JAVIER TUSELL

# SPAIN:
## FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY
## 1939 TO THE PRESENT

TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY CLARK

Blackwell Publishing

# SPAIN:
## FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY
## 1939 TO THE PRESENT

# A HISTORY OF SPAIN

## *Published*

Iberia in Prehistory*
*María Cruz Fernández Castro*

The Romans in Spain†
*John S. Richardson*

Visigothic Spain 409–711
*Roger Collins*

The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710–797
*Roger Collins*

The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 1031–1157†
*Bernard F. Reilly*

Spain's Centuries of Crisis: 1300–1474
*Teofilo Ruiz*

The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs 1474–1520
*John Edwards*

Spain 1516–1598: From Nation State to World Empire*
*John Lynch*

The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598–1700*
*John Lynch*

Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808*
*John Lynch*

Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808–1939
*Charles J. Esdaile*

Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy. 1939 to the Present
*Javier Tusell*

## *Forthcoming*

Caliphs and Kings 798–1033
*Roger Collins*

Spain 1157–1312
*Peter Linehan*

* Out of print
† Print on demand

JAVIER TUSELL

# SPAIN:
## FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY
## 1939 TO THE PRESENT

TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY CLARK

Blackwell Publishing

First published in Spanish as *Dictadura franquista y democracia, 1939–2004* by Crítica, 2005

BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia



First published 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1 2007

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Tusell, Javier, 1945–2005
[Dictadura franquista y democracia, 1939–2004. English]
Spain, from dictatorship to democracy : 1939 to the present /
Javier Tusell ; translated by Rosemary Clark.
p. cm. – (History of Spain)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-631-20615-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Spain–Politics and government–1939–1975. 2. Spain–Politics and government–1975– 3. Francoism. I. Title.

DP270.T835 2007
946.08–dc22
2006036157

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

Set in 10.5/13pt Minion
by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong
Printed and bound in Singapore
by C.O.S. Printers Pte Ltd

The publisher's policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards.

For further information on
Blackwell Publishing, visit our website:
www.blackwellpublishing.com

# Contents

**Note on the Author** viii

**Introduction** 1

Franco: Biography and Political Practice 2
Francoism: A Form of Dictatorship 12
Victors and Vanquished: The Disasters of the Civil War and Repression 20
Exile and the Start of the Postwar Period in Spain 26
Bibliography 31
Notes 33

**1 The Temptation of Fascism and the Will to Survive (1939–51)** 34

A Failed Attempt to Make Spain Fascist 35
The Temptation to Intervene and Internal Conflict (1940–2) 40
Stumbling Progress towards Neutrality (1942–5) 48
Cosmetic Change: Regime Politics between 1945 and 1951 58
Opposition from Survivors: The Spanish Left from 1939 to 1951 65
The Monarchist Alternative 72
Franco in Isolation 75
The "Dark Night": Autarchy and Rationing in the 1940s 82
Culture: Penance and Survival 92
Bibliography 102
Notes 106

**2 The Years of Consensus: The High Point of the Regime (1951–65)** 107

The End of International Isolation: The Concordat and Pacts with the United States 108

Spain and Europe: Colonization of Morocco Ends 114
The Regime and the Opposition up to 1956 119
A New Political Opposition 128
For or against Falange: Political Life under the Regime between 1956 and 1965 136
The Easing of Autarchy and the Change in Economic Policy 147
From Political Opposition to Social Opposition 159
Culture in the Francoist Middle Period: The End of the Penitential Years 166
Daily Life and Leisure Activities 177
Bibliography 182
Notes 186

**3 Economic Development, *Apertura*, and the Late Franco Years (1966–75)** 187

Economic Development in the 1960s and 1970s 189
The Modernization of Spanish Society 197
The Change in Spanish Catholicism 202
*Apertura* (1965–9) 211
The Succession. Matesa and Internal Splits in the Regime 217
Worker Protest. Terrorism 221
Late Francoism: Carrero Blanco as President 228
Late Francoism: Arias Navarro's Government 233
Opposition Activity: The Road to Unity 237
Spain and the Western World 247
Late Decolonization: Guinea and the Sahara 252
A Politically Committed Culture? 256
Spain at the Time of Franco's Death 262
Bibliography 267

**4 The Transition to Democracy (1975–82)** 270

The Monarchy: King Juan Carlos I 273
The Death-throes of the Past 275
Adolfo Suárez: The Road from Liberalization to Democracy 281
Facing Difficulties: Terrorism and the Military Coup 285
Parties and Elections 289
The Long Road towards a Constitution 293
An Unresolved Issue: Nationalism and Terrorism 299
The Triumph and Fall of Adolfo Suárez 303
The Army and the Transition: February 23 306
Calvo Sotelo's Government and the Crisis in Center Politics 311
Foreign Policy 314

Economic Policy and Social Change 318
October 1982: The End of the Transition 321
Bibliography 326

**5 Consolidating Democracy: The Socialist Government (1982–96)** 329

Felipe González and the Two Souls of Spanish Socialism 330
The Socialists' First Term in Office. Reform of the Armed Services, an Economic Update and Foreign Policy 336
A Means of Consolidating Democracy. The GAL 344
Elections and Public Opinion in the Second Half of the 1980s 349
The Second Term in Office: Social Policies and Union Protests. Spain and the World 354
Policy on the Autonomous Communities: A New Vertebrate Structure for the Spanish State 359
The Loss of an Absolute Majority 366
A Tense Term of Office (1993–6) 373
The 1996 General Election. Drawing up the Balance on the Socialists' Time in Government 380
Culture in the Post-Franco Period 385
From a Time of Rediscovery to a State Culture 390
Fields of Creativity 400
Bibliography 407

**6 The Turn of the Right (1996–2004)** 410

The Popular Party in Power: José María Aznar 410
Success in Economic and Social Policies 412
The Dark Side of the Right 414
A Pluralistic Spain: Nationalities and Terrorism 418
Government and Opposition. The Elections in March 2000 423
The Style of Government with an Absolute Majority 429
The Limits of PSOE Renewal 431
Dramatic Basque Elections 433
The Policy of Making Pacts and Breaking with Consensus 436
The PP: Idyllic Peace and Neo-conservatism 439
From More to Less: Government Policy in the Second Four-year Term 443
The Final Straight 448
Bibliography 454
Notes 455

**Index** 456

# Note on the Author

Javier Tusell (1945–2005) was Professor of Contemporary History in the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Spain's Open University) and a leading figure among the intellectuals of post-Franco Spain. The author of many books on the history of modern Spain, he was held in high esteem for his scholarship and judgment and recognized as supreme in his access to contemporary sources. By the time he came to write the present work he had reached his prime, but was then cruelly cut down by terminal illness which afflicted him for the last years of his life. He completed the research and writing, and bequeathed the results in this masterly account of a people in transition from dictatorship to democracy, a book which is evidence too of his personal triumph over adversity.

John Lynch, Series Editor

# Introduction

On May 19, 1939, a hundred and twenty thousand soldiers paraded before Franco in Madrid. The press hailed the ceremony as the victory following a second reconquest of Spain's enemies. During the march-past, the general was awarded Spain's highest military honor, the Grand Cross Laureate of San Fernando. Although the public was not informed, Alfonso XIII himself had written to Franco pledging his support. The king was unaware that the general was no longer a monarchist and indeed was now playing absolute monarch himself.

The celebrations continued with a religious ceremony the following day. Franco entered the Church of Santa Barbara beneath a palium – a treatment reserved for the Blessed Sacrament and for ruling monarchs. Awaiting him in the church was a selection of artifacts that evoked Spain's past struggle against the Infidel. Every detail in the appearance of those present alluded to past tradition, not only the military uniforms and ecclesiastical robes but also the "Spanish *mantillas* worn with pride on tall combs" by the not very numerous women present. The climax of the religious ceremony was the moment at which Franco laid down his sword of victory before the Christ of Lepanto, brought all the way from Barcelona for the occasion. Everything combined to glorify the great leading figure of the entire ceremony. The Primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, prayed that God "in His mercy and in praise might look kindly upon you, forever protect you and protect the nation whose governance He has entrusted to your care."

The entire ceremonial, which more properly belonged to a medieval warrior society in which military, political, and religious life were bound together, largely explains what happened after 1939. If ever there has been a crucial break in continuity in Spanish history it was at that moment, at the end of the Civil War. If the war had never happened, if it had not

lasted so long, or if there had been less bloodshed, continuity between the 1930s and 1940s would have been conceivable. Yet although there was a clear intention to make such a break, it was altogether less clear exactly what form it should take. The repression already exercised during the war years was a foretaste of the treatment that would be meted out to the vanquished, while friendship with Germany and Italy defined Spain's foreign policy; yet decisions still needed to be taken to determine whether Spain's dictatorship would be personal or fascist, how long it would last, and, above all, how it would function.

So far, circumstances and expediency rather than a political program had decided matters. If anything characterizes the victors of the Civil War it is that while the conflict lasted, instead of attempting experiments in new kinds of social structures as their enemies had done, they left that for later. If we consider Francoism in total, from the perspective of its earliest days, its end, and its duration, it is evident that a fundamental change did occur in Spanish society, but not in the way that those who exercised power had in mind. An observer able to compare the Spain of 1939 with the Spain of 1968 would have judged them to be two entirely different worlds. Yet, although there were evident changes, there were also undeniable examples of continuity, especially obvious in anything relating to the exercise of political power. There is, therefore, no better way of approaching the history of Francoism than by taking these factors as a starting-point.

## Franco: Biography and Political Practice

The traits of Franco's character, particularly his apparent impenetrability, may tempt historians to try to play amateur psychologist with a person who in actual fact was more straightforward than he appeared. When this happens, discussion remains superficial; yet a dictatorship which was by nature personal demands careful consideration of the one who held the monopoly of power.

Born in 1892 in El Ferrol into a family with a history of two centuries of service in the Spanish Navy, Franco's childhood was not a happy one, though this factor alone does not explain his life as a whole. His father lived apart from his mother and was not officially acknowledged until his death. This explains the boy's strong emotional attachment to his mother, which contributed to forging a cautious, withdrawn character but one that was, at the same time, susceptible to the wildest flights of ambition. An

even stronger influence in the molding of his character must surely have been his early entry to the Military Academy at Toledo as the youngest cadet in his year. The sinking of the fleet denied him the possibility of joining the Navy: that is why he summed up 1898 in the three words "injustice, betrayal, desertion by Europe." At the Military Academy, his progress was not brilliant. In contrast, after a quick transfer to the Army in Africa, he gained a series of brilliant promotions and was mentioned in dispatches, always at the head of crack troops, first in the Regular Forces and then the Foreign Legion. On five occasions, he was rewarded for conduct on the battlefield. Although Franco's family had suffered no economic difficulties, it is possible that his marriage to Carmen Polo in 1923 was a step forward for him personally. In the 1920s he led an intense social life that, in his own words, allowed him to "make contact with men who were prepared." The general himself at 33 now felt "ready for great responsibilities."

He no doubt meant political responsibilities and it is important to remember in that respect that early on his opinion swung against what he considered dominant "myths." His *Diary of a Footsoldier* reveals the mistrust he felt towards liberal politics, in his view unable to achieve anything other than "years of stumbling steps and tentative truces." But it was the divergence in opinion on military policy in Morocco that brought about confrontation with Primo de Rivera, though it did not last for long. In the draft of his memoirs Franco acknowledges that he welcomed the Republic "enthusiastically." Disappointment followed swiftly, however, and he blamed all the ills of that regime on "ambitious failed politicians" and on Freemasonry. He soon adopted an attitude of "cold detachment" towards the regime, though not too obviously. From the end of the 1920s onwards he received anti-communist propaganda, and the revolution of October 1934, which he took an active part in putting down, was a turning-point in his life. His tardy commitment to the conspiracy against the Republic can be explained to an extent by his mixture of prudence and opportunism, but also by the fact that he had never been a "politicized" soldier to the same extent as many of his comrades-in-arms.

Over the course of the Civil War Franco finally became the figure of history that he would always remain. He based that figure on "a profoundly Catholic social conscience and on [a desire] to rid Spain forever of the causes of our decadence, our warring political parties, Freemasonry, and communism." He sincerely believed that he had "God's scandalous help" and that on his shoulders would rest in due course "total responsibility:

military, political and economic." He soon began to astound foreign ambassadors and close collaborators with his distinctly unorthodox opinions on all kinds of matters. With the war, too, there awoke in him secret desires brought together in *Race*, a text – later made into a film – that he wrote in 1940. The villain of the piece is a lawyer who has gone astray thanks to his membership of the Atheneum but is finally brought back onto the straight and narrow by his love for a young woman Falangist. In contrast, his brother – the hero – is a young officer; a third member of the family – a priest – is murdered during the Civil War. The story concludes with the victory parade in May 1939.

In light of what has been said so far, it is obvious that any study of the character of the dictator must go back in time to his professional life in the Army. Indeed, the first consideration to take into account is that Franco was first and foremost a soldier: "Without Africa," he declared, referring to his own personal experience there, "I can scarcely understand myself." From his personality, this was the only trait that really stood out, to such an extent that it is not possible to attribute to him, for example, the intellectual qualities shown by other officers. His intellectual horizons were for many years limited to attaining the post of high commissioner in Morocco. In certain senses that is what he did become, but in Spain.

It was from his experience in Morocco that he derived his strength of character, his impassivity, his hardness, and his sense of discipline. He did not hesitate in describing himself as a "sheep-like" officer – that is to say, scrupulous in obeying orders – even in front of young cadets. His austerity was closely linked to his experience in the Moroccan campaigns. "I do not object to luxury but I can do without it," he once told one of his closest associates. It would be over-generous to describe his residence at El Pardo as a palace when it could more properly be termed a barracks. His writings from Morocco bear witness not so much to cruelty as to a hardness which made him view death as commonplace. If it was in Soviet Russia that for the first time in the modern world a system was generated in which the state apparatus used modern methods of violence against any who opposed it, it was in Franco's Spain that such a system was first seen in western Europe.

His military career was the only reason why he became an influential national figure but he was by no means outstanding in his profession. His actual capabilities were those of an able tactician in guerrilla warfare against the indigenous peoples of Morocco, and they were also evident in his prudence, orderliness, and logistical skill in the management of his

troops. These same strengths were the ones that he displayed during the Civil War, in which his allies always criticized his excessive slowness and prudence. It is often forgotten that Franco wrote a book entitled *The ABC of Defensive Warfare*; doubtless, in politics too he was a past master of defensive strategies. If life in the Army made him the figure he was, it also convinced him of the superiority of those who received an Army training. Franco always considered military training valuable in itself: he judged Eisenhower and De Gaulle favorably simply because they were generals. His concept of political power was close to his concept of military power and when talking about it he used terms such as "command and captaincy" and, beyond all doubt, tried to organize life in Spain as though it were a barracks. While exercising his political functions as Chief of State, Franco often gave important positions to soldiers. In the mid-1950s, half of the presidents of companies in the National Institute for Industry (*Instituto Nacional de Industria* or INI)[1] were soldiers.

His determination to revive in Spain the glories of the past translated in practice into far more prosaic attitudes as he confined himself to the "order, unity, and endurance" recommended by Luis Carrero Blanco. In the 1930s he reinforced this stance by adding to it another tragic yet firmly held conviction. He became convinced of the communist threat, to which, in his own mind, he added the dangers of a Masonic conspiracy dating back to the eighteenth century. From that time until his death Franco held the view that Freemasonry led inevitably to liberalism and that liberalism opened the way to the threat of communism. The unrelenting stubbornness with which a man who came to govern one of the world's leading industrial powers defended this nonsense appears excessive. His writings on the matter, signed with a pseudonym, show obsessive attention to detail, and his determination to pursue offenders was such that he managed to accumulate in the Salamanca Archives 80,000 files on supposed Freemasons in a country where there had never been more than 50,000.

Franco's experience of life in the 1930s also influenced him in another way. He had always been a Catholic but now his religious beliefs led him to view himself as a providential figure. The sincerity and spontaneity with which this conviction grew are astounding. He assured Don Juan de Borbón that he had won victory in the Civil War thanks to "divine favor repeatedly conferred." Catholicism and the Fatherland were in his mind one and the same thing to such an extent that, being responsible for the latter, he had no difficulty in pontificating on the former. The Spain of his day – at least up until the 1960s – was a country where bishops spoke out

as though they were politicians, while the Chief of State at times seemed to perform the functions of a cardinal. His Catholicism was deeply sincere but it was not informed. He was not in any sense able to understand the changes brought about in the Catholic Church by the Second Vatican Council. It was only then that he felt disoriented.

Victory brought about a fundamental transformation in Franco's life. The terms he used when discussing taking on the duty of governing the Spanish nation precluded any suggestion that his attitude might in any way have been false or cynical. His own family were aware of the profound change that had taken place. If in the past he had been communicative and affectionate, now his position as *caudillo* made him "cold and distant" in his treatment of others. Franco's own convictions concerning his leadership would have been unimaginable were it not for the exalted role that others attributed to him. The consolidation of his position was largely managed by Ramón Serrano Suñer. In one book written in the 1940s Serrano Suñer suggested that the conditions of leadership which allowed the *caudillo* not to have to account for his actions to any official body set him on a par with the pope.

By that time Franco already had the unshakable conviction that no limits should be set on the scope or extent of his powers of command. Consequently, those on the right who wanted to limit his freedom of choice by institutional means, in accordance with the principles of their original plans of action in which he was seen as a temporary solution, he considered traitors. Those, on the other hand, who were flexible enough to explore other possibilities were found a post in the new regime. Nonetheless, their function within that regime depended entirely on what Franco wanted. During the Civil War he explained to anyone willing to listen the role he had planned for Falange and the traditionalists: the latter were to ensure that solid principles prevailed in the organization of postwar Spain, while the former was to become a vehicle for attracting the ordinary masses.

The role allocated to these two political forces reveals Franco's doctrinal limitations. It has been said that in 1939 his power was more absolute than that of any other dictator at the time, not only in terms of specific legislation but also because, as a politician, he did not consider himself bound by any ideology. His decisions were based on national militarism, national Catholicism, and national patriotism, and they drew strength from his obsessive hostility to Freemasonry. However, this was not so much a matter of doctrine as of deep-seated feelings. One minister, Mariano

Navarro Rubio, wrote that he was "short on doctrine but unshakable: his ideas were few, basic, clear, and productive." The first two adjectives no doubt correspond more closely to reality than the second two. At the height of the Civil War, an intelligent conservative such as Cambó did not know whether to be more astounded by how basic the ideas were – "like café conversations" – or by the "admiring tone" in which Franco described his periodic discoveries around the Mediterranean.

It is worth mentioning some of his ideas on different topics because they reveal his limitations. During the Franco years Spain experienced the radical transformation of her economy but not as a result of his economic ideas. What Franco naturally tended towards was a kind of "barracks autarchy." José Larraz, one of his Finance Ministers, used to say that never having managed to make the dictator pronounce the word "inflation" correctly – he always said "inflaction" – he had no hope of ever making him understand what the word actually meant. When the Plan for Economic Stabilization came into being in 1959 the man who had proposed it revealed in his memoirs Franco's "mistrust" of it, compounded by the fact that it was backed by international organizations. In actual fact, Francoism can be blamed for delaying a national economic development that could have occurred earlier. As Dionisio Ridruejo wrote, when the regime claimed credit for Spain's economic development, it was as if a harbor pilot sailing out to sea after a northwesterly gale had blown itself out were to claim that he himself had caused it to die down.

In the area of politics, too, Franco's notions were elementary, though he could concentrate his efforts jealously on holding on to power. During World War II he suggested to Don Juan de Borbón that he should follow the example of "revolutionary totalitarian monarchies" such as the Catholic monarchs had been, in his view. Years later, he sketched out for the same correspondent a curious theory of leadership by "prescribed acquisition." Nor did his theory of "organic democracy" in a previous era make any significant contribution to political science. These were mere words that he used to justify his position as *caudillo*.

It was not by chance that Franco's ideas on important matters were never anything but basic. His world was drably prosaic: his hobbies were fishing, hunting, and, towards the end of his life, watching films and television. He lacked any cultural interests, criticized intellectuals for their intolerable "pride," made spelling mistakes, and in meetings of the Council of Ministers – infuriating the Foreign Minister – he always referred to Eisenhower as "Aisenover." The best description sums him up

in the word "mediocrity." The Duke of Alba wrote that "he possessed all the small virtues and none of the great ones," and General Kindelán said of him that he suffered from "mountain sickness" – that euphoria that swamps climbers when they reach heights beyond their physical capabilities. This also explains why loyalty was for him such a fundamental value. In the early days he very often used people from his close family circle, such as his brother or his brother-in-law, or those he had known during his childhood and youth in El Ferrol (Juan Antonio Suances or Camilo Alonso Vega, for example).

This notion of mediocrity may seem contradictory given the fact that Franco remained in power for a considerable length of time. One must remember, however, that his dictatorship was the product of a civil war whose cruel memory lasted a very long time. In contrast to this past, he himself presented an image of a shepherd who could bring all the diverse factions of the Spanish right together to graze in the same meadow and could avoid the divisive pluralism that had characterized the Republican years. Never was a phrase so accurate as when Francesc Cambó stated that "the one who stays in power is utterly determined to stay in power." José María de Areilza foresaw in 1945 that Franco would "always limit the scope of his politics to a short radius around his survival in the job." Such was the truth of this statement that the man who made it ended up working closely with the dictator, and he was not the only one.

This does not, however, explain how it was that Franco stayed in power for so long. Not being a professional politician himself and detesting those who were ("Do as I do; do not go into politics," he told one visitor), he nonetheless had the range of abilities without which he could not have played his part. A cynical Basque politician, José Félix Lequerica, gave up comparing him to great figures of the past and instead preferred to liken him to Gabino Bugallal, one of the best-known Galician *caciques*.[2] José Antonio Girón de Velasco, a leading Falangist, summed up Franco's virtues as "an ox-like tread, eagle-eyes, wolf's teeth, and playing the fool." Thanks to the last of these, Franco gave the impression of being harmless and manageable during the Civil War. "Wolf's teeth" refers to the hardness he displayed on more than one occasion and the "ox-like tread" to a sense of timing that his collaborators often found intensely irritating. Carrero Blanco, for whom this was particularly so, said to Laureano López Rodó: "We shall have to see just how hard he finds giving birth," alluding to his hesitancy over decisions on the question of the monarchy. And when Fraga suggested cosmetic changes such as no longer playing the

National Anthem at the end of radio broadcasting, Franco suggested that they did it in two stages.

His ox-like sense of timing would have been of little use to him had he not had "eagle-eyes." His perspicacity combined a clear perception of reality, a moderation that contrasted strongly with some of his supporters, and above all, a certain cool. "Even more than when he was on the attack," Navarro Rubio affirms, "the times when you saw him most sure of himself were when he had to ride out storms." Cautious cunning and discretion completed the panorama of his personality. "Anyone here who is not a fool is a crook," Franco told Areilza in a phrase devastating in its pessimism. It should come as no surprise that José María Pemán came to the conclusion that there was only one way to find out what his opinions were: to wait until they escaped from his grasp. Girón made no further zoomorphic comparisons but had he done so he would have had to mention the chameleon and its adaptability. The judgments that Franco pronounced on institutions within his regime seem so cynical that had they been expressed in public they would have been damned as subversive. He told López Rodó that he had never managed to understand what was meant by a "vertical trade union," unless the term was meant to depict an institution in which some people were higher up and others lower down. He told Antonio Garrigues quite shamelessly that the National Movement or *Movimiento* was a useful "claque" for stirring up the masses on public occasions.

These aspects of Franco's political character were translated into his daily activity in government; to describe that activity will help towards a definition of his dictatorship. He kept absolutely all political responsibility in his own hands and from the Civil War until his death he retained a degree of constitutive power that would, for example, have made his replacement by an heir quite feasible. So it is possible to say that in Spain what came into being was not a totalitarian system but a dictatorship in which power was vested in one single individual. At least from the legal point of view, Mussolini was constrained by fascist ideology and its institutions. Franco had significantly more political power.

However, this is not to say that he personally took charge of all the various ministries. The most important decisions and those relating to aspects of what he considered fenced-off areas of policy had to be submitted for his approval, but in practice he left a wide area of maneuver for ministers' initiative, just as he would have done as a commander-in-chief with his subordinate officers. His ministers' freedom of movement

and "judicious" exercising of virtual omnipotence also drew strength from Franco's conception of his own function as one of arbitration. He had won a civil war thanks to the fact that he presided over a coalition of the Spanish right, and his dictatorship aimed to ensure that this situation continued. Having an arbiter in a regime that was not totalitarian meant that each sector could have a slice of power but no one could ever claim that any one sector of the right was entirely in opposition or entirely in the position of favorite. Franco's exercising of power as arbiter had climactic moments: replacing ministers. Once he had learned how to do it, he tried to make ministers last in office for 5 years. Changes were brought about through an intermediary and they allowed Franco to show his ability, almost like a homeopath, to combine together all the best ingredients.

According to Fraga, until 1962 "he never discussed politics in the Council of Ministers," which is true, though he talked even less about politics in the *Cortes*.[3] Franco kept all big political decisions to himself but from time to time the Council of Ministers became a kind of pocket parliament where fundamental issues or those that might in some way be seen as such were bitterly debated. True political enmity during the Franco years was to be found in the Council of Ministers where Franco's form of arbitration also meant turning a deaf ear to confrontation or doing away with anyone who caused conflict. In his opinion, forums of debate were dangerous institutions which might limit his power or slip into the bad habits of parliamentarianism. For that reason he always considered both organized pluralism and freedom of expression harmful, which explains why he took so long – from 1938 to 1966 – to draw up legislation governing the press, only then to modify its liberalizing content; or why his last political decision was to close the doors firmly on any possibility of providing an institutional framework for political pluralism.

It would be incorrect to state that Franco had "favorites" because that would suggest that he accepted the possibility of his own responsibilities being handed over to someone else, or that he saw no problem in sharing power. Serrano Suñer played a very significant role but never one that interfered with that of Franco who, on another front, needed him as a link to Falange as he had not yet completed his apprenticeship as dictator. Carrero Blanco's functions were more in the nature of support, as indeed became evident when his influence grew as Franco's health waned. Beyond this intimate circle were the most important members of the Army and emblematic figures in each and every sector of the Spanish right. The

influence that these figures exerted could at times be great but it was never either decisive or constant.

The distance between Franco as dictator and those who collaborated with him was a product of a character that was neither particularly expressive nor effusive, and it explains the curious situation that occurred in the final phase of the regime. In the past this distance had served to enhance his role as arbiter but as his physical condition weakened he seemed barely able to play that role any more. Parkinson's disease brought out a trait that was the antithesis of his past behavior: weakness of character. His "eagle-eye" and "wolf's teeth" were apparently dulled unless one views his final repressive measures as their death throes; all that remained was the "ox-like tread." Franco had always been "a sphinx without a secret," but now, still indispensable and yet silent and inert, he was nothing more than a sphinx.

His ministers were perfectly aware of his physical decline. According to López Rodó, until 1965 meetings of the Council of Ministers began with a lengthy exposition by Franco and lasted all day, but after 1968 they only lasted the morning. It was also seen as quite an event, as Fraga recounts in his *Memoirs*, when in September the dictator interrupted a meeting to relieve himself. It was not by chance that from the following year on it became almost commonplace for confrontations between different factions to erupt at the nerve-center of the regime without intervention from the one whose mission it was to arbitrate and prevent this unforeseen conflict.

The last years of Franco's life were also characterized by his isolation. It was only to be expected that a person who had exercised power entirely alone should be condemned to end that way. Earlier on, his secretary had realized that the dictator was not so much talking to him as pronouncing "lengthy monologues." He seemed like a distant patriarch who had not entirely lost all his automatic responses and was still able to offer correction but now lacked information. Even so, he did retain a pale glimmer of what had been abilities in the past. In contrast, what turned the final years of his dictatorship into a burlesque farce were those close to him and his family. On the retina and in the memory of many Spaniards images persist from those years, and yet it would have been impossible for him to remain in power right up until his final days had he not played a very different role in the years up to that time.

It is not easy to compare Franco with other historical figures who have exercised power on their own. He has little in common with a professor of

company law such as Salazar, or a former left-wing agitator like Mussolini. In one sense, on the other hand, he can be compared to Tito who, like him, rose to power after a civil war. Like him, too, the Yugoslav president, in the final stage of his rule, left his country with images of a distant patriarch with characteristics that were not entirely negative.

## Francoism: A Form of Dictatorship

The 1939 regime may often be referred to as a Francoist dictatorship but it did not owe its character solely to the man who personified it. It has clear similarities to other types of dictatorship in Europe and Latin America. What set it apart, however, was that while Franco was alive it stopped being one kind of dictatorship and became another, while keeping the same person at its head. All those characteristics that are attributed to Francoism as a form of dictatorship are present in other regimes at other times and in other places.

In Spain, rapid politicization under the Second Republic did not result in a strong Fascist Party; instead, what emerged as dominant on the right was Catholicism which, though essentially reactionary, nonetheless acted within the scope of the possible. Manuel Azaña was not wrong when he affirmed in the middle of the war that there might be fascists in Spain but there was no fascism, and were the opposition to win the war it would favor Congregations of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and military parades rather than imitating secular regimes with modernizing tendencies. Even if there was a Fascist Party, religious fervor and a proliferation of outmoded baroque ideals seemed to signal a return to Counter Reformation values.

In the midst of World War II, the point of comparison for the Franco dictatorship was never Germany; instead, the closest model was Italy and even more so the semi-, pseudo-, or para-fascist regimes that proliferated at the time. Franco's dictatorship was, without doubt, more like Vichy France or certain Eastern European countries than the Hitler regime. In Spain, for example, there was a struggle for power between the Army and the Fascist Party identical to that in Antonescu's Romania. As with Vichy France or Hungary, the Franco dictatorship, without ever going so far as to become totally fascist, went a long way down that path: indeed, far more so than those two countries, neither of which had only one single party. It made use of a populist façade and certain fascist political institutions but it cannot really be termed fascism as such.

Fascism provided a clear political framework of reference during World War II but after the war it ceased to feature as a viable alternative. After the 1940s the desire for totalitarianism in right-wing regimes, but not the regimes themselves, waned, though the regimes gained new strength during the 1960s and 1970s, albeit with different styles. Non-totalitarian regimes tolerated a certain degree of pluralism in their ranks. Rather than having a precisely formulated ideology, they were the product of a certain mentality and they too lacked a single party chanting a fascist liturgy. Into this category of dictatorship one could well put Francoism which, from a certain moment on, also used Spain's economic development as its main argument for remaining in power. Non-totalitarian dictatorships were a common phenomenon in Latin America, though with different variations: popular nationalism in Perón's Argentina, an anti-revolutionary military dictatorship in Pinochet's Chile, or regimes where the Army acted corporately (the praetorian model). Francoism had something in common with all these styles of regime. To sum it up, one might say that when studied as a whole it can be seen as far more than a mere conservative dictatorship such as that of Primo de Rivera, but also as far less than a fascist dictatorship. Certainly, it is not enough to point to possible similarities, which will be discussed again later; instead we must also emphasize those characteristics that remained constant throughout the regime's history.

One primary defining element has to do with the role of political ideology. An essentially authoritarian vision, national Catholicism, and a certain populist social agenda would together constitute keynotes of the regime, which remained hostile to the disruptive pluralism and freedom of opinion associated with a liberal society. Yet more than being just the result of a certain set of ideas, its character can more realistically be attributed to a particular mentality: that of those who won the Civil War. Francoism drew inspiration from a number of ideological sources (in the sense that they came from across the spectrum of the Spanish right), which were different in its infancy; however, it also allowed for modification of these ideas in response to changing circumstances.

The regime was, looked at another way and in contrast to certain Latin American or fascist dictatorships, personal not collective: hence its name "Francoism," for even if the man who personified it was a soldier, it was not dictatorship by the Army. Its personal nature did not preclude a desire for permanence which was never questioned, and this made it different from military regimes in Latin America and that of Primo de Rivera.

Nor did Franco try to do away entirely with powers other than those pertaining to the state. The regime did not even address seriously the task of establishing itself as an institution. Its founding legislation was a response to strategic reasoning and even looked ahead to projects in a distant future but it was never applied with even a minimum of sincerity.

One of the reasons why the regime was never institutionalized was that, having arisen out of a conservative coalition, its different component parts had different visions for the future. The Falangists were pro-Republican and the Carlists always rejected the notion of a single party, to cite just two examples. Therefore, potential conflict was a constant threat that Franco avoided periodically by direct intervention. This worked by splitting each of the groups within the conservative coalition into two sides: those who would collaborate and those who would not. The former reaped the benefits of a slice of power and so enhanced the legitimacy of the regime, while the latter remained on the margins of power.

Franco's style of government by arbitration was always informal in approach, for he never allowed strong political forces as such to be represented in the Council of Ministers. It was he who elected its members, though always with an eye to what would work best. He even assigned portfolios to each of the different groups, which might well be called "families": the Justice Ministry to the Carlists because it involved relations with the Vatican; portfolios relating to economic issues to the Alfonsine Monarchists because of their technical knowledge and contacts in economic circles; Labor and Agriculture to Falangists because of the social content, and Education and Foreign Affairs to the Catholics because for them the former was a burning issue and the latter might allow a more acceptable image to be projected to the outer world. The informal nature of the coalition meant that these groups never became institutionalized. The "families" of the dictatorship were above all a phenomenon in the early part of its history; with the passage of time, they were replaced by individuals.

It is typical of dictatorial regimes that they either mobilize ordinary citizens to support them or demobilize them as though passivity were a necessary response for survival. Fascist regimes always mobilize and the Franco regime did so right from the start; throughout all its life, when it thought it was in danger, its response was to mobilize support. Usually this took the form of a kind of "docile anarchy" which worked by cultivating an inarticulate, passive society. One person in the 1960s described the regime Spaniards were experiencing as neither Francoist nor anti-Francoist but

just not interested in politics. The power of the regime was based not on a silent majority but quite simply on an absent one. Those years, as was the case with Italian fascism, could well be called "years of consensus," not in the sense that the regime was enthusiastically accepted but apathy meant that it was tolerated after earlier repression had utterly crushed the opposition.

Non-totalitarian dictatorships do not have this one single party. In the case of Francoism, there was one party initially intended to be the only actor on the political stage and the inspiration for the regime. However, this intention was frustrated. In due course, the party became bureaucratized and just another part of the state. The party had not conquered the state; what happened was quite the reverse. Yet the party always remained an important element at the heart of the Franco regime. Although its budget only ever reached at most 2 percent of the state budget, Falange did well out of this unification, and if it was not allowed a monopoly of power, it did receive a significant slice.

In general, in non-totalitarian dictatorial regimes there remain autonomous pockets outside the political sphere; the most influential are usually the Catholic Church and the Army. Obviously Catholicism played a hugely important role during the Franco years, so much so that it has been possible to look on it as the intellectual force behind the regime; however, this statement is only valid for the period up to 1962. The Church always had a sphere of autonomy that included control over a large part of education, a section of the press, and religious association. Yet Catholicism was, at the same time, just another family within the regime which took an important lead at certain key moments. It wanted to change the regime in 1945 but found itself forced to accept a portion of power without being able to introduce any changes.

Franco's dictatorship can much better be described as military than as Falangist. It is important to bear in mind that it was the Army that won the Civil War and that it had changed over the course of the conflict. Of the most high-ranking officers serving in 1936 only a quarter joined the uprising, but another factor was that during the conflict its ranks were swelled by provisional officers who would play a decisive role later on. The purge carried out at the heart of the military family was as harsh or harsher and even more arbitrary than in any other sector of the Administration in order to create a weapon capable of keeping in power those who had won it. At the end of the decade of the 1960s more than a third of all officers had been provisional lieutenants.

The regime that existed in Spain between 1939 and 1975 was that of a dictator – Franco – who happened to be a general. That brought opposition from sections of the Army, principally from those who considered him a kind of *primus inter pares*. From the 1950s onwards, changes in the Army made it unthinkable that opposition could arise within its ranks, but that did not mean that the regime could be termed military. Military officers played important roles at the heart of the governing class, especially in specific areas: public order was always under their jurisdiction. All vice-presidents and 40 of the 114 government ministers were from the Armed Services; eight of them held power for more than 10 years. They even held portfolios relating to economic affairs. Yet the regime was not praetorian because, for example, it did not endow officers with functions equivalent to those of university vice-chancellors, as happened in Pinochet's Chile. Military budgets gradually decreased and in 1975 Spain was one of the countries in Europe where the Army was least well subsidized.

Other aspects of the Francoist dictatorship are worth pointing out. The *Cortes* – which was supposedly equivalent to a legislative assembly – served merely as a sounding-board to give added weight to more important decisions taken by Franco himself; it also provided a forum in which the regime's political class could sound out different opinions. However, as López Rodó said, the unwritten rules of the constitutional game were that nobody argued with Franco and that it was the government that ran the country. The highest level that could be reached in Francoist politics was therefore that of minister. The qualities required to attain such a post were first and foremost loyalty to the person of Franco himself, also technical training, and finally membership of one of the regime families. Ministers always had considerable power because of an extensive "area of indifference" in which the dictator left those who collaborated with him a wide margin for freedom of movement.

In describing the dictatorship it is also necessary to take into account other factors such as, for example, the degree of political repression that existed. The sheer magnitude of the repression can only be understood if one views it in the light of the origin of Franco's dictatorship, which was during a civil war. It would be wrong, however, to focus analysis of the Franco regime solely on this initial repressive phase without considering the changes that occurred subsequently. Around 1965, for example, the numbers of those in prison came down to below 11,000 and the number of members of the security forces per thousand inhabitants was relatively

low in comparison to the rest of Europe. Often repression took the form of detention for short periods with delayed court hearings, or it ended with light sentences already served before the trial took place. Although the level of repression rose in the final phase of the Franco years, it was never as severe as it had been in the 1940s or in the 1950s. Society had won new levels of tolerance.

In the economic sphere, freedom of initiative was only interfered with (and that was never done more than indirectly even if it was quite severely) during the first phase of the regime, because the state wanted to show favor to those who had been on the winning side. There was never freedom for trade unions, but from the 1950s onwards there were organizations that represented workers' interests within companies, and they were capable of reaching agreements with the owners on increases in productivity, so that in 1965 there was a relaxing of sanctions relating to strikes. Persecution of clandestine trade union organizations decreased in the 1960s but toughened up again in the final phase of the regime. Any other form of association was subject to strict controls, but there were marginal zones in which a certain degree of autonomy was allowed for chambers of commerce and – more especially – religious associations.

Legislation relating to the press, inspired by Mussolini's Italy, was in many respects harsher and more pedantic in the way it was applied. The preamble to the press law written during the Civil War (1938) railed against "freedom in the democratic style." As prescribed in the text of the law, newspaper editors were always government appointments. The purge among professional journalists was extremely severe: of 4,000 dossiers presented soliciting permission to work in the profession only 1,800 were accepted. Only in the 1950s did it become possible for newspapers to appoint editors of their own choice, and it was as late as 1966 that censorship prior to publication was abolished. Even so, the press always managed to maintain a certain pluralism, though it could only express opinions obliquely. The Catholic media controlled the same number of daily newspapers as there were official publications, and there were also a number in private ownership. The situation was similar for radio, but it was allowed only one single news and information program.

There are two contrary and equally inaccurate tendencies when attempts are made to define the role of the opposition in Franco's Spain. While it never entirely ceased to exist, probably after the war in Europe its chances of ever winning were slim right up until the moment of Franco's death. In its early years the regime used violent repressive measures

against it, but it is also true that for much of the time it seemed willing to attract and even collaborate with its opponents. The opposition survived, however, because those who took over from those who were defeated in the Civil War were joined in the 1960s by a new opposition born as a consequence of Spain's newly developed society. As late as 1953 an important socialist leader died of maltreatment in prison, and in 1963 a communist leader purported to have committed crimes during the Civil War was executed. By the 1970s socialist leaders were known to the police who might occasionally arrest them, but they were not tortured, and when tried they were not sent to prison for long. There was always an opposition that was tolerated and not persecuted as long as it was not too active, and another that was illegal and the butt of extremely severe repression. In addition, the pluralism of the regime itself fostered the existence of a certain pseudo-opposition or opposition from within, of whom it could be said that the boundaries between it and the more moderate form of outside opposition became blurred during the final phase of Francoism.

This description allows us to gain a general impression of what the Franco dictatorship itself was always like; we can, therefore, try to compare it with other types of regime. The best comparison, because it allows us to consider similarities and differences, is with Italian fascism and with Salazar's Portugal. Relations between the three regimes were close but Franco – who on occasion could see Mussolini not only as someone worthy of admiration but also someone to be imitated – did not view Salazar as anything but a means of making contact indirectly with the democratic world. The origins of the three regimes were different. Only the Spanish regime had begun in civil war and had tried to rebuild a political system out of nothing; furthermore, it alone applied severe repression and always used a dialectic of victors and vanquished. Salazar was never totalitarian; his regime was conservative and based on Catholic corporativist ideas which used authoritarianism to reinforce republican institutions. Mussolini invented the word "totalitarian" but he himself never put it into practice (his totalitarianism was "imperfect" or "defective," at least in comparison with that of Hitler). Having risen to power by legal means he did not resort to violent repression, and when he institutionalized the regime, he left the way open to absolute totalitarianism, keeping it as a possible option.

A comparison of these two dictatorships with the Franco regime can be extended to examine many other areas too. The single-party model did not apply in Portugal, where Salazar sometimes allowed political

opposition groups to exist legally during elections. He also allowed a certain degree of internal pluralism which brought monarchists face to face with those who were not, and confronted those with progressive views on the colonial problem with reactionaries. Italian fascism allowed for pluralism from different sources, but once in power the only diversity permitted was that of tone. In Portugal the Army, though guarantor of the system, did not play such a crucial role as to warrant the Salazar regime being called a military dictatorship. The Portuguese dictatorship, though personified by a man who had been a member of Catholic movements, was never clericalist, unlike what happened in Spain. In Italy, the more strongly totalitarian character of the dictatorship led to serious conflict between Mussolini and the Church, while the Army, though still maintaining a sphere of autonomy, was decapitated with the removal of those in command. In Portugal, there was the same selective repression as in Spain in the 1950s but it had little in common with the random ferocity of the Saló Republic at the end of the Mussolini era, which was comparable to the earliest Francoist repression. To sum up, in Italy autarchy was favored in the economic sphere, there was an actual cultural policy and even a form of Fascist art, and Italy also had imperialistic tendencies as part of its foreign policy. In Portugal, in contrast, economic policy was in the hands of the careful accountant that Salazar never ceased to be, and his imperialism remained purely defensive. In all these traits it is, of course, possible to see points of comparison with Francoism. If we were to attempt to consider together similarities and differences, we would have to say that the Franco dictatorship was a political regime which, on a hypothetical scale measuring the extent of fascist input, would have been placed in the 1940s between a higher score for Italy and a lower score for Portugal.

Francoism does not, therefore, have any distinguishing traits that make it a peculiar phenomenon. What does make it different is that it came into being as a result of a civil war and this meant that it had more chances of survival. Furthermore, its relative lack of any clear ideological basis allowed it to shift from one form of dictatorship to another, bordering on fascism in the 1940s and resembling more modernizing dictatorships in the 1960s. What is not at all common when a dictatorship disappears is for a peaceful transition to democracy to occur, though this did not depend on the regime itself but rather on changes within Spanish society and on the particular abilities of those in positions of leadership, both within the regime and in opposition.

## Victors and Vanquished: The Disasters of the Civil War and Repression

Any assessment of the disasters caused by the Spanish Civil War must begin with the number of those who died. To cite the figure of a million dead has become a cliché which could only be taken as correct if the number of those "not born" were taken into account. More realistically, the number who died as a direct consequence of the fighting would be just over 1 percent of the total population, which is similar to the percentage of deaths recorded in the civil war in Finland in 1918. In Spain's case demographic losses would not have exceeded the number of deaths caused by flu that year. The destruction was not materially comparable to that suffered in Europe during World War II. One need only compare the tens of thousands of deaths caused during the bombing of German cities with the 5,000 deaths suffered by Catalonia in the entire war. In this, as in so many other aspects, the Spanish Civil War was more like World War I than World War II. Figures show, however, that agricultural output went down by 20 percent and industrial production by 30 percent. More serious still than all this material destruction was the social fragmentation that was a direct result of repression.

In this respect it is true to say that the war of 1936 exceeded by a large margin what happened in other comparable situations: never before had any civil conflict in Spain ended with such persecution of the vanquished. The Carlist Wars of the nineteenth century, for example, had ended with "Embraces at Vergara" – symbols of reconciliation – but in this case that did not happen. Not only were the defeated put on trial, but in order to make such trials possible an entirely new form of judicial structure and new laws to address these exceptional circumstances were thought up. In addition to all that, economic sanctions were imposed and there was a general purge of the Administration.

The harshness of this repression becomes even more evident when the figures for executions in Spain are compared with those in postwar Europe in countries which experienced similar circumstances. In France and Italy, after 1945, repression was mild and did not last long because the democracy that triumphed was generous. In France only 800 collaborators were executed after being tried; in both countries the administrative purge was superficial and few remained in prison on these counts by the start of the 1950s. Julián Marías has written that in Spain the victors could have

healed the country's Civil War wounds with only "a small dose of generosity," but there was no hint of any desire for reconciliation at all. Franco even went so far as to say that the debts of responsibility "could not be settled in a spirit of liberality." Some of his collaborators spoke of the need to "disinfect" the country. This was not a time to think of gaining a pardon but rather of serving a harsh sentence and choosing conversion.

A marked characteristic of the Franco regime was the appearance of a positive tangle of areas of special jurisdiction of which the most important was military jurisdiction. Unlike what happened in Italy or in Germany, repression was not implemented by the Party but by the Army (as had been the case in Vichy France) and in addition the notion of a political crime extended to cover unexpected areas. In 1939 it was decreed that military tribunals would have control over the monopoly on food products, in 1941 railway accidents came under its jurisdiction, and in 1943 it was also given the right to take action in the event of strikes. At the same time, there was a purge of the judiciary (14 percent of magistrates and 22 percent of public prosecutors received sanctions of some sort), areas of special jurisdiction within the service multiplied, and the sphere of action of normal tribunals was curtailed. Litigation and Administrative Jurisdiction were only partially restored in 1944 and had little effective power.

During the Civil War there were already signs of what was to come. In the summer of 1938 the death penalty was reintroduced into the Penal Code. At the start of February 1939 the so-called Law of Political Responsibilities (*Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas*) was made public; it was aimed at punishing "any who contributed substantially by action or omission to the formation of the subversive Red opposition, who kept it alive for more than 2 years, and who hindered the inevitable and providential victory of the National Movement." Responsibility was traced back to October 1934 and political or para-political associations that had been dissolved would subsequently lose all their possessions, which were handed over to the one single remaining Party. In January 1940 it was decreed that "no steps would be taken to apprehend any person without prior denunciation and a summons in writing," which seems to indicate that there had previously been a period of indiscriminate repression. The following March the Law for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism (*Ley de Represión de la Masonería y del Comunismo*) was passed on the basis that it was these two groups who were responsible for "the loss of Spain's Colonial Empire, the cruel War of Independence, the civil wars that plagued the country throughout the nineteenth century, the disturbances that speeded up the

fall of the constitutional monarchy and undermined the Dictatorship, as well as other numerous crimes against the state" during the period of the Republic. This legislation brought together a curious mixture of ideologies that would have been unacceptable to virtually all those it was designed to punish: it labeled as communist "Trotskyites, Anarchists and other such entities."

After outlining the measures themselves we can now move on to consider their results. Military tribunals played a major part in putting repressive measures into action from 1939 to 1942: indeed, up to April 1948 Spain remained under military jurisdiction. Compared to the repressive measures imposed by Hitler and Stalin, those enacted by Franco did not seek to do away with entire sections of the population (Jews or *Kulaks*) and therefore it seems inappropriate to use the term "genocide." Yet they were extremely harsh, making it plain that the intention was to crush any possible resistance arising within Spanish society. The length of the Civil War, the role of the Army in repression, the suffering experienced by the victors, and their determination to remain in power serve to explain what happened. The British Hispanist Gerald Brenan could write that Spain seemed to suffer from "Civil War neurosis," because it was willing to put up with any hardship if it meant avoiding such a disaster ever being repeated.

The data that we have on deaths in the postwar period is only partial. One might think that in a situation that had such an appearance of normality the number of executions might have been recorded in civil registers. That did not happen because the law in force at the time did not consider that any who lost their lives as the result of a penal sanction should be listed there. Calculations concerning the total number of executions vary considerably. Specialists today suggest some 50,000 but this figure is no more than a rough estimate which attempts to get close to the truth by looking at the cases that we do know about for certain (about 35,000).

Examination of such cases as these does, however, allow rather closer study of the form that the persecution of the vanquished actually took. In Catalonia – the region that has been most intensively studied – Francoist post-Civil War repression accounted for 3,385 executions. Catalonia was the only area which had seen a mass exodus of population across the border into France, which is why its leaders and even some lower-ranking members of the Popular Front were never located. Those affected were people who had never thought of themselves as targets for repression, such as political or union militants of no great significance especially in

rural areas where there had been acute social tension, as it was easier to escape repression in Barcelona. In what is now the Community of Valencia where these circumstances did not pertain, the number of executions was higher: some 4,700. Another important piece of data refers to the number of cases dismissed in comparison to executions carried out. In Córdoba repression resulted in almost 1,600 deaths, but there were no fewer than 27,000 cases heard by 35 itinerant military tribunals (in Malaga there were 67 such courts). This disparity between the number of cases and the number of punishments reveals how diffuse the terror was. One might say that all those who had held any kind of position in Popular Front Spain were condemned for having supported the rebellion; punishment varied from the death penalty to 20 years in prison. Those who had held no position received lesser penalties being considered guilty of "helping the rebellion."

All such penal legislation was directed at a kind of crime of "inverted rebellion"; yet those accounted guilty of revolt were not in fact the ones who had rebelled. Marías has recounted how trials were conducted, and all kinds of sources testify in ways that bear his descriptions out. Procedural guarantees were virtually nil: the military tribunals used to deal with between 12 and 15 cases an hour or, for example, pass judgment on an entire group of 60 people accused on different counts. The brief time that elapsed between the courts martial and executions shows just how rapidly cases were expedited. Those defending the accused had to be soldiers but were not necessarily lawyers; a number of those called upon to do this job merely begged for clemency. Often the accused were not questioned, there were no witnesses, and there was no contact between the accused and their defense. Executions were carried out at night, the prisoners being called up for various "outings." The shooting took place against cemetery walls to save time. At Madrid's Eastern Cemetery (known now as the Almudena), 2,663 people were shot immediately following the war, of whom only 86 were women. The data pertaining to this site reveals that the executions were carried out mainly in the earliest months of the postwar period: almost a thousand were shot between May and December 1939.

There were instances where the fierce wave of retribution unleashed against the vanquished crossed frontiers, as was the case with Lluís Companys, President of the Catalan Generalitat. If his political career had been highly questionable, especially during the October insurrection of 1934, his presence in Barcelona nonetheless did much to prevent there being an

even greater number of victims. Companys, in exile in France, was in Paris in June 1940, trying to track down a mentally ill son who had disappeared after the German invasion. The Spanish authorities managed to persuade the Germans to hand Companys and other Republican leaders over to them. Franco decided that he should be tried publicly in Barcelona. Some of the accusations against him came from grotesquely exaggerated police reports, but members of prominent Barcelona Falangist families testified in support of the case against him. After defending himself with dignity and poise Companys was executed, and even his bitterest political opponents, such as Cambó, pronounced that the court case had been an "immense error" experienced by all as a collective punishment.

There were also lesser punishments than the death penalty meted out, which showed the extent of the task of repression. Before the Civil War the number of prisoners in Spain was fewer than 10,000. In 1939 the number rose to 270,000, a figure which went down to 124,000 in 1942 and only fell dramatically by 1945 (43,000), and even more so by 1950 (30,000). From the summer of 1940 onwards pardons were granted as a result of the government's desire to free itself of the burden of its prison population; furthermore, the system of reducing sentences through work came into effect, though it soon degenerated into a means by which the state hired out cheap labor to construction companies. Prison, especially in the early postwar years, meant a lot more than the loss of liberty. The number who died owing to appallingly insanitary conditions or the lack of adequate nourishment in prisons was very high.

Another possible punishment took the form of economic sanctions. These bear witness to a genuine obsession with the existence of an "enemy within," and the arbitrariness of the sanctions was so extreme that not only specific individuals but entire families were accused. Legislation spoke of "erasing the errors of the past" but also of the need to display "a firm determination never to err again." On these terms it was possible to extend penalties to include politicians with reformist or even moderate tendencies, and add to the punishment of the loss of liberty that of economic sanctions. In each section of the population political authorities – which in matters of public order was the Civil Guard and in matters of religion the parish priest – issued reports on people's conduct that were powerfully influential.

There has not yet been sufficient study of the administrative purges that took place but certain data does give some idea of its magnitude. The principle on which it was based was the necessary replacement of all who

held public posts of responsibility whether or not they had been punished according to the Penal Code in force at the time. Civil servants or even mere public employees were not allowed to be neutral: they had to be committed supporters of the regime.

We have already seen how the purging of the judicial system was carried out. The diplomatic service was, of course, hardly a revolutionary stronghold, yet despite this fact 26 percent of the profession received some form of punishment and 14 percent lost their job. Among university teachers, the purge affected 33 percent, and 44 percent in the case of Barcelona. In addition, the first time that competitive examinations for state posts were held, a fifth were reserved for soldiers fighting with the Blue Division (the level reached 80 percent for lower state employees). From the Civil War onwards, Franco took a special interest in the purging of the education system. It is possible that up to a third of all teachers received some kind of sanction but more significant still was the purge in the primary sector. Between 15,000 and 16,000 primary school teachers were punished, which was a quarter of the total number at work, and of those 6,000 were entirely banned from practicing their profession. As in other instances, often the geographical distribution of sanctions followed no perceptible reasoning but instead reflected the greater or lesser benevolence of the commission responsible for the purge. It was not just those employed by the State in the central Administration who were purged. In every town hall the existing municipal police were almost entirely replaced by newcomers. Among the workers employed on the Isabel II Canal which supplies Madrid with water, 57 percent received sanctions and 23 percent lost their jobs. Forty-two percent of workers on the trams in Barcelona were sacked. The impression one gains, then, is that the further down the ladder of public employment you went, the harsher the repression was.

All this suffering, taken as a whole, leads to the conclusion that when it is stated that the Franco regime was accepted passively the statement is only valid for the period immediately following World War II at the start of the 1950s. Also, we know about it from accounts of collective experience. It must be borne in mind too that quite apart from sanctions, there was also police surveillance. General José Ungría, who held major responsibility for surveillance, went so far as to say that under the new regime "denunciation by the police should be highly thought of, as a patriotic action." In Mallorca there was a military tribunal specially set up during World War II to try possible cases where there were disagreements. The entire population was divided into different categories identified with

letters of the alphabet. Category B, for example, grouped together "former left-wing sympathizers who, after the *Movimiento*, joined the national militia." There was even a letter to refer to persons "of dubious morality, who are susceptible to financial inducements." With this mixture of repression and surveillance it is not surprising that the regime managed to ensconce itself so firmly in Spain.

## Exile and the Start of the Postwar Period in Spain

These repressive measures were aimed at the vanquished but some of the defeated escaped them by choosing to emigrate. In this sense too the end of the Civil War caused a rupture in the course of Spanish history. All previous internal conflicts had been followed by more or less emigration but always on a small scale and never lasting so long. On this occasion the exiles, in far greater numbers, retained strong emotional links with Spain but in certain instances lost all sense of what it was really like politically.

Emigration had begun before the Civil War ended. When Franco took the northern zone, some 200,000 people sought refuge in France in several waves and 35,000 remained there. There was a further huge wave of emigration when Catalonia fell, at which moment some 350,000 people crossed the frontier of whom 180,000 were combatants. A third occasion was at the final conclusion of the fighting: leaving via Alicante some 15,000 people abandoned their homeland and settled in North Africa. By March 1939, there were 450,000 Spaniards in exile of whom the immense majority (430,000) stayed in France while a small minority – principally or almost exclusively communists – ended up in Russia.

The circumstances in which Spanish emigrants found themselves in neighboring France were dreadful at this time. The majority were kept in concentration camps in the south where they lacked even the basic conditions for life. Some of them were treated as criminal offenders. France had not foreseen that such great numbers of refugees would flood across the frontier and soon decided that the economic burden of subsidizing these camps was excessive. By the end of 1939 only about 182,000 refugees remained, 140,000 living in France. Because more than 20,000 people returned to Spain during World War II, the final count of those in permanent exile, according to the most likely figures, would have been about 162,000 people – a high enough figure, but one proportionate to that of those who went into exile after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Yet

if we take into account only the number of exiles in France at the end of World War II (about 100,000), the figure is higher than that of all cases of political emigration in the twentieth century added together.

These political exiles had to bear the weight of two added evils: the outbreak of World War II and internal strife. When Germany invaded Poland, the majority took up arms against the Germans. It is not surprising that the Germans considered them potentially dangerous and took action against them. Some of the leaders of the Popular Front were handed over to Franco; others did not suffer this fate, and some were deported to Germany, like Francisco Largo Caballero. About 13,000 Spaniards were taken from France to Germany where they ended up in concentration camps such as Mauthausen; only about 2,000 survived. In the resistance fighting against the German occupation in France there may have been 10,000 Spaniards or more. A large part of the south of France was liberated by Spanish combatants and among the first units to arrive in Paris were tanks bearing the names of battles fought during the Spanish Civil War.

Another misfortune for the exiles was disagreements among themselves – a continuation of the divisions that had existed between 1936 and 1939. In fact, rather than being a matter of ideological differences, this discord was linked to a clash between individual supporters and opponents of Juan Negrín and to the way that resources were shared out. From the time of the Civil War, Republican authorities answerable to Negrín had founded an Emigration Service for Spanish Republicans (*Servicio de Emigración de los Republicanos Españoles* or SERE). This organization was allowed to function in France until it was accused of conniving with communists and the French authorities closed down its offices in Paris. A rival organization soon emerged. In March 1939, the *Vita*, a ship belonging to SERE which was carrying what had been confiscated during the war in the zone controlled by the Popular Front, arrived in Mexico where it was seized by Indalecio Prieto with the approval of the Mexican authorities.

The socialist politician then set up a parallel organization to SERE, called the Junta for Aid to Spanish Republicans (*Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Españoles* or JARE). Past disagreements developed in exile into a bitter argument without either of the organizations ever giving a clear account of how their funds were being used. Meanwhile, there lurked an underlying question concerning the legitimacy of such Republican institutions which had been banned since the last phase of the Civil War. Only when an allied victory in World War II seemed possible did people begin to consider the possibility of rebuilding these institutions in Mexico.

The governments of the Basque Country and Catalonia were in equal crisis, to which was added a process of progressive radicalization.

The mention of Mexico says much about the Spaniards in exile. These splits in the middle classes on which Azaña blamed the outbreak of the Civil War highlighted the fact that large numbers of people (between 10,000 and 13,000) came from the classes that had led the country. The figures we have on this subject often vary but are nonetheless significant. Among the exiles there were possibly 2,500 professional members of the Armed Services, 500 doctors, 400 engineers, more than 1,000 lawyers and up to 12 percent of those who had held professorships in Spanish universities, including seven vice-chancellors. In Mexico a large number of Spanish intellectuals played a leading role in organizing important initiatives such as, for example, the founding of the College of Mexico or the Fondo de Cultura Económica publishing house. The contribution of Spaniards to Mexican life was so great that it could be called "a triumph" for this country. Integration into Mexican society was swift and in the 1940s half of the Spanish emigrants took Mexican nationality. In other parts of the world too, defeated Spaniards were warmly welcomed. In Cuba, the dictator Batista used Spanish immigration to give his regime a more liberal hue. Emigrants to Argentina were fewer and more predominantly intellectual, while Chile welcomed more proletarian elements.

Spanish emigration to Latin America as a consequence of the Civil War took on particular significance for world history. First and foremost, it was exile on a massive scale and of professional classes, something never seen before until that moment. In certain areas, such as the sciences or ideas, the emigrants represented a supremely important section of Spanish cultural life, which was therefore truncated in Spain. At the same time, emigration to Latin America was an intellectual experience: a discovery of the global nature of Spanish culture. So Juan Ramón Jiménez could write that he was "neither speechless nor exiled but reconciled." The mental world of the exiles was still on the other side of the Atlantic, and this explains their constant discourses on the nature of Spain. The poet León Felipe could write: "Franco, thine is the land, the house, the horse and the gun,/ mine is the ancient voice of the earth."[4]

Until now we have only referred to one of the Spains of the immediate postwar period. We must now return to the other side of the Atlantic where the victors, freed from all legal constraints, were preparing to write a new history of Spain from the very beginning and, at the same time, rebuild its ancient imperial glory. They did so, of course, with the enthusiasm

spawned by victory, "with an immense, constant, and perhaps absurd optimism" (the words are from Fernando Vizcaíno Casas), and in this case victory wore the dark blue shirt of the Falange.

Their enthusiasm was made up in equal parts of nationalism and Catholicism closely bound together with a strong determination to make an absolute break with the immediate past. Nationalism found a voice in stories such as the one that recounts how the dish known as "Russian Salad" was now called "National Salad," and hotels once called the "English Hotel" were now renamed "National Hotel." Stories such as these should not be thought of as trivial: a ministerial decree in May 1940 prohibited "the use of foreign generic words in the naming of establishments or services for recreation, commerce, industry, accommodation, the supplying of food, professional services, entertainment, and other such activities." An idealized past provided the ground plan for shaping the future, and of that past a peculiar vision was promoted from which the former liberal tradition and cultural pluralism of Spanish society had disappeared: hence the large posters put up in Barcelona bearing the words "Speak the Language of the Empire." At the same time the leaders of the New Spain were praised with almost religious devotion. Total identification with the person of Franco reached such an extreme that his image was used for commercial advertising, though this was banned in time. One film company claimed to be "the only one which never once produced an inch of celluloid for the Reds."

Another motto of the time ("From the Empire towards God") shows how close the relationship was between nationalism and Catholicism at this moment in the postwar years. What came to be called National Catholicism was not so much a theory as a way of looking at life. It was in no way false but rather deeply felt: the result of a reaction against the faith of the past which was seen as having been far too passive. This new faith was born as part of a fervent desire to reconquer society that was distinctly anti-modern and had no hesitation in conflating religion and politics. Its ideas were shared not only by the victors but even by some of the vanquished, for there were notable conversions and numerous late vocations that swelled the priesthood. What characterized National Catholicism was its "insatiability" – that is to say, its determination to gain total control and the idea that there was a direct and immediate link between Catholicism and politics or culture. The result was a deep-seated intolerance which led Ignacio Menéndez Reigada, the major propagandist of the Crusade ideal, to describe Protestants as "poisonous vermin."

It can come as no surprise, therefore, that one of the major preoccupations of Church authorities should have been to try to proscribe any dissident religious propaganda. The Spanish Church saw itself not as one possible version of Catholicism, or even the one that best suited Spain, but as absolutely the very best. In daily life National Catholicism was evident in what Agustín Foxá ironically called "national seminarism." What he meant was that there was a deeply felt but very elementary form of religion which was usually not just pretentious but also ignorant and which took the form of an extreme form of clericalism. Pemán used to say of Franco that he was the only world leader who, in his political discourses, did not just refer generally to the divine but made specific mention of particular elements of devotional practice associated with the Blessed Virgin Mary. In tune with the mentality of a society that had decided to take a step back in time, women were seen solely as destined for procreation. At the start of 1941, for example, a system of "financial loans for the wedded state" was set up which compelled those women who took advantage of them to give up any jobs they had, while official propaganda spoke of the need for "fertile families to send members of our race out into the world to build and uphold empires." Women were always portrayed as modest and traditional. In accordance with this image, Cardinal Plá y Deniel, the Archbishop Primate of Toledo, gave specific guidance on the length of women's sleeves and skirts and on their necklines. This reference to clothing will not be seen as coincidental if we take into account that in this sphere as well there was an attempt to turn the clock back. In explicit contrast to the image of proletarian women that Orwell had contemplated during his visit to revolutionary pre-Civil War Barcelona, Cambó was able to affirm that at the very moment that Franco's troops entered Madrid, "there were women wearing hats in Madrid, and that meant that once again there was civilization."

Along with all this enthusiasm on the part of the victors, there was a far more prosaic, even cruel reality. As Cambó had foreseen, the postwar period saw an accumulation of ills in the daily lives of ordinary Spaniards. One need only cast an eye over a few aspects of their daily diet and health conditions to see this. It appears that meat consumption went down to a third of its previous level and that in 1941 there were 50,000 deaths as a result of gastrointestinal infections. Five percent of university students were suffering from tuberculosis: an illness that accounted for about 26,000 deaths a year between 1940 and 1942.

Nothing shows the other side of the coin of the victors' enthusiasm better than the situation in which the press found itself. There were no general guidelines published or rules of censorship but the workings of the censors were so meticulous that newspapers were told to publish certain stories and not others, all "with due warmth." The novelist Miguel Delibes, who worked as a newspaper editor during those years, has written that "it is hard to imagine an inquisitorial machinery more "coercive, closed, and Machiavellian" than that put in place by the Franco Administration, which "left no loophole for personal initiative." Working on the subversion of freedom of expression at the lowest level, the censors, on minimal salaries and in precarious positions, rather than being enthusiastic supporters of the regime, were individuals forced to perform a lamentable task – or even to submit their own writings to scrutiny – because of their personal circumstances and in exchange for a pittance. One can imagine the inevitable mixture of humiliation descending into abjection that those who lived in such an atmosphere must have felt.

This was what Spain was like in the triumphal year 1939 in which the Civil War ended. It was this Spain that would have to face up to the years that followed and World War II, together with subsequent isolation that was a direct result of the peculiarities of the Franco regime. Whenever the time comes to pass judgment, it will always be important to bear in mind the contrast between the enthusiasm of the victors on the one hand and the actual reality of repression and exile on the other, and of the degree to which those in power tried to hide the reality that surrounded them.

## Bibliography

A good general discussion: Stanley PAYNE, *El régimen de Franco, 1936–1975*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1987 (*The Franco regime 1936–1975*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987 and London: Phoenix Press, 2000). Aspects of the topic: Javier TUSELL, Susana SUEIRO, José María MARÍN, *El régimen de Franco (1936–1975). Política y relaciones exteriores*, UNED, Madrid, 1993, and "Franquismo," *Historia Social*, no. 30 (1998). Recent university publications about the period: Jesús A. MARTÍNEZ (coordinator), *Historia de España. Siglo XX*, Cátedra, Madrid, 1999, and volume XLI of the *Historia de España* by MENÉNDEZ PIDAL continued by JOVER, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1996, edited by Raymond CARR. A brief book: Juan Pablo FUSI, José Luis GARCÍA DELGADO, Santos JULIÁ, Edward MALEFAKIS, Stanley PAYNE, *Franquismo*, Temas de Hoy, Madrid, 2000.

There are many biographies of Franco, though they are of varying worth. The most extensive is Paul PRESTON, *Franco. A biography*, Harper Collins, London, 1993 (Spanish translation published by Grijalbo), which cannot be considered definitive. See also, Juan Pablo FUSI, *Franco. Autoritarismo y poder personal*, El País, Madrid, 1985; Stanley PAYNE, *Franco, el perfil de la Historia*, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1992, and Alberto REIG, *Franco, caudillo: mito y realidad*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1995. Franco's writings: *Apuntes personales del Generalísimo sobre la República y la guerra civil*, Fundación Francisco Franco, Madrid, 1977, and *Papeles sobre la guerra de Marruecos*, Fundación Francisco Franco, Madrid, 1986. The *Documentos inéditos para la Historia del Generalísimo Franco*, published in Madrid by the Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, stop at the end of World War II. Studies on aspects of his personality, in J. A. FERRER BENIMELI, *El contubernio judeo-masónico comunista*, Istmo, Madrid, 1982; Román GUBERN, *Raza: el ensueño del general Franco*, Ediciones 99, Madrid, 1977; Herbert R. SOUTHWORTH, *El lavado de cerebro de Francisco Franco*, Crítica, Barcelona, 2000 (*Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: the brainwashing of Francisco Franco*, New York: Routledge, 2001). The memoirs of those who lived closest to him during the long period of the dictatorship are most useful: Francisco FRANCO SALGADO ARAÚJO, *Mi vida junto a Franco*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1977, and *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1976. Highly debatable in terms of the interpretation it offers is Luis SUÁREZ FERNÁNDEZ's *Francisco Franco y su tiempo*, Fundación Francisco Franco, Madrid, 1984 and following.

Interpretations of Francoism as a political regime: Juan J. LINZ, "Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime: the case of Spain" in Robert DAHL, *Regimes and oppositions*, Yale University Press, New York, 1973; "An authoritarian Regime: Spain," in ALLARDT-LITTUNEN, *Cleavages, ideologies and party systems*, Helsinki, 1964; Amando DE MIGUEL, *Sociología del franquismo*, Euros, Barcelona, 1975; Ismael SAZ, *Fascismo y franquismo*, Universitat de València, Valencia, 2004, and Javier TUSELL, *La dictadura de Franco*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1988. Monographs on political life throughout the Franco years in Richard GUNTHER, *Public policy in a no party state; Spanish planning in the twilight of the franquist era*, University of California Press, 1980; Guy HERMET, *Les catholiques dans l'Espagne franquiste*, PUF, Paris, 1980–1981; Javier TUSELL, Emilio GENTILE and Giuliana DI FEBO (eds.), *Fascismo y franquismo, cara a cara. Una perspectiva histórica*, Biblioteca Breve, Madrid, 2004.

Repression and purges during the Franco regime: Josep BENET, *La mort del president Companys*, Barcelona, 1962; J. CASANOVA, F. ESPINOSA, C. MIR and F. MORENO, *Vivir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco*, Crítica, Barcelona, 2003; Santos JULIÁ, et al. (eds.), *Víctimas de la guerra civil*, Temas de Hoy, Madrid, 1999; Conxita MIR, et al., *Repressió econòmica i franquisme: l'actuació del Tribunal de Responsabilitats Polítiques a la provincia de Lleida*, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1997; C. MOLINERO,

M. SALA and J. SOBREQUÉS, *Una inmensa prisión. Los campos de concentración y las prisiones durante la guerra civil y el franquismo*, Crítica, Barcelona, 2003; Francisco MORENTE, *La escuela y el Estado Nuevo. La depuración del magisterio nacional (1936–1943)*, Ámbito, Valladolid, 1977. On exile: José Luis ABELLÁN, *De la guerra civil al exilio republicano (1936–1977)*, Planeta, Madrid, 1982 and, especially, the anthology *El exilio español de 1939*, Taurus, Madrid, 1976, 5 vols., and Javier RUBIO, *La emigración de la guerra civil de 1936–1939*, San Martín, Madrid, 1977.

## Notes

1 A state holding company created by Franco in 1941 to promote economic viability and strengthen defence industries.
2 Gabino Bugallal Araujo (1861–1932), of a wealthy landowning family further enriched at the time of the 1830 selling off of Church lands, was the third generation to wield such power as local political bosses (*caciques*) that a movement – *bugallismo* – was named after them.
3 A one-chamber parliament to which the executive was not answerable, which served to rubber-stamp decisions.
4 "Franco, tuya es la hacienda, la casa, el caballo y la pistola, / mía es la voz antigua de la tierra."

# 1

# The Temptation of Fascism and the Will to Survive (1939–51)

If we view Francoism as a single period, we see that the year 1959 was crucial, not just economically as a result of the change that occurred at that moment, but also politically because that year saw a blurring of any identification with the fascist model and the dictatorship became more bureaucratic in style. It was no mere chance that the emphasis on politics in the period immediately following 1939 coincided with an economic situation that had become disastrous through mismanagement by those in power.

Dividing the Franco years into 5-year periods also makes sense. If 1959 is taken to be a pivotal year, the two decades preceding it can be seen as leading up to it while the following 15 years show the consequences of the change that occurred in that year. The first decade of the Franco regime was characterized by internal unity. During the early years of the dictatorship every effort was made to align the victorious Spain that had won the war with the powers that had been its allies during the conflict. That effort provides the key to the entire period and explains why Spain was later ostracized.

What happened in effect was that there was an attempt to rebuild Spain according to a model that was the complete antithesis of what had gone before. The attempt to establish fascism within the country was closely linked to an expansionist policy outside, in the same way as survival, thanks to cosmetic changes from 1945 onwards, focused Spain's foreign policy entirely on the need simply to survive. As for political opposition to the regime, during World War II and afterwards it kept going by remaining focused on how the Civil War had ended. One can even go so far as to say that Spanish culture of the period was deeply marked by the immediate impact of the recent conflict.

If it makes sense to view the period as a single chronological unit, it also makes just as much sense to divide it up. The World War II years were not only marked by Spain's foreign policy but were also the first moments in the new regime's political journey. Furthermore, it was the period in which Franco served his apprenticeship and learned his political skills. In the period that followed, one might say that this apprenticeship was completed, and what became central to life in Spain was its ability to resist outside pressure.

## A Failed Attempt to Make Spain Fascist

In the months following the Civil War Spain seemed to move towards an alignment with the Axis, more in terms of political institutions than foreign policy. Concerning the latter, the fact that Spain joined the anti-Komintern pact and left the League of Nations (*Sociedad de Naciones*) was proof of its ideological tendencies.

Visits by Spanish leaders to Germany and Italy confirm that this desire for alignment existed, especially the talks that took place in Rome in May 1939 between the fascist leaders and Serrano Suñer. This rising star in Franco's government enjoyed a close relationship with Ciano and even with Mussolini, and it was this that earned him a reputation as the representative of fascist politics in Spain. Nor was Serrano's reputation derived solely from the regime's international alignment; it came also from its internal politics. Mussolini, by advising Franco not to proclaim Spain a monarchy and by emphasizing the need to "talk to the people," was in effect suggesting that the regime become more fascist. Ciano's visit to Spain in July confirmed this sense of there being an alignment with Italy. Discussions in the Spanish Council of Ministers – Franco's cabinet – now revealed clear tension between those who were ready to follow the rising star, Serrano, and those who were not.

Although crisis had been brewing for some time, it finally erupted in August; by then Franco had already done away with the monarchist Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez. The change in government signaled victory for Serrano, who from that moment until 1942 was the key figure in Spanish politics. A cultured and intelligent lawyer, Serrano was superior to the rest of the regime's emerging political class, though he by no means lacked faults, being megalomaniac, ambitious, tending to foster a personality cult, intemperate, and secretive. As well as keeping his government portfolio, Serrano also

managed to take on the presidency of the party's Political Junta; from then on he was addressed as "Minister President" by a press that he himself controlled. It is even perfectly possible that the young generals serving in various ministries for the Armed Services at that time (Juan Yagüe, Agustín Muñoz Grandes, and José Enrique Varela) were there not only because Franco trusted them more than those who had brought him to power but because from Serrano's point of view they were more susceptible to his own influence. There were in the new government personalities from the traditional Catholic right, but only as technical advisers or because they were close to Serrano (José Ibáñez Martín and José Larraz); the monarchist presence was much less evident – a clear sign that Franco saw it as potentially dangerous. The Carlist presence (Esteban Bilbao) was manageable.

The all-powerful Franco–Serrano duo was strengthened by a number of measures. Shortly before the governmental crisis, General Queipo de Llano was sent to Italy; in practice, he was exiled. At the same time, legislation was passed on the position of the Chief of State who, from then onwards, "on a permanent basis," would be able to exercise the functions of government without need of prior consultation with the cabinet. In fact, thanks to measures such as these, Franco acquired more absolute power than even Stalin – who had, at least in theory, to obey a Constitution – or Hitler, who was answerable to a parliament. The ratification of the party statutes, praised by Mussolini, took on characteristics that made them virtually identical to those of the fascists. Not only were the National Council and its Political Junta endowed with decisive political importance but also provision was made for controlling trade unions and armed militias. The economic plan approved in October 1939 was notable for its tendency towards autarchy.

If there was indeed a will to make Spain more fascist, one must ask why fascism never came anywhere near gaining control there. The reply to this question may be found in what actually happened in a situation in which internal politics were closely bound up with the international situation. In brief, it would only have been possible for the regime to become fascist if Franco's Spain had decided to join in World War II on the side of the Axis. In 1939 and 1940 any attempt to increase fascist influence would have been in its earliest stages and was unlikely to mature, and if the intention had been clear it nonetheless had fundamental weaknesses from the start.

The role of the army in the Spain that emerged victorious from the Civil War was of supreme importance and there was never the slightest

doubt that it would have to be a major player were conflict to arise, in contrast to what happened in, say, Romania. One must bear in mind that in 1939, 80 percent of posts in the Administration were reserved for ex-combatants (and not, for example, for party militants) and that at least 25 percent of all political posts were given to men with an Army background. We have already noted that during the Civil War the military dominated the Administration in the rearguard and that in the wake of the conflict they took on the task of repression. Even in the Party's National Council, if 24 percent of its members were party veterans, about another 20 percent were from the Armed Services. As late as 1951, 27 percent of mayors and local councilors were Civil War ex-combatants. Any victory of the Party over the army could only have been possible if the Party had managed to establish for itself a more influential role in Spanish society.

The early years of the post-Civil War period illustrate clearly just how limited any growth in fascist influence actually was. The Party published figures which seemed to show its strength: in 1939 it had 650,000 members, and in 1945 1,000,000, in addition to 2,000 government employees and another 10,000 in the union organization, and it was no doubt monopolized by the most orthodox Falangists. The role of Carlism decreased: the position it occupied allowed it to retain some influence but it was marginalized and limited in the impact it might have. As regards the Party, the Carlist attitude can be summed up in what an ex-minister, the Conde de Rodezno, told Franco: it would not have been openly hostile but it certainly lacked solidarity. It was only in Navarre that Carlism had any real influence. Membership of the Party varied according to regions. In Catalonia it was tiny before the outbreak of the Civil War; it could only draw members from the anti-Catalanist right and a few local notables. In the Basque Country the Party managed to gain the support of traditionalists at a municipal level and of those linked to Falange in positions of power in the provinces. Over a large part of the Iberian Peninsula traditional elites were of the right. It is possible to discern a limited achievement of the aim of "nationalizing the masses" in the incorporation into the Party of former left-wing militants: A study of the Aljarafe district in the province of Seville shows that 15 percent of Party members came from left-wing militias and expressed radical opinions with uncompromising directness. This explains why it embarked on a mission of social action which went so far as to include speaking out strongly against monopolies. At the same time, the fact that it was a leading force in society meant that

it could also play a policing role. Whatever the situation, its powers of coercion and its propaganda against its opponents had a far greater impact than any willingness to sign up to its ideas. Despite censorship, only sections of the press and the media could ever be considered tools of "fascist expansion" at the time. By around 1940 it was obvious that the result of the Party's attempt to influence society would remain ambiguous: in practice it fostered fear and passive acceptance rather than whole-hearted commitment.

Nor did the institutions that governed the Party work well. The National Council remained a divided body that in fact did very little, so much so that there is not much to be gained by discussing it further. More or less the same could be said of the Political Junta. The Institute of Political Studies (*Instituto de Estudios Políticos*), which was supposedly the intellectual breeding-ground of fascism, never matched up to its reputation. It might initially have been thought that in organizations aimed at young people there might have been a will to see fascism spread. However, the revolutionary Spanish Students' Union (*Sindicato Español Universitario* or SEU) finally lost its battle for life in 1941 with the disappearance in Russia of its principal radical leader, Enrique Sotomayor. Although the SEU had more than 50,000 members, there were always obvious gaps in its coverage of Spanish territory, the most obvious being in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In 1943, compulsory membership became the rule for all students. The Youth Front (*Frente de Juventudes*) created in December 1940 never had more than 13 percent of young people on its lists, and the percentage of women was even lower. Unlike what had been on offer in Germany, training was traditional, being run by soldiers and primary school teachers who had left their 20s far behind them, so without ever entirely losing its Falangist character, the Youth Front drifted towards educational and sporting activities. A parallel voluntary organization, Franco's Falange Youth Groups (*Falanges Juveniles de Franco*) – whose identification with the leader is itself significant – barely attracted 18 percent of young men and 8 percent of women. Last of all, the section of the Party aimed at women favored the domestic ideal of the model housewife that typified the traditional Spanish right. The *Sección Femenina* of Falange offered the mother as its role model rather than the young revolutionary. Its leader, Pilar Primo de Rivera, left no one in any doubt that "the real duty of women to their Fatherland is to bring up families on firm foundations of austerity and cheerfulness where all that is traditional can flourish." Nothing was so worthy of praise as a woman's "submissiveness"

to men. Numbers of members never even reached a third of those in equivalent organizations in Italy; women barely took part in mass processions and could rarely be photographed doing gymnastics.

The Party quickly lost the political battle in two areas. In the summer of 1940 militias were set up but not much was achieved beyond laying down very elementary guidelines for mobilization. The military makes militias superfluous and in Franco's Spain the initial victory that had laid the foundations for the regime belonged unequivocally to the Army. Falangist union organizations did not play a major role in the national economy either. According to the Law on the Bases of Union Organization (*Ley de Bases de Organización Sindical*) of December 1940, although unions claimed to represent "the entire people organized as a working militia" the law did not include chambers of commerce or members of the professional classes. There is nothing of greater significance in the blocking of the revolutionary aims of the Falangist union organization than the fact that it was an army general, Andrés Saliquet, who denounced the man in charge of it, Merino, as a former Freemason. In Mussolini's Italy, the Party controlled and put blocks on union activity; in Spain, the force that exercised the greatest power – the Army – closed the door on Merino by denouncing him.

Mention of the Party takes us on into World War II. For Franco's Spain the invasion of Poland was not welcome news but it responded by aligning itself with its Civil War allies. For the first months of World War II Franco's Spain was closely aligned with fascist Italy but was in no state to think of taking part in the conflict, not even to the limited extent that the Duce considered his own country able to participate. In the event, in April 1940, when Mussolini decided to enter the war, he told Franco first, and when in May it became clear that France had been defeated, the Falangist press began to demand the return of Gibraltar. The spectacular defeat of France – Spain's traditional enemy in Morocco – immediately meant that Spain was tempted to join in the war in an attempt to gain some benefit in a radically new European order. Two days after Mussolini joined the war, Franco and Serrano modified Spain's position and put it on a footing of "non-belligerence," which in Italy's case had meant "pre-belligerence." The fact that over those same days Italian warplanes were allowed to overfly Spanish territory to bomb the British made participation seem more likely.

For Spain actually to take part in World War II it would have needed its economic situation to be better than it was and for there to be a greater

degree of internal cohesion. By December 1939 there was already discontent among the highest-ranking military officers directed at Franco and strong reservations concerning Serrano who, in the eyes of many, had too much power concentrated in his person, gave too much support to a Falange that was too revolutionary, was dominant, megalomaniac, and even seemed not to get on well with those who had helped to bring him to power. In January 1940, General Muñoz Grandes was replaced as Minister Secretary General of the *Movimiento* after only a few months in the position. It is worth underlining the fact that a regime that prided itself on following the model of fascist Italy should have appointed a soldier as leader of the Party when it was in fact a soldier who would replace Mussolini in 1943.

## The Temptation to Intervene and Internal Conflict (1940–2)

It has been written that a triumphant Germany immediately put pressure on Spain to join in World War II and that this pressure was insistent and lasting even if it never succeeded in breaking down Franco's resistance. What actually happened, however, was that after Germany's victory in France, the Spanish leadership identified totally with the Axis and this situation lasted, with different nuances and some hesitations, until well on into 1944. German pressure to induce Spain to intervene in the war, though strong for several months, did not last very long. The initiative concerning Spain's possible entry into the conflict was taken not by Germany but by the leaders of Franco's Spain. In mid June 1940, the *caudillo* sent General Jorge Vigón to hold talks with Hitler and express Spain's willingness to become a participant in the conflict. On this occasion Spain for the first time made substantial territorial demands. These consisted – and remained so for some months – of the extension of its possessions in the Sahara and Guinea and, above all, of the occupation of the whole of Morocco and the part of Algeria that had been colonized by Spaniards. There was not a single section of the Franco regime that was not in favor of these imperialist ambitions. If for Falange Spain's imperial destiny seemed likely to be fulfilled by this process, for Africanists who had fought in North Africa long-cherished ambitions would be realized. The Falangists, nonetheless, were the most ambitious (and least realistic) and at times demanded Spanish expansion into the south of France and Portugal too.

There was never the slightest chance that the Franco regime's aims would ever be achieved because the position of Hitler's Germany on the issue was a far cry from what was widely desired in Madrid. The Führer was never a strong advocate of a historical justice that would allow Spain to fulfill its aspirations; for Hitler Spain was a not very important country that he expected to follow his lead of its own free will and be ready to furnish him with raw materials and strategic advantages in return for almost nothing. In Hitler's view, not even the Mediterranean was of any importance. Once France was defeated, he hesitated briefly over where Germany should next expand, finally deciding on eastern Europe with the result that Spain was no longer of any interest to him.

Having outlined the German position, we can now return to the events that were now unfolding. In July 1940, the Spanish Foreign Minister Juan Luis Beigbeder suggested occupying part of French Morocco on the pretext of controlling disturbances there. The operation never took place, probably because the French kept up a high level of military presence in the area and because Germany was never likely to authorize it. There was, however, an attempt to replicate this kind of spectacular decision in the style of Mussolini which, although it was somewhat of a caricature, did not, unlike the Italian model, end in a fiasco. At the very moment when German troops were entering Paris, Spanish troops occupied Tangiers, announcing the move as irreversible. The French representative was expelled from the city and a German consulate was set up there, whose actual aim was espionage. In practice it would be as late as 1944, when the war seemed to be turning decisively in favor of the Allies, that Spain would come round to considering the zone it controlled as international once more.

Shortly afterwards in 1940 Spain made concessions of considerable strategic advantage to the Germans: by July there was a German military mission in Spain preparing for an eventual retaking of Gibraltar, besides which, throughout 1940 and 1941, thanks to what was called Operation Moor, a total of 18 German submarines were re-provisioning in Spain. This allowed them to extend their radius of action considerably – so much so that they could reach as far as northern Brazil. The Germans also benefited from the information provided by the Spanish secret services, and even such people as Serrano handed over to Nazi diplomats dispatches from neutral ambassadors and anyone whose information might be interesting to them, such as, for example, the Duke of Alba, Spain's representative in London.

The German presence on the French–Spanish border signaled imminent danger for what was to become the United Kingdom's main base on the Old Continent: Portugal. The Portuguese might well have feared that Germany would attack through Spain with Spanish help and it was in these circumstances that negotiations took place, beginning at the end of June 1940 and ending a month later. The treaty was seen by the Spanish as a way of drawing Portugal away from the British cause and into its own camp. The British were not at all worried that their ally should sign up to such an agreement because it did not alter Britain's own policy towards Spain, outlined before Germany had ever become a threat. In Britain's view, a friendly Spain was desirable but a neutral Spain was essential. This was why it sent as its ambassador to Madrid an important Conservative, Sir Samuel Hoare. The ambassador, as eagerly as the Foreign Office, favored maintaining a stance that would incline Spain towards neutrality by exerting pressure on provisioning. The tactic used was typical of British Imperialism: to neutralize a dangerous area with the minimum of military effort and at only a limited economic cost. However, the policy went hand in hand with errors in execution and excessive fatuousness on the part of Hoare. On more than one occasion Churchill considered that invading part if not all of Spain's territory might prove to be a necessity given the possibility of Franco inclining towards the Axis and endangering the UK's strategic position.

Hoare tried to make his influence felt in military circles and used money to buy the support of monarchist generals. Yet his most effective policy consisted of a series of agreements from the final months of 1940 onwards that allowed Spain to be provided with enough oil and essential supplies to survive but not, on the other hand, to join in the war. However, despite all this, the possibility that Germany might invade Spain with the help of part if not all of those in power meant that plans were drawn up to block the way to Gibraltar and allow a takeover of the Canary Islands. A large amount of Britain's limited combat resources were kept on alert for many months in case of such an eventuality.

An important aspect of Britain's policy was the need to persuade the Americans to come into line with the British position. However, the United States tended to be even more anti-Francoist than Britain, perhaps as a result of the way that the two countries had chosen to distance themselves from each other after the Civil War. When an agreement with the United States to supply oil was finally reached at the start of 1942, only 60 percent of Spain's previous consumption of petroleum products was conceded.

If British policy was decided on and put into action swiftly in that crucial summer of 1940, remaining unchanged until the end of the war, German policy was formulated later and therefore was more subject to change. In fact, it was only in 1945 that Hitler realized that he should already have persuaded Spain to join in the conflict by the summer of 1940; that would have allowed him to take Gibraltar which in turn would have allowed him to gain a stranglehold on the UK's main communications route to its Empire. He had not done so because he believed that with his air force he could force Churchill to submit. In any case, Hitler did not want the French colonial empire to fall into British hands. All these factors meant that he could not satisfy Franco's excessive territorial demands, which were the essential condition for Spain's entry into the war.

Over the summer of 1940 and on into September the Spanish repeatedly presented their demands to Hitler but in the course of a visit in September Serrano, who was soon to take on the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, discovered to his great surprise that the rebuilding of Europe was not going to take the shape that Spain's notion of historical justice required but instead one that entirely suited Hitler's own personal interests. Not only were Serrano's requests barely granted a hearing but, moreover, he was faced with a German demand for one of the Canary Islands and another naval base in either Agadir or Mogador. He, as much as Franco, was strongly in favor of taking Spain into the war; as Franco wrote, "we shall benefit from being in the war but not by acting in haste." His idea was to gain substantial territorial advantages with the least possible intervention, but Hitler thought that Franco's Spain was a weak country lacking in resources which was asking too much and arrogantly attempting to mount an operation against Gibraltar for which it lacked the necessary means. This last factor was decisive: taking everything into account, the Führer himself explained to those working with him that by trying to reconcile the conflicting interests of Spain, Italy, and France, he was trying to bring off a "monumental deception."

This meant that Spanish desires never stood a chance of being met given Hitler's own agenda, while there was a distinct possibility that Franco might give way under the stubborn, calculated pressure exerted by the master of Europe. Nonetheless, accounts of their meeting at Hendaye in October 1940 have suggested that Franco managed to avoid committing himself while Hitler was in despair at his own failure to make him do so. What really happened was that Hitler, who had always despised the Spanish leaders, managed on that occasion to get them to sign a protocol

that committed Spain to entering the conflict but on no precise date, which meant that the situation remained open. Franco himself had gone to the meeting with a memorandum in which he explained that he could not enter the war "just because he wanted to," reminding Germany that Italy had become a burden to its ally. The critical moment in Germany's pressurizing of Spain occurred in the last weeks of 1940. Hitler, whose main focus of concern was Central and Eastern Europe, had no strategy in mind for the Mediterranean except for a few brief weeks, and by January 1941 he considered the option of taking Gibraltar closed. In any case, his troops in the Balkans were having to cover for Italian defeats and when the invasion of Russia took place it became impossible to undertake sizeable operations at both extremes of Europe.

In February 1941, on one of only two journeys that Franco ever made outside Spain, accompanied by Serrano he met for talks with the Duce in Bordighera. He explained to the fascist leader that he not only wanted to enter the war but that he was afraid he might do so "too late." Mussolini, who must at that time have assumed that the war had already been won by Hitler, did not credit Spanish intervention with much importance: "How can a country which has not got bread to last the week go to war?" he asked one of his associates. It must be said that he himself had not won any great victories and Spain might become a competitor in the sharing of power around the Mediterranean. What happened after that was a repeat of what had gone before: Italy wanted Spain to join in the war but only when Italy said so and only when it best suited Italian interests.

From the start of 1941 on, Germany's military strategic planning on Spain was purely defensive: it anticipated only the creation of a protective front in the north which would move back gradually in the event of British troops taking the Iberian Peninsula. Spain no longer served Axis interests beyond its function as a defensive wall. That year Germany imported seven times as much military material from Spain and in 1943 Spain's trade with the Reich accounted for 25 percent of the country's total and was above the level of trade with Allied countries. This did not, however, mean that Spanish supplies were essential to the Reich except in certain strategic materials and at the end of the war. Germany gained significant trade concessions from Spain, yet at the same time instructions to the German ambassador in Madrid were to keep out of internal politics which, throughout 1941, were particularly uneasy.

A decisive factor in Spain's non-intervention in World War II was the lack of unity among the leaders of the regime which witnessed bitter

confrontation between the military and Falange exacerbated by Serrano's determination to hold on to his own personal power. In June 1940 Franco had dismissed Yagüe, who had been accused of disloyalty, possibly by Serrano himself. More decisive still was the formation of a military party opposed to what Franco represented. Some generals favored intervention in the war but all of them were far more aware than the Falangists were of the dangers for Spain of insufficient preparedness. "With what?" asked one general when the possibility of Spain joining in the war was being discussed in his presence. The military feared that the exalted national sentiment stirred up by the Party might lead to an engagement in the conflict that would be suicidal; their high-ranking officers had advocated caution in any statements coming from those with political responsibility, and caution was not the style favored either by Falange or by Serrano. Yet there was also a question of the distribution of power. The military believed that they had won the Civil War and considered that it was they who had put Franco in the position he now enjoyed. In their view Falange was demagogic and ineffectual and Serrano was abusing the excessive power to which he clung.

In May 1941 a crisis-point was reached like no other in the entire history of Francoism. What made it different was how long it lasted and the fact that Franco, having tried to resolve it in one way, found himself forced to back down. At the start of May Falange, controlled by Serrano, declared itself no longer subject to censorship; at the same time, two members with the evocative surname Primo de Rivera – Pilar and Miguel – resigned from their posts in the organization. On May 5, it was announced that Galarza, who until then had been undersecretary to the Presidency, was moving over to be Minister of the Interior: a post that had in fact been vacant but in effect had been controlled by Serrano through the undersecretary since he himself had taken on the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. At the same time Carrero Blanco, who was destined to play such an important role later in internal politics, took over the post of Undersecretary to the Presidency.

However, Falange had the strength to retaliate. The Falangist newspaper *Arriba* launched a personal attack on the new Minister of the Interior and there followed a whole battery of resignations. Some, like Larraz, acted out of a conviction that the regime was handling the economy very badly, but those who resigned were above all leaders within Falange and Serrano himself was among them. He wrote to the Chief of State, addressing him as "Dear General," and assured him in a menacing tone that "the

case as far as we are concerned now offers no dignified solution." Franco was forced to make changes: on May 16, no fewer than four highly significant Falangists were appointed to ministerial posts: Arrese as Minister-Secretary of the *Movimiento*; Miguel Primo de Rivera as Agriculture Minister and Girón as Labor Minister; another Falangist, Joaquín Benjumea, became Finance Minister, taking over from Larraz. If we add to their number Serrano and Demetrio Carceller, we have to conclude that never before or subsequently did Falange play such a decisive role in government. Yet Franco managed to keep Galarza on as Minister of the Interior and Galarza, from that position of power, began to appoint provincial governors and leaders of the Party. At his side, Carrero started to make moves prejudicial to Falangist interests; what he saw as necessary was not a party in chaos confronting the military but rather a "select minority" with administrative skills. Finally, the star of the only person capable of leading Falange to a monopoly of power – Serrano Suñer – began its decline. From that moment on he controlled neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the press; he had also lost his monopoly in relations between Falange and Franco. In the future this role would be played by Arrese, who was more submissive and less intelligent but also less ambitious, and who would end up supplanting entirely the brother-in-law to the dictator.

It is significant that this crisis coincided almost exactly with the signing of an agreement between the Vatican and Spain which resolved the greatest problem that existed between the two powers: the appointment of bishops in Spain. The Spanish Church felt it had cause for grave concern in the final months of 1939. Its bishops feared at that stage that an attempt might be made to gag the Church. Pontifical documents were subjected to censorship, as actually happened when they spoke out against Nazi racism. The decisive issue was that of the appointment of bishops, as Franco's Spain wanted the right to nominate candidates. Disagreement was so profound that the appointment process ground to a halt and by the end of 1940 some 20 dioceses were vacant. Agreement was finally reached in the days following the governmental crisis, probably because Serrano felt he needed a diplomatic success. As a result, bishops were appointed according to a system whereby the Vatican was presented with a previously agreed list of candidates. Obviously, at the same time, the image of relations between Spain and the Vatican presented to the public was idyllic. The Saint Barbara festival was like a royal coronation and Franco was accompanied throughout those years and the period that followed by a relic of Saint Teresa's hand, captured from the enemy in Malaga in the Civil War.

In June 1941 the German offensive against Russia united the Francoist leadership for a time, all agreeing that, as Serrano put it, "Russia was guilty" of causing Spain's ills in the 1930s. Yet there was disagreement even on the subject of the Spanish Volunteer Division (*División Española de Voluntarios*) sent to Russia: not least concerning its name, since in Falangist circles it was called simply the Blue Division (*División Azul*). There also appear to have been differences of opinion on who should command it since some thought that it was a matter of political responsibility while others considered the operation strictly military. As happened on so many occasions, Franco opted for what seemed like a solution to suit both sides, which was to hand over command to a Falangist soldier, Muñoz Grandes. The Spanish Division numbered 18,000 men and saw action in the Leningrad sector. Muñoz Grandes met twice with Hitler in 1942 and expressed quite openly his own unequivocal support of the Axis. As time passed and Franco decided that Muñoz Grandes's position as commander of the Division had become problematic, he got rid of him by the simple device of making him a lieutenant general: a rank that meant he could no longer stay in Russia. German victories at the start of the conflict had made an early Soviet collapse seem likely. In July 1941 Franco had stated that the war "had been approached wrongly and that the Allies had lost it." Not even the entry of the United States into the war at the end of 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor induced the Spanish leadership to be more prudent in their pronouncements.

Over this time, confrontation between Falange and the Army was becoming more frequent. Spain's entire political life was taken up with a succession of confrontations between soldiers and Falangists that became increasingly violent. As Serrano's role had become less important, internal strife had built up such a store of acute tension that finally violence erupted. On August 16, 1942, a group of radical Falangists threw bombs at the close of a religious service in Begoña at which the Army Minister, the traditionalist Varela, had been present. The immediate result was a political crisis whose gravity can be measured by how long it lasted and how many people were dismissed from their posts. General Varela resigned, blaming Falange for what had happened. The crisis would have ended there had Franco, urged on by Carrero, not thought it necessary to compensate for Varela's resignation by distancing himself from Serrano. There was at this point no response from Falangists in support of Serrano to make Franco change his mind. On September 13, Varela was replaced by Carlos Asensio and Serrano Suñer by General Jordana, a former vice-president during the

Civil War. There was no indication that the crisis signaled a step towards a change in foreign policy; rather it appeared to be the result of internal factors. Foreign ambassadors judged quite correctly that what had happened showed that the only effective force within the Spanish regime was the Army; they were right, but only in part, because the ultimate winner was in fact Franco himself. No other political crisis would last as long as those that faced him in 1941 and 1942. The Falangists themselves, and more especially their Secretary General Arrese, submitted to the authority of the dictator despite the fact that a Falangist was executed. In the difficult times that lay ahead, Falangists and the *caudillo* would form a tight-knit group bound together by mutual interest.

During the period in which Serrano Suñer enjoyed political hegemony, attempts were made to endow relations with the Spanish-American world with special significance through cultural contacts. In defiance of democratic ideals Falange, working through diplomatic channels, launched a virulent campaign against the United States. The creation of the Council of the Hispanic World (*Consejo de la Hispanidad*) in November 1940, when the possibility of Spain joining in World War II had not been definitively dismissed, provided an administrative structure. The impact of this policy on Spanish interests was catastrophic: apart from the fact that there were no actual advantages gained, throughout the years following its implementation it was a heavy burden on the Franco regime.

## Stumbling Progress towards Neutrality (1942–5)

The change in direction in politics within Spain allowed the move towards neutrality that Jordana might have been working towards to benefit from the new turn the war was taking. The new Foreign Minister repeatedly assured the Axis that Spanish foreign policy was not going to change under any circumstances; nonetheless, at the first meeting of the government a resolution was approved that meant that the term "non-belligerence" disappeared.

The Allies had now gained the initiative in the war and were in action in a part of the world that directly affected Spain. Landings in North Africa were accompanied by British guarantees to Franco that the operation was not directed against him. After the British landings in December 1942 Jordana went to Portugal: a move indicative of the stance he wished to adopt from that moment on. The Salazar regime had remained neutral

towards both sides in the conflict and could provide a useful means by which Franco's Spain could indicate a Spanish will to make overtures towards the Allies. Evidence of the ambiguity of the situation is seen in the fact that Carrero seemed still to think a German victory possible. Only after the Normandy landings did he suggest that Britain and Germany might broker a peace that would prevent the Russian advance.

Just as during the most fascist phase of the Franco regime's development relations with the Church had been plagued with difficulties, so now there were abundant signs of Spain's will to be on good terms with the Vatican. Franco went so far as to write a letter to the pope accusing the Americans of making concessions to Russia that would represent a serious threat to Catholicism. The pontiff replied in discreet terms that promised nothing. The Spanish position remained uncertain. The most clearly neutral position was that of Jordana and a section of Spain's diplomatic service which included, for example, the Duke of Alba.

One might well ask how the Spanish position was viewed by the warring parties. Germany had always taken a dual political approach where Spain was concerned and now this became especially relevant for a period of a few months. The very large German embassy staff (some 500 people of whom perhaps a third were spies) had been told repeatedly not to involve themselves in Spanish political affairs. On the other hand, the Nazi Party representative kept in close contact with radical Falangist groups. At the end of 1942 and start of 1943, the Germans also made contact with a number of high-ranking military officers, but what Hitler really wanted was for Spain, in the event of an Allied attack, to defend itself. In accordance with this stance, the Germans ended up agreeing to the Spanish proposal that Germany supply Spain with arms. The agreement they reached meant that half Spain's imports from Germany would be in the form of materials of war, principally artillery for coastal defense, while exports would take the form mainly of wolframite: a mineral of enormous strategic importance. As on other occasions, the position Italy adopted was substantially different from that of Germany. For Mussolini, the fact that the war was now centered around the Mediterranean was no longer a matter of choice based on Italy's own interests but rather of survival. He therefore suggested that Hitler attack the Allies through Spain.

Franco's policy in 1943 was still to foster a sense of being apart from the conflict while those who favored a more neutral political stance were having some successes without ever actually winning the debate. There

was a significant move towards neutrality in April 1943 when, on the occasion of the commemoration of Columbus's landing in Barcelona on his return from America, Jordana spoke clearly of his desire for peace, no doubt largely as a result of his Catholic affiliation. It took time before Franco gradually began to adopt the language initially used by his Foreign Minister. Nonetheless, the Spanish position did shift millimeter by millimeter as the course of military operations changed. The fall of Tunis in May 1943 led Carrero to suggest that Germany should react quickly or try to make peace.

The collapse of Mussolini's regime was, however, to have an even greater impact since it had been a role model that Franco's Spain had imitated. It was information from Spanish military sources that convinced the Italians that the Allied landings would happen in Corsica or Greece rather than Sicily. When they happened in Sicily, Italy collapsed almost immediately, ruining any chance the fascist regime might have had of survival. Mussolini's removal from power had immediate repercussions in Spain, represented in Rome at the time by a Falangist of some importance: Raimundo Fernández Cuesta. Falange thought that something similar might happen in Spain. Once again this caused divisions at the heart of the regime's governing class. While Jordana tried to freeze Spanish diplomatic relations in Italy, Falange helped Mussolini's supporters in Spain. Of Europe's neutral countries, only Portugal and Switzerland maintained relations with the Saló Republic. Mussolini, some of whose closest collaborators ended up in Spain, was also on the point of fleeing there at the last moment. As is well known, he opted instead for Switzerland, was arrested on the way there, and summarily executed.

Yet Mussolini's fall had in effect happened much earlier, in July 1943 when, for the first time, he mobilized the members of Italy's political class who favored the restoration of the monarchy. This subsequently became an element of decisive importance in Spanish internal politics. The best evidence of the anxiety that Franco might well have felt when faced with this alternative is his affirmation, in front of an audience of Falangists, that "the liberal capitalist system," which he always linked to monarchist circles, "has gone for ever," at the same time announcing his firm decision that those who were not entirely loyal to him should "leave the ship."

To understand the monarchist position we must go back in time to the start of 1942. The previous year in Rome Alfonso XIII had died after acknowledging Don Juan as his heir and abdicating in his favor. The man who now took upon himself the future succession of the dynasty was

someone who had identified himself with the extreme right and had not hesitated in trying to take up arms against the Republic in the middle of the Civil War. However, his cause soon came to represent something quite different because a certain sector of the political class was seeking a more viable political formula for Spain in view of a possible victory of the democratic powers. Already by March 1942 a monarchist committee had formed that was in contact with sections of the military that tended to express strong criticism of General Franco. Franco felt obliged to keep up some contact with Don Juan and in May wrote him a letter in which he lectured him on the characteristics required of any monarchy that might be restored in Spain; it must be "revolutionary" and by no means the "decadent" monarchy that in his view had ascended the throne in the eighteenth century.

In June, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez and Eugenio Vegas Latapié had to go into hiding: the former into exile in Portugal and the latter in Switzerland. Don Juan de Borbón responded to Franco's letter at the end of 1942 by appointing as one of his advisers José María Gil Robles, a prominent leader of the most powerful right-wing faction during the Second Republic. As time passed, Don Juan's insistence that Franco accept the monarchist option became more pressing. In March 1943 the *Cortes* was set up. Franco had ensured that members of the nobility and the Armed Services sat alongside the Falangist leadership, thus indicating that he himself intended to stay in power. Don Juan then wrote to Franco outlining the "extremely grave risks" that would have to be faced if the monarchy were not restored, but the dictator merely pointed out that in actual fact those who supported the monarchy were an unreliable minority.

As has already been suggested, the moment when monarchist pressure on Franco became more insistent was in the summer of 1943. In June Franco might well have felt that his ranks were thinning when some 30 members of the *Cortes* approached him requesting the reinstitution of a traditional Catholic monarchy. The regime's reply was cautious. Carrero alerted the military to the existence of a Masonic plot to undermine the regime. In September 1943 Franco received via the Ministry for the Army a document signed by all lieutenant generals asking whether the time might not have come to make way for a new regime; in its original version the text was even more explicit since it suggested a return to monarchy and a dismantling of the totalitarian system. Not only those who had signed it but probably all Spain's high-ranking officers were in agreement with the proposed changes. Franco, on the other hand, was planning to

stay in power and he had before him, in what had happened in Italy, the stark example of what not to do. He insisted that he had never received the document and refused to allow all the lieutenant generals to come and see him together, which might have resulted in a repetition of the last great Fascist Council meeting in which the Duce was done away with. What he did instead was receive the generals one by one and defuse in private conversations what might otherwise have become a dangerous force in opposition. In this way Franco freed himself from the possible threat of military opposition at the very moment when Allied pressure was becoming stronger.

Franco had no reason to hope that the Allies would treat him well after he had shown a decided inclination towards the Axis up to that time. The British, however, were too busy mopping up in Italy in 1943 to spend any time on Spain. At this point the position of British diplomatic representatives in Spain did undergo a marked change. The British ambassador, Hoare, soon realized that nothing was going to change Spanish politics; nonetheless, he did not recommended strong action against Franco. Jordana managed to have the Blue Division recalled; in total, over time, some 47,000 Spanish soldiers went to Russia, almost half of whom were wounded. What the British ambassador found hardest to take was the calm air of self-sufficiency that Franco displayed each time he received the diplomat and delivered one of his endless monologues. In circumstances such as these it is not surprising that Hoare's defense of a policy of non-aggression towards Spain lasted to the end of World War II.

For their part, the Americans had at this time another ambassador, the historian Peter Hayes, who was a Catholic and Roosevelt's personal representative but was not always in line with those in power in the State Department, who were more strongly anti-Francoist. Hayes tells in his memoirs how in Franco's office he came across photos of Hitler and Mussolini but soon reached the conclusion that the Spanish regime had little to do with fascism. Initially he tried to intervene in Spanish politics, for example asking Spain not to attack Russia, but in the postwar period he became an enthusiastic defender of the Franco regime. Nonetheless, neither Hoare nor Hayes can be held responsible for the Allies' harshest decision on Franco's Spain; that was taken by the US Department of State.

What happened can be explained by the position adopted by the Spanish up to that point and by Spain's slowness and insincerity in its move towards neutrality, but there was also a chance factor that led to the decision being taken. In November 1943 what came to be known as

the "Laurel Affair" happened. Spain sent a telegram to the pro-Japanese government in the Philippines mentioning its "indestructible and proven relationship" with that country. The text did not, in fact, constitute recognition of the government but Washington was indignant about it.

The result was that in January 1944 all oil exports to Spain were suspended. The situation became extremely tense for the regime because at that time an Allied victory seemed highly likely after the Normandy landings. Finally, following very difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached in May by means of an exchange of notes between the Spanish Administration and the Allies. Franco's Spain confirmed the withdrawal of the Blue Division, promised to close the German consulate in Tangiers, and expressed willingness to resolve by arbitration the legal situation of Italian ships in Spanish harbors (which finally happened in line with American demands). It is probable that the question of greatest interest to the Allies concerning Spain was that of the Spanish export of wolframite to Germany. This mineral was of prime importance in the production of weapons of war (in warheads and armor-plating, for example) and Hitler had lost all other possible sources of supply apart from Spain. The agreement consisted of limiting supply to just a few tens of tons, the Allies buying up and using the rest. In this instance, as in so many others, Jordana's favorable attitude to neutrality met with disapproval from an Administration in which the Axis still had many supporters. No lesser figure than the Industry Minister, the Falangist Carceller, appears to have been one of them.

From that time on, Spain's foreign policy of neutrality was based on close identification with the pope and Catholicism, apart from one pronouncement on World War II that outlined three different theaters of war. As regards neutrality, efforts were made at the start of 1943 to draw together those neutral countries that shared Spain's religious position, but all attempts failed. As Franco himself explained, he was neutral as far as the war between Britain and Germany was concerned but he supported Germany in her war against the Soviet Union, as well as those countries that were fighting Japan. In fact these opinions were intended principally as camouflage to hide his former alignment with the Axis, but they also testify to the regime's interests and the mistakes it made. They show, for example, that Franco never took seriously the Allied demand for the unconditional surrender of the enemy, and they highlight his fear of a communist threat and his radical disagreement with those Americans who seemed to think that the communist regime might change.

At this point, however, a major about-turn had occurred in another aspect of Spain's foreign policy: in relation to Latin America. There was no more pro-Axis political propaganda and no Spanish interference in internal politics; indeed, Spain now accepted American influence in the area. At the same time ambassadors and organizations linked to Falange disappeared, though they had never been as important as the United States had thought. Spanish propaganda became purely cultural and had different objectives. The attempt to link Spain with a group of nations which had not been involved in the conflict underlined once and for all its own neutrality.

Its neutrality was evident in another area too. The Franco regime did not adopt a notably anti-Jewish stance; there was no racially based anti-Semitism, partly for the simple reason that numbers of members of this ethnic minority were small, though anti-Jewish discourses were at times used by leaders of the regime. Francoist anti-Semitism was a product of Catholic traditionalism and was compatible with both appreciation and the study of Spain's Sephardic heritage. There was, however, no policy of offering protection to Jews despite the fact that some were Sephardi and could therefore claim Spanish origins. There was a stage early on in which some 30,000 Jews passed through Spain but the regime had no policy aimed at saving them. Even towards the end of the war the regime did not offer them protection, although by then it was obvious that they were facing extermination. About 8,000 Jews were saved thanks to intervention by Spanish authorities, but these were instances in which Spanish diplomats took the initiative and acted on their own behalf, not on specific instructions from the government. In Greece and Hungary significant numbers of Jews were saved, and not only Sephardis; one Spanish ambassador, Ángel Sanz Briz, features in the Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem as one of those who defended the persecuted people.

All these factors are significant because they show that the Spanish authorities wanted to avoid any cause for confrontation with Nazi Germany but they also wanted to conform to conditions laid down by the Americans. At the same time, Franco's Spain tried hurriedly in the early stages of the war to give the impression that it was adhering strictly to a position of neutrality that had been far from clear up to that point. However, its true position was made evident to Allied ambassadors when Lequerica was made Foreign Minister. An intelligent man and skeptical to the point to cynicism, the new minister represented his country in its dealings with the Pétain regime and as a person he had always shown a clear preference for

the Axis. As minister he never missed an opportunity to try to gloss over his pro-German past and to align himself almost to the point of adulation with the United States, which now seemed likely to be the undisputed winner in World War II.

When in the spring of 1944 Churchill stated in the House of Commons that he thought it was a mistake to insult Franco unnecessarily since he had done the Allies a favor by not entering the war, the regime thought this signaled a British attempt at rapprochement. That was not the case, however: Churchill responded in a tone that left no room for doubt on his strong disagreement with the political system in Spain. As for the United States, Lequerica directed all his diplomatic efforts at that country without any success. As time passed, Spain made concessions in relation to American warplanes and its neutrality turned into more positive support of those who were now quite clearly going to win the war. In April 1945 it broke off diplomatic relations with Japan; even so, the American president wrote to his ambassador that he did not want any involvement with Spanish politics, not believing that a regime that had been set up with the support of the fascist powers would be acceptable in the newly organized postwar world. Even those who were on the brink of defeat distanced themselves from Franco: after September 1944 the German ambassador was withdrawn from Madrid and when, months later, Hitler heard that Franco considered that he had not really been an ally of Germany, he spoke bluntly of Franco's "cheek."

What lay in wait for Franco was not just isolation from the outside world but also problems within Spain. As 1943 went by, several attempts were made to make him move ahead with the restoration of the monarchy on his own initiative. His refusal to do so had profoundly perplexed Don Juan's supporters who did not know whether or not to go for open confrontation with the regime. In the early months of 1944 a split did occur, mainly due to the attitude adopted by Franco himself. In January he wrote to Don Juan arguing at length that his own position was entirely legitimate, even claiming that it was providential. He also warned Don Juan that the exercise of power was "not a matter for bargaining." The dynastic heir retorted that Franco was overconfident about his regime and its likely duration. This so infuriated the *caudillo* that he wrote back stating that he would ask God to shed His light in Don Juan's mind and forgive him for the error of his ways. This exchange of letters, in which Franco always addressed Don Juan in a respectful tone rather like that of a schoolmaster with a not very intelligent child, left an open wound in the

relationship between the two men that would never heal. Franco always considered the dynastic heir his closest rival, which explains the acerbic comments that he extended to encompass most of Don Juan's followers and advisers. At around the same time, several members of the monarchist cause were sanctioned. With the end of the war in sight, in March 1945 Don Juan, in the so-called Lausanne Manifesto, presented the monarchy that he personified as the means of bringing about a transition towards a regime with a constitution, respect for human rights, and certain regional freedoms. From that moment on, the monarchy remained on the horizon as a possible formula for political reconciliation and for a transition without trauma from dictatorship to something resembling political regimes elsewhere in postwar Europe. This option met with a total lack of any attempt at understanding on the part of those who had fought on both sides in the Civil War, whose memories of the conflict were still too acutely painful. Any gesture Don Juan might make could immediately be interpreted by either side (or both) as a betrayal, and the result was predictable. Even so, when World War II ended it not only seemed that the Franco regime was facing enormous difficulties but that its very survival was impossible.

We would do well at this point to draw up a final balance for the period 1939–45. As regards World War II it should be said from the start that it is difficult to offer a precise definition of the position taken by Franco's Spain, and not only because Franco himself did not want it clarified since Spain, having little actual power, could not change the final outcome of the war and so had to adapt to circumstances. If we were to try to define its position, we would have to start with Francoist Spain's links with the Axis. They explain why neutrality turned into non-belligerence when there was hope that some benefit could be gained with minimal involvement. After 1940 Spain again rejected the possibility of joining in the conflict to avoid coming up against the same demands. It is clear that the priority of the Spanish regime was clearly not so much victory for the Axis as its own survival.

Franco always maintained that his "capability and prudence" were what prevented Spain entering the war, but although he always thought carefully about what he considered to be national interests (which were synonymous in his mind with his own), he did not lack capability, though he was by no means prudent on every occasion. If he was often wrong about the direction the war was taking, at the same time he did not just give in to what others wanted and he always knew how to cover up unashamedly

for past mistakes. But his politics were never the politics of neutrality. He gave help to the Axis that not only exceeded by far any help offered by truly neutral countries such as Switzerland, or those that adopted a stance favorable to Germany such as Sweden or Turkey, but was even greater than the help given by Finland which fought against the Soviet Union from the summer of 1941 on. A correct assessment of the Spanish position in relation to the war reveals that there were at least three occasions – in the summer of 1940, the following year, and in the autumn of 1942 – when Spain could have entered the war; that it did not do so was little short of a miracle.

The main reason why Spain did not join in was in all probability nothing to do with Franco or the regime's diplomacy. Conditions within the country at the time – it was poor and weak and its ruling class was in disarray – were a prime factor, but there were others too. Germany was only interested in Spanish involvement for a short time. Italy did not want a competitor when it came to the dividing of the spoils but it did want an ally at a time when its own strategies had not paid off. Britain, despite its naïveté at times on Spanish policy, is evidence of the value of intelligent diplomats capable of making the most of their resources in difficult circumstances. The United States could on occasion be thuggish, but never so much as to commit a gratuitous act of aggression against a Spain that it did not like.

It seems obvious that, unlike what had happened in 1914–18, Spain did not reap the benefits of true neutrality. Other countries had to stretch the definition of what was neutral (for example, allowing German troops to pass through them as Switzerland did), but none of them defined themselves as non-belligerent when what they were was pre-belligerent. The consequences would be felt later. When with constant ambiguity and repeated delays Spain gradually moved towards a firmer neutrality, no one could believe that this new stance was genuine. It is a curious paradox of the end of the World War II that the fate of Franco's Spain might well have been worse had Hitler won the war. He had never liked the Spanish leaders and, unlike those who did win, he had no qualms about interfering in the politics of other countries. And one can cite another paradox: the permanent hostility of Franco's Spain towards Soviet Russia throughout all these years proved more useful to him in the postwar period than friendship with Portugal, and at least as useful as his relations with the Vatican.

There is one more aspect to consider where it is important to examine the balance in relation to Spain's stance during World War II. We know

that this was a very difficult time for Franco and not just because events in the rest of the world were putting pressure on him. In terms of Spanish politics too, these were the most complex years that he had to face, but they were also the years in which he served his final apprenticeship. What is surprising is not so much what he did in World War II as how capable he proved himself to be in the postwar period in Spain, despite the fact that this stage was only reached after a period of persistent crisis and bitter confrontation among those working alongside him, such as during the crisis of 1939–45. In this final year, he managed to combine his capacity for arbitration between the different tendencies within his regime with the ability to understand intuitively how foreign policy was going to change, or to stir up memories of the Civil War in a way that would permit him to survive after a very complex period of isolation.

## Cosmetic Change: Regime Politics between 1945 and 1951

In 1945 Franco's dictatorship was threatened at one and the same time by uncertainty inside the country on the direction it should take, by the possibility of internal opposition, and inevitably, by isolation from the outside world. All three factors were so closely linked that one cannot talk about one of them without also referring more or less directly to the others.

Franco discovered early on that it was important to give an appearance of institutional change and he found that the way to do this was by gaining approval for a number of constitutional measures that would in no way interfere with his own political power. This explains the 1942 Law of the *Cortes*: a procedure aimed at placing greater emphasis within the regime on the traditionalist element, as was obvious in the historic titles given to the assembly itself and to the parliamentary deputies or "*procuradores.*" It would come to be seen as typical of the Franco regime's hesitancy over institutionalization that this move was a direct result of advice from Mussolini to Serrano and Franco, and that in the end it would give satisfaction to a particular section of Falange. There was a similar occurrence in 1943 when a bill on fundamental legislation was drawn up but at the time did not see the light of day.

The defeat of the Axis made it obvious that what Lequerica had told Franco in 1945 had been wise: Arrese (and Falange with him) "should be removed from the limelight" – that is to say, as far as the outside world

was concerned they should be as unobtrusive as possible. Franco, conscious of the wisdom of this advice, was not slow to act. From 1944 on there was evidence of him wanting to offer a more democratic image, for example when the first union elections were held in 1945 with a promise of municipal elections later on. After the summer of 1945 he understood what was happening on the international stage and responded effectively. As ever, his best weapon was his sense of timing which allowed him to prolong his stay in power while he made changes that were apparent rather than real. He actually told General Varela that he believed he was acting "with great tact but without haste," a phrase that says much about his political style as a whole. When Serrano Suñer proposed setting up a transitional cabinet to oversee the move towards a form of government acceptable to the rest of Europe, with some intellectuals included, Franco simply wrote "ha ha ha" alongside the proposal. His canniness – so like that of Sancho Panza – would stand him in very good stead.

He himself took the initiative in July 1945 when he brought forward new constitutional legislation and made changes in the government whose aim was crystal clear: to bring him into line with the political situation in Europe. Before doing so, however, he covered his own back with generals whose loyalty he knew he could count on at the time. Franco's most important decision from a tactical viewpoint was to adopt a Catholic stance in his politics. This was a clever move as one of the parties that was doing much to stabilize democracy in Europe at the time was the Christian Democrats. In Spain Franco did not go that far but he did call on support from Catholic associations that had remained in the background during the early days of the regime. There was one common element that united the official Catholic world and the Franco regime: their shared experience of a Civil War in which one in five parliamentary representatives of the Catholic Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* or CEDA) had perished at the hands of the enemy. National Catholicism was not a doctrine practiced by only one section of the Spanish right but rather a common sentiment that united them all by linking together religion, nationalism, and the political regime. Nonetheless, the Catholic establishment did not exercise actual power until 1945, despite its clear support for the regime from the start. The Spanish Catholic Church expressed a clear desire for institutionalization and openness that went beyond a personal dictatorship.

Those Catholics prepared to collaborate who came to power in July 1945 had a program that coincided with the Church's overall wish that the

dictatorship be institutionalized but should not be fascist. The person who best represented the will to collaborate was Alberto Martín Artajo, who moved from the position of President of Catholic Action to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the summer of 1945 the regime's options seemed extremely limited, and, taking up a position in direct opposition to it, key figures in CEDA such as José María Gil Robles and Manuel Giménez Fernández condemned the degree of collaboration with the government that was beginning occur. It would not be fair to say that this was pure opportunism on their part, though it did become so in the end. Martín Artajo wanted – at least in theory – a return to monarchy, a declaration of political rights, and the necessary legislation to ensure that those rights were respected. In addition, according to his plans, citizens' views would be consulted. Furthermore, legislation governing the press would be modified and Falange would disappear, while the social services it had created would come under state control.

All in all it was a program that would allow for greater openness that was to an extent liberalizing but made no move towards democratization, offering only faint hope of some modest step towards closer relations with Europe. Franco never hid the fact that his own plans were altogether different. It was time once again to consider Spain as a kingdom, he affirmed, but Don Juan was no more than a "pretender" to the throne; it was up to Franco to decide who his successor should be. He was also quite blunt in the judgment he passed on the institution of monarchy. It could not, he said, be based on nothing more than the matter of who the offspring of "the last man to sleep with Queen Isabel (meaning Isabel II)" happened to be; rather they should wait and see whether or not "what emerged from the Queen's womb" was suitable, and the task of deciding that fell to him. He also made it quite clear to those who asked for some institutional structures to reflect political pluralism, that there would never be political parties. Of the press during the Civil War he stated that "I knew nothing of the matter and could not take charge of it during the war."

Political change did not result in the disappearance of Falangist ministers, who kept hold of the portfolios for Labor (Girón) and Justice (Fernández Cuesta). It did, however, signal the end of the office of General Secretary of the *Movimiento*. This was in fact an attempt to hide what was really going on in Spain from anyone outside as the organization itself remained in existence in the hands of a lower-ranking civil servant. This means that Girón was quite right when he said: "The men of Falange were going to do Spain a painful service by vanishing discreetly from the public

stage." The raised-arm salute disappeared. Coinciding with the change of government, three important alterations became law. The Primary Education Law (*Ley de Enseñanza Primaria*) ensured that at this early level education was entirely Catholic. The Spaniards' Charter of Rights (*Fuero de los Españoles*) turned out to be a typical list of rights that were never made law. The passing of a Local Government Law (*Ley de Régimen Local*) implied that in local town halls a wider range of interests would be represented but this hope too was doomed to frustration. There was no change made on state control of the media which now came through the Ministry of Education. If censors had once been Falangists, now the job was done by members of the Catholic establishment.

In October 1945 the Referendum Law was approved, indicating a will to put before the people a major decision (that everyone suspected would be about the monarchy), though this did not mean that consultation would take place immediately. In that same month an amnesty was declared but a Law on Public Meetings, Associations, and Personal Guarantees (*Ley de Reunión, Asociación y Garantías Personales*) was immediately put on hold. There seems to have been a moment when a proposition was put forward to do away with the National Council, which was too strongly reminiscent of fascist organizations, but Franco was clearly reluctant to do without Falange. The proposal on the transformation of the *Cortes* never went further than effecting a slight variation in the rules governing it.

All in all, although there was much talk about "organic democracy," the reality on the ground in Spain was different from the Catholic corporativism of the 1930s. The regime was still a dictatorship which had changed its language but not the reality, which meant that all power was still concentrated in the person of Franco. Rather than being defined according to the principles of organic democracy, Francoism could be summed up in three words that appeared in one of the reports from Carrero to Franco written in those days as guidelines on how to resist pressure from outside Spain: "order, unity, and endurance" – with special emphasis on the last of the three. In the eyes of the man who now provided Franco with his greatest inspiration, what drove dissidents and democratic powers to try to change Spanish institutions was "sheer silliness" in the case of the first group, and a desire to rob Spain of its national independence in the case of the second.

Franco, who never harbored the slightest doubt about remaining in power but was not always able to keep up his appearance of confidence, clung on with grim determination. He turned against the monarchists and

repeatedly voiced his anti-Masonic obsession. What seemed to him the greatest cause for concern was the possibility that the monarchy might manage to attract a large number of supporters from among those who had till then stood firm at his side. That was why, at the start of 1946, when Don Juan arrived in Estoril, he reacted decisively and violently. Statements on how "the regime must defend itself [against the defenders of the monarchy] and sink its teeth into their very soul" and "crush them like worms" show a level of excitement that was unusual in one so cold. This sense of anger is also evident in the anti-Masonic articles that he wrote in the press.

Yet Franco was always perfectly clear in his own mind as to what to do about the monarchist option. In the spring of 1947 he raised the matter in a Law of Succession on which a referendum was held in July and approval won by the inevitable overwhelming number of votes in favor. The law did not at any point address the issue of keeping the traditional dynastic line. It went no further than to make a general statement to the effect that Spain was a kingdom and to outline a very elementary mechanism for change in the event of the Chief of State passing away (a Regency Council (*Consejo de Regencia*) made up of high-ranking members of the political, military, and religious authorities). It was still Franco's prerogative to decide who would succeed to the throne but how this would happen was left vague. The only immediate practical consequence of the Law of Succession was that he was now able to bestow titles of nobility, which he did, giving dukedoms to the heirs of Primo de Rivera, Calvo Sotelo, and Mola, and other titles to the soldiers who had been in command under him during the Civil War. At the same time, over the course of 1948 and 1949, some of the monarchists who had fought with him in the war were sanctioned or dismissed from the Armed Services.

At the same time as the referendum, company juries (*jurados de empresa*) were set up as a complementary social strategy similar to the ballot in that they offered an appearance of democracy and were equally devoid of any real political effectiveness because of the delay in sorting out the regulations governing them. Rigid control of the press remained in place right up to that time; throughout the 1940s any criticism of the government of any sort was suppressed. The team responsible for the media, drawn from Catholic circles, was disbanded by political maneuvering before their program – modest though it was in scope – had had a chance to be implemented. In many areas – for example in relation to culture or to tolerance towards other religious groups – these Catholics had often been more closed-minded than even Falange.

At the end of this period Franco had every reason to feel extremely satisfied. In 1949 he was described by the major newspaper of the regime, *Arriba*, as "the man sent from God who always appears at the critical moment and defeats the enemy." That same year he visited Portugal and was awarded a doctorate at the University of Coimbra in the second and last journey outside Spain that he ever made in all his long time in power (and as on the previous occasion, he went once again to a dictatorship). In 1954 the *Cortes* would approve the renaming of his grandchildren to allow them to keep the surname of their grandfather the dictator. But there can have been no greater sign of his self-satisfaction than his governmental reshuffle. In 1951, with the storm effectively behind him, Franco gave himself the private satisfaction of not showing his true face. The Catholics retained their quota of places in the sharing-out of power and even increased it thanks to Ruiz Giménez being made Minister of Education, but Falange now made a comeback as the post of Secretary General of the *Movimiento* was resurrected and put once again in the hands of Fernández Cuesta. In addition, two men who had played key roles during World War II (and not exactly to the Allied advantage), General Muñoz Grandes and Arias Salgado in charge of the Blue Division and controlling the press respectively, were given a military portfolio and that of the Ministry of Tourism and Information. Carrero Blanco, Franco's principal adviser since World War II, who was critical of Falange's excessive power, was given a ministerial post.

Everything we have seen so far in this epigraph shows how measures implemented after 1945 brought minimal change, at least as regards Franco's personal power. However, if we compare the years immediately after the Civil War with the period after the end of World War II, there were evident changes in the mood of the country, and these become clear when we consider two questions: Catholicism and attitudes to particular cultures.

The desire to bring about a "neo-traditionalist reconquest" of Spanish society led on to the idea that the Catholic faith and the Spanish fatherland were consubstantial, to a messianic interpretation of past history, and to an authoritarian vision of a harmonious future for society. What made Falangists different from clericalists, and the years up to 1945 different from those that followed, was a difference in emphasis. Falangists accepted without question that the regime and the Party were both Catholic but they were not prepared to accept that the Catholic religion was autonomous and independent of politic control. They therefore pursued a political strategy aimed at achieving an "absolute monopoly" of power by

preventing the formation of Catholic organizations. The more clericalist sector, on the other hand, saw Catholicism as a means of integration but at the same time claimed autonomy for itself.

Nonetheless, the fact that they agreed on certain fundamental principles means that it is almost impossible nowadays to understand the controversies that divided the two groups throughout the 1940s. The clericalists complained that the Civil War was not being viewed as a "Crusade": an essentially religious conflict. They also rejected the attempts that were being made to "nationalize" the intellectuals of the "98 Generation" or the liberals. The radical Falangists would have used the term "national revolution" to describe the regime. More than the traditionalists, they favored a secular culture with which they could identify and which they could imbue with Spanish nationalist sentiment.

What was most characteristic of the period after 1945 was not the disappearance of a National Catholic mentality so much as the greater degree of autonomy that was allowed to the Catholic Church in matters of social action. The regime accepted that the various movements within Acción Católica had their own areas of specialization. In 1947, following an example that had already been set the 1930s, a group of organizations emerged which were essentially apostolic in aim but could be seen as competing with organizations linked to the Party. Among these were the Workers' Catholic Action Guild (*Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica*), Catholic Labor Youth (*Juventud Obrera Católica*), and Catholic Student Youth (*Juventud de Estudiantes Católicos*): HOAC, JOC, and JEC, respectively. As time passed, these would all come into serious conflict with the Party.

The example of Catalonia, which is by far the best known, shows very clearly the Franco regime's desire to implement a policy of homogenization that would lead to the disappearance of regional cultures, which would be replaced by the culture of Castile. The expression "cultural genocide" seems appropriate to describe what happened in those years. The Catalan language could only be spoken in the privacy of the home, while the renaming of streets seemed designed either to be offensive or as a gratuitous display of force. Not only was the use of Catalan prohibited in public life but an official propaganda campaign was mounted to promote the use of Castilian ("Speak the Language of the Empire," was the advice given by solemn posters all over Barcelona). A number of city monuments that might have been associated with Catalanism were removed and there was no more Catalan press, not even of a religious nature. From the summer of 1939 on, it was decided that as many obstacles as possible would be put

in the way of publishing in Catalan. The only publications allowed were folkloric or religious pamphlets, the Bible, and classical Greek texts such as Plutarch – provided the introduction and notes were in Castilian.

In 1946 the situation changed slightly. There was a discernible "springtime" in the world of publishing which allowed almost all Catalan poetry to be published, though the work of Joan Maragall, for example, could be published in Castilian but not in Catalan; the translation of recent authors into Catalan was forbidden. Preaching in Catalan was tolerated in rural areas but not until the 1950s in urban areas. Some grotesque cases occurred, such as that of writers such as Shakespeare having to be published in clandestine editions. Not surprisingly, the Catalans themselves wondered whether their culture would be able to survive. Even so, this period was in actual fact better than what could be termed the "blue era" when the Falange's influence was strongest.

## Opposition from Survivors: The Spanish Left from 1939 to 1951

In 1969 the former mayor of the little village of Mijas in the province of Malaga reappeared in public after an amnesty had been declared on crimes committed during the Civil War. He had spent 30 years of his life hiding in his home from 1934 to 1964, waiting for the chance to reappear. His experience, though remarkable, was only one of many similar stories that could be told by Spaniards on the side that lost the Civil War. In fact, until they could be reasonably certain of the outcome of World War II, no real attempt was made by the vanquished to regain power in Spain; once they did so, however, the international situation meant that the attempts of the opposition met with failure. It did, however, survive and enjoyed a moment of hope which was destined to die in the 1950s.

Probably the clearest example of dissent within a party was that of the socialists. The situation created during the Civil War continued or even intensified up to 1945, and only the hope of an Allied victory kept alive any desire to re-form the party. The one who did best out of this situation was Indalecio Prieto, who saw the ranks of his followers swelled by former supporters of Francisco Largo Caballero and Julián Besteiro, while Juan Negrín's influence waned noticeably. Negrín's influence had never been particularly strong in Spanish socialism, though he had been a powerful figure in the state apparatus of the Republic; now the frequent shifts in

position of the Spanish Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Español* or PCE) weakened his position. Prieto began very early on to argue in favor of a plebiscite: an option he had favored at the end of the Civil War. His tactic never won unconditional support within the party but he did gain a majority.

Within Spain, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* or PSOE) survived, though its position was very precarious. In Asturias guerrilla groups continued fighting until 1948, and from 1944 on a national executive existed inside the country. This executive, like the PSOE which had formed after emigration to France, adopted a strongly anti-communist stance. In France the principal organizer of the Socialist Party was Rodolfo Llopis, but Prieto, who combined greater prestige with tactical capabilities, provided the real thrust behind the PSOE in exile in France, and in 1946 the organization had 8,000 members. Taken as a whole, therefore, the Socialists were in a position to put forward a strategy based on external pressure on Spain and aimed at achieving a transition towards democracy. Even as they declared that they were Republicans, the Socialists were still open to change.

This attitude clashed with the opinion of those who wanted to restore the institutions of the Republic. The so-called Spanish Junta for Liberation (*Junta Española de Liberación*), founded in 1943, was the brainchild of Catalan Republicans with support from Socialists, though its most significant figure was Diego Martínez Barrio. The Junta came into being in opposition not only to the monarchist alternative but also to communist attempts to set up larger organizations. Inside Spain, what was known as the National Alliance of Democratic Forces (*Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas* or ANFD), which came into being around the same time, insisted more strongly on the need for free elections in the present than on re-founding the institutions that had existed in 1931; closer to the monarchists, the ANFD also showed itself to be unequivocally anti-communist.

There had, then, emerged a possible source of confrontation between the ANFD and the Republicans in exile. It was as late as 1945 that the Republican *Cortes* was finally set up and functioning in Mexico. Martínez Barrio was elected President of the Republic and Negrín offered him his resignation. Not that this reunited the Republican camp. Prieto wanted Negrín as President of the Government and when a cabinet was formed under José Giral he refused to join it. It is therefore fair to say that the Republic was reborn with serious problems of disunity. At the start of November Giral completed his task of forming a government but Prieto,

being more closely in touch with international relations at the time, was not slow to voice very different opinions from those of the official Republican government. Giral renounced violence but this was not enough to gain clear support from the western nations who, by asking in March 1946 for a transitional government to be set up, showed that they did not see the Republic as synonymous with democracy.

The Spanish Communist Party, whose political influence had increased over the course of the Civil War, found itself at the end of the conflict being accused by the rest of the Spanish left of harboring hegemonic ambitions. Confrontation was particularly bitter between the socialists and the communists and left the latter isolated. During the period that followed there was a first change in direction for the party when José Díaz committed suicide in 1942 and the leadership passed to Dolores Ibárruri: *La Pasionaria*. The bulk of the communist leadership was in South America and from there, via Portugal, they managed to reestablish some degree of organization within Spain. In 1941–2 Spanish communists suggested adopting a tactic of "National Union" against Franco, hoping thereby to group together very different factions, including some from the Spanish right, united by principles that were exclusively patriotic and anti-fascist. In reality, however, the communists attracted almost no support. They were, after all, as divided as any other group by internal disputes about the International and their diagnosis of what was going on in Spain. The defeat of an attempted guerrilla invasion via the Pyrenees allowed Santiago Carrillo to take over as communist leader in France. His position as leader there did not, however, mean a change in tactics, for the guerrilla war continued.

Compared with anarchism, Spanish communism had not been very strong in the 1930s but this situation changed in the first half of the 1940s. The reason was that the anarchists now faced the ultimate dilemma of whether or not to take part in politics. Now, with disputes intensifying within its ranks due to the split between anarchists inside Spain and those in exile, the possibility of moving towards syndicalism presented itself, or even of engaging in party politics alongside Republican groups or without them. But quite apart from these dilemmas, more than any other left-wing group the National Confederation of Labor (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* or CNT) received offers of support from members of the official Francoist union. As with the socialists and communists, by 1944 the anarchists had a clandestine organization that was active nationwide, though it appears that they bore the brunt of Francoist repression.

The reason was that they tried to function as a union among the masses that could easily be infiltrated by the police. At the end of 1945 the new national executive of the CNT was imprisoned; of the first 14 such executives, 10 were dismantled by the police. In contrast to those who were in favor of joining the political process, the most extreme members who rejected any form of government advocated guerrilla war and acts of terrorism, though they were unlikely to achieve anything by these means. In the early post-Civil War years, the CNT lost 80 percent of its membership and by the start of the 1960s its leaders were longstanding militants who had fought in the Civil War, there being no one of a younger generation to take their place.

As regards nationalist movements, one can detect in all of them, as a general trait, an initial tendency towards radicalization during the World War II years. It is significant that in 1944 the linking up of the nationalist groups from around Spain's periphery led to the re-forming of "Galeuzca," the group whose three syllables, taken from the names of the three historic regions, had united the most radical nationalist youth in the 1920s. However, after 1946 this group disappeared from the scene.

Up to the start of 1946 one might say that in fact the opposition in exile or of the left merely managed to survive. Then, with the defeat of the Axis, its members believed they could see light at the end of a very long tunnel. For Spaniards on the right, however, the Republic not only meant a return to the situation before the Civil War but also a reversal of the outcome of that war. From that time on, it seemed far more likely that it would be the monarchist option that would take Franco's place than the republican option.

Giral's government, from its moment of inception, had had problems that only increased in 1946 because it failed utterly to convince the democratic nations that Franco might come to pose a serious threat to world peace. Objectively speaking, Giral was quite wrong in making this assertion and the United Nations' recommendation that the only action needed was to withdraw ambassadors from Spain might have been seen as a defeat by the socialists who were being increasingly spurred on by Indalecio Prieto to seek possible ways ahead. This explains why a government was formed with Llopis as president at the start of 1947. From the very beginning the main representative of Spanish socialism in France faced a difficult balancing act. He belonged to a party which favored the democratic nations and therefore seemed able to offer some form of guarantee; yet it also had to try to unite all the opposition parties in exile and for that reason Llopis

included a member of the Spanish Communist Party in his cabinet. In the summer of 1947 Prieto's position, which was always open to change, became the most powerful element in the PSOE, which meant that it was now impossible to hold the government together. The exclusively Republican government that then formed with Albornoz as president came to be seen as a kind of representative of Republican legitimacy and this enabled it to last a long time, though it was still incapable of providing any real alternative to the Franco regime.

From 1947 on, the PSOE in exile was still the most powerful party under Prieto's leadership. His attitude had proved to be the most clear-sighted on the left, but if his strategy was to succeed he had to find some way of working with the monarchists. His approaches to them over the course of 1948 proved fruitless, however. In 1948, at talks held in France they had failed to forge any solid hope of replacing Franco. Until 1951 the PSOE continued to argue at its conferences for the need to work with the monarchists but there was little it could do when faced with the democratic powers' increasing reluctance even to consider the problem of Spain. If for the socialist leaders outside Spain these were years of bitter disappointment, inside the country, after a brief period of hope, Spaniards experienced in their own flesh the full weight of repression. Between 1944 and 1947 there was some degree of organization inside Spain but it soon disappeared. At the end of the 1940s socialism was active only in areas where in the past it had been firmly rooted (Madrid, the Basque Country, and Asturias) and there it lacked coordination. By 1949 three national committees that had served one after another and some 1,300 militants were in Spanish jails.

As was the case in all communist parties in Western Europe at the time, the PCE obeyed directives from Moscow without question, to such an extent that Santiago Carrillo used the phrase "pole star" when talking of the Soviet Union, Jorge Semprún said that if the Soviet Union did not exist life would not be worth living, and Rafael Alberti described Stalin as "father, comrade, and master." As in other European communist parties, the Stalinist personality cult had its national equivalent: in Spain's case, Dolores Ibárruri. The particular stance of the PCE within the Spanish opposition was that it strongly supported the use of guerrilla warfare, though it by no means had a monopoly there. The fact that the PCE abandoned the option of guerrilla tactics in 1948 has been attributed to a decision by Stalin but it is more likely that circumstances outside Spain led to the change. Stalin only made a very general statement about the

need to use armed combat in conjunction with legal processes. It is not true to say that this about-turn resulted in the PCE leading the strikes that happened in those years, which were in fact spontaneous.

At least as much as, or even more than, its support for guerrilla warfare, what characterized the PCE at the time was its isolation; it was so inward-looking as to adopt the defensive position typical of the Stalinist period which required constant purges driven by a fear of infiltration. In 1947 the PCE abandoned the Republican government at the same time as its marginalization was becoming obvious in other countries such as Belgium, France, and Italy. In 1948 it ceased to exist, as did the autonomous governments of Catalonia and the Basque Country. In 1950 it was declared illegal in France. Meanwhile, ideological purges were taking place which can be seen as clear evidence of heterodoxy in other countries. The party's self-destructiveness was evident in the fact that of the 17 PCE parliamentary deputies from the Republicans' last *Cortes*, four had died by this time but ten had left the party.

Although it drew its main support from the communists, the guerrilla war started up spontaneously in areas where there was a solid leftist tradition or where the geography was complex. With scant organization and few resources, the resistance fighters were simple "escapees" or people who had "taken to the hills," often after having broken out of prison. The communists used them to set up networks engaged in armed action which could count on limited supplies but never posed any serious threat to the regime. It was not, therefore, the most "serious" opposition group and it was not the reason why Spain did not enter World War II. Nor did it organize proper military action. As Carrero wrote to Franco in one of his reports, it was more a case of "banditry" aimed at creating an atmosphere of insecurity than an offensive reaction capable, for example, of cutting communications.

There was significant guerrilla activity between 1946 and 1948 but it decreased to a bare minimum after 1952, although there would still be occasional executions of resistance fighters in the mid 1950s. The most active group, which functioned on the eastern side of the country between Teruel, Cuenca, Castellón, and Valencia, depended on resources brought through from France. Unlike similar guerrilla warfare in other countries, the Spanish resistance did not have steady support from the local population, though they did have a network of some tens of thousands working with them or liaising; nor could they count on cross-border support and so they had to keep going by making small raids in isolated places.

Their action consisted mainly of assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage, or raids, and at most they occupied a small settlement for a short time. The guerrilla fighters did not work as large units but as small bands of men who remained hidden during the day and attacked at night. That is why it is impossible to give a detailed account of guerrilla operations. Some 2,200 guerrillas died in combat, while the Civil Guard, which was mainly in charge of fighting them, lost 250 men, and the losses to all the security forces combined can be put at about 300. Although there might have been as many as 7,000 guerrillas in total, there were never more than 2,000 to 2,500 in action at any one time in groups of no more than 300 people. On both sides the struggle was notable for its savagery: the guerrilla fighters executed real or supposed supporters of the regime, while the regime's counter-insurgency tactics included torture and application of the "law on attempts to escape." Carrero Blanco himself suggested using "a thrashing" as the most usual method for dealing with opposition terrorism.

It would be wrong to suggest that there was a fundamental difference between the guerrilla war and workers' protests in factories as if their strategies were incompatible: in fact, the first strikes in Franco's Spain occurred at the height of the guerrilla war. In May 1947 in the Basque Country the General Union of Workers (*Unión General de Trabajadores* or UGT) and the National Confederation of Labor (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* or CNT) joined in the strikes but so did the Basque Nationalist Union and the respective political groups which supported these movements. Asturias was the region that until the 1960s led in terms of workers' protests in Spain. From the start of the new regime a steady increase in the extraction of coal was recorded: in 1952 the numbers of miners employed topped 90,000, whereas in 1935 there had been only 44,000. After the Civil War there was also a marked militarization of working life which meant, for example, arrest for not turning up to work. Even though in the Spain of the time miners' salaries were above average, in practice until very late on they barely served to cover basic food needs. If all these factors are taken into account, along with the lack of modernization, the high accident rate in Spain is easily explained. Between 1941 and 1959 more than 1,500 miners died in Asturias and about 750 in León and Palencia as a result of accidents at work. Despite these statistics, in Asturias, the Basque Country, and Barcelona instances of protest were spontaneous, isolated, and unconnected, which can be explained by a general sense of defeat, fear, and repression.

In a context such as this, what happened in the Catalan capital at the start of the 1950s is of particular interest as it was something entirely new. The Barcelona Tram Strike of 1951 was not started by any clandestine organization; it happened as a result of a protest not about a political issue but about the price of public transport, which had been raised by 40 percent, far more than in Madrid. It meant that almost all trams stopped running for several days and had the added success of splitting those in power in the Catalan capital (Falange clashed with a governor whom they considered lukewarm). The wave of strikes spread from Barcelona to the Basque Country. There, in contrast, together with groups made up entirely of workers, members of Catholic organizations joined in too. All these factors, which go some way towards explaining the ministerial crisis that followed in April 1951, lead us on to consider a social protest that was to have a promising future, but only with the passage of time.

## The Monarchist Alternative

As we have already seen, the most active person on the Spanish left at this time, Prieto, knew only too well that replacing the Franco regime would depend on reaching an agreement with the monarchists. Although with some variations, the democratic forces also agreed on a transition towards democracy on the condition that the restoration of the monarchy would bring about reconciliation. We must therefore consider the monarchist alternative which now meant a clear break with the regime, however much the regime might try to bring about change by a peaceful process of transition. One could say that if ever there was a time when the Franco regime might have been replaced it was in 1946 and it would have been Don Juan who ruled as king in place of the dictator.

Over the course of 1945 Don Juan's and Franco's emissaries traveled to and fro between Switzerland and Spain but the chances of them reaching an agreement were scant because they differed on important issues. The dictator did not think for one moment that he should give up power; rather he clung to it with even greater determination. He had potent weapons to draw on: he could mobilize the younger elements in the Armed Services, and from the outset he thwarted any attempt to restore the monarchy by constantly suggesting new candidates. He used every argument possible to stay in power, including the need to hand out firm justice to those who had lost the war, but his most powerful weapon was his sense of timing and how slow he was to take action.

Don Juan's arrival in Portugal caused great commotion in Spain. An impressive committee of dignitaries, including 20 ex-ministers as well as aristocrats, members of the Armed Services, and Spain's five most important bankers, wrote Don Juan a letter which showed that support for Franco was less than one might have thought. However, most of the signatories were doing no more than putting their names to a formula that the international situation at the time seemed to demand, and they were unlikely to pursue it to its logical conclusion. This was how things stood when, a few days after Don Juan's arrival in Estoril, Franco broke off existing relations with him. It is obvious in what Carrero wrote to the dictator at the time that both men felt indignant about "the small smart salon set" whose common characteristics were "snobbery, frivolity, and stupidity."

At that time the monarchists had to play a "double game" which, as Gil Robles suggested, was so plagued by difficulties that in the end they simply could not win. It was, on the one hand, a matter of undermining the Spanish people's support for the regime by drawing into the monarchist camp sections of society that had been on Franco's side in the Civil War and, at the same time, reaching an agreement with the non-communist left. Although Don Juan de Borbón hesitated on more than one occasion and made many tactical mistakes, it was the monarchists' heterogeneity, their lack of unity, and their uncertainty as to the exact method they would use to remove Franco from power, as well as the state of post-Civil War Spain, that are the main factors that explain their failure. Certainly, if Franco was never deposed it was because it is very difficult, when a dictator has been brought to power by a civil war, to remove him without another civil war.

"Double politics" came into being in the early months of 1946. In February the so-called "Estoril Principles" ("*Bases de Estoril*") were signed with the result that a section of the Carlist movement joined Don Juan's cause, signing up to a program which mentioned "healthy representative institutions." At the same time contact was made with the moderate left inside Spain. It is probable, however, that the monarchists moved far too cautiously at this time, because in the months that followed Franco seized the initiative, never to lose it again. One must remember, too, that the socialists only adopted a more open stance later on.

Francoism benefited from a curious reaction that was evident in Spanish public opinion. The stance adopted by the democratic forces who condemned the regime was not widely understood and, as a result, the regime found it easy to stir up a mood of resistance like that when ancient Numantia defied the Romans. Carrero and Franco both realized this almost immediately and it was fundamental in shaping their decisions. It

was in this atmosphere that Don Juan was contacted about the Law of Succession on which he had not yet had a chance to express an opinion. His conversation with Carrero, who was sent by Franco to report back on Don Juan's response, could not have been more significant. Don Juan complained that the text implied that the ruler was to be chosen; Franco's adviser retorted that in a civil war one could not bestride two trenches. "You will not succeed," replied Don Juan, warning of the difficulties they would face in terms of public opinion outside Spain. He was wrong about this. Declarations that he made shortly afterwards unfortunately clashed with monarchist public opinion in Spain. They made it seem as though it had been the monarchy that had won the Civil War and had restored civil liberties. Don Juan also stated that he was allowing contact between his followers and those who had fought on the opposite side during the Civil War: a fact that was confirmed when Gil Robles met Prieto in London in October 1947. The two leaders agreed on the reestablishment of civil liberties, on an amnesty, and on Spain's reintegration into Europe – that is to say, on the basic essentials. Both men were at the time open to possible change; they had had the support of the main political groups in the 1930s but there was no great difference between the final positions they now adopted. When news of this appeared in the Spanish press, accompanied by the usual propaganda, the conservative masses in the country adopted an attitude totally closed to any possibility of change. The unlikelihood of an immediate restoration of the monarchy at this point, the question of the education of Don Juan Carlos, the eldest royal child, and the divisions among the monarchists meant that from 1948 onwards Don Juan tried a series of different tactics. These included the meeting held on Franco's yacht the *Azor* off the Basque coast in August 1948. As with all other meetings between Franco and Don Juan, what was most important here was not its content so much as the fact that they met at all. "Whose gun is going to backfire on him?" Don Juan asked, referring to Franco and himself. "God will decide," he concluded. In the medium term the answer was undoubtedly Franco's but it changes totally if we consider the longer term. One must remember that Don Juan Carlos, merely by returning to Spain, could have been considered to have been confirmed as Franco's successor.

At the very same time as these talks were going on between Franco and Don Juan, monarchist and socialist representatives were meeting for discussions in San Juan de Luz, only a few kilometers away, and realizing that they agreed with each other on the outcome of the transition. Yet

from the end of 1948 on, hopes of a return to monarchy gradually faded, while at the same time there was a slow shift among monarchists towards cooperation with the regime. Pressure from democratic forces had dwindled to nothing and there was puzzlement among the monarchist rank and file. By 1951 any possibility of agreement between monarchists and socialists had vanished totally.

At the end of 1951 Franco's new government had been named and a monarchist spokesman did not hesitate to label it the "most totalitarian" to date. In November 1948 Don Juan Carlos had been sent to Spain; at the same time Don Juan replaced the most anti-Francoist of the advisers who had been with him so far with others more closely in touch with government circles. The prince's education became a political issue once again when, after he had completed his Baccalaureate, the decision had to be made as to whether he should continue his studies in Spain or go abroad. Those working closely with Franco had their way, which meant that Franco himself could oversee the training of the one who would in time become King of Spain. Nonetheless, between father and son there was always a kind of "family pact" aimed at achieving an identical outcome, though that was not at all evident at the time, as became obvious after 1975: that is to say, 30 years after the Monarchist option first came to seem a real alternative.

## Franco in Isolation

The previous pages have allowed us to appreciate to just how great an extent outside pressures on Spain affected internal politics. The only reason for Spain's isolation was the continuance of a political regime that had not evolved to any degree since its beginnings in 1939. If Spain had done away with Franco and had evolved as Turkey had done, its collaboration with the Axis might have been forgotten. Something similar could have happened had it made a more radical about-turn as Brazil did, though Getulio Vargas did have to hand over power; or alternatively if Spain had opted in the past for a genuine neutrality like that of Salazar in Portugal, who also decided in 1945 to adopt a tentatively conciliatory political stance. However, nothing like this happened in Franco's Spain.

Despite triumphalist declarations by the regime's spokesmen, there were clear signs of diplomatic difficulties before the end of World War II. In the summer of 1945 an international conference was held in San

Francisco, out of which the United Nations Organization would emerge. The Mexican delegate proposed that nations whose regimes had been set up with the help of the fascist powers should not be granted membership. The "big four" meeting in Potsdam not long afterwards approved a resolution which stated that no request from Spain would be considered. Also, over the course of 1945 Spain's modest attempt at imperialist expansion ended pitifully: it was not allowed to take part in the international conference that was to decide on the future administration of Tangiers.

Within the regime Franco himself always had a major role in determining the direction that foreign policy would take, but this was even more the case at a time when he himself was having to play a hard game to stay in power. Franco showed no sign of personal greatness or statesman-like vision, but he did demonstrate that he was capable of astute analysis of the international situation when he judged that collaboration between the democratic countries and the Soviet Union could not last. If his foreign policy was successful it was because it was simple: he merely applied Carrero's maxim of "order, unity, and endurance" that governed his actions inside Spain to events on the world stage. Foreign policy consisted, then, of affirming repeatedly that Spain was a nation with an open and evolving constitution, capable of coming into line with the rest of Europe but with peculiarities that precluded political parties. The Civil War was seen as one episode in an ongoing struggle against communism and the regime was considered to have stayed neutral throughout World War II.

Many Spanish diplomats at the time knew full well that only the disappearance of the most notoriously dictatorial aspects of the regime would allow outside pressure on Spain to be eased. Lequerica – effectively Franco's representative in the United States – used a different type of argument based on material interests and on the political games played in American internal politics. In his view it was essential "to help businesses," which meant having the Republican Party in power: a group that was "not fanatically passionate but strong at administration and economics." That was the period of the reconstruction of a Europe that had been devastated by war, and Spain had resources that they might need.

It was above all in the early months of 1946 that Spanish diplomatic relations reached a particularly low point. Panama asked the United Nations member-countries to make their contacts with Spain conform to what had been decided at the San Francisco and Potsdam conferences.

France, still driven by memories of the Spanish Civil War, closed Spain's borders. One might have thought that the regime's days were numbered, which would explain both the monarchists' excitement and Franco's defensive attitude. However, the first references to the "iron curtain" date from this time. In March 1946, to avoid aligning themselves with the Soviet Union, the western Allies (France, Britain, and the United States) published a declaration which expressed both their desire for changes in Spain's political situation and that there should not be another civil war. In effect they were now giving the impression that they would have accepted a formula that allowed a modest pace of evolution. "The most we can hope for," wrote one British diplomat, "is modification of the present regime and the suppression of its most undesirable elements."

That position was taken much further by the United Nations. In April of that same year Poland, a country in which Soviet influence was now decisive, stated that the existence of a regime such Franco's posed a threat to world peace. However, in Ocaña where, according to the Polish delegate, atomic bombs were being made, all that was actually being produced was bricks. What the communist countries would have liked was for the United Nations to break all economic links with Franco's Spain. After a lengthy attempt to formulate a resolution, in December 1946 Spain was expelled from all international organizations and a recommendation was made that all diplomats in Madrid be called back to their own countries.

We already know that when these measures were made public in Spain the reaction was like that in ancient Numantia. They did of course give the clearest possible indication of just how isolated the Franco regime was at that time: in the United Nations voting there had only been six votes opposing the proposal, all from Latin American countries, against 34 votes in favor and 12 abstentions. Yet the UN measures made little impact in practical terms since Franco's Spain was already virtually isolated. Only three European ambassadors (including the British ambassador) and two Latin Americans were withdrawn from Madrid, while the Portuguese, the Swiss (interpreting their position as neutral), the Vatican nuncio, and the Irish representative, because he was from a country with a strong Catholic tradition, stayed on.

It was obvious what Franco had to do if he was to escape from the isolation imposed on him. He could hope that the Vatican and Catholic lobbies in all countries might join together to defend him. He also managed to persuade Portugal to act as intermediary between Spain and the

democratic nations: between 1945 and 1957 Franco and Salazar met for talks five times. However, the regime actually broke out of its isolation first and foremost by exploiting divisions between the countries that had won World War II, attitudes to Spain in Latin American countries, and, to a lesser extent, in Arab countries too.

Although the main split between the countries that had won the war was between the Soviet Union and the others, there were some gray areas that need explaining in relation to the Spanish question. It suited the Soviet Union to have an area of ongoing instability in Southern Europe. In that sense the Soviets preferred Franco to a stable democratic monarchy. At the start of 1947 they made indirect contact with Franco to ensure that he would not align Spain with the western nations. It was the split between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries that was Franco's salvation – far more so than his own foreign policy. France saw that, as had happened in the Civil War, Spain's problematic state was becoming a cause for political debate within the country, but material considerations came to the fore: a trading agreement was signed in mid 1948. France would rather have kept its relations with Spain exclusively limited to trade, but Franco would agree only to full relations. The British position was the most coherent and consistent of any of the western nations: it involved trying to encourage the different elements of the Spanish opposition to engage in some form of cooperation presided over by the monarchy. The process leading up to this situation was also to be gradual: as Bevin said, it should be the result of a daily exercising of pressure and not of a total split. As early as March 1947 the British signed a trade agreement with Spain but, disappointed to find the opposition too divided, they finally came to the conclusion that there was no longer any point in applying more "pin-pricks" to Franco.

American policy was the most erratic of all the great powers. It was the United States that, in 1946, published the most hard-hitting document against Franco's claim to have been neutral while at the same time being reticent about a possible transition towards a monarchy. In the end, however, military interests won over all others. From 1947 onwards, all American strategic planning was based on the notion that if the Soviets launched an offensive against Europe, within 50 or 60 days they would reach the Pyrenees. Spain would be useful as a bastion of resistance and a base for a counter-offensive; in conditions such as these, Spain was as important on the southern flank of Europe as Britain was in the north. In October 1947, the State Department Office of Political Planning came to

the conclusion that the Franco regime could not be removed except by force and recommended that pressure on it be eased.

At the same time, Lequerica's maneuvering in the American press and politics had a degree of success. From 1949 onwards the American House of Representatives began to approve aid to Spain – aid that was vetoed by President Truman. The first time aid was given definitive approval was as late as 1951. Apart from military reasoning, the Americans' change of heart owed much to the formation of an influential nucleus of Catholic senators and congressmen who were anti-communist, interested in exporting cotton, and who encouraged the arms industry or opposed Truman. The result of all these factors was a marked change in the American position: in 1945 public opinion had been largely hostile to Franco but in 1951 almost half of those polled were in favor of Spain joining NATO. Even so, one would have to say that what actually happened was that there was a shift from considering an alliance with Spain "extremely unpopular" to seeing it as "just not very popular."

Having explained the position of each of the western nations, it is also useful to look at the "substitution strategies" to which Franco resorted in order to alleviate his isolation. Foremost among them was his attitude towards the Latin American countries, and the tactic that the regime used to win support in that part of the world was its culture; as a result, funding increased substantially (by 40 percent). The Council of the Hispanic World (*Consejo de la Hispanidad*) was renamed the Institute of Hispanic Culture (*Instituto de Cultura Hispánica*). Spain's culture was presented in Latin America as offering a very particular, traditional, and Catholic alternative capable of challenging other, more materialistic options. In this way the Spanish regime could count on being favored by a section of Latin American opinion, even if at the same time it alienated more left-wing countries (such as Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, and Colombia).

"We have hauled our body halfway out of the pit now and we shall never forget who it was who held out their hand to help us up when we were down in the depths," said Areilza in 1949, referring to Argentina in a speech which he made as Franco's representative. Indeed, Argentina's role in enabling Spain to emerge from isolation was so decisive that one could even suggest that "saving the dictatorship" depended on it. In the 1940s Argentina was the world's major exporter of wheat and beef but did not have a merchant fleet capable of transporting its products. In political terms Perón's government favored a populist "third way" with a "Latin identity" aimed at providing an alternative to American dominance

in the new continent. At the time when Spain's isolation was at its worst the interests of the two countries coincided, which might give the impression – quite wrongly – that their politics also coincided. In fact Perón wanted to hold on to the support of the extreme right in his country while at the same time fostering a sense of national identity in opposition to American pressure; but his regime's popularism was markedly different from the National Catholic tone of Franco's Spain. Eva Perón had no hesitation in telling a Spanish minister that his country was overrun by those who "paraded around in cassocks sucking on communion wafers."

Cooperation between the two leaders, being a direct result of circumstances, was short-lived and caused trouble for Perón. For Franco, however, it proved decisive. At the very same moment when the UN was recommending the withdrawal of all ambassadors from Spain, Argentina was hastening to send its own to Madrid. In October 1946 a trade agreement was signed. In 1947 Eva Perón came to Spain on a visit that lasted 15 days and provided plenty of opportunities for displays of popularist demagogy. The following year saw the signing of what was known as the Franco-Perón Protocol aimed at fostering trade relations between the two countries. In this way Argentina made a crucial contribution to ensuring that Spain's supply lines did not collapse, although it received very little in return. In 1948 Spain imported almost 400,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of maize – quantities which, in terms of price, were not a tenth of what Spain exported to Argentina. However, Cádiz did not become a free port facilitating the distribution of Argentine goods throughout Europe, investment in Spain did not increase, and Spain did not export industrial products to Argentina. In 1950 the balance of payments was already in Spain's favor and in 1954 rumors were rife of a possible breakdown in relations.

Spanish–Argentine relations – effectively an alliance between two pariahs – were characterized by misunderstandings. Argentina was a naturally rich country whose leaders were excessively overoptimistic about the future but it could not help Spain to gain any real benefits because the two economies were not complementary. There was also a divergence in foreign policy, for Perón had anticipated World War II and had adopted a neutral stance, while Franco wanted involvement in the western world. Each hoped to benefit from the other but it was Franco who gained real advantages. Meanwhile, the climate in the New World was changing. The clearest proof can be seen in the way the Latin American countries voted on the UN recommendation approved in December 1946. Whereas in 1946 some six countries had voted against the motion, in 1947, 1949, and

1950 respectively, the votes were eight, 12, and 16 against. The change in attitude towards Franco's Spain in Latin America can therefore be seen as widespread, early, and decisive, independently of Argentina.

Along with the support Spain received from Latin America, support from Arab countries must be taken into account. Even more so than with the former, Spain's policy in relation to the latter was the result of a process of substitution. It was a matter of managing through contact with the Arab nations to bring about some improvement in international relations as a whole. The Arabs did not have democratic institutions and usually abstained from voting in the UN; they also tended to reject any third-party interference in their own affairs, fearing communist intervention above all. This explains why Spanish diplomacy and propaganda had notable success. The problem facing Franco was that at any given moment the Arabs might demand independence for Morocco. Even so, in 1950 King Abd-Allah of Jordan visited Spain as the first Head of State to do so in this period. Then, in 1952, Martín Artajo traveled to various Arab countries with Franco's daughter and General Ben Mizzian, who was of Moroccan nationality but was an officer in the Spanish Army.

The successes achieved by Franco's Spain in its relations with Arab nations were due in part to the fact that they were more interested in the Palestine question than in Morocco. If Spain opposed the creation of the State of Israel and supported the Vatican proposal that the Holy Places should be under international control, the main reason for doing so was Israel's attitude. When independence was declared the news was not even announced to Spain: a country which the Israeli ambassador to the UN considered an "active sympathizer and ally" of the Nazis. In effect Israel gained the support of liberals and socialists. Not even firm reminders of the help afforded to escaping Jews during World War II, nor the degree of religious freedom allowed in Spain after 1945, impressed Israeli politicians one iota.

Having highlighted the support that Franco's Spain could call on, we can now describe how the country began to emerge from isolation. In 1947 Franco's Spain was expelled from the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. On the other hand, in the UN it received 16 votes in its favor in comparison to six the previous year. The western powers now decided that the withdrawal of ambassadors had, paradoxically, had the effect of increasing support for Franco and therefore that it was time to adopt a different stance. The "slow relaxing" of pressure on Francoist Spain recommended by planners in the State Department was helped by

events on the international stage. In the summer of 1947, responding to Soviet pressure, Hungary had become a communist dictatorship and in February 1948 the same happened in Czechoslovakia. In the summer of 1948 the Soviets began the blockade of Berlin. By that time the chairman of the American Committee of the Armed Forces had visited Spain. In January 1950 the American Secretary of State did not agree to America approving a UN resolution allowing relations with Spain to be resumed. However, finally, in November 1950, the United Nations approved by 38 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions (which included France and Britain), a resolution which passed no judgment on the regime and gave approval for the resumption of diplomatic relations. In fact, by this time Spain already had representatives from 24 countries in Madrid. At the end of 1950 Spain took its first step towards membership of international organizations when it was admitted to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

At a glance it might seem that the attitude of the western nations had changed substantially, especially in the case of America. All the democracies thought from 1945 onwards that it would have been better had Franco handed over power but at no point were they prepared for military intervention, partly because it was not common practice and partly because Franco's Spain posed them no real threat. In response to what the Polish delegate had stated at the UN, a British diplomat said of Spain that "it is only a danger and a disgrace to itself." The western powers also discovered that the Spanish opposition was weak and divided and therefore Spain ended up being what might be termed "tolerantly ostracized." Truman stated that the withdrawal of ambassadors was "the wrong means to achieve the right ends," and Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, described what had been his own attitude up to then as "neither effective nor intelligent behavior." This position did not imply any recognition of the benefits of the regime but only that it was immovable. The cold war increased tolerance towards the Franco regime but it was still ostracized and the clearest proof of that is that Spain was not allowed to benefit from the Marshall Plan or to join NATO.

## The "Dark Night": Autarchy and Rationing in the 1940s

As we already know, the level of destruction inflicted within Spain was nowhere near the level outside in Europe after World War II. In Spain a

tenth of all cattle were lost during the Civil War but in Greece half perished in World War II; three-quarters of the Spanish merchant fleet survived while only a quarter of the French and Greek fleets were saved. In these two countries the drop in electricity production was 50 percent greater in France and 300 percent greater in Greece and the destruction of homes was twice and five times as bad, respectively. What made Spain different was how slowly reconstruction got under way – a fact that must to a great extent be blamed on the regime's economic policy which ensured that 1945 made no significant impact on the situation inside the country. Both before and after that date the political strategy favored autarchy and state intervention with a seasoning of revolutionary rhetoric which on several occasions conflicted with the measures put forward by Finance Ministers but satisfied the regime's Falangist members. During World War II Spain had an economic policy of strict rationing with no chance of cross-border trade against a background of stagnation. Once the war ended, the economic policy pursued previously could no longer be justified in any terms. Had Spain had more links with European foreign policy doubtless a profound transformation would have been possible, like that experienced by the rest of Europe from 1947 on. It has been estimated that without the Civil War Spain's economic growth could have increased by a third, and that with the Civil War – but with the Marshall Plan as well – growth could still have increased by a quarter.

What was most important in terms of foreign trade during the World War II years was Spain's relations with Italy and Germany. As time passed, involvement with these two countries became increasingly prejudicial to Spain at a time when the country was paying off a part of the debt incurred during the Civil War. Germany and Italy headed the list of countries buying Spanish products in 1941, and that did not alter until 1943. It was only in 1944 that a real change occurred in the theater of war that was clearly in the Allies' favor. It is true to say, therefore, that political factors made Spain dependent on the Axis, and that this dependency became particularly significant because Spanish trade had fallen to almost half its previous level as a result of the conflict. Estimates suggest that 12 percent of the value of its imports was transferred to Germany and 3 percent to Italy as a result of the debts incurred during the Civil War. Another aspect of the question relates to military expenditure by the Spanish state over this period, either to improve defenses or in preparation for joining in the world conflict. According to official figures, the budget for expenditure on such materials was always above 50 percent

during the war and reached a maximum of 63 percent in 1943. This data all reveals the extent to which, if Spain had adopted a truly neutral position, it would have been of real benefit at the time. Improvements could have been made to industrial productivity by greater openness to trade with the Allies but in 1945 Spanish industrial productivity was 10 percent below what it had been in 1935 and the annual growth rate had not yet reached 1 percent.

The opportunity lost over these years can best be appreciated if one compares Spain with other neutral European nations. All of them improved more than Spain, which was the country with the lowest level of industrial expansion. Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey faced difficulties that were, objectively speaking, much greater in terms of their geography and trade than any facing Spain, yet Spain made difficulties for itself by its bad relations with the Allies and by spurning foreign investment. On the one hand, public resources were used to build up industries that produced war materials, which swallowed up imports, energy, and money; on the other, no dams were built which could have eased the energy deficit and in effect the expansion of industries that could have exported their products was cut.

Autarchy and interventionism had been strong tendencies in the Spanish economy since the start of the century but now, being rooted in nationalist ideas, they became more pronounced than ever before. At the same time intervention proved to be extremely ineffectual. In Franco's startlingly simplistic opinion, "Spain is a privileged country which should be entirely self-sufficient"; as the peseta rose and fell in the only place where it was in free circulation (Tangiers), Franco imagined Jewish conspiracies at work. Self-sufficiency came to symbolize a revolt against the evils of degenerate economic liberalism. The hard-line nationalists of the time contended that prices of products and matters relating to productivity could be fixed by decree without any reference to the market; even the Labor Charter (*Fuero del Trabajo*) stated that "prices of major agricultural products will be subject to discipline and reevaluation." Any non-conformist behavior was viewed as a crime against the "Fatherland," with its corresponding guilty parties who had to be punished. Nor was the verb "punished" used purely theoretically, for we know only too well that in many militarized industries such as coal-mining, offenses led to arrests. The extreme simplicity of these ideas means that it is possible to say that Spain's political *caudillo* behaved like a quartermaster in matters relating to the economy.

A fundamental characteristic of economic interventionism at this time is that it was not at all original. At most what happened was that there was

evidence of an effort to imitate the economic policies of fascist countries by setting up bodies to allow the state to act directly in Spain's economic affairs, such as the National Institute for Industry (*Instituto Nacional de Industria*) and the National Resettlement Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Colonización*). There are many examples of such imitation in Spanish legislation; so, for instance, the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute (*Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera*) was renamed the Institute for Currencies and Exchange (*Instituto de Cambio y Divisas*), borrowing the title used in Italian law. Yet more probable still is the notion that all such changes owed more to the need to apply a coat of modern varnish to an old-fashioned "barrack-style autarchy" that could be traced back to Spanish military projects at the time of World War I. Another characteristic of Spain's economic policy was the extreme, almost militaristic zeal with which it was applied. Thirdly, state intervention created a "legal barrier to entry" which served principally to favor monopolistic practices and also, therefore, behavior that would prove economically damaging, and one final characteristic of the Spanish economy at the time was the multiplicity of administrative organizations, which added to the general chaos and privileged those who supported the regime.

Never before had it been more obvious that autarchy made very little sense in Spain. Not only were there not enough rubber, cotton, fertilizers, and oil but not enough wheat either: a product in which Spain should have been self-sufficient a lot earlier. It is typical of a state that is so powerfully interventionist to have no real and effective plan for its own reconstruction. Dating back to the Civil War there was a National Service with responsibility for devastated areas which in due course (in 1940) became a Directorate General (*Dirección General*). There was also an Institute for Credit (*Instituto de Crédito*) whose function was exactly what its title suggests, and action was taken to ensure that specific places that had suffered particularly badly from the effects of war, such as Brunete and Belchite, were "adopted" according to a special scheme. However, these were isolated instances where action was actually taken and not a real overall plan.

Whatever area one considers it is clear that interventionism failed, being least relevant where it should have been most effective. The Ministry of Agriculture was still in Falange's hands but the program that it implemented was in fact a copy of the one that the traditional right had outlined under the Second Republic. Apart from returning land to those who had had it taken away from them during the Agrarian Reform, an attempt was made to increase productivity by various schemes aimed at

repopulation that did not affect the question of land ownership. This led to the creation of the National Resettlement Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Colonización*) in October 1939. During the earliest period of the Franco regime the Institute concentrated almost exclusively on buying up land but did not really carry through its aims of repopulation. Estimates suggest that the yearly rate of resettlement for the period 1939–51 was only about 1,500 workers a year, which is a low figure when compared with attempts made by the Republic during its much briefer existence marked by failure. Only 23,000 families were settled on 10,000 hectares of land. In fact, the largest repopulation took place in the period immediately following (1956–60), when levels reached 2,000 per year thanks to the Badajoz Plan. Yet the efforts of the Institute affected only some 48,000 settlers and 6,000 agricultural workers up to 1975; of those, some 10,000 were resettled in Badajoz.

Despite this neglect of the countryside in the years following 1939, Spanish society did become more "rural": from a level of 45 percent of all workers being in agriculture the figure rose to 50 percent, breaking with a centuries-old trend. There is a very simple reason for this: the difficulty of getting hold of supplies meant that the population moved to where the foodstuffs were. Nonetheless, there are authors who point out that a higher percentage of big landowners cultivated their own land than had been the case under the Republic when most of these properties were farmed by tenant farmers. The deficiencies in agricultural productivity in the immediate postwar period have been blamed on what was termed the "persistent drought" but there was another reason as well. Although there were indeed some terrible years in terms of the lack of rain (1941 and especially 1945 when the wheat harvest was only 53 percent of the average harvest before the Civil War), a much more decisive factor was the lack of investment given that the state concentrated its efforts almost exclusively on autarchic industrialization.

No sector was as extensively regulated and no sector witnessed such total failure due to the regime's interventionism as that of commerce inside Spain. Immediately after the war a system of ration cards came into use: started as a "provisional" measure it was to remain in place for no fewer than 12 years. In fact rigid controls on agricultural productivity meant in effect that agricultural workers had to hand over a fixed quota of what they harvested for a ridiculous price. Shortages in supply in the first instance awakened a desire for yet more government intervention but, as well as not solving anything, this led to black marketeering known as

"estraperlo." It would be hard to exaggerate the size of the black market; it has even been suggested that black market trading in wheat exceeded official trading and that in the case of olive oil figures were close. Interventionism was as ineffectual as the measure which "absolutely" forbade queuing. The black market became such a normal part of life that Ridruejo could conclude that "everybody has a finger in the pie."

In discussing problems of supply we have indirectly touched on Spain's industrial policy. The nationalistic obsession of its politicians at the time with Spain's greatness was more easily satisfied by huge factories than by more modest projects that were economically viable. Its grandiose industrial policy was the pride and joy of the regime, which tried by these means to achieve national greatness and prove the superiority of this political strategy over any other except increasing Spain's military capability. Measures concerning industry were implemented early on after being approved in 1939–40. However, the achievement the regime was most proud of was the founding of the National Institute for Industry which dates from 1941. Its founding statutes stated that its main aim would be to "foster the creation and revival of our industries, especially those whose principal purpose is to solve problems arising from the defense needs of this land or concerned with the development of our economic autarchy." This measure was to an extent an imitation of Italian legislation, though the politician responsible was not a fascist but Suances, a naval man and a personal friend of Franco's who had been Industry Minister in 1938–9 and in charge of devising these legal measures. In 1945 Suances once again took on a ministerial post with responsibility for Industry, a job that he managed to make compatible with being the President of the INI.

The fact that those principally responsible for Spain's economic policies were from the Armed Services is significant. It was been written of Suances that he "treated private capital as a schoolmaster treated pupils to whom he was giving lessons in patriotism"; he was "a paternalistic but severe schoolmaster" who threw himself into the task of making the most of Spain's "neglected resources" as though his sole aim was to create industries without any regard for cost. In a country where hunger was rife, clothing scarce, and shelter often lacking, Suances decided to invest huge sums of money to ensure that oil from the bitumous slate of Puertollano should still be available for the foreseeable future (it was in fact only obtainable in the 1950s and at uneconomical prices). Born in El Ferrol, Suances had spent a number of years working in naval shipbuilding and under the Republic he had had experience in a private company that had

ended in failure, intensifying his suspicion of private initiatives. He equipped the INI with its own financial resources in the form of bonds (*obligaciones*) at savings banks (*cajas de ahorros*) guaranteed by the state. His main objective was the "vital nerve-centers of production" to such an extent that he effectively took on a "director's role" in the Spanish economy. Management was centralized and vertical. His efforts were mainly directed at producing energy and they were profoundly unsuccessful on oil production, though there were better results on electricity thanks to the use of low quality coal in the thermo-electric industry (ENDESA and ENHER)[1] and to the fresh drive in the exploitation of available hydroelectric resources. A third aspect of the INI was that it functioned as a "hospital for sick companies" by means of an actual "socialización" of losses. Within 10 years the INI had also become the only company producing vehicles, it had a major share in fertilizers and aluminum, and it played a very important role in oil-refining and artificial fibers. In other words, the public company had taken over from the private or foreign company in Spain.

As economic activities of dubious worth increased in number, the economic policy of the newly formed state did not pay enough attention to private industry which, against a background of interventionism at home and uncertainty in foreign trade, was forced to resort to extraordinary procedures. A mayor of Sabadell acknowledged in his memoirs that at that time two-thirds of the wool used in the Catalan textile mills did not come from official suppliers. Major businessmen were at times obliged to adopt the paternalistic tone that was imposed on them by the state but at the same time they also had virtually limitless powers within their companies as "bosses" answerable only to the state. Nor should one forget that there were serious deficiencies in Spain's energy supplies. In 1940 the country had consumed a million tons of oil but because of its pro-Axis stance it had restrictions imposed on its oil supplies by the Allies, so much so that it did not reach that level of consumption again until 1946. Once World War II was over, the difficulties that Spain was encountering in obtaining the currency to buy oil were starkly obvious and electricity supplies were found to be seriously inadequate. In years such as 1945 and 1949, electricity supplies were on occasion some 30 percent below demand.

All of these factors contributed to the poor performance of Spain's index of industrial productivity in comparison with other countries. Available data reveals that the country's backwardness dated from this time. Growth was only 0.6 percent during the period 1935–50, while in the rest of Europe it was 2.7 percent. Only in 1950 did levels of industrial

production once again equal the levels in 1930. Spain fell behind Italy and did not even begin to close the gap until 1963, and in 1975 the difference was as it had been in 1947. Between 1946 and 1950 Greece and Yugoslavia doubled their industrial production while Spain's rose by 1.1 percent. In 1950 the income per capita was 40 percent lower than in Italy, when in 1930 it had been only 10 percent lower. All of these factors must be taken into account when we encounter statements saying that the Franco regime was the driving force behind Spain's economic development.

A key factor in the economic policy of the time was public finance. Historians seem to agree on the effectiveness of the action taken by the Finance Minister Larraz who had been responsible for monetary reunification after the war. Other aspects of his time in office seem less positive. As regards taxation, the period was characterized by the shaky structure of direct personal taxation which was virtually nonexistent, and by widespread tax-avoidance, although there was marked success in indirect personal taxation and taxes levied on exceptional profits (*beneficios extraordinarios*). Even so, estimates on tax fraud suggest that only a third of what should have been collected actually reached the public coffers. Whereas taxes in Europe at that time were far higher, in Spain the tax problem prevented an interventionist state doing its job properly (in Britain tax was at 33 percent of the national income, in Italy 21 percent, and in Spain only 14 percent).

Also, maintaining the situation in banking virtually unchanged in effect created a *numerus clausus* preventing development, and this was reinforced by the Law on the Regulation of Banking (*Ley de Ordeanción Bancaria*) of 1946. Not surprisingly, in some operations banks obtained profits of 700 percent. In years that were not very good in economic terms, annual dividends of 12 or 13 percent on bank bonds were not uncommon. In addition, banks concentrated their growing power in industry. At the same time, banking legislation had a clearly inflationary effect. Debt became common throughout the system and it was automatically dealt with by the Bank of Spain (*Banco de España*). Yet this was not the only mechanism that drove inflation. Being unable to generate revenue by means of taxation, the state resorted to circulating debt. It is remarkable that as interventionist a state as Spain should have forgotten how vital it is to control debt. Circulation of debt by the state was as frequent as it was abundant: it can be shown that the national debt tripled over those 10 years. As for foreign investment, suffice it to say that Riotinto was viewed as an "economic Gibraltar" and everything that could be done to ensure

that the mines ended up as capital in Spanish hands was done. Finally, in 1954, seven Spanish banks bought up two-thirds of the capital while the rest remained in British hands.

We once again find ourselves face to face with the state's interventionist policy as soon as we turn our attention to foreign trade, which was dominated by bilateralism, the awarding of licenses, and numerous exchange rates. The peseta kept the same exchange rate until 1948, which was entirely consistent with Franco's nationalist ideology since he viewed a strong currency as the best sign of economic power. After that there was a shift to a system of "multiple exchange rates" which came into force in an impenetrable jungle of highly elaborate regulations. Since foreign trade was also subject to a system of licensing, the demand to participate soon became overwhelming. In this as in so many other areas there were many instances of favoritism that were both irrational and corrupt. Certain surnames from the ruling classes, including many from a Falangist background, soon appeared on the list of those with large fortunes. It was only in mid 1950 that a free currency market was established – a date when, in any case, the chances of obtaining foreign finance were still small for political reasons. The problem was made worse by the fact that the Spanish state nationalized the greater part of all foreign capital in Spain (German companies set up during the Civil War, Barcelona Traction, Telefónica in 1945 . . . ).

As the moment comes to try to evaluate Spain's economic development at this time, it is worth calling to mind the opinion of the Hispanist Gerald Brenan: "The impression Spain gives at present is of a country for whom the road which leads to the basic conditions of what is human and tolerable is closed." This may seem an exaggeration and it contrasts strongly with what actually happened subsequently in Spain's economic development, but it does reflect the situation as it was at the time Brenan was writing. In 1945 the per capita income was close on a third of what it had been in 1935 and it only recovered completely in 1951; however, it was not until 1954 – that is to say, when the regime had been in existence for 18 years – that prewar macroeconomic levels were reached once again. In order to reveal the extent to which the 1940s were a time of sacrifice for Spaniards it has been possible to ascertain that the actual salaries of specialized workers fell by half. At the end of the decade Spain had fallen behind the most advanced countries in Latin America such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Instead of experiencing a process of reconstruction, political factors condemned Spaniards to a stagnation without

parallel out of which there grew, as an inheritance for the future, a public sector whose value was questionable.

This examination of Spain's economic policy should conclude with reference to the government's social policy. Unlike what had happened in other countries with basically similar regimes, such as Peronism, Spain's social policy was not in the hands of unions but of the Labor Ministry. The Single Union Law (*Ley de Unidad Sindical*) and the Law on the Bases of Union Organization (*Ley de Bases de Organización Sindical*) of 1940 followed criteria that were clearly fascist. The union was conceived of as single, compulsory, and "ordered hierarchically under state direction," which meant that "since all democratic illusions have now been defeated, it brings together those who are choosing to take part and serve by their leadership." These unions were permeated by an ideology that used revolutionary language that in practice said very little. In this way negotiation was avoided, life inside companies was run like a barracks, and employers had exceptional disciplinary powers. Until late 1944 no election of representatives took place within companies and in October 1947 company juries were set up. However, at this point the owners managed to prevent their actual introduction into the workplace by suggesting that it was a "dangerous innovation" and in effect the measure only came into force after 1953 and then only in larger companies.

Since trade unionism had been emptied of all content, revolutionary rhetoric found an outlet in another sector of the Administration. The specific measures that were the outcome of these policies in the early years of the Franco regime meant expansion of the social welfare system inherited from the Republic and before. The next few years saw the first family allowance, the setting up of conciliation boards at work in 1938, old age pensions in 1939, a policy of Protection of the Family (1945), sickness benefit (1942), and the Law of Labor Contracts (*Ley de Contrato de Trabajo*) in 1944. There was also pay for public holidays and bonuses. Technical universities became the new starting-point for professional training. Of all these new provisions, the one that made the greatest impact on Spanish society was without doubt medical provision for children. Infant mortality fell by half in the period 1935–55 and deaths in childbirth to a quarter or even a fifth of previous levels. Other aspects of the regime's social policies were put into practice much more slowly or remained in the limbo of rhetorical declarations, such as those aimed at protection of the family. One must take into account the fact that salary rises were automatically made non-effective by inflation, and that however much social

legislation intended to bring in new measures, levels of consumption clearly showed a downward trend once again.

## Culture: Penance and Survival

The situation of Spanish culture in 1936 has been described as a true "age of silver." The trauma of war meant that a section of Spain's creative writers and artists went into exile and also that a very particular interpretation was put on the country's past, as much by those who left Spain as by the ones who remained there. In neither case was there was a total break with the past, though some attempts were made to do just that.

The experience of exile made a powerful impact on many Spanish intellectuals. Prominent figures who went into exile included the musicians Manuel de Falla and Pablo Casals; philosophers such as José Gaos and Gabriel Ferrater; specialists in the social sciences such as Manuel García Pelayo and Francisco Ayala; men of letters such as José F. Montesinos and Guillermo de Torre; educationalists such as José Castillejo and Alberto Jiménez Fraud; playwrights such as Alejandro Casona and actresses such as Margarita Xirgu; the historians Rafael Altamira, Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, and Américo Castro; the novelists Max Aub, Arturo Barea, and Ramón Sender. Yet more important by far than drawing up a list of exiles is to determine the ways in which they might have been influenced by the extraordinary circumstances of their exile. Many saw their academic work disrupted and all of them experienced exile as an acutely painful mutilation. Yet as well as their pain we must consider other more fruitful consequences of exile. Many of them discovered the global nature of Spanish culture and felt that, rather than being driven from their own country, they had discovered another land, unlike numerous Central Europeans who had fled from Nazism.

This is why reflection on Spain and its past has been as insistent as it has been passionate. That has often been the case with all kinds of thinkers but is especially true of historians. In Américo Castro's opinion, Spain's past had been profoundly marked by its three religions – Christian, Muslim, and Jewish – and by a deep-rooted intolerance towards any dissenting minority. Nor, in his view, had this been totally negative since the anguish of the Jewish *conversos* had provided the inspiration for a large part of Spain's cultural creativity. In his famous debate with Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, what seems to have been most important was not the degree to

which either of them might have been right or wrong but the fact that they were both so powerfully drawn to the study of Spain's past. Sánchez Albornoz, a positivist historian whose work had little in common with Spain's tradition of essay-writing, attacked Castro's thesis, rejecting what Castro claimed to have been the arabization of Spain and instead taking his own search for Spanishness further back in time as far as the Iberians. Essentially both historians felt strongly attracted by the notion of Spain's uniqueness and their results coincided. This type of preoccupation is also evident in novels written by exiles after the Civil War in which war itself also played a major role in the work of many writers. That is the case with Barea's *La forja de un rebelde* (*The forging of a rebel*), or Manuel Andújar's *Vísperas* (*The evening before*), and also with works by Aub, Sender, Ayala, and a great many others in which the theme of the Civil War mingles with memories of childhood, the problems of exile, and the difficulty of returning to Spain, or the threat of the dictatorship.

It has often been argued that given the caliber of those who left Spain, who were not only brilliant in terms of thought and narrative but also in disciplines such as poetry or the natural sciences, what was left behind in Spain was a barren desert with nothing but official art and official literature of more than dubious quality. However, to suggest that this was the case is to oversimplify and to ignore history. The exiling of intellectuals did not encompass even a fraction of Spain's cultural creativity; furthermore, it is far from certain that there ever was an official culture as such, quite apart from the fact that among the ranks of the victors too there was evidence of quite considerable brilliance.

Those who stayed in Spain had not all supported the winning side or even changed sides (though some had). As the Catalan journalist "Gaziel" wrote, clearly an effort was made by those in power to breathe life into "the relics of a past that has been obliterated in the rest of the world," and they had the "sickeningly submissive" approval of the Spanish bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, if Spain's liberal tradition could not survive as such, at least there still existed a "noble line of integrity." There were also those who, like Julián Marías, chose "to live with the scant liberty that exists at present but in all circumstances to be free." When writing, he adds, one had at times not to say everything that one was thinking but one could at least say some of it. It goes without saying that this was far from easy. We need only remember that many of the most important novels of the decade were censored. Cela's *La familia de Pascual Duarte* (*The family of Pascual Duarte*) was censored first of all and then he was thrown out of

the Press Association (*Asociación de la Prensa*) on account of *La Colmena* (*The Beehive*). In the immediate postwar years Baroja's complete works were banned, more than 10 percent of all plays were subjected to censorship along with novels by well-known Falangists, while for years it was forbidden even to mention Spain's most successful playwright, Jacinto Benavente. Nonetheless, as Marías has said, "there was a considerable degree of personal and social freedom" because the regime was never entirely totalitarian and because it was not overly concerned with cultural issues. This explains, for example, how José Ortega y Gasset was able to return to Spain and try to reestablish a link with the liberal heritage of the past, as no lesser a person than Gregorio Marañón had done before him. In the aftermath of World War II, Spain's weighty legacy of tragic experience seemed to come through more clearly in Marañón's work because, in the biographies that he wrote, the theme of exile or the thirst for political power appeared more often than they did in the works of the more shy and reserved Ortega. It is highly likely that both men believed that Francoism might possibly move in a more liberal direction but in this respect they both soon had cause to give up hope. In Ortega's opinion, Madrid had reverted to being like any "unchanging small town in La Mancha," just as it always had been. As for Baroja and Azorín, they seemed to prefer someone who would "tame" revolutionary passions to the passions themselves.

There was little evidence in Franco's Spain of the real heirs to the liberal tradition, although 1947 did see an Institute for the Study of the Humanities (*Instituto de Humanidades*) founded, inspired by Ortega; it was also possible to begin publishing *Insula*, a literary review which put the literary world inside Spain in contact with those in exile. The problem is that this world was denied the opportunity to exercise any real influence and in consequence many prewar cultural institutions were left in a situation that was, to say the least, precarious. Marías wrote of the two great patriarchs of Spanish thought of the earlier period that "Unamuno was not seen in a very good light [but] it was not as bad as for Ortega [since] after all [the former] was dead and had been a less rigorous thinker." Nonetheless, in Franco's Spain as it was in its early stages, apart from those already mentioned and many others who were less important there was, for example, Ramón Menéndez Pidal who ended his literary career with a period of sparkling polemical syntheses. In other words, it was not the case that the literary masters gave in. However limited their chances of action were, liberal intellectuals with their slow silent labors

made their contribution to Spain's transformation. The writer Carlos Barral could state that in the postwar years "the country set about doing penance [but] a transformation which years later seemed unimaginable happened at breakneck speed."

Rather than propounding only one kind of cultural orthodoxy the Franco regime had many kinds that overlapped to a greater or lesser extent and were neither clearly differentiated nor long-lasting. The mission to rebuild Spain's capacity for scientific research was entrusted to the National Scientific Research Council (*Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* or CSIC), part of whose directorship was of the traditionalist clericalist right and not at all in tune with Falange. In universities there was a sort of division of labor between the Party and Church groups when it came to formulating the 1943 Universities Act (*Ley Universitaria*). The result was a text which in essence did not in any way break with the university tradition of the nineteenth century: the lowest-level teaching posts were given to Catholic integrists. Continuity within Spain's universities was evident in their centralization and the continuation of the system of selection based on competitive examinations (*oposiciones*). Within 12 years three quarters of university chairs had new occupants. The only decisive change was the exponential rise in control in the sense that the vice-chancellor, who was appointed by the government, was seen as both a "head of the university and a government delegate." Power was shared between the most strongly clericalist sector and Falange in the sense that Falange controlled the Spanish University Students' Union (*Sindicato Español Universitario* or SEU) and the residential university colleges (*colegios mayores*) in order to maximize its impact on the young. As for academic staff, one would have to point out that the clericalists were the strongest element. Nor should one forget the drastic financial cuts that plagued the universities which, in the postwar period, had only 365 teaching staff in contrast to 553 under the Republic. Many of the students and academics who studied and taught there during those years have left in their memoirs a very negative testimony to their experiences. Carlos Castilla del Pino affirms that after the war in every academic subject there was someone whose aim was to start at the level that had previously been attained and to "to drag it down further than could ever have been imagined in the mid twentieth century." In many areas this may well have been the case but generalization can also distort the picture. In other areas political commitment was abandoned and essays and articles led on to serious academic study as a refuge from surrounding circumstances.

Falange and others associated with it took charge of what might be termed "high culture." The Party operated on two levels: one of lower quality production more directly controlled by more immediate political interests responsible for publications such as *El Español* or *La Estafeta Literaria*, and the other represented by the review *El Escorial*. The latter aimed to provide "propaganda in the grand style" but quality soon took precedence over the desire to persuade. It was hoped that in this way the roots of liberalism would be taken over and absorbed but it also ensured their survival. On another front, children's magazines published by Falange gave a first opportunity to write to authors who in time would become serious critics of the Franco regime. There is no doubt at all that there was more intelligence, sensitivity, and generosity of spirit in Falange circles than in other groups dominated by Church interests. Among such Falangists it was even possible at times to find an appreciation of new developments in the sciences that until then had never caught anyone's interest in Spain. The *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (Political Science Review), aimed in theory at setting out the regime's doctrinal position, in fact served to introduce sociology into Spain. Whatever the means might have been, by the middle of the 1950s there were no more than mere traces of fascism or any kind of cultural orthodoxy left.

In addition to this plurality of orthodox positions we should add to the general panorama of the moment a comment on the relative autonomy enjoyed within each of these areas and the drift among former hardliners towards greater apathy. There was of course an entire literature which chose to explore themes related to aspects of the whole experience of the Civil War but it belonged to the traditional right (Ricardo León, Concha Espina . . . ) and it did not last long. In the last analysis it is only of limited interest and does not of course invalidate their writing that Cela was a censor and Gonzalo Torrente Ballester wrote a book which spoke highly of the single party system, any more than Luis Rosales's or Luis Felipe Vivanco's fascination with epic or religious poetry should be paid undue attention. The most honest and obvious explanation for facts such as these will always be preferable to an attempt to claim that these writers were early dissidents when in fact such dissidence either did not exist or else came very much later. Another fact worth mentioning is that with one or two exceptions the novelists and intellectuals most closely associated with the regime in the area of ideology were more belligerent in their attitudes before it came to power than while it remained there. The case of Rafael Sánchez Mazas best typifies this as he soon devoted himself to an

evocative style of writing, as is clear from *La vida nueva de Pedrito de Andía* (*The New Life of Pedrito de Andía*).

In exile as much as within the country, Spain's essential nature became not just a dominant theme but an obsession for essayists. This is evident in Menéndez Pidal's last works, especially *Los españoles en su historia* (*Spaniards through their history*) in which, like so many pro-Castilian historians of liberal background, he traces the origins of the nation back to a very distant past and condemns Spain's plurality as decadence. The fiercest argument of the period was the one that arose between different orthodox viewpoints at the end of the 1940s. The ensuing debate set Pedro Laín Entralgo, the most outstanding figure among the Falangist intellectuals, against the monarchist Catholic extremist position represented by the CSIC journal *Arbor*, founded in 1944, for which the author of *España sin problema* (*Spain without problems*), Rafael Calvo Serer, used to write. The Falangist position aimed to move closer to the intellectual attitudes of the liberal left in order to integrate them into its own way of thinking. Those opposing it, however, had since 1939 denied that there was anything essentially problematic about Spain because Menéndez Pidal "presented us with a Spain without problems." Laín's judgment was so very different that his starting-point was an alternative vision entirely unlike that of Menéndez Pidal and it was presented as being more liberal than the opposition's own view. All in all, this debate is evidence of the crucial importance of reflection on Spain's essential nature in the cultural world of the postwar period and throughout the Peninsula. It also allows us to trace the slow progress that was being made towards the recovery of liberal principles. For the Falangists it was the desire to draw in intellectuals in exile that in the long run led to them becoming more like them. The other faction was anti-totalitarian and monarchist and this last factor meant that it evolved too, at least in the case of Calvo Serer.

If we move on from these semi-political debates to the life of Spain's literary world we shall find a marked change in attitude from the Republican years. Prior to its politicization in the 1930s, the "1927 Generation" had been known for its experiments in form and its brilliant use of metaphor. The "1936 Generation" replaced these techniques with dense sentimental rhetoric and a preoccupation with human destiny. Germán Gullón sums it up more or less exactly: as a generation it would have been "moderate, tolerant, understanding, and an enemy of conventionally determined posturing and flag waving," reluctant to contribute to splitting Spain in two precisely because it had already witnessed that spectacle and had suffered

in its own flesh because of it. As one can see, all this has very little to do with the mockery (*fumistería*) of official art (Josep Pla). For many of these writers both in exile and in Spain a supremely important influence was that of Ortega y Gasset.

Much of what has been said so far is even more relevant to any discussion of poetry at the time. Apart from its initial interest in religious or imperialistic poetry when it was founded, the journal *Garcilaso* represented a search for a lyricism that would be "neoclassical (in form), intimate, and nationalistic." Yet not even the supreme mentor of this group, José García Nieto, always adhered to these principles; perhaps more significant still was the return to a classical notion of discipline (the "scandal of rigid discipline"). In Rosales, as in Vivanco and Leopoldo María Panero, we find that political commitment and a commitment to this classical ideal were soon left far behind. At the same time, Damaso Alonso's 1944 work *Hijos de la ira* (*Sons of Wrath*) signaled the "rehumanizing of poetry" by presenting Madrid, in an agonizing way that has parallels with what was going on at this same time in *tremendista*[2] narratives (Cela), as "a city of more than a million corpses." The review *Espadaña* also marked a return to reality which contrasted with the process of "embalming" undertaken by those who had tried to link the world of poetry with the classical world. Even before the 1950s Gabriel Celaya had chosen to write politically committed poetry in opposition to the regime.

To an extent, in narrative too a backward step was taken towards classicism – to the tradition represented by Galdós and Baroja. The latter became the great master of the newly emerging generations, as Camilo José Cela – the most brilliant author of all those who had emerged in the 1940s – would recall. Cela's *La familia de Pascual Duarte* (*Pascual Duarte's family*, 1942) was the novel whose appalling version of reality, taken from the work of the painter José Gutiérrez Solana and the "Spanish Black Legend," brought the pain of the postwar period into a literature that seemed not to have experienced it until now. In fact *tremendismo* was born of this experience and became a dominant fashion. Less agonizing and more humbly imitative of Spain's "harsh, heartfelt, and painful day-to-day reality," as is stated in the prologue, was Cela's *La colmena* (*The Beehive*), written in 1946 but only allowed to be published in 1951 and then only abroad. Carmen Laforet's *Nada* (*Nothing*), published in 1945, explores beneath a prosaic story the general degeneration in collective morale in postwar Spain. At around this time the career of another writer began to make slow but sure upward progress: that of Miguel Delibes.

The theater, given its particular nature, would have had difficulty had it allowed discordant elements to have a voice. It has therefore been written that the 1940s were characterized by "humorous theater" that had "some novelty and was somewhat disconcerting and offered veiled social criticism of Spain's banal daily existence." The perennial bourgeois theater saw Benavente triumph in 1945 when he was once again allowed to put on a new play. Real novelty, though not immediately obvious, came in the form of plays in which humor and tenderness mingled, such as works by Miguel Mihura, author of *Ni pobre ni rico, sino todo lo contrario* (*Neither rich nor poor but quite the contrary*) of 1943 and *Tres sombreros de copa* (*Three bowler hats*), premiered in 1952. It was only in 1949 that *Historia de una escalera* (*Story of a staircase*) was first performed, introducing the short-lived but morally questioning theater of Antonio Buero Vallejo. For the time being, the vanguard was limited exclusively to writers in exile where in 1944 Rafael Alberti premiered *El adefesio* (*Looking a sight*).

There was never really one official orthodox position on architecture and the plastic arts either. Although the architecture of the time followed fascist models, in the postwar period there was virtually no possibility of rebuilding, and monuments commemorating the conflict used almost exclusively the form of the cross. There was practically no censorship in the plastic arts. In architecture – the art form most likely to have an immediate political impact – there is evidence of changing tastes and undefined intent in some of the greatest monuments of the time. This may well be the case with the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen), begun in 1940 and very much the inspiration of Franco himself who even made some sketches for it. Initially there may have been an intention to imitate the architecture of Nazi Germany about which an exhibition was held in Madrid, and it was with these aesthetic notions in mind that designs were put forward for the Air Ministry building in Madrid. However, these plans went nowhere, partly due to the weakness of Spain's economy at the time and partly too because of changes within the regime. In this last respect, it is significant that the Air Ministry already mentioned was finally built according to architectural styles from Spain's own national heritage. Sánchez Mazas wrote that "El Escorial offers us the best lessons for the Falanges of the future" and indeed the Ministry owes much to the architectural principles of El Escorial. A style of monumental architecture that drew on national traditions is also to be found in other important examples of the architecture of the time, such as the Technical University (*Universidad Laboral*) in

Gijón designed by Luis Moya Blanco. National tradition was also evident in music, for example in the case of Joaquín Rodrigo's *Concierto de Aranjuez*. After 1951 it is clearly inappropriate to talk of official architecture in relation to the Franco regime.

As regards painting and sculpture, the most that one can say is that there was official art in areas such as illustration (Carlos Sáenz de Tejada) or murals (José Aguiar) but it did not last for long. Official tastes tended towards classicism and they were the dominant influence on sculpture (Enrique Pérez Comendador, Enric Monjo, José Clará . . . ) for obvious reasons. However, rather than a return to classicism, what in fact happened was that some aspects of the avant-garde of a previous period continued to exist but in a very limited market. One must also take into account the impact on new generations of outstanding figures from an early era of Spanish painting: as was the case with Daniel Vázquez Díaz in Madrid or Joaquín Sunyer and Pere Pruna in Barcelona. A further important factor to bear in mind was that painters such as Solana, who had until this time been demonized, became acceptable because they had so much in common with the literary phenomenon of the time known as *tremendismo*. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this link connecting the present with the past is to be found in the so-called *Academia Breve de Crítica de Arte* (Brief Academy of Art Criticism) and what was known as the "Vallecas School." The former, inspired by Eugenio D'Ors, existed from 1942 onwards and merits attention for its attentiveness to the most recent changes in painting and sculpture. D'Ors's efforts were devoted to raising the level of information on, and quality of, material on contemporary art in the capital. The Vallecas School did not represent a particular discipline or trend; rather, it was a group of young painters drawn to Benjamín Palencia: a figure who provided a link back to the vanguard of the 1930s. Many painters were interested in landscapes and still life, and in very uncertain circumstances they managed to keep up an admirable level of activity which only received public recognition in the 1960s. After 1948 the earliest attempts at abstract art began to appear, at first closely associated with surrealism and influenced by Klee and Miró, or with primitivism (the "Altamira School"). The first biennial Festival of Latin American Art, where the artistic merit of a young painter such as Palencia was acknowledged, marked the start of a new era. Conceived as a vehicle for political propaganda about Latin America, its importance lay in the fact that from that time on, the official Spanish art world came to accept the most varied artistic options.

Brief reference must be made to popular culture – to entertainment and leisure, for it is here that we can best observe the spirit of the age. In the history of Spanish cinema those were the years in which the popularity of the medium spread. The number of cinemas began to multiply and did not stop until the late 1960s. In 1952 the British historian Gerald Brenan stated that such a passion for the cinema was not to be found in any other country: an opinion confirmed by the fact that the number of establishments per thousand inhabitants equaled that of the United States. In those years too, an industrial style of production came into being. In 1941 the dubbing of films became standard: a nationalist measure initially, though it then became a lasting habit. In that same year, quotas were set for the showing of Spanish films and a system introduced which meant that anyone who produced Spanish films could also import foreign ones. Furthermore, the cinema was declared an industry of national interest and so received official funding.

During this period Spain produced an average of 37 films a year. In official circles the cinema was considered to have a vital function as a "formidable weapon for disseminating ideas," though this did not mean that pure entertainment was abandoned since the most popular genre at the time was comedy. However, films on historical themes (Juan Orduña) were thought to have greater significance. They were considered especially important in "shaping of the spirit of the nation" and common themes included heroic biographies, the formation of the Spanish state, and the colonial enterprise in America.

In song too, and in other forms of entertainment associated with it, there were notable changes in the 1940s. As well as a campaign to impose a certain morality in variety performances, the world of popular music saw a last revival of Spain's own style of operetta, the *zarzuela grande*, whose main exponents were Federico Moreno Torroba and Pablo Sorozábal. Its final crisis came as a result of a creative recession and a loss of prestige among the general public brought about by elitist criticism. In contrast, a genre that did flourish was a kind of folkloric spectacle introduced by Antonio Quintero, Rafael de León, and Manuel López-Quiroga which was almost entirely Andalusian. The success of this kind of production displaced for a time the music-hall songs of the past, the Argentinian tango, and Mexican ballads (*corridos*) which had given the musical entertainment of a previous era a cosmopolitan dimension.

Having made its appearance in the 1920s, radio became a social phenomenon in the 1930s. After the Francoist victory a new legal ruling came

into force that was intended to last. Alongside the most widely broadcast private radio station *Unión Radio*, now rebaptized with the new name *Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión*, a state radio station came into being, *Radio Nacional*, and also one representing the Party. However, information – what was known as a "*parte*" or bulletin: a term with a military ring to it – was strictly the monopoly of *Radio Nacional* and at the same time a system of strict censorship was introduced. This did not, in fact, mean that radio broadcasting was in any way limited; in those years there were a million receivers: a figure three times the size of the figure at the start of the 1930s. Alongside political information, what is most remarkable about radio broadcasting in the postwar period is the sheer quantity of religious programming. Despite all difficulties, by the middle of the 1940s it was obvious that private radio had survived and indeed a new form of entertainment appeared: serials. The retransmission of popular music would have an immense impact both on the broadcasting companies (in commercial terms) and as a means of laying the foundations of a form of popular leisure entertainment.

## Bibliography

Political history: J. CAZORLA, *La consolidación del Nuevo Estado franquista*, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2003; Giuliana di FEBO, *Ritos de guerra y de victoria en la España franquista*, Desclée de Brouwer, Bilbao, 2002; Álvaro FERRARI, *Franquismo y conflictos ideológicos, 1936–1956*, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1993; "El primer franquismo, 1936–1959," *Ayer*, no. 33 (1999), edited by Glicerio SÁNCHEZ RECIO; Javier TUSELL, *Franco y los católicos. La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1984.

On Falange: Miguel Ángel APARICIO, *El sindicalismo vertical y la formación del Estado franquista*, EUNIBAR, Barcelona, 1980; Ricardo CHUECA, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco. Un estudio sobre FET y de las JONS*, CIS, Madrid, 1983; Stanley PAYNE, *Franco y José Antonio. El extraño caso del fascismo español*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1997; Miguel A. RUIZ CARNICER, *El Sindicato Español Universitario (SEU), 1935–1965. La socialización política de la juventud universitaria en el franquismo*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1996; Joan María THOMAS, *Falange, guerra civil, franquisme. FET y de las JONS de Barcelona en els primers anys del règim franquista*, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1992.

Political memoirs: José María AREILZA, *A lo largo del siglo, 1909–1991*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1992; Francesc CAMBÓ, *Meditacions. Dietari (1936–1946)*, Alpha, Barcelona, 1982; José M. GIL ROBLES, *La monarquía por la que yo luché*

*(1941–1945)*, Taurus, Madrid, 1976; Alfredo KINDELÁN, *La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1981; Pedro LAÍN ENTRALGO, *Descargo de conciencia (1930–1960)*, Barral, Barcelona, 1976; Dionisio RIDRUEJO, *Casi unas memorias*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1976; Ramón SERRANO SUÑER, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue. Memorias*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1977, and *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar*, Nauta, Barcelona, 1973; Eugenio VEGAS LATAPIE, *La frustración de la victoria. Memorias políticas, 1938–1942*, Actas, Madrid, 1995.

Spain's position on World War II: Charles B. BURDICK, *Germany's military strategy and Spain in World War II*, UP, Syracuse, 1968; Lorenzo DELGADO GÓMEZ ESCALONILLA, *Diplomacia franquista y política cultural hacia Iberoamérica (1939–1953)*, CSIC, Madrid, 1988; Donald D. DETWILER, *Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar. Die Frage des spanischen Eintritts in den Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1962; Rafael GARCÍA PÉREZ, *Franquismo y Tercer Reich. Las relaciones económicas hispano-alemanas durante la segunda guerra mundial*, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1994; Massimiliano GUDERZO, *Madrid e l'arte della diplomazia. L'incognita spagnola nella seconda guerra mondiale*, Manent, Firenze, 1995; C. H. HALSTEAD, *Spain, the powers and the Second World War*, University of Virginia Ph. D., Virginia, 1962; Christian LEITZ, *Economic relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936–1945*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; Antonio MARQUINA, *La diplomacia vaticana y la España de Franco, 1936–1945*, CSIC, Madrid, 1982; Rosa PARDO, *Con Franco hacia el Imperio. La política exterior española en América Latina, 1939–1945*, UNED, Madrid, 1994; Klaus Jorg RUHL, *Franco, Falange y el III Reich. España durante la II Guerra Mundial*, Akal, Madrid, 1986; Denis SMYTH, *Diplomacy and strategy of survival. British policy and Franco's Spain, 1940–1941*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986; Javier TUSELL, *Franco, España y la segunda guerra mundial. Entre el Eje y la neutralidad*, Temas de Hoy, Madrid, 1995; Javier TUSELL and Genoveva GARCÍA QUEIPO DE LLANO, *Franco y Mussolini. La política española durante la segunda guerra mundial*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1985.

The period of isolation: María Dolores ALGORA, *Las relaciones hispano-árabes durante el régimen de Franco: la ruptura del aislamiento internacional*, Biblioteca Diplomática Española, Madrid, 1996; Paola BRUNDU, *Ostracismo e realpolitik. Gli alleati e la Spagna franchista negli anni del dopo guerra*, Università di Cagliari, 1984; Beatriz FIGALLO, *El protocolo Perón-Franco. Relaciones hispano-argentinas, 1942–1952*, Ediciones Corregidor, Buenos Aires, 1992; Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO, *Franco e Salazar. As relaçoes luso-espanholas durante a guerra fria*, Assirio e Alvim, Lisboa, 1996; A. J. LEONART, *España y la ONU*, CSIC, Madrid, 1978 ff.

The opposition during the early years of Francoism: Helmut HEINE, *La oposición política al franquismo de 1939 a 1952*, Crítica, Barcelona, 1983 and Javier TUSELL, *La oposición democrática al franquismo (1939–1962)*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1977. The Monarchists: Fernando de MEER, *Juan de Borbón, un hombre solo*

*(1941–1948)*, Junta de Castilla y León, 2001; José María TOQUERO, *Franco y don Juan. La oposición monárquica al franquismo* Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1989, and *Don Juan de Borbón, el rey padre*, Plaza y Janés-Cambio 16, Barcelona, 1992; A. VILLANUEVA MARTÍNEZ, *El carlismo navarro durante el primer franquismo, 1937–1951*, Actas, Madrid, 1998. Republicanism: José BORRÁS, *Políticas de los exiliados españoles, 1944–1950*, Ruedo Ibérico, Paris, 1976; José María DEL VALLE, *Las instituciones de la República en el exilio*, Ruedo Ibérico, Paris, 1976; David WINGEATE PIKE, *Vae victis! Los republicanos españoles refugiados en Francia, 1939–1944*, Ruedo Ibérico, Paris, 1969 (*The Spanish communists in exile 1939–1945*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

On socialism: Luis ARIQUISTAIN, *Sobre la guerra civil y en la emigración*, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1983, edited and with a prologue by Javier Tusell; Julio AROSTEGUI, *Largo Caballero en el exilio. La última etapa de un líder obrero*, Fundación Largo Caballero, Madrid, 1990; *Congresos del PSOE en el exilio, 1944–1974*, Editorial Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1981; Richard GILLESPIE, *The Spanish Socialist Party. A history of factionalism*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989; Santos JULIÁ, *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879–1982*, Taurus, Madrid, 1997; Abdón MATEOS, *Las izquierdas españolas desde la guerra civil hasta 1982. Organizaciones socialistas, culturas políticas y movimientos sociales*, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, 1997; Amaro DEL ROSAL, *Historia de la UGT de España en la emigración*, Grijalbo, Barcelona, 1978; Juan A. SACALÚA, *La resistencia socialista en Asturias, 1937–1962*, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1986; "El socialismo en España," *Anales de Historia de la Fundación Pablo Iglesias*, IV (1986); César TCHACH and Carmen REYES, *Clandestinidad y exilio. La reconstrucción del sindicato socialista, 1939–1953*, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1986. On the Anarchists: Ángel HERRERÍN, *La CNT durante el franquismo. Clandestinidad y exilio (1939–1975)*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2004 and Eurico MARCO NADAL, *Todos contra Franco. La Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas, 1944–1947*, Queimada, Madrid, 1982. On the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the guerrilla war: Fernando CLAUDÍN, *Santiago Carrillo. Crónica de un secretario general*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1983; Joan ESTRUCH, *El PCE en la clandestinidad, 1939–1956*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1982; Gregorio MORÁN, *Miseria y grandeza del Partido Comunista de España, 1939–1975*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1986; Secundino SERRANO, *Maquis. Historia de la guerrilla antifranquista*, Temas de Hoy, Madrid, 2001. On the opposition in the Basque Country: BELTZA, *El nacionalismo vasco en el exilio, 1937–1960*, Txertoa, San Sebastián, 1977 and Iñake BERNARDO, *Galíndez, la tumba abierta. Los vascos y los Estados Unidos*, Gobierno Vasco, Vitoria, 1993. On the opposition in Catalonia: Félix FANES, *La vaga de tramvies del 1951*, Laia, Barcelona, 1977; Miquel FERRER, *La Generalitat de Catalunya a l'exili*, Aymà, Barcelona, 1977; Carles PI SUNYER, *Memòries de l'exili. El Consell Nacional de Catalunya, 1940–1945*, Curial, Barcelona, 1978.

Living conditions and social protest: Carme MOLINERO and Pere YSÀS, *Patria, pan y justicia. Nivell de vida y condicions de treball a Catalunya, 1939–1951*, La Magrana, Barcelona, 1985; Carmen BENITO DEL POZO, *La clase obrera durante el franquismo. Empleo, condiciones de trabajo y conflicto (1940–1975)*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1993 and R. GARCÍA PIÑEIRO, *Los mineros asturianos bajo el franquismo (1937–1975)*, Fundación 1º de Mayo, Madrid, 1990.

Catalonia: Josep BENET, *L'intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya*, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1992; María Josepa GALLOFRÉ, *L'edició catalana i la censura franquista (1939–1951)*, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona, 1991; Borja de RIQUER, *L'últim Cambó (1936–1947). La dreta catalana davant la guerra civil i el franquisme*, Eumo, Vic, 1996; J. M. SOLÉ SABATÉ and J. M. VILLARROYA, *Cronologia de la repressió de la llengua i cultura catalanes (1936–1975)*, Curial, Barcelona, 1996.

Social and economic policy: Alfonso BALLESTEROS, *Juan Antonio Suances, 1891–1977. La política industrial de la posguerra*, Lid Editorial empresarial, León, 1993; Carlos BARCIELA, *La agricultura cerealista en la España contemporánea: el mercado triguero y el Servicio Nacional del Trigo*, UCM, Madrid, 1981; and *Autarquía y mercado negro: el fracaso económico del primer franquismo, 1939 – 1959*, Crítica, Barcelona, 2003; Jordi CATALÁN, *La economía española y la segunda guerra mundial*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1995; Antonio GÓMEZ MENDOZA, *El "Gibraltar económico": Franco y Riotinto, 1936–1954*, Civitas, Madrid, 1994; Pablo MARTÍN ACEÑA and Francisco COMÍN, *INI, cincuenta años de industrialización*, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1991; Carme MOLINERO and Pere YSÀS, *Els industrials catalans durant el franquisme*, Eumo, Vic, 1991; Pedro SCHWARTZ and Manuel Jesús GONZÁLEZ, *Una historia del Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1941–1975*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1978; Ángel VIÑAS *et al*., *Política comercial exterior de España (1931–1975)*, Banco Exterior de España, Madrid, 1979.

Culture: José Luis ABELLÁN, *De la guerra civil al exilio republicano (1936–1977)*, Mezquita, Madrid, 1982, and *El exilio español de 1939*, Taurus, Madrid, 1978–79; Miguel DELIBES, *La censura de prensa en los años cuarenta*, Ámbito, Valladolid, 1985; Elías DÍAZ, *Pensamiento español, 1939–1975*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1992; Equipo RESEÑA, *La cultura española bajo el franquismo*, Mensajero, Bilbao, 1977; Jordi GRÀCIA and Miguel Ángel RUIZ CARNICER, *La España de Franco (1939–1975). Cultura y vida cotidiana*, Síntesis, Madrid, 2001; José Carlos MAINER, *Falange y literatura*, Labor, Barcelona, 1971; J. M. MARTÍNEZ CACHERO, *La novela española entre 1939 y el fin del siglo. Historia de una aventura*, Castalia, Madrid, 1997; Gregorio MORÁN, *El maestro en el erial. Ortega y Gasset y la cultura del franquismo*, Tusquets, Barcelona, 1998; Javier VARELA, *La novela de España. Los intelectuales y el problema español*, Taurus, Madrid, 1999. Plastic arts and architecture: *Arte para después de una guerra*, Comunidad de Madrid, 1993–4; José CORREDOR MATEOS, *Vida y obra de Benjamín Palencia*, Espasa,

Madrid, 1979; Ángel LLORENTE, *Arte e ideología en la España de la posguerra, 1939–1951*, Doctoral Thesis presented at the Complutense University (Madrid) (undated); Gabriel UREÑA, *Arquitectura y urbanística civil y militar en el período de la autarquía, 1936–1945*, Istmo, Madrid, 1979, and *Las vanguardias artísticas en la posguerra española, 1940–1959*, Istmo, Madrid, 1982. Cinema: Valeria CAMPORESI, *Para grandes y chicos. Un cine para los españoles*, Turfan, Madrid, 1993; Félix FANES, *Cifesa. La antorcha de los éxitos*, Institució Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia, 1981.

Memoirs by intellectuals: Carlos BARRAL, *Años de penitencia*, Alianza, Madrid, 1975; José Manuel CABALLERO BONALD, *Tiempo de guerras perdidas*, Anagrama, Barcelona, 1995; Carlos CASTILLA DEL PINO, *Pretérito imperfecto*, Tusquets, Barcelona, 1997; Camilo José CELA, *Memorias, entendimientos y voluntades*, Plaza y Janés-Cambio 16, Barcelona, 1993; Fernando FERNÁN GÓMEZ, *El tiempo amarillo. Memorias*, Debate, Madrid, 1990; Julián MARÍAS, *Una vida presente. Memorias*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1988–9.

The role of Catholicism in these years: Alfonso BOTTI, *Cielo y dinero. El nacionalcatolicismo en España (1881–1975)*, Alianza, Madrid, 1992; Gregorio CÁMARA, *Nacional-catolicismo y escuela. La socialización política del franquismo (1936–1951)*, Hesperia, Jaén, 1984.

## Notes

1 The National Electric Company PLC (*Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, sociedad anónima*) and the Ribagorzana National Hydroelectric Company (*Empresa Nacional Hidroeléctrica del Ribagorzana*).

2 *Tremendismo* was a movement that depicted the harshness of life in graphic detail.

# 2

# The Years of Consensus: The High Point of the Regime (1951–65)

The middle years of the history of Francoism may be described as years of plenitude and the high point of the regime. When applied to those years but not to others there is truth in the paradox that while the regime was indeed a dictatorship it enjoyed a sufficient level of acceptance – even if it was only passive acceptance – for it to be able to say that there was a consensus in Spanish society that believed it should remain in power. There is no need to stress that repression and the dismantling of the opposition sufficed to explain this situation. By 1951 Franco's regime had in effect survived the worst period of its existence, which was the years immediately following World War II due to simultaneous pressure from within with guerrilla resistance and from outside coercion. But throughout the 1940s Spain remained a personal dictatorship whose doctrine was hard to define and was, in the European context, a marginalized country which seemed doomed to remain underdeveloped.

In 1951, in contrast, it began to win recognition of its international status, which never went as far as full acceptance as an equal but was radically different to its previous situation. The new Concordat with the Holy See contributed hardly at all to existing relations between the two powers but the mere fact that it had been signed came to signal a kind of recognition and acknowledgment. Spain's pact with the United States revealed in the world number one power an emphasis on strategic rather than ideological factors, which was distinctly to Franco's advantage. Even Moroccan independence, which one would have supposed would prove critical in the life of the regime, was achieved without trauma.

To a great extent these changing circumstances were due to international factors that had nothing whatever to do with the wishes of the Spanish. To a lesser extent the regime's high point was a result of the collapse of the opposition, which would not regain its potential for action until Franco's

death. The 1950s was the worst period in opposition history in which, in the case of the monarchists, it was reduced to collaboration with the regime, and for the left, to fragmentation and looking back to the past. During the years we are about to analyze an opposition force did arise among the children of the Civil War victors in 1956. Also for the first time, in 1962, when the European powers met in Munich it did seem that reconciliation might be possible between opposition forces within Spain and those in exile. However, these events did not so much have an immediate impact on Spanish politics as forewarn of what lay ahead.

The Franco regime still lacked proper institutionalization but rather than being a sign of weakness, that proved to be clear evidence of its adaptability. Falange's return to the forefront of Spanish politics did not mean that the regime came together under its guiding principles, as indeed became obvious in 1956–7. The subsequent *Ley de Principios del Movimiento* (Law on the Principles of the *Movimiento*) was imprecise but did point the way ahead towards a kind of dictatorship unlike the Falangist model.

The high point of the regime was also appreciable in relation to initiatives in Spain's economic policy. Furthermore, when the regime took steps to change direction on the economy, this had the effect of increasing social support even if such support remained passive. The image that foreign visitors had of Spain in the early years of Francoism was of a country that had been condemned to irremediable poverty. Economic growth in the period after 1948 was inflationary and unbalanced and only allowed Spain to move from being an agricultural nation to one that was semi-industrialized. However, in the 1950s, a process of growth began that could even be described as strong in the first half of the 1960s. This process initiated a decisive change in the course of Spain's history: surely the most far-reaching change that occurred in our country during the Franco regime. At the time, the economic transformation seemed only to produce political conformism. Yet with all the provisos that might be made, one can nonetheless say that for Franco these years, as the years before World War II had been for Mussolini, were "the years of consensus."

## The End of International Isolation: The Concordat and Pacts with the United States

The international situation, with the intensification of the cold war, had an immense influence on the survival of the dictatorship. Two events that

coincided will suffice to show this clearly: first, at the very same moment at which conflict began in Korea in 1950, Spain embarked on a fast-moving process of international rehabilitation that climaxed in 1953: a crucial date in the Korean War and for pacts between Spain and the United States. It is therefore obvious that for the leading western world power strategic factors far outweighed political considerations and this paved the way – albeit in very particular circumstances – for Spain to regain a role in international politics.

If the isolation of the Franco regime had been secured by a series of measures which excluded it from international organizations (or applied vetoes), its rehabilitation was achieved by reversing the process. In November 1950 the recommendations contained in the 1946 resolution were revoked. At the same time Franco's Spain began once again to join United Nations agencies whose technical, rather than political, character allowed discussion of a political nature to be avoided. At the end of 1950 Spain became a member of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); then came membership of the International Civil Aviation Organization and in 1952 it joined UNESCO. Spain's entry into the United Nations took longer to achieve because it required prior agreement between the two major powers to admit a group of nations with conflicting ideological tendencies. In November 1955 Spain presented its candidature, which received immediate support from the United States. It was admitted, along with another 15 nations, in mid December after a speech in favor from no lesser person than the Soviet representative. At the same time, however, there were those among the western block nations who abstained from voting in favor of its inclusion.

It is possible to say, then, that at this point in time Franco's Spain had been fully accepted by the international community because acceptance had been ensured by an indirect procedure: the signing at almost the very same moment of the Concordat with the Holy See in August 1953 and the pact with the United States just a month later. Although these two diplomatic agreements were reached for different reasons, what they had in common was that their ratification would have been inconceivable only a few years earlier.

What is most surprising about the Concordat with the Vatican, given the advantages gained by the Church, is the fact that the idea actually came from the Spanish state. It was Ruiz-Giménez, who had been sent as Spain's ambassador to the Vatican in 1948, who announced his wish to take this step, which would in his opinion serve to consolidate the role of Catholicism

in Spanish society and would at the same time, by strengthening the position of the Church in relation to Francoism, ensure that it gained a large share of autonomy. It goes without saying that a stance such as this cannot be understood except within the context of the Catholic mentality of the time, which had strong leanings towards extreme orthodoxy. Yet the Vatican did not share its vision and nor did a Madrid which favored royal over ecclesiastical power and considered Ruiz-Giménez not so much Spain's ambassador to the Vatican as the Vatican's ambassador to Spain.

After 1951, when the ex-ambassador took on the Education portfolio, negotiations were left in the hands of his successor, Fernando María de Castiella. All negotiation was now a matter for the state as supreme authority, as was typical of the regime. After a given moment, in a cold war atmosphere, Rome's reticence vanished. When the Concordat was signed everyone was complimentary about the text, especially in Catholic circles close to the government. One specialist in canon law went so far as to say that it "conformed more than any other" to Catholic doctrine; another went even further and stated that the Spanish Concordat "was a triumph far greater than that of any Concordat with any other nation over all time, so much so that it was a shame that it could not serve as a pattern for all others because not all nations could bear such a noble burden." For the future minister Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora the signing of the Concordat had "a purely political impact; it provided weighty and definitive backing for the legitimacy of the Spanish state both in its origins and in its exercising of government; it was a demonstration of exemplary concord between two sovereign states one of which, with its supreme moral authority, could ensure the international rehabilitation of the Spanish state."

Of course, a statement such as this would not have been publicly approved by the Vatican but the Church did quite unequivocally give the impression that it supported the Franco regime politically, and it received numerous favors in exchange. Spain's religious unity was reaffirmed, though non-Catholics had the right to practice their faith in private. The Church would receive an endowment from the state which would be officially approved and backed up with tax exemptions. The religious orders were granted a legal status that they had never enjoyed before in Spain's entire history. There was recognition of an ecclesiastical charter of rights together with acknowledgment of the Church's authority in matters of matrimonial law; in addition, a calendar of liturgical festivals was agreed which were then made part of the secular calendar, and religious associations were granted approval so long as their activities remained limited in scope.

What the Spanish state gained in return was relatively little. The existing system for the appointment of bishops remained unchanged. Also, all who held positions of political authority were obliged to pray during public religious events. All this, together with the various pontifical and liturgical honors bestowed on Franco, were in fact little more than mere formalities, but even so the Concordat was a diplomatic triumph for the state. Although its text had nothing substantially new to add, it did give the appearance of closer agreement than had been evident in the state's early relationship with the Holy See. Nonetheless, the Concordat was anachronistic, even for the Spain of the time, in the sense that it looked back to the past rather than forward to the future. Very soon problems began to surface concerning the exact interpretation of its contents, such as those relating to the appointment of auxiliary bishops, and this issue would later allow the Church to free itself from state intervention. In the last analysis, the Concordat did little more than contribute towards lessening Franco's Spain's isolation from the international community, though this situation had largely been resolved already by changing circumstances.

Virtually the same could be said of Spain's treaties with the United States. When in 1945 pressure on the regime began to be applied, the Foreign Minister, Martín Artajo, sent Spain's representatives abroad instructions recommending that they should "wait until the corpse of those defeated in 1939 had passed by." It took a long time for this to happen. In 1950 the United States had begun to offer economic aid to a Communist country, Yugoslavia, whereas Spain had to await developments in the Korean conflict – so much so that negotiations already under way between Spain and the USA halted until the battlefront was established – and also until the Truman Administration had been replaced by that of Eisenhower. Truman had always had a strong allergy to all that Francoism represented and he placed obstacles in the path of any aid to Spain voted by the American government to prevent it ever getting through. An Anabaptist, he was seriously concerned about religious freedom in Spain. Nonetheless, in the early months of 1951 a clear change had already taken place in the stance adopted by America. Indeed, it is significant that in the closing months of 1950 the United States set up bases in French Morocco and the Portuguese Azores. If Spanish negotiators were concerned about economic issues, military matters were the major concern for the Americans.

Negotiations began on the pretext of a visit to Spain in July 1951 by General Sherman. By then, after the ratification of American proposals on

bases on Spanish soil, the Spanish position was already clear. Franco stated that his country did not want to join NATO – in actual fact he was well aware that this was not even possible – but that it was prepared to fight against the Soviet enemy on the European front. When discussion moved on to consider terms in greater detail, it became obvious that the discrepancy between the two countries was considerable: the United States wanted land to be ceded to them while the Spaniards preferred bases for joint use. In Spain's case representatives of the Armed Services appear to have played a greater role in the negotiations than diplomats. It was perfectly obvious anyway that the degree of recognition accorded to Franco's Spain proved in practice to be less than had been hoped for by those in positions of power in the regime. Carrero Blanco, for example, stated quite rightly that as regards America Spain "received entirely different treatment" from that accorded to other European countries. The truth is, however, that given the difficulties in the way of any closer agreement, Franco's representative recommended signing without delay that very year: 1952. It may well be that a delay would have been advantageous to Spanish interests but there was also a political advantage to be gained from a decision being taken quickly.

There is no clearer proof of the difference in treatment just mentioned than the details of the conditions laid down by both countries. What was signed concerned three agreements relating to defense and economic aid. "Agreement" is the term applied in American constitutional terminology to pacts signed by the executive powers that do not require ratification by the legislative assembly. In the legislative assembly, however great an interest the Pentagon took in the matter, it would have been beyond the bounds of possibility for any commitment ever to be agreed on with a regime that had maintained relations with the Axis powers. The pacts allowed for joint use of a series of bases over a period of 10 years and they would be renewable for a further 2 to 5 years. The bases would be built at Rota, Morón, Zaragoza, and Torrejón. The American garrisons on these bases were relatively small in number: some 6,700 men who, together with the civilian population, would reach a total of 15,000 (in 1958). An additional factor relating to these pacts was a commitment on the part of the Spaniards to stabilize the peseta and balance the budget, which meant a reciprocal obligation for the Americans to help Spain in material terms. On this issue there has not to date been sufficient emphasis placed on the significant role played by America in the transformation of Spanish economic policy.

The best description of the contents of the pacts that were signed may well be the one given by Franco himself when he stated that they were "military in origin with political consequences and definite implications for the economy." This is not the right moment to engage with this last aspect; suffice it to say at this stage that even though American aid to Spain was substantially less than that given to other countries, it was nonetheless of crucial importance. From a strategic point of view European defense acquired support and a weight that it had lacked previously, but advances in technology and strategy soon meant that a good number of Spanish bases became superfluous to requirements. In the medium term Rota was the most valuable acquisition for American and western defenses because it could provide logistical support for nuclear submarines. For its part, Franco's Spain won above all a diplomatic victory. That triumph meant that Spain won recognition for its contribution to the defense of the west, the start of an aid program, United States interest in political stability in Spain, and last of all the continuation – at least in theory – of overall military command on the bases.

Strictly speaking, the pacts also had clear disadvantages due to the glaring lack of equality in the treatment Spain received. The terms relating to the use of the bases by the Americans were very imprecise, as were the conditions that the Americans must fulfill. Spain did not get any explicit guarantee concerning her own defense, had no control over operations mounted from within Spanish territory, and, in addition, it was dependent as regards the actual functioning of economic aid on the allocation of funds voted by the United States Congress. Spain suffered the disadvantage of being a potential object of reprisals for the simple reason that the bases were within its territory, and in exchange it did not gain any of the advantages that might have accrued had it been viewed as an equal by its allies. All in all, nothing altered the substantial differences between the two countries in terms of their political structures. In the United States the alliance with Franco's Spain moved from being hugely unpopular to being merely not very popular.

With this as a starting-point, one can well imagine that the next few years saw an upsurge of countless causes for friction between the two nations. They related in the first instance to questions of compensation by the Americans. The Spanish authorities do not seem to have been aware initially of the dangers of a nuclear threat for centers of population near the bases, though these soon became evident. When in 1962 the renewal of the treaties was negotiated, Spain did not gain any advantage other than

a vague allusion to the fact that there would be consultation in the event of any threat from outside. Differences in treatment were also evident in the matter of resources allocated to Spain by the United States. The Spanish Army relied on material from America, though this served only to prevent it falling even further behind in technical terms; also Spain did receive economic aid but this was incomparably less than what it would have received under the Marshall Plan. Figures show that it achieved little in comparison with other European countries. Between 1946 and 1960, Spain received 456 million dollars in military aid, which was a tenth of what France got, a quarter of what went to Italy and Turkey, and half of what was sent to Luxemburg. Over the same period economic aid was around 1,013 million dollars – a figure lower than that received by Holland or Turkey and only a fifth of aid to France, a seventh of that given to Britain, and a quarter of what Germany managed to obtain. Under conditions such as these it is not at all surprising that relations with the United States were constantly plagued by misunderstandings, for all their calm appearance. In 1959 the President of the United States, General Eisenhower, with whom Franco seemed to have some affinity, visited Spain. However, the affinity proved insufficient to ensure that Spain was treated as an equal. In the course of the next renewal of the pacts in 1963 Spain managed to obtain one aircraft-carrier but did not see any sign of the status of relations between the two countries being raised to that of a proper treaty.

## Spain and Europe: Colonization of Morocco Ends

As far as the Americans were concerned, Franco's Spain was a far-off land whose development was not a subject on which for the most part the general public was kept informed since its only importance for the United States was strategic. In contrast, this was never the case in the democratic countries of Europe where the memory of the Spanish Civil War continued to be an important consideration in internal politics. Economic interests, realism in terms of recognition that Spain's opposition was unlikely to achieve much, and the realization that a blockade was a bad method to use to achieve a good result are all factors that go some way towards explaining why relations between Franco's Spain and other European countries were maintained. However, that is not to say that Franco's Spain was accepted as one of those countries. It was always seen

as a chronic invalid whose eventual recovery might just happen in the distant future. In complete contrast to this vision from outside Spain, the regime considered itself stable and well satisfied, and it would continue to be so at least until 1964: the year in which Spain celebrated 25 years of peace. Many people saw Franco as the supreme guarantor that there would be no more conflict.

Relations with other countries depended to a great extent on the make-up of their governments. Two clear examples of how huge a gulf could divide even two conservative governments are France and Germany, whose two leaders, De Gaulle and Adenauer, were in favor of Spain joining the Common Market at the start of the 1960s. Nevertheless, the Spanish ambassador in the French capital, José María Areilza, encountered serious difficulties in official Spanish circles concerned that he should not offer help in any obvious way to anyone trying to destabilize the Fifth Republic. As for the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain established relations with it in the spring of 1951 but a year went by before Adenauer sent an ambassador to Madrid. In early 1960 Germany tried to reach an agreement with Spain on military facilities but it was enough for the international press to get wind of it for the possibility to vanish.

What was far more significant than these factors was what happened to Spain when moves were made to form a Common Market. At the start of the 1950s, when the Americans asked Franco what he thought about European unity, he replied that he detected socialist leanings in everyone who was working towards that unity. In March 1957, before the signing of the Treaty of Rome which brought the Common Market into being, there were ten European regional organizations and Spain belonged to only three of them. A country such as Austria, which at that time had a singularly curious neutral status, was a member of five and even Turkey was in seven. The paradox is that at this time Spain was already sending 61 percent of its exports to Europe.

At a time when the creation of more economic open spaces in Europe could be glimpsed on the horizon, the regime's reaction was hesitant and it finally opted for a long period of waiting. At the heart of the regime there were those who were not ready to accept the obvious fact that Spain needed some form of integration in, and association with, Europe. In Falangist circles, for example, a kind of "Ibero-market" was favored, though in fact it was not viable because the Spanish and Latin-American economies did not in any way complement each other. What weighed more heavily still was the fact that the leaders of the regime had strong political

reservations about a united Europe. Carrero Blanco, for example, was of the opinion that economic cooperation would inevitably lead to political submission; he foresaw a world controlled by international companies and this vision, colored by conspiracy theory, always raised the specter of imminent danger for Spanish interests. Franco shared this view but, being more pragmatic, judged that "it would punish Spaniards of this generation and the next" if Spain had no contact at all with the Common Market.

However, the driving force behind relations with the Common Market was principally a new generation of politicians, characterized by their professional experience in economic and diplomatic affairs, who had no political program other than a shared realism. And so, along paths that at times coincided and were certainly tortuous, chosen by the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Trade, a way ahead for a decision to be reached was opened up in about 1957. After 1960 Spain had diplomatic representation in the Common Market. For its part, Alberto Ullastres's trade policy, presented by the Trade Ministry, aimed initially to open up the way ahead by means of bilateral pacts. The pressures of the actual circumstances at the time made themselves felt. After 1955 Spanish diplomats began to realize that the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was "the only means of gaining entry into" Europe. In the second half of 1958 Spain became a member both of this organization, then known as the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and of the International Monetary Fund, and this had important consequences for the formulation of a new economic policy. The decision to seek entry to the Common Market itself was finally taken in 1962.

At that same time Franco's Spain had begun to face new problems in the context of international relations, such as the question of decolonization. In this respect it had always shown quite clearly that it was out of touch with the spirit of the age, which explains why its achievements so far had been distinctly unsatisfactory, as is evident in the case of Morocco.

As we have already shown, Franco's Spain, even during its worst period of isolation, had kept up contact with Arab countries and continued to do so after 1951, as is evident from a visit that Martín Artajo made to some of those countries in 1952. In recognition of the part played by Moroccan troops in his Army during the Civil War, Franco made vague promises to the effect that the Moroccans would receive "the finest roses from the rose-garden of peace." After World War II the education system set up in Spanish Morocco used Arabic primarily, whereas the French zone prioritized the use of French. In contrast to what was happening to the south of

Morocco and in Spain itself, within the Spanish protectorate there was freedom of the press and for political parties. Franco was always able to use the fact that Spain had high-ranking officers such as General Mohammed Mizzian, who had been born in Morocco, as an argument in support of his policy, but as he did not entirely trust Mizzian he put him in charge of the Captaincy General in Galicia in the far north of Spain.

Initially, demands for independence in these circumstances did not come from within the Spanish protectorate but from French Morocco. From 1947 onwards the French authorities had had serious trouble with the Sultan Mohammed V who had not forgotten the promises of independence made by the Americans in 1943. In 1952 and 1953 violent incidents caused hundreds of deaths. The Palestinian question was no longer in the forefront of international relations and instead the problem of Moroccan independence became the most urgent issue still to be resolved. Restlessness increased in the Arab world as a whole, as is evident in the proclamation of the Republic of Egypt and in the struggle for independence in Algeria.

The moment of crisis in Spanish politics came when on the one hand the demands of the nationalists intensified, and at the same time it became obvious that Spain was out of tune with the other colonial power: France. Morocco had continued to be an economic burden for Spain to bear but it had not yet posed any problems in terms of public order or uprisings. In 1952 the Spanish protectorate gave a degree of autonomy to the indigenous population which seemed to conflict with policy in the French protectorate. The indigenous authorities in the Spanish zone played with various options and finally chose nationalism. The gravest problems emerged after 1953, at which time the policy of the Spanish government was rash and came to a bad end. In that year, the French expelled the Sultan Mohammed V and replaced him with a colorless character who supported them. The Spanish reaction was of indignation. The Spaniard in charge at the time was General Rafael García Valiño, whose policy was always firm but daring. On hearing that the Sultan had been dethroned, the Spanish general declared: "They have entirely ignored our presence in this area . . . it seems unlikely that in the future there will be a climate of confidence to facilitate collaboration." Spain continued to recognize the authority of the Caliph appointed by Mohammed V in the Spanish protectorate and also backed the setting up of Moroccan nationalist propaganda organizations in its territory. This policy was, it appears, a joint decision by Franco and García Valiño; nonetheless, there were also

significant differences between them. García Valiño, for example, did not hesitate in adopting a permissive stance on the selling of arms to the nationalists. Franco considered sacking him but finally decided against it.

The failure of Spanish policy was already apparent by the time the French suddenly changed their approach. Though France was in fact much more deeply concerned about Algeria than Morocco, in 1955 it accepted a transitional formula – "interdependence" – and, at the end of that year, allowed Mohammed V to return to his country. In March 1956 France finally accepted Moroccan independence and Spain was obliged to do the same the following month. If for its neighbor this had not meant very much, for Spain it undoubtedly meant a lot more because of the constant Moroccan demands concerning land that Spain considered Spanish. On the very same day that the Spanish Head of state accepted Moroccan independence he also contacted the Americans to say that the new situation represented a grave danger because he saw the spread of communist ideology as inevitable.

However, the Moroccan question was not resolved by the declaration of independence. The new nation, like so many others, adopted a nationalistic political stance right from the outset. Eight of its ministers belonged to the Istiqlal party, one of whose ideologues, Allal al-Fasi, backed the idea of a larger Morocco that would encompass the entire Sahara. In addition, in the south of the country a so-called National Liberation Army was active which in actual fact consisted of independent factions in part armed with weapons kindly provided by the Spanish authorities of the Protectorate. In November 1957 there were armed clashes in Ifni and the northern Sahara (only a month before, at the UN, Morocco had demanded control of the Tarfaya area) and many small Spanish positions had fallen to these armed groups. It may indeed have been an exaggeration to say that what happened was a "little Annual",[1] for casualties were no more than two or three hundred dead. With French help the Spanish managed to stabilize the situation in the Sahara, though they were less successful in Ifni. In February 1958 it became possible to initiate talks with the Moroccans in the Portuguese city of Cintra, as a result of which, at the end of the year, the Tarfaya area was handed over to Morocco.

Despite this development Morocco continued to press its demands for repossession of Ifni, the Sahara, and the two Spanish sovereign enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Only as late as 1968 would Ifni be handed over, by which time it was of little interest anyway. Decolonization of Morocco only came about because pressure was brought to bear on Spain, and even

then the result was never satisfactory for either party, which meant that collaboration with Spain was not at all good in the years that followed. The mistakes made by the French were worse at first, but France's material wealth made later collaboration between the metropolis and its former colony possible. From that point on, Franco, and even more so Carrero Blanco, was reluctant to make the move towards decolonization, which was put off for as long as possible. In 1960 there was still a substantial Spanish garrison in Moroccan territory, whereas the French had already entirely abandoned the country; the Spanish would only do so finally in 1961. Franco could do nothing whatever to prevent his allies, the Americans, providing arms for Morocco, which eventually meant a dangerous strategic situation for Spain.

In contrast to what went on in Africa, in Latin America the Franco regime's foreign policy was more original and better adapted to circumstances. The stance adopted on the Cuban revolution was not conservative and did not fall in line with United States policy. Spain's presence was palpable in Cuban society through its religious institutions. When Cuban Catholics joined the opposition, the Spanish Ambassador Juan Pablo Lojendio afforded protection to many of who were persecuted in the last days of the Bautista regime. When the new regime in turn began to take repressive action – notably against Catholics – there was a major clash between no lesser personage than Castro and Lojendio in January 1960. Although the ambassador was forced to leave Cuba, diplomatic relations were not broken off and Spain did not take part in the economic blockade instigated by the Americans. The Spanish stance shows, therefore, that the Franco regime was capable of a certain ideological ambiguity in international affairs. If decolonization of its own territories must have been seen by many in high places as a tragedy, the Falangists, unlike the United Kingdom and France, rejoiced to see a nationalist leader triumph rather than a democrat such as Nasser.

## The Regime and the Opposition up to 1956

Having reached this point we should once again consider the evolution of Spain's internal politics, which did not undergo any major changes in the period under discussion: a telling fact in itself. The opposition showed no signs of being ready for action until the middle of the 1950s and circumstances outside Spain did not provide any pressure for change as

they had done in 1945. One might even say that the crisis in 1956 was only partial and due to one simple incident, though it is certainly the case that it would have profound repercussions on the emergence of a new Spanish opposition. There would be no crisis that was more than a "changing of the guard" until 1957.

Mention has already been made of the ministerial reshuffle of 1951 which saw the greatest changes ever made in the history of the regime. Although as ever they were the result of Franco's arbitration in balancing up conflicting tendencies within his government, they did mean – to an extent at least – that Falange returned to the political stage. In fact, not only was the organization represented in the cabinet by Girón, Fernández Cuesta, and Muñoz Grandes, but the post of General Secretary of the *Movimiento* was officially reestablished – a job which, in effect, Fernández Cuesta had done since 1948, controlling Falange while at the same time combining this mission with the Justice portfolio. Furthermore, this is not the only evidence we have of Falange's evolution from 1951 on; it also held its one and only Congress in October 1953, showing an entire lack of reticence about making its presence felt in public. Falange's increasing influence was also obvious in the weakening of the other regime "families." In 1954 Falange used all its power and influence to prevent several front-line candidates winning the municipal elections held that year, while the role of political figures who were members of Catholic organizations (Martín Artajo and Ruiz-Giménez) was basically limited to carrying out the ministerial duties incumbent upon them. In theory the Party had 2 million members but only some tens of thousands of these were politically active: perhaps fewer than those belonging to Catholic organizations. Falange controlled a bare 1 percent of the budget, while the Home Office controlled 10 percent. In other words, what was most significant at this point was the single Party's visibility rather than its actual power.

One figure who remained in the shadows only to emerge later as a powerful influence was Carrero Blanco, who became a minister for the first time in 1951. In reality Carrero wanted to take advantage of these governmental changes not to bring Falange back into power but rather the exact opposite: that is to say, to pension it off. "The Girón phase," he wrote, "is now over," but the Labor Minister would remain in place until 1957. If Carrero was listened to on the matter of removing Fernández Cuesta from the Justice Ministry, he was ignored on the suppression of the post of general secretary of the *Movimiento*. It is significant that Carrero Blanco approved of the Home Office taking over the regime's political

institutions, but of far greater interest than all that he advised against is what he proposed, which would only be implemented 6 years later. He was concerned about Spain's economic policy and his stance on it was very different from that of the majority of the government up to that point. "What really matters is that it should be effective," he pointed out, adding "What would be ideal would be for private enterprise to do whatever is necessary." This, as one would expect, brought him into confrontation with Suances who, in Carrero's view, deserved "severe criticism" for his pushy attitude and failure to accomplish tasks committed to his charge. It may well be that Carrero's intervention was responsible for Suances quitting the Ministry for Industry, but he did not leave the INI; Carrero may also have been behind the appointment of certain ministers to posts in economic affairs. Whether or not this is the case, it was not until 1957 that the aims of this trend were fulfilled. What is obvious is that the mind of the sub-secretary to the presidency, though eager for effective action, was very different from the classic mentality of the market economy: he thought that he could solve the problem of monopolies by sending offenders to work camps.

One or two other aspects of Carrero's position should be mentioned at this point. Nervous because of the opposition that had reared its head once again in 1951 in mass actions such as the Barcelona Tram Strike, Carrero proposed a general, Alonso Vega, to take on a Home Office post of responsibility for public order. Another general, Jorge Vigón, could take on foreign policy. Finally, one question which for the moment did not bother Carrero concerned the institutional mechanisms of the regime: "The regime has now totally and finally taken shape," he affirmed. It is also worth noting that Franco was a stronger supporter than Carrero of Falange which, now tamed, was proving useful in serving his aims.

We should now consider the running of the 1951 government, though economic factors will be discussed later. It was Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez who, as a minister, caused most political controversy, not so much because of what he said as because of the reaction of groups opposed to his ideas. Ruiz-Giménez was at the time the most important young member of the regime's Catholic family and it was this that led him to make up his ministerial team with figures who, at least in part, were of Falange. The combination of the cultural "liberalism" of this group – in the sense of its desire to prove its openness to intellectuals on the left – with the Ministry of Education's usual financial problems and also with the reactionary nature of the most strongly clericalist sectors in power made Ruiz-Giménez's

Administration controversial and brought it to an abrupt end. The only surprise here is that its demise came about through confrontation with the most hard-line sector of Falange and not with the most strongly clericalist elements in cultural affairs.

Difficulties arose early on for Ruiz-Giménez, initially linked to the approval of the Law on Secondary Education which provoked strong protest from those in the clericalist camp who were of the opinion that it would "cut the throat" of secondary education in religious schools. The law was passed in February 1953 but only after facing a hard battle. Even so, this was nothing compared to the problems that faced any attempt to open Spain up culturally. As has already been suggested, Ruiz-Giménez had relied on figures in university circles who favored such a policy: Pedro Laín Entralgo, Antonio Tovar, and Torcuato Fernández Miranda, the vice-chancellors of the Universities of Madrid, Salamanca, and Oviedo, and indeed on the Director General for Universities, Joaquín Pérez Villanueva. The policies adopted on universities were of no great import but in practice they signaled the advent of a kind of cultural openness that was extremely influential. The three vice-chancellors mentioned above and the Falange youth press, inspired in great part by Dionisio Ridruejo, tried to revive the Spanish liberal intellectual tradition of the turn of the century (more specifically that of Unamuno and Ortega, its emblematic leading figures). From an intellectual point of view this revival of an important aspect of Spain's pre-Civil War cultural life was an important – perhaps even irreversible – move, but it would be wrong to suggest in any way that these groups wanted to break with the regime; rather, they were a particular part of it characterized by their secular nature and the attraction of the objective quality of their cultural tradition. They nonetheless had some formidable enemies in the most strongly clericalist circles which followed in the footsteps of Ramiro de Maeztu and *Acción Española*.

Controversy had first arisen on cultural issues when Laín Entralgo and Calvo Serer published two books at the end of the 1940s and start of the 1950s. The most traditional right-wing groups, associated with Opus Dei by their opponents, had a firm foothold in the Ministry of Tourism and Information and the Atheneum in the person of Florentino Pérez Embid, and also in the National Scientific Research Council (CSIC). The most combative representative of this tendency was Rafael Calvo Serer. The group's approach was very different from that of the supposedly "liberal" Falange: they loathed liberal culture and considered their opponents' stance both collaborationist and revolutionary at the same time. However, as this

extreme traditional right-wing group was also Monarchist, paradoxically it favored a formula that might open the way to replacing the Franco regime.

Friction between these two factions was glaringly obvious in 1951, 1952, and 1953 but it came to an abrupt halt in the closing months of 1953, probably because Franco himself intervened. Calvo Serer published an article in a French periodical in which he denounced the Falangists as "revolutionary opportunists" and condemned "compliant Christian-Democrats" such as Ruiz-Giménez. For this he was sent into temporary exile. In the Falange Congress already mentioned, a "third force" that Calvo Serer had identified with his own stance was openly ridiculed.

Yet the failure of one of the two parties in the dispute did not mean victory for the other; rather, both ended up suffering the same fate. After the end of 1953, any worthwhile intellectual debate in various cultural publications on both sides was silenced. Moreover, a biting attack on Unamuno by the Bishop of Las Palmas resulted in the cancellation of an act of homage that was being organized in Unamuno's honor. Despite the fact that Franco was given a doctorate *honoris causa* by the University of Salamanca – a title that he received with visible emotion – his attitude towards the worlds of culture and intellectualism remained cautious and reticent. That attitude effectively blocked most of Ruiz-Giménez's attempts to incorporate into the teaching body any who had a Republican past.

The upsurge of a certain amount of student agitation in 1954 on the issue of the British presence in Gibraltar, the existence of cultural clubs under the aegis of the Spanish University Students' Union (SEU), and the show of solidarity with Ortega y Gasset on the occasion of his death in October 1955 were three catalysts which produced a situation that would become positively explosive in the early months of 1956. Yet we should note that the burning questions about the structure of the regime which had dogged public life from 1945 to 1951 were no longer seen as relevant, perhaps because Franco considered them resolved or because he did not even wish to address them having achieved his main aim: that is, to remain in power. During the last months of 1955 there seemed to be no reason to anticipate any trouble but events in fact led to a double confrontation: on the one hand at the heart of the regime and on the other among a section of university students at the same time.

By this point the republican option had ceased to be viable and any opportunity the monarchist cause might ever have had no longer existed. There were monarchists who had liberal inclinations but were not exactly

democratic, such as those who, in the municipal elections in Madrid in 1954, voted against the official *Movimiento* candidate. However, on the whole, the tendency to go along with the regime was strong at the time. When the moment came to decide where Don Juan Carlos was to study, the decision was made by Franco himself who at the same time had no hesitation in stating that he might well consider the possibility of the succession passing down the line of Don Juan's older brother, Don Jaime. During the conversation that took place between Franco and Don Juan at Las Fincas at the end of 1954 the two men seemed to share the same views. However, the monarchist collaboration with the regime only reached its peak in 1955 when in certain declarations attributed to Don Juan the heir to the royal line appeared in public praising Fernández Cuesta and speaking of the need to come together in a "tight bunch" in order to protect existing political institutions. It was only from this moment on that collaborationist support that had in effect meant total support for the person of Franco himself was withdrawn.

If this was the situation among those who had in the past nourished the strongest hopes on the matter of replacing the Franco regime, how much worse was the situation of those in opposition who had seen the great opportunities of the period from 1945 to 1947 vanish without trace. This was the case for the Socialist party, whose membership outside Spain dwindled substantially over the 1950s: the number of sections represented at conferences organized by the General Workers' Union (*Unión General de Trabajadores* or UGT) in exile totaled 469 in 1951 and only 186 in 1959. At the same time, uncertainty on strategy grew. The failure of the monarchists' policy of collaboration with the regime led to an "isolation cure" from 1952 on, but the party was aware that it needed to work together with other options, which meant that the years that followed saw a constant weaving and unpicking of attempts to do so.

The main leader of the PSOE in exile after the start of the 1950s was Rodolfo Llopis, who came from the left of the party but would end up becoming, in the eyes of the new generations inside Spain, the very epitome of conformity. A fairer judgment from a historical point of view would point out that it was Llopis who also managed outside Spain to sustain a structure capable of bridging the gap between the party's historic tradition and these same new generations. Indeed, he did so by effecting considerable transformations in the party's basic approach, though more in practice than in theory. This is perfectly evident and can even be seen in those leading lights of the party who, throughout the 1930s, had

adopted a more radical stance. Such was the case, for example, for Araquistain, whose ideological trajectory shifted from a deeply felt anti-communist position to one favoring a reversion to democracy that allowed for a certain openness on the matter of the regime.

As for the Spanish Communist Party, one has to consider, along with the defeat of the guerrilla resistance to the regime and the impossibility of linking up with other opposition groups during those years, the continuing Stalinist purges and the apathy displayed by Vicente Uribe between 1952 and 1954. The target for expulsions was a central committee made up of 65 members of whom 27 had already been expelled from Spain by this time. Then at last the party's Fifth Congress held in Prague in November 1954 saw a leadership reshuffle and support given to those sectors who had come through from the Socialist youth movements (Santiago Carrillo, Fernando Claudín, and Ignacio Gallego).

At the same time, even if there was a reshuffle of the Communist Party leadership, the same cannot be said of its understanding of what was happening in Spain. During the party conference the suggestion was made that an Anti-Francoist National Front (*Frente Nacional Antifranquista*) should be formed, whose aim would be to create a provisional revolutionary government which would follow a program intended to bring about the disappearance of the "last remains of feudalism" in the country. As a result the communists failed to anticipate the process of economic development that would shortly be under way in Spain. In their minds – in their imaginations – the memory of Spain's republican phase and the conviction that a regime such as that of Franco could suddenly collapse remained strong. Reality would soon show that Spanish society could evolve without that affecting the political system in the least in the short term.

It seems obvious in the light of this overview of the opposition between 1951 and 1954 that this was the period when its chances of success were fewest. Nonetheless, in February 1956 it was clear that this did not mean that the opposition was going to vanish; rather, it was in fact seen to have enough potential to manage to reshape itself, even if this was a result of the stance taken by a section of society and not by what the leadership wanted. What happened that month should not be exaggerated to such an extent as to suggest that there was ever any real threat to the regime. It was not only the new student opposition that played a part in events; what occurred was also due in large part to developments within the regime itself.

Up until this moment the attitude of specifically student groups had not played a significant role in political opposition to the regime. The events of February 1956, however, involved students from the social classes that supported the regime, though several interpretations of what happened were possible. First, there were dissident Falangists who acted with the support of the SEU in some institutions, such as the University Employment Service (*Servicio Universitario del Trabajo*), and of some periodicals. The official students' union, which still had considerable influence at the time, organized demonstrations to protest against the British presence in Gibraltar but then it could not control them. Disaffected monarchist students also joined in and there was undoubtedly an upsurge of religious fervor that would have a significant political impact, which was seen in those who gathered around the priest Father José María Llanos,[2] who were initially Falangists and then later Communists. There was in fact communist agitation during the protest due to infiltration by a handful of militants but it was only minor.

In 1955 the press in exile realized that there was ferment in Spanish university circles but only in the closing months of that year did any direct clashes between students and the regime take place. The first incidents occurred on the occasion of the death of Ortega y Gasset whose liberal tradition some students wished to continue. Activities of a literary nature (such as plans for a conference of young writers) served to bring together students and some Francoist leaders such as Dionisio Ridruejo who now adopted a more dissident stance. The leaders of the student protests ( Javier Pradera and Enrique Múgica) were communists who turned what was initially disaffected cultural ferment into a more clearly political protest, pushing for a Student Congress entirely separate from the official students' union.

At the start of February 1956 a collection of signatures in support of setting up the Congress caused the first incidents involving Falangist students, who retaliated by attacking the Law Faculty at Madrid's Complutense University. The fiercest confrontation resulted in a serious bullet wound for one young Falangist, inflicted by a member of his own side wielding a gun. This event resulted in the immediate arrest of Ridruejo and the dissident students. For a few days political tensions were so high in Spain's capital that several senior academic authority figures had to go into hiding to avoid being targeted in Falangist reprisals. Most important of all, however, was the fact that actions carried out by the opposition had an immediate impact on Spain's internal politics. This was the first

occasion on which anything like this had happened since the earlier disturbances in Begoña[3] had been caused by militants from within the regime. Unlike what had happened on that occasion, it seems that Franco did not hesitate for one moment.

In the circumstances the dictator followed his usual strategy of arbitration. Ruiz-Giménez represented an openness that had caused conflict; he had also not proved capable – because he lacked the means – of tackling the deficiencies in public sector education or bringing private and religious schools to heel. Falange's main spokesman (and at the same time its controller) was Fernández Cuesta. Both men were dismissed immediately. Such was not the case with Blas Pérez who was in charge of public order which was under threat at the time. The marginalization of both contenders, as had been the case in 1942 with Varela and Serrano, proved in the short term to be to Falange's advantage since it meant that Arrese was once more given a ministerial post. From that time on, there would be no more cultural openness within the regime, or at least only in areas that were specifically designated (cinematography) or uncontroversial (painting), unless it occurred outside the framework of the regime or indeed in opposition to it. If in the past Francoism had enjoyed the support of intellectuals, most of that was now lost, though attitudes remained passive rather than openly confrontational. In political terms, it would perhaps be wrong to exaggerate the effect of these events on life within the regime. If Ridruejo chose the path of opposition, the same cannot be said for Ruiz-Giménez whose ideas would only take a similar turn much later on as a result of the impact of Vatican II. In fact the significance of the events of February 1956 was only relative. The political life of the regime continued on its way, unaffected by attempts to achieve a greater degree of cultural openness.

It was nonetheless at this moment perhaps that a definitive image of Franco emerged that is worth discussing at this point because it remained so until the time of his death. It was no longer the image of the man who had won the Civil War, nor even of the one who, according to regime propaganda, had kept Spain out of World War II; it now was also the image of the man whose vigilance could ensure that discord would never return to Spain, even at the heart of the regime. Official propaganda instructions relating to the cinema news documentaries or NODO (*Noticiario y Documentales*) stipulated that "all news items about the *caudillo* or in which he takes a leading part should appear at the end of the newsreel and if possible provide a final apotheosis." Franco, even more than a leader,

seemed to have become a kind of paternalistic guardian protecting Spain from the inclemencies of that national evil: discord.

The repercussions of the events of February 1956 had a far greater impact on the opposition, particularly in the long term. In the weeks that followed, demonstrations and arrests continued; the defense lawyers acting on behalf of the detainees were often prominent members of the opposition such as Gil Robles. Yet very soon student protest died down and it is probably true to say that until well on into the 1960s the universities generally conformed. However, those who did not swelled the ranks of an opposition that would in time become influential in university circles. Not long afterwards, when Franco was talking with Don Juan about Don Juan's son's education inside Spain, he mentioned the presence at university of those he called "rowdy and troublesome." In fact, in student circles political groups were forming that would play an important political role later on. First and foremost there was the Socialist Association (*Agrupación Socialista* or ASU) which was never very large and did not last long (it disappeared in 1962), but what was important about it was that it was the means by which figures who were destined to play significant roles with greater strategic flexibility were allowed to make their appearance on the political stage. So it was that the young members of the ASU were in favor of approaches being made to Don Juan and to the Spanish Communist party at the same time: attitudes that were sheer heresy in terms of traditional socialism and even more so if they were combined. The same was true of the other opposition groups that emerged at this point.

## A New Political Opposition

In the interests of cohesion it would be better to continue with our discussion of the opposition before moving on to consider the evolution of the regime. It is important to remember that the political groups who will be mentioned here were tiny – so much so that it is almost flattery to call them parties at all. Yet they did represent something new that would bear fruit in due season. Those involved with opposition groups have contrasted the figure of Indalecio Prieto, "his face drowned in sadness," with the "ethical men" of the new opposition who acted on principle but also felt a "fascination with danger faced knowingly." The role played by the opposition in Spanish life would doubtless be greater in the period after 1965 but its starting-point was now.

The newest development in the period after 1956 was the appearance of an opposition inside Spain which had little to do either with prewar opposition groups or with groups in exile. They can be viewed as the seedbed for what would in the final years of the Franco regime be termed the "moderate opposition." Strictly speaking, it was not because this opposition looked kindly on the dictatorship but because it did not aim to use violence and it did not demand the return of the long-gone legitimate prewar government. It was more a matter of groups with largely centrist tendencies against whom on the whole the fiercest repressive measures were never used; rather, they were viewed as having a paralegal status based on the understanding that they would in no way harm the regime. The forerunners of this kind of opposition can be found in the circles that gathered around Don Juan. After all, since the monarchy was supposed to draw all elements together, its aim continued to be to maintain the "dual role" it had had in 1945, which meant drawing people from the right and left together to share in a common purpose.

Don Juan did not repeat the statements that in 1951 and 1955 had led to him being identified with Francoism, but by maintaining a collaborationist stance he finally managed at the end of 1957 to draw into his camp a section of the Carlist cause. This closer association with the right did not prevent him keeping contact with the left-wing opposition or having occasional disagreements with Franco. In March 1960 Franco and Don Juan met and talked for the third time, once again focusing on the matter of Don Juan Carlos's education. In fact the lack of any real understanding between the two men is evident in Franco's repeated attempts to discredit Don Juan's advisers, whom he branded as Masons, and also to impose what were in effect guardians to watch out for his own interests.

Ambivalence on the form the monarchy might take was especially obvious at the start of the 1960s. So, for example, the wedding of Don Juan Carlos to Princess Sofia in Athens (1962) was organized without the regime playing any part at all in the proceedings. In 1961 the most notable representative of the monarchist cause in Spain was José María Pemán in the position of President of the Cabinet (*Consejo privado*). José María Pemán, an intellectual without any political pretensions who came from the extreme right but had liberal tendencies, was at that time Spain's most renowned man of letters. Favoring the institutionalization of the regime and a monarchy that would work with it, he realized that the monarchy would have to be accepted by the anti-Francoist opposition as well. Perhaps acting on his advice, Don Juan tried to build bridges between the

monarchy and liberal intellectuals and he had some success: in 1958 he even visited Juan Ramón Jiménez, that most outstanding of Spain's cultural figures in exile.

Most of the groups that made up the new opposition that emerged after 1956 gravitated towards the monarchist opposition. The most surprising case was the group inspired by Dionisio Ridruejo, named Democratic Action (*Acción Democrática*). In fact Ridruejo had been gradually distancing himself from the regime, after an orthodox start, because he believed that it was not Falangist enough. However, after the events at the universities he increasingly favored democracy as an alternative to Francoism. Blessed with a gift for words and a brilliant intellectual who was warm, effusive, and charming, he could in time have played a key role in drawing the opposition together. His political affiliation never went beyond a left-wing liberalism. What was most significant about Ridruejo's position was that it represented in effect a turnaround of Copernican proportions for a man who had once been one of the main leaders of Falange. His position had also changed on the monarchy, which at one time he had considered a reactionary symbol.

If Ridruejo was a newcomer to the monarchist camp whose presence there seemed almost accidental, other political groups that emerged at this time were more clearly monarchist as a result of their past. This was the case with the groups with Christian democrat tendencies who drew their inspiration from José María Gil Robles and Manuel Giménez Fernández. The former had been one of Don Juan's principal advisers but had distanced himself somewhat in the first half of the 1950s when Don Juan's collaborationism had become more marked. Further left still there was the group led by Manuel Giménez Fernández who spoke out openly against Catholic collaboration with the regime and took up a stance even further to the left in all his public statements. He therefore expressed support for agrarian reform and proposed a federal structure for Spain. This group would have liked closer contact with the left in exile and that indeed came about; it also tried to define itself as provisional (*accidentalista*).

Unlike the Christian democrats, the monarchist factions that came together to form the Spanish Union (*Unión Española*) in 1957 were unambiguous in their stance on the monarchy. As was the case with Ridruejo, they too epitomized the conversion to democratic ideals of a sector of society that had come from the extreme right at the time of the Second Republic. Now, however, the ideologues of *Unión Española* reproached the

regime for justifying its existence on the basis of a civil war rather than trying to heal the wounds caused by that war. A strong defender of democratic principles, like all the groups mentioned so far, *Unión Española* had its own particular strategy which included an interest in the Armed Services, participation in some of the regime's electoral processes (like the 1954 elections), and the adoption of an economic policy based on strictly liberal principles. In fact, in one of its documents circulated internally *Unión Española* declared itself to be a "moral" link rather than a political party. This is most significant not only in relation to this particular group but also to the other groups that came into existence at that time. We are in actual fact talking about groups with very small numbers which were really more like social discussion groups or friendly "brotherhoods" and whose capacity for action was extremely limited.

As a result of the events in the universities in 1956 and of these groups, which may be described as representing a "moderate" opposition, others appeared which would come to play a decisive role on the left in Spanish politics either immediately, as in the case of the Popular Liberation Front (*Frente de Liberación Popular* or FLP), or as time passed, like the group led by Tierno Galván.

What made the Popular Liberation Front different was probably that it was ahead of what would, as time passed, come to be the life experience of an entire generation of university students. At first its motivation was in part religious; in that sense, too, it was a forerunner of what was to come later in circles involved in secular apostolate after Vatican II. Also typical of the Popular Liberation Front was the type of revolutionary ideals which meant that at times its leaders were quick to criticize the Spanish Communist Party which it saw as competition, or it would even go so far in the Basque Country as to collaborate with ETA. The FLP was also the first concrete evidence of the impact in Spain of a revolutionary tendency linked to the Third World, notably Tito's Yugoslavia, the Algeria of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), and Castro's Cuba. It was so sensitive on the issue of Spain's plurality that it took on different names in the Basque Country and Catalonia: the Basque Socialist Party (*Euzkadiko Sozialisten Batasuna* or ESBA) and the Catalan Workers' Front (*Frent Obrer Català* or FOC) respectively. Its attitude remained ambiguous on the use of violence but, like the University Socialist Association (*Agrupacion Socialista Universitaria* or ASU), it never actually used it. It was typical of a certain historical moment but it gradually lost all its members to other groups that were usually more moderate after the start of the 1960s and particularly after

1968. Its leaders could well be described as "radical aesthetes," though they then became leaders of other groups in opposition to the regime.

Although in time it joined up with the PSOE, the group that originated in Salamanca and gathered around Tierno Galván with notable successes in university circles cannot be said to have identified with the left at the start. This was typically a consequence of the character of the person who led it. Reserved, courteous, academic, and introspective, Tierno invented for himself a left-wing republican past and an image like that of a sober, incorruptible Old Castilian, especially after the end of the 1960s when he shifted towards a socialism that was theoretically very radical. His initial doctrinal position could be described as monarchist. For Tierno, monarchy could pave the way to a liberty that, according to his view at the time which was strongly influenced by Anglo-Saxon neo-positivist philosophy, was the "effective" solution *par excellence*.

From the end of the 1950s on, the PSOE endured the worst phase of its opposition to Francoism. This was in part due to the fact that it lost some of its support among the working classes: during the strikes in Asturias in 1957 and 1958 socialists had played an important role but this was decidedly less so in 1962. The tactic of the UGT, which consisted of not taking part in union elections, was to blame. After the student protests of 1956 the ASU clashed with its leadership outside Spain, despite the fact that these leaders allowed them a certain latitude in their affiliation to the party. In 1959 the UGT party conference had to be suspended, while in the 1960s the PSOE conference had to move from close to the French border much further up into France. For a time it was not possible to publish the party newspaper and later they had to resort to the trick of using a French title. Meanwhile, inside Spain the first splits with the party leadership had occurred. They were the inevitable result of the logical disparity of viewpoint between the realism of those inside Spain and the idealism of those in exile, though there were also differences of approach. The militant socialists inside Spain were more inclined to agree to work with the monarchists, but also with the communists; most important of all, they demanded greater freedom of action. In support of their case they argued that they alone were the target for repression by those in power, and that repression was harsh right up to the end of the 1950s. As late as 1959 a final attempt was made to net socialists' leaders without any political activity having taken place to justify it. Political repression on the part of the regime diminished after that and there was a substantial reduction in prison sentences, which barely lasted 1 year for mere militancy.

The section of the party that diverged most strongly from the leadership outside Spain was the *Agrupación Socialista Universitaria*. Some of these young people showed monarchist tendencies but were above all inclined to criticize what they called "the blinkered anti-communism" of the leaders outside while in fact joining the PCE in some of their protest activities. Indeed, the ASU went even further and declared its support for a "revolutionary socialism," and in 1961 one of its members, Luis Gómez Llorente, had a confrontation with the now very elderly Indalecio Prieto. In fact, the groups of professional lawyers who led the party in Madrid and the Socialist Movement of Catalonia (*Moviment Socialista de Catalunya* or MSC) had similar disagreements with Rodolfo Llopis.

One aspect of the new opposition within Spain that deserves attention, given the importance it acquired in the 1960s, is its contacts with the opposition in exile. The huge decline of the opposition between 1951 and 1956 was accompanied by the severing of contacts between the opposition inside Spain and that in exile, but it was not by chance that these contacts were renewed in 1956. In 1957 Tierno Galván presented a document to the opposition in which he put forward three "hypotheses" on ways of replacing the regime in which it was clear what his own opinion – also widely held among the opposition in Spain – was: namely that a monarchy was the most realistic and viable solution. They would have to wait until 1959 for a formula to be decided upon that could unite the opposition and even then it would not see the light of day until 1961. This formula gave rise to what was called the "Union of Democratic Forces" ("*Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas*") and at its core were the Christian Democrat Left (*Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana*) and the PSOE in exile. Both proved that it was possible to devise a process whereby those in opposition inside and outside Spain could work together, which would bear fruit at the pro-Europe meeting in Munich in 1962.

A common feature of all the groups formed inside Spain in and around 1956 was in fact their pro-European bias. The regime had applied for Spain to join Europe as though it had at last realized that in the short term there was no other possibility for the Spanish economy than this. However, the European option also had at this moment a precise aim: the aim was that by Spain aligning itself with democratic processes the PCE, which was not at the time in favor of Spain's entry into the European Common Market, would be excluded.

Inside Spain pro-European feeling started in political Catholic circles but soon spread widely throughout a range of different political tendencies.

In exile the occasional monarchist, the Basque nationalists, and above all Salvador de Madariaga had done much to promote European unity. Madariaga and those closely linked to him must be credited with taking the initiative in calling for a pro-European joint conference. It was finally decided that the conference would be held on the theme of "Europe and Spain" at the same time as a second conference organized by the European Movement in Munich at the start of June 1982. By the time the conference took place Spain had suffered a wave of strikes – perhaps the most significant in terms of size and distribution since the end of the Civil War. Most opposition groups inside Spain had expressed their solidarity with the strikers while others outside encouraged or defended the protest.

On the date mentioned, in the Bavarian city over a hundred Spaniards gathered, two-thirds of whom were from inside Spain. All opposition groups were represented, both those in exile and those inside the Peninsula, and at last agreement on replacing the Franco regime was reached among all of them. Questions relating to the regime were sidestepped and instead discussion focused on what points they all had in common, which were based on a common acceptance of human rights, of representative institutions, of the identities of the different regions, and the possibility of setting up political parties and trade unions. At the final conference session the two figures who best represented the two worlds spoke and jointly emphasized their close alignment. Madariaga reminded those present that Europe was not just a commercial entity and therefore Europeans could not accept a dictatorial regime in their midst. For his part, Gil Robles reiterated that it was not the desire of the European Movement to teach Spain any lessons. The fact that these two sectors came together in this way was definitive proof that by 1962 reconciliation had been achieved between those who had been on opposite sides during the Civil War. In fact the Munich Conference was the moment at which the transition to democracy became a possibility.

Franco's reply was, nonetheless, immediate and must be understood in the context both of his ability to exploit outside interference in the life of his regime and of his habitual fear lest moderate sectors in politics were to rob him of the support of the middle classes which had until then been firmly behind him. All these factors meant that his reaction was excessive: he suspended the Charter of Spaniards' Rights (*Fuero de los Españoles*) and the press mounted a bitter campaign against any who had attended the conference which was immediately labeled a "conspiracy." Once back in Madrid, the participants had to choose between being confined to the

Canary Islands or emigration. In total nine people were confined to the Canaries, all of whom would later play important roles in Spanish politics during the transition, especially as members of the Union of the Democratic Center (*Unión de Centro Democrático* or UCD). At the same time demonstrations were organized throughout Spain in which, as in 1946, those who supported the regime were encouraged to stand firm like the people of ancient Numantia.

The Munich "conspiracy" was an important event in Spanish history for several reasons. For the first time ever, the opposition inside Spain seemed to exceed in numbers and relevance the opposition in exile. However, more important by far was the fact that on the occasion of that meeting the wound left by the Civil War began at last to heal. As for the possibility of the opposition being able to show the Franco regime a united front, Munich was a significant step forward, though unity among the entire opposition was still a long way off. The communists, who were more manifestly reticent on the subject of the European institutions, did not officially take part in the conference; the FLP was present but again not officially. The meeting in the Bavarian city was evidence that in the course of time, which was slowly but surely pushing Spain towards Europe, the winds of history were blowing in favor of the opposition. It was, however, also evidence of the fragility of that same opposition.

In the memoirs of an official journalist at the time, Emilio Romero, one can find a disparaging comment regarding the pro-European lobby who attended the Munich conference which suggests that "Franco could eat them up with potatoes." Indeed he could, because he had instruments of repression at his disposal and he knew only too well how to use them. But the scant threat posed by the opposition was due not only to the possible use of repressive measures but also to simple misunderstandings. Immediately after Munich a crisis situation arose between the Christian democrats and the monarchists. A note from Don Juan de Borbón stating that he had not been represented at Munich was taken by Gil Robles as a denial of his own personal authority, and at the same time a split occurred between those who thought Don Juan's declaration positive and those who did not.

The repercussions of Munich for the regime were no less significant. The problem of the incompatibility of the dictatorship with Europe would continue until the death of the dictator. However, at the same time and in the short term, Franco's regime had managed to steer clear of any greater dangers. All in all he reacted to Munich exactly as he had reacted in 1946 and, as on that occasion, his success was undeniable, which would prove

to be much more troublesome in the years that followed. It should also be borne in mind that if there were signs of renewal within the opposition, it is also true that some sectors that in the past had been more dynamic dwindled and faded away. In the mid 1960s the last traces of violent anarchist action were eliminated and at the same time a section of anarchist syndicalism was induced by Solis to collaborate with the regime. It was sufficient to offer a five-point agreement that was never actually put into effect. "Five-pointism" ("*Cincopuntismo*") was the name given to this tendency which brought about the demise of part of the Spanish left.

## For or against Falange: Political Life under the Regime between 1956 and 1965

The years immediately following 1956 witnessed the first serious attempt to provide the regime with an institutional framework: a process that Franco had been reluctant to undertake. The process that would actually achieve the desired result would only reach completion later, after the formation of the cabinet in 1965, but the general direction that change was to take was made clear, even if only with typical caution, in those early years. It was then that for a few months it became conceivable that the regime might take on once again the blue tinge associated with Falange that had colored its politics at the start of World War II. Once that possibility was eliminated, the process of institutionalization moved ahead slowly along a different path, starting with a first very simple step – a generic Law on the Principles of the *Movimiento* (*Ley de Principios del Movimiento*) – while the drafting of real constitutional change did not even begin until Franco had been in power for 25 years and had had a first reminder of death: his hunting accident at the end of 1961.

Given that it seemed as though the choices facing Franco were either to favor Falange or to do away with it, we should briefly recall the role that he had allotted to it within his regime. Falange was on the one hand merely a tool but on the other it was indispensable. Statements by Falangists to the effect that Franco was not one of their own abound: this explains the loathing that the most radical Falangists felt for Carrero Blanco. We have already quoted one of the Chief of state's statements about Falange's supporting role, which have a somewhat cynical ring to them. Two statements that he made in the presence of the doctors who looked after him throughout all his illnesses flesh out this image and both show the General's

displeasure when confronted by a party such as Falange. He told Vicente Gil, who was a Falangist, that the members of his party were "*unos chulos*" – thugs – revealing on that occasion a nervous irritability that was not at all usual among the postures he habitually adopted. He told Dr Ramón Soriano more calmly that Falange was like a kind of OAS (the *Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* – the terrorist group that supported the French presence in Algeria) which "I soon taught how to behave properly."

This was the situation by 1956, but it is true nonetheless that faced with the other political groups that supported him, Franco had to be able to count on the support of the Falangists. He had used them against the military chiefs during World War II and he had kept Fernández Cuesta in power after 1945, charged with the unpleasant task of disciplining Falange. When he resolved the tensions between the cultural openness of Ruiz-Giménez and Fernández Cuesta by following Solomon's example, it occurred to him to turn to Arrese for help because he thought that José Luis Arrese might be more useful to him in controlling this sector. The Falangists believed that Franco thought the new secretary-general of the *Movimiento* a highly gifted intellectual but it is far more likely that the dictator knew Arrese's limitations and used him for his own ends.

Unlike another Falangist, Jesús Rubio, who succeeded Ruiz-Giménez, Arrese tried to win a more active political role for his faction of the "reactionary coalition" and indeed, had he been successful, he would have done so almost on his own and irreversibly. In 1945 he had commented on what he called in the Charter of Spaniards' Rights "the sly introduction of vague, threatening rights." Nor was he wrong in this, for the text gave that impression even if it was never in any way put into action. Now Rubio tried to set the regime on a firm institutional footing, taking advantage of the political situation as it appeared to be. For his part Franco remained clearly skeptical about the possibility of providing a clear structure for a form of power such as his, which was all the stronger when less well defined. Arrese, with his statements and initiatives, applied indirect pressure aimed at institutionalization on Franco whose own intentions were very different.

In March 1956 Arrese stated before a Falangist audience that the political structure of the state was not fixed since there was as yet no law to regulate either the government or the *Movimiento*. For an instant it appeared that his intention of launching these two initiatives was going to succeed and even herald a clear Falangist majority in the cabinet. However, after the summer, in October, he began to meet with unexpected difficulties

and, from having virtually been the man Franco trusted most, he came to be seen as a danger to the unity of the regime.

At that point Franco handed him 15 comments on the initiatives he had in progress, which the Falangist realized were like so many death sentences. He had managed to surround himself with a solid team whose main mentor was Emilio Lamo de Espinosa. Lamo de Espinosa believed that if the regime was to be institutionalized the question of the monarchy ought to be left to one side and that what was needed instead was a National Council as the most appropriate organ of government. What was particular about the *Movimiento* was the degree of absolute independence it would enjoy in relation to Franco's eventual successor. It would be led by a secretary-general elected by the Council who would have very wide powers equivalent, in Arrese's own words, to those of "a political commissar on active service." The law aimed at regulating the government was intended to set out new areas of responsibility. The National Council was to take on the responsibilities of a kind of tribunal on constitutional guarantees, the government could be dismissed by the Council, and the secretary-general of the *Movimiento* had the power to veto specific initiatives from ministerial departments. Had all these measures been approved, the result would quite obviously have been out and out hegemony for a Falange that would have been the one and probably the only beneficiary of this unification.

It was not surprising, therefore, that there was a storm of protest against what Arrese was trying to achieve. The military had no interest at all in the implementation of the initiatives and were spurred on to oppose them by the monarchists. From the monarchist camp the president of the *Cortes*, Esteban Bilbao, considered the proposals "a straightjacket" and refused to attend the National Council. His future successor, the Carlist Antonio Iturmendi, described the *Movimiento* as a "rigid, state-bound organism incapable of popular warmth." Another minister affirmed that if the proposals were to be allowed through, the Spanish regime would be identified with "those political systems most lacking in the most basic liberties." However, perhaps the most ironic interpretation was the one that stated that the changes that would occur might make Spain into something like Russia "but with priests." The Church also opposed the proposals in a document signed by the three serving cardinals. In addition, some 15 bishops subjected the man primarily responsible for drawing up the proposals to a grueling interrogation. The Catholic family put forward a counter-proposal which suggested reinforcing representative

institutions, the creation of a Council of the Realm (*Consejo del Reino*) with greater powers, and a reduction of Falange's powers to the point where they would cease to exist. Faced with all these proposals, the only reaction of which Arrese was capable was limited and defensive.

At the end of 1956 there was such turmoil at the heart of the regime that at a meeting of the Council of Ministers the Count of Vallellano left the room after a confrontation with Franco and then returned later. In January 1957 Carrero Blanco, who had outlined on paper his negative response to the proposals, advised Franco to dismiss Arrese despite the fact that the latter was a "good, loyal, and excellent person." He also suggested the possibility of putting a soldier in the post of Secretary-General of the *Movimiento*. Carrero's judgment was definitive in ensuring that Arrese's proposals went no further for, by this time, as one Falangist said, Franco effectively spoke "through Carrero's brain." In a private note the General wrote that "everyone wants laws to be made which will define and guarantee these functions [sic] but not for such a situation to be reached in a way that pleases everyone." This was what led him to request that the proposals be withdrawn and any institutional change be put on hold until some distant future date.

Arrese never really stood a chance of carrying through to completion his plans to provide the regime with an institutional structure; he soon made public the possibility that he would choose "a quiet return to the warmth of a loving home." He even went further than this: he agreed to being relieved of his post if instead he was given the Housing portfolio (he was an architect), so it is not possible to suggest that his experience was the starting-point for Falangist dissidence. There was, however, little that he could do in his new ministerial post owing to a lack of funding. Meanwhile, the purists in Falange had decided that from that moment on, the state was actually in crisis and that the doctrinal line that it was taking was insincere and a corruption of the ideals of the founder, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. In his memoirs the Falangist Girón states that the proposals he outlined were nothing but "a castle of fireworks which burned out in a few months." Those who came to play a prominent role later on were considered heirs of this "third force" at the start of the 1950s and it is confidently said of them that "they invented nothing: it was a kind of enlightened despotism with no wig and no snuff."

The government reshuffle of 1957 was one of the changes of personnel that Franco did not want to happen, which would suddenly explode on him without warning. This does not mean in any way that it was of no

significance: quite the opposite. In the first place it created an opportunity for a large number of the leaders of the official Spain to be replaced, and out of 18 ministers 12 changed. One of the key issues in these changes was the relegation of Martín Artajo, who had drawn attention to himself by his opposition to Arrese. It is typical of the complicated game of balance and counterbalance that Franco played that Falange suffered the worst defeat of all, yet Arrese remained a minister while the most significant member of the Catholic family disappeared (Castiella could only be considered loosely attached). The disappearance of Girón, together with Arrese's relegation, reduced Falange to little more than a sigh. José Solís represented for Falange purists a turnaround of Copernican proportions and, above all, a way of watering down the "revolution waiting to happen." So charming that he was forgiven for his constant maneuvering, slippery in the extreme, crafty as a mouse, and lacking both training and reading, Solís was living proof that it was impossible for Falange ever to gain overall control of power in Spain.

The most significant characteristic of the crisis was that Carrero Blanco's opinion carried the day and in his wake a whole new political class appeared on the scene. His role was so decisive that in the majority of cases he subjected candidates for ministerial posts to rigorous examination before they ever got to speak to Franco. It was also his program that was put into action subsequently. He had always thought that what would be far better than a single party like Falange would be a limited number of well-trained Catholic administrators. The question of efficiency in the functioning of the state bureaucracy and economic matters had worried him for some time. As for the appointment to government posts of Mariano Navarro Rubio and Alberto Ullastres as Ministers of the Treasury and Commerce, all that is certain is that the appearance of the latter owed much to the former, though it seems that they did not share a precise political aim. Stabilization, which Franco accepted was inevitable, was made essential by circumstances. What these ministers represented at the time was a different kind of political leader not associated with any of the regime families. This was, in any case, a world that had little in common with Falange. Navarro Rubio, for example, although he had spent a large part of his career in the Trade Union Organization (*Organización Sindical*), ended up in confrontation with Fernández Cuesta and in his memoirs he calls a certain type of Falangist "gun-slingers." Like Ullastres he was a member of Opus Dei, but one must also acknowledge more generally in other men who appeared on the public stage at this time a certain common identity

or similarity of approach: a high level of training, a predominance of specialization in a specific discipline, and an absence of strictly political criteria. All of these characteristics were what Carrero was looking for.

It is essential above all to consider the position of those who lost out during the crisis. The measures of a political nature that were approved during the mandate of the 1957 government did not really have any serious impact on Falange and nor did they erode its power, but despite this they were received with angry suspicion. Although none of the party's most important hierarchies made any difficulties over the turn the regime took from 1945 on, there were tensions in those years. Falange faced a serious disadvantage owing to the lack of high-level leaders and to internal divisions. Arrese, for example, had to contend with opposition from Fernández Cuesta, and even Girón criticized him for stating that Falange had never exercised power. At the end of the 1950s the Falangists felt sufficiently vulnerable from an ideological point of view to set up a number of José Antonio Doctrinal Study Groups (*Círculos Doctrinales José Antonio*) which came to form a kind of parallel structure to the organizations of the *Movimiento*.

Although the old structure of the single party allowed this sector of Falange to continue to exercise an important influence in Spanish political life, it was beginning to creak. By the middle of the 1960s half of those signed up with Falange had been members in the 1940s and the average age of its members was over 50. The organizations which were enjoying the greatest success at the time were perhaps the youth organizations but in fact their success depended in large part on their ability to provide social services and only 2 percent of members of these organizations went on to join the *Movimiento*. The main consequence of Solís's administration as head of the unions and then of the party was the "depoliticization" of these organizations brought about by turning the bureaucratic apparatus into a machine to ensure conformity. It was, at the same time, a machine of power which drew a large clientele and in itself provided a justification for those whose role was to lead it. There were occasional glimmers of protest but any effects were definitely negligible and easy to suppress. In 1950 a report on the *Movimiento* concluded that "in all sectors politics is no longer a factor under discussion." Yet the books in Spanish schools that were supposed to be disseminating the official doctrine of the regime throughout society were doing so less and less by the end of the 1950s, while support for this kind of political education was even less among teachers (barely 10 percent in large cities). Obviously there was no evidence

of open opposition (in the referendum of 1946, only in the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa was the opposition the strongest voice).

Once Arrese's proposals had been defeated, the focus of political initiative shifted to those around Carrero Blanco where Laureano López Rodó was beginning to be a prominent figure. The son of a manufacturer who had suffered in the dramatic social instability of the 1920s and himself a university professor of company law (*derecho administrativo*), López Rodó states in one of his books that he was a Falangist in his youth only because there was nothing else he could be. He rose through the ranks thanks to Carrero, who was the means by which López Rodó ensured that his political proposals reached Franco. As he says in his *Memoirs*, when Franco asked for a text relating to some legal measure it was López Rodó who provided the "withies to weave the basket." He stated in the 1960s that two fundamental objectives should be "economic development" and the establishment of "a legally constituted social state." In these same memoirs he transcribes a few paragraphs from his diaries according to which he thought that his actions should lead to "a degree of evolution in politics." When faced with Arrese's attempt to promote fascism, the new forces emerging within the regime came to represent a tendency towards a dictatorship that would be bureaucratic and administrative with a strong element of clericalism.

In this sense the Law on the Judicial Structure of the State Administration (*Ley de Régimen Jurídico de la Administración del Estado*) of June 1957 was highly significant because from a political point of view it could have been a reaction to the law on government dreamed up by Arrese. The Falangists were angered by it because it did not address political issues and because it made no mention of the *Movimiento Nacional*. A few of the more intelligent among them came to realize that a measure such as this "profoundly altered the very foundations of the regime," which had been a state controlled by one party and was now becoming dependent on an Administration. While discussing these measures mention must be made of the approval one year later of the Law on Administrative Procedures (*Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo*) which allowed private individuals to challenge government decisions in the courts, with the result that the government itself became subject to fixed rules that were now laid down by the law. From then on, the functioning of the machinery of the state became much more even and organized: minutes were taken at meetings of the Council of Ministers by the secretary, Carrero himself, and also at meetings of the various commissions set up by the government to deal

with different areas of administration, principal among which was the Commission on Economic Affairs.

More political by far was the Law on the Principles of the *Movimiento Nacional* (*Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional*) promulgated by Franco himself before a *Cortes* summoned to act merely as a "sounding-board." Once definitive judgment had been passed pronouncing Arrese's proposals not viable, the three areas they addressed were passed on, not to the National Council, but to the Office of the Chief of state for consideration. Only one of them was judged viable, because it always had been so: the Law on the Principles of the *Movimiento Nacional*. Begun in the summer of 1957, what characterized the drafting of the text was the number of people involved in it and, at the same time, the gradual reduction of the text itself. All the different regime families took part in its composition and the number of principles enumerated – which had originally started at 40 – was cut to 12. In fact the text became so generic that it was acceptable to all but also aroused suspicion among the Falange purists, more for what it did not say than for what it did contain. The law did not at any stage refer to the *Movimiento* as an organization; nor did it pronounce a clear ban on pluralism in relation to associations or unions. At the same time, the appointment of a military judge to deal specifically with terrorist activities, the Law on Public Order (*Ley de Orden Público*) of the summer of 1959, and the legislation on military rebellion of 1960 provided those in power with the necessary tools to ensure that they need not be afraid of an opposition which was in any case was still in a desperate state at that time.

Other important bills were drafted but with little hope of their becoming law in the short term. The drift in favor of the monarchy seemed to be becoming more pronounced despite the fact that it was still imprecise, and this meant that in 1959 young Falangists repeated their protests – which were still fairly harmless – against Franco and Carrero. It is important to remember that at the end of the 1950s a return to monarchy – which irritated part of Falange – was no longer as remote a possibility as it had been in the past. In 1959 Don Juan Carlos completed his civilian studies and in 1961 began his military training. Given the legal situation at the time, if Falange could not express its republican leanings openly it did at least do all it could to make the choice of Franco's successor as complicated as possible. The maintenance of a certain ambiguity in the debate on the monarchy, at least on the actual person involved, and the alternative of a choice between the *Movimiento* and a single party, were

issues that continued to cause division within the regime itself. There continued to be indecision on the matter of institutionalization but by 1959 it was generally thought to be inevitable that there would be a return to monarchy at some point.

The government formed in 1957 spanned the 5-year period that Franco considered an appropriate length of time for a cabinet to last, but before we discuss the cabinet that took its place we should consider one fact that is important if we are to explain one of the resolutions made the moment it was replaced. In December 1961 Franco had a hunting accident when his gun exploded because it was of an insufficient caliber. His wound was slow to heal and this served as a reminder that such an accident could happen at any moment. The reaction of Franco himself is worth noting because it was so typical of the man. It was two soldiers, Alonso Vega and Arias Navarro – both responsible for public order, who drafted the press release informing the nation of what had happened and it was another soldier, Muñoz Grandes, who, the following year, was made vice-president of the Council of Ministers. So the question of the succession was raised and it became clear that Franco's own thinking tended towards preference being given to the Army.

As usual, the change of government happened in July and apart from the appointment of Muñoz Grandes as vice-president – a job that was compatible with that of Chief of Staff of the Armed Services – other important moves were also made. Arrese disappeared once and for all from the government but more significant still was the appearance of Manuel Fraga Iribarne to replace Gabriel Arias Salgado, who had been badly hit by the events in Munich that have already been discussed. The new Minister for Information was able – even if it took a long time to draft it – to bring out a Press Law to replace the legislation dating from 1938. In the cabinet there was soon evidence of a shifting of positions which must be taken into account if we are to understand the rest of the history of Francoism. Muñoz Grandes was unable to play an important part politically in what followed because of bad health, among other reasons, but he normally sided with ministers with Falangist tendencies such as Pedro Nieto Antúñez, who was in charge of the Navy, Solís, Castiella, and Fraga. As typified by Fraga, this tendency could be defined as "open" (*aperturista*) in contrast to the position adopted by Carrero Blanco whose mind was closed to all processes of change. These categorizations, apart from being of dubious value, depended on the matters under discussion and indeed ministers did not always side with the same

cabinet colleagues. What should be underlined is that there existed a struggle between differing tendencies which was not characteristic of the entire Franco period and most especially had up to this time been subject to Franco's arbitration as he saw fit, and now his health had begun to fail. The tendency that Carrero Blanco represented was described by his adversaries as technocratic and linked to Opus Dei. There is no doubt at all that within that tendency there was a constant shifting of alignments, there were clashes between its members, and in matters such as economic policy there was a tentative effort at liberalization but those in positions of leadership preferred coordinated action and a common will. In his memoirs Fraga ascribes to López Rodó the nature of an "octopus," as if the latter were trying to control the whole state apparatus with Carrero's help. His judgment is not without foundation. In fact, López Rodó himself states in his memoirs that 13 ministers came from the commissions who drew up the first development plan and another 13 from the second and third plans.

As 1962 approached, although the regime still had 13 years to run, the problem of the succession was already being openly discussed and at the same time as the question of the institutionalization of the regime: a particular preoccupation of Carrero Blanco. After his hunting accident, although Franco would still present a healthy appearance until well on into the mid 1960s, he did suffer from Parkinson's disease and if it allowed him to live a normal life nonetheless, as time passed it weakened his capacity to make decisions, which had never been the case before. As a result, some of his ministers insisted that there was urgent need to give the regime firm institutional foundations of some kind. Franco's usual tendency to avoid this happening caused stormy scenes on more than one occasion during plenary sessions of the Council of Ministers. On one such occasion, speaking to a persistent Fraga, Franco replied by asking if Fraga thought that he was a "circus clown" unable to grasp the need to prepare for the future. There were of course plans to draw up a constitution but in Franco's mind the time did not seem ripe for any such schemes to win approval. From outside Spain pressure was brought to bear on the ruling classes of the regime so that there might at least be an appearance of liberalization. At the start of 1962 an international commission of jurists wrote an extensive report which pronounced clearly on the human rights abuses taking place in our country. However, the regime remained content with its institutions (or lack of them) and ample proof of this was given when in 1964 it celebrated 25 years in power, which it described as "years of peace."

Yet all these factors together did not add up to any sense of urgency about the institutionalization of the regime because of the preeminence of the issue of the monarchy. In 1963, as we know, Don Juan Carlos settled permanently in Madrid in the Zarzuela Palace after a brief period in which relations with Franco had been somewhat tense. His father had wanted him to return to Spain with the title of Prince of Asturias, thereby acknowledged as heir to the throne. The *caudillo* finally reminded him indirectly that the Zarzuela Palace was vacant and could be occupied by someone else. This game of ambiguity on the matter of the succession continued through the years that followed. The following January Franco received Don Hugo, the eldest son of Don Javier and heir to the Carlist line. That same year, Franco himself had to reply before the Council of Ministers to Solís, who stated that the question of the monarchy did not seem all that clearly defined, and he retorted "that is the only thing that is clearly defined." As late as 1965 Carrero, who was the driving force behind this policy on institutionalization, expressed the view that it was now not possible to get Franco to decide on both naming a successor and the institutionalization of the regime at the same time.

Meanwhile the regime was facing problems arising from the changes that had taken place in Spanish society since the start of the 1960s. The most important of these concerned social change brought about by Spain's economic development. Those sections of the population that had initially put their trust in autarchy were already sensing defeat in 1963 when Suances, the inspiration behind the autarchic work of the INI, left office. Franco, who had accepted the Stabilization Plan with some reservations, made statements from time to time that were reminiscent of his perennial desire to intervene in economic affairs ("I am becoming a communist," he said on one occasion), yet at the same time he benefited from the general air of success that surrounded the running of the economy.

There is another factor to be borne in mind which had an impact on developments within the Catholic Church. As early as the start of the 1960s there were already signs of a drift away from the Church on the part of many former members, which was a source of concern for Franco and the leaders of the regime. The publication of the encyclical *Mater et Magistra* caused problems, but more problematic by far were the Second Vatican Council and the election of Pope Paul VI, which was for Spain's Head of state like "a cold shower" as he said quite openly to those closest to him. The results of these changes within the Catholic Church were significant in three ways. First, they led in 1964 to discussion of issues

such as the statute relating to non-Catholics. Second, they gave rise to complaints from bishops about certain aspects of the regime. One of the strongest of these related to the official unions which had been the subject of a heated correspondence between the Cardinal Primate of Spain and Solís in 1960. Third, they provided fresh arguments in support of protest on the subject of the social effects of Spain's economic development. "I am not afraid of the workers but of the priests who stir them up," Franco stated in 1965. A few years earlier (1962) he had still seemed convinced that in the case of these anti-regime Catholics "the perfection of the Church cancels them out and the Church corrects the error of their ways."

By 1965 it had become clear that the government had to change: a notion to which Franco, as ever, turned a blind eye. When Carrero tried to make him address the issue Franco attempted to put off any change and his adviser protested: "that is what Your Excellency said to me last summer." Franco's physical decline had already begun by then, which made it harder for him to practice his usual strategy of arbitration and also made him reticent when decisions had to be taken. Although these signs would become increasingly obvious, it was only after 1965 that one of his ministers, Manuel Fraga, could think, as he says in his memoirs, that this historic figure was fading away just at the very time when he was needed most.

Nonetheless, at that point, however clear it was that Franco had begun to decline physically, a process of economic development had begun which not a few of his supporters identified at the time with his regime. We know to what an extent it was false to make this identification because the very nature of the regime had made any sustained economic development impossible since 1945. Yet all in all and despite the fact that the regime played a far smaller role in Spain's economic growth than the role it attributed to itself, there is no doubt that it was the single most important factor in the history of Spain over this period.

## The Easing of Autarchy and the Change in Economic Policy

At the start of the 1950s, for the first time in the history of the Franco regime there was a significant rise in national earnings: in 1954 ration books disappeared. Until then Spain had been the exception in the context of a postwar Europe of economic "miracles": it had remained one

of the countries on the old continent with the lowest energy consumption per inhabitant and its per capita income was on a level with Costa Rica. After the start of the 1950s there was significant economic growth, especially in industry. The average rate of growth in industrial production was at about 8 percent during the 1950s and in some years, such as 1952, it reached the extraordinary level of 15 percent. The Spanish economy moved once more from being agrarian to being largely semi-industrial and agriculture accounted for no more than 25 percent of the gross domestic product. Spain's economic development was therefore notable and exceeded that of any previous period, including during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Growth was nonetheless uneven, unbalanced, and unhealthy. In the last instance this type of growth would in time end up requiring the adoption of a more orthodox policy after 1957, and one that was more unequivocally liberalizing in 1959, with all the leeway and flaws that will be examined in due course. It is important to emphasize, therefore, that change was slow and had its foundations in the restraints imposed under the previous autarchy, and it was brought about far more by letting things happen than by defining a new economic policy.

There is one prime factor that does much to explain the change that came about in the years we are discussing. That was the acceptance on the part of the democratic countries and – more especially – the United States, that Franco's Spain was a necessary evil. This fact had immediate repercussions on the Spanish economy in the sense that it allowed it to be supplied with some of the currency it needed. As we know, in 1951 and 1952 the United States Congress agreed loans to the Franco regime that the American Administration did not want to make. After 1952 economic help began to filter through, but it was only at the time of the pacts between Spain and America that they came fully into effect. In the period between 1951 and 1963 economic help reached 1,183 million dollars – a figure which, though small in comparison with that given to other countries, played a vital role in making growth possible in a stagnant nation. Of this total sum, only 414 million were donations (35 percent), while the building of bases on Spanish soil accounted for some 230 million and the rest took the form of loans.

The impact of this help on the Spanish economy has been described graphically in the words "it fell on Spain like water on parched ground." The effect it had was both to stabilize and to allow expansion. Despite the fact that the aid given was less that that received by a communist country – Yugoslavia – it meant not only allowing imports to grow but also stimulating

growth within Spain. Had it not been for this aid Spain's program of a new economic policy could not even have been contemplated in 1959.

A second important factor that should be discussed relates to the program initiated by the government. On the one hand there seemed to be no doubt that the program drawn up in 1951 was far more competent in technical terms and seemed far more capable than its predecessors of dealing with the conditions imposed on Spain by membership of a western world economy. In addition, from time to time there were critical moments (for example in 1951 or in 1956) which forced changes to be made. However, historians disagree over the extent to which the economic policy pursued by the cabinet in 1951 amounted to a direct precedent for the 1959 Stabilization Plan. One writer has pointed out that "large-scale expansion began but it tended to produce an imbalance because it did not in any essential way diverge from the intellectual framework of the previous policy." Another has indicated, for his part, that "adopting a liberal perspective . . . had enough force behind it to have some influence but implementing it later was less decisive and – needless to say – less energetic." What resulted was a decrease in the previous use of discretionary powers and of irrational moves but official declarations which tended to accept, for example, international commercial exchange, the market economy, and private initiative clashed with the Administration itself, which did not follow the program that had been outlined.

What happened from 1951 onwards shows just how much potential for development the Spanish economy had and the difficulties that government policy created. In the period 1951–4, growth – sizeable growth – allowed income levels to reach prewar levels once again and prices stabilized; between 1955 and 1957 the increase remained rapid but became inflationary. Industry not agriculture was the motor for this economic development. The average rate of increase in industrial production was 8 percent. In contrast, the part played by agriculture, though there were some positive changes, decreased in relation to the overall national income. The Agriculture Minister appointed in 1951, Rafael Cavestany – a pragmatist and former businessman – took steps to ensure that over the decade the use of fertilizers doubled and numbers of tractors quadrupled. The hectares under irrigation grew by a third.

Spain's industrial policy hardly changed at all but the splitting up of the former Ministry of Industry and Commerce seems to show a desire to break with the interventionism of the former, though not in the case of the latter. The INI under its president Suances was still being financed

by the state and over the period 1946–59 it embarked on three large-scale industrial projects that still seemed autarchic in style even though autarchy was no longer the official policy: REPESA (petrol refining), ENSIDESA (steel), and SEAT (cars). Criteria such as industrial quality and productivity did not seem to play the decisive role that they should play. As if this were not enough, there were other areas in which state action should have been much more decisive if it was to bring about real industrial development, but that did not happen. Restrictions on electricity consumption continued on into 1954 but state intervention in the three areas mentioned did have a positive effect. While the autarchic aim to produce petrol from raw materials within Spain had meant 7 years without producing a single barrel, petrol refining now tripled in 1951–2. In steel production the INI took over from a private company that had proved incapable of embarking on the adventure that lay ahead and by 1967 production levels beat those of Spain's entire steel production in 1929. SEAT, founded in 1950 thanks to the importation of cheap Italian technology, produced more than 10 million cars in 1956.

There is perhaps no area where the heterodoxy of the government's performance on the economy is more obvious than in its monetary policy. The growth in money supply remained disproportionate over the entire period. The Treasury continually defaulted on payment of debt and forced the banks to absorb it, though it did allow them to transfer it. The consequences of this situation were predictable. Between 1953 and 1957 the official price index rose by 50 percent, though the real figures would have been higher. The reaction from the economic authorities was arbitrary and impotent and consisted of nothing more than a whole raft of controls and restrictions to no effect. The government's wage policy had in the past been very strict but now it had found it necessary to adapt to new circumstances. The sharp wage rises under Girón as Labor Minister, for example in 1956 (when pay rose by about 40 or even 60 percent), had no effect other than to contribute to spiraling inflation. Nor did the state show itself to be either active or efficient in the matter of fiscal policy.

At the same time there were important changes made to the situation so far in areas such as internal and foreign trade. As regards the former, the previous period was seen as "abnormal" and therefore required radical change. April 1952 saw free trade, price-setting, and the circulation of the majority of products approved, though measures did no more than establish a system described as "semi-normality." For example, preferential tariffs still existed for rail transport and "supervised" prices on designated

products. As for Spain's policy on foreign trade, there was at first a sense that there would be rapid and substantial changes made. The new Ministry of Commerce under Manuel Arburúa aimed its policy at increasing exports and improving the exchange rate. In 1951, for the first time but not the last, Spain's gold reserves fell so low that only the chance occurrence of a good harvest would save the situation. Under Arburúa between 1951 and 1952 the number of import licenses tripled. However, once again an economic policy that began decisively ended up bogged down in ineffectual delay tactics (*gradualismo*). The minister took a liberalizing approach to foreign trade: in theory at least foreign trade was accepted as the usual means of solving problems arising from weaknesses in internal supply. However, unlike what happened in Italy at that time Spanish exports remained weak because they consisted largely of agricultural products for "aperitifs and desserts."

In fact the rise in imports was due entirely to American aid. Although the types of exchange rate were reduced from the original 34 to no more than 5, the entire system became a cumbersome device: the rate of exchange with the dollar went from 11 to 127 pesetas per dollar. What those in charge of Spain's economic policy at the time did not manage to do was to improve exports of industrial goods. The fragility of Spain's trade situation became abundantly clear when in 1956 a severe frost hit citrus production, coinciding with a poor olive harvest. Spain's capacity to buy from outside was more than 70 percent dependent on agricultural products and raw materials.

From an economic point of view, then, it is obvious that the 1951 government found itself caught up in a series of contradictions arising from confrontation between different sectors within it, of which the most important were on the one hand the economics ministers and on the other the sectors who favored of the old political autarchy, who were usually Falangist sympathizers. This was not so for all of them, for they ranged from members of the INI and the Industry Ministry to those in the Agriculture Ministry, and they also included some from the Labor Ministry. The position in which the Spanish economy found itself had become unsustainable. The new government of 1957 provided the "ideological *substratum*" for a change in economic policy. It did so under pressure from circumstances and in the absence of any other possible option.

It is worth asking whether or not Franco was aware of the change that he himself made possible with this ministerial reshuffle. In all probability the answer is no because even though the new government team's arrival

in power coincided with the end of Arrese's Falangist-inspired projects, Franco showed little or no enthusiasm for any stabilization plans. He still did not understand why the dollar bought more in the United States than it did in Spain, and only when under pressure from the mere possibility that a bad orange harvest might result in bankruptcy for Spain did he finally accept what his economics ministers were proposing. When it was suggested that the exchange rate should be set at 58 pesetas per dollar he finally agreed to 60 pesetas "because it is a nice round figure." Quite clearly his mind was still unable to grasp the principles of capitalist economic thought. When the Industry Minister Joaquín Planell defended state intervention via the INI Franco was delighted with the minister's speech ("give him both ears and the tail," he commented in a plenary session of the Council of Ministers). Although two of the new ministers belonged to Opus Dei (Mariano Navarro Rubio and Alberto Ullastres, in addition to the highly influential post held by López Rodó), this team should not be seen as having a coherent program as many of its members held widely divergent views on a number of major issues. The Stabilization Plan was the work of Navarro Rubio while Ullastres had wanted a slower transition towards liberalization and the aims of López Rodó and later López Bravo were very different from the initial aims of the 1959 Stabilization Plan.

"It all happened as though the monetary authorities had had a fairly precise process for achieving stabilization ready in their heads," wrote one of the most outstanding economic historians of this period. Nonetheless, what mainly operated was, as Fuentes Quintana wrote, "a survival instinct" – that is to say, circumstances proved stronger than Franco's wishes. He, on the other hand, had such absolute control in the political sphere that he was not too worried about changes in the economic sphere. The memoirs of Navarro Rubio, who was principally responsible for economic change, confirm that. One has the sensation that the period 1957–8 was a time of preparation for the much more decisive measures that would be taken in 1959. It is important to underline the fact that these measures coincided with others of a different sort such as the Administrative Procedures Law (*Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo*) of 1958 and before it the State Administration Law (*Ley de Administración del Estado*) of 1957 which paved the way for the move from a dictatorship with fascist leanings to one that was more bureaucratic in nature.

This is obvious if one examines measures implemented in the period between 1957 and 1959. Fiscal reforms in December 1957 increased

revenue by a seventh by rough but effective means such as "global evaluation" and a system of standing agreements (*convenios*); in addition, a new tax on the sale of companies (*tráfico de empresas*) came into existence. Also, for the first time the usual resources of the monetary policy were actually applied. An attempt was made to reduce the extent to which public organizations could issue debt and it was made harder to transfer it by rediscounting. The Treasury thereby played a clearly anti-inflationist role. Together with the Foreign Ministry it was also responsible for Spain joining the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1958, and the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. When representatives of these various institutions appeared in Spain, stabilization gained powerful support.

Following these early measures, Navarro Rubio read out a document in which he set out his program before the Council of Ministers at the start of the summer of 1958. Essentially the text stressed that Spain was not different from other countries and that therefore the rules that would ensure a sound economy in other countries would do the same in our own. At the end of the year Navarro made a speech identical in tone before the *Cortes*. Franco wanted to be on good terms with the envoys from the International Monetary Fund and, without going so far as to admit to the flaws in the Spanish economy, he seemed ready to allow a general overhaul. It was only in June 1959 that the plan was accepted in its entirety by the Council of Ministers.

There is a further complementary aspect of the political strategy adopted by those who favored stabilization which allows some explanation of the success of the plan. In January 1959 a questionnaire on economic matters was sent to various institutions. On reading their answers it was deduced that there seemed to be a general consensus in favor of the liberalization of foreign trade, monetary stability, a leveling of the balance of payments, and even the integration of Spain into wider economic spheres. The truth is, however, that the INI was hesitant about an economic program of this type, as indeed, only a few months earlier, the secretary-general of the *Movimiento* also had been when putting forward a proposal for a kind of Iberian Benelux agreement instead of integration into Europe. However, the difficulties in implementing such a program did not come from these groups only but also from others such as the Industry Ministry; even the Labor Ministry only took action following these events once it had decided that what lay ahead was inevitable. From the very moment that the Stabilization Plan was approved, disagreement

between Navarro Rubio and Ullastres became so obvious that the former describes it in his memoirs as "extremely dramatic in character."

Over the period in which preparation for what came to be called the Stabilization Plan was moving ahead, a slow rate of growth was sustained in agricultural production while industrial growth increased much more rapidly. All in all, the growth in revenue stood at 4 to 6 percent per annum and the per capita income at 3 to 5.6 percent, but where the situation changed completely was in foreign trade, showing the extent to which the policies of the time had been inadequate. Towards the end of 1958 a report by the OEEC described the situation as "precarious" and proposed not only a devaluation of the peseta but also "the abolition once and for all" of all interventionist devices. By the very end of 1958 the situation of Spain's gold reserves was clearly disastrous since there was an enormous deficit which in 1959 reached over 76 million dollars.

What is remarkable is not that those in power in Spanish politics changed the focus of its economic policy drastically but that they took so long doing it. The situation was desperate: there loomed over Spain the threat that vital imports such as oil would be suspended. The following winter, with a likely decrease in exports and increase in imports, could bankrupt the country at a time when, in addition, its level of imports was higher than it had been in the past. On the other hand, there was an obvious solution to Spain's economic problems. The program that all the specialists from the international organizations that Spain had just joined were recommending to its leaders meant a return to financial orthodoxy, the liberalization of trade, and the elimination of restrictive practices. Any other solution would not only mean a return to the past but would also be to lapse back into a situation that was sheer madness.

It was in these circumstances that, under pressure from Navarro Rubio, Franco finally gave in and – only for the time being and with notable bad grace – gave up on what had until now been his own ideas on economic matters: "Do whatever you like," he told his Treasury Minister. This decision gave rise to a government memorandum dated the end of June 1959 and addressed to the IMF and the OEEC. In a tone that was both down to earth and laconic, this text defined the turn that Spanish economic policy was now going to take. "The Spanish government," it said, "believes that the moment has come to bring our economic policy in line with that of the nations of the western world and to free it from controls which, being a legacy of the past, are no longer appropriate to our present situation." This presupposed that private initiative would be respected and

interventionism would be cut. In addition, the memorandum made the following statement: "The government will continue with its present policy of authorizing wage increases only in cases where they are justified by a parallel increase in productivity." Although it was never made public, the document contained entire paragraphs of reports written by foreign experts.

This memorandum was followed halfway through July by the publication of a decree law described as a "Stabilization Plan" – an inappropriate title because it stressed its monetary aspects when its scope was very much wider than this suggested. In fact, "the most notable of the measures put forward . . . was its very extensive package of regulations and its high standard of internal coherence" which set it apart from measures put forward not only in the past but also in the future under Francoism. The regime had "changed its shirt and even its body in terms of its economic policy yet it remained essentially the same."

The decree contained a great variety of initiatives. First and foremost it limited annual public spending to 80,000 million pesetas and promised to keep it under control in subsequent budgets. Secondly, it also capped growth in bank credits, setting the figure at 163,000 million, a reform in banking was announced, and the immediate pledging of debt was done away with. Similarly, steps were taken to ensure better coordination of state policies on investment. Fourthly, a new trade policy was introduced by the state: only 20 percent of foreign trade would be trade by the state and the exchange rate was unified after a large devaluation of the peseta in relation to the dollar which would now be worth 62 pesetas. The Plan also made a modification of tariffs possible and this immediately meant the liberalization of the majority of foreign trade. Finally, another important aspect of the Stabilization Plan was that it called on foreign financial assistance, principally from the international organizations that Spain had recently joined. Nonetheless, directly or indirectly most of the finance for the new Plan came from American sources.

What was most important of all, however, was not so much what this decree contained as the extent to which it allowed a glimpse of what the future held in store. The impact of the Stabilization Plan immediately had a positive effect on the balance of payments. In no more than the space of a year, from the end of 1958 to the end of 1959, the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute (*Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera* or IEME) balance moved from 58 million dollars in the red to 52 million in credit. A year after the Plan came into action, currency reserves topped 400 million

dollars. On the other hand, as could well have been predicted, this meant a recession in the short term because of the reduction in consumer demand and the collapse of investment. Industrial production suffered a severe stoppage in growth but agricultural growth continued to increase. By 1960 Spain saw a significant improvement in these areas and by 1961 it was fair to say that the crisis was past. This situation coincided with the beginnings of foreign tourism and of emigration as two new factors which made an impact on the Spanish economy.

It was in this climate that the inevitable offensive against the policy of stabilization began. The meetings of the Council of Ministers became, in Navarro's words, "sorrowful Fridays" because all the ministers were fighting against the limits imposed on the resources available to them. The *Movimiento* and the unions led the resistance for obvious reasons, arguing against the lack of social content in the measures. From 1960 onwards, expansionist economic measures began to be implemented with reference principally to public investment. In April 1962 the banking system underwent a reform with the nationalization of the official bank and the creation of three types of private banks: commercial, industrial, and mixed, all subject to different legal requirements. The savings banks (*cajas de ahorros*) were no longer dependent on the Labor Ministry and now came under the umbrella of the Treasury. In 1960 the liberalization of foreign investment in Spain had begun but a legal frame of reference was only finalized in April 1963. In July 1964 a generalized tax reform was approved. One might say that this represented a decisive move towards laying down a legal framework for economic life in Spain.

Yet other initiatives by reformers on economic policy never got anywhere near seeing the light of day. Restrictions on public spending happened in certain sectors such as the Spanish Railways (*Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles* or RENFE) but not in the INI or in housing. Even before stabilization, attempts had been made to coordinate public sector spending by an office created for that very purpose. However, the "investment plans" ("*ordenaciones de inversión*") of 1959 and 1960 were only for 1 year. Navarro Rubio's own success helps to explain why from a certain moment on, the main protagonist of stabilization should come up against political difficulties. He did not manage to release the IEME from Commerce Ministry control and when he was spoken of as a possible candidate for a position of economic vice-president the bid was a failure and he was never appointed. Nonetheless, the way ahead, leading to fresh discussion of Spain's economic problems, remained open. A delegation

from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) visited Spain in the summer of 1961 and then published a report which was distributed widely – 20,000 copies were sold – which could be considered the first serious text offering a global perspective to discuss the subject of Spain in depth since the Civil War. This document stated that "Spain had the human and physical resources to achieve and sustain a high level of economic development" but that if it was to do so it would have to pay adequate attention to the matter of costs.

In February 1962 a new body – the Commission for the Development Plan (*Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo*) answerable to the Presidency – was set up and came to be seen as so vital that it was soon given ministerial rank. With collaboration from international institutions, the first Development Plan was published in December 1963. Formulating it had been the work of a series of commissions and reports in which 400 people took part, of whom 250 were businessmen. In practice the role of these groups was purely advisory. According to López Rodó, who name was linked to the process of drafting the development plans, these were intended to be "an effective means of reducing uncertainty and making a real commitment to solidarity." Like all the plans that would follow, the first Development Plan, based on of the notion of "indicative planning," whose main European theoretician was Monnet, aimed to commit the public sector to a series of projects while the private sector was only given suggestions for possible action.

A consequence of the drafting of the first of the Development Plans was the opening up of a public debate on Spain's economic problems. Proof of this is found in the passion with which pronouncements were made on the report by the World Bank earlier on in 1962. In general there was protest from Falangist groups and those who favored planning based on interventionism but this was neither widespread nor a frontal attack. There was also reticence on the part of those on the left who were critical of the first plan's neo-liberal economic perspective. However, before the drafting of the first Development Plan had even been completed rapid economic growth had already begun.

Indeed, between 1961 and 1964 the growth in industrial production oscillated between 11 and 13 percent per year – a figure that would not be repeated until 1969. This showed that the Stabilization Plan, not the Development Plans, was the factor that set in motion the transformation of the Spanish economy. The measures taken in 1959 had an effect like that described by Adam Smith when mercantilist initiatives disappeared.

All in all, the reasons why economic development happened from this moment on can be traced back to possibilities that had existed in the 1950s, the initial implementation of the measures put in place in 1959, and the income of a country situated at the western extreme of a flourishing industrial civilization.

These reasons reveal, on the other hand, the limitations of both the development that took place at the start of the 1960s and the people who took part in the process. The Stabilization Plan was the starter-motor that set in motion Spain's industrial development but its center of gravity was its liberalization and this remained within certain modest limits. At a moment when the dominant figure on the Spanish political stage was Carrero Blanco it could not be otherwise, because his mind was not receptive to the opening up of the Spanish economy to international competition. When stabilization had shown proof of being successful Carrero wrote in a report that the world was dominated by three international powers: communism, socialism, and freemasonry, the last of which "will help us because they need us, but even as they help us they will be trying to control us." His attitude to the world outside Spain was quite clearly suspicious in the extreme. His caution combined with his nationalism to cause him to write in another report: "The ideal would be not to have to import anything other than what we need for production."

Liberalization ended in about 1967 and López Rodó and López Bravo "understood the market economy to be like another form of discretionary decision-making centered on stimulating private initiative and offering direct help to employers." It is possible that this was because of fears that liberalization might find a way to enter into politics, but it is even more probable that in a regime such as the Spanish regime at the time the natural tendency was to encourage a kind of development in which the state, through prizes and agreements with interest groups, might carry on playing the same decisive role as ever. Those who replaced Navarro Rubio – one historian has commented – watered down the wine from 1959 onwards.

Yet they also brought to completion a renewal of the leadership team central to the regime's economic policy. Between 1951 and 1963 Suances, who until then had been Franco's main adviser on industrial policy, saw his influence decline dramatically. Carrero had accused him – and not without some cause – of trying to direct Spain's entire economy from his office. At that time it was said that the president of the INI manipulated as though it were one economic unit what was at that time the astronomic sum of 1,000 million pesetas, which was nicknamed the "*suancio*" after

Suances himself. In 1953 Suances resigned for the fifth time and a few years later he broke off in practice all personal relations with the Industry Minister. From 1958 on links were cut between the INI and the budget and it had to finance itself through the savings banks. In 1963, when Suances felt nothing less than persecuted and his blunt pronouncements were beginning to cause serious problems in relation to Spain's economic policy, he ended up resigning once and for all. In the last stages of his time there the INI made a commitment on the construction of power stations.

It is important to note in conclusion that Spain's change in economic policy was accompanied by a parallel loosening up of social policy. As we have seen, in the stage of autarchy the Labor Ministry had played the major role in determining social policy. After that time, on the other hand, a much more decisive role was played by the Trade Union Organization (*Organización Sindical*).

This change illustrates very well the developments that had taken place at the heart of the regime. In 1953 rules were drawn up governing the company juries formed 6 years earlier. In 1957 – that is to say, halfway through the 2 years that led up to the Stabilization Plan – the first elections were held to choose trades union delegates (*enlaces*) and in 1958 the Law on Collective Standing Agreements (*Ley de Convenios Colectivos*) was passed and had an important impact on Spanish life. From that time on, within businesses, the renewal of a *convenio* would be an element that would further politicize the social struggle, but it had now become possible to avoid wage claims, leading inevitably to conflict and the disruption of public order. It was a matter, quite definitely, of an initiative aimed at making the labor market more flexible by making it more like the market economy outside Spain.

In 1965 Spain's economic development was still too recent a phenomenon to allow political conclusions to be drawn that might threaten the stability of the Franco regime. However, it is essential at this point to turn our attention back to the political opposition because it was to make a significant contribution later as a mediator between the politics of the regime and a society that had modernized thanks to the country's economic transformation.

## From Political Opposition to Social Opposition

If 1962 represents a certain turning-point in the political history of Francoism, the same can be said of the history of Spain's political opposition.

In effect, after Munich a new phase opened up which would be characterized by the emergence of a form of protest that was social rather than strictly political. This new reality showed clearly how limited political opposition had been in the past, apparently unable to achieve anything more than symbolic gestures. Social protest could give the impression that it was directed against specific aspects of daily life in Spain rather than against the regime. Yet social opposition provided a justification for political opposition. It was not directed by it but it gave hope to the political opposition; it broke down the walls separating small opposition coteries and made the last years of the life of the regime a time of constant uncertainty.

Spain's "social opposition" reached its peak in the second half of the 1960s but there had been a previous phase which helps to explain what it was like. Halfway through the decade it was not possible to state categorically that it actually existed. One should point out that from the very outset it had had three driving forces which took over one from another. It began with opposition from a section of organized Catholicism, then it took the form of student rebellion, and in its third manifestation it was led by protest from workers.

Organized Catholicism distanced itself from the Franco regime before Vatican II. During the first phase of Francoism, various organizations committed to the workers' apostolate channeled much of their protest against bad working conditions and played an important role in the strikes of 1951 and 1956. In 1956 the main leaders of Workers' Brotherhoods of Catholic Action (*Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica* or HOAC) were dismissed from their jobs. There had by this time been a move in all areas of Catholic Action in Spain away from a kind of pastoral work which one might describe as based on "authority" to one requiring "consent." There were also other sources of conflict between the state and the Church. In 1956, for example, the editor of the periodical of the Episcopate that was not subject to censorship, *Ecclesia*, was dismissed on issues to do with the freedom of the press. In the 1960s there had already been initiatives from trade unions spurred on by members of Catholic Action and, in 1963, the ZYX publishing house was founded to provide a link between Spanish Catholicism and social action.

What is important is that by the middle of the 1960s there had been a decisive change in the thinking of the leaders of the apostolic organizations. The majority of the leaders of Catholic Action had nothing whatever to do with revolutionary attitudes, to such an extent that, as the future Cardinal Vicente Enrique Tarancón would say, even to suggest that they

had was not only a grave mistake but one that might prove damaging to the Catholic Church itself. Whatever the situation, apostolic movements were the first means by which political opposition became social opposition among Spain's young people.

Viewed in this light, Jorge Semprún's statement in 1965 to the effect that the two organizations with any future in the Spanish opposition were the Communist Party and the Christian democrats makes sense. One might add that Catholicism performed a crucial function in that it disseminated democratic principles through its communications media. An example of this would be the periodical *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* founded in October 1963 which, from Catholic origins, in time brought together the entire opposition. *Cuadernos* was not only a fundamental means by which the ideological guidelines of democratic thought were disseminated but was also evidence of the shift of a section of Spanish Catholics towards the opposition. Its founder, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, did not break his links with the regime until the moment in 1964 when a new law on associations was discussed in the *Cortes*. With the passage of time Ruiz-Giménez took over leadership of the most left-wing section of the Christian democrats after the disappearance of the man who had led it until then, Giménez Fernández (1968). However, by that time the moment of opportunity had passed for that particular political group. If it had been useful in spreading democratic ideas, it ran out of energy doing so. Many members of the socialist leadership in 1975 had been Christian democrats 10 years earlier.

We would have to locate the forerunners of student protest in the events of 1956, but also in the transformations that took place at the start of the 1960s in the official students' union. This had lost its fascist character and had adapted to circumstances, allowing free elections to the student year-group councils (*consejos de curso*) and to autonomous faculty committees (*cámaras*), though the top hierarchy were still appointed from above. At first the apathy predominant among students allowed them to be controlled from above but soon these timid beginnings gave way to a strongly contentious mobilization by university students while the more moderate proposals put forward by the union leadership proved a failure.

In any case, even as late as the middle of the 1960s anti-Francoist students at Spanish universities were in a minority, though they had no adversary to fight other than the general level of depoliticization. The initiative in the protests against the regime had been taken originally by the University of Barcelona where a Committee for Inter-University

Coordination (*Comité de Coordinación Universitaria*) was set up. It would subsequently move in 1961–2 to Madrid where it would be led by groups that claimed to have no party agenda, such as the Spanish Democratic University Federation (*Federación Universitaria Democrática Española* or FUDE) and the Union of Student Democrats (*Unión de Estudiantes Demócratas* or UED), the former on the left and the latter largely Christian democrat though it also included other tendencies. The protest against those in positions of leadership in the SEU spread so fast that by 1964 the majority of university regions did not in fact recognize the official union.

The academic year in which student protest became most intense was 1964–5 and the climax came with a student demonstration in February 1965 in which several university teachers took part (José Luis López Aranguren, Agustín García Calvo, Santiago Montero, and Enrique Tierno Galván). From that moment on, both the protest itself and government reactions to it took on a different tone. By 1965, in terms of action, clandestine unions had been replaced by student assemblies, which were more effective as a means of calling immediately for demonstrations, but they also took the place of the representative democracy of the faculty *cámaras*. The difficulty was that this opened up a way that led to a form of radicalization that did not take into account Spain's actual political situation. A stable students' union became an impossibility because state repression set about dismantling it. In March 1966 the initiative was taken once again in Barcelona when 500 people gathered at the Capuchin Monastery in the Sarrià district of the city (in what came to be known as the *caputxinada*) founded the Barcelona University Students' Union (*Sindicato de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Barcelona* or SDEUB). The regime's reaction, far from attempting to revive the fascist SEU, was to set up Student Professional Associations (*Asociaciones Profesionales de Estudiantes*) which proved to be no more stable. In April 1965, after the vice secretary-general of the *Movimiento*, Fernando Herrero Tejedor, had met with students, a decree was approved which allowed the bureaucratic and administrative functions of the SEU to be separated off from its representative function.

By the second half of the 1960s the regime seemed to have accepted that the situation in the Spanish universities was impossible without finding any solution, and to have decided to live with it. The universities had by this time become a kind of world apart where political principles alien to those that governed the Franco regime were circulated and a degree of tolerance was exercised in relation to political dissidence. If at the beginning of the 1960s dissident students were in a minority, from the second half

of the decade on they became a clear majority. One might even add that among the younger academics, to be a Francoist was not just exceptional but truly eccentric. This situation was evidence of the weakness of the regime but also, in some sense, of its strength because it survived, despite these oddities, within the body politic without any difficulty at all.

The working classes also won a certain limited degree of autonomy just as the university students had done. There had always been union opposition to the regime but earlier, halfway through the 1950s, it had largely been dismantled. What brought about the change in the situation was the strategy adopted by the clandestine unions which had until then been reluctant to take part in official union life.

The situation began to change after the start of the 1960s, which makes it necessary to consider first of all the role played by the official unions up to this point. They had never had the means to deal with possible demands from workers who had traditionally enjoyed a higher level of union autonomy. At the start of the 1940s, for example, the leaders of the union movement acknowledged the "manifest hostility" of the workers. As time passed, however, conflict between individual workers and companies was channeled through union organizations or work tribunals (*Magistraturas de trabajo*).

The regime tried by means of legislation to avoid the situation becoming too damaging to its own interests. The Work Contract Law (*Ley de Contratos de Trabajo*) of 1958, which was not enacted until 1961, set out a new framework for labor relations according to which from time to time the signing of a *convenio* created conflict within companies over workers' demands. In addition to this, in 1965 strikes on purely economic issues were legalized under the heading of "collective conflict at work." Meanwhile, the creation of a National Board of Employers (*Consejo Nacional de Empresarios*) broke with the structure of the vertical union and separated the workers from the employers. In turn, all of these changes owed much to the circumstances of conflict experienced in earlier times. It is possible that the strikes in Asturias in 1962 triggered much of the union activity in the final phase of the regime and even on in our own time, because it was not a matter of spontaneous conflict (as had been the case with the Barcelona Tram Strike of 1951); nor was it the result of agitation by those who had lost the Civil War, as in the 1947 strike in Bilbao; rather, it happened as a consequence of a specific conflict and ended with a demand for the freedom to strike and the creation of trade unions – two areas which enjoyed support from intellectuals. It is from 1962 that an important

and irreversible change in Spanish history can be dated: namely, the transformation of strikes into a daily reality in labor relations.

One factor which explained this consolidation of social protest and the birth of a new kind of union movement was the appearance on the scene of groups of workers from Catholic organizations. The Workers' Union Front (*Frente Sindical de los Trabajadores*) was a product of the HOAC. The Workers' Trade Union (*Unión Sindical Obrera*) too, founded in 1961, had similar roots even though it declared itself non-confessional. It described itself as socialist but was not linked to any party in particular. Last of all, the Workers' Union Alliance (*Alianza Sindical de los Obreros*) was founded in 1964 on the foundations of what had been called the Workers' Vanguard (*Vanguardias Obreras*): an apostolic organization of Jesuit inspiration.

All these organizations with Catholic roots, like the Spanish Communist Party, took advantage of the legal status enjoyed by the unions. However, it was the PCE that got the best results from this tactic thanks to the founding of the Union Confederation of Workers' Commissions (*Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras* or CC.OO). It seems that in a region such as Asturias the initiative for this move came entirely from the Communists, while in other places such as Madrid Catholics and even disaffected Falangists played a significant role. In general the *Comisiones Obreras* spread during the cycle of conflict that began in 1962, though its organization was not really consolidated until the second half of the 1960s. From 1964–5 onwards, *Comisiones Obreras* began to organize action on a provincial level and by 1966, when union elections were held throughout Spain, this clandestine union was very successful. It no longer depended for support on a proletariat that remembered the republican years but could now draw on a much younger membership. In 1967 *Comisiones* held its first congress where the powerful influence of the Spanish Communists was seen to dominate proceedings, leaving other groups clearly in the minority. What really mattered was that by this means the Communist Party had begun to break out of its former isolation. In this sense the profile of those elected in the union elections mentioned earlier was typical: more than half were under 30 and therefore had experienced the economic growth of the last few years. For people such as these, *Comisiones*, as a loosely organized unitarian assembly able to accept part of the legal situation of the time while also pushing for concrete changes, was an ideal formula. This was the Spanish Communist Party's second achievement. Yet even earlier, from the second half of the 1950s on, it had

managed to attract a good number of figures from intellectual circles and most important of all it had won a degree of respectability among all the groups who opposed the regime.

This reference to *Comisiones Obreras* and to the political groups with which it had contact serves as an introduction to a discussion of changes that took place within the Spanish Communist Party. It would not be right to think that these changes were the result of careful thought from within the Party – at least, not at the start. The PCE did not in any way alter its traditional stance and that is why the revolt against the Soviets in Hungary was condemned out of hand; however, after the summer of 1956 at least there were more insistent calls for reconciliation to end warfare between Spaniards.

The policy of national reconciliation became the main Communist Party slogan at the time when the leadership was taken over by a younger generation of those who, in the Civil War, had joined from the United Socialist Youth (*Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas*): Santiago Carrillo and Fernando Claudín to name but two. In contrast, by 1959 Dolores Ibárruri had already been relegated to a position that was little more than decorative. The new team embarked on much more explicit action inside Spain. Already by this time Jorge Semprún, using the pseudonym "Federico Sánchez," had played an important part in the student protest of 1956. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the success of the propaganda in favor of "reconciliation" or the calls for a "day of peaceful protest" such as the one attempted at the time. Also, the immediate result of the party's increased activity was even harsher repression. The execution of Julián Grimau in April 1963 for supposed crimes committed during the Civil War is evidence that the regime would not be slow to recall how it was that it had come to power whenever it wanted to justify repressive action.

The failure of the "national days of protest" was so glaringly obvious that in no time at all there was intense debate inside the party on how to interpret the situation in which Spain now found itself. Carrillo played the role of the willful political pragmatist and relied on the prestige of Dolores Ibárruri who described the dissidents as "feather-brained intellectuals." Claudín and Semprún, who were right when they recognized "the changes in Spanish society, now far removed from feudalism," ended up criticizing Stalinism and the lack of democracy inside the party from which, after a long debate which dragged on from 1962 to 1964, they were both expelled. This separation in actual fact was not seriously problematic for the PCE. In practice Carrillo began, though slowly, to adopt many of the views

formerly held by his adversaries. The purely utilitarian argument that Carrillo developed in his various writings of memoirs consists of affirmations that if Claudín's theory was accepted it would mean a significant decrease in militancy.

## Culture in the Francoist Middle Period: The End of the Penitential Years

Developments in Spanish culture in the middle of the Franco period provide interesting parallels with what was going on in the economic sphere and in political opposition groups. These developments came about thanks to Spain's opening up to the outside world and the unequivocal desire to modernize. Economic and political changes are understandable if we take into account the fact that it was the cultural media who contributed to them to a quite remarkable extent.

This is not to suggest that the cultural media had no contact whatever with official circles. It seems quite clear that if in terms of politics there was a definite break made with the past, there were in contrast elements of continuity that were much in evidence linking cultural life before 1939 with that after it. Meditation on the essential nature of Spain, the presence of José Ortega y Gasset and the inheritance from the Generation of '98 in much of current Spanish thinking, the militancy of writers in politics and their confidence in the state as the instrument of collective salvation are all evidence of a continuous line of thinking which linked the pre-Civil War intellectual world with that after the war. It is quite another matter, however, that their ways of resolving issues were radically different. Nonetheless, one cannot dispute the fact that a large number of front-line intellectuals in Spain at this time were active members of organizations that formed part of the regime. Many of the best writers (Jesús Fernández Santos, Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio, Ignacio Aldecoa . . . ) had been members of Falange. Their reasons for not conforming as writers were ethical and literary rather than strictly political. It is true that their Falangist origins left their mark on the attitudes of such writers who later became dissidents. Hence Juan Francisco Marsal has quite rightly spoken about the "objective Francoism" of writers who had abandoned their earlier attitudes favorable to the regime and had adopted others that were more in line with opposition thinking because, even as they did so, they nonetheless retained a "unitarian" and totalizing concept that had little in common with a liberal position.

If in the 1950s and early 1960s there emerged a political class that is still present in Spanish public life even today, the same can be said of the intellectual world. It was this that led Spain down the road to identification with the thought and concepts of life of the western world. What Carlos Barral termed evolution "in a gently easing direction" on the part of the regime helped to develop these possibilities further. In this respect a parallel can be drawn with Spain's economic development. What happened in Spanish culture at this time can be summed up by saying that there was a significant catching up on time lost since the Civil War. In the economy too there was a return to the macroeconomics of the prewar period and the foundations were laid for what would later be growth in the 1960s.

The first intellectual opening up to the outside world during the Franco regime was made possible by the presence of Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez in the Ministry of Education. What is of most interest to us here is not that there was now a far more open attitude, nor that it aroused strong opposition, but rather the fact that this political phenomenon coincided with others of an intellectual nature. The evolution of many of the most significant thinkers in the Spain of that time and later is characterized specifically by the building of bridges between them and Spaniards in exile and Spain's liberal tradition. Nonetheless, the paths they took were different. Aranguren, starting from a Catholic critique, shifted over this period from a position of concern to one of ethical disquiet and resistance to the power of the regime which necessarily became political. In the case of Tierno Galván, his thinking moved from the linguistic abstraction of the neo-tacit approach to a functionalism that was directly critical of the ideological monopoly imposed by the present political system. The work of Julián Marías, for its part, was characterized at this time by a dual emphasis: the need to maintain links with Spain's liberal tradition whose most iconic representative was Ortega, and the affirmation that the Spain of that time had not lost all of its vital intellectual tradition which indeed was at work within those precise ideological coordinates. It was on this particular point that he held a most interesting debate with the American Hispanist Robert G. Mead.

Nonetheless, the debate that best represents this cultural moment was the one that raged around the figure of Ortega y Gasset himself. Accused of religious heterodoxy, Ortega was in the line of fire of those whose attitude was staunchly National Catholic because his thinking was more systematic than that of Unamuno and therefore seemed to them to be far more dangerous. The main participants in the debate were Julián Marías,

who insists that he took part reluctantly out of a certain sense of duty, and the Dominican Santiago Ramírez, whose basic position was one of intolerance. It is significant that a large number of intellectuals whose views had coincided with those of the regime or who shared its ideals (ranging from Aranguren to Laín Entralgo and Maravall) also took part in the discussion expressing their sense of indebtedness to Ortega y Gasset.

This fact proves that the philosopher's presence in Spain was a factor that led the Spanish intellectual universe of the time in a more liberal direction. Some of the great intellectual minds (apart from José Antonio Maravall, another example would be Luis Díez del Corral) were able to grow from the original seed of Ortega's thought. So we can see quite unequivocally that a gradual recovery of liberal ideals was under way among those who had started off from very different positions. At the end of the 1950s liberals from a Falange background took part in intellectual events organized by the Congress for the Freedom of Culture (*Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura*) whose ideology was pro-western and funding American. Outside Spain this institution published some "Notebooks" which for the first time featured signatures of intellectuals both in exile and inside Spain. No doubt an offshoot of the debate on Ortega, Marías denounced the fact that there were those who were prepared to use the Congress against the regime but who then immediately afterwards decided that it should be done away with along with liberalism itself. In fact, it was at this time that members of the new generation broke with liberalism (and also with Catholicism which was seen as suffocating and oppressive). Marías in fact presented as "converging aims" the directions now taken by the Spanish Communist Party and the regime on the subject of Ortega-style liberalism.

The crucial moment in the split between these intellectuals and their past took place around the events of 1956. For some of those who took part in these events, what happened was "a crisis very like a crisis of faith." Ridruejo himself went so far as to say that "we were on the other side." Yet, as has been indicated, appearances changed but the underlying totalitarian thought often did nothing more than move from extreme right to extreme left. To understand how these changes came about, there is no better method than to ask to what extent the official world of the regime had at its disposal resources and centers of activity capable of attracting a more creative youth. It was the cultural activities organized by the SEU – the Spanish University Theater (*Teatro Español Universitario*) or film-clubs – that fueled the transformations that were taking place at the time.

The *Servicio Universitario del Trabajo*, conceived in an atmosphere of close harmony between Falange and Catholicism, gave birth to a pro-communist Catholicism. In a different way the cultural periodicals that appeared in these years were evidence of a plurality of attitudes all essentially derived from positions of political dissidence. So in *Laye* and in *Alcalá* – two intellectual publications associated with Falange of which the first was more secular and the second more Catholic – one can detect a drift in the radicalism of some of its writers towards a vague kindof Marxism. In *El Ciervo* a self-critical Christianity, in its acceptance of the ideas of the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, made possible a certain attitude that represented a compromise with communism; we have already noted the relationship between this publication and the FLP. In *Praxis*, published in Córdoba, it is again possible to see the link between religion and revolution. The periodical *Índice* was associated with some of the major figures of the regime but its enthusiasm for Third World revolutions and for the reintegration of exiles is clearly evident. Perhaps the most respectable approach of all the periodicals of the time was that of *Ínsula*, of which Enrique Lafuente Ferrari commented that it was evidence of "a will to protect the continuity of true Spanish intellectualism," and *Papeles de San Armadans*, whose patron, Camilo José Cela, stated in a letter to someone in exile that he wanted it to serve "to unite Spaniards by means of their intelligence."

There are several other interesting aspects of the development of Spanish thought at the start of the 1960s. It is from this time, for example, that we can date the beginnings of the recovery of the cultures of Spain's periphery: about 50 titles were already being published in Catalan. In fact, "the recovery of Catalan literature was only one piece in a far more complex mosaic" (Jordi Gràcia). Poetry festivals between 1952 and 1954 gave the sense that a brotherly relationship was possible between Castilian and Catalan, closely tied in with opposition culture. It was also in this period that the first signs of a genuinely Spanish form of Marxism appeared, suitably disguised to pass through the customs control of the censors. Censorship, as far as books were concerned, had by now become much more flexible. One man who worked as a censor told the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, who was living in Barcelona at the time, that in one of his books the word "whale" had had to be replaced with "cetacean" when referring to a soldier.

It is proof of the obvious pluralism of the Spanish cultural scene that alongside the traditionalist *Atlántida* there appeared the *Revista de*

*Occidente*. However, perhaps the periodical that is most representative of this moment was *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, whose inspiration was clearly Christian democrat at the start. It allowed the branch of Catholicism that favored renewal (whose main forerunner was Manuel Giménez Fernández) to play an important intellectual role in the propagation of the democratic ideal of peaceful coexistence. Similarly, the emergence of the social sciences at a later stage was to have an increasing impact by exercising a distinctly critical function in relation to traditional views of Spain at the time. This was so, for example, with history which now followed the principles of the French school as a result of the work of a historian of no lesser prestige than Jaume Vicens Vives whose concepts broke with the imperialistic notions that had once characterized traditional Spanish historiography. Finally, there remains one last intellectual debate that is of interest, which considered whether or not Spanish culture was European in nature. In fact, in opposition to Fernández Santos, the position defended by Juan Goytisolo, which argued that it was not, presented a key political issue which drew strength from the revolutionary potential that existed in the so-called Third World.

There was, then, a political element in all the major aspects of developments in Spanish thought at the time which was also to be found in literary fiction. Around 1950 a change occurred in Spanish narrative that tended to depict day-to-day reality. It bore witness to the world around it and was very explicit in novels such as Cela's *La colmena* (1951), Luis Romero's *La noria* (1951) and *Proceso personal* by José Suárez Carreño (1955). This realist trend can be seen as the most outstanding single trait in that entire period of Spanish literature, not only in narrative but also in social poetry and even in quite a large part of Spanish theater.

As regards the novel, the aesthetic influences on which this realist approach was based were Italian neo-realism, French objectivism, the so-called American "generation of the damned," and, above all, Sartre's theory of political engagement. The Spanish mentor chosen by the new generation of writers was Antonio Machado, who was celebrated in many acts of homage in his honor. From a political point of view their so-called "operation realism" received strong support from the PCE and its emissary inside Spain at that time, Jorge Semprún, but in actual fact the links between exponents of the new aesthetic style and the party were frequent but only short-lived. If indeed the populist social style of writing continued to flow from the pens of some authors during the second half of the 1960s (Francisco Candel, for example), it fairly much died out after that.

One must remember, after all, that there were many different ways of adopting this new approach: one need only point to the difference between the more cosmopolitan literature that came from Barcelona and what was produced in Madrid.

All in all, the realist approach and political engagement produced many diverse approaches to writing. In the majority of young writers of the time one can detect a clear disillusionment with politics, the deprivation suffered by a generation that had been a silent victim of the Civil War, and a resolutely accusatory stance towards society, at least in moral terms. The protagonists of these narratives were always anti-heroes with no sense of any transcendental mission. The most typical novel of this period without doubt was Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio's *El Jarama* (1956), a story about a group of Madrid young people's mundane excursion to the Jarama river during which the total absence of any meaningful events reveals the stunted nature of their existence, which is barely affected at all by the death of one of their number. There is in contrast a much clearer social critique as a backdrop to García Hortelano's novels *Nuevas amistades* (*New friendships*, 1959) and *Tormenta de verano* (*Summer Storm*, 1961), which are about Spain's middle classes at the time, and this tendency is even more marked in the writings of the Goytisolo brothers. In *Juego de manos* (*The Young Assassins*, 1954) Juan Goytisolo depicted political inconsistencies in a group of angry young people before moving on to report on the conditions of poverty in daily life in Almeria in *La Chanca* (*The Salthouse*, 1962) and *Campos de Nijar* (*The fields around Níjar*, 1950), while Luis Goytisolo described life in the urban slums around big cities in *Las afueras* (*The Outskirts*, 1958).

These examples of the social novel of the period achieved extraordinarily wide distribution figures as a literary fashion. In less notable works this type of narrative later became the object of acerbic criticism which Carlos Barral tried to disarm by reminding critics that the "thinness and coarseness" of such social literature was merely a response to the forms against which it was reacting which were themselves "so poor and so obstinately and introvertedly Spanish and Hispanicizing." Nonetheless, it is essential to stress once again that there were many different forms of realist writing at this time. The greatest success in terms of conventional writing in the period, José María Gironella's Civil War trilogy of 1953–66 which began with *Los cipreses creen en Dios* (*Cypresses believe in God*), was imbued with this same critical tone. On the other hand, a novelist who produced reasonable work that became increasingly interesting, Miguel Delibes,

focused on issues where a clear social critique, combined with a profoundly humanist approach, played a major role in his writing, as was the case in *Mi idolatrado hijo Sisi* (*My idolized son Sisi*, 1953). Ignacio Aldecoa's short stories and the exploration of the inner world of Fernández Santos in *Los bravos* (*The Bold*, 1954) illustrate aspects of Spanish narrative which connected with the literary fashion of the moment.

Historicity, realism, political commitment, testimony and social critique were also characteristics of the poetry of the 1950s and first half of the 1960s. It is, in any case, worth emphasizing that the new poets' consciousness of generational differences were provided with a means of promotion by the writings and anthologies of José María Castellet, who considered the replacement of Juan Ramón Jiménez by Antonio Machado as these writers' main source of inspiration a phenomenon of prime importance. Gabriel Celaya, Blas de Otero, and José Hierro, who began work before the 1950s, perhaps afford the best example of this kind of poetic approach. From Celaya came a characteristic condemnation of arguments in defense of the notion of art for art's sake ("I curse poetry that is conceived as a luxury. I curse the poetry of those who will not take sides and get their hands dirty") and a defense of lyricism viewed as a tool: a "weapon loaded with the future." *Pido la paz y la palabra* (*I demand peace and the word*, 1955) may well be the most moving work by Blas de Otero: an act of solidarity with mankind, peaceful coexistence, and the fatherland. Years later the poet said that his work expressed his identification with Marx: "I copy him a bit and make it sound better." In Hierro's *Quinta del 42* (*The year-group of 1942*) a similar attitude exists ("I confess that I loath ivory towers," the poet would say), yet if his work contains what he terms "reports" linked to this notion of social poetry, there are also "hallucinations" which lay bare the poet's personal life experiences. The younger poets rebelled against the lack of realism of the 1940s. "More than setting themselves against them they simply turned their backs on their elders": a kind of attitude that can be seen as representative of the time. Skepticism or even pessimism permeates the work of José Ángel Valente, and of Jaime Gil de Biedma which presents as an ideal "to live like a ruined noble amid the ruins of my intelligence." The two major themes of the poetry produced in Barcelona in those years relate either to remembering the Civil War: ("I was awoken out of the purest childhood by gunfire / by men in Spain who were giving themselves up to death": Goytisolo)[4] or to the destruction left behind in the wake of the war ("You go out into the street / and you kiss a girl or buy a book / or walk around

happily and they strike you down": Gil de Biedma).[5] Their personal identification with a line of political dissidence is also quite explicit in some of these writers such as Claudio Rodríguez, who took part in the subversive activities in Madrid University in February 1956.

In the best theater – not escapist theater – political commitment also gave rise to substantial debate in this period. It set Alfonso Sastre against Antonio Buero Vallejo, the former advocating "impossibilism" and the latter "possibilism" in terms of politically committed theater. Sastre, who had originally been associated with the Falangist media, had argued for a "theater of agitation" which was to have an "inflammatory" impact on Spanish life. Given the circumstances, his dramatic works such as *En la red* (*In the net*, 1959) suffer from a distinct lack of depth, but above all they were so badly maltreated by the censors that they could not even be performed. Buero Vallejo's theater, based on moral reflexion but not pamphleteering, dealt with human nature and its misfortunes based in history but with clear allusions to immediate present reality. It was, without doubt, *Historia de una escalera* (*Story of a staircase*, 1949) that was the start of a whole realist school whose interiors had nothing whatever in common with the bourgeois interiors of conventional theater. There was, however, a second and much younger generation of realists represented by Carlos Muñiz, Lauro Olmo – notably *La camisa* (*The shirt*, 1962), José Martín Recuerda, and Ricardo Rodríguez Buded who presented, with numerous references to the present, the spectacle of the poverty and spiritual prostration of a Spain on which they would never cease to show their profound disagreement.

The theater in its conventional or its comic guise had no limits imposed on what it could present as realist theater did. Pemán moved on from historical drama to a traditionally *costumbrista*-style comedy of manners. However, the greatest theatrical success of this entire period was Joaquín Calvo Sotelo's *La muralla* (*The wall*, 1954), which dealt with a moral conflict that could easily connect with the Catholic mentality of the moment. It was characteristic of the circumstances in which the theater was functioning at the time that a considerable part of the renewal of the drama scene had to be achieved through humor. Fantasy, the improbable, and sentiment provide the dramatic foundation for the work of Enrique Jardiel Poncela and Miguel Mihura. The tardy appearance of Mihura's *Tres sombreros de copa* (*Three top hats*) in 1952, some 20 years after its first draft, shows how difficult it was to bring about change in Spanish dramatic life. Mihura had to adapt to circumstances but he then put on

a great many new plays in the 1950s. Jardiel Poncela, who described humor as a "disinfectant," never came to be viewed as bringing any profound renewal to the theater which sees him rather as following the formulae of the theater of the absurd. A formula that did little towards renewal but was better adapted to the tastes of the Spanish theater-going public of the period as well as being endowed with undeniable wit and wisdom was that of Alfonso Paso, an extremely prolific writer who, for some 20 years, was the main playwright to be staged in Spanish theaters. As for the extremely personal "panic theater" of Fernando Arrabal, which had much in common with surrealist theater, it was in reality a dramatic phenomenon from beyond our own frontiers and was hardly performed at all in Spain before 1975.

As we come to the end of these paragraphs dedicated to literary creativity it would be wise to offer a brief summary of the consequences of these writers' political commitment. It has been said that "with Franco acids that would destroy the flotation line of their future did not run out but were shared around" (Jordi Gràcia). This quotation may well be right, but in the short term what actually happened was that their initial urgent sense of commitment was replaced by more demanding standards in formal aspects of literary production. In that respect it is significant that the Biblioteca Breve Prize was set up in 1958, whose significance in terms of literary history is that it set out to achieve just that. It is possible to glimpse similar moves being made in other areas: for example, in the 1960s Taurus published editions that made the major works of western thought available throughout Spain. The legacy of those years, far more than any supposed political transformation, lies in the setting up of structures to allow the diffusion of culture that proved to be enduring.

It is perhaps in regard to painting that we can best appreciate the cultural changes that ran parallel to changes in literature during the middle years of Francoism. In both cases there was a certain recovery of historical memory and, at the same time, an eagerness to open Spain up to the world outside. It is also possible to detect in these two areas elements critical of the reality surrounding the artists in Spain. It is also important to bear in mind that this period, in the cinema as well as the plastic arts, had seen commercial networks set up for the first time, individual reputations made, and indeed a reaching out to the outside world that would prove vital for Spain in the future.

In painting, surrealism was beyond any doubt the spark that set the aesthetic creativity of Spain's artistic avant-garde alight but it was just that:

a spark. Apart from those for whom this avant-garde movement was a continuation of their previous development (José Caballero), it was also the case that some members of *El Paso* followed surrealist principles at first (Antonio Saura). In either case, in the surrealism that preceded abstract art it was possible to detect the influence of Central European surrealism (especially of Paul Klee) but also of Miró who had returned to Spain in 1942. Klee represented a crossroads where the abstract and the figurative, the concrete and the transcendent all met, together with a magical aura which explains his success. However, as a group, only the so-called *Dau al Set*, which included Antoni Tàpies, Joan Josep Tharrats, Modest Cuixart, Joan Ponç . . . , can rightly be termed surrealist. In the rest of the Peninsula we have to go back to the end of the 1940s to find any signs of an artistic avant-garde at work, and what did exist never really developed. The so-called Altamira School (1948) was a friendly gathering of very diverse personalities among whom there were writers and critics too.

Moving on to the 1950s, there were for the first time indications that avant-garde art was being accepted and even promoted with official backing. This was evident in a series of biennials of Spanish American Art in the third of which, held in Barcelona (1955), Tàpies presented his first densely textured mixed medium pictures, and before that at the art course put on at the Santander Summer University in 1953. By this time it had become almost normal to find in Spain exhibitions of recent work by American, Italian, or French artists. It was only after the second half of the 1950s that informalism came to dominate the art scene. The years 1956 and 1957 saw the blossoming of initiatives such as the "First Exhibition of Non-Figurative Art" or the exhibiting of an "art other." All in all, the most decisive step was the coming together of groups such as *Parpalló* (1956), *Equipo 57*, and *El Paso* (1957). *El Paso* was one of the most important and although it did not survive long and its doctrinal baggage was no more than an expression of a desire to stir up stagnant waters, it did bring together some of the best abstract painters of the moment (others such as Lucio Muñoz stayed on the sidelines) who shared many of the same concerns. *El Paso* brought together Manuel Millares, Antonio Saura, Manuel Rivera, Luis Feito, Juana Francés, Rafael Canogar, and others, who shared an aesthetic which, if on the one hand linked them to the American avant-garde, on the other was full of specifically Spanish references. The basic nature of the materials they used, their critical approach to Spanishness, and their recourse to a certain type of dramatic abstract style are what have been considered essential characteristics of *El Paso* whose members

over time either continued in their initial tragic vein (Saura) or evolved towards more lyrical forms of expression (Rivera). In the case of *El Paso* enthusiasm for informalism was evidence of a desire to break with the general panorama of Spanish art at the time but it was also sufficiently cosmopolitan to be successful beyond our frontiers. Official policy backed these signs of modernity. In the final years of the 1950s and the early 1960s Spain's new abstract art enjoyed important successes in Venice, Paris, and the United States. This was also true of the first figures to emerge in Spanish avant-garde sculpture. It was Ángel Ferrant's mobiles that re-awoke the interest in the avant-garde that had existed before the Civil War but Basque sculpture (Eduardo Chillida, Jorge de Oteiza) – monumental and rounded in style – was the product of a very different sensibility.

At the end of the 1950s and start of the 1960s there had also appeared in both sculpture and painting an abstract geometrical style (Eusebio Sempere, José María Labra, Andreu Alfaro, Pablo Palazuelos) which showed that the paths that led towards pictoric modernity in Spain were not limited to the abstract expressionism that gathered around the *El Paso* group. Some of these creative artists (above all Sempere but also Francisco Farreras) can be seen to have shared a form of lyrical abstract art whose origins may lie in France rather than America. There were other painters too who have become associated with Cuenca, although that particular town in La Mancha was a meeting-place for the most diverse options in the most advanced plastic arts (Gerardo Rueda, Gustavo Torner, Fernando Zóbel) whose dominant characteristic is a style devoid of extravagance, anguish, or the violence of *tremendismo*, combined with a subtle poetic language. If for abstract expressionism a picture had to be like a violation, for this lyrical abstract art the work became a careful decanting that owed nothing to improvisation. For its part, from the starting-point of geometric abstraction *Equipo 57* found its artistic voice in an attitude of criticism and rupture which preferred collective to individual work and then took the path towards design. Of course not all art was abstract in Spanish painting over these years. In the middle of the 1950s there also appeared in the general panorama of Spanish art representatives of a realism imbued with a particular forcefulness (Antonio López and the brothers Julio and Francisco López Hernández) which came to be one of those examples of originality that can be detected from time to time in the history of painting.

Although it is difficult to set architecture alongside other cultural movements, one can appreciate an identical sense of a cosmopolitan modernizing urge in some of the examples of architectural design from the 1950s

onwards. Miguel Fisac, who achieved in the CSIC buildings in Madrid what may be considered the very finest example of classicism, is also the man who introduced new materials such as bare concrete, or kinds of lighting such as lateral lighting through stained-glass windows (the church in Alcobendas, 1955). Another important feature was the work of José Luis Fernández del Amo, collaborating with the *Instituto de Colonización* (Institute for Repopulation) to promote the building of mass housing in accordance with the canons of Spanish architectural style. From the 1950s onwards, organicist architecture exemplified by the work of José Antonio Coderch began to appear, while Spanish architects such as José Antonio Corrales and Ramón Vázquez Molezún enjoyed a significant degree of international success.

## Daily Life and Leisure Activities

We already know about the spread of the cinema in post-Civil War Spain since it is without doubt the art form that aroused the greatest interest among ordinary people. In 1951 the Ministry of Information and Tourism was created and it featured for the first time ever a department responsible for cinema. State protectionism continued to play a crucial role in Spanish cinema. A process for funding it was negotiated according to which the essential criteria were those to do with costing and with quality as judged by a commission set up for that purpose. Between 1951 and 1962 the number of films produced in Spain rose from 40 to about 80. Suevia Films took over from Cifesa as the most successful company in Spanish film-making. At the start of the 1960s the American producer Samuel Bronston settled in Spain and it was here that some of the greatest films of the period were made.

Cinema production had its ups and downs as a result of the appearance of a new generation of producers with a distinctly critical approach. We should nonetheless bear in mind that the quality of the work of this more critical section of the film world was no guarantee of success. The films that had the longest runs in the period were Juan de Orduña's *El último cuplé* (*The last song*, 1957) and Luis César Amadori's *La violetera* (*The violet-seller*, 1958). Luis García Berlanga's *Bienvenido míster Marshall* (*Welcome, Mr Marshall*, 1952) only appeared in eighteenth place. Comedy was undoubtedly successful in a more gentle form such as José Luis Sáenz de Heredia's *Historias de la radio* (*Stories from the radio*, 1955), or the most

critical of Fernando Fernán Gómez's films. However, public preference showed the extent to which the folkloric musical remained the genre most resistant to change and also the most influential. At this time too, the rural melodrama and historical film disappeared from the scene: indeed, the granting of the label "of national interest" to *Surcos* (*Furrows*, 1951) by the radical Falangist José Antonio Nieves Conde, and not to Juan de Orduña's *Alba de América* (*American Dawn*, 1951) whose script was said to have been written by Franco, was in effect the swan song of this genre. Other kinds of cinema characteristic of this period were "films with children" which usually included singing and were often edifying and religious. Suffice it to say that of the ten Spanish films with the highest viewing figures, three were religious.

In contrast to what might be called National Catholic cinema such as *Marcelino pan y vino* (*Marcelino bread and wine*, 1954), neo-realism, of which good examples to cite might be *Plácido* (1961) and *El verdugo* (*The Executioner*, 1963) by Luis Berlanga or *Muerte de un ciclista* (*Death of a cyclist*, 1955) and *Calle Mayor* (*Main Street*, 1956) by Juan Antonio Bardem, presented a critical realist view of Spanish life. From the middle of the 1950s on, there was a phase of self-criticism aimed at Spanish film-making by the directors themselves. Bardem, in a phrase that would become famous, described it as "politically ineffectual, of minimal intellectual worth, aesthetically void, and extremely shaky as an industry." These were also the times in which cinema clubs flourished, many of them made possible by the SEU and discussions on the problems facing Spanish cinema that took place in Salamanca. Thanks to the presence of José María García Escudero in the post of greatest responsibility in the Ministry of Information and Tourism during the Fraga years, there was in the early 1960s a certain flowering of what came to be called new Spanish cinema which was much more closely tied to the reality of daily life. It was accompanied by the production of one of Luis Buñuel's most remarkable films, *Viridiana* (1961), which posed serious problems for the censors.

In the 1950s, sport, and most especially football, was confirmed as being one of the major pastimes for Spaniards. Physical education was introduced into the school curriculum as early as the 1940s. The popularity of football is demonstrated by the fact that the daily newspaper *Marca*, which is principally but not exclusively dedicated to the sport, was selling 350,000 copies and became the best-selling of all Spain's newspapers. Sports organization after the Civil War was the responsibility of the General Secretariat of the *Movimiento* (*Secretaría General el Movimiento*)

and it was only after the 1960s that the National Sports Delegation (*Delegación Nacional de Deportes*) could act to a certain degree independently of political power. The first national delegate for Sports was General José Moscardó who had been decorated for his defense of the Alcázar of Toledo, while the second, José Antonio Elola, was a well-known Falangist politician.

The social implications of football are of particular interest to us. Of the 73 leagues or cups that there were, 60 were won by the biggest clubs, each of which had a very clearly defined profile. The Madrid team, under its president Santiago Bernabeu, a civil servant working at the Treasury who enjoyed a healthy economic lifestyle, had a number of cabinet ministers as members of the club during the middle years of the Franco period. Barcelona always enjoyed the best economic situation because it had so many members but its sporting results were often poor: between 1961 and 1984 it won only one league. It usually had a certain Catalan dissident tone. In 1968 it had its first non-Francoist president, Narcís de Carreras, who had in the past served as secretary to Francesc Cambó. In 1973 Agustí Montal's bid to become chairman of the club was successful and he was elected after stating during the campaign that "we are who we say we are: Barcelona is more than a club." *Atlético de Bilbao*, which had dominated Spanish football in the first decade of the century, did so again in the 1940s despite the fact that, of the Basque players who had remained permanently on tour outside Spain throughout the Civil War, all but one decided to stay in exile. Its links with the Air Force team *Atlético de Aviación* allowed *Atlético de Madrid*, which joined up with it, to take on all the players who had been in that particular branch of the Armed Services.

Political intervention by the state affected even the football clubs themselves: all teams had to include at least two Falangists, a ruling that did not disappear until 1967. Nationalism not only meant that naming clubs in English had to cease but that foreigners themselves had to disappear during the 1960s. The language of sports journalism had to be Castilianized by order of the censors and it sometimes acquired a certain epic tone. Football club chairmen had initially been appointed by the national delegates themselves. Then, in the 1940s a new system was introduced which meant that only a few select people attended club meetings, though by the 1950s there were once again democratic elections.

A large number of Hungarian players appeared in Spanish football during the 1950s. The first was Ladislao Kubala whose career started with the decade and who gave Barcelona an unaccustomed series of wins.

Spanish football became international, although it was far from easy to do so after the Civil War. Ferenc Puskas did the same for Madrid, but the foreign player *par excellence* in that team was Alfredo di Stefano whose arrival in Spain was controversial because of the rivalry between Madrid and Barcelona, which it did much to sharpen.

In World Championships the results gained by Spanish teams were not brilliant. Spain only just managed to qualify for the final rounds in 1961 and 1966. In 1960 it refused to compete against Russia and in 1964 it did and it won the European Championship in the presence of Franco, the event being celebrated as though it were a military triumph. However, the most important role in relation to the public projection of Spanish football outside its own frontiers was without doubt played by Real Madrid. When in 1955 it won the Latin Cup in Paris the players were awarded the Imperial Order of the Yoke and Arrows (the emblem of the Catholic Monarchs and Falange). Its greatest successes were winning the European Cup for 5 years, as a consequence of which the Foreign Minister made Di Stefano and one of the club's directors, Raimundo Saporta, Commanders of the Order of Isabel the Catholic. On another occasion it was stated entirely seriously that the influence of football in Spanish society would be a cause of alienation but that opinion could not be justified: at most one might say that the impact of football was more a result than a cause of political passivity in Spain.

"The radio came into its full glory in the 1950s," wrote Manuel Vázquez Montalbán. It is proof of the popularity and attractiveness of radio that there were even rented sets with a slot for coins for those with little money. A decisive factor was a new form of programming with spaces for comedy, serials, and "magazines" with very varied content ranging from competitions to music broadcasts. *Lo que nunca muere* (*What will never die*), a series by Guillermo Sautier Casaseca, the most successful scriptwriter of this genre, was about a family split by the Civil War which finally sees toleration and understanding triumph among its members. In short, serials on the radio became rather like the reediting of the serials that had appeared in newspapers in an earlier period.

In the area of popular culture too we should mention music which underwent a transformation after the start of the 1960s. Before that time the typically Spanish form of operetta known as *zarzuela* – by now "a distortion, stinking of formalin, of an old style of authentic rural sentimentality" – had virtually disappeared. In an earlier period a recovery of the short musical pieces known as *tonadillas* and other forms associated

with the one-act comedies known as *género chico* and of a more international melodic trend had all converged, with uncertain results. From the middle of the 1950s both Italian and American records began to be found in Spain.

Pop culture reached the Peninsula much later and in a rather peculiar way. It triumphed due largely to requests by listeners to the radio, but at first there was strong nationalist resistance. "What is so lamentable," wrote one enemy of the new music, "is that Spanish writers are themselves contributing to the increasing popularity of a style whose spread we should be preventing rather than imitating." Even so, in only a short space of time pop culture had given birth to an entire industry. In *ABC* in February 1964 there was a statement to the effect that "today any song, if it becomes popular, can make the writer a millionaire."

Pop reached Spain stripped of "much of its explosive charge." Caution about the subversive side of the new music can also be seen as regards the cinema: *Rebel without a cause*, the film by Nicholas Ray starring James Dean which came to symbolize a generation that had broken with its parents, was first shown in Spain 8 years after it was first premiered. The true pioneers of pop were Manuel de la Calva and Ramón Arcusa – The Dynamic Duo (*El Dúo Dinámico*) – from 1957 on. They were the "friendly, responsible, familiar face of rock and roll," which was destined to become the background music at the parties of the younger generations of the middle classes (these were the years of the definitive triumph of Elvis Presley). The two Spanish singers worked for an aircraft company and had to turn professional quickly; they managed on the one hand to adapt songs by other writers and also to write their own. *Quince años tiene mi amor* (*My love is 15 years old*, 1960) was their first original success. After the second half of the 1960s they were overtaken by other groups but much later, at the end of the 1980s, they made a comeback due to nostalgia shared with others of their generation.

However, at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s the general public still preferred the music of the *copla*, the *bolero*, and the *ranchera*. The transition from the *copla* to pop music of Anglo-Saxon origins was made by Latin American groups who played the more moderate forms of rock and sang in Spanish. This was so with *Los Cinco Latinos* from Argentina, and *Los Llopis*, who were a Cuban band with a contract in Spain to sing tropical-style songs, but who also translated and performed rock. More immediately the Mexicans Enrique Guzmán and Teen Tops introduced versions of rock songs in Spanish into the Peninsula.

Apart from the radio, a decisive role in the diffusion of the new style of music was played by festivals organized for young people and schools. The lead in these was taken by "tall, good-looking students with a good presence," people "with a minimum of money, contacts and technical knowledge." It was above all a phenomenon among university students. From November 1962 on, the morning shows at the *Circo Price* in Madrid offered a mass experience featuring music for the young, but this was finally stopped on governmental authority without ever having given rise to any serious conflict. As in Italy, music festivals played a significant part in promoting popular music. The festival in Benidorm known as the Spanish Song Festival (*Festival Español de la Canción*) was the main event aimed at promoting the city's beaches. It is interesting to note that it was started in collaboration with The Broadcasting Network of the *Movimiento* (*Red de Emisoras del Movimiento*) in 1959 and it launched Raphael in 1962. But there were many more festivals, each with its own particular character. Some served to promote the singers who later came together as exponents of the Catalan "nova cançó."

Halfway through the 1960s there were two important new features on the Spanish pop scene: the attempt to develop an original style and an impact at last being made outside Spain. *Los Brincos* aimed explicitly to become "a typically Spanish beat group": *Flamenco* was its first attempt at a kind of music that had its roots in popular songs of another era. *Los Brincos* were immensely successful and earned five times more per performance than any other group, even selling more records than the Beatles at times. In the second half of the 1960s other groups appeared who often did not themselves record but had musicians do so in the studio. This was what happened with *Los Bravos*. Their *Black is Black*, sung in English, was second in the hit parade in Britain in 1966 and sold two and a half million copies worldwide. In the world of popular music, which is a very important part of daily life for Spaniards, a very important change had occurred. It was, however, merely a consequence of what had happened in the rest of Spanish society.

## Bibliography

There is no specific bibliography on this period but there are many memoirs: S. ÁLVAREZ, *La larga marcha de una lucha sin cuartel*, Ed. Nos, A Coruña, 1994; Alfonso ARMADA, *Al servicio de la Corona*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1982;

"CÁNDIDO," *Memorias prohibidas*, Ediciones B, Barcelona, 1995; Fabià ESTAPÉ, *De tots colors. Memòries*, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 2000; José María GARCÍA ESCUDERO, *La primera apertura. Diario de un director general*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1978, and *Mis siete vidas. De las brigadas anarquistas a juez del 23-F*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1995; Antonio GARRIGUES Y DÍAZ CAÑABATE, *Diálogos conmigo mismo*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1978; Laureano LÓPEZ RODÓ, *La larga marcha hacia la Monarquía*, Noguer, Barcelona, 1977, and *Memorias*, Plaza y Janés-Cambio 16, Barcelona, 1990–2; Raúl MORODO, *Atando cabos. Memorias de un conspirador moderado*, Taurus, Madrid, 2001; Mariano NAVARRO RUBIO, *Mis memorias*, Plaza y Janés-Cambio 16, Barcelona, 1991; Dionisio RIDRUEJO, *Escrito en España*, Losada, Buenos Aires, 1962; Emilio ROMERO, *Tragicomedia de España. Unas memorias sin contemplaciones*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1985; Federico SILVA MUÑOZ, *Memorias políticas*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1993.

Partial aspects of politics: Juan José del ÁGUILA, *EL TOP. La represión de la libertad*, Planeta, Barcelona, 2001; José Ignacio CRUZ, *El yunque azul. Frente de Juventudes y sistema de educación. Razones de un fracaso*, Alianza, Madrid, 2001; Luis Fernando CRESPO, *Las reformas de la administración española (1957–1967)*, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2000; Francisco SEVILLANO, *Ecos de papel. La opinión de los españoles en la época de Franco*, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 2000.

The Opposition: Donato BARBA, *La democracia cristiana durante el franquismo*, Encuentro, Madrid, 2001; Sergio VILAR, *Protagonistas de la España democrática. La oposición a la dictadura. 1939–1959*, Éditions Sociales, Paris, 1969. Social protest: José BABIANO, *Emigrantes, cronómetro y huelgas. Un estudio sobre el trabajo y los trabajadores durante el franquismo*, Siglo XXI-Fundación 1º de Mayo, Madrid, 1995; Carmen MOLINERO y Pere YSÀS, *Patria, pan y justicia. Nivell de vida i condicions de treball a Catalunya. 1939–1951*, La Magrana, Barcelona, 1985, and *Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas. Clase obrera y conflictividad en la España franquista*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1998. On Ridruejo one can consult his *Dionisio Ridruejo: de la Falange a la oposición*, Taurus, Madrid, 1976. On the Socialist Party: Abdón MATEOS, *El PSOE contra Franco. Continuidad y renovación del socialismo español, 1953–1974*, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1993; Raúl MORODO, *Tierno Galván y otros precursores políticos*, El País, Madrid, 1987; Enrique TIERNO GALVÁN, *Cabos sueltos*, Bruguera, Barcelona, 1981; César ALONSO DE LOS RÍOS, *La verdad sobre Tierno Galván*, Anaya and Mario Muchnik, Madrid, 1997. About the PCE: Fernando CLAUDÍN, *Documentos de una divergencia comunista*, Iniciativas Editoriales, Barcelona, 1978; David RUIZ, *Historia de las Comisiones Obreras (1958–1988)*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1993. On the student revolt of 1956: *Jaraneros y alborotadores. Documentos sobre los sucesos estudiantiles . . .* , Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1982. On the "Munich conspiracy": Joaquín SATRÚSTEGUI *et al.*, *Cuando la transición se hizo posible. El "contubernio" de Múnich*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1993. On the Anarchists: Ángel

HERRERÍN, *La CNT durante el franquismo*, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2004. On Catalonia: Josep M. COLOMER, *Els estudiants de Barcelona sota el franquisme*, Curial, Barcelona, 1978, and *Espanyolisme i catalanisme. La idea de nació en el pensament polític català (1939–1979)*, L'Avenç, Barcelona, 1984; Hank JOHNSTON, *Tales of nationalism*, Rutgers University Press, Piscataway, NJ, 1991; *El President Tarradellas en els seus textos, 1954–1988*, Empúries, Barcelona, 1992. Others: José Antonio GARCÍA ALCALÁ, *Historia del FLP. De Julio Cerón a la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria*, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2001.

On foreign policy, for Spain's relations with the United States, apart from the texts already mentioned, see: María Jesús CAVA MESA, *Los diplomáticos de Franco. J. F. de Lequerica. Temple y tenacidad (1890–1966)*, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, 1989; Ángel VIÑAS, *En las garras del águila. Los pactos con los Estados Unidos de Francisco Franco y Felipe González (1945–1995)*, Crítica, Barcelona, 2003, and Arthur P. WHITAKER, *Spain and the defense of the West. Ally and liability*, Harper, New York, 1961. On Moroccan independence: Víctor MORALES LEZCANO, *El final del protectorado hispano-francés en Marruecos. El desafío magrebí (1945–1962)*, Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos, Madrid, 1998, and María Concepción YBARRA, *España y la descolonización del Magreb. Rivalidad hispano-francesa en Marruecos (1951–1956)*, UNED, Madrid, 1998. On relations with Portugal: Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO, *El ocaso de la amistad entre las dictaduras ibéricas, 1955–1968*, UNED, Mérida, 1996. On European politics and other international organizations: María Teresa LAPORTE, *La política europea del régimen de Franco, 1957–1962*, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1992. On relations with Cuba: Manuel de PAZ SÁNCHEZ. *La diplomacia española ante la revolución cubana (1957–1960)*, Centro de la Cultura Popular Canaria, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 1997.

On economic policy before and after the Stabilization Plan: Charles W. ANDERSON, *The political economy of Modern Spain. Policy making in an authoritarian system*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1970; Manuel Jesús GONZÁLEZ, *La economía política del franquismo (1940–1970). Dirigismo, mercado y planificación*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1979.

On culture in the second third of the Franco period, memoirs: Carlos BARRAL, *Años de penitencia*, Alianza, Madrid, 1975, and *Los años sin excusa*, Seix Barral, Barcelona, 1978; J. M. CASTELLET, *Los escenarios de la memoria*, Anagrama, Barcelona, 1988; Jaime GIL DE BIEDMA, *Diario del artista seriamente enfermo*, Lumen, Barcelona, 1974; Juan GOYTISOLO, *En los reinos de Taifas*, Seix Barral, Barcelona, 1986; Manuel MILLARES, *Memorias de la infancia y juventud*, IVAM, Valencia, 1998; Antonio MARTÍNEZ SARRIÓN, *Infancia y corrupciones*, Alfaguara, Madrid, 1993, and *Una juventud*, Alfaguara, Madrid, 1997; Antoni TÀPIES, *Memoria personal. Fragmento para una autobiografía*, Crítica, Barcelona, 1979.

General: Jordi GRÀCIA, *Estado y cultura. El despertar de una conciencia crítica bajo el franquismo (1940–1962)*, Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse, 1996; Shirley MANGINI, *Rojos y rebeldes. La cultura de la disidencia durante el*

*franquismo*, Anthropos, Barcelona, 1987; Juan F. MARSAM, *Pensar bajo el franquismo. Intelectuales y política en la generación de los años cincuenta*, Península, Barcelona, 1979.

Literary aspects: Laureano BONET, *La revista "Laye." Estudio y antología*, Península, Barcelona, 1988, and *El jardín quebrado. La escuela de Barcelona y la cultura del medio siglo*, Península, Barcelona, 1994; José Luis CANO, *Poesía española contemporánea. Las generaciones de la posguerra*, Guadarrama, Madrid, 1974; Víctor DE LA CONCHA, *La poesía española de la posguerra. Teoría e historia de sus movimientos*, Prensa Española, Madrid, 1973; *España, vanguardia artística y realidad social: 1936–1976*, Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1979; Román GUBERN, *La censura: función política y ordenamiento jurídico bajo el franquismo (1936–1975)*, Península, Barcelona, 1981; Alfonso LÓPEZ QUINTAS, *Filosofía española contemporánea*, BAC, Madrid, 1970; Fernando MÉNDEZ LEITE, *Historia del cine español*, Rialp, Madrid, 1965; Thomas MERMALL, *La retórica del humanismo. La cultura española después de Ortega*, Taurus, Madrid, 1978; Santos SANZ VILLANUEVA, *Historia de la literatura española. Literatura actual*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1984.

Intellectuals: Josep M. MUÑOZ I LLORET, *Jaume Vicens i Vives. Una biografía intel.lectual*, Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1997; Enric PUJOL, *Ferran Soldevila. Els fonaments de la historiografia catalana*, Affers, Barcelona-Catarroja, 1995; Javier TUSELL y Gonzalo ÁLVAREZ CHILLIDA, *Pemán. Un trayecto intelectual desde la extrema derecha a la democracia*, Planeta, Barcelona, 1998; Javier VARELA, *La novela de España. Los intelectuales y el problema español*, Taurus, Madrid, 1999.

Aspects of the plastic arts: "Artistas españoles de París en Praga, 1946," exhibition held in 1993–1994 in the Sala de Exposiciones Casa Monte de Madrid; Lourdes CIRLOT, *El grupo* Dau al Set, Cátedra, Madrid, 1986; "Exposición Antológica de la Escuela de Madrid," exhibition held at Caja Madrid, Madrid, May–July 1990; "Equipo 57," exhibition at the Centro de Arte Reina Sofía, Madrid, 1993; "El grupo de Cuenca," exhibition held in the Casa de Alhajas de Caja Madrid, 1997; Víctor NIETO, *Lucio Muñoz*, Lerner y Lerner, Madrid, 1990; *Pintura española de vanguardia (1950–1990)*, Fundación Argentaria-Visor, Madrid, 1998; "Grupo Pórtico, 1947–1952," exhibition organized by the Gobierno de Aragón and the Ministerio de Cultura in 1993–1994; "Del surrealismo al informalismo. Arte de los años cincuenta en Madrid," exhibition organized by the Comunidad de Madrid in 1991; "Tomás Seral y Casas. Un galerista de la posguerra" exhibition organized at the Centro Cultural Conde Duque, Madrid, 1993; Laurent TOUSSAINT, El Paso *y el arte abstracto en España*, Cátedra, Madrid, 1983; Gabriel UREÑA, *Las vanguardias artísticas en la posguerra española, 1940–1960*, Istmo, Madrid, 1982.

History of the Church: Jesús IRIBARREN, *Papeles y memorias. Medio siglo de relaciones Estado-Iglesia en España, 1936–1986*, BAC, Madrid, 1992; Antonio MURCIA, *Obreros y obispos en el franquismo*, Ediciones HOAC, Madrid, 1995.

Leisure activities: Jesús GARCÍA JIMÉNEZ, *Radiotelevisión y política cultural en el franquismo*, CSIC, Madrid, 1980; C. F. HEREDERO, *Las huellas del tiempo. Cine español 1951–1961*, Generalitat Valenciana–Ministerio de Cultura, 1993; Jesús ORDOVÁS, *Historia de la música "pop" española*, Alianza, Madrid, 1987; Duncan SHAW, *Fútbol y franquismo*, Alianza, Madrid, 1987 (*The political instrumentalization of professional football in Francoist Spain*. PhD Thesis, 1988. British Library); Manuel VÁZQUEZ MONTALBÁN, *Crónica sentimental de España*, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1986.

## Notes

1 In the Defeat at Annual in 1921 some 15,000 Spanish troops and civilians lost their lives.
2 A Jesuit, after the war Llanos embarked on a work of apostolate among Falangist youth, became chaplain to the Youth Front (*Frente de Juventudes*) in 1946, and subsequently assistant director of the Catholic student *Congregación Universitaria de Madrid*, maintaining a high public profile.
3 On August 16, 1942, at the shrine of Our Lady of Begoña in Bilbao, anti-Francoist Falangists mounted a protest. A bomb exploded and a Falangist, Juan Domínguez, was sentenced to death as a result.
4 "Fui despertado a tiros de la infancia más pura / por hombres que en España se daban a la muerte."
5 "Uno sale a la calle / y besa a una muchacha o compra un libro/ se pasea feliz y le fulminan."