Inequality, Protests, and the Progressive Allocation of Cash Transfers in the Argentine Provinces

Ernesto Calvo
Lorena Moscovich

ABSTRACT

In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.

In the last 20 years, a wealth of scholarly research has sought support for a purported relationship between inequality, democratic competition, and redistribution. Taking as a point of departure the well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes, scores of researchers have ventured into individual, national, and cross-national datasets in search of evidence. This research generated considerable excitement as an elegant theory connected democracy and progressive redistribution at a fundamental level. Indeed, if electorally motivated parties have an incentive to reduce inequality by addressing the preferences of the median voter, then democratic competition should lead not only to desirable political outcomes but also to a more equitable distribution of income.

Results, however, were disappointing. From the outset, evidence was mixed at best, often supporting the alternative hypothesis that more unequal societies were also less likely to redistribute resources (Lindert 2004; Pontusson and Rueda 2010;

Ernesto Calvo is a professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. ecalvo@umd.edu. Lorena Moscovich is an assistant professor of political science at the Universidad de San Andrés. lmoscovich@udesa.edu.ar

DOI: 10.1111/laps.12016

Huber and Stephens 2012; Ansell and Samuels 2014). As confirmatory evidence faltered, scholars proposed amendments to the original theory, sorting out confounding factors and adding ad hoc mechanisms to fit a variety of adjusted models of inequality and redistribution.[1]

Much of the emerging research emphasized how issue salience and agency (e.g., parties, unions, and mobilization) interact with existing inequality to bring about progressive redistribution. The leading challenge to the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis came from the Power Resource Theory (PRT), which argued that greater inequality is not necessarily brought to the attention of voters or acknowledged in political discourses. Instead, as stated by Huber and Stephens (2012), a "greater distance between the median and the mean income tends to be accompanied by a more skewed distribution of political power and thus lower responsiveness to demands for redistribution" (2012, 11).

Indeed, it is not enough for inequality to exist, but it has to be recognized as a political priority as well. Challenges to the Meltzer-Richard model of inequality and redistribution consequently focused on the mediating effects of belief systems, social organizations, or political institutions (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Moene and Wallerstein 2001).[2]

The challenge from PRT to the proponents of the Meltzer-Richard model of inequality and redistribution was twofold. Models should account for the mechanisms that relay information of higher inequality to the voters and the political actors, and models should distinguish economic incentives from political ones, as higher inequality may increase distributive incentives but also demobilize voters.

This study tests for the effect of inequality on redistribution conditional on social mobilization. It contends that protests raise the salience of inequality among voters, signaling to political entrepreneurs the importance of redistribution (Lodola 2005). To this end, it provides an original measure of redistribution that considers a variety of income sources, such as wages, rents, retirement benefits, and cash transfers.

To test for the effects of inequality and protests on redistribution, this study uses as its dependent variable the regressive-progressive allocation of government subsidies to workers and nonworkers in Argentina (cash transfers).[3] It takes advantage of cross-sectional time series income surveys by the Argentine Census Bureau (INDEC) in urban conglomerates from 2003 through 2011. Using Gini decomposition techniques on a variety of income sources (wages, rents, retirement benefits, and cash transfers, among others), we estimate the contribution of each income source to the overall Gini of voters in Argentina. Our analyses test for the direct effect of inequality on redistribution as well as for the effect of social protests at different levels of prior inequality (e.g., the conditional effect of protests on inequality). Findings align with research that describes a Robin Hood paradox in democratic redistribution, wherein more unequal societies redistribute resources regressively while more equal societies redistribute resources progressively. In the Argentine provinces we confirm that in the absence of protests, inequality breeds more regressive social spending.

In the last 15 years, across most of Latin America, significant declines in income inequality have been observed. Describing the particular case of Argentina, Lustig et al. (2013) report significant gains in wages among employed workers and add, "Within non-labor income, the changes in the marginal distribution of government transfers accounted for the lion's share of the decline in [inequality], and the main contributing factor was the large expansion in coverage of government transfers" (Lustig et al. 2013, 5).

Our exploration of inequality in the Argentine provinces provides little support for the Meltzer-Richard model of inequality and redistribution in its original form. Like much of the current research, this study finds that—in the absence of social protests—higher income inequality results in more regressive rather than more progressive allocation of government subsidies. However, our results find support for a conditional effect of inequality on redistribution in the presence of social protests.[4] That is, in highly unequal environments, protests yield larger gains than in more egalitarian environments. Thus, in highly unequal provinces, social protests yield larger redistributive gains than in more egalitarian provinces.

These findings align with those of Pontusson and Rueda (2007), who find that social mobilization reduces wage inequality and does so more dramatically in more unequal societies. However, our results differ from theirs in two very important ways. Pontusson and Rueda consider unionization and turnout as signals of mobilization, which, in our view, better describes labor strength. In the empirical section, we implement a fixed effect autoregressive (AR1) model, which both is extremely conservative and takes the cross-district effects of unionization and turnout out of the equation. Our results cannot be explained by unionization and turnout, which remain relatively constant, but instead require observable shocks that vary within provinces over time, such as protests. Second, and more important, results show that overall protests have a larger redistributive effect than union protests taken separately. Furthermore, by decomposing the different sources of inequality, results show that protests have a larger effect on cash transfers than on the primary wages of workers. In all, findings show that protests reduce overall inequality and, more important, have a measurable effect on the progressive allocation of cash transfers. Therefore, although our arguments bear a family resemblance to those of Pontusson and Rueda (2007), both the proposed mechanisms and the estimation strategy differ.

The article is organized as follows. The next section presents survey data on voters' perception of inequality, which we consider a crucial determinant of redistributive intent. Recent changes in inequality and social mobilization in the Argentine provinces are described. Gini decomposition estimates for a variety of income sources are presented, which allows for an assessment of the progressive or regressive nature of cash transfers in the Argentine provinces. The following section estimates the relationship between inequality and redistribution, conditioning on the level of protests.

Inequality and Redistribution

Recent studies of inequality and redistribution were heavily influenced by the model proposed by Meltzer and Richard three decades ago. Their theory was elegant and its implications far-reaching. Given that the income of the median voter is smaller than the average individual income, a decisive median voter who favors redistribution should create incentives for parties to implement policies that lower income inequality: "The basic intuition is that low income earners have more to gain and less to lose from expansions of welfare spending than persons with high incomes" (Moene and Wallerstein 2001).[5]

While economists and political scientists embraced the redistributive logic of Meltzer and Richard, the implications of the model found no support in early empirical studies. Instead, analyses of social spending and wage inequality in OECD countries proved that more equal societies display larger levels of social spending (Perotti 1996). Furthermore, individual-level income data proved that the median voter was not a net beneficiary of redistribution in most democracies (Milanovic 2000).

Answering these challenges, authors such as Moene and Wallerstein (2001) argued that a negative relationship between inequality and redistribution was the result of an insurance logic that concealed the redistributive pressures of the Meltzer-Richard models. Wealthier and less unequal societies, they argued, expand social spending to insure voters against unemployment, health risks, and old age. Consequently, the effect of inequality on redistribution is dampened by the insurance function of welfare states.[6] Soon afterward, other rival theories were proposed. Alessina and Angeletos (2005) argued that different belief systems across countries affect the extent to which voters demand redistribution and welfare spending. Iversen and Soskice (2006), Rueda and Pontusson (2007), Lupu and Pontusson (2011), and Anderson and Beramendi (2012) incorporated leftist parties, social mobilization, and electoral rules, which altered the workings of the Meltzer-Richard model. Over all, the question raised by these models was whether inequality was observed by voters and whether it led to policy change. Indeed, it was not enough for income inequality to be present; it had to be recognized by the median voter as well.

An alternative argument connecting inequality and redistribution, the Power Resource Theory, argued that changes in income inequality also result in changes in the organization of democratic politics (Huber and Stephens 2012). Given that income inequality increases the disposable resources of the wealthy, it also provides an increased capacity to invest resources, secure existing wealth, and improve the economic position of the economic elites. In other words, inequality provides new opportunities for the wealthy to augment their income. As previously noted, the empirical question underlying Power Resource Theory was not whether higher inequality is less preferred by the median voter but whether political incentives align with those preferences. The comparison can be expressed in two hypotheses.

H_{1A}. Meltzer-Richard: Higher inequality at t_0 increases the demand for redistribution, leading to progressive redistribution at t_1.

H_{1B}. PRT: Higher inequality at t_0 increases the relative power of wealthy actors, leading to regressive redistribution at t_1.

Observing Inequality

The most important question underlying these arguments, however, is whether inequality is observed by voters and dealt with by politicians. This is far from a settled question. Survey data provide evidence that inequality is not always observed by voters or described as a political priority in making voting decisions. Three recent surveys in Argentina found that inequality was cited as the most important problem by just 1 percent to 2 percent of all respondents (Lupu et al. 2015; ENPEA 2015; Latinobarómetro 2015; Escolar 2016). The Latinobarómetro surveys report similar findings for the years considered in this article, 2003 and 2009. In all seven surveys, inequality is reported as the most important problem by less than 2 percent of the respondents, not just in Argentina but in every country of Latin America. This is in stark contrast to the top five most important problems listed by Argentine respondents: crime, the economy, unemployment, low wages, and poverty. While it is true that low wages and poverty have a direct effect on most measures of inequality, respondents who favored low wages and poverty as the most important problems were marginally more likely to report that "there is too much inequality" when the question was asked.

As Blofield and Luna note, "It is well established that Latin America has the highest income and wealth inequalities in the world. What has remained less well known is how citizens perceive these inequalities" (2011, 147). The answer to this question, as reported by the literature, seems to be rather mixed. While inequality remains conspicuously absent from the list of policy priorities, researchers have shown that Latin American voters see inequality as being "too high" and tend to be supportive of policies that favor low-income workers and the poor (Morgan and Kelly 2010). A recent Electoral Panel Study (Lupu et al. 2015) reported that 85 percent of Argentine respondents agree or strongly agree that inequality is "too high" and 76 percent agree or strongly agree that the state should seek to reduce income differences. Similar findings are reported in the Argentina National Election Study (ENPEA 2015), wherein 55 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "inequality has increased in the last year" and 83 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the view that the state should seek to reduce income differences. However, while a majority of Argentines support redistribution and recognize that inequality is "too high," the number of respondents who give priority to this problem is negligible, and there is no evidence that inequality has a significant effect on vote choice.

In all, Argentine voters consistently favor an active role for the state in reducing inequality, but at the same time, do not consider income inequality a priority. Consequently, while voters have clear preferences for policies that lower inequality, redistribution is also a low-salience issue. Thereby we come to our second hypothesis:

H_2. Inequality at t_0 will increase the demand for progressive redistribution only if issue salience can be increased among voters.

Protest and Issue Salience

There is a significant literature that analyzes whether protests raise the visibility of demands and bring policy issues to the attention of politicians (Gormley 1986). Beginning with William Gamson, sociologists and political scientists have argued that social protests increase the chances for groups to advance their policy goals (Gamson 1975). Protests signal likely alliances between nonincumbents and factions of the elite that may seek to unseat incumbents (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007; Navarro Yáñez and Gutiérrez 2009). Protests also provide opportunities for issue trespassing and issue capture by rising challengers (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992), allowing parties to gain the support of new voters (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Inclán 2009). It has been argued that protests signal that individuals and groups are willing to invest resources to promote important issues (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and to strengthen their organizations (Piven and Cloward 1977). Protests also provide a narrative to attribute responsibility to politicians (McAdam 1999), which elicits policy responses from incumbents (Benford and Snow 2000, 615).

Inclán argues that previous protests encourage and help define new demands, raising the probability of political consideration (2009). Furthermore, if and when institutions fail to translate demands into policies, protests provide an effective venue to bypass political institutions and communicate social demands to voters (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Machado et al. 2011; Scartascini and Tommasi 2012).

It is difficult to overstate the importance of social protests in Argentina. Argentine unions are known for their combativeness and very high organizational capacity (Murillo 2001; Torre 1990). Since the rise of Juan Domingo Perón in the mid-1940s, unions have used their strength and numbers not only to negotiate collective wages but also to drive party politics and challenge policies they disliked. Unions were the backbone of the "Resistance" between 1955 and 1974, carrying the banner of the party when Perón was exiled and the Peronism brand was under proscription. The strength of the unions to negotiate collective wage agreements (*paritarias*) was accompanied by very high levels of mobilization and protest. Between democratization in 1983 and the beginning of the 2001 political and economic crisis, the Argentine General Workers' Union organized 22 general strikes and negotiated wage increases for a majority of the formal employees.

With the rise of unemployment in the 1990s and the rapid increase in informal sector work, a new social movement emerged that relied almost exclusively on protests and pickets to advance its goals.

> The *piqueteros*' ability to make their demands heard rested on their form of protest: blocking heavily traveled roads (typically vital commercial arteries in the countryside and around the city of Buenos Aires) until provincial and/or national authorities were forced to give in. Since the first picketing, the immediate objectives of this tactic have

> been to secure new jobs, access new government subsidies, or increase existing ones. (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007, 160).

As described by Alcañiz and Scheier, the *piqueteros* used social mobilization to increase and redirect resources toward their members, raising the visibility of a constituency that was neither inserted in the labor market nor unionized. In effect, social mobilization by unions and the *piqueteros* was critical to raising the policy importance of social benefits in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis.

Inequality and Protests in Argentina

To test for the effect of prior inequality on redistribution in the Argentine provinces, we test hypotheses H_{1A} and H_{1B} by measuring the progressive or regressive allocation of government subsidies conditional on prior inequality. While we focus on cash transfers and overall income inequality, we also measure the progressive or regressive allocation of retirement benefits, rents, and a variety of other sources of income.

After testing for the effect of prior inequality on the progressive or regressive allocation of different income sources, we provide an alternative specification that considers the effect of protests, which we take as a proxy for raising the issue salience of inequality. The alternative specifications tap into a different set of mechanisms that depend critically on political agency. To test the proposed hypotheses, we use individual income data from the Argentine Census Bureau (INDEC). We consider survey respondents in 32 urban areas over a 9-year period.

Argentina is a federal country with 3 levels of government (federal, provincial, and municipal), 23 provinces, and an autonomous city. There is enormous variation in income, taxes, spending, partisan environment, and inequality in the Argentine provinces. Although most revenue collection takes place at the federal level, revenue-sharing rules provide governors with significant discretion to set spending priorities and allocate subsidies.

In the last 20 years, the Argentine provinces have enjoyed a more prominent role in the delivery of subsidies, as well as in the provision of basic services. Most social services have been, since the 1990s, decentralized to provincial and municipal authorities (Falleti 2005, 2006). Health and education today are delivered by provincial institutions and are subject to the availability of local resources, as provincial public budgets today are equal to or larger than that of the federal government. Because tax collection is carried out by the federal government while most spending takes place at the provincial level, researchers have documented important common pool policy traps that facilitate overspending (Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Rodden 2006).[7]

There is also significant variation in the prevalence of social protests in the Argentine provinces. Over the last 20 years, Argentine scholars interested in contentious politics have documented significant province-level differences in the number of protests (Pérez and Pereyra 2013; Svampa 2009; Delamata 2002; Scribano and Schuster 2001;

Schuster et al. 2006). Nevertheless, according to the Americas Barometer, in 2010 more Argentines demanded policy changes from their government by participating in protests than through any other active channel of participation, such as writing letters or participating in political parties (Lodola and Seligson 2013). Among protest participants, 57 percent attended two to three protests and 73 percent of the respondents described their participation as worthwhile (Lodola 2013).

There is also ample evidence that politicians take notice of protests and implement policies in response to contentious events.[8] This has been noted by scholars such as Szwarcberg (2015), who has documented linkages between social protests, electoral mobilization, and clientelistic redistribution. Extensive subnational variation in spending, together with wide discretion to allocate income subsidies, allows us to test for the relationship between inequality and redistribution.[9]

A Gini Decomposition Technique to Explain Inequality in the Argentine Provinces

To measure the progressive or regressive allocation of cash transfers (and other sources of income) in the Argentine provinces, we implement a Gini decomposition technique. Gini decomposition is an estimation strategy that measures how different sources of income shape overall income inequality. The results of the decomposition analysis are interesting by themselves, but they will also serve as an intermediate product to understand the progressive or regressive allocation of government subsidies.[10]

In their 2009 paper, Soares et al. implement a Gini decomposition strategy to measure the effect of conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. In their analyses, Soares et al. provide evidence that conditional cash transfer programs represent a small fraction of individual income but have a large effect on reducing inequality. Furthermore, they note significant intercountry differences in the inequality-reducing effect of cash transfers, although they do not systematically explain the origin of country differences.

Similarly, in an excellent article, Cont and Porto (2014) use Gini decomposition techniques to describe the effect of taxes and government spending on inequality. They find that overall, government spending in Argentina reduces inequality, a combination of progressive spending that is able to offset slightly regressive taxation. Cont and Porto note that provincial spending has a more pronounced progressive effect than federal spending, "accounting for approximately 70 percent of change in Gini coefficient" (Conto and Porto 2014, 572). They also find that most redistribution takes place through social spending on government-provided services.

While Cont and Porto conclusively show that government spending reduces overall inequality, they offer little discussion of the mechanisms that explain the degree of progressivity across provinces. Indeed, their strategy does not allow us to explain differences in observed inequality, assess the extent to which prior inequality explains progressive redistribution, or consider the effect of other political variables. We assume this task in what follows.

The Data

Between 2003 and 2011, the Argentine Bureau of Statistics carried out quarterly national-level surveys in the country's 32 largest metropolitan areas. Each of the surveys included between 45,000 and 65,000 respondents, for a total of 1,838,828 individuals. A total of 968,833 of those individuals received at least some income at the time of the survey, providing us with large sample sizes by urban conglomerate and province (see the appendix for descriptive information). While there has been concern about data manipulation of the PCI index by the Argentine Census Bureau, the National Income Survey has had a stellar record of data collection since it was first implemented in 1974. The sample includes public and private sector employees working part-time or full-time in the formal or informal labor market.

Although the national income surveys have been implemented since 1974, for our analyses we pooled a standardized subset that includes an identical set of questions and variables. From 1974 through 2001, overall income inequality in Argentina steadily rose. Inequality deepened through a combination of political and economic shocks, such as the antilabor policies of the military regime (1976–83), the high inflation shocks that followed the debt crisis in 1982, and the economic contraction under the Currency Board after 1996, as well as the subsequent economic meltdown of 2001. In all, overall inequality, as reported by Argentina's Gini, increased from .35 in 1974 to about .45 today, with peaks of .55 during the economic crisis of 2001. Since 2003, fast-paced economic growth and large increases in wages have been accompanied by a reduction in overall inequality. Most of that reduction has resulted from gains in real wages (Lustig et al. 2013). This trend has been verified nationwide, although significant variation is observed across provinces.

As figure 1 shows, inequality held relatively low and steady in San Luis and Santa Cruz provinces. It also remained high and unchanged in Tucumán. Very large reductions in inequality in Chaco and Salta contrast with mild declines in La Rioja and Neuquén. It is interesting that there is little relationship between mean provincial income and inequality (Cont and Porto 2014). Inequality in the poor province of La Rioja is roughly similar to the well-off province of Mendoza. Low Gini scores in the high-income province of Santa Cruz are comparable to those in the relatively poor province of San Luis. Indeed, unlike most other income indicators, Gini estimates display little regional clustering.[11]

Decomposing Inequality in the Argentine Provinces

As we have seen, individual incomes are composed of different sources, such as wages, rents, severance payments, owed income, retirement benefits, subsidies, and so on. In Argentina, between 60 percent and 80 percent of personal income is collected from the respondent's main employment (see figure 6 in the appendix for provincial details). Each of these different income sources contributes, to a different extent, to the overall income of respondents as well as to overall inequality.

Figure 1. Inequality (Gini) by Province, 2003–2011



Source: Authors' estimates from EPH surveys.

Figure 2. Overall Gini vs. Main Wage Gini by Urban Conglomerate and Period, 2003–2011



Source: Authors' estimates from INDEC data.

The Gini decomposition technique measures the relative contribution of each income source to overall inequality. Each income source contributes to overall inequality according to its share of the individual's total income and as a function of progressivity (the extent to which it increases or reduces inequality).

Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) propose a strategy to decompose Gini coefficient G as a function of three terms: describing the contributions of a collection of incomes k to total income S_k; the source Gini_k; and the correlation R_k between each income and the source Gini G_k.

$$G = \Sigma_{k=1}^{K} S_k G_k R_k \quad (1)$$

The different parameters of the model in equation 1 describe the contribution of each income source to inequality and present information on the relationship between each income source k and overall inequality. The substantive interpretation of the three parameters allows us to assess how important the effect of an income source is (i.e., how large the income share, S_k), how unequal the allocation of that source is (i.e., what is the Gini of the composite source, G_k), and what the correlation is of this income source with the overall Gini, R_k.

Consider, for example, figure 2, which plots the overall Gini (G) on the horizontal axis and the decomposed Gini for the primary wage of the respondent (G_{wage})

Table 1. Correlation (R_k) Between Source Income k and overall Gini (G)

Source Income	Mean Correlation (R_k)	SD of Correlations	Minimum	Maximum
Summer bonus	0.746	0.239	–0.758	1.000
Alimony	0.555	0.153	–0.266	0.915
Child's employment	0.309	0.542	–0.906	0.999
Fellowships	0.193	0.508	–0.942	0.992
Investments	0.814	0.322	–0.975	1.000
Wages (main occupation)	0.910	0.025	0.806	0.988
Other cash	0.581	0.492	–0.976	1.000
Wages (secondary occupation)	0.637	0.106	0.102	0.958
Owed income	0.873	0.225	–0.744	1.000
Rental property	0.818	0.150	–0.571	1.000
Retirement	0.712	0.121	0.213	0.986
Severance payments	0.436	0.567	–0.898	1.000
Government cash transfers	–0.065	0.310	–0.769	0.968
Unemployment benefits	0.285	0.447	–0.905	1.000

Note: Gini decomposition correlation means by urban conglomerate and trimester, estimated in Stata 12 using Descogini. Vectors were stored, and entries report mean correlations (R_k) between each source income and overall inequality.

on the vertical axis for all quarterly estimates by metropolitan region in Argentina. We also add a 45-degree reference line to show that overall inequality (Gini) grows faster than wage inequality (G_{wage}). Indeed, G_{wage} is highly correlated with overall inequality G, given that it is the largest source of income. Other sources of income, such as investment (stocks and bonds) or rental properties, tend to increase overall inequality, while fellowships, cash grants, and retirement benefits tend to lower mean inequality.

We decompose the Gini coefficient using all 14 different sources of income listed in the Argentine National Household Survey: summer bonuses (*Aguinaldo*), alimony, children's income, fellowships, investments, wages (main occupation), other wages, other cash income, owed income, property rentals, social security (*jubilaciones*), severance payments, social subsidies (*beneficios sociales*), and unemployment benefits.

The correlation between each of the income sources and overall inequality is reported in table 1, which shows that cash transfers are, on average, negatively related to overall inequality while most other income sources correlate positively with the source (overall) inequality.

A negative correlation indicates that an income source reduces overall Gini. Correlations near zero indicate that the income source does not correlate with the overall Gini and consequently provides moderate levels of redistribution. Furthermore, a high correlation indicates that the income source further contributes to higher levels of inequality. When inequality in the allocation of government subsi-

Figure 3. Correlation ($R_{Social\ Benefits}$) Between Distribution of Social Subsidies and Overall Gini (G)



Note: Points describe the estimate of the correlation between the source income ($R_{Social\ Benefits}$) and the overall Gini by urban conglomerate and trimester.

dies runs counter to overall inequality, it indicates that cash transfers disproportionately target populations as their relative income declines.[12] While cash transfers, on average, are negatively related to overall inequality, figure 3 shows significant variation within districts and over time. In particular, we see more progressive allocation of government cash transfers after 2005.

The Allocation of Cash Transfers in the Argentine Provinces

We take as a dependent variable two main variables: the Gini coefficient, which has been extensively used as a general measure of inequality; and the progressive or regressive allocation of cash transfers by urban conglomerate and trimester, as captured by the correlation terms $R_{CashTransfers}$ in the Gini decomposition model. This provides a total of 908 observations, each of which takes a value ranging from –1 to 1. As noted, a negative $R_{CashTransfers} < 0$ indicates that cash subsidies are being disproportionately allocated to offset overall inequality. By contrast, $R_{CashTransfers} > 0$ indicates that cash transfers fail to reduce existing inequality. As figure 3 shows, govern-

ment subsidies are generally progressive, with negative correlations on average in an overwhelming majority of districts.

To explain the progressive or regressive allocation of government subsidies at the district level, we consider a range of independent variables. They include the mean inequality in the previous trimester ($G_{[t-1]}$), the progressive or regressive allocation of cash transfers in the previous trimester ($R_{CT[t-1]}$), the log of the provincial population, the log of the population with unsatisfied basic needs, and the log of the number of workfare programs allocated in the province. We also consider a number of political and institutional variables, including the log of number of protests in the previous year, the log of protests by unions in the previous year, a dummy variable that indicates whether the current governor comes from the same political party as the president (PJ), and a dummy variable that indicates whether the current mayor comes from the same political party as the governor.[13] In the unrestricted specifications we also consider the interactions between the lagged inequality and protests, $G_{[t-1]}$ * ln (*Protests*), as well as the interaction between the lagged cash transfers and protests, $R_{CT[t-1]}$ * ln (*Protests*). These last interacted terms measure the conditional effect of prior inequality on redistribution, conditional on the level of protests, which raise the visibility of inequality.

Table 2 presents the results of eight different specifications. The first four models measure the effect of prior inequality (lagged Gini and *rk*) and protests on current inequality. All models present autoregressive specifications with fixed effects by survey and urban unit, although a variety of alternative models (random effects, moving average, AR[2], etc.) yield substantively similar results.[14] Table 2 presents the most conservative estimates, with fixed effects that eliminate cross-sectional confounding effects and lagged values for the dependent variable that eliminate confounding variables within units.

In all models, higher inequality is described by the mean Gini at t–1 or the prior correlation between each source of income and Gini (where higher correlation means that the allocation of the income source increases inequality). The higher the prior inequality, the less progressive the allocation of subsidies. Results are robust within and across urban conglomerates, across specifications, and when sampling provinces with different levels of development. The protest variables in the first four models are negative, indicating that the greater the number of protests, the lower the Gini (models 1 and 2). Similarly, the greater the number of protests, the more progressive (lower regressive *rk*) of social benefits (models 3 and 4). Because the correlation between overall protests and union protests is .82, it is not surprising that statistical significance drops when both terms are introduced simultaneously. It is interesting that in all specifications we can see that overall protests reduce inequality to a larger extent than union protests. The effect is particularly significant in model 4, with larger numbers of overall protests yielding a more dramatic reduction in the regressive allocations of social benefits. In all, results show that an increase in the number of protests (LN) results in a statistically significant and substantive decline in inequality. In other words, protests result in a more progressive allocation of government subsidies.

Table 2. The Effect of Protests and Prior Inequality on Current Inequality by Income Source, Argentina 2003–2007

	(1) Overall Inequality Gini	(2) Overall Inequality Gini	(3) Social Benefits (*rk*)	(4) Social Benefits (*rk*)	(5) Main Occupation (*rk*)	(6) Retirement Benefits (*rk*)	(7) Severance Payments (*rk*)	(8) Unemployment Benefits (*rk*)
Union protests (Count-LN)	–0.00466*	–0.00305	–0.0818***	–0.0554*	–0.00205	–0.00439	0.112	0.00245
	(0.00277)	(0.00284)	(0.0288)	(0.0291)	(0.00171)	(0.00952)	(0.140)	(0.0825)
Overall protests (Count-LN)		–0.00539*		–0.0919***	–0.00350**	–0.00845	–0.126	–0.0818
		(0.00292)		(0.0297)	(0.00172)	(0.00950)	(0.202)	(0.108)
Gini (LAG)	0.276***	0.250***						
	(0.0466)	(0.0485)						
rk (LAG)			0.341***	0.357***	0.116**	–0.0627	–0.361**	–0.00101
			(0.0536)	(0.0542)	(0.0500)	(0.0515)	(0.153)	(0.124)
Constant	0.345***	0.367***	0.161***	0.345***	0.824***	0.838***	0.929*	0.696**
	(0.0229)	(0.0258)	(0.0419)	(0.0735)	(0.0469)	(0.0463)	(0.515)	(0.326)
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	408	394	360	346	394	392	64	93
R-squared	0.098	0.104	0.129	0.174	0.040	0.008	0.118	0.010
Number of urban units	30	29	30	29	29	29	19	26
LogLik	866.2	844.9	–53.15	–37.60	1046	367.1	–15.64	–8.309

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 3. Regressive Allocation of Social Subsidies R_{SB} as a Function of Covariates

	(1) Overall Gini	(2) Social Benefits (*rk*)
Protests (LN-LAG)	–0.00720	–0.0725***
	(0.0143)	(0.0264)
Gini (LAG)	0.294***	
	(0.0902)	
Protests (LN-LAG) * Gini (LAG)	0.00783	
	(0.0310)	
rk (LAG)		0.549***
		(0.0952)
Protests (LN-LAG) * *rk* (LAG)		–0.0944***
		(0.0327)
Population (LN)	–0.0131*	–0.158**
	(0.00696)	(0.0669)
Unsatisfied basic needs	–0.0196***	–0.188***
	(0.00590)	(0.0573)
Number of workfare programs allocated	0.0168***	0.171***
	(0.00388)	(0.0373)
Mayor same party as governor	–0.0117	0.218
	(0.0174)	(0.166)
Peronist governor	–0.0153	–0.0856
Population (LN)	(0.0131)	(0.124)
Constant	0.420***	1.225
	(0.111)	(0.972)
Observations	427	385
R-squared	0.240	0.277
Number of urban centers	28	28
LogLik	937.2	–21.78

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

The results with all covariates are presented in table 3. As expected, the results show a more progressive allocation of subsidies in more populous districts (negative coefficient for the log of the district population) and in districts with larger numbers of individuals with unsatisfied basic needs. More interesting, as shown in table 3, model 2 and in figure 4, is that the effect of social protests on subsidies is largest when the prior allocation of resources is regressive, but has no statistically significant effect when resources were already distributed progressively at *t*–1.

Figure 4. Effect of Social Protest on Progressivity, Conditional on Prior Allocation of Cash Transfers



Source: Estimated from table 2, model 6.
Note: Higher numbers on the horizontal axis *rk[n–1]* describe more regressive allocation of cash transfers. Because *rk* captures the correlation between cash transfers and Gini, positive numbers indicate that it increases Gini values (therefore it contributes to higher inequality). Positive values on the horizontal axis indicate that cash transfers reinforce inequality, while negative numbers indicate that they reduce inequality.

Concluding Remarks

Despite a significant amount of research, little support has been found for the Meltzer-Richard model of inequality and redistribution. Consistent with the findings of Lindert (2004) and Pontusson and Rueda (2007), this article shows that more unequal districts are more likely to distribute cash transfers in a regressive way. Using very large income surveys from the Argentine Bureau of Statistics (INDEC), we find no "virtuous" democratic mechanism that reduces inequality through electoral mechanisms.

Results are more interesting, however, when we decompose inequality and analyze the effect of prior inequality and protests on the regressive allocation of social benefits. The findings show that protests reduce inequality and, more important, that they do so more extensively when prior inequality is high. That is, the more unequal the district, the more progressive the allocation of resources induced by protests.

Consider, for example, the cases of Tucumán and Neuquén, two provinces with similar levels of social protest but vastly different levels of inequality. Findings in this article do not simply show that protests yield a reduction in inequality, but more important, that this reduction will be larger in the highly unequal Tucumán than in Neuquén. Furthermore, the results show that increasing protests should yield negligible reductions in inequality in Santa Cruz and large reductions in Salta.

To explain the effect of protests on redistribution and their conditional effect, we consider how protests increase the salience of inequality as an important issue. As we have noted, Argentine voters are aware that inequality in Argentina is high, but at the same time, they do not consider such inequality an important policy issue to be dealt with. Protests, we argue, raise the visibility of inequality as an important policy issue and provide signals to politicians to invest public resources. The higher the existing inequality and the more numerous the protests, consequently, the more progressive politicians' investment to deal with this issue.

APPENDIX

Figure 5. Inequality (Gini) by Province, Boxplot



Source: Authors' estimates from EPH surveys.

Figure 6: Overall Annual Number of Protests (LN) by District



Source: Pérez and Armesto 2012.

NOTES

We thank Germán Pérez and Melchor Armesto, who facilitated data on protests. Extensive comments were provided by Pablo Beramendi, Charles Munnell, María Victoria Murillo, Carlos Scartascini, Richard Snyder, Mariano Tommasi, and Rebeca Weitz-Shapiro on different versions of this manuscript. We also thank the participants of workshops at Brown University, Oxford University, and the Universidad de San Andrés. Lorena Moscovich thanks the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Brown University, the financial support of the LASA-Mellon Seminar Funds, and the BIARI program.

1. See Ansell and Samuels 2014 for a more general review of the literature.

2. Electoral rules are critical intervening variables that affect how extensively inequality is translated into redistributive pressures. For example, malapportionment, majoritarian biases, or proportional allocation of seats are not equally likely to give voice to the median income earner (Iversen and Soskice 2006; Schneider and Soskice 2009; Ardanaz and Scartascini 2013); a disenfranchised and demobilized poor may result in a decisive median voter who is wealthier than the actual median income earner (Anderson and Beramendi 2012); and wealthier societies with lower inequality may be able to expand social insurance, confounding the distributive pressures anticipated by the theory (Moene and Wallerstein 2001).

3. In this article, a regressive allocation of subsidies is defined as one that increases overall (Gini) inequality, and a progressive allocation of subsidies is defined as one that reduces (Gini) inequality. To this end, we implement a decomposition technique that allows us to measure the contribution of different income sources to overall inequality.

4. For analyses of the relationship between protests and redistribution see Garay 2007; Weitz-Shapiro 2006; and Giraudy 2007.

5. Extensions of Meltzer and Richard have been incorporated into a range of influential analyses, explaining why economic elites resist democratization while the poor promote it (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003); why majoritarian electoral rules were abandoned (Cusak et al. 2007); and the expansion of welfare policies (Alesina and Angeletos 2005).

6. In a recent article, Barber et al. (2013) find experimental support for these two incentives, although the effects were moderate and voters had difficulty distinguishing the distributive and insurance function of transfers.

7. Most resources are collected by the federal government and delivered to provinces according to a federal revenue-sharing law. Some resources are also delivered discretionally or through federal policies (infrastructure or social aid).

8. Examples include statements from prominent governors such as Felipe Solá of Buenos Aires province (Lucesole 2004) and Eduardo Fellner of Jujuy (Noro 2003).

9. Such subnational variation has made the Argentine provinces the object of numerous analyses by political scientists and economists, studying a range of phenomena that includes differences in the degree of subnational democracy (Gibson 2005; Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2010); spending (Spiller and Tommasi 2007); income and inequality (Cont and Porto 2014; Porto and Cont 1998); protest (Arce 2010; Garay 2007; Giraudy 2007; Machado et al. 2011; Moscovich 2012; Weitz-Shapiro 2006); and partisan competition (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Leiras 2007).

10. A description of inequality measures can be found in Mahler and Jesuit 2006. These include the Gini coefficient, still the most widely used; net and disposable income; fiscal spending; and tax transfers. While many cross-national datasets exist, we are not aware of any that include time series comparative subnational data. In the Argentine case, Gini decomposition data that account for posttax income were estimated in Cont and Porto 2014 for a single wave of the EPH, which is why we decided to use the progressive or regressive effect of different income sources on the Gini coefficient. We consider this a reasonable approximation of the effect of different income sources on inequality.

11. The boxplot in figure 5 in the appendix facilitates a comparison of inequality for the entire period, describing median Gini estimates by province with a solid line inside each bar and describing the 75/25 range in Gini estimates for the entire period. As can be observed, Gini coefficients display significant variation across provinces and over time, with Salta, Tucumán, and Corrientes displaying the highest inequality scores, compared to Santa Cruz and San Luis with the lowest scores.

12. We also estimated an alternative specification using overall change in Gini by government subsidies. Both models yield similar results.

13. Variables describing the number of protests by district are from Pérez and Armesto 2012. The dataset collects national media reports, which underestimate provincial protests and treat the Buenos Aires metropolitan area events as "local." Reporting biases, however, should remain relatively constant over time. We thank Germán Pérez and Melchor Armesto for sharing these data.

14. Alternative models and replication materials may be downloaded at http://gvpt sites.umd.edu/calvo.

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2005. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alcañiz, Isabella, and Melissa Scheier. 2007. New Social Movements with Old Party Politics: The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Party in Argentina. *Latin American Perspectives* 34, 2: 157–71.

Alesina, Alberto, and George-Marios Angeletos. 2005. Fairness and Redistribution. *American Economic Review* 95, 4: 960–80.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Pablo Beramendi. 2012. Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced Industrial Societies. *Comparative Political Studies* 45, 6: 714–46.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Silvia M. Mendes. 2006. Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential. *British Journal of Political Science* 36, 1: 91.

Ansell, Ben W., and David Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arce, Moisés. 2010. Parties and Social Protest in Latin America's Neoliberal Era. *Party Politics* 16, 5: 669–86.

Ardanaz, Martin, and Carlos Scartascini. 2013. Inequality and Personal Income Taxation: The Origins and Effects of Legislative Malapportionment. *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 12: 1636–63.

Barber, Benjamin, Pablo Beramendi, and Erik Wibbels. 2013. The Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics: Evidence from Surveys and a Laboratory Democracy. *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 10: 1155–89.

Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, 1: 611–39.

Blofield, Merike, and Juan Pablo Luna. 2011. Public Opinion on Income Inequalities in Latin America. In *The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America*, ed. Blofield. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 147–81.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Calvo, Ernesto, and Marcelo Escolar. 2005. *La nueva política de partidos en la Argentina: crisis política, realineamientos partidarios y reforma electoral*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.

Cont, Walter, and Alberto Porto. 2014. Personal and Regional Redistribution Through Public Finance in a Federal Setting. *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance* 54, 4 (November): 563–78.

Cusak, Thomas R., Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. *American Political Science Review* 101, 3: 373–91.

Delamata, Gabriela. 2002. De los "estallidos" provinciales a la generalización de las protestas en Argentina. *Nueva Sociedad* 182: 121–38.

ENPEA. 2015. Database from a national survey about preference and political opinions. PASCAL-UNSAM. 2015. Version 1.0. http://www.pascal.unsam.edu.ar/wp-content/enpea.html

Escolar, Marcelo. 2016. Informe de la encuesta nacional permanente electoral argentina 2015. PASCAL-UNSAM Working Paper no. 2. Buenos Aires: PASCAL-UNSAM. http://www.pascal.unsam.edu.ar/wp-content/enpea.html

Falleti, Tulia G. 2005. A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective. *American Political Science Review* 99, 3: 327–46.

———. 2006. Review of *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes* by Kathleen O'Neill. *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, 3 (Fall): 208–11.

Gamson, William A. 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood: Dorsey Press.

Garay, Candelaria. 2007. Social Policy and Collective Action: Unemployed Workers, Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina. *Politics and Society* 35, 2: 301–28.

Gervasoni, Carlos. 2010. A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces. *World Politics* 62, 2: 302–40.

Gibson, Edward L. 2005. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. *World Politics* 58, 1: 101–32.

Giraudy, Agustina. 2007. The Distributive Politics of Emergency Employment Programs in Argentina (1993–2002). *Latin American Research Review* 42, 2: 33–55.

———. 2010. The Politics of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Reproduction in Argentina and Mexico. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2, 2: 53–84.

Goldstone, Jack A., and Charles Tilly. 2001. Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action. In *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 179–94.

Gormley, William T., Jr. 1986. Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System. *Polity* 18,4: 595–620.

Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2012. *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Inclán, María. 2009. Repressive Threats, Procedural Concessions, and the Zapatista Cycle of Protests, 1994–2003. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, 5: 794–819.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others. *American Political Science Review* 100, 2: 165–81.

Latinobarómetro. 2015. Latinobarómetro Survey (LBS) 2003–2009. Ref. LAC_2003_LBS_v01_M. Dataset. http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp. Accessed March 29, 2016.

Leiras, Marcelo. 2007. *Todos los caballos del rey. La integración de los partidos políticos y el gobierno democrático de la Argentina, 1995–2003.* Buenos Aires: Prometeo.

Lerman, Robert I., and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1985. Income Inequality Effects by Income Source: A New Approach and Applications to the United States. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 67, 1: 151–56.

Lindert, Peter H. 2004. *Growing Public.* Volume 1. *The Story: Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lodola, Germán. 2005. Protesta popular y redes clientelares en la Argentina: el reparto federal del Plan Trabajar (1996–2001). *Desarrollo Economico* 44, 176: 515–36.

———. 2013. El votante argentino. *Revista SAAP* 7, 2: 379–88.

Lodola, Germán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2013. Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina y en las Américas, 2012: hacia la igualdad de oportunidades, lo hicieron. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/argentina/Argentina_Country_Report_2012_Cover_W.pdf. Accessed February 2016.

Lucesole, María José. 2004. Solá no descarta usar la fuerza. *La Nación*, July 8. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/616570-sola-no-descarta-usar-la-fuerza. Accessed Feburuary 2016.

Lupu, Noam, and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution. *American Political Science Review* 105, 2: 316–36.

Lupu, Noam, Carlos Gervasoni, Virginia Oliveros, and Luis Schiumerini. 2015. APES: Argentine Panel Election Study. http://www.noamlupu.com/data.html. Accessed May 4, 2016.

Lustig, Nora, Luis F. López-Calva, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juárez. 2013. Declining Inequality in Latin America in the 2000s: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. *World Development* 44: 129–41.

Machado, Fabiana, Carlos Scartascini, and Mariano Tommasi. 2011. Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, 3: 340–65.

Mahler, Vincent A., and David K. Jesuit. 2006. Fiscal Redistribution in the Developed Countries: New Insights from the Luxembourg Income Study. *Socio-Economic Review* 4, 3: 483–511.

McAdam, Doug. 1999. Marcos interpretativos y tácticas utilizadas por los movimientos: dramaturgia estratégica en el movimiento americano pro-derechos civiles. In *Movimientos sociales, perspectivas comparadas, oportunidades políticas, estructuras de movilización y marcos interpretativos culturales*, ed. McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Madrid: Istmo.

McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82, 6: 1212–41.

Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. *Journal of Political Economy* 89, 5 (October): 914–27.

Milanovic, Branko. 2000. The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality, and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Test with the Required Data. *European Journal of Political Economy* 16, 3: 367–410.

Moene, Karle Ove, and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review* 95, 4: 859–74.

Morgan, Jana, and Nathan J. Kelly. 2010. Explaining Public Attitudes Toward Fighting Inequality in Latin America. *Poverty and Public Policy* 2, 3: 79–111.

Moscovich, Lorena. 2012. From Top To Bottom (and Back to the Top Again): Federal Spending, Sub-national Coalitions, and Protests in Argentina, 2002–2006. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 4, 1: 35–72.

Murillo, María Victoria. 2001. *Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions and Market Reforms in Latin America*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Navarro Yañez, Clemente J., and María Rosa Herrera Gutiérrez. 2009. Contexto micro y macro de la protesta colectiva: América Latina en la década de los noventa [Micro and Macro Context of Collective Protest: Latin America in the 1990s.] *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 71, 1: 83–130.

Noro, Pedro R. 2003. Jujuy: un muerto en una violenta jornada. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), October 11. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/534875-jujuy-un-muerto-en-una-violenta-jornada. Accessed February 2016.

Norpoth, Helmut, and Bruce Buchanan. 1992. Wanted: The Education President: Issue Trespassing by Political Candidates. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56, 1: 87–99.

Pérez, Germán J., and Melchor Armesto. 2012. Social Protest Database. Collected by the Group of Studies on Social Protest and Collective Action, University of Buenos Aires (GEPSAC-UBA).

Pérez, Germán J., and Sebastián Pereyra. 2013. La protesta social entre las crisis de la democracia argentina. *Revista SAAP* 7, 2: 463–71.

Perotti, Roberto. 1996. Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say. *Journal of Economic Growth* 1, 2: 149–87.

Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. 1977. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. New York: Pantheon.

Pontusson, Jonas, and David Rueda. 2007. Income Inequality and Partisan Politics in Industrialized Democracies. Unpublished mss.

———. 2010. The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left Parties in Advanced Industrial States. *Comparative Political Studies* 43, 6: 675–705.

Porto, Alberto, and Walter Cont. 1998. Presupuestos provinciales, transferencias intergubernamentales y equidad. *Desarrollo Económico* 38: 267–91.

Rodden, Jonathan A. 2006. *Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Scartascini, Carlos, and Mariano Tommasi. 2012. The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not? *American Journal of Political Science* 56, 4: 787–801.

Schneider, Ben Ross, and David Soskice. 2009. Inequality in Developed Countries and Latin America: Coordinated, Liberal and Hierarchical Systems. *Economy and Society* 38, 1: 17–52.

Schuster, Federico L., Germán J. Pérez, Sebastián Pereyra, Melchor Armesto, Martín Armelino, Analía García, Ana Natalucci, Melina Vázquez, and Patricia Zipcioglu. 2006. Transformaciones de la protesta social en Argentina 1989–2003. Documentos de Trabajo 48: 1. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales.

Scribano, Adrián, and Federico Schuster. 2001. Protesta social en la Argentina de 2001: entre la normalidad y la ruptura. *Observatorio Social de América Latina* 5: 17–22.

Soares, Sergei, Rafael Guerreiro Osorio, Fábio Veras Soares, Marcelo Medeiros, and Eduardo Zepeda. 2009. Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil, Chile and Mexico: Impacts Upon Inequality. *Estudios Económicos* 1: 207–24.

Spiller, Pablo T., and Mariano Tommasi. 2007. *The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Svampa, Maristella. 2009. Protesta, movimientos sociales y dimensiones de la acción colectiva en América Latina. Paper presented at the conference Jornadas de Homenaje a Charles Tilly. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Fundación Carolina. May 7–9.

Szwarcberg, Mariela. 2015. *Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Torre, Juan Carlos. 1990. *La vieja guardia sindical y Perón: sobre los orígenes del peronismo*. Colección Historia y Sociedad. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana/Instituto Torcuato di Tella.

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2006. Partisanship and Protest: The Politics of Workfare Distribution in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review* 41, 3: 122–47.