Inequality, Democracy, and the Inclusionary Turn in Latin America

Diana Kapiszewski, Steven Levitsky, and Deborah J. Yashar

INTRODUCTION

Latin America experienced an inclusionary turn beginning in the 1990s and accelerating as the twenty-first century dawned. Governments across the region created institutions and policies aimed at including previously excluded groups and expanding the boundaries of citizenship. Movement toward greater inclusion occurred in three major areas. First, states took unprecedented steps to recognize indigenous peoples, Afro-Latin communities, and multicultural and plurinational societies.[1] Second, governments established new channels of access to policymaking and created or broadened participatory governance institutions,[2] triggering what has been described as an "explosion of participation" in the region (Cameron and Sharpe 2012, 231). Finally, governments throughout Latin America invested heavily in redistributive social policies: welfare states expanded, providing unprecedented coverage to historically excluded sectors such as women, the unemployed, and the rural and informal poor.[3] Partly as a result of these policies, poverty rates declined markedly, and in much of the region, levels of socioeconomic inequality fell for the first time in

[1] Stavenhagen (1992); Brysk (2000); Sieder (2002); Van Cott (2005); Yashar (2005); Lucero (2008).
[2] Van Cott (2008); Avritzer (2009); Selee and Peruzzotti (2009); Wampler (2009); Goldfrank (2011); Mayka (2019).
[3] Lomelí (2008); Pribble (2013); De la O (2015); Diaz Cayeros et al. (2016); Garay (2016).

decades.[4] Underlying, and to some degree constitutive of, these changes was stronger enforcement of the rights that had been enshrined in many new Latin American constitutions.[5] Indeed, as Holland and Schneider (2017, 988) write, "[i]t is not much of an exaggeration to say that the 2000s was one of the best decades in history for the poor in Latin America."

The emergence of a more inclusive politics across Latin America marks a significant – and in many ways, unexpected – break with the past. Latin America has long been characterized by extreme inequality and social exclusion; even today, it is the most unequal region on earth. Historically, efforts to combat social and economic inequality – by left-leaning governments, social movements, or armed guerrillas – have almost invariably triggered harsh conservative reactions, usually culminating in military coups. Even after democracy returned in the 1980s, economic crisis and far-reaching neoliberal reforms appeared to demobilize and depoliticize citizens.[6] Corporatist structures broke down, labor movements weakened, and leftist and labor-based parties collapsed or shifted to the Right. Emerging civil society organizations lacked the national reach of political parties, and unions did not provide comparable access to the national state.[7] Neoliberal reforms reinforced these processes, atomizing and demobilizing class-based popular sectors.[8] The dismantling of already weakened state institutions appeared to condemn many Latin Americans to "low-intensity citizenship."[9] In this context, Roberts (2002) even wrote of a "re-oligarchization" of politics.

Yet recent decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of citizenship. Even in the context of the neoliberal 1990s, Latin American governments began to experiment with new forms of inclusion – extending recognition to previously marginalized peoples (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005), creating new channels for local political access (Goldfrank, this volume), and in some cases extending material benefits to more citizens (Garay, this volume). In the 2000s, the region experienced a repoliticization of long-standing socioeconomic issues (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Roberts 2008, 2015; Silva 2009), and popular mobilization also placed new issues and demands on the political agenda. Some

---

[4] López Calva and Lustig (2010); Birdsall et al. (2012).
[5] Bejarano and Segura (2004); Segura and Bejarano (2004); Hartlyn and Luna (2009).
[6] Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998); Roberts (1998); Kurtz (2004).
[7] Chalmers et al. (1997); Roberts (1998); Yashar (2005); Collier and Handlin (2009).
[8] Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998); Roberts (1998); Kurtz (2004).
[9] O'Donnell (1993); Kurtz (2004).

parties and governments responded to these demands, creating new rights, institutions, and policies aimed at traditionally marginalized groups. In short, politics and policies became more *inclusive*, allowing for the more effective practice of citizenship by individuals who previously had been excluded on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference.

These developments have engendered exciting new research agendas. For instance, recent scholarship has examined the extension of new social and cultural rights,[10] the spread of participatory institutions,[11] and the expansion of redistributive social policies in Latin America.[12] For the most part, however, scholars have studied these developments in isolation. This volume adopts a different approach. We treat the combination of state efforts to include previously excluded popular sectors (by enhancing recognition, increasing access to political power, and augmenting resource flows) as a broad regional syndrome – a confluence of processes that may be described as an "inclusionary turn." Examining these changes holistically offers greater insight into the way they interact, and an opportunity to evaluate whether and how they may be jointly transforming democratic Latin America.

In the next three sections of this introductory chapter, we conceptualize inclusion, describe Latin America's most recent inclusionary turn, and place it in historical context. We then offer an explanation of the inclusionary turn and some hypotheses about the sources of cross-national variation *within* the turn. Our explanation of the overall turn highlights the cumulative effects of democratic endurance in a context of deep social inequality. Democratic endurance is a contemporary phenomenon. Historically in Latin America, efforts to mobilize the poor, elect leftist, or populist governments, or redistribute wealth under democracy, frequently triggered conservative reactions and, in many cases, military coups. By the 1990s, however, due to a more favorable post–Cold War regional environment and the absence of legitimate regime alternatives, even relatively weak democracies survived. Democratic survival encouraged, and created unprecedented and extended opportunities for, popular sector movements and their partisan allies to organize and make

---

[10] Van Cott (2005); Yashar (2005); Gauri and Brinks (2008); Brinks and Gauri (2014).
[11] Van Cott (2008); Avritzer (2009); Selee and Peruzzotti (2009); Wampler (2009); Goldfrank (2011); Cameron et al. (2013); Mayka (2019).
[12] Lomeli (2008); Huber and Stephens (2012); Pribble (2013); De la O (2015); Díaz Cayeros et al. (2016); Garay (2016).

demands; simultaneously, sustained electoral competition in a context of jarring social inequality created incentives for parties from across the political spectrum to appeal to low-income and marginalized voters through multifaceted efforts at inclusion. For the first time in Latin American history, these developments did not trigger a significant authoritarian backlash, allowing such inclusionary efforts to unfold and accumulate over time.

The social and political gains made during the inclusionary turn should not be overstated, however. First, ground-level advances in popular sector recognition, access, and resources have been slower and less consequential than legal innovations and parchment-level changes might suggest. Moreover, movement toward inclusion is never unidirectional; it always activates resistance and reaction. Inclusionary advances in some areas may coexist with exclusionary movements in other areas. The chapter's penultimate section examines some of these "paradoxes of inclusion," surveying its limits and limitations, its problems and pathologies. In the chapter's conclusion, we broaden our discussion to consider the uneven implementation of the parchment reforms on which much of the chapter focuses. We also consider the sustainability of the phenomenon after the Left turn, asking how the ascent of more right-wing governments in several Latin American countries, as well as the catastrophic COVID-19 pandemic, might affect inclusionary politics in the region.

CONCEPTUALIZING INCLUSION

We understand "inclusion" to be a multidimensional process through which previously marginalized actors gain more meaningful and effective citizenship. Citizenship entails civic, political, and socioeconomic membership in a polity. All polities establish institutions defining who has membership; what rights and duties are associated with it; and how members are represented in and gain access to the state. That is, all states establish citizenship regimes that institutionalize which members of a polity are considered to be insiders and which members are outsiders.[13] Since the boundaries between these groups are politically constructed, elected officials and bureaucrats can shift them by creating new rules about who is included, which rights are extended, and how people are represented. Inclusion thus involves political actions to move boundaries

---

[13] For a discussion of citizenship regimes, see Jenson and Philips (1996); Yashar (2005); and Vink (2017).

between groups in a way that broadens membership in a polity, turning "outsiders" into "insiders."[14]

We conceptualize inclusion along three dimensions: recognition, access, and resources. By *recognition*, we mean promising a group full status as a legitimate actor in society. This may include, but is not limited to, legalizing previously banned or repressed organizations (such as unions, peasant associations, or leftist political parties); constitutionalizing multicultural and pluricultural states; acknowledging the equal (or sometimes distinct) rights of people previously targeted by discrimination (because of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and/or on other bases); and stating a commitment to protect and uphold these rights.

By access, we mean the creation of new institutional channels to influence political decision-making or policymaking. Reforms that augment access might, for instance, facilitate or guarantee certain groups representation in established positions of state authority (i.e. the national executive or legislature); extend suffrage to new groups; reduce clientelism or otherwise facilitate sincere voting; or legalize parties representing excluded groups. In the third wave of democracy, region-wide institutional reforms have also included decentralization, and the establishment of corporatist, consultative, participatory, deliberative and/or governing institutions, all of which may lead to greater access for previously excluded groups.

By *resources*, we mean the distribution of material, financial, and legal assets to members of previously marginalized groups to enhance their opportunities as citizens. This includes, for example, creating or expanding redistributive social policies (e.g. land reform, minimum wage, family allowances); developing affirmative action policies for historically excluded groups; and introducing policies that facilitate equal access to the law (such as those that mandate legal aid and public defenders).

Implicit in (and constitutive of) all three dimensions of inclusion is the enhancement of citizens' *rights*. In Latin America, a significant (albeit not universal) extension of civil, political, and socioeconomic rights occurred decades ago. As the inclusionary turn accelerated in the 1990s, these rights were extended further, and in many countries, new social and cultural rights were introduced (Gargarella 2014, 13–16). Inclusionary

---

[14] We use these terms to describe broader swaths of the population than does Garay (this volume), who defines "insiders" as formal sector workers who were included through mid century labor incorporation, and "outsiders" as workers who were not included through that process, e.g. the urban informal sector, rural workers, and the unemployed.

"action" has involved state-led initiatives that permit the more effective exercise of both rights that already existed on paper, and of new rights. For example, courts' more expansive interpretation and more energetic enforcement of constitutional rights can induce elected leaders to design new inclusionary policies.[15] Moreover, as the chapters by Garay and Hunter show, the introduction of universalistic social policies can advance both social and political rights by eroding clientelism. More broadly, as Marshall (1950), Sen (1999), and others have so compellingly argued, the resources gained through socioeconomic redistribution facilitate the effective exercise of citizenship rights.

Meaningful inclusion thus requires both *parchment* changes aimed at enhancing inclusion (i.e. the creation of formal institutions, policies, and legislation) and changes in *practice* (i.e. the implementation of those innovations). In many Latin American countries, there remains a significant gap between the two – between what policies, laws, and institutions promise, and what government actually delivers. This volume takes seriously the notion – advanced by Marshall (1950), O'Donnell (1993), Sen (1999), and others – that parchment rights are substantively important, but are only made universally meaningful through practice. We consider the parchment–practice gap in more depth in this chapter's final section and our contributors remain attentive to it throughout.

Inclusion thus involves diverse sociopolitical actors and processes. It occurs under different kinds of regimes, takes multiple forms, and can be used for good and ill. Pressure for inclusion may emanate from below (through social mobilization and activism) or above (through political entrepreneurship and electoral competition). Inclusion does not imply any mode or mechanism, nor is it a particular form of interest intermediation, such as pluralism or corporatism. Rather, different types of interest intermediation or interest regime (e.g. state or societal corporatism, pluralism) may be more or less inclusionary.

Given inclusion's capacious nature, it is important to demarcate the specific aspects of inclusion covered in this chapter. First, we focus primarily on formal or "parchment" measures – the creation of formal institutions, laws, and policies by state officials. This focus presumes that

---

[15] One striking example is the Colombian Constitutional Court's 2008 decision (T 760), in which it found that the Colombian government had failed to satisfy its constitutional obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health, and ordered state leaders to progressively realize universal health coverage by 2010, leading to significant health care reform (Merhof 2015, 724).

institutional design matters. Formal institutions are prerequisites for meaningful inclusion. They do not determine, but certainly encourage and constrain, political behavior. How inclusionary policies, laws, and programs are designed affects their implementation, operation, and impact. For instance, how open to (political and judicial) interpretation and contestation laws and policies are, how difficult they are to implement, how much authority institutions are granted, and how broadly programs are designed, all affect how consequential they are. It is for this reason that politicians fight pitched battles over the specific design of inclusionary initiatives. Formal institutions also provide a baseline. We can only accurately evaluate (and effectively explain) the gap between parchment and practice if we fully understand how relevant policies, reforms, and institutions were designed to work (see Brinks et al. 2019). We explore some of the limitations of an analytic approach that solely employs formal measures in the chapter's conclusion.

Second, we focus, in particular, on materially disadvantaged groups, or what are commonly referred to in Latin America as the "popular sectors." In defining the popular sectors, we follow Collier and Handlin (2009, 4 n. 1), for whom these sectors comprise "groups within the lower strata of the income hierarchy."[16] Given the tight link between race and ethnicity, and class, in Latin America, steps toward racial inclusion are also inherently steps toward the inclusion of the socioeconomically disadvantaged. By contrast, the volume does not focus specifically on other marginalized groups, such as women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) communities.[17] While there may be a common explanation for increasing inclusion of all lower-income groups (which are territorially concentrated, household-based, and intergenerational), more research is needed to ascertain if our explanation about popular sector inclusion extends to other marginalized groups.

Table 1.1 offers some examples of formal inclusion, that is, official reforms introduced to include the popular sectors in a more meaningful

---

[16] Whereas Collier and Handlin focus only on the urban working classes, we understand indigenous people and the peasantry to form part of the popular sectors as well.

[17] Of course, some reforms directed at the popular sectors benefit members of these other types of marginalized groups; moreover, some reforms meant to include groups such as women and LGBTQ communities are actually directed toward the popular sectors. For instance, initiatives that aim to prevent the commercial sexual exploitation of children (primarily designed to help poor girls and transgender or gay boys who have been victims of abuse) often do so by seeking to expand their core social and citizenship rights. We thank Lindsay Mayka for highlighting this point.

TABLE 1.1 *Examples of formal inclusionary reform across three dimensions*[a]

Dimension of Inclusion	Examples of State Action
Recognition	• *Constitutional recognition of multiculturalism or plurinationalism.*
	• *Introduction of policies that recognize multiple languages (or establish them as official languages) in state institutions (e.g. courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and in educational instruction.*
	• *Signing of international conventions that recognize the rights of historically oppressed or excluded groups (e.g. ILO Convention 169) or government endorsement of related international declarations (e.g. those generated by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance).*
	• Legal or constitutional extension of collective rights (e.g. legalization of unions and collective bargaining).
	• Changes in the design and implementation of the census implying the right to be counted, recognized, and represented.
	• Symbolic changes such as displaying the flags or images of indigenous peoples; or constructing museums.
Access	• *Creation of new (mainly national) bodies, ministries, agencies for and staffed by members of popular sector organizations that guarantee access to the governing or policymaking process for representatives of popular sector groups.*
	• *Decentralizing reforms that devolve power to the local level or create new municipalities.*
	• *Creation of participatory democratic institutions or other deliberative bodies.*
	• *Creation of new mechanisms of consultation of previously marginalized groups, such as consulta previa for local communities affected by extractive industries.*
	• Extension of the right to vote.
	• Introduction of measures that make nominal voting rights more effective in practice by eliminating formal and informal barriers to electoral participation (such as discriminatory electoral laws and practices), combating clientelism and vote buying, and easing voter registration and access to the ballot box.
	• Elimination of bans on political parties that represent historically excluded groups.
	• Reforms that guarantee representatives of previously marginal groups access to the executive or legislative branches (e.g. formal/informal legislative or cabinet quotas); creation of new ministries (e.g. labor or indigenous ministries) or cabinet posts dealing specifically with issues of relevance to the popular sectors.
Resources	• *Introduction, expansion, or "universalization" of social policies to provide more generous pensions, wages, health care, or family incomes (e.g. conditional cash transfer programs).*
	• *Land reform.*
	• *Labor law reform/legal changes that affect individual level labor/work site issues.*
	• *Labor law reform/legal changes that affect workers as a collective.*
	• Progressive tax reform.
	• Development of affirmative action programs for historically oppressed or excluded minorities.
	• Introduction of legal aid, public defenders, and other institutions that ease use of the legal system.

[a] Italicized items are measured in Figure 1.1.

way – on each of our three dimensions of inclusion. Although we have associated each example with one particular dimension of inclusion, many of the actions included in the table may enhance inclusion in more than one respect. For instance, policies that allow multiple languages to be used in educational settings (*recognition*) could well mean better education (*resources*) for students who lack proficiency in the national language.

It bears noting that inclusionary behavior on the part of the state may be either sincere or strategic: state officials may act with the sole normative intent of augmenting inclusion, may seek to enhance inclusion with the strategic goal of winning elections by increasing a party's electoral base, and/or may aim to preempt further radicalization of popular sectors, for instance. Moreover, state officials' actions may unwittingly have an inclusionary effect. For our analysis, all of these actions comprise inclusion; inclusion is defined by the content and impact of state action, rather than the intent of state actors.

THE INCLUSIONARY TURN IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

How, then, do we identify an inclusionary *turn*? One can find important instances of inclusionary reform and shifting boundaries of citizenship across history. Indeed, the 1980s and early 1990s, a period that is generally *not* viewed as inclusionary in Latin America, witnessed important reforms broadening recognition of indigenous rights, region-wide decentralization, and the creation of local-level participatory institutions (see Garay, Mayka and Rich, Hunter, Goldfrank, and Cameron, this volume). But isolated instances of inclusionary change do not necessarily constitute an inclusionary *turn*. We understand an inclusionary turn to have occurred in a particular world region when, over a relatively concentrated period of time, significant and sustained movement occurs on all three dimensions of inclusion in a large number of countries. While movement along our three dimensions began at different moments and accelerated at different paces in different Latin American countries, important reforms have been introduced across the region on all three dimensions since the 1990s.

In order to better illustrate the contemporary inclusionary turn in Latin America – to date its onset and trace its acceleration and arc – we identified and tallied, for a subset of the types of reforms listed in Table 1.1 (those in italics), major reforms adopted between 1980 and 2016 across nineteen Latin American countries. We selected three

categories of recognition-enhancing reform, and four categories each of access- and resource-enhancing reform.[18] We chose reform types that were both prominent and easily measurable (for which we were confident that we could find data). We counted only *formal* reforms (i.e. found in constitutions, laws, international treaties, executive orders, and regulations). Overall incidence is presented in Figure 1.1 (Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the Appendix provide individual country data). These data allow us to date government action associated with the inclusionary turn and to cautiously identify some trends. However, as our data only capture formal or parchment changes, and as some of the reforms we document are quite recent, we cannot comment on the implementation, effects, or long-term consequences of the inclusionary reforms we identify.[19] Whether these contemporary parchment reforms ultimately generate meaningful, sustained inclusion remains an open – and critical – question.

Latin America's most recent inclusionary turn began slowly around 1989–1990, when we observe an initial uptick in inclusionary reforms in various countries of the region along each of our three dimensions; the turn then accelerated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, continued into the new millennium, and then gradually attenuated after 2012. Initially, Latin American governments adopted more recognition-related reforms. By the mid-1990s, however, reform along each of our three dimensions began to increase moderately. In the early 2000s, we see an acceleration of overall reforms, with resource-related reforms outpacing reforms along the other two dimensions by mid-decade.

Several additional and important observations about the timing of the inclusionary turn may also be drawn from these data. First, the

---

[18] Data were compiled from a wide range of sources, including government data/documents; nongovernmental organization or intergovernmental agency databases/reports; news paper articles from major national outlets; and academic databases/studies. We are extremely grateful to Jared Abbott for his role in collecting these data and creating the attendant figures.

[19] A few additional points about the data bear noting: (1) When a single document embodied multiple distinct substantive reforms (as often occurred with constitutions, for instance) we coded each reform separately despite their being codified in the same document. (2) The data do not reflect the quality, depth, breadth, or relative political/ economic/social/cultural importance or potential impact of reforms; substantively import ant changes in countries' inclusionary regimes and minor reforms are represented in the data in the same way. (3) Though we sought to carry out a comprehensive survey of available data sources for each reform area in each country, there may be undercounting at the start and end of the time frame analyzed, given a) the lower incidence of digitized editions of Latin American newspapers in the earlier years versus later years, and b) the lower likelihood of very recent reforms being registered in academic work.

Yearly Reforms by Reform Type

Cumulative Reforms by Reform Type

FIGURE 1.1 Subset of inclusionary reforms for Latin America (1983 2016)
(includes reforms italicized in Table 1.1)

inclusionary turn both predates and extends beyond Latin America's Left turn. As is well known, beginning in 1998 and accelerating in the early and mid-2000s, Latin America experienced an unprecedented wave of left-wing electoral victories (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). However, as these data make clear, the movement toward greater inclusion was not merely a product of shifting political winds. While the Left's ascent to power across the region undoubtably hastened the pace of the inclusionary turn, the turn starts before the wave of Left victories. Moreover, inclusionary reform did not end with the ascent of more right-leaning governments, including Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Sebastián Piñera in Chile, and Iván Duque in Colombia beginning in 2015: thus far, right-wing governments have not systematically rolled back inclusionary reforms introduced by their predecessors (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017),[20] and some of these governments have continued inclusionary reforms (Fairfield and Garay 2017). It is important, therefore, that we not conflate the inclusionary turn with the Left turn. The former is substantively broader and temporally longer.

Second, the inclusionary turn also clearly predates the region's post-2002 commodities boom. While financial windfalls no doubt facilitated inclusionary reform in some countries, the dramatic expansion of such reforms, including social policies, cannot simply be attributed to the revenue generated by booming commodity prices (see Garay 2016, this volume).

Third, the inclusionary turn began at the height of the neoliberal era, when governments across the region were carrying out radical market-oriented reforms that are widely considered exclusionary. It appears, then, that the 1990s saw somewhat contradictory forces at work: at the same time that the formal working class lost access to material resources and union-based participatory channels, inclusionary reforms provided unprecedented recognition to indigenous and other identity-based groups, and decentralization created new forms of local institutional access.

Finally, the timing of the inclusionary turn corresponds closely to the spread of democracy across Latin America. Inclusionary reforms began to appear around 1990, the first year in which the entire region was free of direct military rule.[21] This timing, we will argue below, is by no means coincidental.

[20] Brazil and Bolivia, discussed below, may be important exceptions.
[21] Military leaders left power in Chile, Panama, and Paraguay in 1989.

As the data suggest, inclusionary turns are not unilinear processes. Rather, they often proceed incrementally, through slow accretion, comprising a series of political reforms layered one upon the other. Inclusionary turns may entail expansions and enhancements of previously existing policies and expansions of citizenship in new areas. They may involve both reversals and contradictions – steps forward and backward. As the neoliberal decade of the 1990s demonstrates, the introduction of inclusionary reforms in one area may coincide with the adoption of exclusionary policies in other areas. Finally, inclusionary movement is hardly inevitable, nor are advances necessarily permanent. Indeed, as recent actions taken by Presidents Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Bolivian interim-President Jeanine Áñez Chávez remind us, they may be halted and even reversed.

COMPARING INCLUSIONARY TURNS

Latin America's recent inclusionary turn is not the first instance of large-scale movement toward greater inclusion in the region. The process of labor incorporation in early and mid-twentieth century Latin America, so brilliantly analyzed by Collier and Collier (1991), represents an earlier inclusionary turn. In her Prologue to this volume, Ruth Collier compares the contemporary period of inclusion to the labor incorporation period, highlighting various ways in which the "infrastructure of participation" available to the popular sectors has changed. In this section, we likewise examine some of the similarities and differences between the two periods, albeit with a focus on state action to enhance inclusion. In order to structure our discussion, we adopt the framework outlined by Collier and Collier (1977) for studying corporatism in comparative perspective. Drawing on Lasswell's depiction of the study of politics as an examination of "who gets what, when, how" (1936), the Colliers suggested that a nuanced study of corporatism must consider "who does what, to whom, and how." Although on most of these points differences between the two inclusionary turns are a matter of degree, the two processes nevertheless diverge in intriguing ways.

Who

Following Collier and Collier (1977), one concern is *who* makes inclusionary appeals: Who are the actors initiating inclusion "from above"? Whereas mid-century labor incorporation entailed both "state incorporation" (initiated by dictatorships) and "party incorporation" (initiated by

elected governments) (Collier and Collier 1991), in the more recent period the central players are almost exclusively democratically elected, civilian governments. Thus, while political parties were active in both periods of inclusion, they are the primary drivers during the contemporary period: there are no recent instances, for example, of military-led inclusion.

As in the labor incorporation period, reforms in the contemporary turn have been undertaken by a diverse set of parties (see Etchemendy, Handlin, and Pop-Eleches, this volume). Some of the parties initiating contemporary inclusionary reform have their origins in the earlier incorporation period (for instance, Peronism in Argentina and the Socialist Party in Chile). Others are third wave-era parties that are nonetheless now well-established, such as the PT (Workers Party) in Brazil. Still others are new political forces. In Ecuador (Rafael Correa) and Venezuela (Hugo Chávez), inclusionary reforms have been led by populist outsiders; in Bolivia, they have been introduced by a new movement-based party (the MAS, "Movement for Socialism"). Finally, as in the earlier era, the governments that have advanced inclusionary measures are ideologically diverse. While many have been left-of-center, in Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and elsewhere, important inclusionary reforms have also been undertaken under right-of-center governments (Garay 2016; Fairfield and Garay 2017).

What

Inclusion across both periods has entailed formal *recognition* of popular sector actors who were previously viewed as peripheral to the political system. In the first period, recognition of the urban working class (and in some cases the rural peasantry) was central to the inclusionary project. Collier and Collier (1977, 1991) emphasized the importance of labor codes, associated social policies, and labor ministries as mechanisms for inclusion. In the contemporary period, recognition has been granted to a broader range of groups, including informal and rural workers, indigenous people, and racial minorities. We point to the constitutional recognition of indigenous people, the creation of state institutions targeting ethnic and racial groups (e.g. in Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia); and the recognition of undocumented, unemployed, and informal sectors (e.g. *piqueteros* in Argentina). The politicization of ethnic and racial cleavages has had a range of consequences. For example, Seawright and Barrenechea (this volume) find that the egalitarian discourse used by populist governments in two cases, Venezuela and Bolivia, encouraged

citizens to identify as brown-skinned (*moreno*) rather than mixed (*mestizo*) in Venezuela, and as *mestizo* rather than white in Bolivia. While we emphasize the popular sectors, recognition has also expanded along other (cross-cutting) cleavages such as gender and sexual orientation. The politicization of these cleavages has pressured governments to formally recognize the political importance of these newly activated "outsiders" by modifying constitutions, amending other legal frameworks, and creating new political institutions.

State actors also took steps to expand *access* in both periods, offering citizens and groups new institutional channels to influence political decisions and policymaking. Again, however, they did so in different ways. In the earlier period, the formal extension of suffrage was an important aspect of expanded access in several cases (although limitations remained, such as literacy restrictions in many countries). Moreover, access tended to be expanded through centralized, corporatist mechanisms that sought to, and often did, monopolize the space between citizens and the state. The contemporary period is marked by greater variation in mechanisms of access. For example, decentralization has become an underlying logic of access to political decision-making, with reforms that institutionalize local elections and grant municipalities new forms of administrative and fiscal authority. Governments have also created or expanded participatory institutions, ranging from local-level participatory budgeting, health councils, and community councils to national conferences (see Mayka and Rich, and Goldfrank, this volume). Finally, judicial review has been democratized in many countries, as mechanisms to file cases have multiplied and standing has been broadened through constitutional reform (e.g. Colombia 1991). These reforms have been complemented by the creation or strengthening of accountability mechanisms such as public prosecutor's offices, ombudsmen, and *comités de vigilancia*. A shared characteristic of most of these new institutions is that access is (largely) voluntary, rather than compulsory or conditioned on political support.

With regard to *resource* allocation, governments in both periods pursued regulation (mandating certain types of behavior), distribution (awarding government resources), and redistribution (shifting resources from one class or group to another) (see Lowi 1964). However, the balance among the three, as well as the targets of policy, differed across the two periods. Mid-century labor incorporation entailed group-targeted *regulation* as well as significant *redistribution*, including major instances of land reform (e.g. in Mexico and Venezuela). The redistribution of resources was channeled primarily through corporatist institutions, which made for a truncated and hierarchical system. The main logics of the more

recent period, by contrast, are *regulation* and *distribution* – with far less emphasis on the redistribution of private property. We have not seen dramatic instances of land reform in the recent period (although some reform was undertaken, for example, in Bolivia and Venezuela), and there have been few significant shifts in labor's share of income. Instead, we observe policies such as the redistribution of *state* lands (with subsoil minerals remaining under the control of the state) and social policies based on means-tested *individual* targeting.[22] Thus, in contrast to the redistribution that took place in some of the early labor incorporation cases, most contemporary social policies take the form of what Holland and Schneider (2017) call "easy" redistribution, in that they are fiscally cheap and do not threaten powerful interests or entail substantial institutional disruption (also see Roberts, this volume).

Given these varying logics, the resource dimension of inclusion was far more contentious in the earlier period, as redistribution generates higher-stakes conflict than does distribution (Lowi 1964). The mid-twentieth-century inclusionary period challenged oligarchies and antagonized elites, often inducing them to call on their military allies to halt inclusionary processes. Contemporary distributive policies have generated contention, but in the 2000s in particular have been facilitated by the availability of government rents from the commodities boom (see Mazzuca, and Hunter, this volume). Moreover, to date, they have been largely bounded by and directed through electoral politics (rather than focused on upending the political system itself).

To Whom

Which groups or actors were targeted in each period? Although new actors were drawn into the political arena in both periods,[23] there are significant differences between the two. At mid-century, leaders passed reforms to enhance inclusion with the working class foremost in mind. The earlier period thus witnessed the mobilization of a set of organized and structured collective actors (e.g. unions), leading to the formal incorporation of labor into politics. As such, a truncated part of the popular sectors benefited from these earlier inclusionary policies. Further,

---

[22] An important exception is the distribution of resources to indigenous and Afro Latin communities.

[23] Collier and Collier's (1991) work on the earlier period had a particular center of gravity labor   due to the nature of their analytic question. The present volume, by contrast, does not privilege a particular actor, though its focus is on the popular sectors.

beneficiaries were targeted as members of class-based (and class-identified) groups rather than as individuals.

In the contemporary period, by contrast, leaders have targeted a broader range of popular sector actors (Collier, this volume). Among the historically excluded popular sector groups that were newly mobilized during the contemporary period are informal sector workers (Garay 2016, this volume), indigenous groups (Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005), and evangelical Christians (Boas, this volume). Further, while in some countries ethnic, racial, and religious groups have been targeted as collectives in the recent inclusionary turn, more often citizens have been targeted *as individuals* (e.g. through conditional cash transfer –CCT– programs; see again Garay, and Hunter, this volume). Inclusion has thus benefited a more diffuse, fragmented, less organized set of actors, often with weak political leverage (see Mazzuca, and Roberts, this volume), rather than mobilizing and incorporating new social classes. In short, the recent inclusionary turn has targeted more diverse actors who are more difficult to mobilize, are defined by cross-cutting cleavages, and often have unclear partisan ties (Collier and Handlin 2009; Collier, this volume). The mixed composition of the newly included makes any resulting alliances among them more fluid and unstable, which as Roberts argues in the concluding chapter, could make the more recent inclusionary turn less robust than its mid-century predecessor.

How

The two inclusionary turns also occurred in quite distinct ways, in large part because the different political regimes in place engendered different forms of interest intermediation, and a different balance between inducements and constraints (Collier and Collier 1979). With regard to interest intermediation, as Collier and Collier (1991) depict, mid-century incorporation was corporatist (and generally more top-down, compulsory, and repressive). This corporatist inclusion offered substantive benefits but also compromised labor union autonomy. The contemporary inclusionary turn has been marked by a more pluralist logic. The individual-focused inclusion that characterizes pluralism does not necessarily pose the same trade-offs (as it neither privileges popular sector organizations nor compromises their autonomy).

The two periods also entail a different balance between "inducements and constraints" (Collier and Collier 1979), with the contemporary period featuring fewer institutional (and coercive) constraints. Of course, in line

with our previous discussion, some of the policy advances in this latest inclusionary turn entail "low-hanging fruit." For instance, the most common social policy reforms across the region were comparatively inexpensive and thus more politically palatable (e.g. the introduction of CCTs); by contrast, truly significant, programmatic advances that would have required much greater social expenditure, planning, and infrastructure – for instance, reforming health care systems – have been less common. Similarly, while numerous countries launched participatory initiatives at the local level, not all scaled to the national level. Nonetheless, a shifting balance *away* from coercive constraints is significant.

Summing Up: A Second Incorporation?

In sum, in both the mid-twentieth century and contemporary inclusionary turns, reform occurred on each of our three dimensions, albeit to varying degrees. Mid-century incorporation was in the main a transition to mass politics involving the incorporation of organized labor as a legitimate actor, structured by the state primarily via hierarchical and corporatist institutions. The more recent turn is less repressive and more pluralist. It is also more expansive in scope, entailing more varied institutional mechanisms and structures of inclusion and reaching a greater diversity of people, while simultaneously involving less expensive reforms, minimizing institutional disruption, and empowering actors who possess less aggregate political power.

Similarities between the labor incorporation period and the contemporary period of inclusion have led some scholars to characterize the contemporary period as a "second incorporation" (Roberts 2008, 329–330 and 2014; Luna and Filgueira 2009; Rossi 2015; Rossi and Silva 2018). We agree that the 1990s and 2000s brought both an important expansion of substantive rights and the creation of new "institutional mechanisms that link popular sector organizations to the political arena" (Rossi and Silva 2018, 8), especially for indigenous people.[24]

Nonetheless, we do not view these contemporary developments as a "second incorporation" for two reasons. First, we conceptualize incorporation as a classical subtype of inclusion (i.e. the former has more defining attributes and fits a narrower range of cases).[25] "Incorporation" – as conceptualized by Collier and Collier (1991) – describes a *one-time-only event* with *enduring consequences*: The

---

[24] See also Cameron (this volume); Van Cott (2005, 2008); Yashar (2005).
[25] On classical subtypes, see Sartori (1970) and Collier and Levitsky (2009).

incorporation of the working class led to the rise of mass politics, permanently reshaping politics in ways and to degrees that have no *region-wide* parallel in the contemporary period (although indigenous incorporation in the Andes – Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia – arguably comes close).

Second, the inclusionary turn that began in the late twentieth century was not unambiguously a new, region-wide incorporation of previously marginalized groups (as with mid-twentieth-century labor incorporation): it combines a *new incorporation* of some groups (e.g. indigenous movements, evangelical Christians, informal sector workers) with a *return and reorganization* of inclusion for other popular sectors – including a wide range of reforms removing barriers to the exercise and defense of preexisting rights and practices. Indeed, with redemocratization in the 1980s and 1990s, most popular sector groups had regained the vote and basic civil rights, and their institutional access was increasing via decentralization and other participatory institutions. In this sense, the popular sectors *returned* to politics in the more recent inclusionary turn.

Third and finally, while the poor were unquestionably disadvantaged by harsh neoliberal reforms, they were not "disincorporated" economically as much as left to fend for themselves in highly unequal democracies. Thus, there was no basis for (newly) "incorporating" them – although there were certainly ways to restructure the terms of their inclusion. In short, important advances in popular sector recognition, access, and resources since the late 1990s can best be understood as a second inclusionary turn, not a second period of incorporation.

EXPLAINING THE INCLUSIONARY TURN

The acceleration of the inclusionary turn in the late 1990s and early 2000s took many scholars by surprise. For much of the 1990s, the combination of elite neoliberal consensus and labor demobilization – reinforced by union decline and the expansion of the informal sector – led many scholars to conclude that "low-intensity" citizenship and democracy were likely to persist (O'Donnell 1993; Roberts 1998; Kurtz 2004). Yet this singular focus on how democracy was privileging market logics over popular sector needs, and the negative effects of neoliberal reforms on organized labor and peasant unions, overshadowed the simultaneous adoption of inclusionary reforms expanding recognition and access for other citizens. Many scholars only began to focus on this inclusionary movement when it started to gather speed as the twentieth century drew to a close.

Why Now? Explaining Latin America's Movement toward Greater Inclusion

What, then, has driven Latin America's inclusionary turn? The prevailing explanation focuses on neoliberal reforms and the social mobilization they triggered (see Silva 2009; Simmons 2016; Rossi and Silva 2018). For example, drawing on the classic work of Karl Polanyi (1944), Silva argues that free market reforms "necessarily generate a protectionist countermovement within society" (2009, 17). Because the commodification of land and labor "disrupts the ability of people to fulfill vital needs, such as personal and family economic stability," individuals and groups "invariably seek to protect themselves from the impersonal, unpredictable, ever-changing, and frequently destructive powers of the market" (Silva 2009, 17). Silva argues that neoliberal reforms in Latin America "threatened a wide range of popular sector and middle-class groups," and over time, "a great variety of social groups mobilized to defend against the threat of 'neoliberal' policies" (2012, 11). For Silva, then, a "Polanyi-like defensive mobilization to challenge neoliberalism" (Silva 2009, 43; also Rossi and Silva 2018) led to the Left turn and the introduction of inclusionary policies in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – what they call a "second incorporation" (see also Cameron, this volume).

This demand-side account points to the importance of disruption and demand-making by mobilized constituencies in explaining political inclusion, and we concur that opposition to neoliberal reforms contributed to the Left turn. Yet, this account's causal emphasis on neoliberal reforms has some analytic weaknesses. First, the argument mainly focuses on one aspect of inclusion (resources), proving less able to account for the other elements of the inclusionary turn (i.e. enhanced recognition and access). Second, as noted above, the beginning of the inclusionary turn coincided with, or even preceded, the initiation of neoliberal reform, meaning that economic restructuring cannot be the (only) cause of inclusionary reform. Third, the relationship between market reform and societal response is far from clear. Indeed, some of the strongest inclusionary demands took place in countries that underwent the least neoliberal reform (e.g. Ecuador, Venezuela), while some of the most radical neoliberal reforms (e.g. Peru) triggered only minimal defensive demands. Fourth, the relationship between the proximate cause highlighted in this account – social mobilization – and inclusion likewise presents analytic challenges. On the one hand, social mobilization has been erratic and uneven in Latin America, which limits its ability to catalyze a broad and ongoing region-wide phenomenon. On the

other hand, while Latin America has clearly witnessed important instances of popular mobilization (e.g. Argentina and Bolivia in the early 2000s, and Chile in 2011 and 2019) leading to inclusionary reform, societal demands for inclusion do not *always* lead to state responses. The prevailing explanation thus begs the theoretical question of when and why social mobilization spawns inclusionary policymaking.

We offer an alternative explanation. We argue that the principal impetus behind the region's inclusionary turn lies in the sustained interaction between two broader phenomena: inequality and enduring democracy. Latin America has long been the most unequal region in the world.[26] Unequal landholding and unequal incomes, alongside poverty rates that remain higher than countries of comparable levels of development, have defined the region as a whole. Although neoliberal reforms may have exacerbated economic inequalities in the region, social inequality and exclusion predate neoliberalism by centuries. And even though inequality rates have declined in the 2000s, their absolute levels continue to outpace those in other regions (Lustig 2015, 14). Further, inequality is not only economic: it manifests along multiple dimensions. Its effects are particularly stark when material inequality aligns with other cleavages such as race and ethnicity, gender, and geography (urban/rural) (Hoffman and Centeno 2003; Karl 2003; Lustig 2015).

Latin America's deep, persistent, and multifaceted inequality *holds the potential* to spur inclusionary reform by shaping the incentives of key actors. While inequality alone clearly does not produce mobilization, it can motivate disadvantaged citizens to demand greater recognition, access and/or resources,[27] and to vote for politicians who might campaign on these issues. Mobilization, in turn, may encourage politicians – including those for whom inclusionary policies are ideologically anathema – to (proactively or preemptively) advance inclusionary measures.[28]

Yet while inequality has repeatedly given rise to popular demands for greater inclusion in the region, it has rarely triggered sustained

---

[26] Hoffman and Centeno (2003); Portes and Hoffman (2003).

[27] Of course, as the social movement and collective action literature highlights, structural conditions do not automatically generate mobilization. The process of mobilization is a political activity that requires additional explanation.

[28] There is an extensive literature on the role of inequality and politics. Marshall (1950) long ago noted that the tension between capitalism (which generates economic inequalities) and democracy (which assumes political equality) generates the impulse to extend a series of rights, including the social welfare state. Sen (1999) has noted that inequalities prevent development as freedom; that democracies are better than authoritarian regimes at mitigating these inequalities; but that reform is much easier when addressing crises rather than endemic and structural inequalities.

inclusionary responses from the state. Quite often, the opposite has occurred. Throughout most of the twentieth century, efforts to mobilize the poor, expand rights, or redistribute wealth under democracy almost invariably triggered destabilizing conservative reactions, polarization, and, in many cases, military coups (O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1979; and Collier and Collier 1991). Prior to the 1980s, leftist and other political movements that advanced inclusionary projects in Latin America were often inhibited by some combination of repression, proscription, and restricted suffrage. During the Cold War in particular (when the Right associated the Left with communism), conservative forces and militaries were often quick to overturn democracy whenever such inclusion-demanding movements ascended (or threatened to ascend) to power.

The third wave of democracy fundamentally transformed the political environment in which social inequality was embedded. For the first time in Latin American history, democracy has been both widespread and enduring. This democratic opening and its continuity – that is, three decades of pluralist and competitive electoral regimes – have created unprecedented opportunities for subaltern groups and their partisan allies to organize, mobilize, and pursue political power. These dynamics, which accelerated and deepened from the late 1990s forward, both culminated in and catalyzed the inclusionary turn.

Democracy facilitates inclusion in several important ways. Freedom of expression and association provide space for marginalized sectors to organize and make demands, including via mobilization and protest, with less fear of repression. Several scholars have highlighted the role of pluralism and associational freedom in facilitating popular organization, mobilization, and protest in Latin America (Yashar 2005; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011). Second, political contestation and institutionalized electoral competition (both constitutive of democracy) incentivize politicians and political parties to engage in policymaking that will capture votes. Scholars have long argued that competitive politics in a context of extreme inequality should give rise to left-leaning governments that target marginalized sectors and favor redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012),[29] or right-leaning governments that mimic this behavior in order to capture the broad constituencies needed to win elections (Chartock 2013; Fairfield and Garay 2017). In order to maintain old constituencies and/

---

[29] Of course, the poor do not always vote for the Left and redistribution in unequal societies (Kaufman 2009; Cramer and Kaufman 2011).

or attract new supporters, politicians need to engage in innovative and creative policymaking of just the type that we see in the inclusionary turn – and democracy allows and incentivizes that ingenuity. Recent work by Chartock (2013) and Garay (2016, this volume) highlight the role of electoral competition in generating incentives for governments to expand social policy to include outsiders, such as indigenous people and informal sector workers. Thus, strategic, electoral incentives for political elites to promote inclusion appeared the moment Latin American societies transitioned to democracy, and they remained in place through the first two decades of the twenty-first century, as democracy has endured.

Democratic institutions, however, do not automatically or inevitably give rise to inclusionary policies. In unequal societies, political and economic elites also have incentives to defend their privilege and power. They deploy a range of practices – including clientelism, campaign contributions, bribes, and other (licit and illicit) means – to influence governments, legislatures, and courts to prevent low-income citizens from translating their numbers into electoral power or effective redistributive pressure.[30] In Latin America, moreover, many elected governments were constrained by the legacies of authoritarianism (e.g. military prerogatives, appointed senators) and suffered from other political pathologies (e.g. severe malapportionment; weak rule of law, the uneven protection of civil liberties) well into the twenty-first century (O'Donnell 1993; Samuels and Snyder 2001; Giraudy 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2018). Over time, however, enduring democratic regimes create more consistent opportunities for popular mobilization and pressure to enact redistributive reforms, and more incentives to respond to them, than do other regime types.

What is novel and consequential about the last three decades, then, is the unprecedented *persistence* of democracy in Latin America. That persistence, in turn, was greatly facilitated by the marked improvement in the regional and international conditions for democratic survival beginning in the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2010; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 2014). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Marxism, the perceived threat associated with leftist movements declined, and a broad international consensus on the virtues of democracy emerged. Under these new conditions, and in an increasingly networked world, the cost of overthrowing democracy rose considerably. Thus, the frequency of military intervention plummeted, and in the few instances where coups

---

[30] See O'Donnell (1993); Hagopian (1996); Kaufman (2009); Helmke and Debs (2010); Stokes et al. (2013); Albertus (2015); Albertus and Menaldo (2018); Nichter (2018).

occurred, they triggered strong regional and international pressure to return to electoral rule (e.g. Peru 1992, Guatemala 1993, Ecuador 2000, Venezuela 2002, and Honduras 2009). As with mid-century incorporation, then, timing and world historical time play important roles.

Thus, Latin America experienced few democratic reversals in the contemporary period, despite challenges that in earlier periods would plausibly have led to polarization and breakdown, such as the economic crisis and radical reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and the ascent of left-wing governments and popular mobilization during the 2000s. In particular, the extraordinary regional turn to the Left of the early twenty-first century, which broadened and accelerated inclusionary reforms without triggering regime-changing backlash, was only possible in the context of unprecedented democratic stability (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). The idea that leftist political movements – some of them quite radical – might compete freely in elections, win power across much of the region, boldly introduce inclusionary reforms and, in many cases, *remain in power for more than a decade* was virtually inconceivable in earlier eras.[31] We thus contend that it is democracy's resilience, in the context of unyielding inequality, that is both new and critical for explaining the scope and depth of the contemporary inclusionary turn.

At least three features of the international environment reinforced domestic incentives to adopt inclusionary reforms. One was the influence of international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Labor Organization (ILO). Although international organizations at times pushed exclusionary measures (e.g. the harsh neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s), some of them also encouraged the diffusion of policies we consider to be inclusionary. The World Bank, for example, actively promoted decentralization reforms in the 1990s (Goldfrank, this volume), while the ILO's Indigenous and

---

[31] It is worth noting that this democratic path to inclusionary politics was foreshadowed by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), at a time when that path seemed far less viable. O'Donnell and Schmitter argued that the ascent to power of right of center parties in the initial post transition period might facilitate democratic consolidation by demonstrat ing to conservative elites that their interests can be protected under democracy. Once democracy was consolidated, however, the Left could be expected to win (1986, 44 45), perhaps even ushering in a period of "socialization" (1986, 11 13). Although the sequence may not have led to socialization, the Left's eventual ascent to power in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, and, in its own way, Argentina and Bolivia, arguably approximated the path these authors outlined more than three decades ago.

Tribal People's Convention 169 set a standard for the widespread adoption of recognition, access, and resource reforms related to indigenous people in the 1990s. Second, the emergence and strengthening of transnational advocacy networks provided valuable resources to organizations representing indigenous and other historically marginalized groups, which strengthened social movements pushing for inclusionary reform (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Brysk 2000, Bob 2005). Third, as both Hunter and Goldfrank (this volume) show, the widespread adoption of certain inclusionary policies – for example, CCT programs and participatory budgeting – was driven in part by processes of international diffusion.

In sum, democratic endurance and persistent inequality are the critical macro-conditions underlying the recent inclusionary turn in Latin America. In all cases, movement toward inclusion was marked by internal contradictions, opposition and conflict, and important setbacks. Viewed from a regional and long-term perspective, however, it is clear that three decades of democracy and inequality created both political space for some societal demands to bubble up and gain momentum and political incentives for some democratic leaders to address them over time. While inclusionary moves might have *begun* in the absence of enduring democracy, the inclusionary turn almost certainly would not have continued and accelerated in Latin America's highly unequal polities had democracy not become (and remained) "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991, 26; Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). Yet it did, and in that context, electoral politics gave rise to precisely the kinds of demands for inclusion and redistribution that would be expected in unequal societies. For the first time in Latin American history, democracy persisted long enough (and grew sufficiently robust) for such dynamics to unfold, take root, and lead to sustained state responses rather than being aborted – even as alternation in power led to advances and setbacks for inclusionary policy. The international and regional environment supported democracy's endurance in the region, allowing the Left and encouraging the Right to design and implement reforms aimed at empowering popular sector actors in what would ultimately culminate in the inclusionary turn.

Explaining Cross-National Variation within the Inclusionary Turn

Although movement toward greater inclusion can be observed in most polities in Latin America since the early 1990s, such movement has hardly been homogeneous across the region. As the chapters in this volume show, the timing, pace, and scope of inclusionary reforms vary

considerably, both across cases and within cases over time. Our data on parchment reforms in nineteen Latin American countries (see Appendix) show that while inclusionary reforms were introduced at more or less the same time in each country, the sequencing and vigor of the reforms vary across countries. The overall pace of reform appears quicker in South America and Mexico than most of Central America. Within South America, Bolivia (until 2019) and Brazil (until 2016) stood out for the cumulative pace and scope of reforms across the three dimensions.[32] If enduring democracy amid social inequality accounts for the inclusionary turn as a cumulative, region-wide phenomenon, what explains the considerable variation in the timing, pace, and scope of inclusionary reform across countries and within countries over time? Drawing on the broader comparative politics literature, and with an eye toward encouraging future research, we discuss some initial hypotheses.

Partisanship and Left Government. We noted earlier that the inclusionary turn predated the Left turn, and thus cannot be explained by it. However, partisanship, and particularly the role of left governments, may help to account for intra-regional variation in the *intensity* of inclusionary reform. Between 1998 and 2014, left-of-center parties won the presidency in eleven Latin American countries. Many of them were reelected at least once. Notwithstanding considerable programmatic differences (Weyland et al. 2010; Flores-Macías 2012), left-of-center parties are more likely than non-left parties to champion policies and reforms that we have characterized as inclusionary (particularly reforms targeting the popular sectors). For instance, an established body of research has shown a strong correlation between left government and redistributive social spending in advanced industrialized democracies (Garrett and Lange 1995; Garrett 1998) and, to a lesser degree, in Latin America (López-Calva and Lustig 2010; Huber and Stephens 2012). Scholars have also associated left government in Latin America with reforms aimed at expanding recognition and access to previously marginalized groups (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Cameron and Sharpe 2012; Goldfrank, this volume).

---

[32] We again emphasize that our data capture only parchment reforms and do not address the substantive import, implementation, and impact of these reforms. Moreover, the sheer number of reforms and their impact are not necessarily correlated. For instance, Brazil's CCTs and participatory budgeting might each be counted as a single reform, but their impact has been extensive. Finally, our data do not reflect vast differences in the inclusionary baseline before reforms were introduced. For example, Costa Rica and Uruguay were considerably more inclusive than Guatemala and Paraguay at reform's onset (see Cameron, this volume).

Thus, years of left government should theoretically be positively associated with the degree and scope of inclusionary reform, and resource-related reform in particular.

Yet the relationship between left governments and inclusion may be more complex than is often argued. First, the advent or persistence of left government cannot explain *all* of the cross-national variation in inclusion: left government is neither necessary nor sufficient for national leaders to introduce inclusionary reforms. As we noted previously, inclusionary policies predate Latin America's Left turn. For example, many decentralizing and participatory reforms that enhanced access, and processes of constitutional recognition of indigenous and other historically excluded groups in various countries, were introduced during the 1990s by non-leftist governments (see Mayka and Rich, and Goldfrank, this volume). Also, although left governments promoted important resource-related initiatives throughout the region (Huber and Stephens 2012), similar initiatives, including CCT programs and the expansion of health insurance, were undertaken by non-leftist governments (Fairfield and Garay 2017; Garay, and Hunter, this volume). Furthermore, left governments' efforts to expand recognition, access, and resources vary (Goldfrank, this volume): different types of left-leaning governments – from the more populist (e.g. Chávez) to the more pragmatic (e.g. Ricardo Lagos) – advance inclusion in different ways. Thus, more work needs to be done to understand the strength and nature of the relationship between types of left government and inclusion – a challenge taken up by the contributors to this volume.

Social Mobilization. Another plausible source of variation in the quantity or type of inclusionary measures is social mobilization. Substantial inclusionary reforms are rarely undertaken in the absence of mobilized constituencies (or at least the threat of such mobilization). Labor was not incorporated prior to working-class mobilization. Suffrage was rarely extended – to workers or women – in the absence of suffrage movements. Thus, scholars have suggested that inclusionary reforms benefiting historically disadvantaged groups such as indigenous people, peasants, or informal and unemployed workers, are less likely to occur, or will be more limited in nature, in the absence of social movements and organized groups seeking to advance their interests (Silva 2009). Indeed, Garay (2016, this volume) argues that reforms to expand social policy to cover previously excluded informal sector and rural workers are both more generous (resources) and more likely to be accompanied by new participatory institutions (access) where governments confront large-scale

popular mobilization (e.g. Argentina and Brazil) than where they do not (e.g. Chile and Mexico). Likewise, large-scale indigenous mobilization contributed to the introduction of constitutional and other reforms extending more robust recognition of indigenous communities in Bolivia and Ecuador, compared to Peru where less mobilization occurred (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005).

The notion that the degree or type of social mobilization affects the content and scope of inclusionary reform is compatible with the market-reform countermobilization argument for inclusion offered by Silva (2009), but still leaves many unanswered questions. More work on protest events and event analysis would enable us to further assess when, why, and where mobilization affects inclusionary reforms. It seems clear that far-reaching inclusionary reform is less likely without mobilization, but more research is needed to understand precisely if and how mobilization is tied to the timing, scope, and pace of reforms. For instance, how might the more diffuse patterns of civil society organizing in the contemporary period affect how mobilization influences inclusion (see Collier, and Roberts, this volume)?

Electoral Competition. Patterns of electoral competition and the structure of party systems may also drive variation in the timing and scope of inclusionary policies. Close elections might lead parties to introduce more, or more vigorous, inclusionary reforms, especially where there are uncaptured popular constituencies and/or social mobilization. Garay (2016, this volume), for example, argues that social policy expansion (i.e. inclusion related to resources) tends to be greatest where parties compete intensely for the "outsider" (i.e. informal sector and rural poor) vote. Although party weakness and high levels of electoral volatility might suggest that competition for the outsider vote should be relatively fierce across the region, Garay also demonstrates that where parties are weak and reelection is banned, as in Guatemala and Peru, governments have a far *weaker* incentive to engage in vigorous social policy expansion.[33]

This argument could also help explain variation in the other dimensions of inclusion. Research on decentralization, for example, suggests that decentralizing reforms might occur precisely where dominant parties facing close elections fear losing national office but still have local strongholds; under these circumstances, elected officials might promote decentralization to maintain their local electoral edge (see O'Neill 2005). At the

---

[33] Focusing on an electoral logic, de la O (2015) also argues that the adoption and design of CCTs is related to the antagonistic relationship between executives and legislatures.

same time, however, Boas's study of the political inclusion of evangelical Christians (this volume) suggests that electoral incentives are not always the principal driver of the mobilization and politicization of previously excluded groups. More attention to politicians' electoral incentives should nevertheless provide further insight into the timing, and perhaps the scope, of inclusionary reforms.

Commodity Rents. Another plausible source of variation in the adoption of inclusionary policy is the availability of commodity export rents and, relatedly, revenue streams. This factor has been pinpointed to explain variation in the resource dimension of reforms (Richardson 2009; Weyland 2009; Mazzuca 2013, this volume; Campello 2015). The post-2002 commodities boom increased revenue flows to Latin American governments, thus decreasing their dependence on international financial organizations and providing them with the autonomy and funds to pursue distributive policies that had been virtually unthinkable in previous decades. As Mazzuca's chapter (this volume) makes clear, Latin American states varied considerably in terms of how much they benefited from the post-2002 commodities boom – and thus in how much commodity rents *could* fuel inclusion. Whereas major mineral producers such as Venezuela and Bolivia enjoyed extraordinary windfall rents, countries more focused on manufacturing exports, such as Mexico, experienced a more modest boost in revenue.

However, as with the Left turn, the relationship between the dramatic increase in state revenue generated by historically high commodity prices, and the acceleration of inclusionary policies in the 2000s, is neither straightforward nor necessarily direct. As Mazzuca (this volume) posits, the positive relationship between natural resource rents and social spending during the commodities boom was mediated by political and economic institutions. Left-leaning populist governments that faced weaker horizontal accountability (as in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) used revenue generated by natural resource exports to engage in massive distributive spending to build robust inclusionary coalitions based on unemployed and informal sector workers. In contrast, where political parties and institutions of horizontal accountability have been strong (Chile), or where a high international investment grade raised the cost of a statist turn (Peru), unbridled "rentier populism" was less likely.[34]

---

[34] Of course, commodity rents could plausibly facilitate access and recognition oriented reforms as well; for instance, costs also attach to the infrastructure needed for greater access and representation.

Historical Pathways. Cameron (this volume) raises the possibility that variation in the depth and scope of reforms within the contemporary inclusionary turn may have deeper historical roots given earlier inclusionary periods' varying legacies. Cameron links the intensity of the original labor incorporation period of the 1930s and 1940s to the contemporary inclusionary turn. He argues that countries that experienced more limited labor and popular incorporation at mid-century (in turn related to incomplete or contested periods of nation and state building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), such as those in the Andes, had, in effect, further to go in the contemporary period. These institutional legacies – or "unfinished business" (Cameron 2016) – in terms of both recognition and resources may help to explain why the Andes witnessed more radical or contestatory populist projects entailing more extensive inclusionary moves than did countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. As noted earlier, Latin American countries differed markedly with regard to their inclusionary "point of departure," contrasts that could not help but shape the scope and emphasis of national inclusionary politics.[35]

We close this section by noting that what drives cross-national and over-time variation in inclusionary reform almost certainly differs across the dimensions of inclusion. For example, macroeconomic conditions – whether or not governments confront economic crises or benefit from commodity booms – should have a greater impact on resource-based inclusion than on recognition or access. Likewise, partisanship – and specifically the presence of a strong Left in power – had a strong impact in the adoption of access-related reforms (Goldfrank, this volume), but surprisingly little impact on the adoption of certain resource-based reforms (Garay, and Hunter, this volume). We hope that future scholarship draws out these causal contrasts, while continuing to appreciate each dimension of inclusion as part of a larger phenomenon.

TRADE-OFFS AND LIMITATIONS: THREE PARADOXES OF INCLUSION

Against a historical backdrop of authoritarian rule, democratization, and neoliberal reform, most Latin American regimes moved toward greater inclusion during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Yet even after almost three decades of inclusionary reforms, Latin America

---

[35] For a parallel argument, see Berrios et al. (2011).

continues to be marked by extreme social stratification, uneven citizenship, and widespread popular discontent with political parties, including parties that championed and sponsored inclusionary reforms. In many cases, popular sector actors have experienced inclusionary advances as partial: changes were slower, less transformative, and less celebrated than promised and hoped. These dynamics beg key questions. What are the limits of, and obstacles to, inclusionary reform? What tensions and trade-offs does inclusionary reform entail? In this section, we discuss three political paradoxes that contribute to the uneven advancement of inclusionary initiatives: the potentially double-edged character of democracy; the way in which state weakness both induces the adoption of, and inhibits the implementation of, inclusionary reforms; and the complicated relationship between participation and inclusion.

The Paradoxes of Democracy

We have argued for the centrality of democratic endurance to Latin America's recent inclusionary turn. Three or four decades of pluralism and competitive elections provided popular sector groups with the associational space to mobilize and press inclusionary demands from below and created incentives for vote-seeking parties to make inclusionary appeals from above.

Democracy, however, does not inevitably open the door for inclusionary politics. Since most inclusionary reforms have distributional consequences (i.e. they create winners and losers), they almost invariably trigger opposition. This is particularly true in societies marked by extreme inequality, where inclusionary reforms may challenge long-standing social hierarchies and thus catalyze intense resistance among historically privileged groups, who wield power both behind the scenes and through democratic institutions.

Democratic institutions create various opportunities for conservative forces to hamper inclusion directly. Indeed, liberal democratic institutions were designed to protect minorities from popular majorities. Originally, as Adam Smith keenly observed, they were "instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor,"[36] and indeed the rich have always and everywhere used them for such purposes (Schattsneider 1960; Lindblom 1977). Even in Latin America, where liberal checks and balances are often weak

[36] Quoted in Albertus (2015, 19).

(O'Donnell 1994) and the wealthy are few in number, their resources and political connections generally leave them well-positioned to defend their interests – in this case, to dilute or derail inclusionary reforms through these institutions (Albertus 2015).

Conservative forces can also pursue their interests by designing or manipulating democratic institutions to reinforce and advantage conservative representation. Thanks to a combination of malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder 2001) and clientelism, conservative forces dominated many Latin American legislatures throughout much of the twentieth century, sometimes to the point of wielding an effective veto over redistributive reforms proposed by more-progressive executives (Collier and Collier 1991; Hagopian 1996; Albertus 2015). Reformist governments in Chile in the 1930s and 1940s, Brazil in the 1950s and early 1960s, and Peru in the 1960s were all stymied by conservative legislatures (Collier and Collier 1991). Similar dynamics may be observed in the contemporary era. In post-transition Brazil, for example, even mild land and labor reform initiatives sponsored by the José Sarney government were blocked by Congress (Hagopian 1996). And in Chile, right-wing parties in Congress – their strength magnified by a distortionary electoral system and appointed senators – blocked or watered down many of the redistributive reforms proposed by Socialist presidents Lagos and Michelle Bachelet. More recently, as Garay (2016, this volume) shows, the Chilean and Mexican legislatures scaled back universalistic health care and pension initiatives, resulting in programs that were both less generous and less participatory. In extreme cases, such as Paraguay in 2012 and Brazil in 2016, conservative forces have used legislative institutions to impeach inclusionary presidents (in both cases, on dubious grounds).

The judiciary represents another form of horizontal constraint. In Latin America, courts – particularly those higher in the judicial hierarchy – have also tended to have a broadly elite (and conservative) bias, both in terms of the judges who compose them and the litigants who approach them.[37] To be sure, high courts in some countries have been relatively consistent in enforcing civil and political rights (e.g. in Brazil), and in a few cases high courts have made a name for themselves through vindicating the social and economic rights of vulnerable populations (e.g. the constitutional chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court and

---

[37] Hilbink (2008) offers an alternative view. Also, in some countries lower instance courts appear more likely to support the claims of the poor; the "alternative law" movement in Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil is one prominent example (Ingram 2016, 298).

Colombia's Constitutional Court, see Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero 2006; Wilson 2009). Nonetheless, such behavior is certainly more the exception than the rule – in part because elected leaders have at their disposal (and have frequently employed) multiple mechanisms to retaliate against courts that issue challenging decisions (see, e.g. Kapiszewski 2012 on inter-branch relations in Argentina). Moreover, judges are hardly immune from bribery and corruption, in which conservative forces may more often have the resources to engage. In short, for multiple reasons, political forces are more likely to use high courts to challenge progressive action than to endorse it, and high courts more likely to strike down progressive policies than to uphold them.

Wealthy elites also influence policy through more informal channels, including campaign finance, bribery, and the media. Election campaigns and other forms of democratic competition open a conduit of influence for those with the means to wield it. The control that conservative, pro-business forces wielded over leading private media outlets in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and other democracies during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries almost certainly influenced both electoral outcomes and policy debates. In addition, clientelistic practices continue to limit inclusionary reform in Latin America (Stokes 1991, 2005; Hagopian 1996; Debs and Helmke 2010). Clientelist vote-buying can undermine poor citizens' capacity to translate their preferences into policy – and in many cases, steers their votes toward more conservative parties. Clientelism also affects interest group politics. As Palmer-Rubin (this volume) shows, clientelist linkages between parties and popular sector interest groups dampen programmatic demands, thereby weakening pressure for inclusionary reform. Finally, clientelism undermines the implementation of inclusionary social policies (see Garay, Hunter, and Dunning and Novaes, this volume). Indeed, as Dunning and Novaes show, even ambitious inclusionary policies adopted by programmatic left-wing governments may be seriously hindered by clientelism.

Thus, while democratic persistence empowers popular sector actors and creates incentives for politicians to make inclusionary appeals, opponents may use the same channels to block or hinder inclusion. They may also deploy their often-considerable resources in defense of the status quo. These efforts are frequently successful – so much so that Albertus, in his comparative study of land reform processes across Latin America, concluded that "democracies are less likely to implement redistributive reform programs than autocracies" (2015, 20).

Indeed, conservative opposition to inclusion has at times generated a somewhat paradoxical outcome. In an effort to circumvent conservative obstacles to inclusionary reform (or in response to threats of conservative reaction), some democratically elected governments took steps to weaken and/or dismantle basic democratic institutions and norms. Chapters by Elkins, Handlin, and Mazzuca (this volume), for instance, all illustrate how the inclusionary forces released by democratic politics have, in some cases, encouraged authoritarian behavior. Elkins's chapter highlights the incentives that inclusionary governments may have to rewrite the rules of the game in an effort to weaken or sideline their opponents – as occurred, to varying degrees, through constitutional replacement and amendment in Bolivia under Evo Morales, Ecuador under Correa, and Venezuela under Chávez. He also points out how the obstacles posed by democratic institutions may create incentives for governments seeking to advance an inclusionary agenda to *concentrate* power by circumventing or weakening institutional constraints (see also Madrid et al. 2010 and Weyland 2013).

Whereas the aforementioned examples speak to ways in which democracy can engender a *desire* among inclusionary leaders to move in an authoritarian direction, Mazzuca's chapter highlights how the commodities boom lent some governments the *capacity* to do so. Specifically, commodity rents allowed inclusionary governments in weakly institutionalized regimes to use social spending to build electorally dominant "rentier populist" coalitions that gave them the support needed to employ plebiscitary strategies to undermine constitutional checks and concentrate power. The commodities boom may thus also have had a double-edged effect on democracy, with consequences for inclusion: the revenue it generated permitted unprecedented social spending while simultaneously empowering some governments to rule in an increasingly despotic manner. This relationship highlights an interesting contrast: the regimes that have emerged in the Andes in the last two decades bear a resemblance to the "delegative democracies" that O'Donnell (1994) posited emerged in the 1990s in certain Latin American countries. However, while O'Donnell argued that the latter emerged during economic crisis, Mazzuca's observation suggests that the former have emerged in part due to economic abundance.

In sum, even as we argue that enduring democracy facilitates the emergence of inclusionary politics and policymaking, democracy itself also creates opportunities for well-endowed conservative forces to mobilize against inclusionary reforms. To some degree, these dynamics simply

represent the expected push and pull of democracy. Yet paradoxically, opposition to inclusion *also* creates incentives for some inclusionary governments to weaken the very democratic institutions that enabled their rise in the first place.

The Paradox of State Weakness

State weakness may also create obstacles to inclusion. Indeed, if deep inequality and sustained democratization are the principal impetus behind the inclusionary turn of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, persistent state weakness may be the principal obstacle to its effective implementation.[38] Where such weakness is pervasive, constitutionalized recognition is less likely to be respected, new participatory institutions are less likely be effective, and redistributive social policies are less likely to reach targeted beneficiaries.

State weakness almost invariably has *exclusionary* consequences (O'Donnell 1993, 2001; Caldeira 2000; Brinks 2007). The wealthy can thrive with a weak state, for they have alternatives: they can rely on private schools, private doctors, and private security; when they must deal with the state, they can turn to well-connected friends and, if necessary, bribes. The poor generally lack these options. Consequently, they must rely on public schools, public hospitals and health clinics, and public security, and often have no alternative to depending on inept, corrupt, abusive, and even complicit state bureaucrats.

Moreover, as O'Donnell (1993) so compellingly observed, in large swaths of territory in Latin America, because of state weakness, the legal system (e.g. law, courts, police, prosecutors, and so on) is experienced unequally across classes or territory, often leading to the egregious victimization of the poor and trampling of their rights.[39] States' inability – or unwillingness – to protect citizens, especially the poor, from skyrocketing homicide rates in multiple Latin American countries (including Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil) is arguably the most chilling example of how weak and complicit states (especially the police and military) undermine the regional inclusionary turn by

---

[38] See Centeno (2002); O'Donnell (1993); Soifer (2015); Centeno et al. (2017); Handlin (2017).

[39] See O'Donnell (1993, 1999); Caldeira (2000); Yashar (2005), 2018; Brinks (2007); Giraudy and Luna (2017).

disempowering individuals and atomizing society.[40] In short, weak states are almost always associated with low-quality citizenship for the poor.

As a result, state deficiencies are associated with lower levels of public trust in political parties and other democratic institutions, and higher levels of public disaffection with the status quo. It is thus in weak states such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, that crises of democratic representation are particularly severe and populist anti-system appeals are most likely to succeed (Mainwaring 2006; Handlin 2017, this volume). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that politicians touting the most radical inclusionary projects have had the greatest electoral success in the Andean region (Cameron, and Handlin, this volume). Empowered by electoral support, radical populists such as Chávez, Correa, and Morales, took office with ambitious inclusionary agendas: they promised "revolutions" or new foundations aimed at "Twenty-First-Century Socialism" or an end to 500 years of exclusion.

Precisely because they inherited weak states, however, Andean populists have been poorly equipped to *actually implement* inclusionary reforms (see Cameron, and Handlin, this volume). The ability to create and sustain new participatory institutions and deliver new social benefits and services requires basic infrastructural power (Mann 1984). Yet this kind of infrastructural power has been in short supply in many parts of Latin America, and in particular in the Andes and Central America. Moreover, revolutionary proclamations notwithstanding, enhancing state capacity is a difficult, complicated project on which radical governments could make little progress in the short term. Thus, although the Bolivian, Ecuadorean, and Venezuelan governments benefited from soaring commodities exports, enabling them to dramatically expand social welfare programs, the weak state infrastructures they inherited limited the effectiveness of service delivery (Vazquez-D'Elia 2014). The result was often *more* inclusionary "parchment" but not necessarily better effects. State deficiency has become especially pronounced in Venezuela, where the Bolivarian state is less and less able to deliver basic social services or protect its citizens from violent crime. State underperformance, in turn, generated public discontent, particularly after the end of the commodities boom, and especially in Venezuela, where the Maduro government used increasingly authoritarian means to stay in power.

[40] See also Brinks (2007); Magaloni et al. (2015); Durán Martínez (2015, 2018); Lessing (2015, 2017); Yashar (2018).

In sum, state weakness simultaneously creates demands for and inhibits greater inclusion. Inclusionary projects built upon weak states face distinctive problems of political and practical sustainability. Over time, ineffective and/or coercive implementation of inclusionary reforms can generate widespread frustration and perceptions of injustice among the very citizens who are expected – and who expect – to benefit from those reforms (Mainwaring 2006). That discontent, in turn, can erode public support for inclusionary projects and for the parties that sponsor them, undermining inclusionary electoral coalitions and thus hampering further reform. For radical inclusionary movements, then, state weakness can be cruelly double-edged: it can both fuel their rise and speed their demise.

The Paradox of Participation

Finally, reforms aimed at fostering political inclusion via the creation of new participatory institutions may also prove double-edged. The opening of new channels for participation does not guarantee an increase in *popular* participation. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that, in a pluralist context (i.e. one without state intervention to subsidize participation), wealthier and better educated citizens are disproportionately likely to participate in politics (Schattsneider 1960, 35; Verba et al. 1995). By and large, elites and middle-class citizens possess more time, resources, and skills to participate than do low-income citizens. Unless steps are taken to encourage popular participation (e.g. some form of state subsidy), the risk of new participatory institutions being dominated by wealthier citizens – what Collier (this volume) calls "class representational distortion" – will be high.[41] In such contexts, even if participatory institutions raise the absolute level of popular participation, they may actually *reduce* the share of popular participation relative to the rest of society. Indeed, studies of who actually engages with new participatory institutions in Latin America suggests that the record has been quite mixed (Avritzer 2009; Mayka and Rich, and Goldfrank, this volume).

Moreover, the more inclusionary politics become, the narrower, more routine, and more regularized participation may become. That is, participation may be more likely to be channeled through electoral and partisan avenues than street protests; voting levels may be sustained only where it

---

[41] We thank Jason Seawright for emphasizing this point.

is mandated; and the very social movements that successfully demanded inclusion might lose their convocatory powers once inclusionary reforms are passed and implemented. In short, the institutionalization of participation may paradoxically lead to its normalization and attenuation – a point made by scholars writing from very different political persuasions (see Almond and Verba 1965; Huntington 1968; Piven and Cloward 1977; and Alvarez and Escobar 1992, for example).

The only way to sustain popular participation may be to subsidize or mandate it. Yet, if states heavily subsidize participation, as in the case of state corporatism in mid-twentieth-century Latin America (Collier and Collier 1979, 1991), a different dilemma emerges. Access to state benefits (or what Collier and Collier 1979 call "inducements") may encourage the mobilization and participation of the popular sectors but may also provide governments with tools to manipulate and control popular sector actors. Inevitably, state-led initiatives aimed at mobilizing popular sectors simultaneously enhance state control over those actors.

To be sure, Latin American polities are far more democratic today than they were seventy years ago: politicians depend heavily on popular sector constituencies for electoral support, and are unlikely to employ the coercive tools used by earlier populist leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas, Juan Perón, and Getúlio Vargas. Yet as we suggested previously, and the chapters by Goldfrank, Mayka and Rich, and Palmer-Rubin all highlight, there are important parallels between the corporatist structures that mediated state and popular sector relations during the twentieth century and the nominally participatory or deliberative institutions in contemporary Latin America. Current state–society relations still entail *both* inducement and constraints, despite the balance being tilted more heavily toward the former than was true in the past (Collier and Collier 1979). And participation in the form of popular mobilization still creates a trade-off for popular sectors and political elites alike: popular sectors need to balance the lure of increased access against the possibility of increased cooptation (or loss of autonomy); political elites may view emergent social actors at once as potential allies and potential threats (to social order, to governability, or to powerful economic interests).

CONCLUSION: SUSTAINING AND CONSOLIDATING CITIZENSHIP

This chapter has grappled with a set of profound sociopolitical changes that began in Latin America as the twentieth century ended and

accelerated as the twenty-first century began. We conceptualized inclusion broadly and then concentrated on state policies and reforms that enhanced recognition, access, and resources of previously marginalized groups (with a focus on the popular sectors, in particular). We described the general contours of, and identified some trends in, the region's contemporary inclusionary turn. We argued that the turn was made possible by the unprecedented endurance of democracy in the context of deep and persistent inequality, and we identified some hypotheses that may help to account for intra-regional variation in inclusionary reforms. Finally, we highlighted several paradoxes that attend and complicate inclusionary politics.

In this brief conclusion, we turn to the sustainability and meaningfulness of inclusionary reform in contemporary Latin America. Movement toward greater inclusion is neither inevitable nor irreversible, even under democracy. Democracy may facilitate inclusionary politics in the long run, but in the short-to-medium term, the vagaries of politics invariably yield diverse outcomes. The simultaneous introduction of reforms both promoting and limiting inclusion (as with the adoption in the 1990s of reforms aimed at augmenting recognition and access alongside exclusionary neoliberal reforms), and episodes of conservative pushback following periods of inclusionary progress (as in post-2016 Brazil and post-2019 Bolivia), are to be expected.

Inclusionary outcomes are also shaped by the economic context. The commodities boom arguably accelerated the process of inclusion, particularly resource-related reforms. So too, falling commodity prices and lower growth rates – in particular, in the dire economic context of the Covid-19 pandemic – could provide leaders a justification to limit social and economic programs, likely exacerbating distributive conflict.

The sustainability of inclusionary reforms will also hinge, in part, on the international landscape. The unprecedented coexistence of inclusion and liberal democracy in the 1990s and 2000s was facilitated by highly favorable international conditions, including the end of the Cold War and the absence of viable regional alternatives to democracy. Even under these distinctively auspicious conditions, however, signs of tension emerged. In Honduras and Paraguay, elites used undemocratic means to abort mild inclusionary projects. In Bolivia and Venezuela, inclusionary projects triggered intense and violent polarization that threw democratic regimes into serious crisis. Partly as a result, inclusionary governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Bolivia, concluded that the success of their political and socioeconomic projects required a

concentration of power that threatened liberal rights and institutions of horizontal accountability. If parts of the international environment have had the positive effect on inclusion that we posit, and if these sort of tensions and paradoxes emerged even under these favorable international circumstances, the recent global turn toward illiberalism could bode poorly for the longevity of the region's inclusionary reforms. The rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil and the 2019 overthrow of Evo Morales in Bolivia are especially troubling developments in this regard.

Nonetheless, as long as democratic institutions predominate in Latin America, extant inclusionary reforms may endure. Inclusionary social welfare policies are often sticky (Pierson 1994) as their rollback tends to be unpopular and politically difficult. Rights that have been formally extended are rarely withdrawn formally under democracy. Thus, while democracy persists, there may be limits to the degree to which even the most powerful conservative movements can put the inclusionary genie back in the bottle. Indeed, most of the conservative administrations that have followed inclusion-oriented governments in Latin America in recent years – Macri in Argentina, Piñera in Chile – have been reluctant to roll back inclusionary reforms (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017). The Bolsonaro government in Brazil, however, represents a stark exception. Within days of taking office in January 2019, Brazil's new leader had already threatened to dismantle a range of inclusionary reforms, particularly those that provide recognition, access, and resources to racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. To what degree democratic norms will constrain Bolsonaro from rolling back inclusionary reforms, and to what extent his exclusionary politics will diffuse across the region, remain to be seen.

Even if the inclusionary reforms of the last quarter century manage to survive, at least on parchment, the more fundamental question of whether these reforms will consolidate into meaningful citizenship remains open. The answer will depend upon the degree to which parchment promises are put into practice. The formal instantiation of inclusionary aspirations has already had a profound impact in Latin America. However, as is well known, a vast gap often exists between reforming constitutions and institutions declaring rights, designing policies and programs, and passing laws, on the one hand, and the implementation and enforcement of those norms on the other.[42] A persistent gap between parchment innovations and their practical effects could inhibit the inclusionary turn from

---

[42] This dichotomy is nicely captured by the distinction the law and society literature draws between "law on the books" and "law in action" (Pound 1910).

generating more meaningful citizenship in contemporary Latin America.[43] It is thus critical that we assess the size and content of the parchment–practice gaps that materialize and seek to explain why the implementation and effect of inclusionary reforms varies across the region.

States will play a crucial role. State strength and state capacity can significantly affect the speed, scope, and degree of implementation of inclusionary reforms, as the chapters by Cameron, Handlin, Mazzuca, and Elkins all highlight. Without a doubt, state strength and capacity vary across Latin America and within countries. Yet the issue is even more complicated. The various goals that states set out to achieve – order, development, inclusion – often require different kinds of state capacity (and governing coalitions); achieving some goals requires control at the center; achieving others requires infrastructural power throughout the country (Centeno et al. 2017, chap. 1).

Politics also matters. While effective state institutions are essential for inclusion, they only matter to the degree that political actors deploy them for inclusionary ends (Centeno et al. 2017, chaps. 1 and 15). The relationship between state capacity and inclusion is mediated by political actors' will and capacity to wield state power in ways that augment inclusion. As such, social movements, parties, and the coalitions they construct strongly influence how inclusionary politics develop and if inclusionary reforms are implemented.

Focusing on politics raises another important issue, one that Roberts insightfully highlights in the volume's concluding chapter: while Latin America has grown more inclusionary, the class-based actors with a capacity to mobilize collectively and scale up to the national level, such as organized labor and labor-based parties, have weakened across the region. The diverse movements and organizations that have emerged in their place are more diffuse, fragmented, and decentralized, with more limited capacity for scaling up and sustaining collective mobilization (see Collier and Handlin 2009; and Collier, this volume).

Uncertainties over the future of inclusionary politics have been exacerbated by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020. In Latin

---

[43] Even if reforms are effectively implemented, societal attitudes and behaviors may be slow to adapt. The introduction of constitutional reforms recognizing indigenous people does not mean that nonindigenous citizens will treat them equally. Decentralization and establishing participatory institutions are important first steps, but they do not automatically generate more participatory politics.

America, it is clear that the pandemic's massive human and economic toll will fall disproportionately on the poor, including Afro-Latin and indigenous communities, and that the associated fiscal crisis will likely strain redistributive social policy initiatives. The crisis may also weaken, at least temporarily, efforts at popular sector organization and mobilization. Indeed, the cycle of mobilization that the region witnessed in late 2019 and early 2020 was quashed by the outbreak. At the same time, the enormous state and policy deficiencies exposed by the public health crisis may also strengthen demands for a more activist state to provide broader social protection.

Overall, the contemporary inclusionary turn has deepened citizenship for millions of Latin Americans who had previously lacked recognition, access, and resources. Yet whether this inclusionary turn will consolidate into broad and effective citizenship across the region is anything but clear. There are theoretical reasons for both pessimism and optimism. We hope this volume energizes and accelerates an emerging debate about these and related issues, which could prove so consequential for politics, and the popular sectors, in contemporary Latin America.

References

Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 2018. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1965. *The Civic Culture*. Little, Brown & Company.

Alvarez, Sonia, and Arturo Escobar. 1992. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Arce, Moises, and Paul Bellinger. 2007. "Low Intensity Democracy Revisited: The Effects of Economic Liberalization on Political Activity in Latin America." *World Politics* 60(1): 97 121.

Avritzer, Leonardo. 2009. *Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Bejarano, Ana María, and Renata Segura. 2004. "Transforming Politics into Constitutions: The Politics of Constitution Making in Latin America." Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 2 5.

Bellinger, Paul, and Moises Arce. 2011. "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era." *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3): 688 704.

Berrios, Ruben, Andrae Marak, and Scott Morgenstern. 2011. "Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin America: Economics and Political Ideology." *Review of International Political Economy* 18(5): 673 697.

Birdsall, Nancy, Nora Lustig, and Darryl McLeod. 2012. In "Declining Inequality in Latin America: Some Economics, Some Politics," edited by Peter Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar. *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Bob, Clifford. 2005. *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brinks, Daniel M. 2007. *The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Brazil: Inequality and the Rule of Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brinks, Daniel M., and Varun Gauri. 2014. "The Law's Majestic Equality? The Distributive Impact of Judicializing Social and Economic Rights." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): 375 393.

Brinks, Daniel M., Steven Levitsky, and María Victoria Murillo. 2019. *Understanding Institutional Weakness: Power and Design in Latin American Institutions*. Cambridge Elements Series. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brysk, Alison. 2000. *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Caldeira, Teresa P. R. 2000. *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cameron, Maxwell. 2016. "After Incorporation in Latin America." Presented at "New Patterns of Inclusion in Latin America" workshop, Princeton, NJ, May 20 21.

Cameron, Maxwell A. and Eric Hershberg, eds. 2010. *Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Cameron, Maxwell, and Kenneth Sharpe. 2012. "Institutionalized Voice in Latin American Democracies." In *New Institutions for Participatory Democracy in Latin America: Voice and Consequence*, edited by Maxwell Cameron, Eric Hershberg, and Kenneth Sharpe, 231 250. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Campello, Daniela. 2015. *The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America: Globalization and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America*. University Park: Pennsylavnia State University Press.

Centeno, Miguel, Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar. 2017. *States in the Developing World*. Cambridge University Press.

Chalmers, Douglas A., Scott B. Martin, and Kerianne Piester. 1997. "Associative Networks: New Structures of Representation for the Popular Sectors?" In *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation*, edited by Douglas A. Chalmers, Carlos M. Vilas, Katherine Hite, Scott B. Martin, Kerianne Piester, and Monique Segarra, 540 582. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chartock, Sarah. 2013. "'Corporatism with Adjectives'? Conceptualizing Civil Society Incorporation and Indigenous Participation in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 55(2): 52 76.

Collier, David, ed. 1979. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collier, David, and Ruth Berins Collier. 1977. "Who Does What to Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, edited by James Malloy, 489 512. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

  1979. "Inducements vs. Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism." *American Political Science Review* 73(4): 967 986.

  1991. *Shaping the Political Arena*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collier, Ruth Berins, and Samuel Handlin, eds. 2009. *Reorganizing Popular Politics: Participation and the New Interest Regime in Latin America*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 2009. "Democracy: Conceptual Hierarchies in Comparative Research." In *Concepts and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*, edited by David Collier and John Gerring, 269 288. New York: Routledge.

Cramer, Brian D., and Robert R. Kaufman. 2011. "Views of Economic Inequality in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(9): 1206 1237.

De la O, Ana. 2015. *Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Debs, Alexandre and Gretchen Helmke. 2010. "Inequality under Democracy: Explaining the Left Decade in Latin America." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5: 209 241.

Díaz Cayeros, Alberto, Federico Estévez, and Beatriz Magaloni. 2016. *The Political Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Durán Martínez, Angélica. 2015. "To Kill and Tell? State Power, Criminal Competition, and Drug Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (December): 1377 1402.

  2018. *The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Escobar, Arturo, and Sonia Alvarez, eds. 1992. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Fairfield, Tasha, and Candelaria Garay. 2017. "Redistribution under the Right in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Organized Actors in Policymaking." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(14): 1871 1906.

Flores Macías, Gustavo. 2012. *After Neoliberalism? The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Garay, Candelaria. 2016. *Including Outsiders: Social Mobilization, Electoral Competition, and Social Policy Expansion in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gargarella, Roberto. 2014. "Latin American Constitutionalism: Social Rights and the 'Engine Room' of the Constitution." *Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law* 14(1): 9 18.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lange. 1995. "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change." *International Organization* 49(4): 627 655.

Gauri, Varun, and Daniel M. Brinks, eds. 2008. *Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Giraudy, Agustina. 2015. *Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Giraudy, Agustina, and Juan Pablo Luna. 2017. "Unpacking the State's Uneven Territorial Reach: Evidence from Latin America." In *States in the Developing World*, edited by Miguel Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar, 93 120. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goldfrank, Benjamin. 2011. *Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America: Participation, Decentralization, and the Left*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Hagopian, Frances. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

1998. "Democracy and Political Representation in Latin America in the 1990s: Pause, Reorganization, or Decline?" In *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post Transition Latin America*, edited by Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark, 99 145. Miami, FL: North South Center Press.

Handlin, Samuel. 2017. *State Crisis in Fragile Democracies: Polarization and Political Regimes in South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hartlyn, Jonathan, and Juan Pablo Luna. 2009. "Constitutional Reform in Contemporary Latin America: A Framework for Analysis." Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, June 11 14.

Hilbink, Lisa. 2008. "Assessing the New Constitutionalism." *Comparative Politics* 40(2): 227 245.

Hoffman, Kelly, and Miguel Angel Centeno. 2003. "The Lopsided Continent: Inequality in Latin America." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29: 363 390.

Holland, Alisha, and Ben Ross Schneider. 2017. "Easy and Hard Redistribution: The Political Economy of Welfare States in Latin America." *Perspectives on Politics* 15(4): 988 1006.

Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2012. *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ingram, Matthew C. 2016.*Crafting Courts in New Democracies: The Politics of Subnational Judicial Reform in Brazil and Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jenson, Jane, and Susan D. Phillips. 1996. "Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada." *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, issue on Citizenship and Rights 14(Fall): 111 136.

Kapiszewski, Diana. 2012. *High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 23(1): 1 21.

   2003. "The Vicious Cycle of Inequality in Latin America." In *What Justice? Whose Justice? Fighting for Fairness in Latin America*, edited by Susan Eckstein and Timothy Wickham Crowley, 133 157. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaufman, Robert. 2009. "The Political Effects of Inequality in Latin America: Some Inconvenient Facts." *Comparative Politics* 41(3): 359 379.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kurtz, Marcus. 2004. "The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America." *World Politics* 56(2): 262 302.

Lessing, Benjamin. 2015. "Logics of Violence in Criminal War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (December): 1486 1516.

   2017. *Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts. eds. 2011. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. *Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems*. New York: Basic Books.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lomelí, Enrique Valencia. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of Their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475 498.

López Calva, Luis F., and Nora Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Lowi, T. 1964. "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory." *World Politics* 16(4): 677 715.

Lucero, José Antonio. 2008. *Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes*. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Luna, Juan Pablo, and Fernando Filgueira. 2009. "The Left Turns as Multiple Paradigmatic Crises." *Third World Quarterly* 30(2): 371 395.

Lustig, Nora. 2015. "Most Unequal on Earth." *Finance & Development* 52(3): 14 16.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Edgar Franco, and Vanessa Melo. 2015. "Killing in the Slums: An Impact Evaluation of Police Reform in Rio de Janeiro." CDDRL Working Paper, Stanford University.

Mainwaring, Scott. 2006. "The Crisis of Representation in the Andes." *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3): 13 27.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Anibal Pérez Liñán. 2014. *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, Michael. 1984. *The Autonomous Power of the State*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Marshall, T. H. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mayka, Lindsay. 2019. *Building Participatory Institutions in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mazzuca, Sebastián. 2013. "Natural Resources Boom and Institutional Curses in the New Political Economy of South America." In *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* (4th ed.), edited by Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter, 102 126. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): 914 927.

Merhof, Katrin. 2015. "Building a Bridge between Reality and the Constitution: The Establishment and Development of the Colombian Constitutional Court." *I*Con* 13(3): 714 732.

Nichter, Simeon. 2018. "The Politics of Vote Buying: Brazil in Comparative Perspective." Unpublished manuscript.

Niedzwiecki, Sara, and Jennifer Pribble. 2017. "Social Policies and Center Right Governments in Argentina and Chile." *Latin American Politics and Society* 35(3): 72 97.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

1993. "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Some Postcommunist Countries." *World Development* 21(8): 1355 1369.

1994. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5(1): 55 69.

2001. "Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36: 7 36.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

O'Neill, Kathleen. 2005. *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Oxhorn, Philip, and Graciela Ducatenzeiler, eds. 1998. *What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of Market? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Pierson, Paul. 1994. *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed and How They Fail*. Vintage Press.

Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.

Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman. 2003. "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change During the Neoliberal Era." *Latin American Research Review* 38(1): 41 82.

Pound, Roscoe. 1910. "Law in Books and Law in Action." *American Law Review* 44(1): 12 36.

Pribble, Jennifer. 2013. *Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Richardson, Neal P. 2009. "Export Oriented Populism: Commodities and Coalitions in Argentina." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44(3): 228 255.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 1998. *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

   2002. "Social Inequalities without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(4): 3 33.

   2008. "The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 327 349.

   2014. *Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rossi, Federico M. 2015. "The Second Wave of Incorporation in Latin America: A Conceptualization of the Quest for Inclusion Applied to Argentina." *Latin American Politics and Society* 57(1): 1 21.

Rossi, Federico M., and Eduardo Silva, eds. 2018. *Reshaping the Political Arena: From Resisting Neoliberalism to the Second Incorporation*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Samuels, David, and Richard Snyder. 2001. "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Political Science* 31(4): 651 671.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64(4): 1033 1053.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston.

Segura, Renata, and Ana María Bejarano. 2004. "Ni Una Asamblea Más Sin Nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution Making in the Andes." *Constellations* 11(2): 217 236.

Selee, Andrew, and Enrique Peruzzotti, eds. 2009. *Participatory Innovation and Representative Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Alfred Knopf.

Sieder, Rachel, ed. 2002. *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity, and Democracy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Silva, Eduardo. 2009. *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

2012. "Exchange Rising? Karl Polanyi and Contentious Politics in Contemporary Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 53(3): 1 32.

Simmons, Erica S. 2016. *Meaningful Resistance: Market Reforms and the Roots of Social Protest in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Soifer, Hillel David. 2015. *State Building in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1992. "Challenging the Nation State in Latin America." *Journal of International Affairs* 45(2): 421 440.

Stokes, Susan C. 1991. "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections from a Lima Shantytown." *Latin American Research Review* 26(2): 75 101.

2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315 325.

Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

2008. *Radical Democracy in the Andes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vázquez D'Elia, Javier. 2014. "(Re)Shaping the Political Arena? A Comparative Study of Welfare Regime Reforms in Latin America, 1980 2010." PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Vink, Maarten. 2017. "Comparing Citizenship Regimes" In *The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship*, edited by Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad, and Maarten Vink, 221 244. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wampler, Brian. 2009. *Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Weyland, Kurt. 2009. "The Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory." *Comparative Politics* 41(2): 145 164.

2010. "The Politics and Performance of the Contestatory and Moderate Left." In *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, edited by Kurt Weyland, Raul L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, 1 27. New York: Cambridge University Press.

2013. "Latin America's Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left." *Journal of Democracy* 24(3): 18 32.

Weyland, Kurt, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds. 2010. *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, Bruce M. 2009. "Institutional Reform and Right Revolutions in Latin America: The Cases of Costa Rica and Colombia." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1(2): 59 85.

Wilson, Bruce M., and Juan Carlos Rodríguez Cordero. 2006. "Legal Opportunity Structures and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(3): 325 351.

Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    2018. *Homicidal Ecologies: Illicit Economies and Complicit States in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix

FIGURE 1.2 Total yearly and cumulative inclusionary reforms for each country in Latin America

FIGURE 1.3 Cumulative yearly inclusionary reforms by type for each country in Latin America

FIGURE 1.3 (*cont.*)

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

Reform Type
— Access
— Recognition
⋯ Resources

FIGURE 1.3 (*cont.*)