluded, but at present does not seem likely.

The question of post-totalitarianism particularly in the Soviet Union, is intimately linked with the theories of convergence of industrial or postindustrial society.[65] Alfred G. Meyer has summarized very well the intellectual and ideological context in which such theories have been formulated:

> Theories of convergence are as old as the Russian revolution itself, if we think of Waclaw Machajski's wry Saint-Simonian prognosis of the development of a stratified industrial society in which the educated and skilled would emerge as the new ruling class. Machajski was a disillusioned Marxist; and theories of convergence seem to suggest themselves easily to disillusioned Marxists, or at least to Marxists who have become disillusioned about the Soviet Union. Consider the theories of Trotsky, Achminov, Djilas, Mao, and the European and American New Left. In some fashion or other, they all describe the Soviet system as one in which a proletarian revolution gone wrong has resulted in the society reverting to some form of capitalism. Conversely, in the manner of James Burnham, another disillusioned Marxist, theories of the revolution betrayed correspond to assumptions about the end of capitalism and democracy in the West and foretell the emergence of a "managerial" society much like that projected by Saint-Simon, Machajski, and others. (Meyer, 1970, p. 319)

In addition to the disillusioned Marxists, writers disappointed with or suspicious of democracy, particularly among sociologists, starting with Tocqueville, have also noted the totalitarian tendencies of democracy. Another group is some economists who argue that the command economy has become dysfunctional and must be replaced by new and more rational planning methods. In their work, as in that of Isaac Deutscher, there is a strong element of technological economic determinism, which assumes a given technology causing a functionally corresponding social structure or system of social relations and similar systems of social relations developing similar political systems. The tendency from the days of the founding fathers of sociology to allow only limited autonomy to politics from the socioeconomic system and their areas of interest explain the favor that this perspective has found among them. The collection of readings edited by Paul Hollander (1969), *American and Soviet Society*, shows the fruitfulness and also the limitations of this perspective. Another source has been pacifist moralizing, wishful thinking, and sheer impatience with the cold war,

based on the somewhat dubious assumption that similar systems are more compatible with each other than dissimilar ones. A newer theory of convergence proceeds from the assumption that industrial societies will converge in the form of bureaucratization rather than liberalization and democratization, which represented passing stages in the development of Western societies. Alfred G. Meyer (1970), without calling it convergence, contributes to that perspective when he asserts that the Soviet Union can be best understood as a giant bureaucracy, something like a modern corporation extended over the entire society, a "General Motors at large," even when he warns against pushing the analogy too far considering that in real life General Motors still exists within a larger society, culture, and political system.

The convergence theories, optimistic or apocalyptic, often on the basis of the opposite of ideological premises, have the merit of highlighting certain aspects of the study of societies and political systems that the type of analysis offered in this chapter tend to neglect but that cannot be fully dismissed.

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
THE PLACE OF THE WORLD'S STATES IN THE TYPOLOGY: AN ATTEMPT AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

It would have certainly been highly desirable to further operationalize our three main dimensions: the degree of monism versus limited pluralism, mobilization versus depoliticization of the population, and centrality of ideologies versus predominance of what we have called mentalities. The next step would have been to find systematic, valid, and reliable indicators of those three dimensions and to locate the countries of the world in the resulting attribute space. Finally, by selecting meaningful cutting points we would be able to define operationally the types and subtypes of nondemocratic regimes. The end product of such efforts would be a list of countries that at any particular point in time could be placed in each type.

Any reader of the now extensive literature on the conditions and measures of democracy, well summarized by John D. May (1973), will be fully aware of the difficulties in carrying out such an operation, even for the limited number of countries that generally are considered democratic or borderline cases. In spite of the availability of easily measurable indicators like the percentage of population eligible to vote, percentage voting, electoral support of majority and minority parties, share in seats of those parties, and constitutionally legitimate turnover of executives, as well as much richer information and other indicators like mass media control and the usual indices of economic development, no generally accepted classification or measure of the degree of democracy has resulted. The data that we would need to operationalize the dimensions of our typology are much more elusive, and in addition no one has yet made a deliberate effort to collect them systematically. To take just one obvious dimension, political mobilization of

the citizens versus depoliticization, there is no easily available measure comparable to the percentage of citizen voting in competitive democracies.[66] Even leaving aside the differing meaning of the vote when there is no freedom to articulate and organize alternative opinion, it seems somewhat strange to find that in the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Gabon, the United Arab Republic, and Niger over 98 percent of the electorate actually votes, according to official reports (a similar report is made for seven communist countries), while among the polyarchies only the Netherlands reaches that high level of participation. It is, however, worth notice that among all the countries that we would not consider democracies according to our definition, those claiming an electoral participation rate above 90 percent happen to be totalitarian, post-totalitarian, or those we would have classified at the time as mobilizational postindependence regimes, generally with an officially established single party.[67] However, such an indicator would be useless for those countries that have not had national elections, like Cuba and China, obviously based on a high level of mobilization, and others like traditional Arab sheikhdoms, nor would such an indicator with its gross distortions and falsifications be of much value to classify countries between those extremes. Another possible indicator of mobilization, as we suggested in our discussion, would be the actual membership and participation in the activities of the officially established single party and its mass organizations for youth, women, etc. No one has systematically collected such data, and it is likely that the figures reported would in many cases be a wishful distortion of reality. Certainly the 1.1 million members claimed in the early sixties by Falange-Movimiento in Spain can in no meaningful way be compared with the 2.5 million members of the NSDAP in 1935, if we would consider even the most minimal indicators of involvement in the party. Actually in proportion to the population of each country, those figures would not be far apart. If this is the case with the most easily quantifiable indicator, the situation becomes even worse when we consider ones like the degree of limited pluralism or the monopoly of political power. Scholars unfamiliar with this type of system have fallen into the trap of considering the proportion of members of the government or high officeholders who are members of the party as an indicator, forgetting that they were legally considered members by the fact of holding such offices and their reaching those positions had nothing to do with previous involvement in the party but was based on quite different criteria, like military or bureaucratic careers, technical expertise, membership in influential

religious associations, etc. Only a case-by-case sifting of the evidence for which the monographic research is often unavailable would allow us to make intelligent use of such operational criteria. We would obviously wish to have quantitative indicators of the importance of the official single parties in the political process of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, and we would not deny that such indicators could be devised, like the ratio between government nonparty officials and paid officials of the party; the presence of men who made their careers in the party in other sectors of the political system like government, bureaucracies, the military, the academy, etc.; and the share of the party in the control of mass media. It would seem as if the degree of autonomy, development, interest articulation, and aggregation as defined by Gabriel Almond could serve to measure the degree of pluralism. But the efforts of Banks and Textor (1963; Banks and Gregg, 1965) to operationalize those concepts show the difficulty in using them outside of the democratic and a few other well-known countries. In fact, their coding of those dimensions is based not on any hard indicators but on the judgment of experts, using probably quite different frames of reference in classifying the country they know best.

In view of all these problems it seems unwarranted to attempt to place all the countries of the world within the types and subtypes we have developed here. But it seems appropriate, using our best judgment, to place a number of polities in the types we have theoretically and inductively developed. Certainly even more than in the case of the measurement of democracy found in the literature, scholars will disagree with our typology, but even accepting its usefulness they will question the placing of particular countries at a particular time in it, on account of a different reading of the available evidence or using different indicators than those implicitly used by us. Therefore our classification should be considered indicative and illustrative and be perfected by other scholars before it is used in sophisticated computer analysis in search for correlations with other nonpolitical variables. Our distinctions are qualitative rather than quantitative, and often quite far apart from those resulting from perhaps premature efforts of quantification of some relevant dimensions, like the scaling by Dahl and his associates of 114 countries in 31 types by the opportunities to participate in national elections and to oppose the government. This does not mean that the clusters of countries discovered by them using the admittedly debatable coding of Banks and Textor do not show significant coincidences with the groupings reached by us. When there could be

such a profound disagreement as that between Banks and Textor and Dahl about the classification of a well-known country like France, we can imagine how precarious the data base for such refined classifications must be in the case of most countries that have reached independence recently and are characterized by unstable governments that have not been the object of monographic research from a comparative perspective. All this would account for the relatively low level of coincidence between the classifications in our typology and the scaling of those same countries by Dahl, Norling, and Williams (Dahl, 1971, Appendix A, pp. 231–45) disregarding changes in the nature of the political regime even over short periods of time. The difficulties encountered by Marvin E. Olsen, Dick Simpson, and Arthur K. Smith in measuring democratic performance, noted by John D. May (1973), should serve as warning against premature and specious quantification of any typological effort like ours. Elegant statistical operations built on weak foundations seem to us more misleading than a frankly qualitative judgment based on a mental and hopefully intelligent summation of a large amount of information.

6

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

After our panoramic overview of the variety of political systems that are not based on a regular free competition for power among organized groups emerging with more or less spontaneity from the society, that is, of all the regimes that cannot be called competitive democracies, it is difficult to discern some general trends about the prospects of different forms of government.[68] On the one hand, the successful stable democracies, with their political freedoms, the opportunities for political participation of the average citizen, particularly those with a calling for politics, and the predictability and relative peacefulness in handling political and social crises, continue to be a pole of attraction to people living under the variety of nondemocratic regimes. This accounts for the tendencies toward greater pluralism and more opportunities for participation to which the rulers in authoritarian regimes pay lip service or more or less sincerely and incompetently aim. On occasion we have noted how the processes of liberalization and democratization (in the sense of greater opportunities for active political participation) do not seem to have equally favorable prospects in different authoritarian and totalitarian systems. We can certainly expect the emergence of many transitional types of polities that, without losing their authoritarian character, might have a potential for becoming competitive democracies under favorable circumstances. In a small number of countries the fact that only recently they were ruled as competitive democracies creates pressures both from below and within the elite in that direction. However, we should not forget that the majority of countries we have been considering never have been under liberal democratic rule, never have had an opportunity to develop the traditions and values of a

Rechtstaat ("state of law") or the pluralism of institutions and corporate groups of the type that the West developed in centuries of feudalism, estate representation *(ständische-Verfassung)*, and autonomous corporate cities. Let us not forget that many of the regimes we have been considering have been established as successors of monarchical traditional despotisms or traditional political systems, where authority was limited by customs rather than by law and in which no other groups including religious organizations and authorities could challenge or limit political authority. A large number of polities, particularly in Africa, have emerged as a result of external colonial territorial divisions imposed upon smaller traditional political units, premodern tribal organizations, and communal structures. In those cases the modern and pseudomodern political systems have been imposed not upon a national community with civic consciousness but upon successors of an external authoritarian rule of the colonizer, and the task of building a civic and perhaps national consciousness may have to precede any attempt to organize a democratic state in which horizontal cleavages would crosscut and integrate vertical, territorial, and/or ethnic cleavages. In such societies we can expect a variety of authoritarian and perhaps occasionally totalitarian efforts to create stable regimes. In those societies in which authoritarian rule has succeeded with practically no discontinuity traditional premodern authoritarian forms or colonial rule, we can expect only limited popular pressures toward competitive democracy. Certainly, elites educated and/or oriented toward Western advanced societies are likely to be discontented with authoritarian rule and feel that modernization requires either competitive democracy or an imitation of the utopian totalitarian model. That discontent of sectors of the elite undoubtedly will contribute to the instability of authoritarian regimes, but it is doubtful that it will not lead to the successive reproduction of new and different authoritarian regimes. The transition from a desire by the elites for constitutional democratic forms after independence—first imitated and externally imposed or genuinely desired—to mobilizational or machine-type single parties and then to bureaucratic-military authoritarian rule in so many African states reflects those dilemmas. Authoritarian regimes of one or another type appeared to intellectuals, leaders, and even citizens of competitive democracies as basically illegitimate, and that value judgment in many ways contributes to delegitimize those regimes for important sectors in the elite of their societies but not necessarily for the masses. We therefore should be careful not to confuse the instability of authoritarian

regimes with favorable prospects for competitive democracy. The alternative to a particular authoritarian regime might be change within the regime or from one type of authoritarian rule to another, if not permanent instability or chaos (of which the Congo after independence was an outstanding example, see Willame, 1972).

We should not forget either that even established competitive democracies in a period of social change and revived ideological passion might undergo crises that lead to authoritarian rule unless a last minute and deliberate effort of reequilibration succeeds (Linz and Stepan, 1978). The circumstances accompanying a breakdown of democracy, as cases in Latin America show, make the reestablishment very difficult. Competitive democracy seems to be the result of quite unique constellations of factors and circumstances leading to its inauguration and stability. Many developments in modern societies and in the not-so-modern, particularly in terms of economic well-being, should make stable democracies possible, but those same conditions do not assure a successful process of inauguration of such regimes. Certainly many societies satisfied the requirements for stable democracy we find in the literature, but did not become competitive regimes.

When Robert Dahl raised the question about the future of polyarchies he wrote, "As with a great many things, the safest bet about a country's regime a generation from now is that it will be somewhat different but not radically different from what it is today." We can make the same statement about today's nondemocratic regimes. We would, however, have to add that in contrast to the stabilized democracies, we would expect considerable change in the types of authoritarian regimes and within the regimes themselves. Paradoxically, great shifts in mass electorates in advanced societies, except in extreme crisis situations, are unlikely, and therefore evolutionary rather than basic change characterizes democratic politics. Since in authoritarian regimes change depends on few actors, less constrained by constituencies difficult to convince by persuasion rather than imposition, important changes can take place more unexpectedly and can change the system considerably. Perhaps the particular types of authoritarian regimes are less likely to be fully institutionalized, and therefore we can expect many changes within the genus authoritarian. Since the end of World War II and even earlier, the list of countries fitting into the basic subtypes of majoritarian and consociational democracies has changed little. Neither has that of nondemocratic political states over the same period. But the lists of countries fitting at different moments in time into the various subtypes

has been far from stable. Irregular and violent changes have been frequent, as the overthrow of the postindependence single-party regimes in Africa by military coups establishing military-bureaucratic regimes shows. There are also evolutive tendencies within authoritarian regimes which seem to lead to a certain convergence toward some form of institutionalization of a limited pluralism based on a controlled and irresponsible representation of interests, limited and controlled forms of participation, and limited efforts of ideological justification of such institutional arrangements. That point of convergence in the development of authoritarian regimes seems to be relatively close to the model we have described as organic statism.[69] The regimes established as military dictatorships in the narrow sense of emergency interim rule by the army very quickly tend to become bureaucratic-military if not bureaucratic-technocratic-military. With the passing of time the variety of interests in society, particularly economic, professional, and sectorial, and to a certain degree labor and territorial, are included in one way or another into the limited and controlled pluralism. On the other hand, systems established by and through political parties gaining or aspiring to the monopoly of control or at least dominance over other pluralistic components with the effort of mass mobilization and declared ideological commitments seem to lose that dynamism and increasingly share their power with a variety of selected interest groups. Their totalitarian and arrested totalitarian tendencies are deflected toward various forms of conservative quasi-pluralistic or pluralistic authoritarian regimes, some of which seem to show a growing affinity to the model of organic statism. At some point the observer could think that the future was in the hands of mobilizational single parties that would hold at least dominant or predominant, if not exclusive, power. Contrary to that expectation we have seen the overthrow, transformation, or decay of single-party rule and organizations. Bureaucratic rule in cooperation with recognized organized interests seems to be the dominant model, sometimes supported by the military with its coercive capacity and organizational resources, other times legitimated by the continuing presence and influence at the top of a single party that provides some opportunity to organize a well-controlled mass participation and to recruit politically ambitious persons. It is important to be aware of the range and direction of dynamic tendencies within authoritarian regimes. It is this fact that makes it so difficult to place different countries in the types delineated above without reference to a particular moment in their development.

As to the future of totalitarianism, predictions are even more difficult. Certainly two of the historically most salient and well-known cases, the rule of Hitler and Stalin, seem to have weakened its attractiveness. But there can be no question that some of the underlying utopian ideological assumptions that made those distorted forms with their terror possible are still there. Ultimately, once the pluralistic conflict and accommodation model underlying democratic politics has been rejected in favor of a consensual society based on a deliberate active search for the common good according to a rational or irrational ideal conception under a leadership defined as competent and self-confident about achieving it, this model is not likely to lose its appeal. The totalitarian utopia is, for modern man, a pole of attraction not easily forgotten and is comparable in this respect to that of freedom for the individual to participate in democratic politics. Almost inevitably the elites in authoritarian regimes will feel the attraction of those two poles, even when the confining conditions of reality make it unlikely that most authoritarian regimes will evolve in one or another of those directions. Totalitarianism is ultimately as much if not more a result of a unique constellation of factors as is competitive democracy. Perhaps, fortunately, it is not easy to establish totalitarian systems. In spite of their many failures, and their lack of a distinctive legitimacy formula and ideology attractive to intellectuals, authoritarian regimes rather than totalitarian systems and democratic governments are the regimes most easily established and function under conditions neither too favorable nor unfavorable to the stability of government. Contrary to the hopes of free men and those of the *terribles simplificateurs* of which Burckhardt wrote, many if not most states will be ruled in the immediate future by authoritarian regimes, neither fully subordinating the individual to a great historical task of building a perfect society nor allowing him a free choice among a large set of alternatives or an opportunity to convince his fellow citizens to support him to implement those goals.

Notes

Chapter I: Introduction

1. An excellent comparative study of two societies under different political systems and the implications for the individual of living in the USSR and the U.S. is Hollander (1972). However, the impact of the generational and liberal-radical intellectual protest around 1970 colors some sections on the U.S. too much.

2. For Mussolini's and the Italian use of the term "totalitarian" see Jänicke (1971), pp. 20–36. This work is also the best review of the history of the uses of the term, its variants, and the polemics surrounding it, and includes an extensive bibliography. It should be noted that the use of the term for both fascist and communist regimes was not exclusive of liberals, Catholics, or conservatives, but that socialists like Hilferding already in 1939 did so. Hilferding also in 1936 abandoned a Marxist analysis of the totalitarian state (see Jänicke, 1971, pp. 74–75 and Hilferding, 1947b, p. 266).

3. On the concept of total war see Speier (1944).

4. For a discussion of the perception of the similarities of the Soviet and the fascist regimes by Trotsky and Italian Fascists see Gregor (1974b, pp. 183–88). For another example see the analysis by a Spanish left fascist, Ledesma Ramos (1968, pp. 288–91 passim). See also footnote 55.

5. For a review of the current typologies of political systems see Wiseman (1966, pp. 47–96). Almond and Coleman (1960) was a pioneer work in which Pye, Weiner, Coleman, Rustow, and Blanksten study politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The typology by Shils is used in connection with the functional analysis by Almond. Almond and Powell (1966, chapters 9–11) present a typology according to the degree of structural differentiation and secularization, from

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primitive political systems to modern democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian. Another interesting contribution is Finer (1971, pp. 44–51 passim). Blondel (1972) organizes his comparative analysis of political systems, distinguishing traditional conservative, liberal democratic, communist, populist, and authoritarian conservative systems. Rustow (1967) distinguishes (1) traditional, (2) modernizing—personal charismatic, military, single-party authoritarian, (3) modern democratic, totalitarian, and (4) absence of government.

Organski (1965) has formulated another typology of regimes on the basis of their relation to stages of economic development, the function of politics in that process, and the type of elite alliances and class conflicts. Among them we might note the type he calls "syncratic" (from the Greek 'syn,' together, rule) in semideveloped countries based on a compromise between industrial and agrarian elites stimulated by a threat from below.

Apter (1965), on the basis of his extensive research experience in Africa, has developed a highly stimulating and influential typology of political systems based on two main dimensions: the type of authority and the values pursued. The first dimension distinguishes systems of hierarchical authority (centrally controlled systems) and of pyramidal authority (systems with constitutional representation); the second distinguishes consummatory (sacred) and instrumental (secular) values. The resulting types are, among the hierarchic authority systems: (1) mobilizational systems (like China) and (2) either modernizing autocracies or neomercantilist societies (of which Morocco and Kemalism in Turkey would be examples); among pyramidal authority systems: (3) theocratic or feudal systems and (4) reconciliation systems. Mobilization and reconciliation systems are compared in relation to coercion and information, which are in inverse relation. Unfortunately it would be too complex to present here how Apter relates these theoretically developed types to the analysis of concrete political systems and to problems of modernization.

6. The calculations used in this section on the ranking of countries by population, gross national product, GNP growth rates, and the population under different types of regimes in Europe are based on tables 5.1, 5.4, and 5.5 in Taylor and Hudson (1972).

7. Our delimitation and definition of democracy has been derived from the following major works: Sartori (1962a), Kelsen (1929), Schumpeter (1950), and Dahl (1971). On Dahl's contribution to the theory of democracy, or—as he now prefers to call it—polyarchy, see the critical review essay of Ware (1974). It refers to criticisms of what has been called "elitist theory of democracy." See for example Bachrach (1967). Since these critiques focus more on the "democratization" of polyarchies than on their distinction from nonpolyarchies, we shall not enter further into these important discussions. We have developed our ideas about democracy further in the context of a discussion of R. Michels's pessimistic and ultimately misleading analysis; see Linz (1966).

8. The most debated case is Mexico, where a presidential candidate only in 1952 obtained less than 75 percent of the vote and generally obtains close to or over 90 percent. Opposition leaders are fully aware that they are doomed to lose any election for the 200 governorships and 282 senatorial seats. The opposition party's only hope (a recent development) is to obtain, in exchange for a few positions as representatives or municipal presidents, recognition by the government

for its leaders in the form of contracts, loans, or services. Parties are financed in many cases by the government, and they support the government candidates or provisionally fight them in exchange for concessions for their supporters. "Thus they have participated in the political game and the ceremony of elections," as a Mexican social scientist puts it. See González Casanova (1970). Another critical analysis is Cosío Villegas (1972). An earlier analysis that emphasizes the oligarchic characteristics is Brandenburg (1964). The best monographic study of policymaking in Mexico as an authoritarian regime is Kaufman (1970). For an analysis of elections see Taylor (1960). However, there are other interpretations that emphasize the democratic potential, either within the party or as a long-term development; see Scott (1964, 1965), Needler (1971), Padgett (1966), and Ross (1966). The fact that elections do not serve as a channel to power and that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) is a privileged party does not mean that there is not considerable freedom of expression and organization. For a study of the leading opposition party, its electoral support, and the handicaps it faces see Mabry (1973), pp. 170–82. On the continuing disagreement of scholars on the nature of the political system see Needleman and Needleman (1969).

Chapter 2: Totalitarian Systems

9. On intellectual and cultural life in the Soviet Union see Pipes (1961), Swayze (1962), Simmons (1971), and P. Johnson and Labedz (1965). For East Germany see Lange (1955). For communist China, MacFarquhar (1960) and Chen (1967). An interesting case study is Medvedev (1969) on Lysenko. For Nazi Germany, Brenner (1963), Mosse (1966), Wulf (1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1964), and Strothmann (1963). For further particularly revealing bibliographic references to education, the world of knowledge, see Tannenbaum (1972). While not a theoretically significant contribution, the illustrations showing the heterogeneity and eclecticism in official Italian art contrast with the German equivalents and are another indicator of the doubtful totalitarian character of Italian Fascism. See Silva (1973). The contrast between totalitarian and authoritarian regime cultural policy should become apparent to the reader of the study of Spanish intellectual life under Franco by E. Díaz (1974).

10. On religion and the state in the Soviet Union see Curtis (1960). For more recent times see Bourdeaux (1968, 1969) and Hayward and Fletcher (1969). For communist China see Baier (1968), Bush (1970), MacInnis (1972), and H. Welch (1972). For Germany see Conway (1968), Zipfel (1965), Lewy (1965), Buchheim (1953). For a regional study rich in documentation see Baier (1968). The contrast with Italy can be found in Webster (1960).

11. Already in the SA, ranks were given without regard to wartime rank in the army; see Gordon (1972, pp. 84–85). This ideology breaking through the status structure of the society was reflected in the SA oath: "I promise that I will see in every member . . . without thought of class, occupation, wealth or poverty, only my brother and true comrade, with whom I feel myself bound in joy and sorrow." Later this meant that a high civil servant might have been quite intimidated by his janitor holding the position of party *Blockwart*.

12. We cannot enter into the complex problem of the relationship between political systems and foreign policy. Certainly, aggressive policies, intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, political and economic imperialism are no monopoly of any type of regime. There can be no question either that national-socialism and its ideological conceptions and the internal dynamic of the German regime led to aggressive expansion, war, and the creation of a hegemonic system of exploited and oppressed countries and dependent satellites. There are distinctive Nazi components in that policy, particularly its racist conception, that cannot be confused with those derived from German nationalism (regaining full sovereignty after Versailles, the Auschluss, incorporation of border ethnic minorities) and those of a Mitteleuropa economic dominance policy. See Bracher (1970, pp. 287–329, 400–8, and the bibliographic references on pp. 520–23); Jacobsen (1968), Hillgruber (1971), and Hildebrand (1973). Deakin (1966) and Wiskemann (1966) study the very revealing relationship between Hitler and Mussolini. Undoubtedly, Fascist Italy also pursued a policy of expansion in the Adriatic and Africa, but it could be argued that—leaving aside rhetorical claims—its goals were those of prefascist imperialism. All fascist movements are characterized by their exacerbated nationalism, anti-internationalism, antipacificism, exultation of military values, irredentism, and often pan-nationalism, contrasted with the ideological commitments of demo-cratic parties of the left and center, even when some of those parties were not opposed to colonialism and national power and prestige politics.

The question of foreign policy of communist states presents the same problem of isolating national interests of the USSR—inherited from the Russian Empire—from those derived from the dynamics of the regime (particularly as the result of the civil war and foreign intervention, encirclement, isolation) and finally from those derived from international revolutionary solidarity and ideologically based perceptions of the international scene. The different points of view expressed by scholars can be found in Hoffmsan and Fleron (1971, part 3), in addition to Schulman (1969) and Ulam (1968). The literature on the Sino-Soviet dispute (Zagoria, 1969) brings out the complex interweaving of national interest and ideological conflicts. Obviously the literature on Eastern European communist countries (Seton-Watson, 1968; Ionescu, 1967; Brzezinski, 1960) reveals the inseparability of foreign and internal policy considerations with the Soviet hegemonic sphere. The relations of communist parties with the CPSU, particularly when the Soviet Union served as model socialist country, make it impossible to separate (specifically in the Stalin era) the politics of a worldwide revolutionary movement from those of the only country in which the party was in power. Polycentrism has obviously changed and complicated things. In spite of the affinities between fascist parties, influences and imitations, they never were linked by a common discipline comparable to the communists. Ideologically linked parties, ignoring any more direct dependency, are undoubtedly a factor in the foreign policy of movement regimes. The style and capacity for certain types of international political responses of regimes subject to free public criticism and overt dissent and of those not facing them must be different. However, it would be a mistake to deduct (for any type of regime) foreign policy at any point in time from ideological commitments, as the

flexibility shown in the Hitler-Stalin pact or U.S–communist China relations prove; but it might be more valid to take them into account in long-range strategies of regimes. A related topic we have ignored (perhaps too much) is the link between foreign policy crises and the crises and breakdown of democratic regimes, particularly in the rise of fascism but also the turn to authoritarian solutions in the Third World, as well as the link between preparedness for war, more specifically total war, and totalitarian tendencies.

13. The problem of succession of leaders in nondemocratic constitutional regimes has been considered one of their weaknesses in contrast to hereditary monarchies and parliamentary or presidential democracies (Rustow, 1964). The succession of Lenin and the consequent struggle for power influenced that discussion, as well as the very personal leadership and life-long tenure of many single-party regime leaders. Already in 1933 Farinacci in a letter to Mussolini (Aquarone, 1965, pp. 173–75) raised the question of succession of a unique leader who would not allow the emergence of other leaders as a problem in this type of regime. In fact, the expectation was that in the absence of an heir apparent no smooth transition could be expected and that any effective legal method to remove leaders in life or after limited tenure could be institutionalized. Events did not allow us to see the succession of the founders of fascist regimes, and the longevity of other founders has left us with speculations about the future of their regimes. The rise of Khrushchev (Swearer, 1964; Rush, 1968) despite the conflicts involved proved that succession did not need to lead to a breakdown of the system or even another purge and reign of terror. For the problems surrounding the succession of Mao see Robinson (1974). However the relatively institutionalized and peaceful succession of Khrushchev and Ho Chi Minh, and that of Nasser and Salazar, among others, suggest that the institutions of such regimes might be better able to handle the problem than was thought. Even more noticeable is the tendency of newly established authoritarian regimes, like the Brazilian military, to forestall the emergence of personal leadership and to establish time limits for tenure of office. The not too distant passing away of a number of founders of authoritarian regimes should allow a comparative analysis of the problem.

14. A good measure of the importance of ideology is the growth of a distinctive language (for example in case of Germany see Berning, 1964, and Klemperer, 1966) and the frequency of its use.

15. Aquarone (1965). Quoted from the "Statuto del partito del 1938," Appendix 63, pp. 571–90; see page 577. The work of Aquarone is essential for the study of the ideology and organization of the Italian Fascist party and state and includes a wealth of documents and legal texts.

16. On the ruling and nonruling communist parties see the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Allen, 1969); on their strength see the annual reports of the U.S. Department of State. For the Soviet Union (Rigby, 1968); for China the figures are: 57 in 1921 to 300,000 in 1933, 40,000 in 1937, 1,211,128 in 1945, 4,438,080 in 1949, 7,859,473 in 1955, 17,000,000 in 1961. Ratios to population in other communist countries around 1961 range from 3.2 percent in Albania to 15.5 percent in North Korea, with most countries between 4 and 5 percent, and 4.2 percent in the USSR (Schurmann, 1968, pp. 129, 138). See also Brzezinski (1971, p. 86). For the Italian Fascist party see

Germino (1959), De Felice (1966a, pp. 6–11); for the NSDAP, see Schäfer (1957), Buchheim (1958), Orlow (1973, pp. 136–38), and the extremely useful and neglected *Parteistatistik,* published by the Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP (1935); and Linz (1970a, pp. 202) for other fascist parties.

For those who would argue that intraparty democracy could be an alternative to political competition in the society at large, it is worth remembering that party membership ranges from 1.3 to over 1.5 percent of the population in Cuba (1969), 2.5 percent of the population in China, 4.2 percent in the USSR, to a high of 11.6 percent in Czechoslovakia (all in 1961) (Schurmann, 1968, p. 138). The figure of the PNF in Italy was 5.3 percent (1937) and the maximum for the NSDAP, 9.9 percent in 1943 (Linz, 1970a, p. 202).

17. See also Buchheim (1968a, pp. 391–96) on resignation from the SS, which confirms the in principle voluntary character of membership.

18. This point is well analyzed in Aquarone (1965, pp. 31–34, 262–63), with reference to the conflicts between prefects and party secretaries, and mayors and political secretaries, which generally (but not always) were decided in favor of the state authorities. In 1938 a confidant reported: "In the frequent changes of the guard the active, disinterested and revolutionary elements are substituted by elements that narcotize all activity of the party. . . the tendency to appoint secretary of the [local] Fasci, municipal employees that lack the necessary freedom to activate [potenziare] the party and control the activity of the administrative Enti [organizations]. The party loses, in those cases, its revolutionary activism, the possibility to reinvigorate and make the static element constituted by bureaucracy of the various Enti march in fascist step. In summary, there is lacking that healthy dualism between political and administrative power, indispensable factor in the revolutionary affirmation of fascism" (p. 263). The state-party relation was the object of constant debate among fascist theorists and constitutionalists (F. Neumann, 1963, pp. 75–77; for review of the literature see Conde, 1942, pp. 299–318; Manoilescò, 1938, pp. 97–108). The communists have constantly grappled with this difficult problem (see for example Schurmann, 1968, pp. 109–14). Mao's formulation: "The Party is the instrument that forges the resolution of the contradiction between state and society in socialism" is a response to this problem, as are the principle of vertical and dual rule (Schurmann, pp. 57, 88–89, 188–89) and the conflicts about decentralization. The Yugoslavs significantly criticized the early phase of the regime with the term "statism," and sophisticated Italian fascists like Bottai see in the statism that undermined corporativism and even the party the end of spontaneity and participation in the regime (Aquarone, pp. 216–21). It is no accident that the idea of a "withering away" of the party should have been discussed (Aquarone, p. 35) once the state would be fascisticized and the corporative system fully developed. Such ideas have also appeared with the emphasis on self-management in Yugoslavia and the development of a broadly based Marxist commitment. The Yugoslavs attempted to implement the principle of "separating the party from power," making state and party office incompatible, assigning to the party the role of leading ideological—"conscience of the revolution"—and political force of a society organized

along the lines of self-management of workers councils and communes (Zaninovich, 1968, pp. 141–46; Supek, 1973). The party was conceived as the unifying factor in a self-managed society bridging other cleavages and restraining bureaucratic, technocratic, as well as particularistic interests, even when in practice the older, bureaucratically entrenched party cadres resisted the "pluralization" of society. An interesting possible development is a role for the army-party members as a "vanguard" of the party, counteracting the nationalist tendencies in the society (Remington, 1974). It would be interesting to speculate if the duality state-party is not a functional analogue (equivalent would be too strong a statement) to the duality of state and church and the duality of authority in many traditional empires.

19. On the membership policy of the PNF see Aquarone, 1965, pp. 177–87. The purge of 1930–31 affected 120,000 members, but in 1932–33 the opening raised the membership from 1,007,231 to 1,413,407. (See also Germino, 1959.) On the NSDAP purge of SA members and the left wing particularly among the Politische Leiter, see Orlow, 1973, pp. 120–25, and Schäfer, 1957. See Orlow, pp. 204–7 on the disappointing 1937 membership drive, pp. 236–37 on membership composition and "planning," pp. 342 on difficulties in recruiting youth, p. 408 on membership figures for 1942.

For the USSR see the excellent monograph by Rigby (1968) who gives the official figures from 1917 to 1967 of full and candidate members, which show the impact of purges and membership drives, data on social and sex composition over time, regional variations, members in the armed forces, etc. The purge from May 1929 to May 1930 affected 170,000 members, about 11 percent of the membership, and in 1935, 16 percent.

20. The conception of democratic centralism formulated by Lenin in 1906 in these terms, "The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy of local institutions means specifically *freedom of criticism,* complete and everywhere, as long as this does not disrupt the unity of action *already decided upon*—and the intolerability of any criticism undermining or obstructing the *unity* of action decided on by the party," arouse the comments of Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky, quoted by R. V. Daniels (1969, p. 12).

21. For excellent analyses of leader personality in totalitarian systems see Tucker (1965) and Vierhaus (1964). The general context of personal leadership in modern politics can be found in Hamon and Mabileau (1964), Willner (1968), and Schweitzer (1974). The peculiar hold of Hitler of the Nazi party before even taking power is studied by Nyomarkay (1967). See also Horn (1972). An obvious source not to be neglected are the biographies like the Bullock (1964) and the description of the world around the *Führer* by an insider like Speer (1971). The phenomenon of "court politics" that exists at the top in any political system but acquires special importance in authoritarian and totalitarian systems would deserve serious comparative analysis.

Some of the analyses of totalitarian systems, like the recent book by Schapiro (1972b), seem in our view to overemphasize the role of leadership. The blaming of Stalin has obviously excused many analysts from attempting to understand the conditions for "Stalinism." They should heed the advice in this

criticism by Marx of Victor Hugo's *Napoleon the Little:* "He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history" (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1851, Vol. 1, p. 221).

22. For the change in *Mein Kampf* between the 1925 (second edition) and post-1930 editions, on the election of leaders in the party see Maser (1970, pp. 56–57).

23. The role of elections and the party in managing them in noncompetitive politics would deserve comparative analysis. Some interesting material can be found for the Soviet Union in Gilison (1970), Mote (1965), U.S. Department of State, Division of Research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research (1948). For East Germany, Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen (1963). For Poland, Pelczynski (1959). Yugoslav elections offer an interesting contrast; see Burks and Stanković (1967). The elections after Hitler's *Machtergreifung* have been analyzed by Bracher, Sauer, and Schulz (1960). There is unfortunately no comparable analysis of elections after Mussolini's March on Rome. Elections under authoritarian regimes (outside of Yugoslavia) could deserve more analysis in terms of their functions for the system, the responses of citizens, the patterns of participation, voiding of votes in relation to the social structure, as well as the techniques to discourage candidates of the "tolerated" opposition, electoral coercion, and falsification. The contrast between the election process in totalitarian and authoritarian pseudo- or "semi-" democratic regimes (that some would even claim to be democratic) can be seen in Penniman (1972) and the election factbooks for Latin American countries published by the Institute for Comparative Study of Political Systems. For a theoretical paper that could serve as a starting point see Rose and Mossawir (1967).

24. The problem of relationship between party, state, and society has always been discussed in the ideological literature of totalitarian regimes. For a good analysis in the German case, see Franz Neumann (1963, pp. 62–68, 71–80, an interesting comparison with Italy; and pp. 467–70).

25. For the USSR see Fainsod (1963). For China, Yang (1965) and Vogel (1971). For Cuba, Yglesias (1969). For Germany, Allen (1965), Peterson (1969), Heyen (1967), Meyerhoff (1963), and Görgen (1968). For a contrast with an authoritarian regime see Ugalde (1970), Fagen and Tuohy (1972), and Linz (1970b).

26. See below.

27. See below.

28. An approach that cannot be ignored is the emphasis on the historical and cultural continuity with prerevolutionary Russia (Berdyaev, 1948; Simmons, 1955; Pipes 1967; Vaker, 1962; and the excellent collection of essays edited by Black, 1967). Bell (1961) reviews this "Slavic" interpretation in his essay on "Ten Theories in Search of Soviet Reality," which also discusses (pp. 51–56) Leites's *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953), which sees Bolshevism as a conscious attempt to reverse traditional patterns of Russian character, in an interesting attempt of psycho-history. On cultural continuity and Chinese communism see Solomon (1971) and Pye (1971).

29. The particular German historical and cultural-ideological background that made the rise of national socialism and its successful drive to power possible has been highly debated. A balanced view by a sociologist is Dahrendorf (1967). The ideological-cultural roots are studied by Stern (1965), Mosse (1964), Sontheimer (1968), Faye (1972), Struve (1973) and the earlier and less focussed studies by Butler (1941), Viereck (1961), and Vermeil (1955). Interesting but overstated is Lukács (1955). The essays by Buchheim (1953) and Plessner (1959) deserve mention. However, the general European climate of opinion cannot be ignored either, as the study by Hoepke (1968) on the German right and Italian Fascism shows. Anti-Semitism, which fueled the totalitarian drive of the Nazis and some other fascist movements, has been the subject of considerable research we cannot review here; see Massing (1949), Pulzer (1964), and the more psychological interpretations of Fromm (1941), Adorno *et al.* (1950), Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950), and more recent German sources quoted by Bracher (1970, pp. 506–7). A related problem is that of social Darwinism; see Conrad-Martius (1955) and Zmarzlik (1973).

30. For a review of the literature and bibliography see May (1973) and the already classic analyses by Lipset (1959), Neubaner (1967), Eckstein (1966), and Dahl (1971). A more general analysis of stability of regimes is Eckstein (1971).

31. For a detailed historical account see La Cierva (1969). For historical accounts in English see Jackson (1965) and Carr (1971). More directly relevant for a political scientist is the analysis by Malefakis (1970, Chapter 15, "Could the Disaster Have Been Avoided?" pp. 388–400). The chapter on Spain in Linz and Stepan (1978) will attempt to draw the theoretical implications.

32. We have already referred to the writings of S. M. Lipset, S. Rokkan, S. Neumann, W. Kornhauser, R. Lepsius among others. The specific conditions for the rise of fascism are discussed in Linz (1976). See also below for references to the literature on fascist movements and regimes.

33. The slow process of transition from negative integration, to use the expressions of Guenther Roth (1963), to participation of socialist parties is particularly illuminating in this respect. The monographs by Schorsky, Berlau, Gay, and G. A. Ritter on the German Social Democratic party and the theoretical analysis of Robert Michels are the most salient contributions.

34. In this section we have analyzed only the internal processes leading to the establishment or overthrow of one or another type of regime. Obviously, all types of regimes have been overthrown by external defeat (we have only to think of Nazi totalitarianism, Japanese bureaucratic-military, semitraditional authoritarianism after World War II) or established, maintained, or overthrown with foreign assistance playing more or less decisive role (communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the GDR, North Korea, authoritarian rule in Spain with fascist help, not to mention the impact of American aid or hostility on regime changes in Latin America). Certainly in economically dependent countries outside influences and the reactions to them, even short of direct intervention, are one more factor accounting for internal crises and through them for the success or failure of different regimes. However, the interests of outside economic forces might be equally well served—in different cases—by democratic and a

variety of authoritarian regimes, so that it is difficult to establish a direct link between *dependencia* and type of regime.

Another factor contributing to the emergence, consolidation, and permanence of authoritarian rule is a hostile international environment that makes the open debate of foreign policy alternatives of a democracy undesirable and justifies the outlawing of parties linked with a neighboring foreign power or the discrimination against irredentist minorities supported by it. This was a factor that contributed to the strengthening of antidemocratic tendencies in Finland in the thirties and the transformation of the three Baltic democracies into presidential dictatorships. Similar problems contributed to authoritarianism in Poland and a number of Balkan countries in the interwar period.

Chapter 3: Traditional Authority and Personal Rulership

35. Among the extensive literature see Winckler (1970), Krader (1968), Eisenstadt (1959), Mair (1962), Colsen and Midldleton (1957), Turner and Swartz (1966), Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fallers (1965), Evans-Pritchard (1940 and 1948), Gluckman (1965a and 1965b).

36. The reader edited by Eisenstadt (1971) contains many contributions on premodern political systems and references to the literature. The same is true for Bendix (1968). The classic work in this field is Weber (1968), *Economy and Society.* Bendix (1960) is the best exposition in English of Weber's comparative historical-polititial sociology. The contemporary relevance of Weber's categories has been noted by Roth (1971, pp. 156–69). The major comparative study of classical empires is Eisenstadt (1962). For a typology of traditional systems see Apter (1965, pp. 85–122).

37. For essays showing the persistent significance of tradition for understanding contemporary politics see *Daedalus* (1973) on "Post-Traditional Societies." As examples of monographs showing the complex interaction between traditional and more modern political institutions we can mention Gellner and Micaud (1972) and Behrman (1970).

See for example the collection of papers edited by Swartz (1968) and the essays in *Political Systems and the Distribution of Power,* A.S.A. Monographs, No. 2.

38. The role of tradition in the political and social modernization of Japan has been the object of considerable research. As examples of different interpretations of modernization under the Meiji see Norman (1948), Craig (1961), and Jansen (1961). One of the few paired comparisons in social science is *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey,* Ward and Rustow (1964). For the continuous role of the emperor and the court in modern times see Titus (1974).

39. There are a number of excellent studies on Moroccan politics: Ashford (1961, 1965a, 1967), Waterbury (1970), Zartman (1971), Moore (1970b), and Gellner and Micaud (1972). The latter focusses on the interaction between sectors of society—Arabs and Berbers—and its implications, including a discussion of the coup of 10 July 1971.

40. For a less extreme example see Anderson (1964). These regimes are classified as cases of "personal control" in the typology of Lanning (1974), based on the two dimensions: power relationships between authorities and groups (distinguishing group dominant, power balance, and authority dominance) and organizational basis (distinguishing functional, interest groups, and personal relations). The sixth of the resulting types is based on authority dominance and personal relations and includes Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay and in the past Trujillo.

41. For life and politics in a rural community under Trujillo see Walker (1972, pp. 11–31).

42. Recent sociological and anthropological studies of local politics and even national politics in many societies have conceptualized them with the term *"clientela"*—from the Italian and Spanish—and described the patterns as "clientelism"; see for example Lemarchand (1972), Lemarchand and Legg (1972), Powell (1970), Heidenheimer (1970), Lande (1965), Leeds (1964), Leff (1968).

Chapter 4: Authoritarian Regimes

43. The descriptive literature on Latin American politics and particular countries in the area is extensive and we cannot refer to it in detail. A good exposition with country chapters by specialists (with bibliographies) is Needler (1970). See also Anderson (1967), with special emphsasis on the relation between politics and economic development. R. H. McDonald (1971) is informative on party systems and elections. See also our notes in this chapter on military in politics, corporativism, and Mexican politics. On the problems of instability see Kling (1956) and chapters in Linz and Stepan (1978).

There are a number of books on Middle East politics (Binder, 1964; Halpern, 1963; Karpat, 1968; Hurewitz, 1969; Abboushi, 1970; Rustow, 1971; Landau, 1972) that provide a wealth of descriptive information, bibliographic references, and analysis of ideological tendencies. These works and those on Egypt and the Maghreb (see note 60), particularly Morocco (see note 39), should provide the basis for a more comparative and theoretical analysis of the authoritarian regimes in Islamic societies and the variety of patterns of transition from traditional or colonial rule to more modern political systems in them. Our focus in this chapter precludes discussion of the link between cultural traditions, values, and even a culture-personality-psychological approach to the emergence of authoritarian rule in these societies in contrast to, let us say, the Hispanic or Southeast Asian societies, which would complement our analysis.

For reviews of Southeast Asian politics see Kahin (1964) and Pye (1967).

44. The comparative study of communist systems and the variety of theoretical approaches has a long tradition; for recent bibliographic essays see Cohen and Shapiro (1974, pp. xix–xliv) and Shoup (1971). Kanet (1971), after others like Tucker (1969) and Fleron (1969), has argued that the study of communist systems should be incorporated more into a broader comparative framework. Without rejecting this point we would argue that a more systematic

theoretical comparative analysis of communist systems, not limited to the USSR and Eastern Europe or to paired comparisons of the USSR and China like those in the volume edited by Treadgold (1967) and implicitly in the better monographs on China, but including Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, would be perhaps a prior step. The different phases in those regimes could provide us with even greater opportunities for "multivariate" comparative study, like the paper by Yeh (1967) on industrialization strategies in the USSR 1928–37 and China 1953–62. Area specialization, perhaps imposed by the linguistic skills required and the difficulties of access to data, has been an obstacle to such an effort. Cuba for example has attracted mostly the attention of American sympathizers and critics, French leftists, and a few Latin Americanists, but almost no students of other communist regimes. It has been the object of descriptive-historical studies (Huberman and Sweezy, 1969; Draper, 1965; Suárez, 1967; Dumont, 1970; Karol, 1970; Thomas, 1971; Halperin, 1972) and of collections of papers edited by MacGaffey and Barnett (1965), Mesa Lago (1971), and Horowitz (1972). Except for a study by Tang and Maloney (1962) on the Chinese impact and the greater similarity in patterns of participation with China than the Soviets (Fagen, 1969, p. 259), there has been little effort to study the regime in a comparative perspective, even among communist countries. The charismatic authority of Castro (Fagen, 1965; Lockwood, 1967), the relatively slow institutionalization of the party organization, the shifts in policy, the dependence on the USSR, the U.S. hostility, the growing militarization (Dumont, 1970; Domínguez, 1974), and the highly polemical responses to the revolution have probably contributed to this lack of comparative analyses.

It is impossible to present here an adequate bibliography on communist China. For a basic list of sources, Berton and Wu (1967), Schurmann (1968), Waller (1971, pp. 172–82). The excellent collections of papers edited by Treadgold (1967), Barnett (1969), Baum (1971), Lindbeck (1971), and Scalapino (1972), and the *Handbook* edited by Wu (1973) can serve as introduction to the best scholarship, in addition to monographs quoted in this essay, like those of Lewis (1963), Townsend (1972). Vogel (1971), and the classic works of Schram (1967, 1969) on Mao and his thought.

A useful review is Shaffer (1967), with chapters by Marxist and non-Marxist authors, including countries generally neglected (like Albania, Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia) in a comparative analysis, and bibliographic references. particularly to specialized periodicals.

45. On the long-lived Estado Novo of Salazar see Kay (1970), Lucena (1971), Schmitter (1973b, 1974), Wiarda (1974), as well as the primary sources they quote, including basic books on organization of the state published in Portugal.

46. To use the expression of Karl Marx in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1851–52, revised 1869; see 1955 edition, pp. 243–344, especially 333–34). Thalheimer (1930) (quoted from 1968 edition, pp. 19–38) is an interesting application of the ideas of Marx in the *Eighteenth Brumaire* to fascism, more sophisticated than most Marxist, particularly communist, interpretations. See also note 55 for Trotsky's use of "Bonapartism" in the analysis of Stalinism.

47. The difference between mobilizational authoritarianism and the military-bureaucratic variants is well reflected in this quote from a report by Guariglia, Italian ambassador and top Fascist leader, arguing for support for Spanish fascists in May 1933: "We may be at its side. We have to help them for the moment to overcome their purely Catholic, Monarchist and even reactionary prejudices. We must aid them to avoid taking up the ideology of Action Française, and to forget *primoderiverismo*. Military *pronunciamientos* like Sanjurjo's must be avoided. Propaganda among the agricultural and laboring masses is essential. In a word, they must leave behind the antiquated mentality of 1848 revolutionaries, and adopt the modern ideal of unanimous collaboration of all classes, united by the single superior principle of the authority of the State'" (Report of May 16, 1933, quoted by Coverdale, 1975).

48. On the Franco regime after the phase we might describe as "arrested totalitarianism" in addition to Linz (1964, 1970a, 1973a, 1973b) the work of von Beyme (1971), significantly entitled *From Fascist to Development Dictatorship: Power Elite and Opposition in Spain,* and Medhurst (1973) provide excellent overviews. In Spanish, Esteban *et al.* (1973) analyze the constitution from the point of view of possible changes in the system leading to changes of the system. Iglesias Selgas (1968, 1971) offers a useful "orthodox" description. Anderson (1970) analyzes the economic policymaking in the regime and Linz and De Miguel (1966b) study the business community, its formal and informal leadership and the disjunction between both in the corporative institutions, and the realities of organic statism and interest group politics in an authoritarian regime. On local politics and community power see Linz (1970a).

49. Andreski (1954, revised 1968), S. E. Finer (1962), and Janowitz (1964) offered the first systematic and comparative analyses, which should be read together with the collections of papers edited by Huntington (1962), Gutteridge (1965), Van Doorn (1968), Janowitz and Van Doorn (1971), Kelleher (1974), and the work of Feit (1973). An early bibliography is Lang (1965). For a typology of military regimes see Perlmutter (1969). The frequency of intervention in Latin America has led to area-wide analyses from the early writings of Lieuwen (1960, 1964), Germani and Silvert (1961). Johnson (1964) to those of Needler (1966), Horowitz (1967), Putnam (1967), Nun (1969), Ronfeldt (1972), Solaún (1973), Stepan (1973), Schmitter (1973a), and the bibliographic essays of McAlister (1966) and Lowenthal (1974). Among the country monographs we can mention North (1966) on Argentina, Chile, and Peru; Potash (1969), Evers (1972), O'Donnell (1973) on Argentina; Hector (1964) on Argentina and Bolivia; Puhle (1970) also on Bolivia; Stepan (1971, 1973) and Schneider (1971) on Brazil; Gilmore (1964), Needler (1964), Fitch (1973) on Ecuador and Einaudi (1969), Lowenthal (1974) and a 1975 collection of papers edited by him on Peru. Also on Peru and Brazil, Einaudi and Stepan (1971). The interventions and postcoup regimes in the Middle East have been studied by N. Fisher (1963), Hurewitz (1969), and Perlmutter (1970); in Egypt by Vatikiotis (1961) and Dekmejian (1971), in Iraq by Vernier (1963) and Dann (1969). For Indonesia see Feith (1962) and Pauker (1963), and for Korea, Kim (1971). The long history of the army in politics in Spain is covered by Payne (1967) and in the literature mentioned in the note on the origins of the civil war.

50. The literature on Italian corporativism is very extensive and little of it sociological. Among the many sources Sarti (1968, 1970, 1971) deserves special notice, in addition to Aquarone (1965) and Ungari (1963). Among studies published before the end of World War II see Schneider (1928 and 1936), Finer (1935), Schmidt (1938, 1939), Welk (1938). An interesting analysis of how the Italian experience was perceived by different sectors in Germany, from Conservatives to Nazis, see Hoepke (1968). For a contrast among the Catholic, Fascist, and Nationalist corporativist ideologies see Vallauri (1971).

51. The high member apathy and oligarchic control in a variety of voluntary associations, particularly trade unions and professional associations, has been noted by scholars inspired by the work of Michels (for references see Linz, 1966, pp. cv–cxiii).

52. Max Weber (1968), in *Economy and Society*, Vol. 1, pp. 297–99, in the section on "Representation by the Agents of Interest Groups" notes that "as a rule, this kind of representation is propagated with a view toward disenfranchising certain strata: a) either by distributing mandates among the occupations and thus *in fact* disenfranchising the numerically superior masses; or b) by *openly* and *formally* limiting suffrage to the nonpropertied and thus by disenfranchising those strata whose power rests on their economic position (the case of a state of Soviets)." Weber continues commenting on the absence of effective individual leadership in such bodies, the difficulty of reaching nonartificial majority decisions, etc. These patterns obviously reinforce the "nonrepresentative," "non-elective" elements in the political system, that is, the authoritarian nonaccountable elements.

53. France under the Vichy government of Pétain also exemplifies the difference between an authoritarian regime with many characteristics of organic statism and a fascist mobilizational regime desired by some of those supporting it (Paxton, 1972).

54. On the three-cornered competition for power among the state—controlled by fascists, it is true, in alliance with the bureaucracy—the party organization and the *corporazioni*, as well as interests and ideological tendencies within them, ultimately decided in favor of the first, see Aquarone (1965, chapters 3 and 4, particularly pp. 151, 164–65, 188–89; and for those who argued that the *corporazioni* should substitute the party, pp. 220–21). On the conflicts between state and party, specifically the prefects and provincial party leaders, see pp. 262–63.

55. Significantly, Trotsky (1937, pp. 278–79), in attempting to describe and analyze Stalinism also uses the term "Bonapartism" in this text. We cannot resist quoting since it also reflects his view of the symmetry of Stalinism and Fascism "in spite of deep differences in social foundations."

> Bonapartism is one of the political weapons of the capitalist regime in its critical period. Stalinism is a variety of the same system, but upon the basis of a workers' state torn by the antagonism between an organized and armed soviet aristocracy and the unarmed toiling masses. . . .

> In the last analysis, Soviet Bonapartism owes its birth to the belatedness of the world revolution. But in the capitalist countries the

same cause gave rise to fascism. We thus arrive at the conclusion, unexpected at first glance, but in reality inevitable, that the crushing of Soviet democracy by an all-powerful bureaucracy and the extermination of bourgeois democracy by fascism were produced by one and the same cause: the dilatoriness of the world proletariat in solving the problems set for it by history. Stalinism and fascism, in spite of a deep difference in social foundations, are symmetrical phenomena. In many of their features they show a deadly similarity. A victorious revolutionary movement in Europe would immediately shake not only fascism, but Soviet Bonapartism.

56. The literature on national socialism as an ideology, a movement and a party in power fills libraries. For a bibliography see Herre and Auerbach and supplement edited by Thile Vogelsang *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (since 1953). Basic in English is Bracher (1970), with bibliography, pp. 503–33. For annotated critical bibliography, Orlow (1969, 1973). See also Bracher and Jacobsen (1970). Useful reviews are Broszat (1966), Nolte (1963), the anthologies of documents with introductions by Hofer (1957), Remak (1969), and Noakes and Pridham (1974), and for the period 1933–35, Wheaton (1969). Still indispensable is the classic work by Franz Neumann (1963; originally published 1944), *Behemoth*. An interesting overview of German politics, society, and culture under the Nazis is Grunberger (1971). For excellent biographical sketches of the Nazi leadership, Fest (1970). To place Nazism in the context of German society and history see Dahrendorf (1965). An excellent documentary collection is Tyrell (1969). A most stimulating review of conflicting or complementary interpretations of Nazism is Sauer (1967).

57. In addition to the more sophisticated Marxist analyses of fascism we cannot ignore the partisan interpretations of Aquila, Zetkin, Togliatti, Dutt discussed by Nolte (1967). De Felice (1969, 1970), and Gregor (1974b), the Trotskyite Guerin (1939), and more recent writings of Lopukhov (1965), Galkin (1970), and Vajda (1972), reviewed by Gregor (1974c, pp. 129–70), as well as the responses of the Third International (Fetscher, 1962; Pirker, 1965).

58. The relation of fascism to modernization is a complex issue, object of a recent debate (Turner, 1972; Gregor, 1974c). See also Organski (1965) and the early essay by Borkenau (1933).

59. The politics of particular countries have been the object of monographic study, although sometimes with little effort of comparison and theoretical conceptualization; see for example on the Ivory Coast, in addition to Zolberg (1969), Potholm (1970, pp. 230–71) for a more critical view, and for a comparison of the PDCI with Tanzania's TANU, Zeller (1969); on Mali, Snyder (1965); on Sierra Leone, Cartwright (1970); on Madagascar, Spacensky (1970); on Guinea under the leadership of Sékou Touré, one of the few mobilizational single-party regimes left, see Ameillon (1964), Charles (1962), Voss (1971), and Zolberg (1966). On the authoritarian regime established in Congo (Zaire) by Mobutu after years of turmoil there is an interesting study (using the concept of patrimonialism) by Willame (1972).

60. The Maghreb and the Middle East countries after independence have experimented with military and single-party mobilizational regimes in addition

to the survival of semitraditional rulers (like Morocco, see note 39). For an overview see Clement Moore (1970b) and Hurewitz (1969), who distinguishes in the Middle East military republics, military-civilian coalitions, traditional monarchies, modernizing monarchies, and nonmilitary republics. The most stable civilian single-party regime born in the struggle for independence has been Tunisia under the personal leadership of Bour-guiba (Clement Moore 1965, 1970a; Camau, 1971; Hermassi, 1972), while Algeria, initially a mobilizational party regime, had from the beginning—due to the prolonged war with the French—a military component, which gained the upper hand when Boumedienne ousted Ben Bella (Quandt, 1969; Duprat, 1973). In Iraq (Vernier, 1963; Dann, 1969) and Syria (for bibliographic references see Hurewitz, 1969, p. 520), where the ideological Baathist party had considerable impact in alliance with the army, the military have attempted, like in Egypt, to create nationalist-socialist-populist mobilizational regimes, but ultimately personal rulership, the military and bureaucratic technocratic elements seem to have become dominant. The fate of the socialist Baath party has not been too different from minor fascist parties in authoritarian regimes. Ethnic and religious heterogeneity contributed to the instability of these regimes.

The politics of Egypt since the military coup against the monarchy, under Naguib, Nasser, and Sadat, has been the object of considerable analysis and debate. Among the main studies, Vatikiotis (1961), Lacouture and Lacouture (1958), Lacouture (1969), Wheelock (1960), Abdel-Malek (1968, first published 1962), Binder (1965), Moore (1970, 1973, 1974), Dekmejian (1971), Kosheri Mahfouz (1972), and Harik (1973) deserve mention. It is a perfect example of the changes "within" a regime approaching changes "of" the regime, from strictly military rule to the complex, shifting, and indecisive attempts to create a mobilizational single party, from a military mentality to efforts to develop an ideology, from popular passivity to efforts to create channels of participation. It shows the range of possibilities of change but also the difficulties of change within the framework of an authoritarian regime established by the army.

61. The case of Nkrumah, who moved from charismatic leadership to personal rulership with the forms of a single-party mobilizational authoritarian regime (that some perceived as totalitarian in ambitions), is an example of how even the period of rule of one person cannot be pigeonholed into a typology but how different conceptualizations can serve the analysis; Wallerstein (1961), Apter (1963), Bretton (1966), Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966).

62. For references to different patterns of colonialism see Potholm (1970), pp. 70–77.

63. A decisive factor in the potential for mobilization, control, and participation of new regimes—and with it for totalitarianism—is the strength of the party conquering power before takeover. Let us not forget that the Italian Fascists in March 1921 already had 80,476 members, in December claimed 218,453, and by May 1922, 322,310 (the March on Rome would be at the end of October) (De Felice, 1966, pp. 10–11), even though those members were mostly north of Rome. The NSDAP in 1930 had 129,563 and on January 30, 1933, on the eve of the Machtergreifung, 719,446 (Schäfer, 1957, p. 17); the Hitler Youth at the end of 1931 had already organized 5.1 percent of those

eligible (Orlow, 1969, p. 237). That kind of support can obviously be gained only in an open and relatively modern society, or one undergoing total disintegration, when war and revolution combine, like in Russia, Yugoslavia, China, and Vietnam.

64. In the context of the application to communist systems in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, of the interest-group politics approach, the early and still very fruitful alternatives of "technical-rational traditionalist and ideological revolutionary'" models of development offered by Barrington Moore (1954) have unfortunately been somewhat neglected.

65. For two reviews of the literature on convergence see Meyer (1970) and Weinberg (1969). Also, Halm (1969), Linnemann, Pronk, and Tinbergen (1965), Tinbergen (1961), Mills (1958), Sorokin (1964), Wolfe (1968), Black (1970), Aron (1967), and Brzezinski and Huntington (1964, pp. 9–14, 419–36), for a critical discussion of convergence. While far from accepting the convergence theory, the authors point to similarities, functional equivalents, and differences between the U.S. and the USSR in many spheres in a suggestive comparative study.

Chapter 5: The Place of the World's States in the Typology: An Attempt and Its Difficulties

66. A basic source for comparative study of noncompetitive or semi- or pseudocompetitive elections under authoritarian regimes are the *Election Factbooks* for Latin American countries, published by the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, and the volumes edited by Sternberger and Vogel (1969–).

67. The empirical and systematic study of the organization, function, and composition of political parties (as reflected in the contribution to [the original] *Handbook)* has tended to center on parties in a democratic competitive context (including antisystem parties) and the parties in power in communist noncompetitive regimes and Nazi Germany but has relatively neglected parties in authoritarian pseudo-multiparty, officially single party, and often de facto nonparty regimes. The International Comparative Political Parties Project covering 50 countries at Northwestern University directed by Kenneth Janda (with its careful coding of data and exhaustive bibliographic guides) is filling that gap (including countries like Guinea, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Greece, Iran, and among the communist countries Bulgaria, Hungary, and North Korea of those in our purview).

Chapter 6: Concluding Comments

68. One objection that can legitimately be made to our analysis is that we have focussed on sovereign states, ignoring the clear and not so clear cases of foreign dependence. Certainly we did not include in our purview colonial rule

in all its varieties, from intervention in fiscal affairs of state, protectorate of traditional rulers, to indirect and direct administration by foreigners. Nor have we paid due attention to rule established by a foreign power by the threat of use of force—like the rest-Czech state under the Nazi *Reichsprotektorat*—or the creation of a regime headed by nationals of the country with the military and political assistance of another country, which even after withdrawing its forces exercises influence or veto of its policies and reserves itself the right to intervene by force to sustain the regime.

The satellite regimes that during WWII became identified with the name of Quisling accurately describe that relationship. Such rule of limited or practically no legitimacy is by definition nondemocratic in origin. Continuity, specific successes, and a growing autonomy might transform it into stable regimes not based only on coercion. The delimitation of international spheres of influence and the ideological affinities and personal links between national parties identified with an international movement, particularly in communist states, have contributed to the stabilization of such regimes. Internal political, social, and economic developments, even when not directly decided by the hegemonic power—as they were obviously by Hitler and Stalin—are deeply affected by changes in policy in the dominant power in the bloc or hegemonic area.

In addition there are more subtle types of linkages that affect the internal political development of many states, especially outside the major powers (Rosenau, 1969).

Intervention in internal crises and regime changes is not new, nor is the support for rebels and secessionist independence movements. Since the French Revolution, Napoleon, and the Holy Alliance, outside support on grounds of ideological affinity—not always easy to separate from power politics—has been normal. International parties made their appearance with the revolutionary movements—anarchism and socialism. Later, the ideological affinities created more or less tight relations between parties, from the Comintern and Cominform to the Christian Equipes Internationales and nowadays between nationalist terrorists. At each historical moment one or another successful regime kindles the admiration and desire of imitation by people in many countries, and without such an external reference internal political developments can not be understood. International and internation organizations have attempted to influence the development of regimes by mediation, nonrecognition, exclusion, political economic boycott, peace-keeping forces, etc., with varying degrees of success. Other nations, international movements, or organizations under their influence are therefore factors in the establishment of totalitarian, authoritarian, and on rare occasions democratic regimes, which we cannot ignore (even when we cannot discuss them here).

69. De facto, however, the process often leads to a more personal rule of the leader or the executive, who appoints, intervenes, or controls all institutions, preventing independent leadership and real institutional autonomy, but is without resources (given the deliberation of the single party) for mobilization of support and dynamic social change. These processes have been well described by Aquarone (1965).

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ABOUT THE BOOK

In this classic work, noted political sociologist Juan Linz provides an unparalleled study of the nature of nondemocratic regimes.

Linz's seminal analysis develops the fundamental distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian systems. It also presents a pathbreaking discussion of the personalistic, lawless, nonideological type of authoritarian rule that he calls (following Weber) the "sultanistic regime."

The core of the book (including a 40-page bibliography) was published in 1975 as a chapter in the *Handbook of Political Science,* long out of print. The author has chosen not to change the original text for this new edition, but instead has added an extensive introduction reflecting on some of the contributions to the literature and the changes that have taken place in world politics and in the nature of regimes since the 1970s.

Juan J. Linz is Sterling Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale University. His work on authoritarianism, the breakdown of democratic regimes, and transitions to democracy has had a wide-ranging impact not only on scholarship, but also in the world of politics.