FRANCO

A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY



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Franco

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A Personal and Political Biography

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and
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Franco Becomes Generalissimo

(1936)

As Franco was driven into Tetuán to a cheering crowd on the morning of July 19, the insurrection was spreading through most of the garrisons of northern Spain. Some units did not rebel until the twentieth, or the twenty-first, however, and others did not join the insurgency at all. Like all the leaders on both sides, Franco hoped that the struggle would be brief, but he grasped that he must prepare for a longer conflict than initially planned, though he still did not foresee its full dimensions.[1] Consistent with this calculation, on the morning of the nineteenth he dispatched Luis Bolín, the journalist who had accompanied him from Casablanca, to continue in the *Dragon Rapide* to Marseilles, whence he was to go on to Rome to ask the Mussolini government for planes and other military supplies. Bolín stopped first in Lisbon to obtain written approval for the mission from General Sanjurjo, nominal leader of the insurrection, only a few hours before Sanjurjo attempted to depart for the Nationalist zone.

By the evening of the twentieth, Mola sent out a radio announcement that the revolt was going according to plan and that converging columns would soon take Madrid. This bravado momentarily caused some consternation among Franco and his aides, for, if true, it meant that Mola and other military leaders would soon gain full power, leaving Franco commander on a secondary front without any prominent role in the new regime.[2] Within less than a day, however, it became clear this was mere propaganda and that the insurgency had seized little more than a third of Spain with scant possibility, at least for the moment, of gaining control of the rest.

Rebellion was attempted or took place in forty-four of the fifty-one principal peninsular garrisons, but the insurgents only gained control of about half the forces on the peninsula, though to these were added the elite units in Morocco, for a total of nearly fifty-four thousand troops.[3] It was above all a rebellion of middle- and junior-rank officers. Of the eleven top regional commanders, only three (including Franco) joined the revolt, as did only six of twenty-four major generals on active duty and only one of the seven top commanders of the Civil Guard, though the percentage steadily increased the farther one went down the ranks.[4] More than half of the officers on active duty found themselves in the Republican zone, though many sought to escape to the other side. Ultimately, about half of the officers on duty, numbering around six thousand, served in the insurgent army, and they were joined by nearly eight thousand retired or reserve officers, compared with no more than four thousand regular officers, in what would become the new revolutionary People's Army.[5] In the navy and air force the situation was much worse for the rebels, for the left retained control of about two-thirds of Spain's warships and of most of the military pilots, together with the bulk of the airplanes. Aside from the forces in Morocco, the only advantage held by the insurgents lay in artillery—they controlled slightly more than half the units. On the other hand, the Republican zone contained nearly all the larger cities, industrial production, and financial resources. Only a few days into the revolt, the situation was looking somewhat desperate for the insurgents.

The only possibility of victory seemed to lie with Franco's elite units in Morocco, the only truly combat-ready cadres on either side, though the Legion and *regulares* combined totaled only twenty-one thousand men.[6] Yet Republican control of most of the fleet made it possible after little more than twenty-four hours to blockade and bombard the protectorate's coast. About four hundred troops had been immediately sent to the

mainland, even before Franco arrived in Tetuán, but it then became clear that the only way to move troops across the straits was by air, and Franco had only seven small and antiquated planes under his command. With these he initiated arguably the first military airlift in history, though with such limited means he could scarcely move one hundred troops a day.

From the beginning, therefore, the need for greater airpower and other forms of foreign assistance was apparent, and Franco turned immediately to the governments of Italy and Germany as the most militantly antileftist regimes and the ones most likely to support insurgency against the Spanish Popular Front. Three days after sending Bolín on to Rome, he approached the Italian consul in Tangier to request aid from Mussolini and made a similar petition to Berlin by means of the German consul. On the twenty-third, he commandeered the sole Lufthansa passenger plane in his district to take his representatives, accompanied by the local leaders of the Nazi Party in Spanish Morocco, to seek assistance in person from Hitler's government.

Franco was the last major commander to join the conspiracy, but, once he did, he acted with complete resolution and self-confidence. His declaration of martial law in Las Palmas at dawn on July 18 proclaimed that the Republican constitution had suffered "a total eclipse," as demonstrated by the massive abuses occurring, including "attacks on provincial government and electoral records to falsify votes," and that this devolution justified military intervention to restore order and legality. In his first radio address from Tetuán on the nineteenth Franco demanded "blind faith in victory!," his watchword throughout. He also tried to bluff the Giral government into throwing in the towel, sending it a telegram that insisted that "the Spanish restorationist movement will triumph completely in a few days and we will require of you a strict accounting of your deeds. The rigor with which we act will be proportionate to your resistance. We urge you to submit now and prevent the useless shedding of blood."[7]

By the evening of the twentieth, he learned that the nominal leader of the revolt, General José Sanjurjo, had died in an accident near Lisbon when his plane crashed on takeoff.[8] Though Sanjurjo had played little role in the conspiracy and to some extent was a figurehead, he was the only recognized overall commander. Paradoxically, his death may have been a stroke of luck for the Nationalists, opening the way for a younger, healthier, more capable commander in chief two months later. It is altogether doubtful that Sanjurjo possessed the combination of skills needed for victory in a long, ruthless, and highly complex civil war.

From the beginning, Franco acted as a major leader of the new "National movement," as the insurgents called it, not a regional subordinate, dispatching orders to commanders in southern Spain who were reluctant to join the revolt, as well as sending representatives directly to Rome and Berlin. By the twenty-second, one of his subordinates was referring hyperbolically to "General Franco's National Government," and a week later Adolf Langenheim, Nazi Party chief in Tetuán, reported mistakenly that Franco was part of a ruling triumvirate.[9] Franco may have presented himself that way to make certain that the Germans would take his requests seriously. On July 23, Mola filled the gap in the senior command by forming the National Defense Council (Junta de Defensa Nacional), made up of himself and the seven other principal commanders in the main northern Nationalist zone, led by the most senior in rank, General Miguel Cabanellas, though Cabanellas was a Mason, a centrist Republican, and a former deputy of the Radical Party. Franco, in Morocco, was not at first a member, though on July 25 the council recognized his special role by naming him *general jefe del ejército* of Morocco and southern Spain, that is, commander of the largest and most important part of the army. On August 3, when his troops were beginning their advance northward toward Madrid, Franco was named to the council, along with General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, leader of the insurgency in Andalusia.

The efforts to gain assistance abroad by Franco, and also by Mola, who had sent his own representatives to Rome and Berlin, soon began to yield fruit. Thanks to the help of the Nazi Party leadership in Berlin, Franco's emissaries finally caught up with Hitler at the Wagner festival in Bayreuth late on July 25. The German führer was taken by surprise, since he had no particular interest in Spain and little knowledge of events there, but after nearly two hours of conversation he accepted the claims that the military insurrection's goal was to counter Communist and Soviet ambitions, that it had support among the Spanish, and that its leaders were friends of the Nazi regime. All this appealed to Hitler as a means of outflanking France, defeating the Comintern, and gaining a friendly power on the opposite side of the Pyrenees. He authorized immediate shipment of a limited number of planes and other arms to Franco.[10] Mussolini made a similar decision a day and a half later, influenced more by Mola's representatives (who drew on earlier Monarchist contacts), reports that France would limit its assistance to the Republicans, and personal intervention by the exiled Alfonso XIII, who lived in Italy. He also sent a small number of planes and other arms, dispatching them directly to Franco.[11]

After a week of fighting, Mola's advance on Madrid from the north had stalled; his troops and militia volunteers were outnumbered and very low on ammunition. He was even considering retreat to a defensive position along the Ebro river, but Franco insisted there be no withdrawal, and no yielding of any territory—one of his main principles throughout the conflict—and promised to get supplies to him.[12] Mola managed to hold his position, though he could advance no further.[13]

By the end of the first week in August, Franco had received fifteen Junkers-52 transport/ bombing planes, six obsolescent Henschel fighters, nine Italian S.81 medium bombers, and twelve Fiat CR.32 fighters, as well as other arms and supplies. The diversionary effects of air power helped Franco send a small convoy through the Republican blockade of the Moroccan coast on August 5, carrying two thousand troops and a large amount of military equipment at one stroke. It was very risky and quite unlike Franco, something that he would never attempt again until the blockade had been lifted, but at this point he was desperate to send more men and arms across to begin his own drive on Madrid from the south. German and Italian planes greatly increased his airlift capacity, and more and more of his troops crossed to the peninsula during the remainder of August and throughout the following month. By the time that the blockade was completely broken at the end of September, twenty-one thousand men and more than 350,000 kilos of arms and supplies had been transported by air alone.

With Mola's troops stymied in the north, the whole struggle turned on Franco's elite units advancing from the south. He had become the key rebel commander, the one with the greatest international recognition, recipient of most of the foreign aid, and leader of the decisive combat forces. Mola usually accepted his initiatives, though Franco's relations with Queipo de Llano in the south were somewhat more tense. He provided Queipo with small additional units to help solidify his position in Andalusia but refused him major reinforcements so that he could use most of the limited numbers of legionnaires and *regulares* for his own drive northward. Franco flew back and forth between Tetuán and Seville three times between July 27 and August 3, and his first two assault columns, numbering only two thousand to twenty-five hundred men each, began to move northwest from Seville on the second and third. They were composed primarily of troops from the legion and *regulares*, supplemented with small support units from Queipo's regular army forces. Franco then transferred his headquarters to Seville on August 7.

After achieving direct contact with Mola by taking the city of Mérida on the eleventh, he did not strike directly north but ordered his columns westward to secure the frontier with Portugal, whose government was providing strong logistical support to the insurgents, seizing Badajoz on the fifteenth. This wide indirect approach avoided the easily defensible mountain pass north of Seville and the concentration of Republican forces in that area. Franco has often been criticized for not moving directly north on the shortest route, though he had good political, logistical, and operational reasons for initially skirting the main obstacles by angling first toward the west, uniting the two Nationalist zones, and securing his Portuguese border.

Two days after taking Badajoz, the march toward Madrid was resumed. Franco's columns were heavily outnumbered by the opposing forces, which were composed of a few small army and police units and large detachments of revolutionary militia. The militia lacked leadership, training, and discipline, even if it was adequately armed, and was no match for veteran, disciplined forces. A standard tactic was to fix the militia in place with frontal fire and then to hit it with a flanking maneuver, usually throwing it into headlong retreat that was accompanied by corresponding casualties.

Yet, despite their combat superiority, the limited numbers of Franco's troops, the need to build a logistical system and supply line from scratch, and particularly the need to peel off more and more battalions to shore up secondary fronts in the south, northwest, and northeast all delayed their advance considerably. Altogether, after mid-August two and a half months would be needed to reach the outskirts of Madrid. Many historians and commentators have criticized the slowness of Franco's march.[14] He was never known to do anything in a hurry—it was counter to his temperament—and in the Moroccan campaigns audacious advances like that of Silvestre in 1921 that failed to consolidate the rear, protect flanks, or build firm logistics had led to disaster. It will never be known if a bold, completely concentrated drive on Madrid in September that left the flanks unprotected, brushed aside the matter of feeble logistics, and totally disregarded the desperate conditions on other fronts might have enabled Franco to seize the capital rapidly, perhaps putting a sudden end to the Civil War. Possibly there was a chance this could have happened, though it is not probable. In practice, however, it was quite unlikely that Franco would adopt so audacious a strategy, which went completely against his customs and principles, as well as everything he had learned in Morocco.[15]

From the first day, both sides carried out brutal repression of the opposition in their respective zones. The steady buildup of calls to revolutionary

violence by the left, in progress for several years, and the determination of the insurgents to act similarly, led to massive political executions. Such atrocities were typical of all the revolutionary/counterrevolutionary civil wars of twentieth-century Europe, without the slightest exception, for such conflicts, much more than international wars, emphasized the dehumanization of an internal enemy, who was not merely to be defeated militarily but who had to be exterminated because it represented a kind of metaphysical evil. In the case of the revolutionary left, this would produce about fifty-five thousand executions, among which numbered nearly seven thousand clergy.[16]

The repression by the military was somewhat more extensive and, like almost everything else in the Nationalist zone, better organized.[17] Franco was not initially responsible for it, and it would have taken place had he never existed. He himself was cold, stern, and seemingly remorseless, and he was slow to begin to control the repression, not acting decisively until March 1937. He blanched, however, at two of the early executions, the first that of his first cousin Major Ricardo de la Puente Bahamonde, once a close childhood playmate, executed in Morocco for leading resistance at the Tetuán airbase against the insurrection. By the standards of that moment, it was a clear enough case, and Franco decided not to intervene, for fear of appearing to favor a relative. Since it was up to the commanding general to ratify death sentences by military tribunals in his district, on August 1 Franco transferred his command, for one day only, to Orgaz, just arrived from the Canaries, in order not to have to approve the death of his old playmate, for whom he still felt affection.[18]

The second case concerned his former assistant at the Zaragoza academy, General Miguel Campins, executed for his failure as commander of the garrison in Granada to support the revolt during its first day and a half, even though he did end up joining the insurrection belatedly. In this case, Franco apparently did try to intervene with Queipo de Llano, in charge of the Granada sector, and sent him a personal letter requesting clemency. Queipo, however, had been outraged by the resistance of Campins during the first crucial hours of the revolt and is said to have refused to open Franco's envelope.[19] Franco reluctantly decided that he could not interfere with Queipo's military tribunal. The combined total of executions by both sides reached approximately a hundred thousand before the opposing governments finally took action. The Republicans got the process partially under control in their zone in December 1936. Two and a half months later, Franco for his part, expanded and tightened the formal military tribunals

in his territory, gaining control of the process and greatly reducing the number of executions during the period of active fighting. Moreover, in the first days there was a certain amount of shooting of military prisoners by both sides, though this sort of thing was brought under control more quickly. Instructions from Franco on August 12 ordered advancing columns to weaken the enemy's resistance by leaving an escape valve through which outflanked militia could flee, thereby also avoiding the problem of dealing with more prisoners.[20]

At the same time, he used the public threat of severe repression to try to weaken enemy morale and resistance. As his forces slowly drew nearer the capital, he issued a proclamation to the population of Madrid declaring that

> if this suicidal resistance continues, if the people of Madrid do not force the government and its Marxist leaders to surrender the capital, unconditionally, we reject any responsibility for the great destruction that we shall be obliged to carry out to overcome this suicidal stubbornness. BE WARNED, CITIZENS OF MADRID, THAT THE GREATER THE RESISTANCE, THE MORE HARSH WILL BE OUR PUNISHMENT.[21]

Looting and pillaging on a massive scale was a fundamental part of the revolution in the Republican zone and was also practiced systematically by the wartime Republican government, many hundreds of millions of dollars of valuables being looted, while churches and sacred art were sacked and burned en masse.[22] Despite orders to his troops to avoid pillaging, Franco's columns also sometimes engaged in it. Pillaging was, at least theoretically, directed toward leftist properties and it was temporarily being accepted as a perquisite of the Moroccan units, at least during the first months.[23] The Nationalist authorities also imposed significant fines on and confiscated property from their political opponents.[24]

The insurrection had been launched under the banner of "saving the Republic" and restoring law and order. District commanders seemed almost unanimous on these terms and also promised that all "valid" social legislation of the Republic (essentially meaning regulations on the books as of February 16, 1936) would be respected, while Mola's original political program promised full respect for the Catholic Church, though it called for maintaining the separation of church and state. Franco's initial proclamation of July 18, however, had not specifically mentioned the Republic but invoked the goal of "making genuine in our Fatherland for the first time, and in this order Fraternity, Liberty, and Equality." Three weeks

later, in an interview with a Portuguese journalist published on August 10, Franco was more specific: "Spain is Republican and will continue to be so. Neither the flag nor the regime has changed. The only change is that crime is replaced by order and acts of banditry by honest and progressive work." But he then contradicted himself by declaring there would be fundamental institutional change, adding that "Spain will be governed by a corporative system similar to those installed in Portugal, Italy and Germany."[25] A few days later he was quoted as acknowledging that the first phase of the new regime constituted a military dictatorship but he went on to say that this would be temporary, since he was in favor only of "brief dictatorships." This was confused and confusing, but it did make clear that the outcome would not be continuation of a democratic republic. The reference to Portugal hearkened to the CEDA's goal of a more corporative kind of republic, whereas the references to Italy and Germany implied something more radical, something probably not yet well sorted out in his thinking, almost completely absorbed as he was by military affairs.

The two sides in the Civil War called each other "Reds" and "Fascists," but the left officially termed itself "Republican," as they began constructing a new revolutionary Republican regime in their zone, while the right called themselves "los nacionales," translated by foreign journalists as "Nationalists." As "nacionales," the insurgents affirmed patriotism, tradition, and religion, and quickly generated mass support, particularly among most of the middle classes, as well as the Catholic population generally.

The insurrection had been planned as a preemptive strike to head off the revolutionaries before they could seize control of the Spanish state or, alternatively, produce total chaos. But its partial failure catalyzed the revolution, once the left Republican leaders armed the revolutionaries en masse, giving them de facto power in the Republican zone. Arming the revolution magnified the size of the new militia, but the military achievements were limited, since most revolutionaries devoted themselves to taking over land and economic enterprises, looting on a large scale, destroying churches and religious art, and carrying out mass violence against their political enemies. The revolutionaries claimed, correctly enough, that their revolution was proportionately more extensive and also more nearly spontaneous than what had happened in Russia in 1917. This was accurate, since Spanish society was more consciously and extensively mobilized than Russian society had been.

Yet the extent and ferocity of the revolution soon proved a boon to the Nationalists, for three reasons. First, it consolidated the support of most of

the middle classes and of Catholic and conservative society behind the insurgents. Second, it alarmed Western democracies and rightist dictatorships alike. If the Popular Front had maintained a democracy, other democracies might have come to its aid, but they could not readily support a violent revolutionary regime. Third, the revolution's initial reliance on revolutionary militia was ineffective militarily. Though a portion of the regular army had remained under the orders of the leftist government, it did not trust some of these units and only made limited use of them.

The National Defense Council concentrated on military affairs, and, because of the extreme dispersion of forces across very broad and weakly held fronts, local commanders at first enjoyed considerable autonomy. Little attention was given to forming a regular government. Representatives of the monarchy were kept at a distance, and when Don Juan, third son and heir to Alfonso XIII, slipped across the French border to volunteer for the Nationalist army, he was sent back again by Mola without being permitted to see any of the council members. Franco nonetheless made the first breach in the nominally Republican identity of the insurrection, violating a pledge made only five days earlier, when, at a major ceremony for the Feast of the Assumption in Seville on August 15, he acted unilaterally to replace the Republican flag with the traditional red and yellow banner of the monarchy. He hailed it as the authentic flag of Spain for which patriots had given their lives in hundreds of battles, and his example began to be followed throughout the Nationalist zone. What those commanders who had been more closely associated with Republicanism thought of this is not recorded, but increasingly they followed Franco's lead.

Franco and Queipo de Llano had been added as members of the council on August 3, as the forces in the south became the major military variable. By that time Franco stood out above all the other Nationalist commanders, even Mola, while Cabanellas, the council president, was little more than a figurehead. Franco had cemented relations with Rome and Berlin, receiving all the Italian and much of the German supplies directly, before doling out part to the northern units. All three of the friendly governments who supported the insurgents—Italy, Germany, and Portugal—looked to him as the main leader. On August 16 he flew for the first time to Burgos in the far north, seat of the council, to discuss planning and coordination with Mola. The northern general was cooperative, since his principal ambition was simply to win the war, and he did not exhibit any particular resentment about Franco's growing preeminence. The most prickly Nationalist commander was the ex-Republican Queipo de Llano, who held sway in

western Andalusia. Franco was careful not to interfere with Queipo's autonomy, and on August 26 moved his own headquarters from Seville to Cáceres, farther northwest, to be nearer his advance columns, taking up residence in the venerable Palacio de los Golfines de Arriba, a refurbished sixteenth-century structure.

By this time Franco had a political staff of sorts. No other insurgent commander had assembled an equivalent group. Two senior generals, Alfredo Kindelán, who was his air force commander, and Luis Orgaz, served in his military entourage, while his chief political consultant was his brother Nicolás, who with his wife had escaped from Madrid at the last minute.[26] The Monarchist diplomat José Sangróniz became something of a foreign affairs adviser, and, equally important, served as his principal contact with the multimillionaire businessman Juan March, who provided indispensable financial assistance during the first phase of the war.[27] Franco's new friend Martínez Fuset, a legal officer, would soon serve as his juridical adviser and subsequently take up the post of supervisor of military justice. The war had quickly turned into a major propaganda contest, both at home and abroad, something for which military insurgents were poorly prepared, but Franco engaged the services of his former commander and patron, the histrionic one-eyed and one-armed General José Millán Astray, founder of the Legion, as a kind of propaganda chief.

The town of Talavera, little more than a hundred kilometers west-southwest of Madrid, fell to Franco's forces on September 3. Growing Nationalist strength was evident in the fact that Mola had regained the initiative in the far north, beginning the successful invasion of the eastern-most Basque province of Guipuzcoa and seizing control of one section of the border with France. By that point the initial optimism of the revolutionaries had given way to alarm, as they lost combat after combat. In consequence, the first unified all-Popular Front government was formed on September 4 under the Socialist Largo Caballero, and two months later it was joined by four representatives of the anarchosyndicalist National Confederation of Labor (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo). This was the first time in history anarchists had officially entered a central government, even a revolutionary one, and they gave the government the possibility of bringing some order out of the chaos in the Republican zone. In mid-September, the Largo Caballero government began to create a new centrally organized and disciplined Republican army. The revolutionary Ejército Popular, or People's Army, was modeled to some extent on the Soviet Red Army, adopting its red-star insignia and system of political

commissars, together with the clenched-fist "Red Front" salute introduced by German Communists in 1927. Equally important, in mid-September Stalin and the Soviet Politburo decided to send major military assistance, and the first Soviet arms arrived early the next month. They were accompanied by numerous Soviet military advisers and hundreds of Soviet aviators and tank crewmen, soon to be flanked by the International Brigades, a foreign legion of volunteers that the Comintern began to organize at the end of September, modeled on the hundred thousand or more foreign "Internationalist" volunteers who had fought with the Red Army in the Russian Civil War. Franco, however, would not become fully aware of this and of the magnitude of the Soviet intervention until the latter part of October, when Soviet arms and military specialists began to enter combat in significant numbers.

If September marked a turning point on the Republican side politically and militarily, it was also the time of a decisive turn by the Nationalists, for during these weeks Franco rose to the very top as military commander in chief and also de facto political dictator. The full details of this process will never be known, for no documents survive and the participants have left only two brief accounts, one direct and the other indirect, both written years afterward.[28]

The initiative apparently did not stem as much from Franco and his immediate staff as it did from two key Monarchist generals, Alfredo Kindelán and Luis Orgaz, perhaps with the personal encouragement of the exiled Alfonso XIII. Kindelán was one of the founders of the Spanish air force. He had once been its commander, directed Franco's few squadrons in the drive on Madrid, and would become commander of the Nationalist air force for the remainder of the war. Orgaz had taken over from Franco in the Canaries on July 18, consolidated Nationalist control of the islands, and then assumed a role in the high command on the peninsula.

Their initiative began probably in the first days of September. Its goal was to steer the military regime toward Monarchism, and they also believed that a unified command would be important to achieving final victory. They saw naming Franco commander in chief as a decisive step toward both objectives, necessary to vitiating the non- and anti-Monarchist influence of Cabanellas, Mola, Queipo, and others. Franco told Kindelán that a Monarchist restoration must indeed be the ultimate goal, but this could not be advanced publicly as long as the war continued, since so much of the support for the Nationalists was not Monarchist in sympathy. Kindelán took the point but suggested that Franco might become military

commander in chief and temporary head of state as regent. Franco, however, vetoed any idea of a regency so long as the war lasted, saying that it would undermine unity.

During the first two months of fighting, Franco had been very tactful with his military colleagues. Guillermo Cabanellas, son of the council president, later observed that "Francisco Franco was not prone to deals or the show of emotion. Apparently sincere in his external behavior, good-natured in personal relations, he never sought arguments but showed rigid discipline toward his superiors and informality toward subordinates," and he did not want to give the appearance of claiming dominance.[29] Hence his initial demurral over becoming commander in chief, which was prompted by the fact that when the matter first came up he had no idea how his senior military colleagues would respond. If he were to become a candidate for generalissimo and was rejected, this could permanently poison relations with his fellow commanders and might even seriously compromise the whole war effort. Thus he proceeded with great caution.

There is little doubt that he aspired to the highest rank in the army or, alternatively, the post of high commissioner in Morocco or a key role in a new government. He also wanted greater military authority to mobilize and employ Nationalist resources, but under the present circumstances, that would also mean becoming head of a military dictatorship. Given his high opinion of the Primo de Rivera regime and his own authoritarian instincts, he was not necessarily reluctant to assume such a role, but the concrete opportunity had emerged suddenly and he was keenly aware of the prominence of envy and resentment in Spanish affairs.

Franco received a strong push from his closest advisers—Nicolás Franco, Sangróniz, Millán Astray, and others. Once they saw the interest of the Monarchists in promoting his candidacy, they did all they could to urge him to approve the initiative. Moreover, German and Italian officials looked almost exclusively to Franco as the key leader, and their liaison personnel urged the importance of a more unified and dynamic command. At least one German representative may have directly pressed him to step forward.[30]

The issue began to come to a head as Franco's columns slowly drew nearer Madrid. Need for a commander in chief had become clearer, for Franco had not been able to avoid friction with Queipo de Llano in the south, and on the key central front there were altercations between Mola and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe, head of the advance on Madrid. Kindelán urged Franco to take the initiative in requesting a meeting of all

the council to consider the issue of unity of command. His main ally in convincing Franco to press for the *jefatura* was, by his own account, Nicolás Franco, abetted by Orgaz and Millán Astray.

The meeting was scheduled for September 21 in a small wooden building at the improvised airstrip outside Salamanca, most of the members coming in by plane. Kindelán, who attended, has left the only written account:

> During the morning session, which lasted three hours and a half, we discussed various items of importance, but none as important as that of the *mando único*. I pointed this out three times without managing to bring the issue to discussion, despite having been actively supported by General Orgaz. I seemed to notice, with disappointment, that my goals were not shared by the majority of those assembled.
>
> When the afternoon session began at four, I firmly introduced the question, without the slightest hesitation, encountering a hostile reception from various members. General Cabanellas was clearly and decidedly opposed, declaring that to him the question still seemed premature and that it was not necessary that a unified command be led by a single person, since there were two ways to direct a war, by a Generalissimo or by a Directory or Junta. I agreed, adding: "There are indeed two methods of directing a war: with the first you win, with the second you lose." My proposal was finally put to a vote and was approved with only General Cabanellas dissenting. Then came the vote on the name of the person who should be named Generalissimo. Since it began with the most junior officers and the two colonels excused themselves because of their rank, I decided to reduce tension and break the ice by asking to vote first, and did so in favor of Franco. My vote was immediately supported by those of Mola, Orgaz, Dávila, Queipo de Llano and all the rest, with the exception of Cabanellas, who said that, as an opponent of such a system, it was not up to him to vote for someone for a post he deemed unnecessary.[31]

The council members agreed that the decision would not be mentioned by any of them until the official announcement was made by Cabanellas, but days passed and no announcement was forthcoming.

The *Anuario militar* for 1936 listed Franco as twenty-third in seniority among the major generals, and he was outranked in years of service by Cabanellas, Queipo, and others, yet no one else had his prestige. There were other commanders as brave as Franco, and others with greater technical knowledge, as well as many others who looked more impressive or were

more cordial and better liked, but none had his rare combination of discipline, combat experience, political tact and discretion, foreign contacts, and capacity for command. His lieutenants had already achieved an understanding with Moroccan leaders in the protectorate that secured the Nationalists' rear guard, making Spanish Morocco a crucial staging area that provided numerous intrepid Muslim volunteers, eventually totaling seventy thousand.[32] Cabanellas and Queipo, though more senior, had limited appeal because of their earlier identity with Republican liberalism. The only commander with any equivalent prestige was Mola, but he was only a brigadier and expressed no personal ambitions.[33]

The last part of September represented the culminating moment of Franco's life, and his agenda was so crowded that he had only the most limited time to greet with great relief the arrival of his wife and daughter from France on the twenty-third. They had spent two months abroad in absolute seclusion in Bayonne, trying to remain incognito in the home of the former governess and waiting for conditions in the Nationalist zone to become safe enough to return. The reunited family took up residence at Franco's headquarters in Cáceres, though within a fortnight his headquarters would move to Salamanca.

Carmen recalls that

> Mamá was extremely anxious until we finally got back. We crossed the frontier into Navarre and from Pamplona went on to Cáceres, where we lived only a short time. Then we moved into the archiepiscopal palace of Salamanca. It did not faze me to live in such a building, because the residence of a district commander, as my father had been in the Canaries, was usually a large building with a garden. So this seemed to me normal, though I later realized it was extraordinary, not normal at all. Moreover, when I saw my father again, he looked different. Within little more than two months, his appearance had changed. . . . He had shaved off his moustache and now had more gray hair, so that he looked different . . . He had become a different father also in the sense that I now spent very little time with him. . . . But Mamá always said that it seemed to her incredible that he could sleep so well. If he had a serious problem he was able to put it completely out of his mind when he went to sleep. This always amazed my mother. . . . He was not a nervous man. Not at all.

In the aftermath of the momentous meeting of the twenty-first, Franco made one of his most controversial military decisions. For more than two

months, a motley force of eighteen hundred Nationalists (almost none of them regular troops) had withstood a siege in the Alcázar de Toledo, the huge building that had housed Franco's old infantry academy in his years as cadet. Though most of the building was blasted to rubble, the Alcázar's defenders continued to resist from its large subterranean area, engaging in an epic struggle that had captured the world's attention. Toledo was southeast of the main route of Franco's advance on Madrid, but on the twenty-fourth he decided to reroute his spearheads to relieve the Alcázar, a mission accomplished on the twenty-seventh, followed by a round of executions of Republicans in the city, a tit for tat of the earlier brutality carried out by the Republicans. Franco gained considerable publicity at home and abroad for having saved the heroes of the Alcázar. The priority he accorded this stemmed to an extent from his memories of the Moroccan disaster in 1921, when sizable units had been left to their fate by a weak command, and even more to his conviction that political and psychological factors were of special importance in a civil war.

Later, however, the whole episode became something of a cause célèbre, as Franco's critics, which included members of his own side, insisted that he had made a major operational error by delaying the advance on Madrid for a week or more to relieve the strategically insignificant Alcázar. At the beginning of October, the capital was still weakly defended and could have been seized much more easily than would prove the case a month later. Moreover, in December, after his first assaults on Madrid had failed, Franco himself confessed to a Portuguese journalist that he had felt impelled by his obligations as commander in chief to rescue the highly publicized defenders of the Alcázar, even at the cost of a more immediate move on Madrid.[34]

There was, however, no question of an immediate assault on Madrid at the end of September, because Franco's forces were still too distant and had not yet concentrated sufficient power. Inability to begin the attack for another month was not due primarily to the relief of the Alcázar, though that was one factor, but mainly to the limited resources of the Nationalists, together with the decision to divert reinforcements to other fronts in danger of collapse. Given the enormous publicity generated at home and abroad by the defense of the Alcázar, it was not surprising that Franco decided to relieve it immediately. Some of his critics have charged that his main motive was a public relations windfall that would cement his claim to the *jefatura única*. This is not impossible, though there is no direct

evidence to support it, and in fact the decision of the council for Franco did not depend on the relief of the Alcázar.

One subordinate who did not agree with the priority of the Alcázar was Yagüe, in command of the forces moving on Madrid from the southwest. He insisted, logically, that if the Nationalists pressed the direct advance on Madrid, they would quickly outflank Toledo and force the Republican units besieging the Alcázar to retreat or be cut off. This was obviously correct, but it did not respond to Franco's immediate priorities. Furthermore, Franco and his staff were still unaware that significant Soviet arms and personnel would enter combat within a few weeks. Once that happened, the conquest of the capital would be considerably more difficult. At the moment, this was a secondary disagreement between Franco and his top field commander. Yagüe had suffered from minor heart arrhythmia for years and the pressure of commanding the decisive front in the war was producing cardiac distress. This, not the dispute over Toledo, was the reason why Yagüe was relieved of command on the twenty-second, reassigned to Franco's own staff for rest and medical treatment.

While these events were unfolding, the decision made by the council on September 21 was not being implemented, and Franco and his backers grew more dissatisfied by the day, both with the tardiness of Cabanellas in issuing the announcement and the fact that the extent of his powers as generalissimo had not been clarified. Franco said later in life that he would not have accepted a supreme command that did not include full authority over the government, as well, but that was in retrospect.[35] He was still reluctant to press the issue to a showdown, fearing rejection and the unhinging of the unity of the insurgent command. Kindelán and Nicolás Franco urged Yagüe, whom they knew to be one of his strongest supporters, to take the initiative. Confined for a few days to bed rest, he roused himself and put the matter to Franco very bluntly, claiming afterward that he said that someone would soon become generalissimo, no matter what, but that it would be much better if it were Franco. Whatever the exact sequence and nature of arguments, they had the desired effect, and a second meeting was quickly called for the twenty-eighth to decide the powers of the *mando único*. The only understanding behind the original unanimous vote had been that Franco would be military commander in chief for the duration of the conflict, whereas his backers, and now Franco himself, held that he must have complete political as well as military power. This second meeting was also attended by Yagüe, for, despite his lack of seniority, he had gained

considerable prestige as the field commander of the drive on Madrid and also as the head of the legion. Moreover, on the night before the second meeting, when Franco greeted an exultant crowd from the balcony of his residence in Cáceres, Yagüe stood beside him, hailing Franco as the new "chief of state," no less.[36]

At the second meeting, several council members apparently indicated they had only voted for Franco as military commander for the duration. Franco seems to have been careful not to press on his own behalf, but his backers forced the issue. Kindelán presented a draft of a decree, which he and Nicolás Franco had drawn up the day before, naming Franco supreme commander of the armed forces, a status that would include the powers of "chief of state" "for the duration of the war."[37] This was not initially well received, since it did not reflect what most council members had understood themselves as agreeing to originally, and key figures such as Cabanellas, Mola, and Queipo de Llano at first opposed it. Mola's "open" project had provided for a temporary "military directory" under Sanjurjo, but it did not envision even a short-term political dictator. On the other hand, the council members found that their revolt had caught them up in a ruthless civil war against a revolutionary Republican regime, and the vague framework on which many of them had agreed at the beginning of the insurrection no longer seemed entirely relevant.

During the long Spanish lunch break in the afternoon, Kindelán and Yagüe made a vigorous attempt to convince those comrades, originally a majority, who had opposed their proposal. They argued that the officers in charge of the elite units wanted to see Franco totally in charge and that the German and Italian governments expected the same. The situation had become much more critical than anticipated, and the Nationalists required the strongest and most united leadership possible, the kind of leadership that Franco, plausibly, was best prepared to provide. Mola and Queipo, the other two generals with the most important district commands, at some distance from Salamanca, then departed by plane for their respective headquarters. They were apparently willing to leave matters to the others, who for a variety of reasons were not necessarily prepared to resist the proposal very vigorously. Kindelán has claimed that during the afternoon meeting agreement was finally reached that Franco would have political as well as military command, but Cabanellas is said to have reported that the only agreement was that the council leadership in Burgos would give the matter speedy consideration and render an immediate decision. He made this concession with great reluctance and, after returning to his headquarters

in Burgos, had evening telephone conversations with both Mola and Queipo. Queipo was ambivalent but had no viable alternative to offer, while Mola concluded that it was best to accept the decision, for it would guarantee unity and would contribute to military victory, his main concern.[38] As matters stood, there was no convincing alternative. Queipo reportedly later said that "we chose Franco because with Mola . . . we would have lost the war, while I . . . was completely discredited" because of his Republican past.[39]

Mola's perspective seems to have been that this proposal was an emergency measure that would be in effect for the duration of the fighting, after which they could return to his original plan for setting in motion a political process resulting in a national plebiscite—albeit in carefully controlled circumstances—that would determine Spain's future regime. At that moment the council members did not think they were creating a permanent one-man political dictatorship, though, as it turned out, that was exactly what they were doing. Kindelán's proposal was ratified, the official announcement to be drawn up by the Monarchist diplomat José Yanguas Messía, who was assisting the council. What happened next is uncertain, but the most convincing explanation is that either Franco or his principal backers talked immediately with Yanguas, saying that limiting the mandate to the duration of the war was accepted by Franco but that it must not appear in the text, for it would weaken the new government's authority while the fighting still raged.

For several days there was confusion about the exact terminology. The decree that Cabanellas published on the thirtieth declared Franco "jefe del gobierno del estado español" (the equivalent of prime minister rather than chief of state), but the clause about limiting this power to the duration of the war had disappeared.[40] In remarks prepared for the investiture ceremony on October 1, Cabanellas referred to Franco as "jefe del estado," but in his improvised opening words he called him "jefe del gobierno," as in the decree.[41] What is clear is that as soon as Franco was invested with full power, his position was always defined simply as "chief of state."

Meanwhile, on the twenty-ninth, Franco staged his official entry into Toledo, acting for the attendant newsreel cameras as though he were at that moment liberating the Alcázar, much as some years later General Douglas Macarthur would carefully stage for the cameras his return to the Philippines. One day later, he received the endorsement of the bishop of Salamanca, Enrique Pla y Deniel, whose pastoral letter of the thirtieth, titled "Las dos ciudades" ("The Two Cities"), distinguished between the

heavenly and earthly cities and between the causes of right and left, between Catholic counterrevolutionaries and anticlerical revolutionaries. It also employed the term "crusade," recently coined in Navarre, to characterize the struggle of the Nationalists.

As usual, the forty-three-year-old general did not cut a dashing figure in the ceremony in which he took power in Burgos on October 1. The son of Cabanellas described the scene his own way:

> On the low stand in the throne room, placing him higher than the audience, appears the figure of Francisco Franco, with the prominence of his stomach marked and his thrown-back shoulders accentuating his natural thickness. In such a posture, his figure seems even more diminutive, reduced to a shapeless ball. His face is round, with an incipient double-chin, his hair black, with strong and pronounced brows, the small moustache closely trimmed, the advancing baldness of his head pronounced. His glance, however, is keen and intelligent. On the right hand he wears a gold ring, which seems to cut into his finger now grown thicker. His clothing is poorly tailored, for his sleeves are hidden from sight and the uniform seems too small.[42]

The investiture speech was relatively brief, delivered with the vehemence typical of Spanish public address in that era. Its most striking passage declared that "you are placing Spain in my hands. My grasp will be firm, my pulse will not tremble, and I shall try to raise Spain to the place that corresponds to her history and to her rank in earlier times." That night Franco delivered a longer radio speech, prepared by Nicolás and Martínez Fuset, which he had shortened and simplified. In it, he stated somewhat contradictorily that "Spain will be organized under a broadly totalitarian concept" but that "regions, municipalities, associations and individuals will enjoy the fullest liberty within the supreme interest of the state." It promised that "the state, while not being confessional, will negotiate with the Catholic Church their respective powers, respecting our tradition and the religious feelings of the great majority of the Spanish people."[43]

In this fashion a determined handful took advantage of the need for unity among the Nationalist commanders to promote the most prominent of the rebel generals to the position of generalissimo and chief of state as well. After the meeting on the twenty-eighth Franco had seen the green light and no longer showed the slightest reluctance about assuming complete power. Mola doubtless had some ironic thoughts about the course of

events, in view of his considerable difficulty in getting Franco to join the insurgency in the first place. Though originally an army affair, the elevation of Franco was soon widely accepted by the most diverse political sectors of right and center (though not all of the center) as a military necessity. Even the centrist Republican Alejandro Lerroux, who had fled the revolution in Madrid, argued that the only salvation for Spain lay in a Roman-style legal dictatorship, though he would not necessarily have agreed with what Franco had in mind.[44]

Since he was not introspective, never kept a diary, and left few accessible personal papers, it will probably never be possible to exactly chart the changes in Franco's thinking during the first two months of the Civil War. The German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz referred to what he called the *Wechselwirkung* that takes place during conflicts, by which he meant the effects wrought by the reciprocal interaction of events, leading to pronounced changes, sometimes even to mutual radicalization. Something of this sort took place on both sides during the Spanish struggle, and in some key respects Franco's thinking was transformed. The reluctant conspirator quickly morphed into the determined and ruthless military leader of July 18, but one that, at least in theory, still accepted the partially "open" plan on which the insurrection had been based. In the interview, published by a Portuguese journalist on August 13, in which Franco had said that he was in favor of "brief dictatorships" that completed their task rapidly, he had added that "its duration depends exclusively on the resistance" that it might encounter. The new regime would rely on "technicians" rather than politicians, but it must "transform the structure of Spain completely." The radicalization taking place on both sides encouraged more extreme solutions, and only one month into the war Franco indicated that he was thinking in terms of a corporative, nonparliamentary regime. From the start, he had intended to play a major role, yet the way matters developed in September was not the result of any specific plan that he had but stemmed from the desperate nature of the circumstances and the pressure generated by his supporters, which at times may have surprised even him. The generals who had not supported full power for him had no precise alternative plan of their own and ended up giving in.[45] Ever after, Franco and his closest supporters would contend that he had never sought complete power but had it thrust on him, though that was not exactly the case.

His inaugural speech indicated that he was not thinking in terms of any limited mandate, though it would probably be wrong to conclude that he

had assumed that he would be dictator for life. That ambition would only emerge during the course of the long Civil War; after that there would be no looking back. Franco was soon convinced that parliamentary, liberal-capitalist regimes had become hopelessly weak, divided, and decadent, and that the future of Europe lay with the new single-party national dictatorships, led by Germany and Italy. The Fascist dictatorships provided the assistance crucial to winning the Civil War, and Franco came to identify more and more with their political orientation, even though he did not plan to imitate any specific foreign model.

The preferred title for him soon became "caudillo," a classic Castilian term for "leader" dating from the Middle Ages, a Spanish equivalent of "duce" or "führer." For a brief period several newspapers in the Nationalist zone referred to him simply as "the dictator," as had initially been common with Primo de Rivera, but this was quickly suppressed, even though the word was nostalgically associated in the minds of more than a few with the prosperous and peaceful time of the 1920s and no longer had such negative connotations. As it was, the caudillo almost immediately became the subject of a public litany of adulation, orchestrated by an increasingly disciplined press. This adulation soon far exceeded anything ever accorded any living figure in all Spanish history. It would continue to mark public discourse for the next quarter century, becoming more restrained only in the last years of Franco's regime.[46]

During October Franco was inevitably distracted by the problems of setting up his new government. The National Defense Council was dissolved, to be replaced by the strictly administrative Government Technical Council (Junta Técnica del Gobierno) that would administer the new state but would have no political or military authority. Its president was General Fidel Dávila, a reliable supporter of Franco and an administrative officer par excellence, who also took over the post of chief of the Nationalist army's general staff. Dávila was the only member of the National Defense Council to have a position in the new government. The Government Technical Council supervised seven commissions charged with the various branches of state administration, each having its own president plus three other senior members. Three of these presidencies went to Monarchists. Setting the first example of what would become a standard practice of kicking upstairs unwanted notables, Franco made Cabanellas inspector general of the army, a largely honorific post that relieved the former council president of active command. He also created the office of General Secretariat of the

Chief of State, which he placed under the command of his brother Nicolás, who continued to serve as chief political adviser, as well as the office of Secretariat for Foreign Relations, which he named Sangróniz to head, and a general government ministry that functioned as the Ministry of the Interior and Security under another general. No single city in the main northern sector was large enough to house the entire government. The Government Technical Council sat in Burgos, the main center of administration, though the internal security apparatus was centered in Valladolid, foreign relations in San Sebastián, and the military headquarters at first in Salamanca. This was an ad hoc administration for fighting a civil war, what Franco's brother-in-law Serrano Suñer later called "a field-camp state," but it sufficed, achieving its basic goals over the next sixteen months, until Franco was able to form his first regular government at the close of January 1938.[47]

Despite the early imposition of martial law and a general militarization of government, the new regime could not have succeeded had it not been accepted by a large minority of the population, and indeed by a majority in the original Nationalist zone in the conservative north. All Spaniards threatened by the revolution of the Popular Front—from aristocratic monarchists to ordinary middle-class people to the modest Catholic smallholders of the northern provinces—rallied to Franco as their leader in a desperate struggle for survival. To many of them, he was indeed the "savior of Spain," as acclaimed by his expanding propaganda apparatus. In the face of sweeping violent revolution by their enemies, the Nationalists mobilized a broad, increasingly right-wing counterrevolution that within a matter of weeks embraced a cultural and spiritual neotraditionalism without precedent in recent European history. This quickly led to the restoration of traditional attitudes and values on a broad scale. Schools and libraries were purged not only of radical but of nearly all liberal influences, and Spanish tradition was upheld as the indispensable guide for a nation that was said to have lost its way by following the principles of the French revolution and liberalism.

Federico de Urrutia summarized the new spirit: "This is our ultimate guideline. To be what we were before rather than the shame of what we have been recently. To kill the dead soul of the nineteenth century, liberal, decadent, Masonic, materialist and Frenchified, and to fill ourselves once more with the spirit of the sixteenth century, imperial, heroic, sober, Castilian, spiritual, legendary and chivalrous."[48] Religious revival lay at its root.

As in the Canaries, Franco believed that he must set an example, and from the assumption of full power he began the practice of attending daily Mass in a chapel in his official residence, an official household chaplain, Father José María Bulart, being appointed on October 4. There had never been any doubt about his Catholicism, though it had received only limited expression when he was a young officer. This had been intensified by his marriage to the pious Doña Carmen, but it was the Civil War that identified him with frequent religious practice. The public was given to understand that he attended Mass each morning. Certainly his wife did, but Franco himself was often too busy, going to Mass mainly on Sundays and on special occasions, according to his daughter.[49] Much later, after his death, his niece Pilar Jaráiz, no great admirer of her uncle, would conclude that "his faith was genuine and no mere accommodation, though his way of understanding the Gospel might leave much to be desired and be highly debatable."[50] Certainly religious faith and Catholic identity became for Franco an important part of the sense of providential destiny that he was developing.

In his inauguration speech, Franco had said that his new regime would not be "confessional," reflecting the separation of church and state that Mola had preserved in his original program and that had been followed by all the military leaders in the early weeks, but this position was short lived. The massive violence against both clergy and Catholics unleashed in the revolutionary zone, the slaughter of tens of thousands, united nearly the entire Catholic population behind Franco, with the exception of the Basque nationalists.[51] He soon grasped that religion, even more than nationalism, must become the principal moral support of the National movement, and decided that he must give Catholicism much more than the "respect" promised in his inaugural speech. His new state must, indeed, be "confessional." Within a matter of months, Catholic faith and Spanish nationalism had become inseparable, and Franco's nascent regime soon fully affirmed the traditional "Spanish ideology," which under the country's classic monarchy for a millennium had emphasized the unique spiritual mission of Spain.[52]

The new regime would soon use the concept of "the Crusade" as semi-official designation for the struggle, even though, according to Carmen Franco, her father did not employ it in private conversation, and in later years he almost invariably referred to it simply as "the war." The left would forever condemn the Nationalists' use of the concept of "Crusade" on the grounds that their conduct of the war was too ruthless and inhumane to merit such a term, but the concept defines itself much as does the term

"nation." That is, something is a crusade if most of its practitioners think it to be, and this was the case with a great many of the Nationalists. The cultural and religious counterrevolution helped to generate a spirit of discipline, unity, and sacrifice that was crucial for an all-out struggle. It provided the most important emotional and ideological underpinning for the Nationalists during the long ordeal of civil war.

7 Forging a Dictatorship

(1936–1939)

The military chieftains who had elevated Franco to supreme power may initially have thought of their leader as a sort of primus inter pares, but this notion did not accord with Franco's ideas. Though careful in his treatment of leading subordinates, whom he allowed considerable autonomy, from the beginning he exercised full personal power and firm authority over the military command, so that some of those who had voted for him were taken aback by his sweeping, and often distant and impersonal, use of authority. Referring to this in later years, Franco said that "as soon as he was made Chief of State the first thing he had to do was to 'cinch up' the military."[1]

Normal political life had ceased to exist in the Nationalist zone, all the leftist organizations having been outlawed under terms of martial law. Gil Robles, leader of the largest conservative party, had directed in a letter of October 7, 1936, one week after Franco assumed full command, that all CEDA members and their militia units subordinate themselves completely

to the military leadership. Only the Falangists and the Carlists maintained their own autonomous roles, but they also had to respect military authority.[2] When the Carlists attempted to open an independent officer training school in December, Franco closed it immediately and sent the Carlist leader, Manuel Fal Conde, into exile. Though the Falangists were temporarily allowed to operate two military training schools of their own, on December 21 Franco unified all the rightist militia under regular military command.

Mola and some other commanders had not intended the elevation of Franco to cancel the original "open" plan for the country's future government. During December 1936 and January 1937 several of them may have proposed in discussions with Franco the appointment of a "political directory" to administer civil government and prepare for a new regime, but he showed no interest in anything that reduced his prerogatives or freedom of action. On January 29 Mola delivered a talk over the new Radio Nacional on patriotism and its duties, an indication that he enjoyed a special place in the new order. He was the only general, other than those on his immediate staff, with whom Franco regularly consulted in personal meetings. In a second radio address on February 28, Mola declared that Spain's future regime must have a "corporative organization" but also enjoy an independent judiciary and "freedom of instruction." Several commanders are said to have suggested to Mola that an effort must be made to force Franco to adopt a more collegial system of government, but Mola was intent on winning the war first, telling them that for the moment unity must not be compromised. Once victory had been achieved, it would be time to insist on political changes.[3] Rumors persisted that Franco might appoint another general as a sort of political prime minister, but in fact he did not seem to have had the slightest intention of doing this.

The administration of the Government Technical Council was makeshift and arbitrary, but achieved its principal goals in mobilizing the human and economic resources of the Nationalist zone. Ever-increasing state regulation sought to stimulate and channel the existing system of production and succeeded in encouraging greater proportionate economic output than did the chaotic revolution in the Republican zone. Food production was adequate, mineral exports were sustained, and, after the conquest of the northern Republican zone in 1937, coal and steel production was soon restored and even raised to a higher level. The new state effectively mobilized financial resources; the banks remained profitable and the Nationalist peseta stable, suffering little more than 10 percent inflation per year, while in the opposing zone inflation and monetary depreciation eventually spiraled out

of control.[4] Nearly 30 percent of the cost of the war was met by taxation during the conflict, a better record than that of any of the major European belligerents in World War I, and increased wages almost kept pace with rising prices. Things went so well during the war, in fact, that Franco was not prepared for the severe deterioration in conditions (some of it brought on by government policies) that took place once it ended.

Propaganda assumed a major role, and Franco's government was initially handicapped by reliance on military personnel who were inadequate to the task. The first propaganda director, General José Millán Astray, had oratorical ability but completely lacked the talent and sophistication for what was shaping up as Europe's propaganda battle of the decade. Relying on military administration gave Franco an edge in combat and using technical experts in economic affairs also proved effective, but his regime was at a disadvantage in public relations and propaganda.

Millán Astray was himself responsible for the most notorious cultural incident of the Civil War at a university event in Salamanca on October 12 in honor of the "Día de la Raza," the Spanish national holiday that commemorated the landing of Columbus in the Bahamas in 1492. The presiding officer was the lifetime rector of the University of Salamanca (Spain's oldest), the writer and philosopher Miguel de Unamuno, one of the country's most prestigious intellectuals. Unamuno, like some of Spain's other top writers, had come out strongly in favor of the Nationalists, appalled by the disorder and violence of the left, and he enjoyed personal entrée to Franco.[5] He even served as head of a university commission that removed a number of leftist professors. Seated with him at the speakers' table were Millán Astray and Carmen Polo de Franco, the generalissimo's wife, though none of the three was scheduled to speak. Hearing the orators of the day denounce the "enemies of Spain" in the form of Basques and Catalans was, however, too much for Unamuno, a Basque and a lifelong liberal and independent thinker. He rose to make extemporaneous remarks that, while supporting the Nationalists, denounced the current extremes of what he termed an "uncivil war," briefly defending patriotic and Christian Basques and Catalans, as well as "critical intelligence," which brought howls of derision from the very right-wing audience. Millán Astray could not resist joining in, shouting "¡Muera la intelectualidad traicionera!" ("Death to treacherous intellectualism"), and turning to several legionnaires in the audience, he cried out their old slogan "¡Viva la muerte!" ("Long live death"). As the audience became more vituperative, Doña Carmen, who had great respect for Unamuno, got up to leave and (at the suggestion of Millán Astray

himself) asked Unamuno to take her arm, so that she could get him safely out of the hall, taking him to his home in her own limousine.[6] Doña Carmen herself did not find Unamuno's remarks particularly objectionable and blamed Millán Astray for having created an unnecessary incident.[7]

The university faculty, however, voted to relieve Unamuno of his rectorship. He continued to support Franco, though he became increasingly critical of the Nationalist policy of repression and of political executions, which he apparently tended to blame on Mola's initial policies in the north.[8] On the final day of 1936, Unamuno died an embittered man, deeply saddened by his country's disaster, and soon afterward Franco transferred Millán Astray to leadership of a new service for military amputees.[9]

During the early autumn of 1936 Franco was faced with the problem of the rescue or exchange of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the Falange, who had been arrested by the Republican government in March and was currently being held in a prison in Alicante on the east coast. Falangists were desperate to regain the liberty of their chief, who might be executed by the Republicans at any time. Though Franco could not be expected to be enthusiastic about the prospect of rescuing Primo de Rivera, who might then become a political rival, neither could he reject the requests of the Falangists. He provided assistance and placed a sizable amount of money at their disposal to bribe Republican jailers. The Falangists enjoyed limited cooperation from the German navy and also mobilized support from several leading figures abroad who sought to intervene with the Republican authorities. All these efforts came to naught, and one thing that Franco did not do was to authorize a major political exchange of prisoners.[10] Primo de Rivera was tried by one of the new revolutionary People's Courts in the Republican zone and executed on November 20, 1936, though his death was not publicly acknowledged by the Nationalists for some time. His absence and death left the swollen Falange, suddenly the largest political party in Spanish history, leaderless, lacking the political direction to take advantage of its increasing status in the Nationalist zone, a situation that suited Franco perfectly well. For a number of years, José Antonio Primo de Rivera became the subject of an extraordinary death cult among Falangists, the cult of "el ausente" ("the absent one"). Franco accepted this adoration of the dead José Antonio with equanimity, since it generated no live candidate to oppose him.

During his first months in power, Franco concentrated on military affairs and diplomatic relations. Politics had been proscribed, with all the rightist forces supporting the new regime, and only the Falange engaged in

proselytism, though it was careful not to get in the way of military administration. There was little in the way of political development, however, such matters remaining in the inexperienced hands of Nicolás Franco, head of the General Secretariat of the Chief of State. Nicolás had been a competent naval engineer, but in government he quickly morphed into a self-indulgent bureaucrat, working only in the afternoon or late evening. He had no particular ideas, other than to safeguard his brother's power. There was some talk about the need to organize a "Francoist Party," but this seemed hopelessly artificial and too reminiscent of Primo de Rivera's "Patriotic Union." Franco considered the Primo de Rivera regime his chief precedent, but he kept in mind that the regime had failed for lack of political and institutional development, and he knew that he must avoid such a fate. But how?

By the early weeks of 1937 German and Italian representatives, particularly the latter, were suggesting the need to follow the model of single-party states, with an official political party, presumably designed along Italian or German lines. When, however, the German ambassador General Wilhelm Faupel encouraged the Falangists to take the lead, he was violating Hitler's tacit policy of political noninterference, whereas in Rome Mussolini and his colleagues genuinely hoped that they could persuade Franco to follow the Italian model. This would mean a Fascist-type party in a regime crowned by a monarchy, which then might develop as a satellite of Italy. Early in March 1937 Mussolini dispatched Roberto Farinacci, a top party *gerarca* (leader), on a kind of fact-finding mission to Nationalist Spain, with the goal of encouraging Franco to name a prince of the Italian house of Savoy as the future king. Franco was categorical that this could never be, since monarchy at that point had few supporters in Spain and any such scheme would be hopelessly divisive. Farinacci was further put off when Falangist leaders told him that, aside from being strong nationalists opposed to Marxism, anarchism, and the internationalist left, they advanced a radical program in social and economic affairs. This seemed the more paradoxical to the Italians, given what they perceived as the extremely "reactionary" character of Franco's government.[11]

An important development was the arrival of Doña Carmen's brother-in-law Ramón Serrano Suñer, who entered the Nationalist zone on February 20, 1937. On the eve of the Civil War, Serrano was moving toward the Falange, hoping to bring much of the CEDA's youth with him. Arrested in Madrid, he sat helplessly in prison while his two brothers were executed. A severe ulcer, however, gained his transfer to a hospital, whence, with the help of confederates, he managed to escape dressed in women's clothing,

and he subsequently fled to the Republican zone in disguise. The slender, blue-eyed, handsome Serrano was no longer the dapper blond he had been before the war, for his experiences in Madrid had turned his hair prematurely gray. Doña Carmen was extremely fond of her youngest sister, Zita, and of her brother-in-law. Amid the wartime housing shortage, the couple, together with their four children, were immediately invited to move into the small upper floor of the episcopal palace in Salamanca where the Francos lived.

Serrano was politically experienced and astute, much more sophisticated than the naval engineer Nicolás Franco, and he soon replaced him as Franco's chief political advisor. Like most Spaniards of his era, Franco was strongly family oriented, and in the uncertain early months of his dictatorship, he trusted family members more than anyone else. Increasingly, members of the extended Polo family came to the fore in his entourage, as his brother Ramón was far away in Mallorca and Nicolás was increasingly playing a secondary role. Doña Carmen was always careful to be correct in her relations with Franco's siblings, but inevitably she favored her own relatives, and all the more because she harbored a certain resentment against Isabel Pascual de Pobil, the wife of Nicolás. Isabel was from a wealthy family in Valencia and apparently cut a certain swathe in Salamanca as the spouse of the generalissimo's chief political advisor, but, for Doña Carmen, two "Señoras de Franco" in government circles was one too many.

Earlier, Franco had been impressed by the idea of Catholic corporatism and in 1935 had carefully noted the updating of Carlist doctrine in Víctor Pradera's *El estado nuevo*, but he concluded that these approaches were too right wing and lacked broad mass appeal. Something more dynamic and up-to-date was needed. By the time Serrano arrived in Salamanca, he found that Franco "already had the idea of reducing the various parties and ideologies of the movement to a common denominator. He showed me the statutes of the Falange on which he had made copious marginal notations. He had also made comparisons between the speeches of José Antonio and of Pradera."[12]

Unlike Nicolás, Serrano had a plan of his own, which largely, though never entirely, coincided with Franco's own ideas, and he proposed to create what can be most simply described as a sort of institutionalized equivalent of Italian Fascism, though it would be more identified with Catholicism than Fascism, whatever the contradictions such an identification entailed. This would mean building a state political party, based on the Falange. As Serrano later put it, Carlism "suffered from a certain lack of political modernity. On the other hand, much of its doctrine was included

in the thought of the Falange, which furthermore had the popular and revolutionary content that could enable Nationalist Spain to absorb Red Spain ideologically, which was our great ambition and our great duty."[13] It is doubtful that either Franco or Serrano had ever read the early nineteenth-century theorist Joseph De Maistre, but they implicitly agreed with his conclusion that the counterrevolution was not the opposite of a revolution, but rather was an opposing revolution. The revolutionary dimension of their counterrevolution would be provided by a kind of Fascism.

The Falange had swollen enormously from no more than ten thousand members to several hundred thousand, growing even more than the Communist Party in the Republican zone, but its principal leaders were dead, slain by the leftist repression. The second rank who stepped to the fore lacked talent, prestige, or clear ideas and were divided among themselves. They realized that all indications were that the country was moving toward some kind of major new political organization, and in February they had negotiated terms of a possible fusion with the Carlists, the only other significant paramilitary and political force in the Nationalist zone. The Carlists, however, were ultratraditionalist Catholics, who were extremely skeptical of Fascism, and a merger could not be achieved.

While Nicolás continued to handle routine administration of political affairs, Franco decided—strongly encouraged by Serrano—to establish a *partido único*, a single, unified state party. Matters were brought to a head by turmoil in the Falangist leadership between April 16 and 18, as two dominant factions literally came to blows, leaving one dead on each side. By April 18, the sometime ship mechanic Manuel Hedilla, acting head of the party, was elected its new *jefe nacional* by a narrow vote. While that was going on, Serrano supervised the drawing up of a decree of political unification, officially announced on April 19.

This established the Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx (Falange Española Tradicionalista [FET]) as the new state party (a state party being standard "in other countries of totalitarian regime," according to the decree), arbitrarily fusing the Falangists and Carlists. The Twenty-Six Points, the Fascistic doctrine of the Falange, became the creed of the new party and hence of the state, but Franco emphasized that this was not a final and fixed program and would be subject to modification and development in the future. "The Movement that we lead is precisely this—a movement—more than a program. It will not be rigid or static, but subject, in every case, to the work of revision and improvement that reality may counsel," a point that Franco stressed further in his radio address that night.[14] The

new political structure would not rule out an eventual Monarchist restoration, for Franco specified that "when we have put an end to the great task of spiritual and material reconstruction, should patriotic need and the wishes of the country support it, we do not close the horizon to the possibility of installing in the nation the secular regime that forged its unity and historical greatness," taking care to term it "instauración" of a more authoritarian monarchy, a concept developed by the neo-Monarchist theorists in the pages of the journal *Acción española* in the early 1930s, as distinct from restoration of the parliamentary monarchy.[15] This was not at all a matter of the party taking over the state; rather, the state was taking over the party. A few years later, that would make all the difference concerning the future of Fascism in Spain.

All remaining political organizations were dissolved (one in fact had voluntarily done so already) and their members were expected to join the FET, of which Franco named himself the *jefe nacional*. The organization would have a secretary-general, a political council as executive committee, and a broader national council, all these personnel to be appointed by the national chief. Five days later, the Falange's raised-arm Fascist salute was made the official salute of the regime (to be abandoned only in 1945). The key Falangist insignia and slogans were also taken over: the dark-blue shirt, the greeting of "comrade," the red and black flag (first adopted by the anarchists), the symbol of the yoked arrows (from the Catholic monarchs, Fernando and Isabel, who had unified Spain nearly half a millennium earlier), the anthem "Cara al Sol" ("Face to the Sun"), and the slogan "¡Arriba España!" ("Upward Spain").[16]

Hedilla had been expecting some sort of political unification, but also, naively, thought that he would be the leader of the new party. Instead, he was merely named the head of the Political Council, the central political committee. The unification was not popular with either the Falangist or the Carlist militants, but under the existing conditions of total civil war the immense majority accepted Franco's initiative. Nonetheless, Hedilla and a small minority of activists, while not rebelling overtly, manifested their recalcitrance. Hedilla was immediately arrested and later court-martialed and sentenced to death, though Serrano had Franco commute this to life imprisonment.[17] Over the next weeks and months hundreds of Falangists who showed a degree of defiance would be arrested. A report given Franco at the close of 1937 listed a total of 568, of whom 192 were convicted by military tribunals. There were no executions, but forty-nine individuals were sentenced to life imprisonment, though all would eventually

be released.[18] This was the nearest thing to overt political conflict under Franco's long dictatorship and may be contrasted with the constant strife between the leftist groups in the Republican zone, which altogether resulted in the death of more than a thousand people.[19] The FET became a reality, however much cognitive dissonance this generated. Its members devoted themselves primarily to military service, the provision of auxiliary assistance to the war effort, and the expansion of propaganda activities. The war effort remained the priority.

The goal was to develop a *partido único* of a semi-Fascist kind, though not as the mere imitation of the Italian or any other foreign model. In an interview in a pamphlet titled *Ideario del generalísimo*, published soon afterward, Franco declared that "our system will be based on a Portuguese or Italian model, though we shall preserve our historic institutions." Later, in an interview with *ABC* on July 19, 1937, he reiterated that the objective was to achieve "a totalitarian state," though the example he evoked was the institutional structure of the Catholic monarchs in the fifteenth century. This indicated that what Franco had in mind was not a system of absolute control of all institutions, as in the Soviet Union or even the most categorically Fascist regimes, that is, a true totalitarianism, but rather a military and authoritarian state that would dominate the public sphere but otherwise permit a limited traditional semi-pluralism. As he put it rather ambiguously in an interview with the *New York Times Magazine* in December 1937, "Spain has its own tradition, and the majority of the modern formulas that are to be discovered in the totalitarian countries may be found already incorporated within our national past." Two months before the unification, Franco had declared that it was not a matter of the Falange being a "Fascist" movement: "The Falange has not declared itself fascist; its founder declared so himself." Thereafter, the custom within the Nationalist zone, especially among the press in the first months, of calling the Falangists and some other groups "Fascists" was abandoned. All that Franco had been willing to admit before the unification was that the supposedly non-Fascist character of the Falange "does not mean that there are not individual fascists . . . *within it*."[20] The function of the new FET was, in his words, to incorporate the "great unaffiliated neutral mass" of Spaniards, for whom doctrinal rigidity would not be desirable. Similarly, in the month following the unification, he had to reassure Catholic bishops that the FET would not propagate "Nazi ideas," a particular concern of theirs.[21]

Nonetheless, partly under the influence of Serrano Suñer, Franco's language became somewhat more "Fascist" during 1938 and 1939. In the

draft of his speech for July 18, 1938, commemorating the second anniversary of the National Movement, he applied the adjective "Fascist" to his regime and, more extravagantly, to the Catholic monarchs but decided to delete it from the final version. The official statutes of the party, promulgated on August 4, 1937, structured a completely authoritarian and hierarchical system. Franco's role was defined in Articles 47 and 48:

> The Jefe Nacional of F. E. T., supreme Caudillo of the Movement, personifies all its values and honors. As author of the historical era in which Spain acquires the means to carry out its destiny and with that the goals of the Movement, the Jefe, in the plenitude of his powers, assumes the most absolute authority. The Jefe is responsible before God and history.
>
> . . . It is up to the Caudillo to designate his successor, who will receive from him the same authority and obligations.

The leaders of Franco's army were not particularly pleased, for very few of them were Falangists, and they viewed themselves as the true elite of the National Movement, but they were absorbed in the war effort and had little time or energy to devote to political intrigue. For months, Mola was still viewed by some as a potential political alternative, and he seems to have regretted that Franco had been given so much power, but he continued to tell dissatisfied colleagues that any major political adjustment would have to wait until military victory.[22] Mola's role came to an abrupt end on June 3, 1937, when the military plane carrying him to another meeting with Franco suffered engine failure and crashed, killing all on board.[23] Years later, Serrano would insist that Mola was about to deliver a political ultimatum to Franco, asking him to turn over the political powers of prime minister to another general (such as himself), but there is no clear evidence of that.[24]

In July 1937, with all the Basque country occupied and the conquest of the rest of the northern Republican zone at hand, Franco moved his headquarters to Burgos. The family took up residence in the Palacio de la Isla, a large building ceded by a member of the local elite, which had to be quickly modernized for their occupancy. They were joined once more by the Serrano Suñers and by other members of Doña Carmen's family. As Carmen Franco remembered,

> Until the war was over we all lived together. Since my cousins were smaller, I gave them orders and we all got along very well. . . . Since we lived in a large building in Burgos, both of my mother's sisters joined us, though

> Aunt Isabel had no children. The second floor was for us, while my father's office was on the ground floor. We knew that children were not allowed in his office, but we could go into the office of his adjutants, who gave us pencils, which were half blue and half red. And since they were rather bored, with little to do until my father gave them orders, they paid attention to us and we had a great time. I remember once when a German general came to see my father. The naval adjutant was very nice and sometimes very funny, so he had put a lid on his head as though it were a helmet, the lid of a soup bowl. He had it on when the general arrived, and when he came into the office my father said, "You must be crazy. What are you doing with that lid on your head?"

For the daughter of the generalissimo, the war seemed glamorous enough: "For a girl it could be entertaining. Whenever another town was taken, there was a celebration and that could be a lot of fun. We could go out in the streets with other children to sing hymns and patriotic songs. Yes, that could be good fun."

Though the Francos and Serrano Suñers seemed to have formed one big happy family during the war years, circumstances were not so fortunate for several other members of the family. Franco's niece Pilar Jaráiz, daughter of his sister, was trapped with her own infant child in the Republican zone. Limited exchanges of prisoners began in the autumn of 1937, and in 1938 they were exchanged and brought to Burgos. Many years afterward Pilar Jaráiz wrote that the reception by Franco and Doña Carmen had been cold and unsympathetic, all the more surprising since their relationship before the war had been close. It was as though they were blamed for not having escaped earlier. They had spent two years in a Republican prison, and Pilar's child had almost died of meningitis. Doña Carmen's unfeeling and hostile question, "Whose side are you on?," typified the extreme suspicion of anyone in any way associated with the other side, even sometimes of those who had been prisoners.[25] In later years, Pilar Jaráiz showed some sympathy for the political left, but whether she ever did during the Civil War is unknown.

Despite his notorious sangfroid, in the home Franco could not always hide the tension generated by difficulties on the warfront or by political and diplomatic stress. According to his daughter, occasionally, at meals, which in Burgos were always taken with the family, "he was rather tense. Sometimes, and it was evident because then he wouldn't say anything at all." But this was rare, for he normally maintained an even temper and

even sometimes showed warmth at home, which contrasted with his cold and reserved, though polite, political and military demeanor.

It was left to Serrano Suñer to develop the first steps of the FET and to conciliate and integrate the *camisas viejas* (lit. "old shirts"), the activist veterans of the original Falange, of whom several thousand survived in the Nationalist zone. By this point Serrano had entirely replaced Nicolás Franco as chief political advisor, and he served during the greater part of the Civil War as political coordinator of the new regime, living in intimate association with Franco. Not the least of his services to his brother-in-law was his acting as a kind of lightning rod for critics, who sometimes blamed him for their political frustrations. Soon they would begin to dub him the generalissimo's evil genius, the *cuñadísimo* (most high brother-in-law).

This enabled Franco to sidestep much of the political criticism that inevitably developed. As Eberhard von Stohrer, the second German ambassador, put it:

> Franco has very cleverly succeeded, with the advice of his brother-in-law, . . . in not making enemies of any of the parties represented in the United Party that were previously independent and hostile to one another, but, on the other hand, also in not favoring any one of them that might thus grow too strong. . . . It is therefore comprehensible that, depending on the party allegiance of the person concerned, one is just as apt to hear the opinion . . . that "Franco is entirely a creature of the Falange" as that "Franco has sold himself completely to the reaction" or "Franco is a proven monarchist" or "he is completely under the influence of the Church."[26]

In the new system, the Church was more important than any other institution save the military. Not quite all the ecclesiastical hierarchy had rallied to Franco, nor was the Vatican—having burned its fingers with Mussolini and Hitler—very eager to provide him with formal diplomatic recognition. The first occasion on which the regime referred to itself as a Catholic state occurred in a minor decree of October 30, 1936, which established the *plato único*, the provision that one day a week restaurants serve only a single plate of food rather than a multicourse meal. The role of military chaplains was made official on December 6, 1936, though they had been present in certain units of volunteers, especially those of the Carlists, from the beginning.

On December 29, 1936, Franco and Archbishop Isidro Gomá, primate of the Church in Spain, reached a six-point agreement that guaranteed

complete freedom for all Church activities. They agreed to avoid mutual interference in the spheres of church and state but also that in the future Spanish legislation would be adapted to the requirements of Church doctrine. Though the Vatican made several efforts at mediating between the two sides of the Spanish conflict, during 1937 relations between the Spanish Church and Franco's regime were regularized. The old ecclesiastical budget of state subsidies was not yet restored, but many measures were undertaken to reenforce Catholic norms in culture and education and to encourage religious observance. The Marian cult and traditional symbols returned to public schools, Corpus Christi was once more declared a national holiday, and Santiago was restored as patron saint of Spain. Many more such measures would be introduced over the next decade, before an apogee was reached in the mid-1940s.

Despite the Vatican's reluctance to provide official recognition to the leader of an insurgent movement, Franco pressed the Spanish hierarchy to make an official declaration on his behalf that would counteract Republican propaganda abroad. Once all Catholic Basque territory was conquered in June 1937 and approval received from the Vatican, the Spanish hierarchy released its subsequently famous *Carta colectiva* on July 1. All but five of the bishops, minus those who had been murdered in the Republican zone, signed this document, which explained in detail the position of the leaders of the Spanish Church. It affirmed the legitimacy of the Nationalists' struggle, though it stopped short of endorsing the specific form of Franco's regime as the future government of Spain.

Some of the Republican anti-Catholic laws would not be officially derogated until the spring of 1938, when Franco had gained somewhat greater support from the Vatican. In March of that year religious instruction was made obligatory in all public schools, crucifixes were restored in classrooms, and plans were announced for a new curriculum in secondary schools that would reflect Catholic teaching. The only note of a subdued kind of anticlericalism came from the most radical sector of the Falange.[27] Franco developed a system that was fundamentally, though by no means totally, clerical, and still reserved several cards to play in negotiation with the Church, until an official concordat was finally signed many years later, in 1953.[28]

On January 30, 1938, the eighth anniversary of the downfall of Primo de Rivera, Franco took another major step in the institutionalization of his regime, dissolving the Government Technical Council and replacing it with his first regular government of cabinet ministers. The announcement was part of a new administrative law to define the structure of Spanish

government. Article 16 stipulated that "the Chief of State possesses the supreme power to dictate juridical norms of a general character," a kind of self-definition and self-legitimization of the personal powers of dictatorship. It also declared the function of president of government, or prime minister, to be "united with that of the Chief of State," permanently reserving such power for Franco. Six months later, the new cabinet took the initiative of promoting Franco to the rank of captain-general of the army and the navy, thereby creating a new supreme military rank that had formerly been reserved exclusively for the kings of Spain. Franco was in the process of accumulating more power in his hands, as the ruler of a new-style twentieth-century dictatorship, than had ever been exercised by any traditional ruler in Spain's long history.

The cabinet that took office on January 31 provided the first clear example of Franco's policy of balancing off the various sectors (later to be termed "political families") of the National Movement, giving a measure of representation to each. Pride of place went to the military, who occupied four ministries. The most important was the able and respected General Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza, a Monarchist conservative with much administrative experience, who in June 1937 had replaced Dávila as head of the Government Technical Council. He was made vice president of the government and also minister of foreign affairs. Falangists received only two ministries—Agriculture and Syndical Organization, the latter charged with initiating the new state labor union system.

Carmen Franco has said that aside from the military men and the Carlist justice minister, the Conde de Rodezno, Franco knew none of the other new ministers, all of whom were selected by Serrano. She observes: "He greatly esteemed Gen. Jordana, because they were somewhat similar. Jordana was reticent, not at all loquacious, and had a manner that my father liked very much."

The last major task of Nicolás Franco in the government was to lead a special delegation to Rome in the summer of 1937 to seek even greater Italian assistance (though not more combat troops), marking the beginning of his transition to the world of diplomacy. Initially Franco had wanted to use his brother's background as shipyard director to name him minister of industry in the new government, but Serrano convinced Franco that would simply be "too much family," and so Nicolás was named ambassador to Portugal, a post that he would hold for two decades.[29]

The only one of the Franco brothers who became a casualty of the Civil War was Ramón. When the conflict erupted, the new Republican government had maintained him as Republican air attaché in Washington, but

his brother's prominent role in the military insurrection placed Ramón under increasing pressure. He was said to have been strongly affected by news of the killing of his old copilot Julio Ruiz de Alda (who had also been a cofounder of the Falange) by revolutionary militia in a slaughter that took place in Madrid's central prison during the second month of the conflict. Immediately upon learning of his brother's first proclamation in Morocco, Ramón had released an ambiguous statement to the press, declaring that the military insurrection did not signal a return to the monarchy but was a struggle over the future of the Republic, a perfectly correct statement at that time. He was charged by the Republican government with purchasing American planes for the Republican war effort, but that effort was stymied by Washington's new neutrality legislation. Ramón remained in regular contact with Nicolás and finally burned his political bridges in mid-September 1936, two weeks before his brother became generalissimo. On September 15, the *Washington Post* published an interview in which he declared his willingness to join his brothers in their cause, once more observing accurately that the Civil War was going to produce a dictatorship of one kind or another, and that Spain needed a "dictatorship of the middle classes," provided by the Nationalists. He did not leave Washington with his wife and daughter until his brother was officially inaugurated on October 1, which extinguished any remaining doubts he might have had.

When Ramón appeared in Salamanca, Franco forgave him completely for his political past. To protect him from the fierce repression against leftists and Masons, Franco ordered a judicial proceeding to absolve him of his Masonic and leftist background and then late in November 1936 promoted him one rank to lieutenant colonel and appointed him head of the Nationalist air base on Mallorca, an important post.[30]

Nearly all Franco's top subordinates reacted negatively, but none as much as General Alfredo Kindelán, the commander of his air force, who on November 26, 1936, sent to him what may have been the strongest letter of protest that Franco ever received from a subordinate. Kindelán informed him that, though Kindelán would maintain complete discipline in the air force, the appointment of his brother had been received with strong and unanimous disapproval, most of all because the revolutionary forces with which Ramón had once conspired had slaughtered several thousand of their military comrades within the Republican zone. Some air force officers contended that Ramón should be shot rather than promoted.[31] An impassive Franco merely confirmed the order, which was carried out.

The Nationalist air force on Mallorca, together with the Italian planes that accompanied them, played an important role in interdicting Republican shipping and also in bombing the docks of east coast ports. Though Ramón was received coldly by his subordinates, he increasingly won their respect by his attention to duty and his professional skill, especially his personal example in leading many missions, actions in which, as base commander, he need not have engaged. During the first ten months of 1938, for example, Ramón logged 159 hours on combat missions, reportedly sometimes criticizing Italian aviators for being too timid. During his two years on Mallorca, he also took at least three brief furloughs in Salamanca, reunited with his siblings for several last times. It has been said that Ramón suffered increasingly from stress and depression during his final months, though this cannot be confirmed.

On October 28, 1938, Ramón led a small routine sortie of a handful of seaplane bombers that targeted the docks of Valencia, but his plane never reached its destination, hitting a sudden rain squall and disappearing into clouds. His body was found floating in the Mediterranean several days later.[32] Franco merely released a statement that it was an honor that his brother had died doing his duty, like so many others, and dispatched Nicolás to attend the funeral ceremony at Palma de Mallorca. It was almost as though he felt it necessary for Ramón to give his life fighting for the Nationalists, in order to purge a sinful past. Subsequently he would have nothing to do with the widow or niece, since Ramón had divorced his first wife in order to marry her, a telling example of Franco's flint-hearted rigidity in such matters, which never changed.[33]

Franco had comparatively few political problems during the last two years of the Civil War. Though he occasionally had to take disciplinary measures, primarily against Falangists, he largely avoided problems by banishing politics for the duration in favor of total concentration on the military effort, and this was accepted by his followers so long as the conflict lasted. Only one of his chief subordinates got slightly out of line in public, and that was his old colleague Yagüe, now commander of an army corps. He was one of the few Falangist generals in an officer corps skeptical of the new state party. Yagüe delivered an address in Burgos on April 19, 1938, anniversary of the political unification, speaking of the need for social justice, recognizing the courage of the Republicans and also urging pardon for Hedilla and other Falangists who might have shown an excess of zeal. Only a longtime comrade of Franco would have dared to give the speech, and the censorship proved tardy, allowing the *Diario de Burgos* to publish

the text, which caused something of a sensation. Moreover, the Falangist chief in La Coruña invited Yagüe to deliver another speech the following month. When this address repeated the same themes, Franco expressed his disapproval by relieving Yagüe of command of his corps for a month, putting an end to such speeches.[34]

The only period of tension came during the second half of 1938, which brought the threat of military stalemate along the Ebro and the danger of new international complications, though this proved transitory. By the final months of that year a number of Monarchist militants became more active, generating renewed speculation about papal mediation, in conjunction with Paris and London, for a negotiated solution and restoration of the monarchy, perhaps to rule over a federation of leftist and rightist Spain. This was quashed by none other than the exiled Alfonso XIII, who made it clear that he supported complete victory for Franco.[35]

With his personal authority consolidated and the military balance tilting ever more in his favor, Franco had a tendency to become overweening in a manner quite different from his earlier political comportment. Victorious on almost every front and constantly praised by a bombastic propaganda machine, he had become convinced that his role was providential, far beyond ordinary leadership. As a national hero in the 1920s, he had taken care to be modest in public pronouncements, but by 1938 he was convinced that he was an instrument of divine providence, endowed with special powers. If that were not the case, how could his extraordinary career and triumphs be explained? No pragmatic empirical calculation could be sufficient to account for his phenomenal success. Thus when he presided over meetings of the council of ministers, he talked more and more, pontificating about economic and other technical problems of which he knew little, sometimes to the irritation or amusement of his ministers.

As has been seen, the idea that Franco was purely laconic was always inaccurate. For years he had been quite talkative in the right kind of settings. By 1938 his verbal excesses had reached the point that some of his ministers mocked him in private. According to the unpublished diary of the Carlist minister of justice, the Conde de Rodezno, after an extravagant peroration by Franco about how easy it would be to deal with foreign debt, Andrés Amado, minister of finance, turned to Rodezno and whispered, "This man is on the moon. This is like talk at a café party." Rodezno further observed, "Moreover, he is someone for whom time doesn't matter. He acts like he never used a watch," while Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, the minister of education, privately declared, "This man possesses a broad culture of useless information."[36]

On the other hand, though he held the floor too long, he did not bully his cabinet members in the manner of some dictators. He almost always kept his temper and remained formally polite. One of the few recorded exceptions took place when the more conservative of the ministers moved to reject the draft of a somewhat radical *fuero de trabajo* (labor charter), proposed by Falangist leaders. Franco angrily seconded them, almost shouting that the text was presumptuous and showed a lack of respect for the "caudillo," having adopted what would henceforth become a lifelong habit of referring to himself in the third person. But he seems to have embarrassed himself by such an unusual outburst, quickly calming down and then acting to smooth things over, though categorically rejecting the draft itself.[37]

The only real arguments that he is known to have had were with a few of his top subordinates about the conduct of military operation. Franco was willing to discuss matters with his generals and cabinet ministers and usually permitted them considerable autonomy, but he always gave the final orders without equivocation. His normal calm would occasionally be interrupted by tears of compassion or rage when he learned of a new atrocity or suffering undergone by his sympathizers in the Republican zone, while he could remain glacial in moments of military alarm or when ratifying the death sentences of those condemned by military tribunals.[38] On the rare social occasions in these months, he preferred the usual light conversation and the recounting of old military anecdotes to any serious discussion. The young Falangist leader Dionisio Ridruejo would later write that he was taken aback by his first meeting with the caudillo: "I was surprised to meet a person who seemed timid rather than arrogant."[39] A number of foreign diplomats, such as the first British representative Sir Robert Hodgson, found his modesty of manner with foreign diplomats attractive, but rather more common was the report that the new Spanish dictator did not look like a military hero—he was too short and unimposing, a tad pudgy in middle age, with a high-pitched voice.

Franco's physical appearance thus continued to contradict the military and political reputation. During the Civil War his uniforms often fit poorly, and on one embarrassing occasion, his jacket split under the arm when he raised his right hand in the regime's Fascist salute. The physical image—timid manner, soft, high voice, and a tendency to waddle with increased weight—made for a cartoonist's delight and brought sarcastic remarks even from members of the regime's elite. In supposed reference to his daughter, Carmen, the witty Sainz Rodríguez observed: "This Carmencita resembles her father more and more, in her voice," while Queipo de

Llano, whose sphere of autonomy would be eliminated at the end of the war, sneeringly referred to him in private as "Paca la culona" (roughly, "fat-fannie Francie"). A good two decades would pass before Franco adopted a more high-protein diet and better tailoring. He would cut a better figure in old age as a more trim and reasonably distinguished elderly dictator in expertly tailored business suits than as the victorious early middle-aged caudillo of the Civil War.

Franco was not a hero for some of his first ministers, and he clearly did not have the personal style, manner, or appearance associated with the standard concept of charisma, but it is nonetheless clear that his leadership acquired genuinely charismatic dimensions during the Civil War. The status of "caudillo" was never fully defined in theory but was based on ideas of charismatic legitimacy.[40] There were numerous factors that contributed to this, including the following:

- His personal history and reputation, dating from the Moroccan campaigns, he having almost always emerged victorious, whereas many others had died or been defeated.
- The dramatic circumstances of 1936 that produced a large national movement that had recognized his personal preeminence among military leaders, making it seem as though he had been raised on the shields of the elite, as in Visigothic times.
- The undeniable effects of the Nationalist propaganda machine, inferior though it may have been to that of the Republicans.
- The development of Franco's style of leadership, not brilliant or for many even especially attractive and not eloquent, but firm, displaying self-assuredness, rendering him convincing in command and capable of communicating his basic ideas to his followers.
- Incipient consolidation of the new culture of the Nationalists, informed by an authority based on a new historico-cultural legitimacy and the appeal to national tradition, combined with new principles and techniques forged during the war.
- Continued victorious leadership that suggested he was well organized and that resulted in his never retreating but instead always advancing.
- Culmination in an incipient new state system that claimed to synthesize all the achievements of tradition, together with the most up-to-date techniques and requirements of the twentieth century, supposedly marking the beginning of a new historical era.

Propagandistic exaltation dated from the beginning of the war, but it increased in the autumn of 1936 when Franco became generalissimo, reaching an apogee in 1939–40.[41] The regime's Press and Propaganda Delegation (Delegación de Prensa y Propaganda) was organized in February 1937, even before the new political system had taken form, and though the cult of *caudillaje* was a state strategy, it was embraced by newspapers and by many notables and associations within the Nationalist zone. Toward the middle of 1937 the anniversary of his investiture, October 1, was declared the annual Fiesta Nacional del Caudillo. The invocation "Franco, Franco, Franco" was made a slogan equivalent to the Italian "duce, duce, duce." The style was clearly Fascistic, quite different from the much more moderate and undemonstrative (theoretically constitutional) authoritarianism of neighboring Portugal under Salazar.[42] Conversely, there was more stress on strictly military leadership, when compared with Italy, producing the slogan "The caesars were victorious generals." Key aspects of the effort to achieve legitimacy were thus more praetorian or Bonapartist than Fascist. All this may not have been either logical or consistent, but it proved pragmatic and effective in practice.

Franco thus became, as the slogan went, "the archetype of the Spanish fatherland," the incarnation of national mission and destiny, and even more broadly, in the struggle against Communism, he was projected as a savior of Western civilization.

12 Surviving World War II

(1941–1945)

At first there was limited reaction in Madrid to the war's expansion, for most Spanish leaders shared the perception in Berlin and Rome that the entry of the United States would not greatly affect events in Europe. On December 19 the *Boletín Oficial del Estado* announced that the policy of the Spanish government remained unchanged, something that Franco and Serrano Suñer personally reiterated to Axis diplomats.

The most reasoned evaluation was articulated in a memorandum that Carrero Blanco presented to Franco. The war, he concluded, had become a struggle between "the power of evil embodied in the Anglo-Saxon-Soviet coalition directed by the Jews" and a German-Japanese alliance that, though powerful, was certainly not guided by the principles of Catholic Christianity. This created a war of "a duration difficult to determine, but certainly lengthy." To join an alliance dominated by the Jews was totally inappropriate, so that the only option was Germany, however disagreeable its paganism.[1]

Franco nonetheless had second thoughts about the Blue Division, deadlocked on the eastern front in the Soviet winter. He requested that it be withdrawn temporarily for rest and refitting, since it had suffered numerous casualties, but the German government replied that it could not afford to and that reinforcements could be added at the front. Franco had begun to draw back, and he did not attend the big celebration in Madrid's Retiro Park when the first contingent of veterans returned. He also wanted to replace the division's commander, Muñoz Grandes, who had gained the personal esteem of Hitler. Franco thought it prudent to send a non-Falangist replacement, General Emilio Estaban Infantes, but for the time being Hitler would not release Muñoz Grandes.

In April 1942 a new American ambassador, Carlton J. H. Hayes, arrived in Madrid. Hayes was not a career diplomat but a distinguished university professor and the leading American expert on the history of modern European nationalism. The mission of his predecessor had been a failure because of disastrous personal relations, and President Roosevelt himself selected Hayes, a liberal democrat in politics but a Catholic convert, as someone likely to be able to deal successfully with Franco. Indeed this proved to be the case, as the two developed mutual respect. Hayes wrote of his first meeting with the Spanish dictator: "The General, I soon perceived, differed notably from the caricatures of him current in the 'leftist' press in the United States. Physically he was not so short nor so stout and he did not 'strut.' Mentally he impressed me as being not at all a stupid or 'me too' sort of person, but distinctly alert and possessing a good deal of both determination and caution and a rather lively and spontaneous sense of humor. He laughed easily and naturally, which, I imagine, a Hitler couldn't do and a Mussolini wouldn't do except in private."[2] During the next two and a half years, Hayes would be required to impose an increasingly harsh American line, as fortunes in the war favored the Allies more and more, but he did so with tact and discretion and managed to retain the respect of Franco, who had the ambassador's portrait painted by his favorite artist, Ignacio Zuloaga, shortly before Hayes's departure.[3]

As the war expanded and domestic problems became more acute, the Monarchist elites grew more active. During 1940–41 they sought to play the German card on behalf of a restoration, which they continued to do during the first part of 1942 before beginning to turn toward the British.[4] In Spain, their cause depended ultimately on the will of Franco and, secondarily, on that of a group of self-professed Monarchist generals, all of whom, however, remained cautious. Such different figures as Yagüe, still without

assignment, and Juan Vigón, his replacement as air force minister, toyed with the idea of a "Falangist monarchy" backed by Hitler as the remedy for the country's political divisions.[5] Franco knew about these murmurings and on June 4 suddenly canceled a trip to Germany by Vigón, though Vigón retained his ministry. As a Falangist, Muñoz Grandes rejected the monarchy, though he told the Germans that Don Juan had been dangling a promise of Spain's entry into the war in return for support for restoration by the military and the Germans. The Monarchists, however, still did not understand that Hitler would have nothing to do with them, and all their maneuverings came to naught.

Franco was momentarily distracted by the death in February in Madrid of his eighty-five-year-old father. After the death of his ex-wife, the elder Franco and his new companion, Agustina Aldana, spent summers at El Ferrol in the old family home, which had remained his personal property. Surprised there by the outbreak of the Civil War, they had passed the entire wartime in Galicia, within the Nationalist zone. The death of Ramón, in some respects his favorite son, depressed Don Nicolás considerably. He and Agustina had returned to their apartment in Madrid at the end of the war. It has been said that Franco made an effort to achieve reconciliation, though on his own terms, which required that the elder Franco abandon his second wife and take up a respectable and decorous position as father of the chief of state. His father refused outright.

He rejected his son's regime, which he called "Fascism," was incensed at the public emphasis on Catholicism, and missed various of his leftist friends who had perished in the repression. Don Nicolás detested Hitler, whom he called a tyrant bent on enslaving and destroying Europe. According to his granddaughter Pilar Jaráiz, he termed his son Paco "un inepto," saying the idea that he was a great leader was simply laughable. He also spoke up for Jews and Masons, declaring that in fact his son knew nothing at all about the latter, many of whom he called "illustrious and honorable men, certainly very superior to him in knowledge and openness of spirit."[6] He claimed that everything would have worked out much better if Paco had shown more interest in women when he was young.

During his last three years, Don Nicolás's health began to fail, as arteriosclerosis advanced. After he lost much of his savings at the hands of a pickpocket, he protested so noisily that Franco heard of it, who ordered that in the future an official car and driver be placed at his father's disposal. Though Franco would never have anything to do with her, on February 23, 1942, Agustina sent word to El Pardo that his father was on his deathbed.

Franco's main concern seems to have been that his father reconcile with the Church and not die in concubinage. He refused to visit his father but called his sister, Pilar, instead, dispatching her, together with a priest, to the apartment. The elder Franco refused to confess or reconcile, however, and died about dawn the following morning. Pilar Franco followed her brother's instructions to have their father's corpse dressed in the uniform of a vice admiral, his final naval rank, after which last rites were performed at the chapel in El Pardo, with only the Francos attending. The remains of Don Nicolás were then buried beside those of his former wife in the Franco family section at La Almudena cemetery. A company of naval infantry was present to honor him at his interment, but none of the family attended. Agustina survived her companion by many years, completely ostracized by the Francos. Henceforth references by the caudillo to his father would be extremely rare, though always expressed in terms of respect. He probably experienced some relief at his father's passing.[7]

A few months later, in July 1942, Franco took another step in the long, slow process of institutional development of his regime by promulgating the second of what would be called the Fundamental Laws of the Realm (Leyes Fundamentales del Reino): the Constitutive Law of the Cortes, a sort of corporative parliament, roughly modeled on Mussolini's Chamber of Fasces and Corporations. The task of drawing up the guidelines was given, significantly, not to Serrano but to the pliant Arrese, and in his speech on the eighteenth of July Franco was much more moderate than the year before, avoiding direct mention of either Germany or Italy.

The regime's second political crisis suddenly erupted in August, when, on the sixteenth, Carlists celebrated a memorial mass in the basilica of Begoña in Bilbao in honor of their fallen in the Civil War.[8] The two highest-ranking Carlists in the government, Varela and Antonio Iturmendi, minister of justice, attended. As they were leaving the ceremony, a small group of Falangists outside tossed two hand grenades, one of which exploded, causing numerous injuries, of which, according to the Carlists, two people later died. Varela was not injured but, spurred on by the anti-Falangist interior minister, Galarza, and other army leaders, he charged that this had constituted a deliberate Falangist attack on the army and on himself, an assassination attempt. He dispatched telegrams to all the district captain-generals and lodged a vigorous protest with Franco, seconded by Galarza. Six Falangists were arrested and tried by military tribunals. Franco was told by Falangists, however, that those arrested had been trying to break up a subversive meeting. He talked with Varela on the twenty-fourth

by telephone from his summer home, the Pazo de Meirás. Varela insisted there was nothing subversive about the mass and that the Falangists had been guilty of unprovoked aggression. Since transcripts of the caudillo's personal conversations with his generals and ministers are extremely rare, part of the exchange is worth quoting. Franco began by declaring that he had heard that some of the Carlists had uttered "subversive slogans":

V: Then "Viva España" is subversive.
F: No, "Viva España," no.
V: No, my General, but I say that all by itself, while you have ceased to do so.
F: Because I say "Arriba España," but there is no incompatibility between these two slogans, except that "Arriba" is more dynamic, a slogan envied by foreigners, while "Viva España" is decadent.
V: A slogan for which there have died all those who saved you and Spain and with which this movement was begun.
F: Yes, but a slogan under which many thousands of kilometers were lost for Spain and our empire.
[. . .]
V: Well, if that is to be prohibited have the courage to issue an order and declare it a crime.
[. . .]
V: (With great indignation and energy) Look, my General, I see what you're thinking and they have deceived you yet again, like they always do, my General. They've also told you that people shouted "Death to Franco," and that is not true. . . . But I see what you're thinking, my General. . . . I've listened to all your recent speeches and you haven't had a single word of consolation for these poor victims, all of them working-class, and some severely injured and likely to die, among them a mother of twelve children and a soldier who was there to worship the Virgin and who will lose a leg, but no one has said anything on behalf of them nor condemned the criminal assassins, while you on the contrary have abused them by talking of political postures and factions. And this is not just, my General, this is not an adequate response, only to talk in the name of a revolution that you proclaim.

Franco insisted that Basque nationalists disguised themselves as Carlists, but Varela denied that any such people were involved and said that the military trial was going forward. Only an old military comrade could have

talked to him with such frankness. Franco, who disliked arguments, finally accepted Varela's interpretation of events and terminated the conversation, simply instructing that "everything be done with the greatest equity possible."[9] The Falangist who had thrown the grenade was condemned to death and executed, despite the fact that on the same day, at the urging of Falangists, Hitler awarded him a medal for his efforts on behalf of Germany and the Blue Division.[10]

The exact background to and motivation for this incident will probably never be clarified. When Varela met with Franco on September 2, he apparently demanded that some sort of political action, as well, be taken with regard to the Falange, and when he found Franco was not forthcoming, he presented his resignation.[11] Varela was the third of his ministers to resign, but Franco never lost his old sense of comradeship and continued to hold him in esteem. Franco also decided that he would have to dismiss Galarza because of the extreme hostility between the interior minister and the Falangists, which had been significantly exacerbated by the denunciations he had sent out on his own initiative.

When he conveyed these personnel changes to Carrero Blanco on the following day, his undersecretary pointed out that the military would be very unhappy to see two army ministers leaving without any equivalent disciplining of the Falangists. Carrero, who apparently had been conspiring with Arrese for several months to get rid of Serrano, pointed out that if Varela and Galarza were no longer a part of the government but Serrano remained, the military and other anti-Falangists would say that Serrano and the Falangists had won a complete victory and that it was Serrano, not the caudillo, who actually ran the government.

Franco needed little prompting, because relations between the brothers-in-law had been deteriorating for some time. Political commentators had been observing for nearly a year that Serrano's star was waning. His pretensions and criticisms had become more grating to Franco, while tension had developed within the family as well that began to drive apart Doña Carmen and her sister Zita, married to Serrano.[12] To make matters worse, Serrano had just fathered an illegitimate child with the aristocratic wife of a cavalry officer, and Doña Carmen criticized Serrano bitterly. For a variety of reasons, Franco was fed up, and in fact the end of this close political association was also accompanied by a growing distance between the two families.

The result was a new realignment of ministers that in some respects went farther than the one sixteen months earlier. Franco decided to replace

Serrano with General Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza, his former foreign minister and vice president. The new minister of the interior was Blas Pérez González, an army juridical officer and university professor who was a "pure Francoist" and would remain in the government as long as Arrese and Girón. The worst problem was replacing Varela, since nearly all the military hierarchy supported him. Franco finally had to turn to a major general, Carlos Asensio, a likeable person who was normally easy to deal with. In the face of Asensio's reluctance (if Serrano is to be believed), Franco spat out in frustration, "What do you want? For me to be carried out of here one day feet first?"[13] Carrero suggested that Franco simply hand him the assignment as a military order, which Franco did, and Asensio accepted. The result of these changes, however, was to reduce internal conflict in the government and strengthen Franco's authority, giving him the most harmonious set of ministers that he had had. None of the regime's internal factions felt completely satisfied, but in general the army had gained more than the Falangists and, though Franco did not entirely understand it at that time, this would soon be important for the future of his regime.

The most important consequence was the return of Jordana to the Foreign Ministry. At that time, Franco had no intention of changing Spain's policy toward the Axis and he considered several other names, but the diminutive and eminently sensible Jordana, with his combination of honesty, experience, and ability, seemed the best alternative. Jordana was known for his carefulness and discretion, while Asensio, unlike Varela, was pro-German. Franco therefore used the contacts of Arrese and the FET with the German embassy to reassure the Germans that the changes meant no alteration of Spain's foreign policy, though in fact that would not exactly prove to be the case.

Hitler detested the "Jesuitical Serrano," as he called him, but he disapproved of the change, perceiving, correctly, that it would not benefit Germany. He had kept Muñoz Grandes in command of the Blue Division so that the Spanish general could participate in the final assault on Leningrad in September and gain the laurels of victory. The idea was that this would give him such prestige that he could, on returning to Spain, alter the country's foreign policy, but the offensive never took place, since the Soviets seized the initiative in August. Meanwhile, Muñoz Grandes also tried to wring more colonial concessions from Hitler, even if no more than, as he put it somewhat obliquely, "a word."[14]

He insisted to the führer that the dismissal of Serrano was a step forward that probably foreshadowed Franco's entry into the war. That was

completely mistaken, but, in accord with this vision, Muñoz Grandes proposed to return to Spain to help prepare public opinion. He assured Hitler that if the führer were to recognize Spain's colonial demands and then ordered German troops into the country for its defense, they would be welcomed as comrades and Franco would have to declare war on the Allies, supported by anti-American opinion in Latin America. Whatever he might have wished, Hitler had no such troops available, and on September 8 he dismissed Muñoz Grandes's ideas as "fantasies," as indeed they were.[15]

Between 1940 and 1943 German diplomats and intelligence agents conducted a lengthy series of conversations tinged by intrigue with leaders of the FET and with high-ranking generals (some of whom were also on the British payroll). This was fairly standard activity for representatives of the Reich and at no time amounted to anything that could concretely be called a conspiracy. Nor did it respond to any specific initiative of Hitler or Ribbentrop, because whenever the German representatives asked Berlin whether they should directly promote a change of government in Madrid, the answer was always the same: Germany did not seek to interfere in Spain's domestic affairs, and relations would be restricted to official channels.

The other foreign representatives active in internal political conversations were the British, primarily with top generals. Their most frequent interlocutor was the elaborately suborned General Antonio Aranda, head of the army war college. The principal political gadfly among the senior military, Aranda talked in 1942 of a shadowy junta of generals, ready to depose Franco. (His conversational imagination knew no bounds, and later, in 1946, he proposed that he take up asylum in the American embassy, from which sanctuary he might lead an anti-Franco opposition government.) There was, however, no junta of generals, for, as Javier Tusell has written, the generals who murmured against Franco "did not conspire, but merely talked about conspiring."[16] Nor were the British very much fooled by them. Finally judging Aranda incorrigible, Franco fired him as director of the war college on November 30, leaving him without assignment and replacing him with Kindelán, who was thereby deprived of command of troops.

The main force for change in Spanish policy was the new minister of foreign affairs, Lieutenant General Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza. Though a tiny man scarcely five feet tall, at sixty-six, Jordana remained trim and energetic. He had twice been high commissioner of Spanish Morocco under the monarchy, which earned him the title Conde de Jordana. He

was notable for good judgment, responsibility, and administrative efficiency. Jordana had observed the foreign policy of his predecessor with increasing apprehension, though without public comment. He had not participated in the fascistization of the regime, yet neither had he overtly opposed it, so that he had no political profile other than that of a conservative Francoist general when he returned to the Foreign Ministry. In private, however, his views were firm and clear. He had written in his personal diary that outbreak of war in Europe had stemmed from the "measureless ambition" of Hitler, adding the fervent wish that "God help Spain and protect her from getting into this conflict, which would be a catastrophe for us."[17]

Spanish policy had in fact already become increasingly moderate during 1942, despite the fact that Franco had a contingency plan drawn up to occupy the southwesternmost corner of France, should the Vichy regime be taken over by Hitler, or collapse. There was no indication, nonetheless, that Franco had any particular change in policy in mind when he selected Jordana but instead simply relied on the new minister to be trustworthy and discreet. He had no idea that Jordana wished to end nonbelligerence and return Spain to neutrality. Jordana was not an Anglophile but he had come to the conclusion that the Allies would probably win the war and that Spain's policy must be realigned. He became, after Franco, the second most important person in Spanish government during World War II. Personally loyal, he understood that he could never challenge Franco directly, and at the same time, unlike Serrano, he had too much personal integrity to criticize him in conversation with foreign diplomats. All the while, he was determined to implement a more constructive policy, working with diligence and discretion to influence Franco, several times to the point of offering his resignation.

At the end of September, when Myron Taylor, United States representative to the Vatican, stopped in Madrid, Franco invited him to El Pardo. The caudillo asked him to explain to President Roosevelt his personal theory of "three wars" under way, something that he had already mentioned to several diplomats. The Second World War, according to Franco, was composed of three different conflicts. In the Pacific war between the United States and Japan, Spain was completely neutral. Though his government had agreed to represent Japanese interests in Latin America, it had taken other steps to distance itself from Tokyo. In the West European conflict between the "haves" of Britain and France and the "have-nots" of Germany and Italy, Spain did not formally take sides but did expect to receive the territories due to it in any reassignment of colonial possessions, an idea

that Franco refused to give up. In the struggle between Christian civilization and "barbarous and oriental" Communism, Spain was a belligerent, though not officially in a state of war. Franco perceived that the period of American defeats had ended and worried that American participation in the European war might impact the third conflict and allow Communism to triumph. He seemed to imply that the Western Allies should sign a separate peace so that Hitler could destroy the Soviet Union, the outcome he preferred. Franco even suggested that it was appropriate that Germany's frontiers extend eastward to the Volga and that it dominate most of Central Europe, although he did concede that the countries that would come under its hegemony should retain a certain amount of autonomy.[18]

As the autumn drew on, Jordana became increasingly anxious that the first major Anglo-American military initiative might take place in North Africa or the Mediterranean. On November 4 he warned the council of ministers that the Allied second front might be opened at any time and would probably affect Spain or its possessions. A strong campaign against the Franco regime was being waged in the American press, calling for the rupture of relations and producing rumors that the Allies were preparing an army of Spanish Republican refugees to invade the peninsula. Therefore on October 30 Ambassador Hayes was authorized to inform Jordana officially that the United States had no hostile intentions against Spain or any of its territories, an assurance that had already been provided by Hoare on behalf of Britain.

Operation Torch, the first Allied campaign against Germany, opened on November 8, 1942, with the landing of British and American troops in French Morocco and Algeria, each of which bordered the Spanish protectorate. Only hours before, Franco received personal letters from both Roosevelt and Churchill assuring him that there would be no military incursion against the protectorate or the islands and that neither had any intention whatsoever of intervening in Spanish affairs. In meetings of the council of ministers on November 9 and 10, army minister General Asensio and the Falangist ministers urged that Spain adopt a more categorically pro-German policy, though without entering the fighting, at least for the moment. Conversely, Jordana insisted on absolute neutrality. Soon afterward, a partial mobilization of Spanish reservists was ordered that increased the number of troops, though the government was helpless to improve the quality of their weaponry. The war had now entered its most dangerous phase for Spain. Hitler responded to the Allied initiative by occupying all the remainder of France and rushing Axis forces into Tunisia, but the crisis

for Germany would only deepen on November 19, when the Red Army launched a powerful counteroffensive to encircle Axis troops at Stalingrad.

Hitler's military occupation of the entire Pyreneean border provoked alarm in both Madrid and Lisbon. While the British and Americans had contingency plans to occupy the Spanish protectorate and enter southern Spain should Germany send troops into the peninsula, the Germans formed a contingency plan to occupy the far north of Spain in the event of the entry of Allied troops. Both plans were defensive in nature and neither contemplated a major invasion of Spain, but Spanish leaders could not be sure they wouldn't invade. After a few days, Berlin notified Madrid that it understood why the Spanish government would have to accept the British and American guarantee for the time being but urged it to make no agreement with the Allies.

The new strategic situation only accentuated domestic political tensions. For perhaps the first time the leftist opposition made open gestures in Spanish cities in support of the Allies, while Basque nationalists increased their efforts to gain Allied support for a partition of the country. Within the regime, however, this only had the effect of uniting the military and the Falangists behind the caudillo, and General Asensio informed the German embassy that the army would permit no new "political experiment" during the crisis.[19]

The best expression of the thinking of Franco and Carrero Blanco during these weeks is found in two confidential memoranda that Carrero prepared for the caudillo, The first, dated November 11, only three days after the initiation of Operation Torch, criticized Hitler's policy in the Mediterranean, concluding that all northwest Africa should already have been under German and Spanish control. Since the führer had failed to act in time, the situation had become much more complicated, but Carrero concluded that Germany still possessed great strength and could still win a complete victory in North Africa. Therefore Spain should retain "the decided will to intervene on the side of the Axis" but in view of the new complications should continue to postpone such an initiative, secretly planning future action with Germany while continuing to "deceive" the Allies.[20]

The second memo, dated December 18, presented quite a different perspective. Germany no longer seemed capable of responding effectively either on the eastern front or in North Africa. The war would be a very long one in which Germany would probably not be able to win clear-cut victory, and it might even lead to a new deal between Hitler and Stalin.

Carrero pointed out such negotiation was entirely possible, given that there was "no fundamental difference of a religious or spiritual type" between Germany and the Soviet Union. To prevent a catastrophe in the east, Spain must strive to convince Britain to change its policy and come to terms with Germany.[21] The strategic situation had become so desperate that there could be no further consideration of Spain entering the conflict directly.

Franco struggled to maintain his basic strategy. He remained convinced that, one way or the other, the war would yet produce major political and territorial changes that his regime could take advantage of. On the first anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he addressed the National Council of the FET, remarking that "we are witnessing the end of one era and the beginning of another. The liberal world is going under, a victim of the cancer produced by its own errors, and with it is collapsing commercial imperialism and financial capitalism with its millions of unemployed." After once more praising Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, he insisted that "the historical destiny of our era will be fulfilled, either by the barbarous formula of a Bolshevist totalitarianism or by the spiritual and patriotic formula that Spain offers, or by any other of the fascist peoples. . . . Therefore those who dream of the establishment of demoliberal systems in Europe deceive themselves."[22] A very few years would reveal this to be another of his failed prophecies. The speech also indicated that he still believed that Nazi Germany would survive the war in a reasonably strong position, which at that moment he still considered necessary for the continuation of his own regime. Consequently he would further declare before the war college on December 18 that "the destiny and future of Spain are closely united with German victory."[23]

Nevertheless, one decisive change was that Franco abandoned the idea that Spain could ever enter the war militarily. On December 3, for the first time he notified Ribbentrop that he had become firmly convinced that such a step was undesirable both for military and for economic reasons, and to that extent thinking in Madrid and Berlin was beginning to converge. A few days later, Hitler finally agreed that Muñoz Grandes could be replaced as commander of the Blue Division. He had a farewell meeting with the Spanish general before his return to Madrid during which he told Muñoz Grandes that he had no interest in any plan to pressure Franco heavily or overthrow him; all he asked was that the departing commander do all he could to oppose the Allies and influence Spanish policy on behalf of the Axis.[24]

Muñoz Grandes returned to a hero's welcome in Madrid on December 17, greeted by a huge crowd. The generalissimo immediately promoted him to lieutenant general, a rank that had the advantage of making him ineligible for any further active divisional command. Franco then invited Asensio and Muñoz Grandes to dinner on New Year's Eve, but, according to the latter, was evasive about any more strongly pro-German policy. For two and a half months, he left Muñoz Grandes without assignment, then on March 3, 1943, named him head of his personal military staff (*casa militar*). This was intended to seem an honor that would please Berlin, but in fact it left the Blue Division's former leader without active troop command and under Franco's thumb, where he could cause the least trouble. He continued to maintain secret contact with Berlin for a while, but military and political events increasingly undercut his pro-German posture, and he was effectively neutralized, soon having no alternative but to become a mainstay of Franco's regime, which he would serve to the end.[25]

Though both sides in the war had attempted to reassure Franco during the early phases of the campaign in Tunisia, it was by no means clear in the first weeks of 1943 that Spain was safe from invasion. The greatest concern was German troop movements in occupied France and the new German position along the Pyrenees, where German officers frankly said to a number of visitors that they expected soon to receive orders to enter Spain, though Hitler seems never to have contemplated such a thing seriously.[26]

The last high-level visit to the führer by a Spanish leader was a journey to Berlin by Arrese, secretary of the FET, in January 1943. He bore a personal letter from Franco, who had carefully briefed him beforehand to carry out a purely pro forma mission whose goals were to obtain a shipment of German arms and expedite commerce between the two countries. There was no concrete political aim, for Jordana supervised foreign policy and, with the looming defeat of the Axis in North Africa, even the Falangists had begun to moderate their position. Under the new one-year commercial agreement worked out by Arrese, Madrid opened a credit of 130 million marks, and Germany would export goods to the value of at least 70 million, permitting a sizable difference in the trade balance in Germany's favor. This would guarantee the first German arms shipment since the Civil War, intended for defense against an Allied invasion. During 1943 and the first weeks of the following year the Reich shipped weaponry to the value of 160 million marks, a quantity that nonetheless was insufficient either to cover the full trade deficit with Spain or to remedy altogether the shortage of quality arms there. The good news was that during the first half of 1943

economic conditions in Spain improved slightly, and shortages saw a modest reduction.

The new feature of Spanish policy at the beginning of 1943 was a persistent effort by Franco's government to mediate the conflict. A "Plan D," conceived largely by José María Doussinague, chief of policy planning in the Foreign Ministry, was based on the calculation that the war would continue for some time, with neither side able to achieve total victory. This would produce the need for "an arrangement" resting on "a policy of just and benevolent reconciliation." Spain's goal should be to "intervene" at the right moment to achieve this, and in the process gain the influence to "make Spain a great power." It was supposedly in an ideal position as "the most important of all the neutral nations" and also "the number one Catholic country," offering Spain the possibility of building a sort of Catholic entente with Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovakia.[27]

This was more fantasy than plan. It dreamed of making Spain the principal mediator without having to change Spain's tilted policy of nonbelligerence in favor of the Axis and expected that it could make use of the Vatican, though relations remained prickly with a papacy that did not necessarily see Spain as "the number one Catholic country."[28] The idea that a collection of very minor powers and satellite and puppet states of the Third Reich all possessed the autonomy to pursue a policy designed by Madrid was illusory. Finally, on June 16, Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, the new German ambassador, asked Franco to end his mediation initiatives and, above all, to cease giving the impression that he was acting on behalf of Germany to palliate its weakness. Franco replied innocently that he was merely trying to create "a psychology of peace that would be useful to Germany" and that while Italy had become a "heavy weight" for Germany, Spain was simply seeking to help her. For the first time he criticized the Nazi persecution of the churches, terming it "totally mistaken," and told Dieckhoff that complete victory over the United States was probably impossible.[29] A further concern was his fear that if the war were not soon resolved, a new Nazi-Soviet pact might be negotiated.[30]

The most agreeable event for Franco that month was a special ceremony in the ruins of the Alcázar on June 5, honoring the caudillo and his fellow cadets of the fourteenth promotion of infantry from the class of 1910. A total of 258 of its original 382 members were dead by that time. Of the former, only sixty-eight had died of natural causes. Another sixty-seven had been killed as infantry officers either in Morocco or the Civil War, thirty-eight had been executed in the Republican zone, and others had

died serving in diverse branches of the armed forces. The event also marked the full reconciliation of Franco and Yagüe, who had recently been placed in command of the Tenth Army Corps in Spanish Morocco. Yagüe returned to Toledo to take command of his former comrades for this occasion, delivering a vehement speech on behalf of Franco and his regime, symbolizing the unity of the military behind their caudillo.[31]

Conversely, a massive shock came the next month, when, on July 23, the Grand Council of the Italian Fascist Party, in connivance with the king and the military, overthrew Mussolini on the grounds of his disastrous military leadership. This had a major impact in Madrid; though Franco maintained his customary calm, the Allied invasion of Italy in September closed off strategic space and made his pro-German posture increasingly unviable. During August, Spanish institutions began a slow and limited process of de-Falangization. On the twenty-fourth the FET's university syndicate forbade all comparisons between the Spanish regime and "totalitarian states," and this soon became official policy, as a new program of defascistization proceeded by degrees, gradually accelerating.[32] The press also received instructions to show greater neutrality in reporting and commenting on the war.

Contact with the post-Fascist Italian government was frozen. For six months the Spanish regime had been maneuvering to present itself as peacemaker, but when the first concrete opportunity presented itself Franco refused to take advantage of it, ignoring feelers from the new Italian government about helping to arrange a separate peace, for fear of being tarred with the Fascist connection by the Allies on the one hand and of offending the Germans on the other.

The Monarchists insisted that only a restoration could ensure the future of Spanish government, and a majority of the lieutenant generals, at the top of the military hierarchy, finally agreed with them. Asensio suggested that they put their position in writing and, on September 15, when Franco returned from his long vacation in the Pazo de Meirás, the first visitor on his agenda was Varela, the de facto leader of the senior generals, who burst into the caudillo's office still carrying his general's baton. Franco knew the purpose of the visit, and ordered him to go back out, ask permission to enter, and leave his baton behind.[33] Visibly irritated, Varelita complied, coming back in to present Franco with a letter signed by eight lieutenant generals and apparently endorsed by two more (a majority of the senior command), inquiring in the most polite terms if he did not think that circumstances were right for restoration of the monarchy. The lieutenant

generals promised firm obedience and guaranteed that complete discipline would be maintained throughout Spain during the transition. For the first and only time, a majority of Franco's senior commanders had asked him, most respectfully, to resign.[34]

The Monarchists had begun a new initiative three months earlier, in June, when a group of *procuradores* (deputies) in the new corporative Cortes had signed the "Manifesto of the Twenty-Seven," sent on to Franco by the president of the chamber. Written in obsequious terms, it suggested that he step down in favor of the monarchy as the only kind of government that could avoid political extremes and have any chance of surviving the war. Another variation was the idea floated by a few of a transitional military regency under General Luis Orgaz, high commissioner of Spanish Morocco.

Franco dealt with each challenge in turn. Nearly all the dissident *procuradores* were punished, either dismissed or arrested or both. With regard to the petition of the lieutenant generals, Franco called in Orgaz for a personal dressing-down and was assured that he would take no independent initiative, even though he had signed the collective letter. Franco then received each of the other lieutenant generals who were signatories, though never more than one or two at a time, and explained that the present situation was much too complicated and dangerous to hand over to a novice king, who might have little support anyway. None of the signatories was willing to challenge him personally, and none was punished directly. Of the six lieutenant generals who did not sign, four seem to have been opposed to the letter, but Franco decided to change the political texture of the army hierarchy. Since the end of the Civil War, he had engaged in annual rounds of promotions, normally on October 1 (Día del Caudillo), to keep his senior commanders happy, but the new initiative of 1943 was the most extensive, elevating no fewer than twenty-six of his most hard-line supporters to lieutenant general. In strictly military terms, the move was preposterous, for the weak Spanish army, as in the past, would have more chiefs than Indians, but it watered down a high command that henceforth would be thoroughly loyal politically. That Franco was conceding nothing was shown by his proposal to recognize Mussolini's new puppet government under German occupation in northern Italy, though Jordana managed to talk him out of it by threatening to resign. Only a semi-official representative, not an ambassador, was sent to the new puppet regime.[35]

Political definitions in Madrid continued to gradually shift. An announcement on September 23 directed that the FET would no longer be called a party; henceforth, it would be known as the "National Movement,"

the broader name for Franco's coalition that had no necessary Fascist connotation. Its doctrine would henceforth be moderated more and more toward a Catholic corporatism, the Fascist model progressively abandoned. Jordana also convinced Franco that he must withdraw the Blue Division, a decision taken during the course of two long meetings by the council of ministers from September 24 to September 25. The unit's official dissolution was then announced on October 12.

The policy of nonbelligerence finally came to an end, though it was never officially repudiated. In a speech to the National Council of the movement on the first of October, Franco defined Spain's policy as one of "vigilant neutrality," the first use of the term in more than three years. In a second speech on October 12, the national holiday, he made no reference to the Axis but declared that the dominating impulse of his policy was inspired by the Catholic and humanitarian goals of the historic Spanish empire. The term "neutrality" finally began to figure in the press four months later, in February 1944.

Yet this change was highly nuanced, for in the latter part of 1943 Franco did not intend a policy of full neutrality so much as a return to the "tilted neutrality" of 1939–40. The objective was to maintain the status of special friend of Germany, for he still could not conceive that the Germans would be completely defeated. Franco calculated that Germany would somehow survive as a great power, and, if Spain were its last remaining special friend, Madrid might enjoy significant support from Berlin in the future.

After the Allied invasion of Italy, Allied pressure on Franco increased. For most of the war Portugal and Spain had been Germany's principal source of wolfram, a vital component in strengthening steel and in making certain kinds of explosives. The trade had been very lucrative, as the price of wolfram skyrocketed, but in November 1943 Ambassador Hayes transmitted Washington's demand for a total embargo, which Franco rejected. Even so, certain other aspects of Spanish policy had to change, and on December 3 Dieckhoff had a long meeting with Franco to protest his recent concessions to the Allies. These included withdrawal of the Blue Division, free flow of refugees across the Pyrenees, the internment of several German submarine crews, and the release to the Allies of a number of interned German and Italian ships. Franco replied that such measures had been required by specific circumstances but that it was "inconceivable that Spanish policy would change" its basic orientation.[36]

Throughout the war Washington had sought to take a stronger line with Franco than London, but Spanish authorities were shocked to hear a radio announcement on January 29, 1944, that the United States was

suspending all shipments of petroleum, a move that could cripple the economy. Washington was determined to put an end to all of Franco's collaboration with Germany, all the more because American codebreakers had gotten into the secret code of the Supreme General Staff and had learned of Spanish assistance to German and Japanese military intelligence. The embargo, which also included other items in addition to oil, created the greatest economic emergency of the war in Spain and encouraged growing domestic unrest.

A graphic example of the latter was the report of an informer inside the Institute of Political Studies (Instituto de Estudios Políticos), the regime's think tank, which revealed that "in this Center they speak of His Excellency in very pejorative terms" and that some referred to him alternately as "a simplistic optimist," "vain and pretentious," "a hopeless fellow," or "unwitting." There was much speculation about a major change, though others concluded that "nothing will happen. He will fool everybody. . . . They also say that although everyone in the army speaks badly of the Caudillo they are not likely to lift a finger," because the general opinion was that the generals had been bought. There was a sense that corruption pervaded Spanish institutions. "The general attitude is one of frank pessimism and that any part of our territory might be occupied at any moment, with or without a declaration of war, or with the bombing of Madrid in the same ways as Berlin, the difference being that here we have no air raid shelters." If elections were held, the left would likely win, but a general conclusion was that "we can perhaps expect to see in Spain a grand 'Competition' of groveling and abasement to win the favor of England and the United States."[37]

That same day another report concerning the atmosphere within the Falangist hard core observed that "they are in a state of deep pessimism," and believed the only solution might be "that the Caudillo will have to leave and be replaced by General Asensio."[38] This similarly reflected the worry that the next Allied invasion might target Spain and that, if things got too bad, Franco's only hope would be to flee to neutral Portugal.

By February even *Arriba*, the official organ of the movement, began to refer to Spain's policy as "neutral," affirming that it had been so ever. As the screws tightened, Franco accepted the fact that he must make further concessions, and before the end of the month Jordana negotiated a preliminary agreement with Washington, but this was rejected by hard-liners in the government.[39] Nonetheless, Franco explained to Dieckhoff that while Spain would continue to do all it could to help Germany, he could not

allow his country to be strangled economically. As reserves were touching rock bottom, a formal agreement was completed with Washington and London on May 2, 1944. The government agreed to eliminate almost all wolfram shipments to Germany and also to retire the Blue Legion, the small successor to the Blue Division on the eastern front, as well as to close the German consulate in Tangier and expel all German spies and saboteurs from Spanish territory (this last measure, however, was never fully carried out).[40]

Though a small amount of clandestine collaboration continued, the new agreement placed Spain in a position of relatively authentic neutrality for the first time in the war. Indeed, the main tilt was now in favor of the Allies, sole providers of the prime goods the country needed to survive. Franco would still not accept the idea of complete German defeat, however, and continued to hope that Spain, rather than Italy, would be Germany's principal postwar associate.[41]

The German response to Franco's shift was angry, and there was even talk of breaking relations, but Hitler intervened, judging that Franco might be doing the best he could and that the best thing for Germany was to salvage what remained of the special relationship. The treaty of friendship signed in May 1939 was up for renewal. Since it specified automatic renewal for another five years unless one of the parties objected, it was automatically renewed.

What finally changed Franco's perspective was the success of the Allied invasion of France in June. Once German forces were in full retreat, he acknowledged that Germany had been completely defeated and accepted that it would be occupied by its enemies, as he admitted in conversation with foreign diplomats. Carrero Blanco prepared his last two strategic analyses in August and September, concluding that there was no hope for the Reich.[42] In October, Spanish Communist forces, based in liberated France, launched an invasion of Spain through the Val d'Aran and Navarre, in the hope of stimulating popular support for revival of the Civil War.[43] Franco ordered in sizable army contingents that completely blocked the effort, though small guerrilla groups, using the French Resistance name of Maquis (or "partisan bands" and "bandits," as they were termed by the regime), alternately composed of either Communists or anarchists, would continue the struggle for years.

Jordana suddenly died after a hunting accident in August 1944 and was replaced as foreign minister for the final phase of the war by José Félix de Lequerica, who had been Franco's representative in Paris for five years. Lequerica had mediated the Franco-German armistice and was so close to

German occupation authorities that in some quarters he had become known as "the ambassador of the Gestapo," due to his frequent lunches with the Gestapo chief Otto Abetz. Lequerica was a cultured man, however, and spoke both French and English. Devious, cynical, and astute, he had an agreeable personality and was an accomplished opportunist.[44] For Franco, he had the advantage of a past that tied him firmly to the regime.[45]

Lequerica understood that his task was to transform foreign policy sufficiently to ensure the survival of Franco's regime, bringing it nearer to the Allies. He emphasized Spain's "Atlantic vocation" and the importance of its connections to the Western hemisphere, making much of the doctrine of "Hispanidad" and of Spain's cultural and spiritual role in the Spanish-speaking world. The new policy stressed the "democracy" of Spanish tradition and above all the strongly Catholic identity of the regime and the Catholic corporatism of its institutional structure. The relationship with Portugal became more important and was used to help project an "Iberian model" that could play a special role in the postwar crisis of culture and values.[46]

At this point Spain's policy regarding the genocide that had been perpetrated by the Nazis and their collaborators became important as a means of establishing the regime's humanitarian bona fides. Though Franco made occasional negative references to Jews, and though a certain amount of anti-Jewish language was inherent in the regime's ultranationalist discourse, the caudillo was not particularly anti-Semitic by the standards of his era in continental Europe.[47] He had had Jewish friends in Morocco and had even intervened publicly on one occasion to quash an outbreak of discrimination against Jews in the protectorate during the Civil War. Though they were not totally free from abuse, Spanish Jews served in his army under the same conditions as anyone else, and there was never any regulation by his government restricting Jews or discriminating against them, as German officials noted with disgust.[48]

Possibly as many as thirty thousand Jews had crossed through Spain to safety during 1939–40, and a trickle did so in the following years of the war. There is no evidence that any Jew, once in Spain, was ever sent back to the Germans.[49] The Spanish government arranged to repatriate from occupied Europe Sephardics who held Spanish citizenship, as well as a small number of other Jews. This process was slow and sometimes grudging, since the regime wanted to limit the number of Jews admitted at any one time and move them on to other countries as soon as possible. There had been no particular effort to save non-Sephardic Jews in occupied Europe,

and the rescue of potential victims that took place in Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania stemmed, at least at first, from the spontaneous humanitarian efforts of Spanish diplomats in those countries.[50] The same might be said of the intervention in Hungary, but in this case Lequerica finally made it a deliberate feature of Spanish policy in October 1944. There the initiative was carried out by Angel Sanz Briz, the Spanish chargé in Budapest, and his courageous Italian ex-Fascist assistant, Giorgio Perlasca, who saved more than three thousand Jews at the height of the SS deportations in Hungary. Meanwhile, Nicolás Franco cooperated assiduously with Jewish humanitarian representatives in Lisbon to expand opportunities for refugees.[51]

The nearest thing to a friend that Franco had among the major Allied leaders was Winston Churchill. Though he had adopted a neutral policy in the Civil War, toward the end tilting slightly in favor of the Republic for geostrategic reasons, Churchill had always said that if he had been a Spaniard he would have supported Franco. On May 24, 1944, he rose in the House of Commons to speak positively of Franco's policy during the world war, which he said had been beneficial, though he may have done so in part to assure a benign posture by Spain during the impending invasion of France. As it was, the Allied ambassadors in Madrid reported that the Spanish government was still not abandoning Germany completely,[52] but on October 18 Franco wrote a personal letter to Churchill for the first time, suggesting that a closer relationship between Britain and Spain was needed to save Europe from the Soviet Union. That was going too far, because even the anti-Communist Churchill thought that Stalin must remain a firm ally until final victory over Hitler. Though privately the prime minister may have thought much the same thing as Franco, he did not reply for three months, and then in guarded terms. The British ambassador emphasized to Lequerica that there could not possibly be good relations with Spain so long as its government remained a dictatorship, to which the Spaniard innocently replied that this surely could not be the case, since Britain was so friendly with the Soviet Union.

The generalissimo made another effort in November, when he gave an interview to the United Press. He declared that his regime had observed "complete neutrality" throughout the conflict and that "it had nothing to do with fascism," because "Spain could never associate with other governments for whom Catholicism was not a fundamental principle." In view of the way that the Popular Front had manipulated democracy in Spain, Franco emphasized that "institutions that produce excellent results in other countries have contrary effects here, due to certain peculiarities of

the Spanish temperament."[53] Developing a line of argument that would remain constant for the next three decades, he tried to relate his regime to the postwar world of European democracy by defining it as an "authentic democracy" in the form of "organic democracy," based on religion, the family, local institutions, and syndical organization, as distinct from "inorganic" democracy, which favored direct elections.[54] Simultaneously, government spokesmen drew attention to recent elections of low-level syndical representatives that had taken place on October 21–22, and municipal elections were announced for some unspecified future date.[55] Franco had begun preparations for constructing a new facade for his regime as early as December 1943, when he first instructed the minister of justice to prepare the draft of a human rights law.[56]

Franco had been a partisan of Hitler for much of the war and had committed enormous errors, but his view of postwar relations with the Soviet Union to a large degree coincided with that of Churchill and was more realistic than Roosevelt's. Though Churchill could not endorse Franco, he saw to it that there was no British interference in Spanish affairs and repeated that Franco "had done us much more good than harm during the war," also observing that he personally would rather live in Spain under Franco than in the Soviet Union under Stalin.[57] By contrast, American policy toward Spain was more categorically hostile, despite the relatively good relations between Hayes and Franco.

The only sharp change in Spanish policy during the final phase of the war was the breaking of relations with Tokyo on April 11, 1945, provoked by Japanese atrocities against Spanish civilians during the American reconquest of Manila. Japanese troops fortified themselves in the old Spanish district and surrounding neighborhoods, which were then blasted apart by the potent American artillery. After Warsaw and Stalingrad, Manila became one of the world's most heavily damaged cities. More than fifty thousand civilians died, many of them deliberately slaughtered by the Japanese, including fifty Spanish civilians who were murdered during the wanton destruction of the Spanish consulate.[58]

During the final days of the European war, leaders of the movement distributed an undated "very restricted circular," sent to local groups to quiet the complaints of diehard Germanophiles. It stressed that at no time had the caudillo "betrayed Germany" but that he had instead worked tirelessly to save Spain and to try to save Europe. It posed a rhetorical question to critics: "What do they want? For Spain to commit suicide because Germany is losing the war?"[59] On April 18, 1945, the vice secretary-general of

the movement sent instructions to all provincial chiefs that the end of the war be presented exclusively as a victory of the regime and of the movement, which had always sought peace and had kept Spain out of the war. It underlined the conclusion that "celebrating peace is to celebrate the triumph of the Falange and of the Caudillo." Notwithstanding, less than a fortnight later news of the death of Hitler led *Arriba* and *Informaciones* to render homage to the fallen führer.

When the Truman administration took office in Washington that month, after the death of Roosevelt, it seemed yet more hostile to the Spanish regime than its predecessor, while the Soviet government relentlessly called for the overthrow of Franco. At the same time, Clement Attlee was elected prime minister in Britain, replacing Churchill. At Potsdam in July and August, the Allied conference recommended to the new United Nations that relations with Franco's government be broken in favor of "democratic forces." Such forces were not defined and would have been hard to find in any number, but the goal was somehow to permit Spaniards to choose a new political regime of their own.

The government of Mexico, Latin America's most resolute foe of the Franco regime, presented to the founding session of the United Nations in San Francisco a motion whose terms, excluding the Spanish government from membership, were accepted by acclamation.[60] On June 30, the government of Panama broke off relations with Madrid, which braced for other countries to follow suit. The postwar tide of the left in Western Europe, which swept the Labourites into power in London and would soon place a leftist coalition in charge of France, established governments whose leaders had already sworn deep hostility to Franco. The Soviet Union, ever his most unremitting foe, went one step further, launching a diplomatic campaign against the five neutral governments—Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Argentina—it accused of favoring Germany during the war, urging active measures against them.[61]

Thus began the official ostracism of Franco's regime, which would reach its high point at the end of 1946, when nearly all ambassadors were withdrawn from Madrid. This semi-isolation continued until 1948, by which time the consequences of the Cold War began to change world affairs increasingly to the benefit of Franco and his regime.

Notes

Chapter 1. The Making of a Spanish Officer

1. His full baptismal name was Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo Franco Bahamonde Salgado-Araujo y Pardo de Lama. (Pardo de Lama, from his maternal grandmother, had been originally Pardo de Lama-Andrade; she was related to the Andrades of the Galician aristocracy.)

2. L. A. Vidal y de Barnola, *Genealogía de la familia Franco* (Madrid, 1975).

3. The American writer Harry S. May devoted an entire book, *Francisco Franco: The Jewish Connection* (Washington, DC, 1978), to this speculation, without presenting any solid evidence. In the eighteenth century one of Franco's direct male ancestors obtained a certificate of "purity of blood," a common elite practice in traditional Spanish society and something more or less expected in the naval officer corps, which became more socially exclusive than the army. Later, during World War II, when his regime was a pro-German "nonbelligerent," rumors about Franco's possible Jewish ancestry reached Berlin, prompting Heinrich Himmler (chief Nazi watchdog of racial issues) to order an SS inquiry into the matter. This turned up no supporting evidence.

The notion sometimes advanced that in the Middle Ages Franco was a specifically Jewish name has no basis in fact, even though the name was borne by a number of Spanish Jews. It referred not to a Jewish origin but to identity with a *calle* or *villa franca* (a free street or town) or a "free" office or profession and thus originally denoted a sort of middle-class origin, which explains why a number of Jewish families also adopted the name.

4. S. M. Ball et al., "The Genetic Legacy of Religious Diversity and Intolerance: Paternal Lineages of Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula," *American Journal of Human Genetics* 83, no. 6 (2008): 725–36.

5. Despite her teenage indiscretion, Concepción is said to have later married an army officer, Bernardino Aguado, who eventually reached the rank of brigadier general of artillery. The Aguados had several children of their own, and Eugenio grew up with them as a regular member of the family, though retaining the name of Franco. He became a topographer and had a long career at the Topographical Institute in Madrid, and Nicolás Franco later formally recognized his paternity. Eugenio's son-in-law, a young library administrator named

Hipólito Escolar Sobrino, wrote a very respectful letter on behalf of Eugenio's family to Franco in April 1950. According to one version, Franco only learned of the existence of his illegitimate half brother around 1940, just before his father's death. A specialist in the history of the book in Spain, after Franco's death Escolar Sobrino became director of the National Library for nine years and later published an autobiography, *Gente del libro* (Madrid, 1999). The first public revelation of certain aspects of all this appeared in *Opinión*, Feb. 26, 1977, more than a year after Franco's death. See J. M. Zavala, *Franco, el republicano: La vida secreta de Ramón Franco, el hermano maldito del Caudillo* (Barcelona, 2009), 93–97.

6. Franco made this remark in the autobiographical sketch that he began in 1974. V. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos 476 días de Franco* (Barcelona, 1980), 86.

7. Franco's daughter, who as a little girl became fairly well acquainted with her grandmother, describes her as "deeply religious. . . . She was an old-fashioned lady, of the kind who have their name on a prayer-bench in church. Every day she went to mass at least twice, and then to another ceremony in the afternoon, as well." (All quotations from Carmen Franco in this book are taken from the lengthy set of interviews that the authors conducted with her in Madrid in January 2008. For the full original Spanish texts of these interviews, see J. Palacios and S. G. Payne, *Franco, mi padre* [Madrid, 2008].)

8. It has been said, but cannot be verified, that Nicolás later regularized the relationship in a civil ceremony under the Second Republic. In 1938, however, his son would invalidate all civil marriages.

9. This novella was published as J. de Andrade, *Raza: Anecdotario para el guión de una película* (Madrid, 1942). In Spanish the term lacks the notion of biological race that tends to characterize its English equivalent and refers more broadly to an ethnic group and its cultural inheritance. The title was thus intended to refer to the Spanish patriotic heritage.

10. In comparing the early lives of leading European dictators, it might be noted that Adolf Hitler suffered at the hands of a brutal father and lavished his affection on a kindly mother. But by contrast, while Hitler identified with his father's brutality, it cannot be said that his thinking was influenced by his mother. Doña Pilar, on the other hand, had a distinct moral and spiritual profile of the traditional sort, and Franco would ever remain unswervingly loyal to the values and beliefs of his mother.

11. R. Garriga, *Nicolás Franco, el hermano brujo* (Barcelona, 1980).

12. Zavala, *Franco, el republicano*, is superior to R. Garriga, *Ramón Franco, el hermano maldito* (Barcelona, 1978).

13. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 88.

14. After Franco's death, the widow of Franco Salgado-Araujo published his memoir, *Mi vida junto a Franco* (Barcelona, 1976), though it is not entirely clear whether he was fully responsible for the final text.

15. The only serious study of his early years is B. Bennassar, *Franco: Enfance et adolescence* (Paris, 1999).

16. Pilar Franco Bahamonde, *Nosotros, los Franco* (Barcelona, 1981).

17. J. González Iglesias, *Los dientes de Franco* (Madrid, 1996).

18. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 90.

19. Compare the remarks of the psychiatrist Enrique González Duro; see his *Franco: Una biografía psicológica* (Madrid, 1992), 69–70.

20. He did not carry a wooden rifle, as has often been erroneously reported.

21. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 96.

22. Ibid., 99.

23. For what it is worth, there is a very formalistic account of Franco and of the academy during these years in L. Moreno Nieto, *Franco y Toledo* (Toledo, 1972), 11–88.

24. F. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo, 19 abril 1937–7 diciembre 1942* (Madrid, 1943), 508.

25. The relationship with the Islamic world was of course a major formative factor in Spanish history. A brief survey is provided by R. Damián Cano, *Al-Andalus: El Islam y los pueblos ibéricos* (Madrid, 2004), while the long conflict is narrated in C. Vidal Manzanares, *España frente al Islam: De Mahoma a Ben Laden* (Madrid, 2004). A. de la Serna, *Al sur de Tarifa: Marruecos-España, un malentendido histórico* (Madrid, 2001), presents a useful brief introduction to relations with Morocco. For a broader recent account, see A. M. Carrasco González, *El reino olvidado: Cinco siglos de historia de España en Marruecos* (Madrid, 2012).

26. Four hundred years of military conflict are detailed in A. Torrecillas Velasco, *Dos civilizaciones en conflicto: España en el Africa musulmana; Historia de una guerra de 400 años (1497–1927)* (Valladolid, 2006).

27. The reasons for this weakness were various but fundamental and deep seated: the absence of a foreign threat, lack of participation in European power rivalries, the close connection between Spanish identity and Catholicism (which discouraged nationalism, associated with liberalism or radicalism), the slow pace of economic development and of a national school system, and the growth of internal divisions.

28. The weak minority current of *africanismo* from the second half of the nineteenth century is treated in L. Sáez de Govantes, *El africanismo español* (Madrid, 1971), R. Mesa Garrido, *La idea colonial en España* (Valencia, 1976), and A. Pedraz Marcos, *Quimeras de Africa: La sociedad española de africanistas y colonistas* (Madrid, 2005).

29. The literature on Spain and its small Moroccan protectorate has expanded greatly during the past generation. The most recent general account is M. R. de Madariaga, *Marruecos, ese gran desconocido: Breve historia del protectorado español* (Madrid, 2013). R. Salas Larrazábal, *El protectorado de España en Marruecos* (Madrid, 1992), presents a brief overview. J. L. Villanova, *El Protectorado de España en Marruecos: Organización política y territorial* (Barcelona, 2004), explains the institutional structure. The military campaigns are treated in Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, *Historia de las campañas de Marruecos (1859–1927)*, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1947–81), J. L. Mesa et al., *Las campañas de Marruecos 1909–1927* (Madrid, 2001), F. Villalobos, *El sueño colonial: Las guerras de España en Marruecos* (Barcelona, 2004), and M. R. de Madariaga, *En el Barranco del Lobo: Las guerras de Marruecos* (Madrid, 2005). The policy toward culture and religion is examined in J. L. Mateo Dieste, *La "hermandad" hispano-marroquí: Política y religión bajo el Protectorado español en Marruecos (1912–1956)* (Barcelona, 2003).

30. All quotations are drawn from V. Gracia, *Las cartas de amor de Franco* (Barcelona, 1978).

Chapter 2. The Youngest General in Europe

1. The first regular unit of North African Muslim volunteers in a modern European army had been organized by the Spanish at Oran in 1734. This Algerian city had been a Spanish possession for two centuries, and a small portion of the surrounding population accepted Spanish sovereignty. When Oran was temporarily lost in 1708, a number of the

local Muslims asked to be evacuated to Andalusia, and some of their descendants remained there, becoming assimilated into the Spanish population. Others returned when the Spanish crown regained Oran in 1734, and at that time a regular company of Mogataces (Muslim volunteers) was organized. The term "mogataz" was derived from a local Arabic pejorative for "renegade," but apparently was adopted by the unit as a badge of honor.

2. L. Suárez, *Franco* (Barcelona, 2005), 8.

3. According to the way that Franco told the story near the end of his life. R. Soriano, *La mano izquierda de Franco* (Barcelona, 1978), 81.

4. On the German role, see P. La Porte, *La atracción del imán: El desastre de Annual y sus repercusiones en la política europea (1921–1923)* (Madrid, 2001), 135–76, and, more broadly, H. L. Müller, *Islam, gihad ("Heiliger Krieg") und Deutsches Reich: Ein Nachspiel zur wilhelmischen Weltpolitik im Maghreb, 1912–1918* (New York, 1991), and E. Burke, "Moroccan Resistance, Pan-Islam and German War Strategy, 1914–1918," *Francia: Forschungen zur Westeuropäische Gechichte* 3 (1975): 434–64.

5. His daughter has observed that "he received a lot of support from Alfonso XIII. We still have a letter from the king accompanying a medal of the Virgin sent to protect him. Papá always thought that the monarchy was important to Spain as a moderating force." She concludes, however, that her father was "more a Monarchist because of history than because of theory."

6. E. Carvallo de Cora, ed., *Hoja de servicios del Caudillo de España* (Madrid, 1967), 46–57.

7. There have been several biographies of her. By far the best is C. Enríquez, *Carmen Polo, señora de El Pardo* (Madrid, 2012). Though Carmen Polo and Sofía Subirán, the earlier object of his attentions in Melilla, looked considerably different in their old age, when they were young they bore a slight resemblance, although Carmen Polo was by far the prettier.

8. Interview with María Angeles Barcón in *Interviú*, July 22, 1978.

9. L. E. Togores, *Millán Astray legionario* (Madrid, 2003), is a detailed and admiring biography.

10. Franco's version is given in F. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco* (Barcelona, 1976), 184–85.

11. A. Mas Chao, *La formación de la conciencia africanista en el ejército español (1909–1926)* (Madrid, 1988).

12. Varela, in fact, was prosecuted before a military honor court, but by that time he had just received a major wound in combat, and hence the court refused to proceed against him. F. Martínez Roda, *Varela: El general antifascista de Franco* (Madrid, 2012), 43–44.

13. Anwal is the more phonetic transliteration, though it is commonly rendered in Spanish as Annual.

14. Franco, who had always been well treated by Berenguer, did not agree with the extensive criticism of the high commissioner but tended to defend him. He said that the commissioner had promised reinforcements to the eastern zone as soon as the situation in the west was fully under control. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 140. He was correct to the extent that Berenguer was not responsible for the foolhardy strategy of Silvestre.

15. The literature on Abd el Krim is extensive, and the best Spanish biography is M. R. de Madariaga, *Abd el-Krim el Jatabi: Lucha por la independencia* (Madrid, 2009), while

R. Furneaux, *Abdel Krim: Emir of the Rif* (London, 1967), though colorfully written, is literally fantastic, based on interviews with his family. The best analytic summaries, however, will be found in D. M. Hart, *The Aith Waryagar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History* (Tucson, 1976), 369–403, and La Porte, *La atracción del imán*, 89–134. See also M. Tata, *Entre pragmatisme, réformisme et modernisme: Le role politico-religieux des Khattabi dans le Rif (Maroc) jusqu'à 1926* (Leuven, 2000), and J. M. Campos, *Abd el Krim y el protectorado* (Málaga, 2000).

16. On the immediate background and origins of the Rif war, see M. R. de Madariaga, *España y el Rif* (Melilla, 1999), and G. Ayache, *Les origines de la guerre du Rif* (Paris, 1981). The best narratives of the war as a whole are D. Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion* (Stanford, CA, 1968), and C. R. Pennell, *A Country with a Government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921–1926* (Wisbech, UK, 1986).

17. A major exception was the cavalry regiment of Alcántara, led by Colonel Fernando Primo de Rivera, which was ordered to cover the precipitous retreat and suffered more than 90 percent casualties, said to be the all-time record for any European cavalry regiment in a single action.

18. The best account of the disaster is J. Pando, *Historia secreta de Annual* (Madrid, 1999).

19. A. Barea, *The Forging of a Rebel* (New York, 1946), 365–66.

20. His most important writings from this period are collected in F. Franco Bahamonde, *Papeles de la guerra de Marruecos* (Madrid, 1986).

21. Some of the most important have been collected in *Francisco Franco, escritor militar*, special issue of *Revista de Historia Militar* 20, no. 40 (1976).

22. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 125–26.

23. The publicity that Franco received during the first major phase of his career is treated in L. Zenobi, *La construcción del mito de Franco* (Madrid, 2011), 25–58.

24. As distinct from their father and mother, Franco's sister, and Franco's daughter, all of whom produced multiple children, none of the Franco brothers, as has been noted, proved capable of generating more than one child apiece, despite the fact that Nicolás and Ramón were both married twice.

25. S. E. Fleming, *Primo de Rivera and Abd-el-Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923–1927* (New York, 1991), 108–71.

26. Brigadier General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano later wrote that on September 21, Franco met with him to tell him that he and other leaders of key units had agreed to arrest and depose the dictator but that they needed a man with the rank of general to lead them. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, *El general Queipo de Llano perseguido por la Dictadura* (Madrid, 1930), 47–48. Yet there is no corroboration, and the only thing that can be known for sure is that Queipo was involved in some kind of activity against Primo de Rivera, who relieved him of command and for a time confined him to a military prison.

27. The fullest account is in R. de la Cierva, *Franco: La historia* (Madrid, 2000), 136–43.

28. A. Flores and J. M. Cicuéndez, *Guerra aérea sobre el Marruecos español (1913–1927)* (Madrid, 1990).

29. R. Kunz and R.-D. Müller, *Giftgas gegen Abd-el-Krim: Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch Marokko, 1922–1927* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1990), S. Balfour,

Abrazo mortal: De la guerra colonial a la Guerra Civil en España y Marruecos (1909–1939) (Barcelona, 2002), 241–300, and the summary by M. R. de Madariaga and C. L. Avila, "Guerra química en el Rif (1921–1927)," *Historia 16* 26, no. 324 (2003): 50–85.

30. Franco's role in this key operation was exceptional, though not quite to the extent claimed by certain hagiographers. See P. Pascual, "Así fue el desembarco de Alhucemas," *Historia 16* 23, no. 282 (1999): 64–77.

31. France would complete the full occupation of its own much larger protectorate, where relatively speaking it had to do much less fighting, in 1934.

32. J. L. Villanova, *Los interventores: La piedra angular del protectorado español en Marruecos* (Barcelona, 2006).

33. *La Legión española*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1973), is the fullest account, and J. Scurr, *The Spanish Foreign Legion* (London, 1985), provides a briefer summary of the legion's history, as does J. H. Galey, "Bridegrooms of Death: A Profile Study of the Spanish Foreign Legion," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 2 (1969): 47–63. Its role in the Moroccan campaigns is treated in J. E. Alvarez, *The Betrothed of Death: The Spanish Foreign Legion during the Rif Rebellion, 1920–1927* (Westport, CT, 2001), and F. Ramas Izquierdo, *La Legión: Historial de guerra (1 septiembre 1920 al 12 octubre 1927)* (Ceuta, 1933). Total combat deaths of the legion throughout its history reached approximately ten thousand, most occurring in the Civil War of 1936–39. There is an extensive further bibliography in Spanish.

34. There is a good brief discussion of his mastery of counterinsurgency warfare in G. Jensen, *Franco: Soldier, Commander, Dictator* (Washington, DC, 2005), 22–56.

35. In recent years controversy has developed about Franco's skill in military leadership, though it has much more to do with the Spanish Civil War than with the campaigns in Morocco. The best general analysis is J. Blázquez Miguel, *Franco auténtico: Trayectoria militar, 1907–1939* (Madrid, 2009). Other commentaries, pro and con, include C. Blanco Escolá, *La incompetencia militar de Franco* (Madrid, 2000), R. Casas de la Vega, *Franco militar* (Madrid, 1996), and J. Semprún, *El genio militar de Franco* (Madrid, 2000).

36. Together with his copilot Julio Ruiz de Alda, Ramón got a brief memoir of this exploit into press within a matter of weeks, under the title *De Palos al Plata* (Madrid, 1926). This would be the first of three instant memoirs of his successive adventures that he would publish in the next five years.

Chapter 3. Director of the General Military Academy

1. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 74.

2. Her full name was María del Carmen Ramona Felipa María de la Cruz Franco Polo. Henceforth she will be referred to in this study as Carmen or Carmencita and her mother as Doña Carmen.

3. For example, during 1962–63 Stanley Payne made the acquaintance in Madrid of José Pardo de Andrade, a relative of Franco's from Galicia, who detested his illustrious distant cousin, then dictator of Spain. A favorite refrain of Pardo de Andrade emphasized that, as he liked to put it, "Franco es un débil sexual" ("Franco is a sexual weakling"), incapable of engendering a child of his own. His version was that Carmencita was an illegitimate daughter of Ramón's who had been adopted by Paco and Carmen when they saw they were likely to have no children of their own. Pardo de Andrade somewhat disingenuously

insisted that she resembled Ramón in appearance, in response to which it was pointed out that since Paco and Ramón also resembled each other, that could hardly prove anything.

4. This stemmed perhaps from the fact that as a young woman the attractive Carmencita tended to have what the Spanish call a Moorish (*moruna*) appearance.

5. J. Tusell, cited in González Duro, *Franco*, 129, 410.

6. See C. Navajas Zubeldia, *Ejército, estado, y sociedad en España (1923–1930)* (Logroño, 1991).

7. Doña Carmen's third sister, Isabel, had married but had no children and later would spend more than a little time with the Francos.

8. In 1928, Franco would have undoubtedly been incredulous if told that within eight years he would be unable to prevent the summary execution of Campins by a military tribunal.

9. Or, as Michael Alpert puts it, "of the seven hundred officers who had graduated from the General Military Academy . . . , only 37 were dismissed after the Civil War, presumably for having served the Republic, while 84 had been shot in the Republican zone. The overwhelming majority had been imprisoned in the Government zone or had served in the Insurgent army." Michael Alpert, *The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939* (Cambridge, 2013), 90.

10. *Estampa*, May 29, 1928, quoted in P. Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (New York, 1993), 57–58.

11. Officers were required to seek approval to marry largely because they were so poorly paid; the government wanted to be sure the officer would be able to support his new wife.

12. Carmen Díaz's eventual memoir, *Mi vida con Ramón Franco* (Barcelona, 1981), published, inevitably, only after the death of her sometime brother-in-law, is fairly convincing. Carmen Díaz later had a much happier second marriage with a more normal husband.

13. To defend himself, Ramón quickly brought out his second memoir, *Aguilas y garras* (Madrid, 1929).

14. Garriga, *Ramón Franco*, 149–67.

15. Franco recounts this himself in his brief *"Apuntes personales" sobre la República y la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 1987), 6.

16. Ramón Franco soon published a lurid memoir of this absurd adventure, *Madrid bajo las bombas* (Madrid, 1931), his third volume of memoirs in five years.

17. Garriga, *Ramón Franco*, 210–11.

18. Archivo Varela, legajo 148, published by Javier Tusell in *Cambio 16*, Nov. 30, 1992.

19. The background is presented in S. Ben-Ami, *The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain* (Oxford, 1978). The best Republican memoir of these events is M. Maura, *Así cayó Alfonso XIII: De una dictadura a otra* (Madrid, 2007). J. A. Navarro Gisbert, *Así cayó la monarquía: Cinco días que conmovieron a España* (Barcelona, 2008), provides a broad narrative.

20. The only serious riot in Madrid took place on the early hours of the fourteenth, during which the protesters toppled various statues of historic kings and sacked the headquarters of the small Spanish Nationalist Party. The huge demonstrations of the following day were peaceful.

21. Toward the end of his life, Franco gave his own, very one-sided, version of the collapse of the monarchy in his very brief and never completed *"Apuntes" personales*, 7–9.

Chapter 4. From Ostracism to Chief of Staff

1. When Lerroux had founded the party very early in the century, it had indeed been radical and incendiary, but over the years it moved toward the center.

2. The best studies of the military reform are M. Alpert, *La reforma militar de Azaña (1931–1933)* (Madrid, 1982), and C. Boyd, "Las reformas militares," in L. Suárez Fernández, ed., *Historia general de España y América*, 25 vols. (Madrid, 1986), 17:141–73, while the most detailed account of the military under the Republic is M. Aguilar Olivencia, *El ejército español durante la Segunda República* (Madrid, 1986).

3. Colonel Segismundo Casado, last commander of Republican Madrid in the Civil War, lamented years later that "if Señor Azaña had held the army in due esteem, not merely for its patriotic mission but for its loyal obedience to the Republic, it is undeniable that the reforms would have won the support of the majority of officers. But unfortunately Señor Azaña was not well balanced, suffering from a civilian inferiority complex that was reflected in the scorn and hatred that he felt for military men. This complex was fully demonstrated throughout his political career." *Pueblo* (Madrid), Oct. 7, 1986, quoted in Aguilar Olivencia, *El ejército*, 235.

4. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 425, and *Mi vida junto*, 11, 104, 122.

5. M. Azaña, *Obras completas* (Mexico City, 1966–68), 4:33, 39.

6. As he informed Ricardo de la Cierva in 1973. De la Cierva, *Franco*, 210.

7. Zavala, *Franco, el republicano*, 278.

8. In the summer of 1935 Ramón and Engracia returned to Spain, following the finalization of his divorce in the preceding year, to be formally married. The legality of this marriage would be among the many that were annulled by a decree of Franco's government in 1938 that voided the Republican divorce law altogether, though Franco did extend a widow's pension to Engracia after Ramón was killed in action several months later.

9. Franco, *"Apuntes" personales*, 16.

10. The nearest thing to a biography of Sanjurjo is the book by his relative, E. Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, *El general Sanjurjo: Héroe y víctima* (Madrid, 2004), not a critical study but the usual Spanish hagiography.

11. According to Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, who claims to have been present at the principal meeting between Franco and Sanjurjo. Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, *Testimonio y recuerdos* (Barcelona, 1978), 376–78.

12. So he told his biographer Ricardo de la Cierva. De la Cierva, *Franco*, 228.

13. On the widespread censorship and banning of newspapers under the Republic, see J. Sinova, *La prensa en la Segunda República española: Historia de una libertad frustrada* (Madrid, 2007).

14. Each of these is listed in M. Alvarez Tardío and R. Villa García, *El precio de la exclusion: La política durante la Segunda República* (Madrid, 2010), 195–202.

15. M. Azaña, *Memorias íntimas de Azaña* (Barcelona, 1939), 310.

16. On the various roles of Masons under the Republic, see M. D. Gómez Molleda, *La Masonería en la crisis española del siglo XX* (Madrid, 1986).

17. R. Villa García, *La República en las urnas: El despertar de la democracia en España* (Madrid, 2011), is a thorough and definitive account of the national elections of 1933.

18. The main source is Franco's boyhood friend, Admiral Pedro Nieto Antúnez, who

always remained relatively close to him. R. Baón, *La cara humana del Caudillo* (Madrid, 1975), 36–37.

19. Franco would have opportunity to show his gratitude after the Civil War. Hidalgo had fled abroad to escape the Red Terror, in which many of his political colleagues were killed, but, as a Mason, if he returned to Spain he would be subject to prosecution under the anti-Masonic legislation of Franco's dictatorship. Hidalgo wrote to ask for amnesty for his past Masonic activities, which Franco immediately granted.

20. Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco (henceforth cited as FNFF), *Documentos inéditos para la historia del Generalísimo Franco*, 5 vols. (Madrid, 1992), 1:11–12.

21. D. Hidalgo, *Por qué fui lanzado del Ministerio de la Guerra* (Madrid, 1934), 78–79.

22. Just a few months earlier, the Socialists in Estonia had followed an opposite tack, supporting a moderate authoritarian takeover by the liberal premier Konstantin Päts in order to thwart the greater danger of a more extreme rightist (or "Fascist") threat than existed in Spain. J. Valge, "Foreign Involvement and Loss of Democracy," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 4 (2011): 788–808.

23. Franco, *"Apuntes" personales*, 11. The broader European issues are treated in S. G. Payne, *Civil War in Europe, 1905–1949* (New York, 2011).

24. Within only a few months leftist spokesmen were permitted to present charges of atrocities before a military tribunal. The resulting inquiry produced concrete evidence of only one killing, though probably there were more. The most extensive study on this point is F. Suárez Verdaguer, "Presión y represión en Asturias (1934)," *Aportes* 21, no. 3 (2006): 26–93.

There is a large literature on the insurrection. The most detailed account is P. I. Taibo II, *Asturias 1934*, 2 vols. (Gijón, 1984), which is very favorable to the revolutionaries. See also F. Aguado Sánchez, *La revolución de octubre de 1934* (Madrid, 1972), B. Díaz Nosty, *La comuna asturiana* (Madrid, 1974), J. S. Vidarte, *El bienio negro y la insurrección de Asturias* (Barcelona, 1978), A. del Rosal, *El movimiento revolucionario de octubre* (Madrid, 1983), A. Palomino, *1934: La Guerra Civil empezó en Asturias* (Barcelona, 1998), and P. Moa, *1934: Comienza la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona, 2004).

25. López de Ochoa is said himself to have had nineteen recently captured prisoners shot while the fighting raged, but Yagüe accused him of being soft on the revolutionaries and of insulting the elite units. López de Ochoa subsequently had Yagüe briefly arrested on charges of slander. L. E. Togores, *Yagüe: El general falangista de Franco* (Madrid, 2010), 97–145.

26. Gil Robles later gave his version in his memoir, *No fue posible la paz* (Madrid, 1968), 141–48.

27. De la Cierva, *Franco*, 246.

28. See the account of the aviator Juan Antonio Ansaldo, who was to have piloted the plane, in his memoir *¿Para qué . . . ? (de Alfonso XIII a Juan III)* (Buenos Aires, 1951), 91–92.

29. On the mythic use of the insurrection, pro and con, see B. D. Bunk, *Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War* (Durham, NC, 2007).

30. Preston, *Franco*, 106.

31. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 474.

32. Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, 235; Franco, *"Apuntes" personales*, 24–25.

33. Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, 777.

34. Franco's older brother, Nicolás, spent a brief term in state administration during these months. During one short-lived government, he served from October to December 1935 as director general of shipping and fisheries, then returned to his post in the naval engineering school.

35. N. Alcalá-Zamora, *Memorias* (Barcelona, 1977), 320–21.

36. For a fuller account of the Gil Robles–Franco reforms, see Aguilar Olivencia, *El ejército*, 443–67.

37. S. de Madariaga, *Memorias* (Madrid, 1974), 531.

38. For a critical evaluation of the leadership of Gil Robles, see M. A. Ardid Pellón and J. Castro-Villacañas, *José María Gil Robles* (Barcelona, 2004).

39. The principal version of all this is given by Gil Robles in *No fue posible*, 364–66. It was later publicly substantiated by Franco himself.

40. Franco had earlier had negative dealings with José Antonio when the Francos decided to evict the Falange from an apartment that it used as its headquarters in Oviedo, which belonged to Doña Carmen. They sought to avoid any political complications and used the good offices of José Antonio's close friend, their brother-in-law Serrano Suñer, to persuade the Falangist leader to have the apartment vacated. R. Serrano Suñer, *Política de España, 1936–1975* (Madrid, 1995), 34.

At some point José Antonio himself had a meeting about military insurrection with Franco, who fended him off with his typical patter of professional small talk, consisting mainly of military anecdotes. The Falangist leader was irritated and concluded that Franco was not to be counted on for any daring political enterprise, a conclusion that, generally speaking, was correct. This meeting, variously dated by commentators as taking place in either February or March 1936, more likely occurred in the early winter. The only witness to it was Ramón Serrano Suñer, as recounted in his principal memoir, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: Memorias* (Barcelona, 1977), 56. See also the reconstruction of events suggested by J. Gil Pecharromán, *José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Retrato de un visionario* (Madrid, 1996), 410–11.

Chapter 5. The Destruction of Republican Democracy

1. From 1928 to 1935 the Comintern implemented a strategy for what it called the third period of world revolutionary activity, according to which Communist parties attempted to foment immediate revolution, rejecting any alliance that did not directly support such tactics. This was a complete failure, and in Germany, which harbored the largest Communist party outside the Soviet Union, it boomeranged, playing a major role in permitting the Nazis to seize power. In August 1935, Stalin directed the Comintern to change course by abandoning immediate revolutionary extremism and adopting the kind of alliance tactics that had carried Mussolini and Hitler to power. Communist parties were directed to form broad electoral alliances with any other leftist group, however moderate, and to emphasize legal tactics in the short term. Victorious popular fronts were formed in Spain, France, and, later, Chile. The way this functioned in Spain is examined in S. G. Payne, *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism* (New Haven, CT, 2004), 1–82.

2. M. Alvarez Tardío, "The Impact of Political Violence during the Spanish General Elections of 1936," *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, no. 3 (2013): 463–85.

3. M. Portela Valladares, *Memorias: Dentro del drama español* (Madrid, 1988), 168–69.

4. These data are drawn from new research by Manuel Alvarez Tardío and Roberto Villa García for their forthcoming book on the elections of 1936.

5. Franco's own version of this, written more than three decades later, relies exclusively on distant memory and is apparently not entirely reliable. Franco, *"Apuntes" personales*, 39–42.

6. N. Alcalá-Zamora, *Asalto a la República, enero–abril de 1936* (Madrid, 2011), 163–64.

7. Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, 492–93. There is some discrepancy regarding details and the sequence of events between the recollections of Franco and Gil Robles, though they agree on essentials.

8. Franco, *"Apuntes" personales*, 42–43.

9. Preston, *Franco*, 116.

10. Alcalá-Zamora, *Asalto*, 167–68.

11. Franco's version of this was first presented in J. Arrarás, ed., *Historia de la Cruzada española*, 8 vols. (Madrid, 1939–43), 4:57.

12. Alcalá-Zamora, *Asalto*, 181–83.

13. Ibid., 180–87.

14. Alcalá-Zamora, *Memorias*, 191–92; Portela Valladares, *Memorias*, 186–96.

15. The only source for these conversations is Franco's own reminiscences, but the attitudes he attributed to the two political leaders certainly reflected their position at that moment. Arrarás, *Historia de la Cruzada española*, 3:58, and Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mi vida junto*, 131.

16. Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 53.

17. Quoted in R. de la Cierva, *Historia de la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid, 1969), 764.

18. *El Liberal* (Bilbao), Mar. 26, 1936. Prieto repeated the reference in a speech on May 1.

19. Martínez Fuset is treated in R. Garriga, *Los validos de Franco* (Barcelona, 1981), but the data provided are limited.

20. The principal sources are Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, 563–67, and Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 56–58.

21. R. Villa García, "The Failure of Electoral Modernization: The Elections of May 1936 in Granada," *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 3 (2009): 401–29.

22. The version of his candidacy that he penned in his final years is full of distortions. Franco, *"Apuntes" personales*, 34–35.

23. The most authoritative discussion of this issue is J. T. Villarroya, *La destitución de Alcalá-Zamora* (Valencia, 1988).

24. This was very likely Lieutenant Colonel Valentín Galarza, coordinator of the UME.

25. Alcalá-Zamora, *Asalto*, 410–11.

26. While out of the army, Mola wrote three volumes of memoirs to generate income. These were published immediately, then later collected in his *Obras completas* (Valladolid, 1940) and much later republished as *Memorias* (Barcelona, 1977). In addition, a brief manual on chess that he turned out sold very well and provided welcome income. There are a number of books about Mola, none of much value.

27. There are many accounts of the conspiracy. The fullest are de la Cierva, *Historia de la Guerra Civil*, 735–816, and F. Alía Miranda, *Julio de 1936: Conspiración y alzamiento*

contra la Segunda República (Barcelona, 2011), though the latter is misleading in its presentation of the insurrection as thoroughly and meticulously organized. For a shorter account in English, see S. G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, CA, 1967), 314–40.

28. Many years later, Franco claimed that he had been behind the selection of Sanjurjo as leader and had ulterior motives: "In that way I could pull all the strings myself, because Sanjurjo, though a brave man, lacked the brainpower for so much responsibility." Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 138. Franco was right, for Sanjurjo would have been completely incapable of running any kind of government by himself, but Franco exaggerated in claiming any particular role in the selection of Sanjurjo, whom almost everyone saw as the obvious choice for figurehead.

29. Mola's guidelines have been published in various formats, originally in Arrarás, *Historia de la Cruzada española*, 3:449. Limited data may be found in the books by his sometime personal secretary, J. M. Iribarren, *Con el general Mola: Escenas y aspectos de la Guerra Civil* (Zaragoza, 1937) and *Mola: Datos para una biografía y para la historia del Alzamiento* (Zaragoza, 1938), and in A. Lizarza, *Memorias de la conspiración, 1931–1936* (Pamplona, 1954), and J. del Castillo and S. Alvarez, *Barcelona: Objetivo cubierto* (Barcelona, 1958).

30. According to Mola's secretary, José María Iribarren, in an interview with Stanley Payne in Pamplona, Dec. 15, 1958.

31. According to the Monarchist conspirator Juan Antonio Ansaldo, in his memoir *¿Para qué . . . ?*, 125.

32. The letter has been reprinted many times. The full text is in de la Cierva, *Franco*, 280–82.

33. According to his biographer B. F. Maíz, *Mola, aquel hombre* (Barcelona, 1976), 219–20.

34. J. Vigón, *General Mola (el conspirador)* (Barcelona, 1957), 100; E. Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo* (Barcelona, 1957), 254–55.

35. This was paid for by funds from Juan March, probably Spain's wealthiest businessman, earlier prosecuted by the Republic for his dealings under Primo de Rivera. The full extent of his financial support is a matter of speculation, though he later provided large sums to assist Franco early in the Civil War. Cf. J. A. Sánchez Asiaín, *La financiación de la Guerra Civil española: Una aproximación histórica* (Barcelona, 2012), 167–225, and P. Ferrer, *Juan March: El hombre más misterioso del mundo* (Barcelona, 2008), 354–55.

36. This is the most common estimate, but a total of 444 is reported by J. Blázquez Miguel, *España turbulenta: Alteraciones, violencia y sangre durante la II República* (Madrid, 2009), 624–704. The two principal analyses of political violence in this period are F. del Rey Reguillo, "Reflexiones sobre la violencia política en la II República española," in M. Gutiérrez Sánchez and D. Palacios Cerezales, eds., *Conflicto político, democracia y dictadura: Portugal y España en la década de 1930* (Madrid, 2007), 19–97, and G. Ranzato, "El peso de la violencia en los orígenes de la Guerra Civil de 1936–1939," *Espacio, tiempo y forma*, ser. 5, Historia contemporánea, vol. 20 (2008): 159–82.

37. The timing and content of this message have been confirmed by key participants, but the primary source is the unpublished "Memorias" of Elena Medina, linotypist at the newspaper *El Debate*, who served as a key courier for Mola and carried the message. Cf. N. Salas, *Quién fue Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra (1875–1951)* (Seville, 2012), 184–85.

38. Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 120–21; A. Kindelán, *La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco* (Barcelona, 1981), 173–74.

39. The principal accounts are I. Gibson, *La noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo* (Madrid, 1982), L. Romero, *Cómo y por qué mataron a Calvo Sotelo* (Barcelona, 1982), and A. Bullón de Mendoza, *José Calvo Sotelo* (Barcelona, 2004), 677–705.

40. J. Pérez Salas, *Guerra en España (1936–1939)* (Mexico City, 1947), 82–83.

41. S. Juliá, quoted in N. Townson, ed., *Historia virtual de España (1870–2004): ¿Qué hubiera pasado si . . . ?* (Madrid, 2004), 186. Cf. J. Zugazagoitia, *Historia de la guerra de España* (Buenos Aires, 1940), 5.

42. *ABC*, July 14, 1960, quoted in Bullón de Mendoza, *José Calvo Sotelo*, 703.

43. *The Morning Post* (London), July 20, 1937, in Preston, *Franco*, 137.

44. Douglas Jerrold, the British conservative who helped arrange this operation, has provided his version in the memoir *Georgian Adventure* (London, 1937).

45. The most careful and detailed reconstruction of the fight of the *Dragon Rapide* will be found in A. Viñas, *La conspiración del general Franco y otras revelaciones acerca de una Guerra Civil desfigurada* (Barcelona, 2011), 1–108. Some further details from the British side are provided in Peter Day's luridly titled *Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco to Power in Spain* (London, 2011), 7–89. "British intelligence" did not exactly "help bring Franco to power," but there was some knowledge in London of what was afoot.

46. The most thorough presentation of the conspiracy theory is in Viñas, *La conspiración del general Franco*, 48–115. See also F. Bravo Morata, *Franco y los muertos providenciales* (Madrid, 1979), 17–47. In fact, Balmes did not die immediately and could easily have denounced his murderers, had they existed, while the officer who certified the accident officially was not a conspirator but remained loyal to the Republic. Key facts are laid out in A. Monroy, "Chismes en torno a la muerte del general Balmes," *Razón española* 170 (Nov.–Dec. 2011): 341–47.

47. Enríquez, *Carmen Polo*, 65–67; Garriga, *Los validos*, 28–30. Mola did much the same, sending his wife and daughter across the border to France until the situation in Spain was made secure.

Carmen recalls that on the seventeenth "we went to a hotel in Las Palmas, which delighted me because I had never been in a hotel before. . . . Early the next day a car came to take my mother and myself to military headquarters, which was not far from the port. . . . I was reluctant, saying 'Why do we have to leave the hotel?' We spent all that day at military headquarters. I could see a lot of excitement in the streets, but soon we were not allowed to go to the windows because people were being armed. You could see both soldiers and people in street clothes, all of which seemed very strange to me. Then an official from the juridical corps who was very close to my father [Lieutenant Colonel Martínez Fuset] took us to spend the night on a Spanish coast guard boat. On the following day it took us directly to a German ship rather than having us pass through the port, because the Reds were still in the port. We had spent all night on the coast guard boat and were very lucky, because the radio operator received an order from Madrid to overthrow the officers, even to kill them. . . . Mamá was worried, really worried."

48. L. Bolín, *España: Los años vitales* (Madrid, 1967), 47–48.

49. For the argument that relying on loyal army and security units would have been the wiser course, see the memoirs of the Republican officer Pérez Salas, *Guerra en España*, 105–15.

Chapter 6. Franco Becomes Generalissimo

1. In later years, Franco would say that he had always foreseen a long civil war, but this is apparently ex post facto rationalization.

2. According to his aide Pacón. See Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mi vida junto*, 173.

3. Since this is a matter of learned guesswork, historians have come up with quite varying calculations. Cadres were seriously undermanned in mid-July, as many troops, amounting to half or more, were on summer furlough, and no one knows how many were in the barracks on July 18. The best calculation is that scarcely fifty thousand troops were present in the peninsular garrisons, about half of whom were brought into the insurrection, though there were also about thirty thousand troops on duty in the protectorate. Almost equally important were the roughly fifty-five thousand men in the armed security forces, less than half of whom were brought into the revolt. The most recent study of the division in the armed forces is F. Puell de la Villa, "Julio de 1936: ¿Un ejército dividido?," in J. Martínez Reverte, ed., *Los militares españoles en la Segunda República* (Madrid, 2012), 77–98.

4. The exception occurred at the most senior rank—lieutenant general—which was being phased out by the Republican reforms. None of the three remaining lieutenant generals held active assignments. All supported the revolt but were trapped in the Republican zone. Two were executed and the third, Alberto Castro Girona, finally escaped in 1937 to the Nationalist zone, but he never held a significant command.

5. Altogether, the revolutionaries executed a total of 1,729 commissioned army officers and half or more of all naval officers for complicity in the revolt, while the rebels would execute 258 officers in their zone for having opposed, or occasionally for having failed to support, the revolt. Those officers who stayed with the leftist regime played either senior or only secondary military roles, so that only 130 regular commissioned officers were killed in the People's Army, whereas 1,280 were combat fatalities in Franco's forces. These data are from the detailed study of the conspiracy and revolt by Alía Miranda, *Julio de 1936*, 128–29, 164–65. See also R. Salas Larrazábal, *Los datos exactos de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 1980).

6. As can best be determined, there were about thirty thousand troops in the protectorate: forty-two hundred were in the legion, seventeen thousand were in the *regulares* and other Moroccan units, and the remaining ten thousand were ordinary Spanish recruits.

7. Published in *El Telegrama del Rif* (Melilla), July 19, 1936, quoted in Historia 16, *La Guerra Civil*, vol. 5, *La guerra de las columnas*, ed. G. Cardona et al. (Madrid, 1986), 72.

8. Much controversy has surrounded this accident, the chief published accounts of which are incomplete and confused, as in Bravo Morata, *Franco y los muertos providenciales*, 49–96, and Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, *El general Sanjurjo*, 227–38. Sanjurjo was sixty-four years of age and physically ailing, suffering from disorders of the kidney, liver, and aorta, as well as a syphilitic infection, though the infection had been brought under control. What seems to have happened was that a good-quality French plane and an experienced pilot were chartered for him in southwestern France, in a manner analogous to the arrangement made for Franco in England. The French plane was intercepted at a refueling stop in northern Spain, en route to Portugal, and its sole passenger, Antonio Lizarza Iribarren (head of the Carlist militia in Navarre), arrested. The plane was allowed to continue on to Lisbon, but, since it had been identified by the Spanish authorities, the Portuguese government denied authorization for its pilot to fly Sanjurjo back to Spain, because it did not want to incite a diplomatic protest from Madrid. At that moment the Monarchist aviator

and activist Juan Antonio Ansaldo showed up in Lisbon in his small, underpowered, two-seat, open-cockpit airplane and offered to fly Sanjurjo to the Nationalist zone, but the two main airports were under surveillance by Republicans, so Portuguese authorities required that Ansaldo use a short, makeshift runway near the coast for a surreptitious takeoff, and his small plane never made it fully into the air, crashing and burning (according to Ansaldo, its propeller having hit a natural obstacle). Though Portuguese anarchists later claimed credit, there is no evidence that it was anything more than an accident due to hastily improvised circumstances. See Ansaldo, *¿Para qué . . . ?*, 140–43.

9. Quoted in N. Cerdá, "Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July–October 1936," *Journal of Military History* 75, no. 4 (2011): 1125–57. This is the best brief account of the first phase of Franco's rise to power.

10. The key studies are A. Viñas and C. Collado Seidel, "Franco's Request to the Third Reich for Military Assistance," *Contemporary European History* 11, no. 2 (2002): 191–210, and, more extensively, A. Viñas, *Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 2001), 335–97.

11. J. F. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War* (Princeton, NJ, 1975), 3–84; M. Heiberg, *Emperadores del Mediterráneo: Franco, Mussolini y la Guerra Civil española* (Barcelona, 2003), 31–66; P. Preston, "Mussolini's Spanish Adventure: From Limited Risk to War," in P. Preston and A. Mackenzie, eds., *The Republic Besieged* (Edinburgh, 1996), 21–51.

12. Franco refers to this in notes for his memoirs that he prepared late in life but never turned into a book: "Proposal by Mola to withdraw to the Ebro, vigorous rejection. . . . Inferiority of arms. Acquiring weapons at the rate of an eyedropper. Germany. . . . Chief concern was arming and organizing our army, its objectives and weapons. Miracles in armaments. But we lacked ammunition." Quoted in L. Suárez, *El general de la monarquía, la República y la Guerra Civil (desde 1892 hasta 1939)* (Madrid, 1996), 358.

13. J. Vigón, *General Mola*, 176–99.

14. Two of the most pointed examples are Blanco Escolá, *La incompetencia militar*, and J. A. Vaca de Osma, *La larga guerra de Francisco Franco* (Madrid, 1991).

15. Franco has been defended by Semprún, *El genio militar*, and others, but the most balanced analysis is to be found in Blázquez Miguel, *Franco auténtico*.

16. An enormous literature in Spanish describes the repression during and immediately after the Civil War, some of it seriously researched and reliable, much larger parts merely polemical. The two best general accounts are S. Juliá, ed., *Víctimas de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 1999), and A. D. Martín Rubio, *Los mitos de la represión en la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 2005). For an evaluation, see J. Ruiz, "Seventy Years On: Historians and Repression During and After the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no 3 (2009): 449–72.

17. The most famous atrocity popularized by Republican propaganda—the execution of hundreds of prisoners in the bullring at Badajoz on August 16—was nonetheless an exaggeration (though not a fabrication), as on that day at least three hundred leftists (and possibly more) were executed in Badajoz. F. Pilo, *La represión en Badajoz* (Badajoz, 2001), F. Pilo, M. Domínguez, and F. de la Iglesia, *La matanza de Badajoz ante los muros de la propaganda* (Madrid, 2010), and L. E. Togores, *Yagüe*, 241–312. The repression in Badajoz province continued for some time and was one of the most severe in the Nationalist zone, eventually claiming approximately four thousand victims.

18. According to Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mi vida junto*, 167. Franco, however, had no illusions about the political leanings of La Puente Bahamonde, whom he had peremptorily removed from command of an air base at the time of the revolutionary insurrection of October 1934, as explained in chapter 4. Members of La Puente's family do not seem to have held his execution against Franco, since a brother of his later served on Franco's personal staff.

19. The letter was personally delivered by Franco's aide Pacón, who preserved the unopened envelope and later published the text of the letter in *Mi vida junto*, 348–53. Campins was executed on August 16.

20. Quoted in Pilo et al., *La matanza de Badajoz*, 305.

21. Quoted in J. M. Martínez Bande, *Frente de Madrid* (Barcelona, 1976), 209–10.

22. This fundamental aspect of the Spanish war has been little studied. See the summary in J. A. Sánchez Asiaín, "Recursos económicos y organización territorial en la República de la Guerra Civil," *Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas* 85 (2008): 516–21, and also F. Olaya Morales, *El expolio de la República* (Barcelona, 2004), M. Mir, *Diario de un pistolero anarquista* (Barcelona, 2006), and A. Herrerín, *El dinero del exilio: Indalecio Prieto y las pugnas de posguerra (1939–1947)* (Madrid, 2007).

23. Particularly in a general order of August 12, quoted in Pilo et al., *La matanza de Badajoz*, 294.

24. For the best discussion and summary of the economic reprisals by both sides, see Sánchez Asiaín, *La financiación*, 749–806.

25. *Times* (London), Aug. 11, 1936.

26. Nicolás Franco taught his last class in the naval engineering school on the morning of July 18, where he is said to have been informed by a friend that his name was on a list of people to be arrested. With the typical Franco sangfroid, he returned the following morning to conduct a final examination and then, having no car at his disposal, he and his wife fled the capital later in the afternoon by public bus, literally at the last minute. In a provincial town they were eventually able to hire a taxi to take them to Avila, once more by the skin of their teeth, but there they would be safely within the Nationalist zone. Garriga, *Nicolás Franco*, 48.

27. Sánchez Asiaín, *La financiación*, 167–225.

28. See Kindelán, *La verdad*, which supplements and corrects his earlier *Mis cuadernos de guerra* (Madrid, 1945), and G. Cabanellas, *Cuatro generales*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1977), a part of which is based on what the author learned from his father, General Miguel Cabanellas.

29. Cabanellas, *Cuatro generales*, 2:327.

30. *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (hereafter *DGFP*) (Washington, DC, 1951), D:3, 85–89; Ramón Garriga to Paul Preston, April 30, 1991, in Preston, *Franco*, 176–77, 818.

31. Kindelán, *La verdad*, 29. See also R. de la Cierva, *Francisco Franco*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1972–73), 1:506–9, who had access to the unpublished diary of Mola's aide Major Emiliano Fernández Cordón.

32. S. E. Fleming, "Spanish Morocco and the *Alzamiento Nacional*, 1936–1939: The Military, Economic and Political Mobilization of a Protectorate," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 1 (1983): 27–42. There is now a substantial literature in Spanish on Morocco and the Spanish Civil War. Various Republican political sectors came up with several different plans to foment revolt in the protectorate, but none was implemented, and one of them was vetoed by Stalin himself, for fear of alienating Paris and London.

33. Which is not to say that he had none. This is a controversial issue. Mola's civilian assistant, the Pamplona businessman Félix Maíz, who later turned against Franco, left a memoir that only after many years appeared as *Mola frente a Franco: Guerra y muerte del General Mola* (Pamplona, 2007). Maíz claimed that soon after the meeting he had opportunity to read the official minutes, prepared by a general staff colonel who was one of the two secretaries. This is said to have revealed that the initial vote ended in a tie between Franco and Mola, since at least half the council members did not fully trust Franco, seeing him as too cold, calculating, and ambitious, and that Franco, who did not find it expeditious to promote his own candidacy, supported that of Mola. Maíz agrees that Mola lacked political ambition and says that Mola, who favored the *mando único*, quickly had his own name withdrawn and asked that the election of Franco be made unanimous, which was done, with the abstention of Cabanellas.

34. A. Boaventura, *Madrid-Moscovo: Da ditadura à República e a Guerra Civil de Espanha* (Lisbon, 1937), 212.

35. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 55.

36. There is controversy over Yagüe's role, as well as his physical condition, which cannot be fully resolved. The best account is in L. E. Togores, *Yagüe*, 326–40.

37. Kindelán, *La verdad*, 108.

38. Cabanellas, *Cuatro generales*, 2:336–38, and G. Cabanellas, *La guerra de los mil días*, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1973), 1:624–25.

39. Quoted in Semprún, *El genio militar*, 68.

40. *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Sept. 30, 1936.

41. The differing terminology has been most carefully detailed in A. Ruedo, *Vengo a salvar a España: Biografía de un Franco desconocido* (Madrid, 2005), 201–10.

42. Cabanellas, *Cuatro generales*, 2:351. This may be compared with another hostile impression from about that time, by the left-wing American journalist John Whitaker, who interviewed Franco: "Personally I found Franco shrewd but disconcertingly unimpressive. I talked with him first when he was still slender, and later after he had gone to fat. A small man, he is muscular, but his hand is soft as a woman's, and in both instances I found it damp with perspiration. Excessively shy as he fences to understand a caller, his voice is shrill and pitched on a high note, which is slightly disturbing since he speaks quietly, almost in a whisper. Although effusively flattering, he gave no frank answer to any question I put to him. I could see that he understood the implication of even the most subtle query. A less straightforward man I never met." J. Whitaker, *We Cannot Escape History* (New York, 1943), 105.

43. In L. Suárez Fernández, *Francisco Franco y su tiempo*, 8 vols. (hereafter *FF*) (Madrid, 1984), 2:111–13.

44. Letter to Vicente Serra, Sept. 11, 1936, in Boaventura, *Madrid-Moscovo*, 245–47.

45. According to Mola's personal secretary José María Iribarren, in an interview with Stanley Payne in Pamplona, Dec. 15, 1958.

46. The best accounts of the early construction of the myth of the caudillo are F. Sevillano, *Franco, Caudillo de España por la gracia de Dios, 1936–1947* (Madrid, 2010), and Zenobi, *La construcción del mito*. See also A. Reig Tapia, *Franco "Caudillo": Mito y realidad* (Madrid, 1995).

47. Initial legislation of the National Defense Council and the Government Technical Council is collected in J. P. San Román Colino, ed., *Legislación del gobierno nacional* (Avila, 1937).

48. Quoted in R. Abella, *La vida cotidiana durante la Guerra Civil: La España nacional* (Barcelona, 1973), 109.

49. Such a pattern is confirmed by a member of his household staff in his last years. See J. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada de Franco* (Barcelona, 2011), 30.

50. P. Jaráiz Franco, *Historia de una disidencia* (Barcelona, 1981), 191.

51. Sixteen priests who had been active on behalf of Basque nationalism were executed in Guipuzcoa, the Basque province that was occupied by Mola's forces in September. The Vatican presented Franco with a formal protest, and he promised that this sort of thing would not happen again.

52. By contrast, during the nineteenth century Church leaders had at first rejected the notion of a modern Spanish nationalism, which they believed to be too tainted with liberalism.

Chapter 7. Forging a Dictatorship

1. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 155.

2. F. J. Fresán, "Navarra: ejemplo y problema: El proyecto estatal de carlistas y falangistas (1936–1939)," and F. J. Caspistegui, "La construcción de un proyecto cultural tradicionalista-carlista en los inicios del franquismo," in A. Ferrary and A. Cañellas, eds., *El régimen de Franco: Unas perspectivas de análisis* (Pamplona, 2012), 65–92, 93–148.

3. The publications devoted to Mola generally lack substance and objectivity. The only one that refers in detail to these political strains is Maíz, *Mola frente a Franco*, but it is missing concrete data and documentation.

4. The key study of finance in the Civil War is the massive work by Sánchez Asiaín, *La financiación*. Equally important is the only broad study of the mobilization of resources within the Nationalist zone, Michael Seidman's *The Victorious Counterrevolution: The Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War* (Madison, WI, 2011).

5. It is often alleged that the world of culture strongly supported the Spanish left, as was generally the case outside Spain. Within Spain, plastic artists and poets tended to support the left, but the country's leading intellectuals often backed Franco. All three leaders of the Group at the Service of the Republic (Agrupación al Servicio de la República) of 1931—Spain's top philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, the major novelist Ramón Pérez de Ayala, and the noted physician and writer Gregorio Marañón—fled the Republican zone, preferring to live abroad. Ortega's two sons volunteered for Franco's army, and Marañón's son joined the Falange. Spain's leading novelist, the liberal Pío Baroja, vehemently denounced the revolutionary Republic, and other examples might be cited. Salvador de Madariaga at first came out for the Nationalists but after six months switched to a neutral position. Nationalist propaganda endeavored as best it could to exploit the statements and publications of leading liberal politicians and intellectuals—Alcalá-Zamora, Lerroux, Marañón, Unamuno, and Baroja—though Alcalá-Zamora, unlike the others, never supported Franco. Spanish Relief Committee, *Spanish Liberals Speak on the Counter-Revolution in Spain* (San Francisco, 1937).

6. There are many accounts of this incident, normally not by eyewitnesses. The best reconstruction is that of Togores, *Millán Astray*, 327–47. See E. Vegas Latapie, *Memorias políticas*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1987), 2:111–12, perhaps the best eyewitness account.

7. Carmen Franco reports that "Mamá said that Millán made a big incident out of a trifle, exaggerating things," which she blamed on his histrionic tendencies.

8. See Unamuno's letter to Quintín de Torre, Dec. 1, 1936, quoted in C. Blanco Escolá, *General Mola: El ególatra que provocó la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 2002), 294–95.

9. Unamuno would subsequently be denounced by some of the more extreme pundits in Nationalist Spain. See A. Martín Puerta, *Ortega y Unamuno en la España de Franco* (Madrid, 2009).

10. Falangists generally recognized that Franco had cooperated with requests for assistance in the rescue attempts. Personal exchanges between the two zones did take place, but usually not at the highest level. The best summary of the various attempts to rescue José Antonio can be found in J. M. Zavala, *La pasión de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 2011), 137–207.

11. R. Cantalupo, *Fu la Spagna: Ambasciata presso Franco, febbraio–aprile 1937* (Milan, 1948), 148–57. For a general account, somewhat exaggerated, of Italian political machinations, see Heiberg, *Emperadores del Mediterráneo*.

12. R. Serrano Suñer, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar* (Mexico City, 1947), 31.

13. Ibid., 32–33.

14. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo*, 9–17.

15. *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, April 21, 1937.

16. For a detailed account of these events and of the history of the Falange in the early months of the Civil War, see S. G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977* (Madison, WI, 1999), 239–79.

17. For some time held in solitary confinement in the Canaries, Hedilla would later be moved to internal exile on Mallorca in 1944, at which time both he and his wife received pensions. He was finally released in 1946, after which he was able to develop a career as a prosperous businessman. Carmen Franco insists that there had been nothing personal about it, that it was simply a matter of wartime insistence on complete discipline: "My father . . . was a great believer in discipline and this person broke discipline, but he never had any personal animus against him and always said that Hedilla had made a mistake but did not have bad intentions."

18. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:97–103.

19. More than half of these died in the two mini-civil wars within the Civil War of May 1937 and March 1939. For exact data, see M. Aguilera, *Compañeros y camaradas: Las luchas entre antifascistas en la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid, 2012).

20. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo*, 167.

21. S, Martínez Sánchez, "Los obispos españoles ante el nazismo durante la Guerra Civil," in Ferrary and Cañellas, *El régimen*, 23–64.

22. According to José Ignacio Escobar, who spoke with him around the beginning of April 1937, in Escobar's *Así empezó* (Madrid, 1974), 160–61.

23. According to newspaper reports in the Nationalist zone, summarized in Escolá, *General Mola*, 337–40, and confirmed by Mola's secretary José María Iribarren, in an interview with Stanley Payne in Pamplona, Dec. 15, 1958.

24. Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 212–13. After both Sanjurjo and Mola died in plane crashes, Franco, who had traveled by air frequently in the first months of the Civil War, would rarely use an airplane again.

25. Jaráiz Franco, *Historia de una disidencia*, 97–98.

26. Report of May 19, 1938, *DGFP*, D:3, 657–63.

27. On the tensions between the Church and the party, see A. Lazo, *La Iglesia, la Falange y el fascismo* (Seville, 1995), and J. Andrés-Gallego, *¿Fascismo o estado católico? Ideología, religión y censura en la España de Franco, 1937–1941* (Madrid, 1997).

28. There is an enormous literature on relations between Franco's regime and the Church, and on Catholicism generally under Franco. The most lengthy account of the former, written largely from Franco's point of view, is L. Suárez Fernández, *Franco y la Iglesia: Las relaciones con el Vaticano* (Madrid, 2011). For a brief treatment, see S. G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison, WI, 1984), 149–91, and, on the broader context, see J. M. Cuenca Toribio, *Nacionalismo, franquismo y nacionalcatolicismo* (Madrid, 2008).

29. Garriga, *Nicolás Franco*, 159–66.

30. It is interesting to note that Ramón's nearest Italian counterpart, Umberto Nobile, also experienced major rejection and switched political sides because of it. Ramón piloted seaplanes, Nobile airships. Achieving renown for his flight over the North Pole in 1926, a second flight ended in disaster two years later. Humiliated by the Italian government, Nobile went to work for the Soviet air industry in 1931 but returned to Italy for the last phase of his life. L. Zani, "Between two Totalitarian Regimes: Umberto Nobile and the Soviet Union (1931–1936)," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 2 (2003): 63–112.

31. A facsimile of the letter is reproduced in Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 441.

32. The best treatment of Ramón during the Civil War is found in Zavala, *Franco, el republicano*, 291–325. See also Garriga, *Ramón Franco*, 270–98.

33. Ramón's wife received the full pension of a widow of a lieutenant colonel in the Spanish air force, but the family concocted the story that the real father of her daughter Angeles had been a circus sword-swallower and that her parents had never been married. Years later, when Angeles herself married, she was shocked to see that her birth certificate in the Registro civil of Barcelona had been altered to include only her mother's maiden name and made no mention of a father.

34. On this minor cause célèbre, see Togores, *Yagüe*, 566–75, R. Garriga, *El general Juan Yague* (Barcelona, 1985), 147–48, and D. Ridruejo, *Casi unas memorias* (Barcelona, 1976), 150–51.

35. A. Marquina, "Primero la Victoria, luego el rey," *Historia 16* 4, no. 35 (1979): 23–36.

36. All quotations drawn from the Rodezno diary as cited in J. Tusell, *Franco en la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona, 1992), 313–14.

37. Dionisio Ridruejo, interviews with Stanley Payne in Madrid, Nov. 27 and Dec. 4, 1958; Ridruejo, *Casi unas memorias*, 195–96; Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 262.

38. One of the principal canards about Franco's modus operandi during the war is the frequently cited anecdote, apparently invented by Sainz Rodríguez, to the effect that he signed death sentences over his morning breakfast while having *chocolate con churros* (thick chocolate and doughnuts). In fact, there is no known occasion on which Franco ever signed a death sentence, all of which were handed down and signed by military tribunals. His action was either to ratify or commute them, not infrequently choosing the latter. Second, family members insisted that he never mixed any kind of work with breakfast and never drank chocolate, always preferring "café con leche." Major judicial decisions were usually reviewed with his juridical adviser Martínez Fuset.

39. Ridruejo, *Casi unas memorias*, 96.

40. The only serious attempt to define the charismatic basis and characteristics of Franco's leadership, partly on the basis of the concepts of Max Weber, was made by Francisco Javier Conde, in 1939 head of the Institute of Political Studies (Instituto de Estudios

Políticos), the regime's think tank, in his works *Espejo del caudillaje* (1941), *Contribución a la doctrina del caudillaje* (1942), *Teoría y sistema de las formas políticas* (1944), and *Representación política y régimen español* (1945), all these reprinted in his *Escritos y fragmentos políticos*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1974). Conde sought to argue that the *caudillaje* rested on "reason, tradition, personal example and special divine assistance," which enabled it to achieve a higher level of charismatic legitimacy than democratic systems. The pamphlet *Los combatientes y el Caudillo*, distributed to the troops in 1938, also declared that the *caudillaje* did not constitute an interim, or Cincinnatian, regime: "The responsibility of *caudillaje* is incompatible with any time limit." The first authorized biography was published by Franco's old acquaintance from Oviedo, the journalist Joaquín Arrarás, in 1938.

41. Recent accounts of Nationalist propaganda include G. Santonja, *De un ayer no tan lejano: Cultura y propaganda en la España de Franco durante la guerra y los primeros años del nuevo estado* (Madrid, 1996), F. Sevillano, *Rojos: La representación del enemigo en la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 2007), Javier Rodrigo, ed., "Retaguardia y cultura de guerra," special issue, *Ayer* 76, no. 4 (2009), and R. R. Tranche and V. Sánchez-Biosca, *El pasado es destino: Propaganda y cine del bando nacional en la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, 2011).

42. The best treatment of the Portuguese strongman is F. Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York, 2009).

Chapter 8. Winning the Civil War

1. By October the number of troops defending Oviedo had been built up to twenty-one thousand, about the same number as those advancing on Madrid from the southwest. Both were heavily outnumbered by Republican militia.

2. Quoted in Cerdá, "Political Ascent."

3. See the collective work *Guerra de liberación nacional* (Zaragoza, 1961), 171.

4. As Néstor Cerdá points out, Franco saw to it that the handbook, *Servicio en campaña: Reglamento para el empleo táctico de las grandes unidades*, was revised in 1938 to assert that secondary attacks merely "display a lower intensity and rhythm than the main ones and hinder the objective of forcing the enemy to employ his reserves." This also insisted that "an officer's tactical knowledge, supported by his men's morale and skill, combined with a true desire to win will make up for any inferiority in equipment and numbers." Quoted in Cerdá, "Political Ascent." Franco would largely hold to this doctrine of frontal attack throughout the war, though later he would enjoy superiority in weaponry, beginning with his northern offensive at the close of March 1937, and then, in the very long run, toward the end, superiority of numbers, as well.

5. As recorded in the memoir by his air force chief, General Alfredo Kindelán; see *Mis cuadernos de guerra*, 37.

6. Cerdá, "Political Ascent."

7. Whitaker, *We Cannot Escape History*, 103.

8. The classic study of Italy's role is Coverdale, *Italian Intervention*.

9. Faupel to Neurath, Dec. 10, 1936, *DGFP*, D:3, 159–62.

10. The best brief account is J. F. Coverdale, "The Battle of Guadalajara, 8–22 March 1937," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 1 (1974): 53–75. For the broader Italian effort, see B. R. Sullivan, "Fascist Italy's Military Involvement in the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Military History* 59, no. 4 (1995): 697–727. There is a lengthy bibliography in Italian.

11. Franco's direct communication to the Italian command has not been located, but his stinging critique of the CTV, its commander, and the poor Italian performance is expressed in two documents in Spanish archives, published by J. Tusell, in "Franco, indignado con los italianos: Dos documentos inéditos sobre la batalla de Guadalajara," *Historia 16* 12, no. 135 (1987): 11–18.

12. The full table of recruitment for both armies is available in J. Mathews, *Reluctant Warriors: Republican Popular Army and Nationalist Army Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Oxford, 2012), 35–38.

13. J. Mathews, "'Our Red Soldiers': The Nationalist Army's Management of Its Left-Wing Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no. 3 (2010): 511–31, and, more broadly, his *Reluctant Warriors*.

14. Quoted in J. Tusell, "¡Menos mal que los rojos son peores!," *La Aventura de la Historia* 2, no. 16 (2000): 22–36.

15. Roberto Cantalupo, Mussolini's first ambassador, has presented his recollection of Franco's explanation in his memoir, *Fu la Spagna: Ambasciata presso Franco, febbraio–aprile, 1937* (Milan, 1948), 231. General Emilio Faldella described much the same account by Franco in his letter of February 25, 1971, to the historian John F. Coverdale. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention*, 216.

16. In an interview with *Le Figaro* (Paris) in October 1937. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo*, 214.

17. As mentioned in chapter 7, Franco's brother-in-law Serrano Suñer maintains that, at the time of his death, Mola "was getting ready to raise the issue of separating powers," an arrangement in which Franco would remain chief of state and military commander-in-chief but appoint someone else as prime minister to lead the government. Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 213.

18. To the above list might be added the name of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the Falange. Primo de Rivera might have been Franco's chief political rival, but he had remained in a Republican prison and then was executed by the Republican authorities in November 1936. The most elaborate example of such commentary is F. Bravo Morata, *Franco y los muertos providenciales* (Madrid, 1979).

19. Interview with Mola's personal secretary José María Iribarren by Stanley Payne in Pamplona, Dec. 18, 1959.

20. For his full career, see J. S. Corum, *Wolfram von Richthofen, Master of the Air War* (Lawrence, KS, 2008).

21. There is a large literature on Guernica, much of it misinformed and misleading. The best brief analysis is J. S. Corum, "The Persistent Myth of Guernica," *Military History Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (2010): 16–23. The most complete and reliable account is J. Salas Larrazábal, *Guernica, el bombardeo: La historia frente al mito* (Valladolid, 2012).

22. Republican propaganda concerning Nationalist air raids is studied in R. Stradling, *Your Children Will Be Next: Bombing and Propaganda in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Cardiff, Wales, 2008).

23. It should be pointed out that Guernica had not initially inspired the painting, which Picasso had already begun in the late winter of 1937 as a protest against the horrors of war in the tradition of Goya, adding the name only after the propaganda campaign developed.

24. Cf. U. Bialer, *The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932–1939* (London, 1980).

25. Reproduced in Salas Larrazábal, *Guernica*, 337.

26. By comparison, there had been fewer than fourteen hundred executions in Vizcaya and Santander combined, according to a report sent to Franco on October 18, 1937. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:163.

27. Archivo de la Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, 42:118, 119. (Hereafter cited as Franco Archive.)

28. The most recent account is S. Montero Barrado, *La batalla de Brunete* (Madrid, 2010).

29. G. Cardona, *Historia militar de una Guerra Civil: Estrategia y tácticas de la guerra de España* (Barcelona, 2006), 219. Some of Franco's top commanders—Yagüe, Varela, Aranda—preferred to abandon Teruel temporarily in order to deliver the knockout blow on Madrid. Yagüe was a very loyal old comrade but also one of Franco's most frequent critics. He had urged the caudillo to bypass Toledo in 1936 and then to avoid the most direct approach to Madrid and attack from the northwest instead. Other disagreements would follow in 1938. In almost every case, Yagüe, arguably, was right and Franco wrong.

30. Kindelán, one of the most analytically minded of Franco's generals, attributed this especially to lack of coordination and leadership, in a report prepared for Franco on January 6, 1938. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:174–76.

31. This increasing narrow-mindedness supposedly led General Juan Vigón, his chief of staff, to observe soon afterward to one of Franco's first government ministers that "there are times when I think that what is going to be done should not be done, but since with Franco raising an objection is enough to make him insist on having his own way, I have decided to follow the tactic of saying the opposite of what I really think so that what I really propose will be done." Sainz Rodríguez, *Testimonio y recuerdos*, 342. Since inventing and recounting negative anecdotes about Franco was a specialty of the droll Sainz Rodríguez, this perhaps need not be taken literally, but it can serve to illustrate, however fancifully, the problem of his increasingly overweening providentialism, which became a kind of messianic complex.

32. Togores, *Yagüe*, 449–53. Moreover, Vigón, the chief of staff, Kindelán, who commanded the air force, and the new head of the Condor Legion all seem to have agreed on this.

33. In later years, Franco would refer alternately to each of these arguments, without ever fully clarifying the matter.

34. R. Whealey, *Hitler and Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War* (Lexington, KY, 1989), 60.

35. J. M. Martínez Bande, *La ofensiva sobre Valencia* (Madrid, 1977), 69–96.

36. A good brief account from the Nationalist viewpoint is given in L. Togores, "La campaña de Levante, 23 de abril–25 de julio de 1938, el penúltimo capítulo de la Guerra Civil," *Aportes* 21, no. 1 (2006): 100–129. E. Galdón Casanoves, *La batalla de Valencia, una victoria defensiva* (Valencia, 2012), offers a more detailed treatment from the opposing side.

One of the war's major atrocities, normally overlooked, took place as the Nationalists reached the edge of Castellón, the last provincial capital north of Valencia, on June 13. Nationalist sympathizers began prematurely to put up banners hailing their liberators, which infuriated troops of the Republican Sixth Division, suddenly called in to defend the city. They responded with explosive violence, slaughtering several hundred civilians, in the worst atrocity of mass killing of civilians by infantry forces on either side in the war. Soon

afterward, one brigade of the division fell prisoner to the Nationalists, who summarily court-martialed all its principal officers and commissars, executing twenty-one and sentencing five more to life imprisonment. See the differing versions in Galdón Casanoves, *La batalla de Valencia*, 108–13.

37. Quoted in M. Merkes, *Die deutsche Politik gegenüber dem spanischen Bürgerkrieg, 1936–1939* (Bonn, 1969), 112–13.

38. It was nonetheless sometimes a struggle to maintain the flow of Italian supplies, as well. On November 17, 1938, Kindelán reported to Franco that parts and other supplies for the Italian planes flown by Spaniards in the Nationalist air force would soon be exhausted if new shipments were not rapidly made available. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:223–24.

39. Togores, *Yagüe*, 458–66.

40. Ibid., 494–96.

41. There are a number of histories of the climactic encounter of the Civil War. The most recent are A. Besolí et al., *Ebro 1938* (Barcelona, 2005), and J. Reverte, *La batalla del Ebro* (Barcelona, 2012).

42. On French military policy concerning the Spanish war, see T. Vivier, *L'armée française et la Guerre d'Espagne 1936–1939* (Paris, 2007), and J. Martínez Parrilla, *Las fuerzas armadas francesas ante la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)* (Madrid, 1987).

43. I. Montanelli, *Soltanto un giornalista* (Milan, 2002), 37.

44. G. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937–1938* (London, 1952), 46, 147.

45. In a report to Franco of August 16, 1938, Kindelán attributed this perseverance to the Republicans' occupation of advantageous and well-fortified terrain and improvement in the number and quality of planes, automatic weapons, antiaircraft guns, and also artillery, though he acknowledged that Republican artillery was not particularly numerous. Kindelán concluded that the resistance of the Republican forces did not stem from any improvement in combat ability, for, with the broad extension of the Republican draft, "the quality of most units has declined considerably." By contrast, he judged Nationalist units in general to be improving with experience and with the leadership of the *alféreces provisionales*, who showed "great spirit," though the quality of middle-rank combat leaders such as battalion commanders had declined because of heavy casualties among the professionals, which sometimes meant more sluggish performance by their units. He also noted that war weariness was getting to be a problem. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:193–98.

46. These tensions and disagreements are variously recorded and commented on in Kindelán, *Mis cuadernos*, 184–86, 205, Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mi vida junto*, 264, and *DGFP*, D:3, 742–43.

47. Besolí, *Ebro*, 284–85.

48. Of 721 regular naval officers on active duty at the beginning of the war, by one means or another the left executed 255, or about half of all those in the Republican zone. R. Cerezo, *Armada española siglo XX*, vol. 3 (Madrid, 1983), 119–33.

49. For a brief synopsis of the war at sea, see W. C. Franks Jr., "Naval Operations in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939," *Naval War College Review* 37, no. 1 (1984): 24–55. The fullest account will be found in the thirty-four hundred pages of F. and S. Moreno de Alborán y de Reyna, *La guerra silenciosa y silenciada: Historia de la campaña naval durante la guerra de 1936–1939*, 5 vols. (Madrid, 1995). See also J. Cervera Pery, *La historiografía de la guerra española en el mar (1936–1939): Aproximación bibliográfica, reflexión histórica* (Murcia, 2008). Nationalist naval policy was sometimes overly aggressive and on occasion counterproductive.

Neutral shipping supplying the Republicans was frequently targeted. Between mid-April and mid-June 1938, twenty-two British ships were attacked, resulting in the sinking or serious damage of eleven. London protested sharply, and Nationalist naval action became somewhat more circumspect.

50. The principal study of Franco's air force is J. Salas Larrazábal, *Guerra aérea, 1936–39*, 4 vols. (Madrid, 1998–2003).

51. There is an extensive literature on the Condor Legion. A brief scholarly overview may be found in J. S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and the Coalition Air War in Spain, 1936–1939," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18, no. 1 (1995): 68–90. See also R. Proctor, *Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War* (Westport, CT, 1983), and Corum, *Wolfram von Richthofen*, 117–51.

52. Drawing attention to Franco's bombing had become so important in its propaganda that the Republican government urged the League of Nations early in 1938 to send a mission to Spain to evaluate the nature and effects of Franco's air raids. The league dispatched a commission, whose report concluded "that both the small numbers [of planes] usually involved as well as the bombing patterns pointed towards a doctrine which prioritized the destruction of specific targets like bridges or railway stations," not civilian targets per se. Quoted in K. Schneider, "German Military Tradition and the Expert Opinion on Werner Mölders," *Global War Studies* 7, no. 1 (2010): 6–29.

53. As Hugo García has written, "The terrorist tactics often blamed on the insurgents were extensively used by the government." Review of *Your Children Will Be Next*, by Robert Stradling, *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 4 (2009): 782. The bombing of a town that was least justified militarily was the Republican attack on Cabra, a small town in Córdoba province, which took place near the end of the war on November 7, 1938, and killed more than a hundred civilians, almost as many as at Guernica. Cabra had no military significance whatsoever. A. M. Arrabal Maíz, *El bombardeo de Cabra: El Guernica de la Subbética* (Barcelona, 2012). For a list of Republican air attacks on cities, see Salas Larrazábal, *Guernica*, 231–34.

The most heavily bombarded city of any size was neither Madrid nor Barcelona but the Asturian capital of Oviedo, subjected to constant shelling, as well as considerable bombing, by Republican forces for more than a year. One calculation is that 120,000 cannon shells and nearly 10,000 small bombs were used. Much of the city center was destroyed—far more of it than in other larger towns—including one hospital. Altogether, approximately two thousand civilians were killed, more than in any other city.

54. General directives by Kindelán on March 28 and June 23, 1938, stipulated that only military and economic targets on the periphery of cities could be targeted and that the "urban core" must be avoided. Full text of orders can be found in Salas Larrazábal, *Guernica*, 338, and FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:190–93.

55. For a brief general analysis that compares and contrasts the two opposing forces, see M. Alpert, "The Clash of Armies: Contrasting Ways of War in Spain, 1936–1939," *War in History* 6, no. 3 (1999): 331–51.

56. The best brief treatment is A. J. Candil, "Soviet Armor in Spain," *Armor* 108, no. 2 (1999): 31–38.

57. The total number of captured Soviet tanks reached approximately 150, but many were not fully usable. "Relación de los tanques y camiones blindados recuperados en toda la campaña," June 15, 1939, Franco Archive, 124:6322.

58. W. L. S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (London, 1948), 221.

59. The postwar year of greatest excess mortality was 1941, when there were approximately 124,000 deaths beyond the norm.

Chapter 9. Franco and the Nationalist Repression

1. For a brief account of the revolutionary civil wars, see Payne, *Civil War in Europe*.

2. These took quite varied form in the Republican zone and included members of all the leftist organizations, even to some extent the semimoderate left Republicans, though to a lesser degree. See J. Ruiz, *El terror rojo en Madrid* (Madrid, 2012), and Mir, *Diario de un pistolero anarquista*.

3. *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, July 29, 1936.

4. Ibid., Sept. 1 and 9, 1936.

5. See his "Instrucción reservada número uno," prepared at the close of April 1936, quoted in F. Beltrán Güell, *Preparación y desarrollo del Movimiento Nacional* (Valladolid, 1938), 123.

6. Iribarren, *Con el general Mola*, 94. With Mola dead, this book was quickly suppressed by Franco's government, though earlier Mola had personally approved the manuscript and thanked the author for rendering a faithful account. José María Iribarren, interview with Stanley Payne, Pamplona, Dec. 15, 1958.

7. *ABC* (Seville), July 22–27, 1936; I. Gibson, *Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936 (Con las charlas radiofónicas completas)* (Barcelona, 1986).

8. Many of the published sources frequently cited in the general literature are not reliable. The two principal eyewitness denunciations of the Nationalist repression published during the Civil War were A. Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, *Un año con Queipo de Llano* (Barcelona, 1938), and A. Ruiz Vilaplana, *Doy fe: Un año de actuación en la España de Franco* (Paris, 1938).

9. See Juliá, *Víctimas*, A. D. Martín Rubio, *Paz, piedad, pardon . . . y verdad: La represión en la Guerra Civil: Una síntesis definitiva* (Madrid, 1997), and Martín Rubio, *Los mitos de la represión*. There are many monographs on individual provinces and regions, some of them excellent and others misleading. For a discussion of the controversies involved, see Ruiz, "Seventy Years On."

10. It might be noted, however, that after the occupation of Vizcaya by Franco's forces in 1937, two more Basque nationalist militants among the local clergy were executed. By comparison, while they were in power, the revolutionaries had killed fourteen clergy in Guipuzcoa and forty-one in Vizcaya.

11. Mussolini's special envoy the Fascist leader Roberto Farinacci reported after his visit to the Nationalist zone in March 1937 that "to tell the truth, Red and Nationalist atrocities are equivalent here. It is a sort of contest to see who can massacre more people. . . . The population is used to it by now and pays no attention; it is only we sentimentalists who create a tragedy over people who don't deserve it." Quoted in Coverdale, *Italian Intervention*, 191.

12. Cantalupo, *Fu la Spagna*, 131.

13. For example, the Catholic Action leader Francisco Herrera Oria made several protests to Franco in 1937, which led Franco to soon stop receiving him altogether. In 1939, after

Herrera Oria criticized continuation of the dictatorship, Franco sent him into internal exile. See the account by Herrera Oria's son in J. A. Pérez Mateos, *Los confinados* (Barcelona, 1976), 81–90.

14. It should be kept in mind that martial law and military tribunals had been frequently invoked during times of emergency in modern Spain. Under the Second Republic, for example, between October 1934 and February 1936 more than two thousand revolutionaries involved in the insurrection of 1934 had been prosecuted by military tribunals. Martial law had been a standard response to violent protest, insurrection, and revolution since the nineteenth century. When opposition forces took power, they sometimes adopted the same procedures against which they had protested. See M. Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812–1983)* (Madrid, 1983).

15. The official *documento nacional de identidad*, however, was only decreed in March 1944. More important in the first years after the war was the formal *salvoconducto* required for domestic travel.

16. Ministerio de Gobernación, *Dictamen de la comisión sobre la ilegitimidad de poderes actuantes en 18 de julio de 1936* (Madrid, 1939).

17. E. Fernández Asiaín, *El delito de rebelión militar* (Madrid, 1943), quoted in Ballbé, *Orden público*, 402.

18. It generated an enormous archive of data, much of it accurate but a portion fabricated, which remains the main single archival source on the Republican repression.

19. M. Cajal, ed., *La Ley de responsabilidades políticas, comentada y seguida de un apéndice de disposiciones legales y formularios más en uso* (Madrid, 1930); M. Minués de Rico, ed., *Ley de responsabilidades políticas y de depuración de funcionarios políticos* (Madrid, 1939); and L. Benítez de Lugo y Reymundo, *Responsabilidades civiles y políticas* (Barcelona, 1940).

20. On the persecution of Masons, see J. J. Morales Ruiz, *El discurso antimasónico en el franquismo (1936–1939)* (Zaragoza, 2001), X. Casinos and J. Brunet, *Franco contra los masones* (Madrid, 2007), J. Domínguez Arribas, *El enemigo judeo-masónico en la propaganda franquista (1936–1945)* (Madrid, 2009), and, most succinctly and usefully, J. Ruiz, "Fighting the International Conspiracy: The Francoist Persecution of Freemasonry, 1936–1945," *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* 12, no. 2 (2011): 179–96.

21. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:292–94.

22. F. Franco Martínez-Bordiú (with E. Landaluce), *La naturaleza de Franco: Cuando mi abuelo era persona* (Madrid, 2012), caption to one of the illustrations facing p. 161. The author also recounted this anecdote verbally to Jesús Palacios and Stanley Payne in January 2008.

23. *Anuario estadístico de España 1944–1945*.

24. J. M. Solé i Sabaté, *La repressió franquista a Catalunya (1938–53)* (Barcelona, 1985), 268.

25. A very limited amount of information on this is available in the Franco Archive. The principal historian of the postwar repression is Julius Ruiz. See his *Franco's Justice: Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford, 2005) and, for a brief overview, "A Spanish Genocide? Reflections on the Francoist Repression after the Spanish Civil War," *Contemporary European History* 14, no. 2 (2005): 171–91. In the former, he concludes that the total number of executions may have been higher than twenty-eight thousand.

26. J. Ruiz, "'Work and Don't Lose Hope': Republican Forced Labor Camps during the Spanish Civil War," *Contemporary European History* 18, no. 4 (2009): 419–41. For a case

study, see F. Badia, *Els camps de treball a Catalunya durant la Guerra Civil (1936–1939)* (Barcelona, 2001).

27. Report to Franco of June 7, 1943. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 4:271–73.

28. Suárez Fernández, *FF*, 2:383–86.

29. According to Garriga, *Los validos*, 171–72.

30. Cf. J. P. Fusi, *Franco: Autoritarismo y poder personal* (Madrid, 1985), 79.

31. This is the estimate by J. Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford, CA, 2001), 765.

Chapter 10. From Civil War to World War

1. On concepts of nationalism in the early years of the regime, see C. Almira Picazo, *¡Viva España! El nacionalismo fundacional del regimen de Franco, 1939–1943* (Granada, 1998), and I. Saz Campos, *España contra España: Los nacionalismos franquistas* (Madrid, 2003).

2. The Franco family acquired various properties over the years, though these did not amount to the gigantic patrimony of some dictators. In November 1937 one aristocratic admirer had willed him the Canto del Pico, a property of considerable value in Torrelodones, northwest of Madrid, whose crowning mansion, the Casa del Viento, had been declared a national artistic monument in 1930. This became a favorite retreat for the family. Much later, in 1962, the banker Pedro Barrié de la Maza, who had provided much of the funding for the Pazo de Meirás, purchased and gave to Doña Carmen as a present the Palacete de Cornide, a distinguished eighteenth-century building in the city of La Coruña, where, in fact, she would spend a great deal of time in the final years of her life. Doña Carmen also possessed some inherited property, and subsequently family members would acquire quite a number of other properties. On these real estate holdings, see M. Sánchez Soler, *Los Franco, S.A.* (Madrid, 2003).

3. It has been claimed that an anarchist group made an assassination attempt on Franco during one of these trips in the first months after the war. The only version available says that they fired on the wrong car and, in turn, all the attackers were killed by police. E. Bayo, *Los atentados contra Franco* (Barcelona, 1977), 58–59. This, however, cannot be confirmed.

4. For a synopsis, see G. Di Febo, *Ritos de guerra y de victoria en la España franquista*, rev. ed. (Valencia, 2012).

5. J. Larraz, *Memorias* (Madrid, 2006), 351.

6. Carmen Franco observes that being called dictator "did not particularly bother him, because ultimately it was a dictatorship, and he had thought highly of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. In those days it was not so demonized as now, when someone might say 'Uff, a dictatorship! You call me a dictator?' He understood that well enough, as did my mother." Sensitivity about the term nonetheless increased markedly after 1945, following the military victory of liberal democracy in Western Europe.

7. On the relations between Franco and his generals, see G. Cardona, *Franco y sus generales: La manicura del tigre* (Madrid, 2001), and also, less helpfully, M. A. Baquer, *Franco y sus generales* (Madrid, 2005).

8. Such qualities made Varela likeable, but to this was added their common combat experiences and military professionalism, though they differed in some of their political opinions. Finally, Varela, like Franco, had taken a bullet to the abdomen in Morocco and lived to tell the tale. See Martínez Roda, *Varela*.

9. M. Jerez Mir, *Elites políticas y centros de extracción en España, 1938–1957* (Madrid, 1982), 121–30.

10. On his career until 1939, see L. E. Togores, *Muñoz Grandes: Héroe de Marruecos, general de la División Azul* (Madrid, 2007), 15–219.

11. On the political identities and background of the intermediate personnel in the new regime, see G. Sánchez Recio, *Los cuadros politicos intermedios del regimen franquista, 1936–1959: Diversidad de origen e identidad de intereses* (Alicante, 1996).

12. The greatest wit in the Falange, the writer Agustín de Foxá, liked to say that Franco's relationship with the Falange was analogous to that of a man who married a widow and then had to listen to her spend all her time praising the virtues of her first husband. That made a good joke, but in fact nearly all Falangists served Franco loyally.

13. A. Romero Cuesta, *Objetivo: Matar a Franco* (Madrid, 1976), and interviews by Stanley Payne with two of the surviving conspirators, Madrid, March–May 1959.

14. Serrano Suñer later gave his version of this affair in H. Saña, *El franquismo, sin mitos: Conversaciones con Serrano Suñer* (Barcelona, 1982), 154–57.

15. Franco Archive, 68:17.

16. L. J. Pazos, *Buques hundidos o dañados seriamente durante la Guerra Civil (1936–1939)* (Pontevedra, 2011), gives the records of approximately a thousand vessels of all nationalities sunk or seriously damaged during the war.

17. The principal, if impressionistic, recorder of the systematic pillage is F. Olaya Morales, *La gran estafa: Negrín, Prieto y el patrimonio nacional* (Barcelona, 1996), *El oro de Negrín*, rev. ed. (Barcelona, 1998), and *El expolio de la República*. Since the author is sympathetic to the anarchists, he does not treat looting by them. For that, see Mir, *Diario de un pistolero anarquista*. On restoration of goods and spending the loot abroad, see Sánchez Asiaín, *La financiación*, 1053–1113.

18. For this and other macrostatistical conclusions, see the semidefinitive new study by Sánchez Asiaín, *La financiación*, 959–87.

19. Centro de Estudios Sindicales, *Francisco Franco*, vol. 3, *Pensamiento económico* (Madrid, 1958), 626. It is curious that in the middle of Franco's regime a collection of statements would appear that included many of his economic errors and extravagances.

20. C. Velasco Murviedro, "Las pintorescas ideas económicas de Franco," *Historia 16* 8, no. 85 (1983): 19–28.

21. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo*, 135–45.

22. "Fundamentos y directrices de un Plan de saneamiento de nuestra economía armónico con nuestra reconstrucción nacional," published with commentary by J. Tusell in *Historia 16* 10, no. 115 (1985): 41–49.

23. Larraz, *Memorias*, 181.

24. The sense of reality among his fellow ministers varied, depending on the issue. One of the more lucid was the intelligent naval minister Moreno, who seems to have understood that the grand military projects were a pipedream. On occasion, Beigbeder and Galarza also supported Larraz.

25. Larraz's own account is given in some detail in his *Memorias*, 184–350. See also N. Sesma Landrín, *En busca del bien común: Biografía política de José Larraz López (1904–1973)* (Zaragoza, 2006), 107–32.

26. Cf. Carceller's remarks in the *New York Times*, Feb. 29, 1940.

27. Even the Political Council of the FET recognized the need for foreign loans and

credits and assistance from the international market, and its National Council soon stressed the importance of obtaining foreign exchange for necessary imports, all the while promoting the general policy of autarchy. "Proyecto de Acuerdo de la Junta Política en material económica," Nov. 17, 1939, Franco Archive, 37:1369; Consejo Nacional de la FET, "Fundamentos de la Política de Creación de Trabajo y problemas de su financiación," Feb. 28, 1940, Franco Archive, 68:2737. R. Gay de Montellá, *Autarquía: Nuevas orientaciones de la economía* (Barcelona, 1940), is a general exposition of the autarchist policy.

28. A. Ballestero, *Juan Antonio Suanzes, 1891–1977: La política industrial de la posguerra* (Madrid, 1997).

29. E. San Román, *Ejército e industria: El nacimiento de INI* (Barcelona, 1999), and P. Schwartz and M. J. González, *Una historia del Instituto Nacional de Industria* (Madrid, 1978).

30. Sánchez Soler, *Los Franco*, 23–25.

31. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 178.

32. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo*, 157.

33. Heiberg, *Emperadores del Mediterráneo*, 196–98.

34. Franco Archive, 15:658, 67:2659, 2673, 2675, 2681, 2698, 105:4590. The preamble to the original "Bases orgánicas del ejército del aire," presented to Franco in April 1939, proposed to make the new air force Spain's principal offensive weapon in the future. Franco's marginalia revealed some skepticism about this. Though he wanted a greatly expanded air force, he did not wish to see this limit naval expansion. Franco's staff informed Yagüe that his plan for aircraft construction had to be reduced by more than 50 percent, but the fall of France inspired the air minister to ask for even more. For a sketch of Yagüe's work as air minister, see Togores, *Yagüe*, 597–619.

35. *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, 8th series, 13 vols. (Rome, 1942), 12:458–62.

36. Reports of June 16 and June 22, 1939. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:523–33.

37. Cited in J. Tusell, *Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: Entre el Eje y la neutralidad* (Madrid, 1995), 46.

38. The strategic plan drawn up for Franco by Captain Luis Carrero Blanco of the naval staff on October 30 and the report on the condition of the fleet by Admiral Moreno on November 16 sought to be positive, but in fact they revealed the strategic and maritime vulnerability of Spain. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 1:613–36, 640–50.

39. M. Ros Agudo, *Guerra secreta* (Barcelona, 2002), xxiii–xxv, 44–55. On the Spanish army during the initial period after the Civil War, see G. Cardona, *El gigante descalzo: El ejército de Franco* (Madrid, 2003), 19–77.

40. The key study is C. B. Burdick, "'Moro': The Resupply of German Submarines in Spain, 1939–1942," *Central European History* 3, no. 3 (1970): 256–84. See also Ros Agudo, *Guerra secreta*, 72–117.

41. Franco Archive, 103:4489. These early months of World War II were the last period in which relations with Italy would be as important, or even more important, than those with Germany. The relations between Madrid and Rome during the European war are treated in J. Tusell and G. García Queipo de Llano, *Franco y Mussolini: La política española durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Barcelona, 1985), and G. Carotenuto, *Franco e Mussolini* (Milan, 2005).

42. Quoted in Diario 16, *Historia del franquismo* (Madrid, 1982), 164.

Chapter 11. The Great Temptation

1. Quoted in M. S. Gómez de las Heras Fernández, "España y Portugal ante la Segunda Guerra Mundial desde 1939 a 1942," *Espacio, tiempo y forma*, ser. 5, Historia contemporánea, vol. 7 (1994): 153–67. This was widely reflected in the Spanish press. For the latter, see F. Vilanova, *El franquismo en guerra* (Barcelona, 2005).

2. Quoted in Tusell, *Franco, España*, 81.

3. The fullest treatment of such aims in one volume is M. Cattaruzza et al., eds., *Territorial Revisionism and the Allies of Germany in the Second World War: Goals, Expectations, Practices* (New York, 2012).

4. On this agitation by the Spanish regime, see A. Salinas, *Quand Franco réclamait Oran* (Paris, 2008).

5. N. Goda, *Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America* (College Station, TX, 1998), 59.

6. For this copious literature, see S. G. Payne, *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II* (New Haven, CT, 2008), 292–93. A sober scholarly account of major aspects of Spanish policy in Morocco may be found in G. Jensen, "The Peculiarities of 'Spanish Morocco': Imperial Ideology and Economic Development," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 20, no. 1 (2005): 81–102.

Somewhat paradoxically, these years of would-be expansionism in which some Spanish commentators liked to stress their cultural and ethnic identity with the people of northern Morocco were also the time of a brief blossoming of a separate Spanish racist literature, which posited the existence of a distinct and superior Spanish race. On the latter, see J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez, *Franco: Historia de un conspirador* (Madrid, 2005), 248–54.

7. Denis Smyth was the first to uncover these data in the British records, which he presented in his "Les chevaliers de Saint-Georges: La Grande-Bretagne et la corruption des généraux espagnols (1940–1942)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 41, no. 162 (1991): 29–54. These data are repeated in a somewhat exaggerated form in D. Stafford, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets* (London, 1999), 78–110. An account of Hillgarth in Spain may be found in P. Day, *Franco's Friends* (London, 2011), 55–192. The bribes were usually represented as payments from wealthy Spanish businessmen and financiers who wanted to keep the country out of the war, and the middleman in many of the transfers was the multimillionaire Juan March, who had provided substantial support to the Nationalists in 1936 but during the world war played both sides. M. Cabrera, *Juan March (1880–1963)* (Madrid, 2011), 330–33.

8. R. Powell Fox's memoir, *The Grass and the Asphalt* (Cádiz, 1997), reveals little and contains quite a few errors.

9. On the role of Beigbeder, see C. R. Halstead, "Un 'africain' méconnu: Le colonel Juan Beigbeder," *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième guerre mondiale* 21, no. 83 (1971): 31–60. Unlike much of the Spanish leadership, Beigbeder soon drew the correct conclusions from Germany's defeat in the Battle of Britain and its inability to pull off a cross-channel invasion. Toward the end of September he told the American ambassador "that Germany had already 'lost the short war' and that within a month this fact would be apparent to the world. His implication was that Germany would either eventually lose the struggle or that a peace barren alike to victor and vanquished would be the result." Ambassador Alexander Weddell

to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Sept. 26, 1940, box 57, Alexander Weddell Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library. (Thanks to Joan María Thomàs for this document.)

10. His Fascism had not prevented Yagüe from urging more generous treatment of patriotic Republicans. He had even brought a few apolitical former Republican officers into the air force, while Varela had done the opposite in the army, cashiering a number of veteran Nationalist officers. Franco could not abide Yagüe's constant talking and criticizing and went to the unusual lengths of writing a detailed memorandum for his showdown (attended also by Varela), berating Yagüe that "wherever anyone is peeing blood, you're there, too." The text of the memo is reproduced in J. Palacios, *La España totalitaria* (Barcelona, 1999), 261–62. The original memo, as well as the reports that Franco received on Yagüe, may be found in the Franco Archive, 67:49. The fullest discussion of this affair is in Togores, *Yagüe*, 619–37.

11. Complete text in J. Palacios, ed., *Las cartas de Franco* (Madrid, 2005), 114–15.

12. *Arriba* (Madrid), official organ of the FET, July 19, 1940. This imprudent speech would be suppressed in the official edition of the *Palabras del Caudillo* in 1943.

At this point a plan was drawn up for potential conversion and expansion of industry for military production ("Apuntes sobre organización económica de la defensa nacional," July 1940, Franco Archive, 34:1279), while a new naval plan completed on July 28 proposed a more modest naval construction program than the one presented the year before, targeting construction of nine light cruisers, nine destroyers, ten submarines, and ten torpedo boats, based on recent Italian models. Franco Archive, 67:2700. This goal would not be achieved, either.

13. Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 118–19.

14. Despite the ill health that was much noted when he was foreign minister (which seems to have been caused by little more than a stomach ulcer), Serrano Suñer lived to the age of 102, dying in 2003, the last surviving major European political actor of World War II. In his numerous memoirs, interviews, and public lectures, he declared that he and Franco were basically in agreement on major international issues (which seems to have been correct), but he sometimes could not resist the temptation to portray his brother-in-law as a relative simpleton, compared with his own sophistication and intellect. In fact, Franco was the more shrewd and adroit politician of the two. The only objective biographical account of Serrano is by J. M. Thomàs (especially the introduction "El personaje real y el personaje inventado") in A. Gómez Molina and J. M. Thomàs, *Ramón Serrano Suñer* (Barcelona, 2003).

15. The text is in Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 136–39. Parts of these letters have been published by Serrano Suñer in his *Entre el silencio*, 342–49.

16. Larraz, the finance minister, recalls that Franco articulated such a concern to him. Larraz, *Memorias*, 339. Carmen Franco says the same: "That was something he realized could happen. . . . Then my mother decided that she must pray all she could. . . . She ordered the Sacred Host in our chapel to be uncovered, something she had never done before. The sacred form was housed in a little tabernacle there, which was normal, but for two days she ordered it to be uncovered. That impressed me a great deal."

17. According to Carmen Franco, "Papá arrived late not because he wanted to, but because of the disastrous state of our railroads, not repaired for years, and the train could only go very slowly, slower than could be admitted. As a military man, my father was very

punctual. Then they said he did it on purpose to make Hitler nervous, but not at all. My father would have wanted to arrive on time."

18. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 2:1, 380–81.

19. *DGFP*, D:11, 371–76.

20. It is not known if indeed Hitler really said such a thing, although one might say "se non è vero, è ben trovato." The principal source for this is P. Schmidt, *Hitler's Interpreter: The Secret History of German Diplomacy, 1935–1945* (London, 1951), 194. Schmidt further declares that dealing with Franco made Hitler visibly nervous, irritated, and frustrated. At one point he jumped up, as though to break things off, but quickly got control of himself and resumed the discussion.

21. G. Ciano, *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), 402–3.

22. This document, titled "Los derechos de España en el Africa Ecuatorial," which Hitler never saw, proposed expanding Spanish holdings in the region from 28,000 square kilometers to no less than 1,628,900 square kilometers, an area that would have even included all the former German colony of Cameroon, which it was known that Hitler intended to regain. See G. Nerín and A. Bosch, *El imperio que nunca existió* (Barcelona, 2002), 177–79.

23. *DGFP*, D:11, 376–79, 466–67.

24. Schmidt, *Hitler's Interpreter*, 193–94.

25. Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 140–42. The main German transcript of the original meeting has been lost and the Spanish papers either destroyed or sequestered. Principal sources are *DGFP*, D:11, 371–80, Serrano Suñer's two accounts, *Entre el silencio*, 283–324, and *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar*, 199–322, and that of Schmidt, *Hitler's Interpreter*, 189–94. See also the accounts in D. Detwiler, *Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar* (Wiesbaden, 1962), 51–66, and Tusell, *Franco, España*, 158–64. The independence of Franco's position is emphasized and perhaps somewhat exaggerated in the unpublished eight-page memorandum drawn up two days later by the Barón de las Torres, Franco's translator.

26. *DGFP*, D:11, 466–67.

27. Ros Agudo, *Guerra secreta*, 58–63. J. J. Téllez, *Gibraltar en el tiempo de los espías* (Seville, 2005), treats Gibraltar during these years.

28. P. T. Pereira, *Memorias* (Lisbon, 1973), 2:213–32; C. R. Halstead, "Consistent and Total Peril from Every Side: Portugal and Its 1940 Protocol with Spain," *Iberian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1974): 15–28. The policy and politics of Portugal in World War II are treated in F. Rosas, *Portugal entre a paz e a guerra (1939–1945)* (Lisbon, n.d.), and more extensively in A. Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, 2 vols. (Lisbon, 1987, 1991). N. Lochery, *Lisbon: War in the Shadows of the City of Light, 1939–1945* (New York, 2011), is a recent journalistic account that adds a few documentary details.

29. Franco Archive, 68:2803.

30. *DGFP*, D:11, 598–606, 619–23. Serrano Suñer has presented his version in *Entre el silencio*, 305–8.

31. *DGFP*, D:11, 705–6, 725, 739–41, 787–88.

32. Franco Archive, 27:15007. The full text is in P. Moa, *Franco para antifranquistas* (Madrid, 2009), 234–41.

33. *DGFP*, D:11, 852–58. One of the enduring myths of Spanish-German relations was that Canaris, who was politically a crypto-opponent of Hitler, warned Franco that it would not be in Spain's interest to enter the war. There is no evidence of this, though by December

1940 the point might be considered obvious. Canaris was a German patriot and, so long as Hitler was winning, he had little incentive to try to thwart his strategy.

34. Ibid., D:11, 1140–43.

35. Ibid., D:11, 1157–58.

36. Ibid., D:11, 1173–75.

37. Ibid., D:11, 1188–91, 1208–10, 1217–18, 1222–23.

38. Ibid., D:12, 36–37; Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 152–58.

39. *DGFP*, D:12, 58, 78–79.

40. The best account of this meeting is in Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Franco y Mussolini*, 119–22. In later years, amid moments of leisure in several of his numerous *cacerías* (hunting parties), Franco liked to pretend that he had boldly spoken the truth to Mussolini, claiming that he had asked him: "Duce, Duce, if you could get out of the war, wouldn't you get out?" and after Mussolini glumly nodded his head yes, the caudillo supposedly added, "Well, for that reason I'm not getting in." Carmen Franco has offered a parallel version of this anecdote. It made an amusing story, but was probably made up whole cloth. (The original version was provided by Fabián Estapé, interview by Stanley Payne in Barcelona, June 1974.)

41. Quoted in Tusell, *Franco, España*, 200.

42. There was a great deal of speculation in Spanish publications about this sort of thing. See J. Beneyto Pérez, one of the chief ideologues of the era, *España y el problema de Europa* (Madrid, 1942), on the history of the imperial idea in Spain and a new leadership role.

Hitler himself only once used the term "new order," which was much more in vogue among allies and satellites like Mussolini and Pétain. Hitler only thought in terms of a general order of nations briefly in the autumn of 1940 as he negotiated with his quasi-allies and Stalin. Nazi propaganda invoked the "West" more and more after the invasion of the Soviet Union, but Hitler usually approached matters only in primordial terms of domination, or hegemony. See M. Mazower, "National Socialism and the Search for International Order," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 50 (2012): 9–26, and L. Klinkhammer, "National Socialism and the Search for International Order: Comment," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 50 (2012): 27–38.

43. See F. Piétri, *Mes années d'Espagne, 1940–1948* (Paris, 1954), 55, and the Spanish diplomatic summary of April 23, 1941, quoted in Togores, *Yagüe*, 666. The broadest study of relations between the two chiefs of state is M. Séguéla, *Franco Pétain: Los secretos de una alianza* (Barcelona, 1994).

44. The fullest account is in Ros Agudo, *Guerra secreta*. See also W. Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia, MO, 2000).

45. The whole issue leads to the ultimate counterfactual—what effect, if any, would Spain's military entry have had on the course and eventual outcome of the war? The most serious attempt to answer this question has been made by Donald S. Detwiler, "Spain and the Axis during World War II," *Review of Politics* 33, no. 1 (1971): 36–53. His conclusion is that it would have closed off the West Mediterranean, leading to the fall of Gibraltar and Malta and the possible loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal. This would have made any Allied invasion of France much more difficult and might have led to a "Japan first" strategy, with the first atomic bomb then dropped on Berlin rather than Hiroshima. The question has frequently been debated. What is not at all in doubt is that continuation of Spanish nonbelligerence was in the Allies' interest, as Churchill acknowledged in 1944.

46. Franco Archive, 18:53.

47. For a time the most active Monarchist conspirator was the vigorous rightist intellectual Eugenio Vegas Latapie. See his *Memorias políticas*, 325–30. A broad overview, together with key quotations from the negotiations with Yagüe, perhaps the principal general involved during this phase, may be found in Togores, *Yagüe*, 673–93.

48. The opportunistic Aranda, as head of the Escuela Superior de Guerra, apparently played a role in drafting the plan for the invasion of Portugal, about which he indiscreetly boasted to others. Nicolás Franco to Franco, Nov. 20, 1940, FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 2:2, 397–99.

49. *DGFP*, D:12, 611–15.

50. Spanish-British relations during the war are treated in E. Moradiellos, *Franco frente a Churchill* (Barcelona, 2005), and R. Wigg, *Churchill y Franco* (Barcelona, 2005).

51. When Larraz presented his resignation as minister of finance several days later, Franco acknowledged that Larraz faced much opposition and added, "Serrano is not very likeable. My daughter, Carmencita, once asked me, 'Papá, why is Uncle Ramón so disagreeable?'" Larraz, *Memorias*, 340.

52. Franco found the very tall and handsome Miguel Primo de Rivera a winsome and pliable person, if something of a mediocrity. Carmen Franco recalls that "Miguel was a very likeable man. He knew how to get along with people and women were crazy about him. . . . My father always had very good relations with Miguel."

53. As Carmen points out, her father's cordial relations with Arrese were only strengthened after her mother became very friendly with Arrese's strongly Catholic wife. Arrese is lucidly treated in A. de Diego, *José Luis de Arrese o la Falange de Franco* (Madrid, 2001).

54. The best guide to these active but totally secondary maneuverings is K.-J. Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y III Reich* (Madrid, 1986).

55. See Cardona, *El gigante descalzo*, 95–115.

56. The earlier bibliography is listed in W. Haupt, "Die 'Blaue Division' in der Literatur," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 4 (1959). The massive bibliography up to 1988 is described in C. Caballero and R. Ibáñez, *Escritores en las trincheras: La División Azul en sus libros, publicaciones periódicas y filmografía (1941–1988)* (Madrid, 1989), and a good deal more has appeared since that time. G. R. Kleinfeld and L. A. Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia* (Carbondale, IL, 1979), remains the best one-volume narrative, while X. Moreno Juliá, *La División Azul: Sangre española en Rusia, 1941–1945* (Barcelona, 2004), provides the fullest perspective, treating political, military, and diplomatic aspects.

57. For a broad sketch of Hitler's auxiliaries, see R.-D. Müller, *The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers* (London, 2012).

58. R. Ibáñez Hernández, "Escritores en las trincheras: La División Azul," in S. G. Payne and D. Contreras, eds., *España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Madrid, 1996), 55–87.

59. *Arriba*, June 24, 1941.

60. Ibid., July 18, 1941. Needless to say, this highly imprudent speech was not included in the subsequent edition of *Palabras del Caudillo*.

61. *DGFP*, D:13, 222–24.

62. Ibid., D:13, 441–43.

63. *Solidaridad Nacional* (Barcelona), July 31, 1941, quoted in F. Vilanova, "España en el nuevo orden europeo," in A. C. Moreno Cantano, ed., *El ocaso de la verdad: Propaganda y prensa exterior en la España franquista (1936–1945)* (Gijon, 2011), 241.

64. Memorandum of Conversation by Cordell Hull, Sept. 13, 1941. Thanks to J. M. Thomàs for this document. A full account of U.S.-Spanish relations in this period may be found in his *Roosevelt and Franco during the Second World War: From the Spanish Civil War to Pearl Harbor* (New York, 2008). See also M. A. López Zapico, *Las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y España durante la Guerra Civil y el primer franquismo (1936–1945)* (Gijón, 2008).

65. R. Gubern, *"Raza" (un ensueño del General Franco)* (Madrid, 1977), examines the text and film in detail.

66. On development of the new Tripartite Pact, see E. Mawdsley, *December 1941: Twelve Days That Began a World War* (New Haven, CT, 2011), 236–39, 247–53.

Chapter 12. Surviving World War II

1. The full text is in J. Tusell and G. García Queipo de Llano, *Carrero: La eminencia gris de Franco* (Madrid, 1993), 61–64.

2. C. J. H. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain* (New York, 1946), 30.

3. For an evaluation, see E. Kennedy, "Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes's Wartime Diplomacy: Making Spain a Haven from Hitler," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 2 (2012): 237–60, and, more broadly, J. M. Thomàs, *Roosevelt, Franco, and the End of the Second World War* (New York, 2011).

4. Monarchists talked with officials in Germany in the winter and again in the spring of 1941, and at the end of the year tried to bring the commander of the Blue Division into their confabulations. Togores, *Muñoz Grandes*, 336–44. Don Juan, the pretender, continued to move in this direction as late as March 1, 1942. Ibid., 349–50.

5. Despite his experience as a staff officer, Vigón was completely unable to perceive the importance of American entry into the war. On February 19, 1942, he wrote to Muñoz Grandes that the Allies had already lost, but if the war continued much longer the "modest participation" of Spain on the German side would be necessary. He observed that the British were treating Spain with kid gloves ("they are tolerating more than a little impertinence from us"). The Americans, he said, took a stronger line but were hopelessly naïve and inept and would soon be defeated. In another letter of April 29, he expressed confidence that the Royal Navy would soon be swept from the Mediterranean and explained that he was trying to store up enough aviation gasoline to enable Spain to fight for two decisive weeks on the side of the Axis. Ibid., 346, 351.

6. Jaráiz Franco, *Historia de una disidencia*, 59–60.

7. On the final years of Don Nicolás, see Franco Bahamonde, *Nosotros*, 29–30, and González Duro, *Franco*, 33–39.

8. On political tensions with Carlists, see M. Martorell, *Retorno a la lealtad: El desafío carlista al franquismo* (Madrid, 2010).

9. The full text of the conversation was first presented in L. López Rodó, *La larga marcha hacia la monarquía* (Barcelona, 1978), 503–7.

10. The reports of August 20 and 28 that Franco received on the accused, Juan José Domínguez Muñoz, were incomplete but did not present him in a favorable light. FNFF, *Documentos inéditos*, 3:585–86.

11. Varela's version of the crisis is in Martínez Roda, *Varela*, 339–49.

12. Carmen Franco says that at one point Serrano Suñer sought to use his wife, Zita, to influence her sister to have Franco change his policy. "Since Serrano believed that my father

should be more pro-German, Aunt Zita came one day to harangue my mother. She became extremely upset and began to cry afterward, but my father told her: 'Don't pay any attention to your sister Zita, because she is only repeating what Ramón has just told her. That's why she says these things, but she would never do it on her own, so don't be upset.' But after that, relations became colder. I still got along well with my cousins, but between my mother and Aunt Zita things were no longer the same."

13. Saña, *El franquismo sin mitos*, 267.

14. Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, 206–8.

15. *Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik* (hereafter *ADAP*) (Göttingen, 1969), E:3, 454.

16. Tusell, *Franco, España*, 411.

17. F. Gómez-Jordana Souza, *Milicia y diplomacia: Diarios del conde de Jordana, 1936–1944* (Burgos, 2002), 130–31.

18. Hayes, *Wartime Mission*, 71.

19. Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y III Reich*, 182.

20. Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Carrero*, 83–87.

21. Ibid., 87–90.

22. Franco, *Palabras del Caudillo*, 523–27.

23. *Informaciones* (Madrid), Dec. 19, 1942.

24. Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, 231–32.

25. *ADAP*, E:5.1, 29–31, 41–42, 94–95, 125–28.

26. E. Sáenz-Francés, *Entre la antorcha y la esvástica: Franco en la encrucijada de la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Madrid, 2009), presents an exhaustive study of German-Spanish relations during 1943.

27. J. M. Doussinague, *España tenía razón (1939–1945)* (Madrid, 1950), 150–79; J. Tusell, *Franco, España*, 393–96; A. Marquina Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana y la España de Franco* (Madrid, 1982), 341–44.

28. Church leaders in Spain generally avoided involvement with the regime's politics but at the same time followed Vatican instructions to beware of Nazism, and the denunciation of aspects of the latter in two different Spanish diocesan publications, the second in October 1942, had caused a minor "sensation," in the words of the American ambassador. See Hayes to Hull, Oct. 9, 1942, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942*, 3 vols. (hereafter *FRUS*) (Washington, DC, 1943), 3:297–98, and A. Calvo Espiga, "Precedentes de la pastoral de 12 de marzo de 1942 de D. Fidel García Martínez, Obispo de Calahorra, sobre el régimen nazi," *Kalakorikos* 12 (2007): 9–57.

29. Tusell, *Franco, España*, 410.

30. *FRUS*, 2:613–15.

31. Togores, *Yagüe*, 723–24.

32. *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, Oct. 14, 1943.

33. Franco had first received a report on August 17 that some such initiative might be in the offing. Franco Archive, 172:21.

34. For the details and the text of the letter, see Martínez Roda, *Varela*, 358–61, 544, and de la Cierva, *Franco*, 638–40.

35. Tusell, *Franco, España*, 429.

36. *ADAP*, E:7, 250–54.

37. Franco Archive, 31:2554.

38. Ibid., 64:2568.

39. On March 6, Asensio prepared a very long and respectful letter to Franco insisting that Spain could not merely capitulate to the Allies but recommending that the only way out would be the restoration of the monarchy. Franco took nearly six weeks to reply, assuring his minister of the army that Spain would not simply capitulate and would make no political concessions. Franco Archive, 41:44.

40. Thomàs, *Roosevelt, Franco, and the End of the Second World War*, 67–128.

41. R. García Pérez, *Franquismo y Tercer Reich: Las relaciones económicas hispano-alemanas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Madrid, 1994), 476 and passim.

42. The second and most extensive of these memoranda he titled "Consideraciones sobre una futura constitución política del mundo," which concluded that the outcome of the war in Europe would be politically catastrophic, leaving the United States and the Soviet Union in hegemonic positions. Franco Archive, 1:127.

43. F. Sánchez Agustí, *Maquis y Pirineos, la gran invasión (1944–1945)* (Lleida, 2001); D. Arasa, *La invasión de los maquis: El intento armado para derribar el franquismo que consolidó el régimen y provocó depuraciones en el PCE* (Barcelona, 2004).

44. M. J. Cava Mesa, *Los diplomáticos de Franco: J. F. de Lequerica, temple y tenacidad (1890–1963)* (Bilbao, 1989), is a very antiseptic biography.

45. Carmen Franco recalls that "Lequerica was very likeable . . . , a bon vivant, very amusing. But no, he was not cynical, but a Basque and a bon vivant. He always said that the greater part of Spain was uninhabitable, but that thanks to electricity one could live with air conditioning, with power and heating. And that the only really inhabitable territory was from Burgos to Arcachon."

46. An undated directive posited the goal "that *the world assimilate our political doctrine*, as we carry out the providential historical destiny of Spain, Instructor of the Peoples and Apostle of the new Christian-Social Era that is dawning." Franco Archive, 64:2571.

47. For a critical survey, see I. Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews, 1898–1945: Anti-semitism and Opportunism* (Brighton, UK, 2007).

48. On Jews in early-twentieth-century Spain, see D. Rozenberg, *La España contemporánea y la cuestión judía* (Madrid, 2010), G. Alvarez Chillida, *El antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío (1812–2002)* (Madrid, 2002), A. Marquina and G. I. Ospina, *España y los judíos en el siglo XX: La acción exterior* (Madrid, 1987), I. González, *Los judíos y la Segunda República española, 1931–1939* (Madrid, 2004), and I. González, *Los judíos y la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid, 2009).

49. Arrests in Spain were very few, but one German Jewish refugee died in a Spanish prison. R. Sala Rosé, *La penúltima frontera: Fugitivos del nazismo en España (1940–1945)* (Barcelona, 2011).

50. For brief sketches of these brave diplomats, see E. Martín de Pozuelo, *El franquismo, cómplice del Holocausto (y otros episodios desconocidos de la dictadura)* (Barcelona, 2012), 85–111.

51. The key study is B. Rother, *Franco y el Holocausto* (Madrid, 2005), and his articles "Franco als Retter der Juden: Zur Entstehung einer Legende," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 45, no. 2 (1997): 121–46, and "Spanish Attempts to Rescue Jews from the Holocaust: Lost Opportunities," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 17, no. 2 (2002): 47–68. See also D. Carcedo, *Un español frente al Holocausto* (Madrid, 2000) and *Entre bestias y héroes: Los españoles que plantaron cara al Holocausto* (Barcelona, 2011), as well as D. Salinas, *España, los sefarditas y el Tercer Reich (1939–1945)* (Valladolid, 1997). For a brief overview, see Payne, *Franco and Hitler*, 209–35.

The contacts in Lisbon had been promoted first by Jordana, who had sent the Falangist intellectual Javier Martínez de Bedoya to the Portuguese capital as press attaché early in 1944 to develop relations with Jewish agencies. For Bedoya's version of these events, see L. Palacios Bañuelos, *El franquismo ordinario* (Astorga, 2011), 221–25. For Portugal's policy, see A. Milgram, *Portugal, Salazar, and the Jews* (Jerusalem, 2011).

52. Hayes reported that he had said to Lequerica on August 26 that "some Americans could understand why, back in 1940 and 1941, Spain might have felt obliged to pursue a policy of benevolent neutrality toward Germany, but no American could understand why, during the past six months at least, Spain should seek to pursue a policy of narrowly legalistic neutrality when it should so obviously, in the light of military developments, be pursuing a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. Spain, in many respects, was a more important country than Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal or Turkey, yet its policy lagged much behind these countries." Hayes to U.S. Dept. of State, Sept. 5, 1944. (Thanks to J. M. Thomàs for this document.)

53. Quoted in F. Diaz Plaja, *La España política del siglo XX*, vol. 4 (Barcelona, 1972), 149–52.

54. The original theorist of organic democracy in Spain had been the renowned polyglot intellectual Salvador de Madariaga, who feared that inorganic democracy might destroy Europe during the interwar period. A tepid supporter of Franco during the first months of the Civil War, he turned in 1937 to the need for mediation and then, from 1939 to the end of Franco's life, was one of his sharpest critics. See P. C. González Cuevas, "Salvador de Madariaga y la democracia orgánica," *Historia 16* 11, no. 127 (1986): 27–31.

55. These were the first elections within the syndical system for *enlaces sindicales* (partly analogous to shop stewards).

56. Suárez Fernández, *FF*, 3:453.

57. Quoted in D. Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (London, 2004), 463. See D. Smyth, *Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940–41* (Cambridge, 1986), 247–48.

58. On relations with Japan, see the thorough study by F. Rodao, *Franco y el imperio japonés* (Barcelona, 2002). Of the nearly thirteen hundred Spanish missionaries in the Far East, at least sixty-six were killed in the war, many of these deliberately murdered by the Japanese. D. Arasa, *Los españoles y la guerra del Pacífico* (Barcelona, 2001), 373.

59. Franco Archive, 41:1447.

60. A. J. Lleonart and F. J. Castiella y Maíz et al., eds., *España y ONU (1945–1946): La "cuestión española"* (Madrid, 1978), 30–33; R. E. Sanders, *Spain and the United Nations, 1945–1950* (New York, 1966).

61. For the Soviet accusations, see S. Pozharskaya, *Tainaya diplomatiya Madrida* (Moscow, 1979), 189–241.

Chapter 13. Franco at Bay

1. The French intelligence report, dated February 27, 1946, is cited in D. W. Pike, "Franco and the Axis Stigma," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 3 (1982): 369–407.

2. Franco's government looked into the feasibility of atomic weapons, but Franco decided that these would be too complicated and difficult. In 1947, for example, the Commission for the Study of Applied Physics (Comisión de Estudios de Física Aplicada), a unit created by the Higher Council of Scientific Research (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones

Científicas), examined the problems involved in developing "the military applications of nuclear energy" and found that such a project was not feasible given Spain's resources, according to Cardona, *Franco y sus generales*, 124. Nonetheless, some Spanish military leaders did not give up, and Franco's old chief of staff, Juan Vigón, is given credit for convincing him to create an Atomic Research Council (Junta de Investigaciones Atómicas) in September 1948 to explore peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Alongside this was set up a new corporation, Studies and Projects for Special Alloys (Estudios y Proyectos de Aleaciones Especiales), secretly charged with the direction of nuclear research. Cardona, *El gigante descalzo*, 176. These efforts, however, did not go very far.

3. The Axis refugee colony included the SS commando leader Otto Skorzeny, the Belgian Fascist Léon Degrelle, various French collaborators, a group of Rumanian legionnaires (some of whom, however, had passed through Buchenwald as prisoners), and a few Croatian Ustashi. See C. Collado Seidel, *España, refugio nazi* (Madrid, 2005).

4. For a vivid account of Communist urban guerrilla activities in Madrid, see A. Trapiello, *La noche de los cuatro caminos: Una historia del maquis, Madrid, 1945* (Madrid, 2001).

5. E. Marco Nadal, *Todos contra Franco: La Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas, 1944–1947* (Madrid, 1982).

6. D. W. Pike, "L'immigration espagnole en France (1945–1952)," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 24, no. 2 (1977): 286–300.

7. There is an extensive literature on opposition politics and the insurgency of the Maquis, disproportionate to its significance and effectiveness. For a brief survey, see B. de Riquer, "La dictadura de Francco," in J. Fontana and R. Villares, eds., *Historia de España*, vol. 9 (Barcelona, 2010), 192–245, and, more broadly, J. Tusell et al., eds., *La oposición al regimen de Franco*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1990). For a brief overall account of the insurgency, see A. Nieto, *Las guerrillas antifranquistas* (Madrid, 2007).

8. *FF*, 4:8.

9. For example, among them were a number of professional officers who had been reincorporated after limited service in the Republican People's Army but who in the new purge were summarily expelled.

10. This "Linea Gutiérrez" was no Maginot Line, but consisted of a series of strong points, fortifications, and obstacles stretching from the Cantabrian coast to the Mediterranean. Cardona, *El gigante descalzo*, 116–40.

11. Information from the Ministry of Justice, dated April 18, 1944, reportedly leaked to the British embassy, gave the figure of approximately 120 executions in preceding months, according to a report of August 31 of that year received by Franco. Franco Archive, 35:1. In addition, the director of prisons was said to have admitted to a British diplomat that seventy more executions took place in the month of September. H. Heine, *La oposición política al franquismo: De 1939 a 1952* (Barcelona, 1983), 293.

12. See J. López Medel, *La milicia universitaria: Alféreces para la paz* (Madrid, 2012).

13. Kindelán, *La verdad*, 75–79.

14. This well-known text has been frequently reprinted, notably in López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 48–50.

15. Kindelán, *La verdad*, 187.

16. All this was expounded in a memorandum from Carrero Blanco to Franco following the royal manifesto. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 54–55.

17. Franco explained most of this in a prolix interview on May 1 with the Catholic leader Alberto Martín Artajo, soon to be his new foreign minister. J. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos: La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957* (Madrid, 1984), 50–51.

18. *FF*, 4:43–44.

19. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 50–51.

20. *Fundamental Laws of the State* (Madrid, 1967); *Leyes fundamentales del estado* (Madrid, 1967).

21. Arrese retained his seat in the Cortes and also his position in the good graces of the caudillo. Two years later he produced a new book, *Capitalismo, comunismo, cristianismo* (Madrid, 1947), which declared that "fascism is not a complete formula" because of its materialism and lack of religiosity and pointed toward Catholic syndicalism as the best solution.

22. Treated in detail in Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 52–79.

23. According to Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio*, 394–403.

24. The full text is in ibid., 394–400; Franco's annotated copy is in the Franco Archive, 206:119.

25. F. García Lahiguera, *Ramón Serrano Suñer: Un documento para la historia* (Barcelona, 1983), 260–67.

26. Allegedly, Franco made these remarks at several cabinet meetings; the notes were taken by Martín Artajo. See Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 103. Minutes were never kept of Franco's cabinet meetings and at the beginning of 1947 he forbade any minister to take detailed notes.

27. Quoted in López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 57–58.

28. There were certain strings attached, involving terms of probation, to the amnesty granted to the prisoners.

29. *FF*, 4:57–58.

30. Quoted in A. de Miguel, *La herencia del franquismo* (Madrid, 1976), 29.

31. *Arriba*, Mar. 6, 1947.

32. The U. S. Department of State published a documentary booklet, *The Spanish Government and the Axis*, in March 1946. Madrid's reply may be found in Lleonart and Castiella, *España y ONU*, 67–80.

33. F. Franco, *Textos de doctrina política: Palabras y escritos de 1945 a 1950* (Madrid, 1951), 335.

34. F. Portero, *Franco aislado: La cuestión española (1945–1950)* (Madrid, 1989), provides the broadest treatment of foreign affairs during the years of ostracism.

35. U.S. Embassy, *Semanario gráfico*, Mar. 6, 1946.

36. Franco, *Textos de doctrina política*, 66.

37. M. A. Ruiz Carnicer, "La idea de Europa en la cultura franquista 1939–1962," *Hispania* 58, no. 2 (1998): 679–701, treats the regime's alternative concept of Europe.

38. Lleonart and Castiella, *España y ONU*, 69.

39. On British policy toward Spain in these years, see Q. Ahmad, *Britain, Franco, Spain, and the Cold War, 1945–1950*, rev. ed. (Kuala Lampur, 1995), and J. Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945–1955* (New York, 1999).

40. On Franco's relations with leaders in Latin America and the Arab world, see M. Eiroa San Francisco, *Política internacional y comunicación en España (1939–1975): Las cumbres de Franco con jefes de estado* (Madrid, 2009).

41. The key study is R. Rein, *The Franco-Perón Alliance: Relations between Spain and Argentina, 1946–1955* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1993); see also Rein's "Another Front Line: Francoists and Anti-Francoists in Argentina, 1936–1949," *Patterns of Prejudice* 31, no. 3 (1997): 17–33. For an overview of economic relations with Latin America in these years, see V. Torrente and G. Manueco, *Las relaciones económicas de España con Hispanoamérica* (Madrid, 1953), 423–526.

42. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 73.

43. On the career of Segura, see F. Gil Delgado, *Pedro Segura: Un cardenal de fronteras* (Madrid, 2001), and R. Garriga, *El Cardenal Segura y el nacional-catolicismo* (Barcelona, 1977).

44. *Iglesia, estado y Movimiento Nacional* (Madrid, 1951), 75–76.

45. The literature on Catholicism and Francoism is enormous. Among the best works are G. Hermet, *Les catholiques dans l'Espagne franquiste*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1980–81), R. Gómez Pérez, *Política y religión en el régimen de Franco* (Barcelona, 1976), S. Petschen, *La Iglesia en la España de Franco* (Madrid, 1977), J. J. Ruiz Rico, *El papel político de la Iglesia católica en la España de Franco* (Madrid, 1977), and G. Sánchez Recio, *De las dos ciudades a la resurrección de España: Magisterio pastoral y pensamiento político de Enrique Pla y Deniel* (Valladolid, 1995). The political side is emphasized in G. Redondo, *Política, cultura y sociedad en la España de Franco, 1939–1975*, 3 vols. (Pamplona, 1999–2008), A. Ferrary, *El franquismo: Minorías políticas y conflictos ideológicos, 1936–1956* (Pamplona, 1993), J. Andrés-Gallego et al., *Los españoles entre la religión y la política* (Madrid, 1996), and Cuenca Toribio, *Nacionalismo, franquismo y nacionalcatolicismo*. For a brief overview of the question, see Payne, *Spanish Catholicism*, 171–91.

46. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 55–56.

47. Ibid., 57–60.

48. According to Martín Artajo, in Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 58.

49. The text can be found in J. Tusell, *La oposición democrática al franquismo* (Barcelona, 1977), 114.

50. Cf. C. Fernández, *Tensiones militares bajo el franquismo* (Barcelona, 1985), 71–72. Kindelán spent seven months in the Canaries and then was passed to the reserve list three years later (1949), unremitting in his Monarchism. It was an ironic end to the career of the military commander who had contributed more than any other single individual to making Franco generalissimo.

51. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 73.

52. *Fundamental Laws of the State*, 119.

53. Ibid., 112.

54. For further perspective, see A. Cañellas Mas, "Las Leyes fundamentales en la construcción del nuevo estado," in A. Ferrary and A. Cañellas, eds., *El régimen de Franco: Unas perspectivas de análisis* (Pamplona, 2012), 219–52.

55. On the mission to Estoril and its aftermath, see Tusell, *La oposición democrática*, 161–70, and López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 76–88.

56. The full text is reproduced in F. González-Doria, *¿Franquismo sin Franco . . . ?* (Madrid, 1974), 38–40.

57. In fact, the report sent to Franco recorded somewhat lower figures: an electoral census of 16,187,992, of whom 14,054,026 voted. Affirmative votes totaled 12,628,983, with 643,501 voting no, and more than 300,000 abstentions or null votes. Franco Archive, 206:128.

According to data in D. Sueiro and B. Díaz Nosty, *Historia del franquismo*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1985), 2:106–7, the highest rates of abstention were in Asturias (32.48 percent), Madrid (30.08 percent), and Barcelona (29.50 percent). Vizcaya was only in seventh place at 21.59 percent and Guipuzcoa was far down the line with 15.13 percent. The fullest turnouts on behalf of the regime were registered in Valladolid and Avila.

58. "Notas sobre el balance de diez años del Movimiento Nacional," in Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Carrero*, 190.

59. Cardona, *Franco y sus generales*, 136. Franco had first honored Queipo six years earlier, when he personally awarded the elderly general the Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando in a major ceremony in Seville in 1944.

60. Franco Archive, 1:224. F. Aguado Sánchez, *El maquis en España* (Madrid, 1975), later supplied a more comprehensive account, presenting slightly higher casualty figures for all parties. J. Aróstegui and J. Marco, eds., *El último frente: La resistencia armada antifranquista en España, 1939–1952* (Madrid, 2008), is a broad survey.

61. On the military in the years following World War II, see Cardona, *El gigante descalzo*, 135–93.

62. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 180.

63. Danvila to Franco, July 6, 1948, Franco Archive, 149:32.

64. J. A. Pérez Mateos, *El rey que vino del exilio* (Planeta, 1981), 24–25.

65. Carmen Franco reports that among the family Franco only "remarked upon what a good sailor Don Juan was and how he loved the sea."

66. J. M. Gil Robles, *La monarquía por la que yo luché* (Madrid, 1976), 276.

67. "Boletín de actividades monárquicas," Franco Archive, 151.

68. Pérez Mateos, *El rey*, 94–97.

69. Gil Robles, *La monarquía*, 308–10.

70. Don Jaime lost most of his capacity for speaking and hearing after a botched treatment for a mastoid infection at the age of four. He had officially renounced his rights on June 21, 1933, ten days after his older brother, the hemophiliac Don Alfonso, had done the same.

71. Heine, *La oposición política*, 401–3.

72. This regulation, known colloquially as the "Aranda law," was promulgated on July 13, 1949, providing for the permanent retirement, at the discretion of the high command, of senior officers at the rank of colonel and above who had been passed over for promotion by at least 10 percent of the holders of their rank. Aranda was given one last chance to repent, then placed in premature retirement along with a score or so other pro-Monarchist officers. In 1977, just before his death, King Juan Carlos restored Aranda's full seniority. So far as is known, he retained all the money paid in bribery by the British.

73. *FF*, 4:383–87.

74. Some of the reports that Franco received on the international activities of Masonry during the 1940s have been published in Casinos and Brunet, *Franco contra los masones*.

75. These articles were later collected and published under the name of Hakim Boor, *Masonería* (Madrid, 1952). This has sometimes been referred to as Franco's third book, after *Diario de una bandera* and *Raza*. Carrero Blanco published similar pseudonymous articles under the name Ginés de Buitrago.

76. M. D. Algora Weber, *Las relaciones hispano-árabes durante el regimen de Franco: La ruptura del aislamiento internacional (1946–1950)* (Madrid, 1995).

77. A full account appears in R. Rein, *In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition: Israel's Relations with Francoist Spain* (London, 1997).

78. A. J. Telo, *Portugal e a NATO* (Lisbon, 1996), 71–75, 191–92.

79. Interview with H. V. Kaltenborn, March 24, 1949, Franco Archive, 130:103.

80. Numerous documents describing the trip may be found in the Franco Archive, 254.

81. See Garriga, *Los validos*, 122–24. However, Garriga mistakenly identifies Laureano López Rodó as Carrero's counselor, but in fact his counselor was Professor Amadeo de Fuenmayor.

82. Preston, *Franco*, 598. Soviet strategists were, of course, fully aware of this, and Soviet memoirs have referred to a contingency plan as part of Stalin's final grand strategy of 1951–52 that proposed to preempt any Western redoubt in the Iberian peninsula by means of a large amphibious operation that would accompany outbreak of general war in Europe. This cannot be confirmed, however, and was probably beyond Soviet capabilities.

83. According to Franco's version of this meeting in *FF*, 4:27–31.

84. In his discreet fashion, Carrero had been urging Franco to reorganize his government for more than a year, presenting him with a particularly lengthy memorandum in this regard on April 4, 1951. Franco Archive, 21:39. As usual, the caudillo would not be hurried, and there is no information as to whether or not the disfavor into which Carrero fell temporarily with Doña Carmen was a factor. At any rate, Franco rejected a number of the specific recommendations by Carrero, who wanted to see a diminished role for Falangists and greater attention to the economy and to the evolution toward monarchy.

85. The full text is in R. de la Cierva, *Don Juan de Borbón: Por fin toda la verdad* (Madrid, 1997), 594–612.

86. F. Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57* (Houndsmills, 1998).

87. Most of these data are taken from A. Carreras and X. Tafunell, eds., *Estadísticas históricas de España: Siglos XIX–XX*, 3 vols. (Bilbao, 2005).

88. In Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 293–94.

89. On this exchange, see A. Viñas, *Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos* (Barcelona, 1981), 144–47.

90. Report of Feb. 2, 1952, Franco Archive, 168:27.

91. A. J. Lleonart, "El ingreso de España en la ONU," *Cuadernos de historia contemporánea* 17 (1995): 111.

92. Francisco Franco, *Pensamiento político de Franco*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1975), 1:256.

93. These arrangements are treated in detail in A. Jarque Iñiguez, *"Queremos esas bases": El acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco* (Alcalá de Henares, 1998), and A. Viñas, *En las garras del águila: Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995)* (Barcelona, 2003), 23–285. A broader perspective on American relations with rightist authoritarian regimes during the Cold War may be found in R. Escobedo, "El dictador amistoso: Estados Unidos y los regímenes no democráticos durante la Guerra Fría," in Ferrary and Cañellas, *El régimen de Franco*, 253–85.

94. J. C. Jiménez de Aberásturi, *De la derrota a la esperanza: Políticas vascas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (1937–1947)* (Bilbao, 1999).

Chapter 14. Franco at His Zenith

1. This speech would later be among others, mainly from the years 1940–43, suppressed in the *Antología del pensamiento de Franco* that was published in 1964. The text appears in *FF*, 5:144.

2. For years Franco had been strongly anti-American, an attitude that external circumstances had forced him to drop in the second half of 1944. Once the rapprochement had been effected, his basic attitude seems to have changed somewhat, despite continuing apprehension about the Masonic affiliation of many American leaders. Carmen Franco reports that in later years in private conversation he would praise the United States for heading the struggle against Communism, as well as its generosity in assisting other countries.

3. Carmen Franco claims that the material to which they objected did not come from Pacón himself, insinuating that the publisher added foreign material, which is doubtful. She observes: "Uncle Pacón was a person who always made his career in the shadow of my father, and I don't know why, always had a slightly critical attitude. My mother was quite upset when she read his book because she said it presented my father through certain things inserted by the publisher, which Uncle Pacón had not written. She was at odds with his widow because the latter had not protested to the publisher when they added things to give the book greater consistency and interest and had changed other things. Uncle Pacón's widow could have protested, but she did not. And then Mamá froze her relationship with that lady."

4. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 28.

5. Franco stipulated that the prince would not have to present himself for the formal examinations but that he must be adequately prepared in mathematics to follow technical military studies. Ibid., 9.

6. The full correspondence between Franco and Don Juan is in P. Sainz Rodríguez, *Un reinado en la sombra* (Barcelona, 1983), 378–84.

7. Ibid., 63–64.

8. Ibid., 222–35.

9. Togores, *Muñoz Grandes*, 437–52.

10. See the analysis in Cardona, *Franco y sus generales*, 152–64.

11. M. Parra Celaya, *Juventudes de vida española: El Frente de Juventudes* (Madrid, 2001), is a recent admiring account that nonetheless makes no effort to conceal the small numbers involved by the 1950s.

12. As late as December 1955, only a few months before he was forced to abandon the protectorate, Franco announced that Morocco would not be ready for independence for at least twenty-five years. *ABC*, Dec. 16, 1955.

13. R. Velasco de Castro, *Nacionalismo y colonialismo en Marruecos (1945–1951): El general Varela y los sucesos de Tetuán* (Seville, 2012).

14. For the contradictory Spanish policy during the last years of the protectorate, see Madariaga, *Marruecos*, 383–460, and V. Morales Lezcano, *El final del protectorado hispano-francés en Marruecos: El desafío del nacionalismo magrebí (1945–1962)* (Madrid, 1998).

15. Report dated July 4, 1956, Franco Archive, 166:3.

16. Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 330–44.

17. There are numerous versions of this fatal incident. The preceding narration is based on the recounting given by King Juan Carlos to his long-time personal secretary, General Sabino Fernández Campo, as related by the latter to Jesús Palacios.

18. Franco, *Pensamiento político*, 1:251.

19. Franco Archive, 165:25, 26.

20. Ibid., 165:30.

21. As Carmen Franco sees it, "He rather supported Arrese's plan and the doctrines of the Movement, that is, he supported them but only to a certain point because he understood he couldn't swim against the stream."

22. In 1944, during the first phase of the regime's defascistization, Arrese, who fancied himself a major theorist and intellectual, had published a small book, *El estado totalitario en el pensamiento de José Antonio*, which claimed that the Falange had never supported a totalitarian system, a great oversimplification.

23. Franco Archive, 165:41, 42.

24. González Gallarza died soon afterward but of a major infection, not from the injury.

25. The definitive study is X. Casals Meseguer, "1957: El golpe contra Franco que sólo existió en los rumores," *Revista de historia contemporánea* 72, no. 4 (2008): 241–71.

26. The letter of resignation is in Togores, *Muñoz Grandes*, 421–22.

27. Franco had appointed Barroso head of his *casa militar* the preceding year, when his cousin Pacón had reached mandatory retirement age of sixty-six and passed to the reserve, or "B" list.

28. Despite Artajo's years of faithful service, Franco followed his customary practice of not informing him of his dismissal in a personal meeting, but by sending him an abrupt dispatch by motorcycle messenger.

29. Franco Archive, 258.

30. There is now a fairly extensive literature. See R. Casas de la Vega, *La última guerra de Africa (Campaña de Ifni-Sáhara)* (Madrid, 1985), J. R. Diego Aguirre, *La última guerra colonial de España: Ifni-Sáhara (1957–1958)* (Málaga, 1993), L. M. Vidal Guardiola, *Ifni, 1957–1958* (Madrid, 2006), and J. E. Alonso del Barrio, *¿Encrucijada o abandono?*, vol. 1 of *Sáhara-Ifni* (Zaragoza, 2010).

31. Moroccan occupation of the Tarfaya strip is said by some to have marked the beginning of Saharan nationalism, for the native Saharauis quickly found that the sultan's regime was much more oppressive than that of Franco. For a broader analysis, see G. Jensen, *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara* (Carlisle, PA, 2013).

32. Franco's opinion of his neighboring dictator had risen greatly over the years. In 1939–40 his attitude had been condescending to the point of secretly threatening invasion, but he came to esteem Salazar more and more as a fully supportive ally. During these months Franco granted his most extensive interview ever to Serge Grossard of *Le Figaro* (June 12, 1958), in which he praised Salazar as "the most complete and respectable statesman of all those whom I have known. . . . His only defect perhaps is his modesty."

33. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 222–23; Franco Archive, 165:79.

34. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 166.

35. Franco Archive, 258:6.

36. The technical design is explained in detail by the principal architect Diego Méndez, in his *El Valle de los Caídos: Idea, proyecto y construcción* (Madrid, 1982). For commentary, see A. Cirici, *La estética del franquismo* (Barcelona, 1977), 112–24, and A. Bonet Correa, ed., *Arte del franquismo* (Madrid, 1981), 115–30.

37. His cousin quoted him as opining: "There were many dead on the Red side who fought because they sought to fulfill a duty to the Republic, and others who had been forcibly drafted. The monument was not constructed to continue dividing Spaniards into two irreconcilable bands. It was built, and this was always my intention, as a memorial to

the victory over Communism, which had sought to dominate Spain. That was justification for my goal of burying the fallen of both political bands." Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 239.

38. There is uncertainty on this point. Carmen never heard her father express such a wish: "No, the only person who said that my father wanted to be buried there was the architect. We had no idea, nor did I, of where he wanted to be buried, but apparently he did tell the architect, because my father visited the Valley of the Fallen many times while it was under construction." Franco may also have mentioned it to his successor, King Juan Carlos. "I think he did. Since his final agony was so long and drawn out, people certainly had time to talk among themselves and it seemed to them it was the most appropriate spot."

39. Both Franco and his daughter enjoyed horseback riding, and she remembers accompanying him as a teenager on horseback through the rough countryside to inspect the works: "In the beginning my father was extremely interested in the great sculptures of the four evangelists and in the dimensions of the cross. . . . He talked about this a good deal with the architects, who said that the cross could not be so large, but Papá insisted that they study it more, and they could figure it out. Many people were buried there who had been in mass graves, that is, executed by one side or the other. More of those who fell on our side than from the other, but, still, to some extent a site of burial for both sides."

40. Data on the construction of the Valley of the Fallen may be found in D. Sueiro, *La construcción del Valle de los Caídos* (Madrid, 1976), and J. Blanco, *Valle de los Caídos* (Madrid, 2009).

41. Personal security arrangements for Franco were elaborate but by no means foolproof. Carmen says that her father was "very providentialist," which was undoubtedly correct, and never discussed such things. "For example, when the Christmas lights were put up in Madrid, my mother always said, 'Paco, let's take a ride to see Madrid.' And the two went by car, with only one escort car behind them, no more." She also insists that the stories that he employed a "double" to impersonate him on certain major occasions are pure fabrications.

42. V. A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York, 1978), 305.

43. Ibid., 307.

44. Part of the conversation is presented in E. Martín de Pozuelo, *Los secretos del franquismo: España en los papeles desclasificados del espionaje norteamericano desde 1934 hasta la Transición* (Barcelona, 2007), 224–28. Castiella delivered the message to the White House on March 23, 1960, and reported that "he could assure the president that this matter would very soon be resolved to his satisfaction," since "General Franco had decided that this be done." He promised a full report, which was sent by Madrid on April 6. This was full of doubletalk, complaining that Protestants as a minority were "not very patriotic," compared with Jews and Arabs resident in Spain. The report admitted a problem but then proceeded to dodge it. On the one hand, it alleged that Protestants really were not persecuted, and, on the other, said measures were being taken to correct problems. All of this was an "artificial" dilemma, it was claimed, perhaps due to the misplaced zeal of certain local officials who felt pressured by anti-Protestant public opinion. There was to be established a central registry for dissenting confessions (*registro central de confesiones disidentes*) through which groups with a certain number of members could obtain official recognition, all of which sounded like the official registries in Communist countries. Protestants were slowly being shown

somewhat greater toleration, and the State Department did not press the issue. Ibid., 229–36.

45. Carmen says that her father "was extremely interested in this visit. . . . And then he found Eisenhower very likeable, for they were both military men. . . . He took a real shine to him, for Eisenhower was very nice and knew how to deal with people. Their conversation was very enjoyable, because, though some translators are very slow or twist the meaning a little, the American general Vernon Walters was an excellent translator, a man with much personality and talent." The full transcript of the principal conversation is in the Franco Archive, 98:16, and is published in Suárez, *Franco*, 566–72.

46. D. D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (New York, 1965), 509–10.

47. Walters, *Silent Missions*, 306.

48. Ibid., 307.

Chapter 15. Franco at Home

1. L. de Galinsoga (with F. Franco Salgado Araujo), *Centinela de Occidente* (Barcelona, 1956).

2. The American edition of the memoirs of the former British ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare was titled *Complacent Dictator* (New York, 1947).

3. For an anthology of such dithyrambs, see C. Fernández, *El general Franco* (Barcelona, 1983), 311–24.

4. Professor Philip Powell was at one time director of the University of California's program in Madrid and related this anecdote to Stanley Payne in Los Angeles in May 1965. Though sometimes of dubious authenticity, one of the best collections of personal anecdotes is Baón, *La cara humana*.

5. Quoted in Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 50.

6. Ibid., 55.

7. Ibid., 50.

8. Ibid., 178.

9. A. Bayod, ed., *Franco visto por sus ministros* (Barcelona, 1981), 128.

10. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 159.

11. M. Fraga Iribarne, *Memoria breve de una vida pública* (Barcelona, 1981), 41.

12. According to Laureano López Rodó; see Bayod, *Franco visto*, 167.

13. José María López de Letona, quoted in ibid., 209.

14. Carlos Rein Segura, quoted in ibid., 74.

15. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 285.

16. Ibid., 207.

17. Ibid., 185, 317.

18. Carmen has observed that her father liked to write his own texts "in the early days certainly, always. Toward the end of his life each minister would send him an outline, so that he could grasp things better, particularly with regard to statistics . . . , but he always did a draft of his own by longhand and then had it typed. But Papá always wrote, and he very much enjoyed doing it."

19. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 125.

20. The full list is provided by his household staff member Cobos Arévalo, *La vida*

privada, 240–42. This is the frankest, the most objective, and one of the best-informed memoirs about Franco.

21. For the history of this relic, see G. Huesa Lope, *La mano de Santa Teresa de Jesús* (Ronda, 1996).

22. His public statements on religion were collected and published under the title *Francisco Franco: Pensamiento católico* (Madrid, 1958).

23. By the time of his death, the official count was a total of 5,023 individual commissions, made up of 68,506 persons. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 107–8.

24. Failure to have learned English well seems to have been a source of some frustration. As his foreign minister Martín Artajo noted, his pronunciation was poor and phoneticized in Spanish style. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 113.

25. Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 67–68. According to his daughter, Franco "read the Bible and very boring books that he said were very interesting, but that I couldn't manage. They had to do with a nun in the time of Philip II, a nun who wrote a lot and fascinated him [Santa Teresa de Avila?]. They were small, old-style books set in terrible type. . . . My father read a great deal, mainly at night. He had supper early and later read in bed—too much, according to my mother, until very late. He loved that. And he read a little of everything: novels, of course, he did not, he was only interested in serious books. He had a personal secretary, a naval officer, father of a singer who sadly died young. This naval man pointed out certain things, telling him about new books that might interest him. He liked biographies and current affairs and also history books, as well as books on religion and other faiths, which also interested him a good deal."

26. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 106.

27. Interview with Carmen Franco Polo, *Boletín de la Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco*, 57 (1992).

28. The principal memoir of hunting parties, which is not particularly informative, is A. Martínez-Bordiú Ortega, *Franco en familia: Cacerías en Jaén* (Barcelona, 1994). The author was the brother of Franco's son-in-law.

29. Carlos Rein Segura, agriculture minister from 1945 to 1951, recalls that when Franco took up hunting regularly in the mid-1940s, "he was only an average shot, in fact, rather poor." Bayod, *Franco visto*, 78.

30. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 72. See L. A. Tejada, "Las cacerías de Franco," *Historia 16* 4, no. 37 (1979): 19–30.

31. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 270. The psychiatrist Enrique González Duro, author of the principal attempt at a psychological biography, conjectures about the potential sexual symbolism involved in this compulsive hunting by a man who led an extremely circumspect sex life, but that must remain a matter of speculation. González Duro, *Franco*, 313–18.

32. Carmen Franco also became a minor victim on February 1, 1961, when Manuel Fraga Iribarne, one of Franco's top officials (soon to become a minister), was an invited participant. Fraga had little experience in such matters and allowed his aim to stray in pursuit of a partridge after failing to make use of a *pantalla* (blind), splattering a little buckshot on Carmen Franco, who was not far away. She was not seriously injured, and Franco, though miffed, did not make a big thing of the incident. It does not seem to have interfered with Fraga's political career. Fraga Iribarne, *Memoria breve*, 59.

33. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 37. Vicente Gil eventually

published his own memoir of his long service as Franco's physician, *Cuarenta años junto a Franco* (Barcelona, 1981).

34. Described by Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 63–76.

35. Carmen Franco explains: "He always liked drawing. At one point . . . his physician, Vicente Gil, said that he had to move about more, that sitting all day in his office and then eating, and sitting down again for coffee, was bad for his health: he had to get out and walk, not just sit. . . . But since he had little free time and, when he went out, he had to call for his guards and car and a retinue to get out in the country, all that was too complicated. On the other hand, if he devoted himself to painting after eating, when the others were taking coffee, that gave him a chance to use his time, and he was standing and moving. When you are painting on an easel, you are up and moving from one side to the other. And in that way he began to paint more seriously. But he didn't paint out of doors, no, inside."

36. The best published small collection of Franco's paintings will be found in the illustrations accompanying the book by his grandson, Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*. Some of the paintings were destroyed in the two fires that broke out at the Pazo in the years after Franco's death, very possibly arson.

37. Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 134–35.

38. That the insurance syndicate was fabrication is the conclusion of R. Garriga, *La Señora de El Pardo* (Barcelona, 1979). The best discussion of Doña Carmen's acquisitions and purchases is in Enríquez, *Carmen Polo*, 105–13.

39. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 180.

40. Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 52–54.

41. Franco Bahamonde, *Nosotros*.

42. Sánchez Soler, *Los Franco*, 182.

43. Garriga, *Nicolás Franco*, 272–85.

44. Nicolás and Pilar Franco, not their brother, saw to it that she received a widow's pension.

45. The letter is quoted in full in Fernández, *El general Franco*, 310.

46. For fuller treatment of this bizarre story, see Togores, *Millán Astray*, 415–17. Though unable to legitimize fully the daughter that was born, Millán Astray proved a devoted father and visited her almost daily.

A cognate problem was that of the respected sometime captain-general of Madrid, Miguel Rodrigo. He hoped to marry his long-time housekeeper, but knew that Franco would consider this quite irregular, and so Rodrigo dared to take the step only shortly before he died.

47. *Diez Minutos*, Oct. 15, 1980.

48. The Spanish "cafetería" has no precise equivalent in the English-speaking world. It is neither a bar nor a coffeehouse in the American sense and not quite a pub in the British style, but combines features of all these.

49. There was also talk about the candidacy of Cristóbal Colón, son of the Duque de Veragua and direct descendant of the discoverer of America, though this may have had more to do with symbolism than reality.

50. Quoted in R. de la Cierva, *Historia del franquismo*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1978), 2:99.

51. Carmen explains, "As a grandfather, Papá really enjoyed having the grandchildren around. It has been said that his favorite granddaughter was Carmen [the oldest], but that's not true. Carmen was the favorite of my mother, but my father's favorite was Mery [Mariola], a lively and sassy little girl. Papá said that she seemed to be a *ferrolana* because the girls that

he remembered from his childhood in El Ferrol were like that, very, very outspoken. When they were little they visited all the time, or rather, didn't visit but lived regularly at El Pardo during the weekends. They stayed in a special part that was not too well kept up but was reserved for them and the Englishwoman whom I hired to care for them. They spent all of Saturdays and Sundays there and then went back to school on Monday mornings, staying at home until Fridays."

52. The clearest testimony is that of the oldest grandson, Francisco Franco Martínez-Bordiú: "She took care of us day by day, and we only noticed the presence of our parents if we got sick. Most days there was barely time to tell them about our grades and get a kiss before they went out to dinner.

"Miss Hibbs was like a cavalry sergeant and everyone at El Pardo was afraid of her. She set rules and duties and protected our interests like a lioness with her cubs. She permitted no one, not even my grandfather, to interfere with her supervision of the children. I spent much more time with my grandparents than did my siblings, but when Nanny punished me, which was not infrequently, my grandmother would try to intercede, saying 'His grandfather will be displeased when he learns that his grandson cannot accompany him. . . .' But, implacably, she would reply that she did not care 'what His Excellency might say.' And she rarely canceled the punishment." Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 35.

53. Enríquez, *Carmen Polo*, 150–51.

54. This explains why to date he is the only descendant of Franco to write a book about him. His own account of moving back to El Pardo will be found in Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 175–77.

55. Ibid., 33.

56. J. L. Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo: Crónicas de una agonía imprevisible* (Madrid, 2004), 106.

57. J. Giménez Arnau, *Yo, Jimmy (Mi vida entre los Franco)* (Barcelona, 1980). All the family members and close associates who published memoirs—Franco Salgado-Araujo, Pilar Franco, her daughter Pilar Jaráiz, and Vicente Gil—refer to Villaverde in rather scathing terms. For a different, rather more balanced, portrait of Villaverde, see Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 243–46.

58. Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 32–33.

59. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 91–92.

60. Martínez-Bordiú Ortega, *Franco en familia*, 192.

61. Ibid.; Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 138–40.

62. For example, his nephew Alfonso Jaráiz Franco wrote to him in October 1946: "Dear Uncle Paco: I want you to be the first to know that I have asked my sweetheart to marry me. I know that you would prefer someone else but we love each other and she is very good. Mamá [Doña Pilar] is still opposed, but once she gets to know her she will get over it. For a wedding present I would prefer a dining-room set." A month later, on November 29, Pilar Jaráiz Franco asked for help in paying the fees for her admission to the College of Lawyers: "The expense is considerable and we need help. Toñuco [her son] has been approved for admission [to the General Military Academy] and we have two girls in the Sacred Heart [Catholic school]. Since you have always been very generous with us, I want to ask a favor: to enter . . . I have to pay a fee of two thousand pesetas and would be very grateful if you could help with that." Both letters are in the Franco Archive, 74.

63. Accounts for this period are in ibid., 29 and 29bis (reverse).

64. On June 30, 1956, the total was 21,764,230.60 pesetas, and on June 30, 1961, it amounted to 23,405,098 pesetas. Ibid., 29bis:74, 95, and 99. It might be pointed out that if the very low Spanish price level of 1961 is adjusted to twenty-first-century values, this would be worth more than ten times as much.

65. Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 168.

66. In the twenty-first century, after Madrid had expanded a great deal, the local government rezoned part of the estate for suburban development, making it possible for Franco's heirs to sell that portion for a considerable sum for construction of housing.

67. Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 131; Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 395.

68. M. Sánchez Soler, *Villaverde: Fortuna y caída de la casa Franco* (Barcelona, 1990), and *Los Franco* investigate the family business dealings in detail. See also Garriga, *Nicolás Franco*, 293–320.

69. Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 32.

70. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 178–79.

71. Ibid., 111.

72. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 85–87, 101.

73. Ibid., 93, 97–98.

74. Of these, 470 were Spanish productions and 1,492 came from abroad. Ibid., 134.

75. Ibid., 133–37, 235–36.

76. Ibid., 251.

Chapter 16. Development Dictator

1. For a survey of the 1950s in Spain, see J. Soto Viñolo, *Los años 50* (Madrid, 2009).

2. Franco Archive, 156:9.

3. According to Navarro Rubio in Bayod, *Franco visto*, 89.

4. M. Navarro Rubio, *Mis memorias* (Barcelona, 1991), 124–31, and his "La batalla de la estabilización," *Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas* 54 (1977): 174–203.

5. He listed his concerns in a memo titled "Problemas de la estabilización." Franco Archive, 258:82. Carmen says that he was surprised by the success of the stabilization plan, since he had really not expected that much. "I don't think that he believed the economy would grow so rapidly, but of course he was quite satisfied to have made the change."

6. The other decade was the 1920s. The earlier decade advanced no farther than an early-middle phase of modernization that ended in civil war, while the later decade would achieve decisive growth that could make possible political democratization, though this was not what Franco had in mind. On these decisive changes and the entire later phase of the regime, see N. Townson, ed., *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75* (Hampshire, UK, 2010).

7. The principal letters are published in Sainz Rodríguez, *Un reinado*, 397–406.

8. A memo that Franco drew up a year or so later even included a brief list of the books that he thought Juan Carlos should read. Franco Archive, 86:34.

9. According to Juan Carlos, who was repeating his father's account. J. L. de Villalonga, *El Rey* (Barcelona, 1993), 78–79.

10. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 300.

11. During the defascistization phase after 1945, this ceremony had virtually died. On November 20, 1958, when José Antonio's remains were still buried at the royal church of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Stanley Payne attended the ceremony and found no one present but a small four-man honor guard from the movement and himself. After the opening of the Valley of the Fallen, however, an elaborate ceremony was revived.

12. Franco was not entirely surprised. For years he had received reports on the murmuring among activists and radicals of the Falange movement, including an account from the Directorate-General of Security (Dirección General de Seguridad) of April 7, 1960, concerning a previous incident at the Valley of the Fallen. Franco Archive, 234:1, 2.

13. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 290–91. For a broader account of this whole affair, see R. Ramos, *¡Que vienen los rusos! España renuncia a la Eurocopa 1960 por decisión de Franco* (Granada, 2013). Four years later, with conditions more relaxed, the Soviet soccer team was invited to Madrid, where it lost a match to the Spanish national team, with Franco in attendance. This was hailed by the press as a second victory over Communism.

14. For a discussion of Castiella's foreign policy, see J. M. Armero, *La política exterior de Franco* (Barcelona, 1978), 171–200.

15. Franco is paraphrased as having observed privately, "Although there is no alternative to entry, since we belong to Europe, I do not know if it is really in our interest or may be prejudicial, given that our farm products are sold in other countries, especially Germany. Nonetheless, our industry—particularly the small enterprises, which are the most numerous—might suffer from such competition." "Moreover, with the embargo against our regime, they create many obstacles, complaining that we are not democratic, that we are authoritarian, and so on. Then they pull other complaints out of their sleeves. The main point is to delay our entry as long as possible. There are countries like Italy or France that have no interest in our inclusion in the Common Market." Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 82–83. Franco Salgado-Araujo cites similar comments in *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 332, 334.

16. This difficult relationship is studied in detail in W. T. Salisbury, "Spain and the Common Market, 1957–1967" (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1972).

17. Franco Archive, 100:151.

18. Franco outlined these concerns in a six-point memo that he drew up in preparation for Rusk's visit on December 16. Ibid., 93:98.

19. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 70–72.

20. Franco Archive, 92:78.

21. Franco also marked the occasion by granting the title of marques de Kindelán to his old air force commander, now in retirement, who had been arguably the principal leader of the initiative that had boosted Franco to the status of commander in chief.

22. F. Franco, *Discursos y mensajes del jefe del estado 1960–1963* (Madrid, 1964), 320–21.

23. Sainz Rodríguez, *Un reinado*, 403–4.

24. Franco Archive, 86:30. Don Juan did yet a third 180-degree shift before Franco died, but the perpetual opportunism of a pretender who played such a weak hand never achieved anything.

25. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 46–49.

26. The United States Embassy obtained a much more complete and precise report

about the surgery than was given to the Spanish public, apparently leaked to reassure Washington.

27. Carmen Franco reports that Juanito, the assistant who regularly loaded the shotguns, attended Franco that day, as usual. There was some concern that something might have fallen from the ash tree above him, interfering with the firing mechanism, but the faulty cartridge soon was clearly identified as the culprit. "We were not terribly worried, no, because it was not a vital problem, but an uncomfortable complication. . . . We went to the Hospital General del Aire . . . and the night that they operated, which was Christmas Eve, we slept in the hospital." Then they all returned to El Pardo on Christmas Day.

28. The fullest account is in Soriano, *La mano izquierda*. Franco's grandson Francisco emphasizes that his grandfather always stressed gun security and would repeat the warning "Don't shoot in the air." Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 40, 93–94.

29. P. Urbano, *El precio del Trono* (Barcelona, 2011), 271–75.

30. Years later, as reigning king, Juan Carlos would virtually destroy the marriage with his numerous infidelities, his own recklessness and self-indulgence being to blame. Queen Sofía, technically the only non-Spanish member of the new royal family, would always be its most exemplary representative.

31. According to Carmen, he declared that Juan Carlos "has enjoyed good fortune, has chosen very well," and that was certainly the case. Later Doña Carmen is said to have remarked to her best friend, "The princess has stolen Paco's heart," according to what the friend told José María Pemán, recounted in María Pemán's *Mis encuentros con Franco* (Barcelona, 1976), 218–19.

32. As she recounted it years later to the journalist Pilar Urbano, in Urbano's *La reina muy de cerca* (Barcelona, 2008), 148.

33. Ibid.

34. Urbano, *El precio*, 288.

35. Franco Archive, 61:7. Franco, of course, received a lengthy series of detailed reports, most of them found in the Franco Archive, 73.

36. Ibid., 270:88.

37. Ibid., 98:65. The claim that it was planned at the wedding may well have been a deliberate fabrication to discredit the Monarchists.

38. At least, this is what Pacón records Franco as saying on July 21, 1962. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 346.

39. Carmen recalls hearing Franco talk about these problems with the family's chaplain, P. Bulart, saying such things as "many priests support those people" and "it seems unbelievable." The best study of the changing relationship between the Catholic Church and state for these years is F. Montero, *La Iglesia: De la colaboración a la disidencia (1956–1975)* (Madrid, 2009).

In the winter of 1962 Franco observed privately that "the great sin of the Church is simony," and criticized the fees charged in Catholic schools, declaring that he would complete the development of a system of free state schools. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 103.

40. A year later, on July 5, 1963, Muñoz Grandes would hold the powers of chief of state for one day when Franco had the flu. Togores, *Muñoz Grandes*, 455.

41. A. Cañellas Mas, *Laureano López Rodó: Biografía política de un ministro de Franco (1920–2000)* (Madrid, 2011), treats his extensive role in public affairs.

42. Concerning her father's attitude, Carmen Franco has observed: "Carrero Blanco

was, in fact, the champion of all those technocrats, many of them members of Opus Dei, and my father accepted that government because they seemed to him the most qualified people for that phase. And he was very friendly with some of them. López Bravo was a friend of his, and he liked him quite well. My father received visits from José María Escrivá Balaguer [the subsequently canonized founder of Opus Dei]. Relations with him were very good, very good, though toward the end perhaps a bit less, but he received him every two or three months, and they talked. He had written a little book called *Camino* [*The Way*], a book of meditations, that my mother had on her nightstand. It was a little like a Catholic Masonry, because they had the habit of helping the other members. . . . Many people didn't like them. Cristóbal, my husband, detested Opus, but my father liked them. My father was acquainted well enough with the religious organization and, as I say, saw a good deal of Monsignor Escrivá Balaguer. He did say that he did not like the way they resembled Masonry in always favoring each other. It seemed to him unfair, especially when they were selecting members for special positions. . . . But he found them very able . . . and he thought that every era has its own religious orders. . . . He liked Opus."

43. Franco Archive, 30:35. The full text is in J. Palacios, *Los papeles secretos de Franco* (Madrid, 1996), 360–61.

44. Ibid.

45. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 369.

46. Urbano, *El precio*, 292–95. An alternate version has Sofía's father, the king of Greece, intervening with Don Juan.

47. It might be inferred that he had a tendency to identify her, as a loyal wife and mother, with his own mother, similarly married to an unfaithful husband. Carmen explains his attitude more objectively: "My father always had a great deal of sympathy for her, because he said that she had had a very difficult life in Spain, that she came here very young and had to face a lot of serious problems, while her husband was very young and did not help her all that much."

After the Civil War Franco had restored the royal patrimony confiscated by the Republic, and also sent personal pensions to Victoria Eugenia and to Doña Eulalia, the sister of Alfonso XIII. Doña Eulalia lived in Irún (very near the French border) and wittily observed, according to Carmen, that "every month General Franco sends me 25,000 pesetas for flowers that I convert into potatoes."

48. Franco Archive, 98:68.

49. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 378–81.

50. Historians of the Spanish Communist Party have had the same question as Franco, that is, why someone with Grimau's past had been sent back into Spain, but the Party leaders are said to have been unaware of his role in the Civil War. For the best brief summary of this whole affair, see C. Rojas, *Diez crisis del franquismo* (Madrid, 2003), 133–54.

51. Memorandum of July 16, 1963, Franco Archive, 241:27.

52. Ibid., 241:6.

53. Ibid., 30:99.

54. Ibid., 104:14. Carmen agrees that Mussolini's IRI was to some extent the inspiration for the INI and insists on Franco's high regard for his old friend. He had intervened on various occasions to smooth relations between Suanzes and the technocrat ministers, but "every time that my father made peace between them all, Suanzes soon presented his resignation again . . . I don't know how many times," and so Franco finally gave up.

55. *FF*, 7:127–29. See P. Hispán Iglesias de Ussel, *La política en el régimen de Franco entre 1957 y 1969* (Madrid, 2006), 332–40.

56. Franco Archive, 99:66.

57. Pacón quoted him as saying, "For me the problem with the traditionalists is not their doctrine, which is good, but their insistence on bringing a foreign prince to our country whom no one knows, who has always lived in France and for whom the Spanish people feel nothing." Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 311.

58. For further details, see Palacios, *Los papeles secretos*, 380–81.

59. Carmen observes: "He always said of the Common Market, 'Bah, that's just something for merchants.' He did not lend it the importance it now has. He never did, because for himself, who was basically nationalist, the union of all Europe seemed very difficult."

60. More than three years earlier, on March 31, 1962, the Catholic president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, had written a friendly letter to Franco stressing the common goals of their two regimes in opposition to Communist aggression. Franco Archive, 208:12.

61. Ibid., 180:230; full texts of the two letters are reproduced in Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 452–59.

62. On these first steps, see Cardona, *Franco y sus generales*, 178, 199, and *El gigante descalzo*, 296.

63. According to Urbano, *El precio*, 878, the essence of the project, as a plan for inertial nuclear fusion, was later presented by Velarde in *Inertial Confinement Nuclear Fusion: An Historical Approach by Its Pioneers* (London, 2007), 188–89. Velarde was both a university professor and an army officer, eventually promoted to major general (*general de división*), as Otero eventually reached the rank of counteradmiral.

64. It has been alleged that France was willing to provide 25 percent of the capital for the project, since De Gaulle sought to have another atomic power in western continental Europe, friendly to France. Urbano, *El precio*, 319–21, 877–79.

65. Ibid.; interview with Guillermo Velarde Pinacho by Jesús Palacios in Madrid, May 2012.

66. Franco Archive, 191:69.

67. J. C. Jiménez Redondo, *El ocaso de la amistad entre las dictaduras ibéricas 1955–1968* (Mérida, 1996).

Though it received no publicity in the controlled press of the two dictatorships, a unique atrocity occurred in Spain near Badajoz in April 1965, when Portuguese police agents murdered the leading figure in the Portuguese opposition, General Humberto Delgado, when he resisted their efforts to abduct him to bring him back to Portugal. Ibid., 108–15.

68. F. M. Castiella, *España y la Guinea Ecuatorial* (Madrid, 1968); D. Ndongo-Bidyogo, *Historia y tragedia de Guinea Ecuatorial* (Madrid, 1977); *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 28, 1980; *New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1982. For the history of the long relationship with Equatorial Guinea, see M. de Castro and D. Ndongo, *España en Guinea: Construcción del desencuentro, 1778–1968* (Madrid, 1998), and G. Nerín, *Guinea Ecuatorial, historia en blanco y negro* (Barcelona, 2003).

69. Franco Archive, 114:268.

70. See the remarks attributed to Franco by his finance minister of the late 1960s, Juan José Espinosa San Martín, in Bayod, *Franco visto*, 156–58. Spain's first elected Socialist government reopened the frontier in 1984. For a history of the long controversy, see G. Hills, *Rock*

of Contention: A History of Gibraltar (London, 1974). The most recent account of the Spanish battle in the United Nations, updated to the twenty-first century, is J. M. Carrascal, *La batalla de Gibraltar: Cómo se ganó, cómo se perdió* (Madrid, 2012).

Chapter 17. Facing the Future

1. For a more detailed account, see Hispán Iglesias de Ussel, *La política en el regimen de Franco*, 281–618.

2. *ABC*, April 1, 1964.

3. Carrero Blanco summarized the early discussions for Franco in a lengthy memorandum of March 7, 1959. Franco Archive, 167:1.

4. Fraga Iribarne, *Memoria breve*, 115.

5. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 225.

6. Ibid., 229–30.

7. Franco followed the decisions of the council in detail, commenting extensively on the conclusions. Franco Archive, 47:19, 268:64, 66, 67.

8. Franco explained his unwillingness in detail in his draft notes and subsequent letter to Pope Paul VI of June 12, 1968. Ibid., 17:2. Franco did not blame the growing tension with the papacy on the pope himself but on the efforts by "various monsignors" (unnamed) who supported "enemies of the state." Ibid., 230:54.

9. Franco's ambassador to the Vatican reported to Franco on at least two different occasions that the Vatican had concerns about Opus Dei. Ibid., 19:27 and 229:4.

10. Ibid., 157:1.

11. Fraga Iribarne, *Memoria breve*, 145. Carmen explains her father's perspective: "Nowadays television is more important than newspapers, but newspapers were very influential among people who lived in the years before our war, that is, in the 1930s. . . . When those who had committed major crimes were executed, my father used to say to our domestic chaplain, José María Bulart, 'Go to those who want confession . . . and ask them what motivated such hatred and killing in the way that they killed so many people.' And there was a common response among such people. They used to say that what had influenced them was *Mundo Obrero*, the Communist newspaper. And there were some who said, 'I don't want my children to read *Mundo Obrero*.' This convinced my father that freedom of the press had done a great deal of harm. But he understood when Fraga's reform came up, and they enacted a very qualified freedom of the press. He saw that all the young people wanted that, that everyone could say what he thought or what he wanted. He always used to say that there was no true freedom of press in other countries, because the press was in the hands of pressure groups who could change the way people thought. . . . But I heard him say that times had changed a great deal, which he could tell even from his ministers, who were so much younger than he was. That the old press law could no longer be put up with, let's say."

12. F. Cendán Pazos, *Edición y comercio del libro español (1900–1972)* (Madrid, 1972).

13. Franco Archive, 176:46. This led Fraga to open a study center in his ministry on the Civil War and recent Spanish history, under the direction of Ricardo de la Cierva.

14. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 238.

15. For the ministerial infighting during its gestation, see Hispán Iglesias de Ussel, *La política en el régimen de Franco*, 432–40.

16. *Fundamental Laws of the State*.

17. Franco, *Discursos y mensajes*, 317–19.

18. R. Fernández-Carvajal, *La constitución española* (Madrid, 1969), the same title used for the government's subsequent publication of the Fundamental Laws, *La constitución española: Leyes Fundamentales del Estado* (Madrid, 1971).

19. In a speech to the Cortes of November 17, 1967. Franco, *Pensamiento político*, 2:370.

20. Franco even alleged that the government failed to advance certain kinds of legislation to the Cortes "due to the lack of a receptive atmosphere there." Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 390.

21. Carmen comments on their relationship: "Carrero Blanco was absolutely the person who solved many problems for him. He was the one who, when it was necessary to appoint new ministers, proposed and introduced them. In his first governments my father knew the people whom he named to his cabinet, at least to a certain degree. But in his later years the person who knew people and pointed them out or described their abilities for a certain ministry was Carrero Blanco. . . . Carrero . . . conferred with my father almost every working day. . . . He didn't have lunch with him or take tea with my mother and me, or spend weekends together. Only on certain occasions, since Carrero also hunted, he would participate in a *cacería*, and then they would eat together, but there would be lots of other people there, too. But he normally didn't participate, just at El Pardo, where there were very limited hunts, but not in the big partridge hunts, no. I never knew of a real disagreement between Carrero and my father. I don't think there was one ever."

22. Franco, *Discursos y mensajes*, 324.

23. Quoted in Fernández, *El general Franco*, 214.

24. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 344.

25. According to the finance minister Juan José Espinosa San Martín, in Bayod, *Franco*, 154.

26. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 263.

27. Eventually a sizable literature about dissident Falangism would develop, its volume in inverse proportion to the significance of the phenomenon. One of the latest publications is F. Blanco Moral and J. L. García Fernández, *FES: La cara rebelde de la Falange (1963–1977)* (Molins del Rei, 2008).

28. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 525.

29. The most notable example of a Spanish version of Bell's hypothesis is G. Fernández de la Mora, *El crepúsculo de las ideologías* (Madrid, 1965).

30. G. Jackson, "The Falange Revised: Fascism for the Future," *Nation*, October 7, 1968, 328.

31. According to Pemán, *Mis encuentros*, 82.

32. As quoted by one of his major interlocutors at the Fundación Ortega y Gasset Symposium on the transition (Toledo), May 11, 1984.

33. Ambassador Alfonso Merry del Val provided a detailed report of his press conference with the American journalists, dated Jan. 27, 1967. Franco Archive, 153:64.

34. Directorate-General of Security report of May 30, 1966. Ibid., 109:86.

35. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 388–89.

36. Queen Sofía later recounted: "I was very near Franco and I saw how his eyes glistened in the presence of Queen Victoria Eugenia. He was a sentimental man." Quoted in Urbano,

La reina, 196. Carmen agrees: "I think the atmosphere was very cordial because she was very nice and my father kissed her hand. He was moved to see her again after so many years. . . . My father and mother drew her off to one side, and my mother said she was charming, an enchanting lady." The former queen would die at her residence in Lausanne scarcely more than a year later.

37. There are several different versions of these two messages, both delivered only verbally, the first by a third party, but all sources agree on the substance and on the response. See Palacios, *Los papeles secretos*, 436–39.

38. Franco Archive, 208:55; the full text of Calvo Serer's letter can be found in Palacios, *Cartas de Franco*, 483–87.

39. *New York Times*, July 10, 1968.

40. The approximate text of the letter reached Franco. Franco Archive, 205:7.

41. L. López Rodó, *Años decisivos*, vol. 2 of *Memorias* (Barcelona, 1991), 314.

42. Both documents are in the Franco Archive, 243:50, 51.

43. A more complete account appears in Palacios, *Los papeles secretos*, 453–56.

44. Press clippings can be found in the Franco Archive, 205:5.

45. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 301.

46. According to J. Bardavío, *Los silencios del rey* (Madrid, 1979), 49–50, Fernández-Miranda visited the prince on July 18, 1969, three days before Franco officially presented his name as successor. He explained that swearing the oath to uphold Franco's fundamental laws would not prevent him from reforming them in the future. Miranda pointed out that no system of laws is eternal and that all legal systems provide means for their amendment. Franco had instituted the referendum law for political ratification of significant changes, and the crucial requirement was that any reform be carried out through strictly legal channels.

In his memoirs, Miranda paraphrased his discussion with Juan Carlos as follows:

> On swearing the Fundamental Laws you swore them in their totality and, therefore, you also swore Article 10 of the Law of Succession, which says that laws can be canceled or reformed. Thus these laws themselves admit the possibility of reform.
>
> [Juan Carlos:] But the Principles declare themselves permanent and immutable.
>
> An article in the laws establishes that, but that article is itself reformable, since the reform clause makes no exceptions.
>
> [Juan Carlos:] Are you certain of that?
>
> I am. The Law of Principles consists of two parts: the statement of the principles and the law with three articles which establishes them and puts them into effect. All that law is one of the seven laws, and therefore the reform clause refers to it as well.
>
> [Juan Carlos:] Then why does it say they can't be changed?
>
> That is something not in the laws themselves. The character of the principles is defined in an article of a fundamental law that establishes it, and the reform clause does not admit exceptions. All that is very clear. That Article 1 of the Law of Principles says these are a synthesis of the Fundamental Laws, so that if the text can be modified, it's obvious that also modifies the synthesis. (T. Fernández-Miranda, *Lo que el rey me ha pedido* [Barcelona, 1995], 62–63)

Fernández-Miranda would be key to the reform process after the death of Franco. As Adolfo Suárez later put it, "Torcuato Fernández-Miranda had a great deal of influence over Juan Carlos, because he could explain to him many things." Fundación Ortega y Gasset Symposium on the transition, May 13, 1984.

47. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 321–22. Five months later, in October, Franco promoted Alonso Vega to captain-general on the reserve list, the third commander, after Franco and Muñoz Grandes, to hold that rank.

48. Ibid., 419–31.

49. The text is in Sainz Rodríguez, *Un reinado*, 414–15.

50. For a full reconstruction of these events, see Palacios, *Los papeles secretos*, 471–505. Alfonso Armada, the secretary and key advisor of Juan Carlos, has stated that he accompanied the prince on a trip to Estoril at the beginning of May 1969 to discuss the likelihood of Franco's imminent decision. The Conde de Barcelona, he reports, remained unconvinced, though Armada quotes him as saying, "Juanito, if he names you, you can accept, but you can be certain that will never happen." Armada, *Al servicio de la corona* (Barcelona, 1983), 120. Yet Don Juan had begun to worry, writing to Franco on May 8 to request a personal meeting. Franco ignored his letter. Sáinz Rodríguez, *Un reinado*, 414.

51. There are numerous political biographies of Don Juan, which vary considerably in length and quality, but, on the final phase, see R. Borràs Betriu, *El rey de los rojos: Don Juan de Borbón, una figura tergiversada* (Barcelona, 2005).

52. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 494–495.

53. Cf. R. A. H. Robinson, "Genealogy and Function of the Monarchist Myth of the Franco Regime," *Iberian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1973): 18–26.

Chapter 18. Franco and the Modernization of Spain

1. W. Bernecker, "Modernisierung und Wandel eines autoritären Regimes: Spanien während des Franquismus," in K. H. Ruffmann and H. Altrichter, eds., *"Modernisierung" versus "Sozialismus": Formen und Strategien sozialen Wandels im 20. Jahrhundert* (Nürnberg, 1983), 113–66. An extended debate has been carried on by Ricardo de la Cierva and Sergio Vilar; see *Pro y contra Franco* (Barcelona, 1985).

2. These may not have impressed professional economists, but Franco's self-confidence in such matters impressed some of his military colleagues. Navarro Rubio recounts that Muñoz Grandes once remarked to him: "The Chief knows a lot about economics, right?" Navarro Rubio, *Mis memorias*, 243.

3. J. Catalán, *La economía española y la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Barcelona, 1995).

4. J. Harrison, "Early Francoism and Economic Paralysis in Catalonia, 1939–1951," *European History Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2009): 197–216.

5. T. Christiansen, *The Reason Why: The Post Civil-War Agrarian Crisis in Spain* (Zaragoza, 2012).

6. J. Simpson, *Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta, 1765–1965* (Cambridge, 1995), presents a broad perspective and, to some extent, agrees with Christiansen's conclusions.

7. The economist Juan Velarde Fuertes observes that from 1949 to Franco's death in 1975, the GDP, measured in pesetas of 1995, grew 389.4 percent. By comparison, from 1850 (arguably the first year of consistent data) to 1935, a period three times as long, the economy grew 299.3 percent. Or, taking the 115 years from 1820 to 1935, using the data of Angus Maddison adjusted by Leandro Prados de la Escosura, growth was 416.2 percent. Quoted in L. Palacios Bañuelos, *El franquismo ordinario* (Astorga, 2011), 275. For broad accounts of modern Spanish economic development, see G. Tortella, *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea: Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid, 1994), L. Prados de la

Escosura, *El progreso económico de España (1850–2000)* (Madrid, 2003), and, more briefly, A. Carreras, *Industrialización española: Estudios de historia cuantitativa* (Madrid, 1990).

8. L. del Moral, "La política hidráulica española de 1936 a11996," in R. Garrabou and J. M. Naredo, eds., *El agua en los sistemas agrarios: Una perspectiva histórica* (Madrid, 1999), 184.

9. The criticism of the influence of big banks was one to which Franco was sensitive, since he himself remained suspicious of large banks and in 1965 apparently vetoed the merger of two of the largest. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas*, 428, 458–59.

10. A. de Pablo Masa, "Estratificación y clases sociales en la España de hoy," in FOESSA, *Informe 1975* (Madrid, 1975), 758.

11. On the regime's tourist policy and its unintended consequences, see S. D. Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain* (New York, 2006).

Chapter 19. Twilight Years

1. Franco received detailed reports. Franco Archive, 99:93–98 and 261:4.

2. Carrero's lengthy memorandum has been published in López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 864–71.

3. The two ministers, against whom charges were never proven, had already resigned, while protesting their innocence.

4. Franco, *Discursos y mensajes*, 107–21.

5. The program for the new government that Carrero drew up on March 17, 1970, was, at ninety-eight pages, perhaps the longest document that he had ever prepared for Franco. It emphasized continuity but made minor concessions in the direction of *apertura*. Nearly a year later it was updated by a shorter ten-point program in a report of January 14, 1971. Franco Archive, 197:9 and 153:1.

6. Carrero Blanco's shorter works are collected in his posthumous *Discursos y escritos 1943–1973* (Madrid, 1974), though this volume does not include his pseudonymous newspaper articles.

7. *New York Times*, June 9, 1973.

8. The text of the letter later appeared in *Cambio 16*, Dec. 5, 1983.

9. Vilá Reyes's sentence, however, was not downgraded to house arrest until the following year. The three principal government figures involved protested the pardon because it deprived them of the possibility of proving their innocence. Franco Archive, 149:98.

10. E. Alvarez Puga, *Matesa, más allá del escándalo* (Barcelona, 1974), is a work of investigative journalism. See also M. Navarro Rubio, *El caso Matesa* (Madrid, 1979), and Fraga Iribarne, *Memoria breve*, 251–73.

11. Franco, *Pensamiento político*, 2:760.

12. G. Fernández de la Mora, *El estado de obras* (Madrid, 1976).

13. Franco Archive, 212:12. Among the dissenters was García Valiño, who sent a letter to the captain-general of Burgos on December 1 protesting the use of military tribunals for such matters.

14. All this according to Gil's memoir, *Cuarenta años junto*, 100–101.

15. Franco was quoted as saying privately in 1962 that "a military man is prudent, despite what you might think, and fears war," pointing out that Hitler and Mussolini were civilian politicians. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 159.

16. On the military in Franco's later years, see J. A. Olmeda Gómez, *Las fuerzas armadas en el estado franquista* (Madrid, 1980), Cardona, *El gigante descalzo*, J. Busquets, *El militar de carrera en España* (Barcelona, 1971), C. Ruiz-Ocaña, *Los ejércitos españoles: Las fuerzas armadas en la defense nacional* (Madrid, 1980), J. M. Comas and L. Mandeville, *Les militaires et le pouvoir dans l'Espagne contemporaine de Franco à Felipe González* (Toulouse, 1986), and J. Ynfante (pseud.), *El ejército de Franco y de Juan Carlos* (Paris, 1976).

17. See L. Gámir, *Las preferencias efectivas del Mercado Común en España* (Madrid, 1972).

18. According to the version De Gaulle gave to his favorite journalist, Michel Droit, recounted in J. Lacouture, *Le souverain, 1959–1970*, vol. 3 of *De Gaulle* (Paris, 1986), 776–79.

19. Walters, *Silent Missions*, 551.

20. Urbano, *El precio*, 384.

21. Walters, *Silent Missions*, 554–56. A kind of myth has developed in Spain that Franco stressed Spain's future would be peaceful because he had succeeded in building a large middle class, but there is no reference to this in Walters's memoir.

22. R. Graham, *Spain: A Nation Comes of Age* (New York, 1984), 147.

23. Bardavío, *Los silencios*, 51.

24. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 265.

25. Bardavío, *Los silencios*, 51–52. Bardavío adds that "on a certain occasion I had opportunity to explain these observations personally to Juan Carlos and he endorsed them completely."

26. P. Urbano, *La reina, muy de cerca* (Barcelona, 2008), 165–66.

27. Franco received full reports on the declarations in Washington, during one of which Juan Carlos said, "I think that the people want greater freedom. It's all a matter of determining with what speed." In an interview published by the *Chicago Tribune* on January 27, 1971, he categorically defended Franco but also affirmed the need for reform, for which he would be willing to use "all the means within the constitution" (that is, the fundamental laws of the regime), a discreet forecast of his future policy as king. Franco Archive, 149:87.

28. Bardavío, *Los silencios*, 53–54.

29. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 401. J. M. de Areilza published his own memoir concerning his political activities in these years, *Crónica de libertad* (Barcelona, 1985).

30. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 404.

31. Franco Archive, 153:1. This program outlined the course that Carrero would follow when named president of government two years later.

32. See B. Díaz Nosty, *Las Cortes de Franco* (Barcelona, 1972), 141–83. "Búnker" is the derisive term coined by a Madrid journalist and later popularized by Santiago Carrillo, head of the Spanish Communist Party, to designate die-hard supporters of the regime. For a brief survey, see the special section "El búnker," *Historia 16* 119 (March 1986): 43–68.

33. On the new shadow political culture, see J. Reig Cruañes, *Identificación y alienación: La cultura política en el tardofranquismo* (Valencia, 2007).

34. J. R. Torregosa, *La juventud española* (Barcelona, 1972), 131–48.

35. Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 42–43.

36. On a more serious level, three books that appeared in Madrid in 1972 about the prince and the monarchy were Juan Luis Calleja, *¿Don Juan Carlos, por qué?*, an Editora Nacional publication on the theory and logic of the succession; Miguel Hererro de Miñón, *El principio monárquico*, a discussion of the new monarchy's legal structure and powers that

stressed its theoretically broad authority; and José Luis Nava, *La generación del príncipe*, which treated some of the younger politicians and public figures who had associated themselves with the prince. Two collections of the speeches of Juan Carlos were published, one containing remarks on ceremonial occasions, *Palabras de su alteza real el príncipe de España Don Juan Carlos de Borbón* (Madrid, 1972), and a second containing more substantial remarks, *Por España, con los españoles* (Madrid, 1973).

37. The wedding publicity was lavishly chronicled in the society glamor book by J. M. Bayona, *Alfonso de Borbón-María del Carmen Martínez Bordiu* (Barcelona, 1971).

38. Franco Archive, 40:1.

39. Carmen Franco insists that she was not involved in such maneuvers but was more worried about the marriage itself, which she saw as potentially shaky, since her daughter was barely twenty-one and Alfonso thirty-five: "It worried me, because my daughter Carmen was very young and seemed to me immature beside him, for he was a quite a bit older. I had considered Alfonso de Borbón a friend of my brother-in-law José María. Don Alfonso was a very sad fellow, a good person and very able, but too serious for my daughter, who was a little immature and in my opinion not prepared for this. . . . Some girls at twenty-one are more mature and others at that age not ready for marriage. . . . What worried me was his tendency toward sadness, while she was gay and lively. I did not see their two characters very well matched and I was concerned about how they would get along together. Yet it was true that my father felt somewhat flattered that his granddaughter was marrying a grandson of Alfonso XIII."

Though two sons were soon born to the couple, the marriage did not last very long. Don Alfonso's remaining years were few and tragic. First he ran a stop sign in Navarre on returning from a ski trip and his car was hit by a truck, resulting in the death of his older son. Later, in 1989, Alfonso ignored warning signs while skiing downhill in the western United States and was caught in the neck by a low-hanging wire, which virtually decapitated him. His surviving son, Franco's oldest great-grandson, the strapping Luis Alfonso de Borbón, is, as a result of a complex pattern of inheritance, recognized by many French legitimists as the heir to the throne of France.

40. According to what the prince told López Rodó; see *El principio del fin*, vol. 3 of *Memorias* (Barcelona, 1992), 506. The memorandum is in the Franco Archive, 40:15, reprinted in J. Palacios, *Franco y Juan Carlos: Del franquismo a la monarquía* (Barcelona, 2005), 569–70.

41. As recounted by the authors of the report to Pilar Urbano, in her *Yo entré en el Cesid* (Barcelona, 1997), 138–44.

42. F. Franco, *Tres discursos de Franco* (Madrid, 1973), 28.

43. A. Diz, *La sombra del FRAP: Génesis y mito de un partido* (Barcelona, 1977).

44. R. Carr and J. P. Fusi, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy* (London, 1979), 194.

45. Secretariado Nacional del Clero, *Asamblea conjunta obispos-sacerdotes* (Madrid, 1971), 160–61. Franco received detailed reports on such developments. Franco Archive, 85:6, 7, 96:7, 108:9.

46. Franco Archive, 72:2, 6–21.

47. Ibid., 95:22; the text is reproduced in Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 533–39.

48. According to an extract from "Diario de Fernández Miranda," *ABC*, Dec. 20, 1983.

49. Tomás Garicano Goñi, quoted in Bayod, *Franco visto*, 203; the letter is in the Franco Archive, 108:6, and reprinted in López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 440–42.

50. At the beginning of 1973, Carrero Blanco had prepared for Franco a seven-page outline for what he considered should be the future course of policy: continuity with the past leading to a limited evolution but fully consistent with the former. Franco Archive, 95:16.

51. Ibid., 96:63.

52. "Julen Agirre" (Genoveva Forest), *Operación Ogro* (New York, 1975). Whether Carrero Blanco genuinely constituted the continuation of the regime is, however, not so clear. Juan Carlos has said that he was sure that, had the Carrero government survived the death of Franco, Carrero Blanco would have been willing to resign the presidency in order for the new king to appoint a new leader of the government. J. L. de Vilallonga, *El rey: Conversaciones con Don Juan Carlos I de España* (Barcelona, 1993), 210. Beyond that, however, it is not clear that, as has been alleged, Juan Carlos had a "pact" with Carrero, one that a supposedly repentant Carrero Blanco then confessed to Franco.

53. Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Aguado Sánchez, head of the 111th command of the Civil Guard that was to have conducted the raid, so informed Pilar Urbano in 2001. Urbano, *El precio*, 504–6, 910. See also C. Estévez and F. Mármol, *Carrero: Las razones ocultas de un asesinato* (Madrid, 1998), 103–11.

54. The assassins' own account is presented in the book previously cited by Forest, herself an activist of the Madrid section of the Communist Party and a major accomplice. On the collaboration of Madrid Communists, who provided the principal collateral support for the Basque assassination team, see I. Falcón, *Viernes y trece en la calle del Correo* (Barcelona, 1981). Further details are available in M. Campo Vidal, *Información y servicios secretos en el atentado al Presidente Carrero Blanco* (Barcelona, 1983). "Argala," the ETA leader who actually triggered the explosion, was himself blown up exactly five years and a day later by a bomb device in his car in France, evidently set by agents of the Spanish security forces, who exacted their revenge. *Cambio 16*, May 20, 1985, 26–36.

55. According to what Fernández-Miranda subsequently told his wife. V. Prego, *Así se hizo la Transición* (Barcelona, 1996), 26–27.

56. Iniesta Cano has given his version of this incident in his *Memorias y recuerdos* (Barcelona, 1984), 218–22. He claims that Fernández-Miranda had nothing to do with rescinding the order, though this seems doubtful.

57. Detailed accounts of the events of that day may be found in R. Borrás Betriu, *El día en que mataron a Carrero Blanco* (Barcelona, 1974), and I. Fuente et al., *Golpe mortal* (Madrid, 1983). This was the first significant initiative of ETA outside the Basque country, and the authorities initially believed that it must have been the work of "Maoists," such as the recently organized FRAP, while Franco himself saw the fell hand of Masonry.

58. As reported by Utrera Molina in a television interview some years later. Prego, *Así se hizo*, 51–52.

59. Carrero Blanco's greatest virtues were austerity and incorruptibility, combined with his commitment to hard work and his devotion to duty. After more than three decades as Franco's right hand, he left an estate amounting to no more than an admiral's pension, a less than luxurious though good apartment still not fully paid for, a savings account of less than five hundred thousand pesetas (about eight thousand dollars), and a fully paid-for tomb in the cemetery, according to C. Fernández, *El almirante Carrero Blanco* (Barcelona, 1985), 258.

60. Vicente Gil did everything he could to prejudice Franco against Fernández-Miranda, telling the caudillo that "in every new post he has named people who are either from the

socialist youth or, at least, politically amorphous. Just look at the example he has set with the new delegates of the Frente de Juventudes. And the Guardia de Franco." Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 140.

61. From the diary of Fernández-Miranda in an article titled "Diez años de Carrero," *ABC*, Dec. 20, 1983.

62. According to what Urcelay told José Utrera Molina, recounted in Molina's memoir *Sin cambiar de bandera* (Barcelona, 1989), 77–78.

63. According to the account that Valcárcel gave a close friend, in J. Figuero and L. Herrero, *La muerte de Franco jamás contada* (Barcelona, 1985), 30.

64. A great deal of controversy arose over this selection. The most detailed reconstruction is J. Bardavío, *La crisis: Historia de quince días* (Madrid, 1974), but a later, more accurate account has been provided by L. Herrero, *El ocaso del régimen: Del asesinato de Carrero a la muerte de Franco* (Madrid, 1995), 28–52. A partially parallel explanation may be found in J. Fernández Coppel, *General Gavilán: Memorias* (Madrid, 2005), 185–94, and also in Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 139–60.

65. His background is treated in J. Tusell and G. G. Queipo de Llano, *Tiempo de incertidumbre: Carlos Arias Navarro entre el franquismo y la Transición (1973–1976)* (Barcelona, 2003), 1–52.

66. Carmen Franco concludes, no doubt accurately, that her mother may have made comments or suggestions but says that she herself found the selection of Arias surprising, concluding that her father had few alternatives: "Nearly all his friends were dead. . . . None of my father's contemporaries were left, except for Admiral Nieto Antúnez, who was as old as he was. He didn't have Parkinson's but he was a little old man. . . . I don't know why he chose Arias. In fact, it was strange to select him, because he had been in charge of security. . . . That shocked me, but I didn't say anything. And my father never explained anything about it. . . . My mother thought very highly . . . of Carlos Arias. But I don't think that she influenced his designation. She may have said something about him in comparison with two or three he was considering and so led him toward Arias. But no more than that. And certainly no campaign. No, nothing, she was tranquil and in poor health."

67. Quoted in J. de las Heras and J. Villarín, *El año Arias: Diario politico español 1974* (Madrid, 1975), 52–53.

68. The full text is in ibid., 104–32.

69. Utrera Molina, *Sin cambiar*, 103.

70. J. Oneto, *Arias, entre dos crisis* (Madrid, 1975), 68–76, and Herrero, *El ocaso*, 77–81. Tarancón's version of this affair may be found in J. L. Martín Descalzo, *Tarancón, el cardenal del cambio* (Barcelona, 1982), 203–17. For a broader perspective on such conflict, see M. Ortiz Heras and D. A. González, eds., *La Iglesia española entre el franquismo y la Transición* (Madrid, 2012).

71. Herrero, *El ocaso*, 81.

72. López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, 469.

73. According to his last personal physician; see Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 136–37.

74. C. J. Cela Conde, ed., *El reto de los halcones: Antología de la prensa apocalíptica española en la apertura (febrero de 1974–junio de 1975)* (Madrid, 1975), offers a collection from the ultra press.

75. After the death of Franco, Díez Alegría provided his own version of this affair in his "Primicias de una confesión," *Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas* 61 (1984): 143–76.

Chapter 20. The Death of Franco

1. Herrero, *El ocaso*, 109. Sometime after Franco's death the hospital was renamed Hospital General Universitario Gregorio de Marañón.

2. L. López Rodó, *Claves de la transición*, vol. 4 of *Memorias* (Barcelona, 1993), 57–58.

3. See Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 251, and Villaverde's account given to Herrero, *El ocaso*, 115.

4. Utrera Molina, *Sin cambiar*, 139.

5. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 309–10.

6. Vicentón, "tough Vince," was the common nickname for Gil.

7. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 312.

8. Gil, *Cuarenta años junto*, 189–90.

9. Gil claims that Villaverde ducked behind members of Franco's retinue and that he waited for a minute or two to see if he could catch Villaverde alone in order to punch him up. Ibid., 192.

10. Ibid., 193.

11. Cobos testifies that he had earlier heard Doña Carmen say things such as "Dr. Martínez Bordiú. . . . If you didn't have the father-in-law that you have! Doctor of what?" Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 313.

12. Carmen Franco presents a somewhat different version: "My father had known his personal physician all of the latter's life. He was very Falangist, one of the first Falangists. His own father had been a village doctor, in the same district where my mother's *finca* was located in Asturias, where we went every summer, and he had known Vicente since he was a boy. He served in the war and then became a doctor. But my husband did not consider him a really good doctor, deeming him an adequate physician only as long as my father was in reasonably good health. For that he was all right, and he always passed on news about what was happening in Madrid. He was a fount of information and showered my father with affection, because he was completely devoted to him. But when the phlebitis appeared, Cristóbal said that he needed to be treated by specialists and Vicente did not accept that, so they became antagonists. Then my mother said to Vicente: 'Look, he is my son-in-law, what can I do? You will have to leave.' So Vicente left, and we turned to Pozuelo, because Pozuelo was very calm and orderly. Vicente was always getting my father worked up, because he said that everyone else was causing trouble for him, he wore him out, and this couldn't go on. . . . Yes, the decision was taken by Mamá because she realized that she could not have Cristóbal and Vicente always at odds." Of Gil's total devotion to Franco there was never the slightest question. As Franco's oldest grandson testifies, "If you were to ask me who was the person who most loved Franco, I would reply Vicente Gil." Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 200.

13. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 51.

14. Utrera Molina, *Sin cambiar*, 155–60.

15. Ironically, one of the chief go-betweens whom Juan Carlos used in contacting the opposition was his good friend Nicolás Franco Pascual de Pobil, Franco's nephew, the only son of his brother Nicolás.

16. Utrera Molina, *Sin cambiar*, 163.

17. On political developments during Franco's illness and the role of Juan Carlos, see Bardavío, *Los silencios*, 95–102, Diario 16, *Historia de la Transición* (Madrid, 1984), 50–59, and de la Cierva, *Historia del franquismo*, 2:412–16.

18. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 75–125.
19. Ibid., 206, 147.
20. Ibid., 126–46.
21. Ibid., 112.
22. Quoted in Herrero, *El ocaso*, 152.
23. This, at least, was the perception of Antonio Carro Martínez, minister of the presidency; see Bayod, *Franco visto*, 355.
24. The director general of popular culture appointed by Cabanillas, the historian Ricardo de la Cierva, had encouraged the publication of Stanley Payne's study of early Basque nationalism, *Historia del nacionalismo vasco*, brought out in Barcelona a month before Cabanillas was fired. The planned presentation of the book in Bilbao was then canceled by Cabanillas's successor. De la Cierva was one of those who resigned in sympathy with Cabanillas.
25. Utrera Molina, *Sin cambiar*, 209.
26. These polls mostly used small samples, but the most extensive was conducted by FOESSA in 1969. This study was suppressed by the government but later appeared in abridged form as Amando de Miguel, "Spanish Political Attitudes, 1970," in S. G. Payne, ed., *Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain* (New York, 1976), 208–31. The full text was only published many years later as an appendix to the memoir by its director; see Amando de Miguel, *El final del franquismo: Testimonio personal* (Madrid, 2003), 223–361. See also A. Hernández Sánchez, *La opinión pública en el tardofranquismo* (Valladolid, 2011).
27. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 122.
28. The source for this description of Franco's thought process is Pozuelo's recorded explanation to Luis Herrero, which went well beyond what the former had chosen to reveal in his own memoir. Herrero, *El ocaso*, 171–73.
29. Utrera Molina, *Sin cambiar*, 266–73.
30. F. Herrero Tejedor, *Memorial elevada al Gobierno nacional* (Reus, 1974).
31. Pozuelo quoted Franco in such terms to Luis Herrero. See Herrero, *El ocaso*, 195–96.
32. Herrero Tejedor is said to have personally vetoed a proposal by Girón to form a new political association called Falange Española de las JONS on the grounds that such a name was anachronistic and provocative.
33. The text of these proceedings is in S. Chavkin et al., eds., *Spain: Implications for United States Foreign Policy* (Stamford, CT, 1976).
34. Enríquez, *Carmen Polo*, 233–34.
35. Quoted in Urbano, *El precio*, 743, 947.
36. Ibid., 740–44; L. G. Perinat, *Recuerdos de una vida itinerante* (Madrid, 1996), 157–61; C. Powell, *El amigo americano: España y Estados Unidos, de la dictadura a la democracia* (Madrid, 2011), 221–25.
37. In fact, during the four years that Valcárcel served as president, the Cortes dealt with only 98 legislative proposals from the executive, the great majority of which passed unanimously, while 101 decree-laws were promulgated by the government. During those four years there had been just six interpellations of ministers, only one of them taking place during the current session. Though individual *procuradores* did sometimes voice mild criticism, record a few individual no votes, and manage to add an occasional minor amendment, no law originating in the Cortes was ever accepted by the government. A total of 120 *procuradores*,

21.4 percent of the deputies, were still directly appointed by the chief of state or the government, and the rate of turnover became very high. Between 1971 and 1975, 180 deputies resigned or were dismissed and were replaced by 172 new appointees, for a "coefficient of fluidity" of 32 percent. M. A. Aguilar, *Las últimas Cortes de Franco* (Madrid, 1976), 11–15.

The irony would be that this specially prorogued Cortes of Franco was the one that eventually under King Juan Carlos voted in October 1976 for the legislation that began the political dismantling of the regime. That took place after the king had replaced Valcárcel with Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, who would masterfully manipulate the political hara-kiri of the last Francoist parliament. See A. de Diego González, *El franquismo se suicidó* (Málaga, 2010).

38. According to the memoir of his military aide, General Juan Ramón Gavilán, who coordinated Franco's intelligence reports. Fernández-Coppel, *General Gavilán*, 210.

39. Figuero and Herrero, *La muerte*, 20.

40. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 193.

41. As reported in Fernández-Coppel, *General Gavilán*, 211.

42. This was the impression, for example, of Rodríguez Valcárcel. López Rodó, *Claves de la Transición*, 119.

43. His delight in the royal children is reported in Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 187–89.

44. This was mentioned in various CIA reports from Madrid, cited in Urbano, *El precio*, 734–35, 945. After Franco died, King Juan Carlos had legislation steered through parliament granting Doña Carmen multiple pensions as Franco's widow, stemming from the various positions and honors that Franco had held. In toto these were said to amount to about 50 percent more than the salary of the prime minister and were paid regularly until her death in 1988.

45. As reported by Juan Carlos to Welles Stabler, the new American ambassador, cited in ibid., 736–37, 946.

46. In 1994 the historian Geoffrey Parker, who then taught at Yale, wrote to Stanley Payne that during the preceding year Yale University Press had been approached by an American journalist, Thomas H. Lipscomb of Infosafe Systems in New York. "He had formerly been a feature writer on the *New York Times* and, with a group of colleagues, was interested in securing publication of the Franco material he claimed existed in Zurich (naturally in a bank vault!). He had seen the Marquis of Villaverde, who claimed he had two 'steamer trunks' full of material evacuated from the Pardo Palace in the days immediately before and immediately after the General's death. This included, Lipscomb assured us, a journal kept by the General as well as the correspondence received by him directly from ambassadors abroad. However, when we said we wanted to send in an expert to view the material before becoming involved, the line went dead." Geoffrey Parker to Stanley Payne, May 11, 1994.

47. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 125–29.

48. Fernández-Coppel, *General Gavilán*, 212.

49. Though the Basque terrorists made clear the fact that their goal was the partition of Spain, not overthrowing Franco, the leftist opposition persisted in the romantic notion that somehow they were democratic freedom fighters. Only after the *etarras* turned even more viciously on the post-Franco democratic regime were the leftist parties cured to an extent of their illusion.

50. Nicolás wrote to his brother, "Dear Paco: Don't sign that sentence. It is not desirable and I tell you this because I love you. You are a good Christian, and afterward you would repent of it. Now we are old, so listen to my advice, for you know how much I love you." Quoted in Diario 16, *Historia de la transición*, 144. Nicolás, however, had suffered several strokes in recent years from which he would never fully recover. The letter may have been written by his son, Nicolás Franco Pascual de Pobil, a friend of Juan Carlos and a proponent of a democratic transition.

51. According to what Cobos Arévalo reports that he overheard at El Pardo. Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 320–21.

52. One of the few voices abroad to speak up on behalf of Franco was that of the painter Salvador Dalí, quoted in *Le Monde* in unstinting support.

53. The two intensive care nurses who had been stationed regularly at El Pardo since the summer of 1974 referred especially to the effects of the papal messages, after which Franco exhibited symptoms of agitation he had not shown before, according to Dr. Palma Gámiz, quoted in Prego, *Así se hizo*, 272.

54. López Rodó, *Claves de la Transición*, 419–21.

55. Diario 16, *Historia de la Transición*, 144.

56. Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 111.

57. Many Spanish officials and commentators were convinced that this tactic was thought up in Washington as a means of permitting the American ally Hassan to grab most of the Sahara without fighting. J. R. Diego Aguirre, *Sáhara: La verdad de una traición* (Madrid, 1988).

Franco had dispatched his military aide Gavilán on a one-day mission to Rabat on October 6 to learn Hassan's intentions. The Gavilán report can be found in the Franco Archive, 157:18, and a later account is available in Fernández-Coppel, *General Gavilán*, 212–16.

58. According to the cardiologist Dr. Isidoro Mínguez, quoted in Prego, *Así se hizo*, 271.

59. Figuero and Herrero, *La muerte*, 24–26; Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 329–33.

60. Vilallonga, *El rey*, 228.

61. Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 256–58. Carmen says, "I don't know exactly when he wrote [the statement], because he didn't say. But he must have done so about that time, because those were the last days he entered his private office, which was very small but sacrosanct to him. He had the big office, where he received visitors, square and very attractively furnished, a salon. And then he had his little private office, full of papers and clutter, where he found refuge. He would always go there and wrote there. At the beginning of his illness, when he had a moment he went there to look at papers and organize things. It was on one of those occasions that he wrote it, because later he was bedridden and didn't get up. And when he called for me he was in bed. He told me to go look for some notes he had prepared. . . . I corrected them, because reading them to him in bed, for example, where it said 'your loyalty to the Prince' and not Juan Carlos, I suggested: 'Say Juan Carlos, because he is already Prince, so that there is no uncertainty at all.' And he replied: 'Yes, yes, say Juan Carlos' and so I wrote in Juan Carlos. And then, possibly, added some other detail. . . . He was totally conscious and at ease in bed, propped up on pillows. To get into his office I had to ask his aide to open the door, because it was always locked. The only people who had keys were my father's aides." She provided a more detailed account in an interview with *El Alcázar* (Madrid), Mar. 26, 1976.

62. This has been the subject of much speculation, and there are no conclusive data as to exactly what Franco was thinking during his last week or so as head of state, since, as usual, he said very little. The conclusion offered here is based on weighing all the indirect evidence available. On the final meeting with Arias, see López Rodó, *Claves de la Transición*, 153, and Herrero, *El ocaso*, 240–41.

63. Vilallonga, *El rey*, 221–22.

64. Relevant State Department cables are cited in Urbano, *El precio*, 775–76, 951.

65. According to the surgeon Dr. Alonso Castrillo, quoted in Prego, *Así se hizo*, 287.

66. Ibid., 287; Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 156.

67. Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 145.

68. These atrocities are well documented. The best account of the fate of the Saharans is Jensen, *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara*, but see also T. Bárbulo, *La historia prohibida del Sahara español* (Barcelona, 2002). A considerable bibliography has developed.

69. The frankest of these was the cardiologist José Luis Palma Gámiz, who later wrote of his patient that "that man was very strange and managed to surprise us all. I don't think that in any time in my professional life I ever encountered an equivalent patient: slippery in his symptomology, delayed in his vital crises, discreet in his requests, exaggerated in his clinical signs, and opulent in his hemorrhages. He outflanked you when you least expected it. With him nothing was foreseeable. If he had passed away the night of November 3, he would have ended his days drowned in his blood and opinion, you may be sure, would have condemned us for it." Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 162–63.

70. Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 238. Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 175, confirms that one of the things from which Franco suffered most in the last weeks was the sheer physical indignity of his situation, though, in his typical style, he complained very little.

71. The first physician to publish his brief narrative was M. Hidalgo Huerta, chief surgeon in the three major operations, in his *Cómo y por qué operé a Franco* (Madrid, 1976).

72. On December 2, King Juan Carlos would appoint his reformist former tutor Torcuato Fernández-Miranda to be president of the Cortes, and hence also head of the National Council. In 1976, Miranda designed and led the initial phase of democratization, during which Franco's parliament was replaced with a system based on direct universal suffrage.

73. Palma Gámiz, *El paciente de El Pardo*, 136. Dr. Pozuelo Escudero has been categorical on this point (Herrero, *El ocaso*, 270), which is further corroborated by Dr. Mínguez, quoted in Prego, *Así se hizo*, 317–18.

74. Palma Gámiz was present at this macabre scene; see *El paciente de El Pardo*, 190–91. Some of the photos suddenly appeared in a popular magazine in 1984. Villaverde then claimed that they had been stolen when he had been forced to close his medical office. In the lawsuit that followed, the publisher refused to name the source of the photos but said that they were not provided by any member of the Franco family. Franco Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 30–31.

75. It was quickly noted that by an irony of history this was also the anniversary of the death of his potential rival for the leadership of Nationalist Spain José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange, executed by the Republicans in Alicante on November 20, 1936.

76. The final illness has been chronicled by "Yale," *Los últimos cien días* (Madrid, 1975), G. Lopezarias, *Franco, la ultima batalla* (Madrid, 1975), and J. Oneto, *Cien días en la muerte de Franco* (Madrid, 1976).

77. Quoted in Cobos Arévalo, *La vida privada*, 348–49.
78. Soriano, *La mano izquierda*, 177.
79. J. L. Granados, *1975: El año de la instauración* (Madrid, 1977), 541–49.
80. Urbano, *El precio*, 811.
81. Carmen states that the family did not know where Franco was to be buried but that the original architect of the Valley of the Fallen, Diego Méndez, testified that Franco had declared that he wanted to be buried there, and the government agreed. Fray Anselmo, prior of the Benedictine monastery to the rear of the monument, testified in 2012 that no preparations had been made for a site of interment, which had hurriedly to be excavated between the twentieth and the twenty-second. Enríquez, *Carmen Polo*, 252.

"Soon the abbey of the Valley began to receive . . . many letters, from Spain and from abroad, declaring the person buried there to be a saint and asking for objects that came into contact with his tomb, to keep as relics." Sueiro, *La verdadera historia del Valle de los Caídos* (Madrid, 1976), 272. Though some visitors during the next few years would deposit petitions on Franco's grave as though it were a holy shrine, it never became the major religious center that the family might have wanted. It would remain a special focus for Franco's keenest admirers, but in general it mainly attracted tourists, domestic and foreign. The Socialist Zapatero government of 2004–12 eventually restricted access to the basilica. Though as a religious site it pertained to the Roman Catholic Church, the structure was officially part of Spain's national patrimony.

King Juan Carlos almost immediately awarded Carmen Franco Polo de Martínez-Bordiú the hereditary title of Duquesa de Franco, with the category of *grandeza de España*, and a lesser title was later awarded to her mother. Doña Carmen did not vacate El Pardo until January 31, 1976. It was then declared a national historical site, and she herself would be buried there following her own death in 1988. The greatest sorrow of her last years was that she and her husband were not to be buried together. The simplest and most fitting epitaph was penned by her estranged brother-in-law Serrano Suñer: "She was the wife most absolutely and unconditionally devoted to her husband." Enríquez, *Carmen Polo*, 267.

Some of Franco's papers were burned, and others taken away by the family, their future disposition still uncertain at the time of writing. The main set of many boxes of documents in Franco's office was saved from destruction by the historian Luis Suárez Fernández, who arranged that they constitute the archive of the newly founded Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco. This archive, however, contains few personal papers; it consists primarily of reports and documents that Franco received over the years but little that he originated.

In the years following Franco's death, the family suffered only a limited amount of harassment. The worst was inflicted on the person who was by far its most unpopular member, the Marqués de Villaverde, who was suspended from the practice of surgery for five years by the Ministry of Health in 1984, a decision eventually reversed by the courts two decades later, after his death.

Two mysterious fires, probably arson, broke out at El Pazo de Meirás, but no one was injured. The only deadly incident involving the family was a major blaze that enveloped the Hotel Corona de Aragón, Zaragoza's finest, early on the morning of July 12, 1979. Doña Carmen, her daughter and son-in-law, and one granddaughter were staying in the hotel to attend the forthcoming graduation at the military academy, where José Cristóbal, the only one of Franco's grandsons to follow in his professional footsteps (though just for a few years), was about to be commissioned. All the family members were rescued safely, the

women by ladder from the balcony, though the athletic Villaverde leaped out a window from a different part of the hotel to escape smoke inhalation, suffering no more than an injured ankle and foot. Many others were not so fortunate, for the death toll was horrendous; according to reports, possibly as many as eighty-three people died. At that time the Spanish government refused to call the fire an act of arson, though the Aznar government in 2000 recognized all those killed as victims of terrorism, and a lengthy judicial investigation completed in 2009 finally recognized the blaze as deliberate arson, though without identifying the arsonist or any political motive. Many have seen this tragedy as a terrorist deed carried out by ETA, which was near the height of its activity in 1979. See Palacios and Payne, *Franco, mi padre*, 702–6, and Martínez-Bordiú, *La naturaleza de Franco*, 221–22.

Conclusion

1. Larraz, *Memorias*, 351.

2. Julián Marías, arguably the wisest and most balanced Spanish intellectual of the later twentieth century and a former Republican, remarks that "the Spanish were deprived of many liberties, which I always found intolerable, but not too many people really missed them, for they still had others, particularly those affecting private life, which they feared to lose. Such deprivation came from the outcome of the Civil War, but the majority were persuaded that if the result had been the reverse, the sphere of liberty would not have been greater because both belligerents had promised the destruction of the other, and they had both carried it out during the war itself. Thus it was not easy to mobilize Spaniards toward an *inversion* of the outcome of the war, and since that basically was what the most politicized fragments of the country were proposing, the majority remained relatively indifferent. It can be said that a large number of Spaniards *waited without haste* for the end of the regime." J. Marías, *España inteligible* (Madrid, 1985), 379.

3. There was surprising symmetry between the political thinking of Franco and that of Juan Negrín, the principal wartime leader of the Republic. Negrín agreed that a competitive parliamentary electoral system could not be allowed to return to Spain, no matter how much the Popular Front exploited such a concept for international consumption, because it left open the danger that the right could come to power peacefully, as had happened in 1933–34. He emphasized this point in 1938 to Anatoly Marchenko, the Soviet chargé, whose report is published in R. Radosh, M. Habeck, and G. Sevostianov, eds., *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War* (New Haven, CT, 2001), 499–500.

4. Saz has debated this issue more than anyone other than Juan Linz and has called Franco's system "the least fascist of the fascist regimes or the one nearest fascism among the non-fascist regimes." By the same token, in its first phase it was "the most totalitarian of the authoritarian regimes or the least totalitarian of the totalitarian regimes." I. Saz Campos, "El franquismo: ¿Régimen autoritario o dictadura fascista?," in J. Tusell et al., eds., *El régimen de Franco (1936–1975): Política y relaciones exteriores*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1993), 1:192. See also Saz, *Fascismo y franquismo* (Valencia, 2004), L. Casali, ed., *Per una definizione della dittatura franchista* (Milan, 1990), and F. Sevillano Calero, "Totalitarismo, fascismo y franquismo: El pasado y el fin de las certidumbres después del comunismo," in R. Moreno Fonseret and F. Sevillano Calero, eds., *El franquismo: Visiones y balances* (Alicante, 1999), 12–26. Broad comparisons between the Spanish and Italian regimes may be found in J. Tusell et al., eds., *Fascismo y franquismo cara a cara: Una perspectiva histórica* (Madrid, 2004), J. M. Thomàs,

ed., *Franquismo/fascismo* (Reus, 2001), and G. Di Febo and R. Moro, eds., *Fascismo e franchismo: Relazioni, immagini e rappresentazioni* (Catanzaro, 2005).

5. S. G. Payne, "The Defascistization of the Franco Regime (1942–1975)," in S. G. Larsen, ed., *Modern Europe after Fascism, 1943–1980s*, 2 vols. (Boulder, CO, 1998), 2:1580–1606.

6. Tusell, *Franco, España*, 647–48.

7. The brief Ifni conflict of 1958, in which several hundred Spanish troops died, qualifies as a military incident, not a war.

8. J. Beneyto, *La identidad del franquismo* (Madrid, 1979), 10–11.

9. H. L. Matthews, *The Yoke and the Arrows* (New York, 1957).

10. This seminal study has been reprinted several times: an English version, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," appears in S. G. Payne, ed., *Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain* (New York, 1976), 160–207; the Spanish version, "Una teoría del régimen autoritario: España," appears, inter alia, in J. J. Linz, *Obras escogidas*, 7 vols. (Madrid, 2008–11), ed. J. R. Montero and T. J. Miley, 3:23–64. The extensive debate about Linz's interpretation is well summarized and analyzed in T. J. Miley, "Franquism as Authoritarianism: Juan Linz and his Critics," *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* 12, no. 1 (2011): 27–50.

11. W. Pfaff, "Splendid Little Wars," *New Yorker*, Mar. 24, 1986, 62–64.

12. The differences, however, are at least as important as the similarities, for the Chinese regime remains more statist and also more militaristic, having reached the rank of superpower.

13. S. L. Brandes, *Migration, Kinship, and Community* (New York, 1975), 76.

14. M. Vázquez Montalbán, "Adios, de la Cierva, Adios," *Triunfo*, Nov. 1974. The democratization of Turkey after 1945 might be adduced as an earlier example, but the Kemalist regime in Turkey had been the first Third World "guided democracy" rather than an institutionalized new authoritarian regime of the European fascist area.

15. It may be objected that the process was begun by the Portuguese revolution and the overthrow of the regime of the Greek colonels, both of which took place during the preceding year. Both those cases, however, merely replicated the common experience of regimes toppled by direct overthrow due to external influences; they were not instances of nonviolent democratization from the inside out.

16. He attributed this failing to the prevalence of envy in Spain—a common moralistic observation by Spaniards—and told Dr. Pozuelo that he had sought to overcome it through the tutelage of the movement and the broad expansion of basic education. However, he confessed his failure: "But I have achieved very little. Bureaucracy has triumphed instead." Pozuelo Escudero, *Los últimos*, 160–61.

17. The abortive *pronunciamiento* of February 23, 1981, scenes of which were televised around the world, might seem partially to contradict this conclusion. Though the most dramatic action took the form of an armed occupation of parliament, simulating a kind of coup, this abortive initiative was not designed to overthrow the constitutional regime but to install a multiparty national government to carry out new reforms that would repress terrorism and achieve greater unity. Contrary to common representation of the event, it did not represent an attempt to impose a military dictatorship, though this was the subsequent impression. The clearest account is J. Palacios, *23-F: El Rey y su secreto, 30 años después se desvela la llamada "Operación De Gaulle"* (Madrid, 2010).

18. One professor, lamenting the moderation and tepidity of post-Franco society, has suggested that "these three phases of the same extreme dictatorship will probably be seen as

a continuum of capitalist development in our land, during which Francoism *permitted* the passage from a Third Word condition to postmodernity and in which Franco transfused his own frozen blood into the contemporary sang-froid of the Spanish, who are no longer susceptible to fanatization either by Tejero or ETA and who will never again be disposed to die for any ideal but only to live modestly, indeed as well as possible." J. A. González Casanova, "El franquismo a diez años vista," *Historia 16* 10, no. 115 (1985): 35–40. There is some truth to this observation.

19. See the discussion of polling results in E. González Duro, *La sombra del general: Qué queda del franquismo en España* (Barcelona, 2005), 223–24.