CHAPTER EIGHT

The Left and Citizenship Rights

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The Left is defined, at its core, by its commitment to advance the rights of the poor and disenfranchised. Through redistributive social and economic policies, the Left has classically aimed to ensure that citizens' basic needs are met so as to advance a more just and equal society. This general statement, however, begs the question of how the Latin American Left has viewed and prioritized that commitment.

To address this question, this chapter explores how the Latin American Left has articulated and advanced citizenship rights.[1] I make two broad claims. First, I argue that the Left's view of citizenship rights is historically contingent and internally diverse. The chapter therefore starts off by charting out this variation and emphasizing a general shift in how the Left has prioritized the classic rights of citizenship. Whereas the Left once privileged material and social rights above all else, it has moderated this stance in the third wave of democracy. In tandem with this moderation, we have seen the Left privileging political and civil rights that it once understood in largely instrumental terms.

Second, I argue that the Left's understanding of citizenship rights has been narrow, as it has historically disregarded two core issues, identity and security, that today are politically salient in the region. In the main part of the chapter, I discuss why security and identity are integral to citizenship and how the Left has recently and belatedly turned to address them. The 20th-century Left historically identified these concerns as either anachronistic (when referencing identity concerns) or conservative (when talking about public security). It is no longer possible to stereotype these identitarian and security issues this way; on the contrary, these two issues have become core contemporary concerns for Latin America's poorest citizens. Strikingly, these "new" issues have required the Left not only to expand its agenda but also to revisit classic debates about the preferred role of the state vis-à-vis its citizenry.

Citizenship: Conceptual Background

What, then, are citizenship rights? This deceptively simple question has no simple answer, especially for the Latin American Left. Indeed, the answers to this question have been ideologically and historically contingent, as ideas have changed about who is or can be a citizen and what rights citizenship entails. To structure this discussion, I reference T. H. Marshall's classic work (1963), which provides a useful heuristic for subsequently discussing how various Lefts have thought about citizenship and how those ideas have changed over time.

Marshall argued that citizenship entails three different kinds of rights: civil, political, and social. *Civil rights* are "the rights necessary for individual freedom" and have come to include freedom of association, expression, faith, and religion as well as freedom to own property, engage in contracts, and seek justice (Marshall 1963, 71). *Political rights* refer to the right to take part in government, whether by participating through elected government or by exercising the right of suffrage (72). *Social rights* refer to "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society; the institutions most closely connected with social rights are the educational system and the social services" (72). By assuring a certain standard of living, social rights are designed to provide the poor with the opportunity and the resources to act equally as citizens. It is not that all people should live like equals, according to Marshall, but that all should live above a certain line. In this regard, Marshall acknowledged and accepted that citizenship can provide the architecture for legitimating social inequality (70, 106) and, by extension, capitalism. Capitalism is not undone by citizenship, according to Marshall; it is simply tamed.

While Marshall derived this understanding of citizenship from the British experience, the scope, sequencing, and depth of citizenship in other cases (including those in Latin America) have not occurred in the sequential and nonconflictual ways outlined by Marshall. Particularly in the developing world, citizenship rights have generally been granted sparingly, simultaneously, in a different sequence, or intermittently (O'Donnell 2001). In other words, there is no simple and universal logic to citizenship in the 20th century.

Viewed comparatively, therefore, the *content* of citizenship is a *political* issue, one over which the Left and the Right have historically battled. This is nowhere more evident than when addressing the role of social rights and whether the state should intervene to promote them. Classically, the Left has claimed that the state should intervene to correct market externalities and soften inequalities (which are by-products of capitalism rather than results of individual shortcomings);[2] the Right has generally argued

that increased state intervention in the economy curtails liberties, creates unnecessary dependencies, and assumes responsibilities for personal shortcomings. In other words, the very understanding of citizenship rights has historically been framed by partisan and ideological positions about social rights, in particular, and the role of the state in society, in general. In this sense, the content of citizenship has been subject to enormous variation across time and across region.

Given the debates over citizenship, therefore, any discussion of citizenship must account for the content of citizenship and the role of the state in defending it. Marshall's categorization of three types of rights provides an extremely useful heuristic for doing so, as much for what it highlights as for what it leaves out. After briefly discussing the Left's competing and changing understanding of citizenship rights, I turn to discuss how the unrelated prevalence of violent crime and ethnic politics pose new and weakly addressed frontiers for the Left's conceptualization of citizenship and of the state's role in defending the rights demanded by citizens.

The Left and Citizenship

The "Left" in Latin America has historically shared a common point of departure. Starting with the premise that capitalism was generating deep and structural inequalities that were normatively problematic, the Left believed that it was a political imperative to try to reduce or erase these inequalities and to provide each human being with a minimum standard of living, one that would allow each individual to meet basic needs (to each according to his need, not according to his ability); this is what Marshall would have identified as social rights, what he saw as the right of each individual to lead a minimally dignified life. Basic material conditions, therefore, were projected as social rights for all citizens. States had the responsibility to provide for and defend these rights.

Yet, the Left has never been cut out of one cloth, certainly not when it comes to ideas about citizenship and political strategies. This section highlights various ways in which the revolutionary, social democratic, and populist Lefts in Latin America diverged in prioritizing citizenship rights. For if the Left as a whole shared a commitment to advance some ideal of social rights (advancing greater equality and inclusion) in response to a condemnation of the structural inequalities generated by capitalism, the same could not be said for the other two citizenship rights identified by T. H. Marshall. Historically speaking, the Left has held diverging ideas about political and civil rights, discussed next.[3]

The Left Prior to the Third Wave of Democratization: 1930s–1980s

The 20th-century Latin American Left was quite diverse but can broadly be categorized as revolutionary, social democratic, and populist Lefts. The *revolutionary Left* encompassed both successful (Cuba, 1959 to date; and Nicaragua, 1979–90) and unsuccessful (Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, and Peru, among others) armed movements. Despite significant differences across countries, the revolutionary Lefts fundamentally believed that the existing system was not only deeply unequal but structurally incapable of reform from within.[4] The goal, therefore, was to overthrow the existing political system and transform capitalist systems into more equitable ones. What was to follow was not always clear. But at base all of these movements emphasized that class rights were central and that citizenship would be most advanced where the state took the lead in promoting and defending greater equality. Inspired by the Marxist idea from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs, the revolutionary Left sought to level the playing field by increasing state ownership, redistributing property, and expanding social services (although of course doing so created other kinds of inequalities within these systems). While Cuba was the only country to sustain a regime on this basis, the Sandinista revolution also followed for a decade with a mixed-economy approach. Failed revolutionary movements in other countries also maintained the platform that material (a form of Marshall's social rights) was far and away the most important goal. Implicitly, therefore, citizenship was reduced to the idea that states and citizens were obliged to provide for one another, materially and socially. Respect for political and civil rights was secondary to this economic and materialist goal, as also noted by Levitsky and Roberts in the introduction to this volume. In this context, political and civil rights were occasionally sacrificed, as in Cuba.

The *electoral Marxist or social democratic Left* (including some communist parties) shared with the revolutionary Left a commitment to social rights and a belief that the state had to play an active role in pursuing these ends.[5] Unlike the revolutionary Left, however, the electoral Left (especially in Costa Rica and Chile) believed that those ends could be pursued within the existing system, advancing social rights in the context of democracy and capitalism. Indeed, rather than dismiss democracy as a bourgeois shell for capitalism, social democratic parties saw an opportunity to compete for power, gain office, and reform policies—as was happening in Europe. This electoral Left announced respect not only for social rights but also for the political and civil rights that are at the core of liberal democracy. In practice, political and civil rights were occasionally constrained, but it was argued that this was a necessary but brief deviation. In an ironic and tragic twist of fate, Left-affiliated presidents in Latin America were more often than not overthrown by political elites and the military.

Finally, the *populist Left* was rarely informed by Marxism and unevenly committed to universal rights, but it did nonetheless take the lead in promoting social programs that ultimately increased the material living conditions of many who had historically been excluded (e.g., the famous *descamisados* in Argentina). The populist Left advanced corporatist projects and used a language of universality (appealing to the people). But in practice, left populists often tended to advance their political project by extending contracts to favored unions and distributing goods to those who expressed loyalty—with emphasis sometimes placed on goods distributed by the leader or the party rather than services extended as a basic right of citizenship.[6] Otherwise stated, a social commitment was in evidence, but in practice populists did not necessarily distribute benefits equally and accountably across unions and citizens. Populists, moreover, expressed a fairly ambivalent attitude toward political and civil rights, as evidenced by the now well-charted history of populist Lefts that rose to power in elections and then foreclosed those spaces (Juan Perón in Argentina); populist Lefts that started off in authoritarian cases and then reemerged under democracy (Getúlio Vargas in Brazil); populist Lefts that lost in elections and then deployed violence in subsequent rounds (Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru); and then populist Lefts that were elected and relinquished power at the next election (Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico). In short, this classic set of populists does not necessarily share an underlying commitment to political and civil rights, per se, even if they articulate an underlying commitment to improving the material lot and status of the masses. Indeed, in reviewing these cases, one can see that the populist Left mediates the language of rights (which inhere in citizens as members of a polity) through a language of personalism (which grants the leader the ability to mediate the delivery of goods associated with those rights).

Hence, prior to the third wave of democratization, the revolutionary, social democratic, and populist Lefts shared a commitment to some form of social rights, but their commitment to political and civil rights was more ambivalent—strongest among the social democratic Left; weakest among most revolutionaries; uneven among the populists.

The Left in the Third Wave of Democratization: 1980s to the Present

The contemporary Left's vision of citizenship rights has changed quite significantly in the third wave of democracy.[7] While there has been an increasing respect for political and civil rights (the very issues that were variable in the earlier period), the Left has reconsidered whether and how it can commit to advancing social rights (the very point that was relatively constant in the prior period).

First, we see greater valorization of political and civil rights, in no small part as a

reaction against the harsh authoritarian repression and human rights abuses experienced in the Southern Cone and Central America from the 1960s to the 1980s; in both of these regions, various Lefts (revolutionary, social democratic, and populist alike) have come to place much greater emphasis on political and civil rights as fundamental parts of their agenda—that is, inherently valuing liberal democratic rights as integral to the project of the Left rather than seeing them as epiphenomenal (and therefore purely instrumental to the achievement of other more fundamental goals of social and economic transformation).[8] While revolutionary and populist Lefts previously saw these rights as dispensable bourgeois luxuries or facades, the human rights abuses highlighted how consequential these rights are in practice. Indeed, in all cases that witnessed severe human rights abuses at the hands of authoritarian security regimes (Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), revolutionary left parties and movements fundamentally changed their positions, either modifying their public position toward civil and political rights or fading into electoral obscurity. As Levitsky and Roberts highlight in the conclusion to this volume, however, this respect for democracy has not included an underlying commitment to radical or participatory democracy—contemporary examples of participatory budgeting and mobilization notwithstanding.

In contrast to those countries that experienced repressive military rule, the Andean countries (many of which experienced military rule that oversaw redistributive policies) have articulated a much more ambiguous relationship with liberal democracy and citizenship, sometimes forsaking representative institutions in favor of more direct plebiscites, more participatory politics (especially in Bolivia), and, at times, *caudillismo* (especially in Venezuela and at times in Ecuador). That said, significant political differences exist between left governments in the Andean region, particularly once we look at the question of institutionalization, leadership, and social mobilization (see the introduction); indeed, Levitsky and Roberts refer to Hugo Chávez's government as a populist Left and Evo Morales's as a movement Left, with the latter exhibiting greater accountability to its electorate. Chávez has occasionally shown disrespect for civil and political rights and has built his political base from above—emerging as an outsider, deploying neopopulist and clientelist measures, and building his social base while in office, although leaving space for a "vigorous opposition" in civil society (see the conclusion to this volume). Morales, by contrast, has exhibited a general commitment to political and civil rights. Having risen through the ranks of an indigenous/peasant/*cocalero* social movement, he helped to build a grassroots base for his party before running for office as a Movement toward Socialism (MAS) candidate.[9] The MAS party goal has been to build institutions that support new programs and patterns of politics (tied to communities rather than clientelism). While Morales did deploy questionable tactics in the Constituent Assembly, his overall commitment

to political and civil rights seems relatively strong, even if it has been unconventional. As such, Morales seems committed to upholding the Marshallian trilogy of rights (each in equal measure), while Chávez seems most committed to social rights above all else, as discussed below.[10] Ecuador's President Rafael Correa's origins appear closer to Chávez's than to Morales's, given Correa's election as an outsider, his weak social movement base, and his top-down style of governance; thus far, he seems to have an ambivalent respect for liberal democratic institutions and the political and civil rights that undergird them.

Second, we find that if the contemporary Left has largely increased its respect for political and civil rights, the contemporary Left has had a much more varied relationship with social rights, the very core that historically defined the Left's vision of citizenship in the period prior to the third wave of democratization. The 1980s economic crisis and the neoliberal policies pursued in the 1990s forced a reexamination of social rights, since the new economic constraints posed serious questions about the sustainability and political viability of existing social services. Social rights were defended in theory; but when juxtaposed with concerns about fiscal solvency and balanced budgets, social programs were cut or weakened in the 1980s and 1990s. As such, economic exigencies limited the idea of social rights, and social programs were downgraded from rights to needs; needs were met when possible, but social programs were not guaranteed, nor were they universal. The bait-and-switch politics of the 1990s highlighted how porous the Left's relationship was to social rights in this decade (Stokes 2001).

Yet the late 1990s and the 2000s have ushered in a new Left (perhaps as a reaction to these earlier policies) that expresses a renewed, if more moderate, commitment to social rights. The contemporary Left in office has sought distance from the neoliberal orthodoxy by increasing expenditures, coverage, and labor market policies (Levitsky and Roberts's introduction). In many countries, in the wake of the economic crisis, the Left has effectively supported targeted and demand-driven social programs—expanding them where possible, as we have seen in the cases of Chile's health reforms under Ricardo Lagos and pension reforms under Michelle Bachelet—rather than universal rights-based ones (see Nam 2009; chapter 3 of this volume). Various authors in this volume highlight the kinds of programs that are being pursued in Brazil and the Southern Cone (see chapters 3, 5, and 13, for example). These programs stand out for their gradualist orientation and attention to fiscal solvency—although Huber and Pribble in chapter 5 emphasize how the pension and health care reforms in Chile and Uruguay have made significant progress toward universal coverage.

The contemporary Andean Left has articulated a different approach to social rights than the South American and Central American Lefts have. Rather than start with a concern for market constraints, some Andean left politicians (Chávez and

Morales, in particular) have put social rights at the center of their policies and at times have ridiculed the constraints of the market. Why have these two cases advocated a greater state role in redistribution just as the rest of the region has become wary of such programs? Two plausible arguments are worth considering: (1) it seems certain that the commodity booms experienced by Venezuela and Bolivia have provided the state with the revenue to initiate such programs (see Hunter 2007; Weyland 2009; chapter 3 of this volume); and (2) social programs and statist sectors in these two countries were comparatively weaker than those found in the other more "moderate" left cases; in this regard, Venezuela and Bolivia seem to be approaching the levels and scope of existing Southern Cone nationalization policies (and social programs) rather than radically surpassing them (Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern forthcoming). The combination of these two points makes Venezuela and Bolivia particularly fertile ground for more radical rhetoric and policies about material redistribution, nationalization, and revolution. That said, it is reasonable to question the sustainability of these policies, given that international commodity booms are not a stable equilibrium. Moreover, the programs do not always match the rhetoric; in Venezuela, in particular, Chávez's programs are often more clientelist and targeted than universalist in practice.

In short, the understanding of citizenship in the third wave has seen a reconfiguration for the Left. No one part of the Left equally privileges civil, political, and social rights. While authoritarian rule led to a revalorization of political and civil rights (among former revolutionaries and former populists, with the electoral Left already having demonstrated its commitment in the earlier period), the 1980s economic crisis and the following period of neoliberal reforms led to a decline in the primacy placed on social rights among all three versions of the old Left. This last point is precisely what has prompted charges that the old Left is no longer leftist (with countercharges that the new populist Left is unsustainable and undemocratic). Yet if the Left is no longer defined by its unwavering commitment to social rights (and material redistribution) above all else, then are we simply left with a spatial Left, defined purely by its position relative to other parties? The Left has been working hard to identify that core, in electoral races, party congresses, and think tanks. In response to historical legacies and contemporary global pressures, it is predictably seeking to balance fiscal responsibility with ideas about social rights.

Contemporary Challenges and Citizenship Rights

The contemporary period has therefore witnessed important changes for much of the Left as left parties and governments reshuffle and reformulate their understanding of citizenship and the rights associated with it. Yet the contemporary period has been

more than a question of reshuffling priorities among Marshall's trilogy of rights (a task discussed in the previous section); it has also been a reckoning that class cleavages coincide with other fundamental cleavages and societal concerns that have compelled the Left to consider expanding its understanding of rights and core constituencies. Indeed, rising concerns about two very distinct issues, ethnicity and security, have created new challenges for how we think about citizenship and, by extension, have compelled the Left to (re)position itself vis-à-vis these issues. The Left has not been at the forefront of these discussions. It has assumed a reactive role, until recently.

Ethnic Politics and Citizenship Claims

Levitsky and Roberts, in their introduction, rightfully note that "the Left refers to political actors who seek, as a *central programmatic objective,* to reduce social and economic inequalities. Left parties seek to use public authority to redistribute wealth and/or income to lower-income groups, erode social hierarchies, and strengthen the voice of disadvantaged groups in the political process." While this definition rings true when talking about class, it rings rather hollow when talking about ethnicity and race. Indeed, the various Lefts have been historically and notably silent on questions of ethnicity and race.[11] In retrospect this might seem surprising, given that indigenous and Afro-Latin citizens tend to be overwhelmingly poor and among the most disadvantaged materially, socially, and politically.[12] Yet, Latin American left parties have historically presumed that with overlapping cleavages, class politics trumped ethnic and racial identities. As such, the Left's discourse and politics did not envision or allow for a multicultural view of citizenship. Ethnic identities were viewed as anachronistic, and the Left presumed that the winds of economic modernization or time would result in the displacement of ethnic identities by class ones. As such, where left parties mobilized indigenous peoples in the cities, they presumed that ethnic identities were already in retreat in the face of more national and class-based identities. And where they mobilized in the countryside, they viewed indigenous people as peasants—mobilizing indigenous people into class-based unions, cooperatives, and collectives. Indeed, in retrospect the Left's narrow assumptions about ethnicity overlooked the ongoing salience and changing political significance of ethnic identities, which coexisted alongside class-based forms of political organizing.

As a result, the Left was initially unprepared to respond to the rise of indigenous movements and parties in the last third of the 20th century. Conflict emerged in Nicaragua, for example, between the Miskitu Indians and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) government over conflicting views of ethnic and class-based claims (Hale 1996). Important indigenous movements, moreover, emerged in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Guatemala, and elsewhere that demanded a reconfiguration of citi-

zenship and the terms of representation. These movements articulated a "postliberal challenge" that demanded (1) constitutional recognition that national identities *coincide with* ethnic and racial ones;[13] (2) legal recognition that there should be multiple units of political representation, including individual citizens and ethnic communities;[14] and (3) legal pluralism, respecting national and indigenous jurisdictions and jurisprudence—including the right to territorial autonomy (Yashar 2005). By the end of the 20th century, indigenous movements and parties had fundamentally reshaped Latin American politics in many countries, not only mobilizing new political cleavages and constituencies and articulating new demands and agendas, but also leading political coalitions that came to include (but were not reduced to) classic left agendas (Brysk 2000; Pallares 2002; Sieder 2002; Mattiace 2003; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Lucero 2008; Madrid 2008).

From the perspective of this chapter, several points are worth noting. First and foremost, Left parties were clearly followers rather than leaders of these ethnic movements to redefine citizenship. Not only did class-based organizing largely fail to seriously engage ethnic agendas in earlier decades, but many left leaders at times treated indigenous activists as second-class citizens. Once indigenous activists mobilized (and in many cases gained control of traditional left unions), they expanded the union agenda to include ethnic respect and recognition. These kinds of demands motivated the postliberal agenda noted previously.

Second, the Left has had to reconsider electoral politics in light of an increasingly mobilized electorate demanding some form of postliberal and multicultural citizenship. Left parties can no longer presume (if they ever could) that the indigenous constituency is electorally insignificant. As indigenous movements (and some indigenous political parties) have gained momentum and political stature in electoral politics, left parties have vied more actively to capture an increasing share of the indigenous vote, particularly in countries that expanded the suffrage by eliminating literacy restrictions (Peru in 1979 and Ecuador in 1980), in countries that confronted significant indigenous mobilization and the formation of indigenous or multicultural parties (Ecuador and Bolivia), and in countries where the indigenous vote was viewed as crucial to the presidential outcome (Guatemala in 2007). In other words, the Left has not taken up the ethnic agenda until it needed to win that constituency, a point argued forcefully by Sarah Chartock (2008) in her work on ethnodevelopment. She highlights how and where the Left (and then the Right) put ethnodevelopment on the agenda as a way to gain an electoral advantage. It remains less than certain that this strategy will work for the old Lefts in the long term, since we have seen the declining strength of a range of old left parties such as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Bolivia and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in Guatemala.

Third, the Left has engaged in a fair amount of experimentation in the 2000s, par-

ticularly in the Andes, where Bolivia and Ecuador represent divergent left responses to equally strong indigenous movements. While Bolivia's example includes a multiclass and multiethnic left coalition, as argued by Madrid (2008; chapter 10 of this volume), Ecuador's example highlights left candidates (rather than left parties) that have had a tense relationship with indigenous movements. Let me elaborate on these divergences.

Bolivian president Evo Morales cut his political teeth in social movement organizing among a combination of indigenous peoples, *cocaleros,* and leftist union movements. As such, he came to the legislature and later the presidency as a movement leader who successfully mobilized indigenous peoples and popular sectors. With significant popularity (although not without internal dissent), Morales has advanced citizenship rights with an eye toward social rights but importantly has also taken the lead in forefronting indigenous rights in the Constituent Assembly and in granting indigenous territories as part of the land reform. Morales thus emerges not only as part of the "left" wave but also as a leader in advancing citizenship rights for indigenous peoples (with an eye toward both ethnic equality and ethnic rights that include land reform, local autonomy, bilingual education, and the recognition of indigenous systems of justice). The new constitution (ratified in 2009) recognizes plurinationalism, indigenous judicial systems, indigenous autonomy, and cultural rights (see chapter 10).

Ecuador's contemporary left candidates, by contrast, have had a more strained relationship with the country's main indigenous movement, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and its political party (Pachakutik). Ecuador has twice elected a president with the backing of the country's indigenous movement(s), only to find conflicts emerge; CONAIE and Pachakutik withdrew their support from former president Lucio Gutiérrez when he was seen as reneging on his commitments to them; some indigenous organizations also distanced themselves in July 2008 from President Rafael Correa. Indeed, Correa has not included indigenous movements as an organic part of his constituency or policies (chapter 11). Ecuador's main indigenous movement, CONAIE, did not initially support Correa in the first round of elections, choosing to run Luis Macas as the Pachakutik candidate; it endorsed Correa in the second round but did not become part of a grand coalition; and while the movement supported Correa's goal of a constituent assembly, it withdrew support in 2008 over how to define "plurinational" or multicultural (and whether the latter would include the government's obligation to seek authorization from indigenous people to pursue natural resource policies such as oil exploration, logging, and hydroelectric dams on their lands) and over the mining law.[15] Correa, for his part, took advantage of rifts within the indigenous movements as tensions with indigenous movements persisted in 2009 with regard to the new water law and

mining plans.[16] He has therefore distanced himself from the indigenous agenda put forth by Ecuador's main indigenous confederation; while advocating equality for all peoples (including indigenous peoples), he has rejected claims about territorial rights and, according to Conaghan in chapter 11, has mocked Pachakutik as a group that no longer holds clout.

So, while the contemporary Bolivian Left has grown up organically with(in) the indigenous movement, the contemporary Ecuadorian Left has maintained its distance not only from Ecuador's indigenous movements but also from the latter's claims to expand and redefine citizenship rights.

Fourth, with the promotion of a postliberal and multicultural agenda, the Left has had to reconsider the unitary role that it once attributed to the state.[17] The Left's view of citizenship presumed that the central state would be the entity to define and uphold citizenship. The postliberal agenda outlined by indigenous movements presumes a more decentralized state, but it is not a decentralized state that is solely reducible to delegating power in a unitary way to subnational units (municipalities and provinces or states); rather it is a decentralized version that would cede unique power to indigenous jurisdictions (some falling within or across existing political administrative boundaries) that might hold different visions of citizenship, development, and justice. Ethnic calls for autonomous jurisdictions have thus required the Left to reconsider its once national, centralized, and unitary view of the state. The Left was ill equipped to address these ethnic agendas because it had overlooked ethnic claims in the past, but also because its statist vision of citizenship and development did not allow it to take questions of ethnic autonomy and representation seriously. Alongside neoliberalism and decentralization, therefore, multiculturalism has challenged the Left to consider what a more decentralized and postliberal state can and should do.[18]

In sum, contemporary politics has highlighted that the "poor" in Latin America are not reducible to class and that the partisan Left was relatively late and ambivalent in addressing ethnic claims to expand citizenship rights. While ethnic politics has had a minimal impact on left politics in countries with small indigenous populations, ethnic politics has come to play a more critical, if varied, role in countries with majority or plurality indigenous populations, such as Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador, all of which are governed at the time of this writing by left-identified politicians who garnered significant portions of the indigenous vote. Lefts in these three countries have reframed their political vision of citizenship as one that encompasses multiculturalism. This is at the heart of what Evo Morales and MAS were trying to do in Bolivia's Constituent Assembly. Guatemalan president Álvaro Colom also invoked ethnic claims as one of the leading goals of his administration: after his electoral victory and again at his inauguration, he announced that he wanted Guatemala to be-

come the model of a "social-democratic country with a Mayan face." While Colom's ideological agenda and political commitment remain uncertain, no one can doubt the continental need to consider what the links between social democracy, ethnicity, and citizenship will entail in the current period.

New Patterns of Violence: Calls for Citizen Security

As the Left has been slow to address contemporary ethnic claims about citizenship, most of the Left has also been slow to address citizen security in the contemporary face of rising violence and mass concerns about personal safety. The face of violence in Latin America has changed dramatically in recent decades. While the data is poor, the trends are clear. Three decades ago, Latin America was scarred by authoritarian regimes marked by widespread political violence. Political assassinations, disappearances, and lack of habeas corpus were commonplace in many countries, particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. With the transition away from authoritarian rule in most of the region, violence has taken different forms. There has been a sharp decline in human rights abuses. While state violence is not entirely a thing of the past, its scope and intensity are markedly different from a few decades ago. The power of militaries to subvert civilian control, engage in widespread human rights abuses, and act with impunity has been seriously diminished. In this context, Latin America's third-wave democracies have promoted deeper and more meaningful patterns of citizenship—with citizens gaining the basic political and civil rights that were so violently denied them in earlier decades, and with the historical Left that suffered human rights abuses entering this period by clearly prioritizing and valuing political and civil rights as fundamental (rather than instrumental) goals, as noted earlier.

Despite these advances in civil and political rights, citizen security has not been achieved in the contemporary period, and the Left has been slow to address this issue. The past 15 years have seen a startling rise in new patterns of violence in several Latin American countries. Non-civil-war-related homicide rates in particular have reached disturbing levels in much of the region. Based on these contemporary trends, Latin America consistently stands out as one of the most violent regions in the world. "While the global average in 2000 was a homicide rate of five per 100,000 habitants, the estimated average for Latin America was 27.5, the highest for any region in the world," according to the World Health Organization (Krug et al. 2002). Moreover, Central America claims the infamous distinction of being the most violent region in the Americas: in 2005 homicide rates reached 44 per 100,000 in Guatemala and around 60 per 100,000 in El Salvador and Honduras, according to the United Nations Development Program (2007). While some sources cite an increase in violence, it is

also important to heed the warning by Comaroff and Comaroff (2006, 219) that "police statistics everywhere are erected on an edifice of indeterminacies and impossibilities."[19] Tables 8.1 and 8.2, for example, illustrate the high homicide rates in several countries and the variation across cases, as well as the apparent underreporting in some of the cases. A range of international organizations (including the PanAmerican Health Organization regional office of the World Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and national sources indicate that national homicide rates are startlingly high in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia, with shockingly high municipal rates in these same four countries as well.

Many Latin American democracies (alongside several other third-wave democracies, notably South Africa) have demonstrated an uneven ability to address this violence. In some cases, state organizations and other actors are implicated in the very violence they are supposed to limit; in some of these same cases, judicial and police institutions are captured, wracked by corruption, staffed by poorly trained personnel, running with limited resources, and subject to political whim. Moreover, we have seen the emergence and growth of parastatal organizations, some illicit (gangs, organized crime), others not (local community organizations).

In response, public opinion polls regularly highlight the depth of concern about the violence that has now become brutally commonplace in many parts of Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. The concern is not only about homicides but also about carjackings, bodily assault, theft, and kidnappings, to name a few. Unsurprisingly, the high levels of violence have generated widespread insecurity. When asked to identify the most important problem facing the region, people identified unemployment as the top concern, followed by crime, according to the 2005 Latinobarometer poll; most people (57% of those polled) saw the former as a cause of the latter (UNODC 2007, 28). As victimization surveys highlight, insecurity is a basic concern, even in countries experiencing relatively low levels of violence. While civil rights are a de jure right, fear of violence leads people to presume that it is a nonexistent right, and, in response, citizens and foreigners alike radically alter their movements, patterns, and associations to try to shield themselves from the violence that is taking place. This insecurity has fueled the significant rise in private security firms. In fact, "private security officers outnumber the police in all six Spanish-speaking Central American countries. These companies are often owned by serving or former members of the police or security forces" (UNODC 2007, 82). Indeed, private security firms are now a common fixture in many parts of the region. Yet the rise of private security firms highlights the depth of inequalities, since the poor are the most affected by the violence and yet are the least capable of purchasing the private security that is now a commodity for the rich alone (Holston and Caldeira 1998).

Table 8.1.
Homicide rates in the Americas, 1995–2008 (per 100,000 inhabitants)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Argentina	4.2	4.7	4.8	4.7	5.3	5.8	7.0	7.6	7.3	5.8	5.2	5.0	4.5	4.4
Brazil	25.7	27.0	28.7	29.5	30.4	29.7	31.4	32.3	33.1	31.1	29.2	31.2	29.3	29.9
Chile	3.2	3.0	2.5	2.8	3.0	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.8	5.6	4.5	
Colombia	76.6	80.1	75.0	80.1	80.7	80.7	83.6	89.1	72.8	65.6	52.5	55.3	54.0	
Costa Rica	5.2	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.1	6.3	6.1	5.8	7.3	6.5	7.7	8.0	7.1	8.7
Cuba	7.8	6.7	6.8	7.9	5.9	5.8	5.9	7.0	6.4	6.5	6.2	5.5	5.1	4.6
Dominican Republic	9.8	10.5	13.4	15.4	15.0	12.7	9.6	8.5	7.6	9.9				
Ecuador	13.4	16.1	12.5	15.3	17.7	16.9	15.9	16.3	13.8	17.9	18.4	21.2	20.7	21.7
El Salvador	51.2	52.3	45.5	53.2	50.7	45.4	43.7	42.5	43.0	57.7	61.3	63.8	65.9	64.2
Guatemala	19.7	21.2	28.7	26.2	18.0	19.3	20.0	23.7	27.8	27.5	34.6	33.3	33.8	40.7
Mexico	18.4	17.0	15.8	15.9	14.4	12.3	11.7	11.3	11.3	10.6	10.5	11.2	8.1	12.5
Nicaragua		11.7	11.7	10.0	13.0	13.0	13.7	12.5	18.7	18.8	17.5	13.2		
Panama		9.4	12.2	10.8	10.6	12.0	12.4	14.9	13.8	12.4	13.5	12.7	15.5	20.2
Paraguay	18.6	20.0	18.0	18.5	17.5	20.1	20.7	19.8	21.0	22.4	17.6	16.1	16.9	16.4
Peru	5.5	4.4	4.2	5.4	2.6	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.7	3.0	
Puerto Rico	25.1	24.9	23.4	21.3	17.4	17.7	19.7	18.8	19.1	18.5	19.3	18.3	18.1	
Uruguay	4.7	4.4	4.7	5.8	5.4	5.5	4.9		4.7	4.6				
USA	8.3	7.6	7.1	6.4	5.9	5.8	7.0	6.0	5.9	5.8	6.0	6.0	5.9	
Venezuela		14.8	14.1	13.7	19.2	29.3	29.4	34.1	34.6	32.5	31.9	32.8	34.7	

Sources: Organización Panamericana de la Salud, Unidad de Análisis de Salud y Estadísticas, Iniciativa Regional de Datos Básicos en Salud; Sistema de Información Técnica en Salud, Washington, DC, 2010, www.paho.org/Spanish/SHA/coredata/tabulator/newTabulator.htm.

Notes: The raw data are from Pan American Health Organization, Health Surveillance and Disease Management Area, Health Statistics and Analysis Unit, PAHO Regional Mortality Database. Rates based on World Population Prospects 2006, revised 2008.

Table 8.2.
Per capita homicide levels (per 100,000 inhabitants) in select cities, 1999–2003

Extreme levels		Medium levels	
Recife, Brazil	158	Porto Alegre, Brazil	24
Medellin, Colombia	104	Bogota, Colombia	23
Guatemala City	103	Lima, Peru	22
San Salvador, El Salvador	95	Curitiba, Brazil	20
San Pedro Sula, Honduras	90	Mexico City	18
Cali, Colombia	91	Quito, Ecuador	16
		Panama City	11
High levels		**Relatively low levels**	
Washington, DC	62	Santiago, Chile	6
São Paulo, Brazil	55	Buenos Aires, Argentina	5
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	53		
Tegucigalpa, Honduras	48		
Brasilia, Brazil	38		
Salvador (Bahia), Brazil	36		

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, 1999–2003; reprinted in Mockus and Acero Velásquez 2004.

The high levels of violent crime, therefore, reveal that citizenship is not reducible to civil rights (liberalism and courts), political rights (democracy and legislatures) and social rights (welfare policies) but also requires the right to be physically safe (via some combination of rule-of-law institutions and preventive and rehabilitative social programs). The contemporary social science literature on citizenship seems to have neglected to discuss this most basic right of all: the right to be free from harm. Whether security is better understood as a prerequisite of citizenship (as currently conceived) or a fourth right of citizenship (as demanded on the streets) is still open to debate. What is certain is that one cannot fully exercise civil and political rights absent a minimal degree of citizen security. In practice, this dilemma is most transparent in impoverished urban areas, where crime is highest and states are often absent, corrupt, complicit, and/or weak. It is precisely this juxtaposition of the legal expansion of political rights and the de facto restriction that crime places on civil rights that is captured by Holston and Caldeira (1998) when they refer to Brazil's "disjunctive democracy." In Caldeira's book *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo*, she describes it thus: "In fact, the universe of crime indicates the disjunctive character of Brazilian democracy in a double way: first because the increase of violence itself erodes citizens' rights, and second because it offers a field in which reactions to violence become not only violent and disrespectful of rights, but also help destroy public space, segregate social groups, and destabilize the rule of law" (2000, 52).

Where do the various Lefts stand on the issue of citizen security? How have they navigated the challenge of promoting a strong state response (police and courts) without falling prey to authoritarianism or charges thereof? How can they articulate a "left" response that is compatible with underlying concerns about equality, redistribution, and incorporation? The imperative to address contemporary violence poses an enormous challenge for the Left. The Left, alongside suspected left sympathizers, were primary victims of brutal human rights abuses during the earlier authoritarian regimes; so, too, the Left championed itself as a defender of human rights when fighting against dictatorship. Of course, security apparatuses were then the biggest abusers of human rights. And in many cases the police forces continue to abuse civil and human rights, including varying patterns of extrajudicial killings by the police (Brinks 2008). So it is perhaps not surprising that the Left has not prioritized whether and how to address contemporary citizen security issues, especially since these kinds of campaigns and policies raise thorny questions about how to promote citizen security without empowering the state institutions that previously violated human rights; indeed, these kinds of campaigns are often identified with the Right.

Hence, the citizenship question facing the contemporary Left is not only whether or how to reframe political, civil, and social rights but also how to address citizen security rights. The challenge is to defend democratic rights *and* build up states that can protect (rather than harm) citizens; to build up the rule of law rather than sacrifice it; to fortify a state that can provide, rather than ignore, the basic protection that Hobbes claimed states are supposed to provide; and to create social programs designed to prevent crime as well as rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-offenders. This is not simply a democratization issue of reigning in a repressive state (although that is obviously also necessary); it is also an issue of building up a capable and workable state that can provide for basic security without violating civil and political rights. Meeting the challenge requires, at a minimum, that the state establish that much-cited and seemingly elusive *legitimate monopoly* over the use of force in a given territory. Without states that do so, citizenship is not just low (O'Donnell 1993); it is curtailed, leading citizens to micromanage daily life in a whole new set of ways to minimize exposure to violent organizations—including street gangs, organized crime, and the state itself. In most cases, the governing Left originally responded anemically to citizens' concerns about public security and violence (Dammert and Díaz 2006; Gutiérrez and Policzer 2008).

The Right has not been shy to step forward with a set of policies to quash the violence. In recent years, *mano dura* (iron fist) policies have been promoted by politicians associated with the Right in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and most recently Mexico (with the election of Felipe Calderón).[20] In each of these cases, the Right has articulated a law-and-order discourse, increased police authority, occasion-

ally deployed military forces, and passed legislation that restricts the civil liberties of criminal suspects. The *mano dura* platform and policies have been electorally successful[21] (the 2007 presidential election in Guatemala is an important exception to this pattern), but they have not proved to be successful policies; they have not only failed to keep criminals off the streets but have arguably generated unintended consequences, including the greater professionalization of organized crime and gangs (which have learned greater discipline in the process).[22]

For a Left that grew up opposing the authoritarian security state, it has been a veritable challenge to articulate a policy of citizen security that both is a distinct alternative from the Right and promotes basic civil rights. The Left (especially those governments in federal states) has not articulated a unified response. Gutiérrez and Policzer (2008) reviewed the record of the Left with respect to crime issues and have argued that left governments have in fact had a disjointed approach to violence, depending on whether they are more liberal in orientation (in which case they are likely to articulate a Hobbesian response) or more populist (in which case they are likely to adopt a more tolerant/rights-and-rules-oriented/Lockean response). They argue: "In other words, the politics of violence fragments the Left in unique ways, which do not necessarily reflect these governments' policies in other areas" (3). A brief overview of the Left highlights this significant variation. Below, I group cases in terms of those that initially articulated a proactive nationally integrative approach and the majority, which initially adopted a more reactive approach, with no clear national policy in evidence.

The Left in Nicaragua and Chile represents one end of the spectrum, as those governments articulated early on an integral approach (further professionalizing a centralized police force while also advancing preventive social programs and community participation). They did so early in the process of democratization, early relative to their neighbors, and early relative to contemporary concerns about crime and violence. Notably, the Nicaraguan and Chilean police today confront relatively low homicide rates relative to the rest of the region.

The FSLN in Nicaragua oversaw dramatic reforms to citizen security as part of the Sandinista revolution, reforms that included an institutional overhaul of the police and military (which remain among the most professionalized, respected, and trusted in the Central American region). The FSLN not only adopted a rule-of-law approach but assumed that its police should work with community organizations at the local level. While the Sandinistas lost the 1990 elections, their foundational institutional reforms for the police endured, as did some local patterns of engagement. Thus the FSLN set the tone for patterns of citizen security with its socialist and participatory approach to the revolution. This legacy has apparently endured into the contemporary period, as police chiefs articulate their mission in terms of crime control, crime

prevention, and community access.[23] These preventive and rehabilitative measures contrast sharply with *mano* and *super mano dura* policies that emerged in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Strikingly, violence levels have remained comparatively low in Nicaragua. Current president Ortega has not to date announced a new citizen security plan that distinguishes his government from his predecessors (who in turn did not really pursue a citizen security plan that distinguished them from the Sandinista period).

Chile's Concertación also entered the third wave with an apparent commitment to address citizen security. While it left the national police forces largely intact (with the Carabineros remaining under the control of the Ministry of Defense), it advanced a set of policies to address citizen security, including increasing police resources, promoting forms of community participation and community-police networking, and articulating both crime control and crime prevention strategies. Seemingly the Christian Democratic and Socialist wings of the Concertación have supported these policies (although they have faced opposition from the Right when they have proposed moving the Carabineros under the authority of the Ministry of Interior). President Lagos added a new dimension by introducing increased emphasis on justice system reforms, prison system reforms, more crime prevention programs, and more community participation (Dammert 2006, 66). While there have been many plans, the *plan cuadrante* highlights community policing and community integration, which was expanded under President Lagos (Frühling 2003, 36–38). The citizenry, however, has expressed rising concerns about violence, even though Chile's homicide level is much lower than that found in its neighbors. Criticized for not responding adequately, Dammert and Diaz (2006, 3) note that Bachelet campaigned with a more punitive set of security proposals, including stiffer sentencing, harsher prison conditions, and an increase in the size of the police force. As president, Bachelet announced a public security plan in September 2007 that focused on gun control, programs to deal with youth involved in violent crime, and other security measures. While the election of Sebastián Piñera ended the Concertación's lock on the presidency, there are no signs to date that he intends to change Chile's policy on citizen security.

In contrast to Nicaragua's and Chile's nationally coordinated, proactive, and early approach to citizen security, the majority of other Latin American Lefts represent the other end of the spectrum; they have largely played a reactive role while also delegating responsibility to subnational units to determine public security responses in cases where public security and police forces are decentralized. There are ongoing localized examples of community policing, women's police stations, preventive social policies targeting youth, and rehabilitation, but these do not seem to be the product of nationally coordinated left policies. At present, the literature talks about community policing as a creative community response (in coordination with local or state-level

governments) rather than the product of partisan politics (See Frühling and Tulchin 2003; Arias and Unger 2009). Given that (1) the elite can achieve greater security through private means and has done so and that (2) crime is seen as disproportionately hurting the poor (as targets and sites of violence), it is all the more striking that the Left largely sidestepped the issue of citizen security as a national responsibility and as a fundamental right or prerequisite of citizenship, especially in those countries experiencing high levels of violence.

Brazil falls squarely into this second camp. Brazil has until recently delegated authority to the states, which oversee public security. As Arias and Ungar (2009, 417) note, "most control over public security lies in the hands of twenty-seven state governments." And although there are some important Brazilian case studies of community policing, the Left has been slow to articulate a national position on citizen security that moves beyond rhetoric. Macaulay even goes so far as to argue that both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva saw bold criminal justice policy as politically risky:

> Both Cardoso and Lula governments realized that the potential cost of failure in attempting an audacious reform would far outweigh the possible electoral rewards. The Cardoso government avoided the issue of criminal justice, whereas the first Lula administration forced out a very promising reform team in under two years when their activities threatened to draw public attention to the government's responsibility to deliver. Delegation is such a tempting strategy in a federal system that it was not until 2006 that criminal justice became a topic for debate between the presidential contenders, as Lula attacked Geraldo Alckmin over the PCC [São Paulo's major organized crime gang]. This contrasts with the hyperpoliticisation of crime control in gubernatorial contests in Brazil. (2007, 646).

Cardoso and Lula, however, have not entirely ignored citizen security. Cardoso announced in 2000 the first federal security plan since 1808—although it did not really get off the ground (Dellasoppa and Sant'Clair Branco 2006, 27). The Workers' Party announced a public security plan in 2002 that declared security to be a right for all citizens; the plan included a call to modernize security forces, provide ethical training, and promote social participation (37–39). And in August 2007, Lula's administration passed the National Public Security and Citizenship Programme (PRONASCI), which aims to create a more integrated security response focused on addressing the violence and promoting preventive measures. Yet these national plans coincide with ongoing delegation to subnational units that assume responsibility to define policy and implementation (at times using coercion). In some cases subnational units have deployed a militarized response with apparent government support. For example, twice in 2007 Lula authorized the use of the military to help Rio's governor crack

down on organized crime in Rio's favelas—and reporters speculated that Rio's governor requested this help so that he could purge state-level police of corrupt officers.[24] The public, however, has remained concerned about violent crime and a national response. Debate continues over the constitutionality of using the military for policing. In June 2008, Rio's federal justice ruled that the constitution does not permit the military to serve as a police force, thereby ordering the army out of the favela Morro de la Providencia; nonetheless, later that month the defense minister indicated that he wanted Congress to pass a legal statute "sanctioning the use of the armed forces for 'urban conflicts' such as drug trafficking in the favelas."[25] In turn, Rio governor Sergio Cabral (PMDB, formerly of PSDB) has advocated and promoted an increased military police presence (Police Pacification Units [UPPs]) in thirteen favelas, an idea apparently inspired by his 2007 visit to Colombia.[26] With the approaching 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, the newly elected Workers' Party (PT) president Dilma Rousseff will face added pressure to address urban violence in Brazil, although it is still too early to say what direction that policy will take.

The Left in Venezuela, El Salvador, and Argentina has also been relatively late to articulate a national position on citizen security, despite very high violence levels in Venezuela and El Salvador. As in Brazil, the balance between a more punitive and coercive approach and a more socially engaged and preventive approach remains unclear at this stage. Venezuela's homicide rates, like those in Central America, have achieved alarming proportions. Homicides rose 11% from 2006 to 2007,[27] and Chávez was criticized for not drafting a national response. In February 2008, he announced the creation of a unified national police force that would be overseen by a national council on citizen security and regional security coordination; the measure unifies the country's 126 separate police forces.[28] In April 2008, he announced two additional decrees: the creation of a general command of the national reserve (over which there is considerable debate) and the creation of a new police law. "The new police law is the product of six years of debate. Chávez said the new 'humanist' police force, working closely with local community councils would replace the 'capitalist' police forces of the past which abused the poor in the barrios."[29]

El Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front [FMLN]) assumed office in 2009, after making citizen security a central part of his campaign. The Left had previously articulated a feeble position on citizen security, ceding the issue to the Right until recently. In office, Funes has created an emergency commission to address public security; has sought out broad consultation with social sectors (think tanks, parties, banks, elected officials, churches, NGOs, and social movements); and has announced a broad policy that strengthens civilian institutions (police and courts). The latter policy, however, has been complemented by a commitment to also repress and control crime, with the military slated to assist the police in

these efforts.[30] Because it is still early in Funes's term in office, it is impossible to evaluate implementation. Nonetheless, we can already see the tension between pursuing a social/civilian response and the calls for a militarized one. It is also worth noting that the Salvadoran police are commonly charged with corruption (despite post-civil-war police reforms that were initially embraced by the international community); even if Funes continues to advocate a more progressive and integral approach to citizen security, it is unclear whether the police can undertake such measures without serious reform to the institution itself.[31]

Argentina has relatively low violence rates compared to those of Brazil, Venezuela, and much of Central America. It is perhaps less surprising, then, that the Peronists have assumed a largely reactive role regarding citizen security, leaving the provinces in charge of security policy and occasionally calling for a national crackdown on crime. As examples of this last point, Carlos Menem and Eduardo Duhalde advocated zero tolerance policies that would have imposed stiffer penalties on suspected criminals, rather than advancing a more integral approach that would have (also) set out to address the causes of crime (Chevigny 2003, 85). With the election of Néstor Kirchner, there was a partial shift in tone; reactive and hardline measures were still on the agenda, although they were combined with some participatory elements. The Ley Antisecuestro (2003) gave prosecutors greater authority and established harsher penalties for anyone convicted of kidnapping. The Ley de Agravamiento de Penas (2003) increased penalties (jail terms) by one-third for crimes committed by security forces or for adults using minors to commit crimes. The government also created the National Directorate for Criminal Intelligence (created in 2001 and modified in 2003), which was intended to foster coordination among provincial police forces, create a federal emergency system, and coordinate the fight against terrorism and crime in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and Triple Frontier regions. Pending proposals include a national plan for the prevention of crime, which includes national, provincial, local, and community coordination; illumination of public spaces; community activities; and so forth. In 2009 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's government announced the Programa Integral de Seguridad Ciudadana; as of April 2010, 40 municipalities in Buenos Aires province had signed on. Among its provisions, the program makes resources available for the hiring of additional police, installation of security cameras, satellite monitoring of patrol cars, and the acquisition of new patrol cars. *La Nación* and *El Clarín* have criticized insufficient disbursement of funds (apparently only one-third of the promised moneys have been allocated). Civil society organizations and political actors, moreover, issued a communiqué in 2010 heralding the Acuerdo para la Seguridad Democrática and criticizing the Argentine government for being long on repression. Not surprisingly, no Peronist politician has signed on.[32]

At this point we cannot comment on the implementation of these new programs in Latin America or their ultimate political goals. But a few characteristics stand out. First, today's left parties and presidents have largely been compelled in the past decade to articulate some kind of citizen security policy, no longer simply ceding the terrain to the Right. Second, their response has varied but has recently included a commitment to combine law-and-order police enforcement with some degree of community efforts to develop preventive programs. Third, police forces have remained part of the ongoing problem (relatively speaking in all cases but Chile and Nicaragua), leading to calls to root out corruption and to create integrated democratic, efficient, effective, and accountable police forces. Finally, the language of citizenship is increasingly being used both to defend and to define the programs. As I discuss in the conclusion, this has required the Left to refocus its energies on the state as an actor that provides security not only through the legitimate monopoly of the coercive apparatus, not only through professionalizing police forces, but also through social programs and community participation that seek to prevent the proliferation of violence at the community level. In this regard, the Left's approach to security might take us back to social programs that were once understood as material rights alone. In the current context, these social programs are also about ensuring citizen security so that citizens can practice the rights that they are promised on paper.

Conclusion

There is clearly no single Left in Latin America. This chapter has charted out, however, that there was in the past a core: a commitment to social rights and a vision that the state had a responsibility to promote and defend programs that would provide a more equitable basis for citizenship. That commitment took many forms (and was undermined by many contradictions), but in its most basic form it was informed by a material understanding of citizenship and a presumption that the state could and should play a leading role in the move to achieve a more just life ("social rights" for all its citizens). The contemporary Left has increasingly shied away from these kinds of claims (now seen as revolutionary or populist but no longer fiscally responsible). What most of the contemporary Left now shares is a commitment to political and civil rights (at the cornerstone of liberal democracy) and a commitment to work for solutions to help the poor. In this new context, the scope of social rights has been debated rather than presumed. Indeed, one cannot really say that the contemporary Left promotes social programs as citizenship rights; they are seen more as moral preferences. In this regard, material constraints have shaped the delivery of material goods.

Yet, the Left's constituency is not reducible to material concerns alone and state

provision thereof. I have highlighted an unlikely and unrelated pair, multiculturalism and violent crime. I juxtapose these two (at the risk of making them seem related, which they are not) to highlight how the Left has had to readjust to a changed context. The current landscape is not primarily defined by corporatist organizations, class-based associations, and the military; but rather it is increasingly defined by alternative modes of mobilization, including new types of civil society (cleaved not only by class but also by ethnic politics) and new types of uncivil society (cleaved by gangs, organized crime, and street violence). Whereas the former aims to expand democratic citizenship in a multicultural direction, the latter has machine-gunned the most fundamental contract between states and citizens: the promise that the state will provide physical security for a citizenry that in turn will recognize its authority.

The Left has been slow to respond to these societal challenges, perhaps because they were seen as anachronistic (ethnicity), retrograde (security), and ephemeral (at base understood as material concerns). But in the current political environment, the Left has largely had to play catch-up in response to important societal trends. To respond, the Left has had to reconsider the nonmaterial bases of citizenship: not just which rights citizenship entails, but also who is part of the citizenry and how the state can or should protect them.[33] These are questions about the social contract itself, and ironically they lead the Left back to the state (not just as the provider of material equality and driver of growth, but also as the institution that encompasses and protects a multicultural citizenry). To do so, the Left is now being forced to reassess the uses of the state, including the difficult questions of when and how coercion can(not) be used to provide security; when the state should (not) delegate authority to subnational units; and when and how social rights are necessary not only for material well-being but also for identity and security. This is a new frontier for the Left in the region.

NOTES

Many thanks to the editors and reviewers for their thoughtful comments on this chapter and to Vinay Jawahar for his excellent research assistance.

1. Elsewhere I have written about three dimensions of citizenship: membership (who is included), modes of interest intermediation (which societal units—individual or collective or both—are privileged by the state), and rights (the content of citizenship, as defined by T. H. Marshall). In this chapter, I focus primarily on the third citizenship component (rights).

2. Clearly the Left did not agree about whether the state could play that role in a capitalist system; the revolutionary Left argued that capitalism needed to be overthrown, and the social democratic Left argued that an activist and vigilant state could promote a mixed economy within a capitalist and democratic system.

3. I limit my comments here to the revolutionary, social democratic, and populist Lefts, although other less numerous left movements did exist.

4. Revolutionary movements did not all share the same critique of capitalism and democracy. Moreover, ideological positions shifted over time even within the same revolutionary movements. The Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionary movements, for example, were both ideologically heterogeneous, with some form of ideological coherence emerging only after the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista and Anastasio Somoza Debayle, respectively.

5. One might arguably include Christian Democratic parties in this category. With the electoral Left they shared a commitment to some of the same civil, political, and social rights; however, in these years, Christian Democratic parties self-consciously did so by presenting themselves as an ethical alternative to the radical or Marxist Left.

6. For important discussions of populism, see Weyland 2001; Roberts 2006a, 2007b; and Levitsky and Roberts's introduction to this volume.

7. Cuba did not experience a democratic transition and therefore is not included in this section.

8. Nancy Bermeo (1992) has discussed this process as learning. More recently, Castañeda (2006) has also argued that older Lefts have moderated their discourse and come to value democracy as a more central value.

9. Also see Roberts 2006a, 2006b; 2007b; and Levitsky and Roberts's introduction.

10. At this time, it is impossible to explain with confidence whether Chávez's diminished concern for civil and political rights is a function of a disenchantment with the limited progress made during previous electoral regimes (historical analysis), of the widespread mandate he has been able to command (contemporary power), or of a commitment to ends over means (ideology).

11. In this section I focus on indigenous peoples, although the argument extends to Afro-Latins, given the limited attention historically paid by the Left to racial identities in general.

12. World Bank data indicates that poverty among indigenous people in the Americas is disproportionately higher than among the rest of the population. See De Ferranti, Perry, and Ferreira 2004. Given that indigenous identities have historically been understood as coterminous with poverty, social mobility was historically viewed as coterminous with assimilation into mestizo culture—a position that has been challenged in recent years by indigenous movements.

13. Indigenous people have demanded legal recognition after years of being viewed as anachronistic at best and invisible at worst. Constitutions now recognize the multiethnic and pluricultural makeup of Colombia (1991), Mexico (1992), Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), Ecuador (1998), and Venezuela (1999), among others in the region (Van Cott 2005)

14. Indigenous movements have demanded recognition of multiple units of representation. While demanding respect for individual rights, indigenous movements have also demanded that the state recognize indigenous communities as a historically prior community and, accordingly, one with an autonomous sphere of political rights and jurisdiction. These demands range from the call for community or supracommunity autonomy to the call for designated representation in legislatures and ministries.

15. *Latin American Weekly Report,* Andean Group, June 2008; also see chapter 11.

16. *Latin American Weekly Report,* October 8, 2009.

17. The Left has also reflected on the primacy of a central state in response to the unfold-

ing of decentralization that has accompanied the third wave of democratization in many Latin American countries.

18. In this sense, I agree with Hale (2002) that multiculturalism can be functionally supportive of neoliberalism. I do not agree, however, with the implication that neoliberalism caused multicultural agendas in the region.

19. The data is difficult to gather and compare because definitions and measures of homicide vary across countries and even across national institutions within the same country. Even recognizing this problem, UNODC (2007, 53) notes that most data indicates that Guatemala and El Salvador are among the most violent places in the world (alongside Jamaica, Colombia, South Africa, and Swaziland); Costa Rica, Panama, and Nicaragua are considerably less violent; data on Honduras is incomplete, but existing evidence suggests that it is closer to Guatemala and El Salvador than to the other Central American cases.

20. Mexico's President Calderón announced an increasing role for the military in addressing crime shortly after he took office in December 2006 (*Latin American Weekly Report,* May 17, 2007; May 28, 2008). The Salvadoran and Honduran governments, moreover, cracked down on gangs, arresting leaders in many cities in each country (See *Latin American Weekly Report*'s *Caribbean and Central American Report,* January–February 2008).

21. See Holland 2007 for a discussion of *mano dura* policies in El Salvador.

22. A *Demoscopia* study concluded that *mano dura* policies have resulted in greater organization and ties among gangs and organized crime. Also see *Latin American Weekly Report,* February 2008.

23. Nicaraguan police chiefs, interviewed by the author, spring 2007; particularly Nicaraguan police chief Aminta Granera, interview by the author, March 14, 2007.

24. *Latin American Weekly Report,* April 19, 2007; July 5, 2007.

25. Ibid., June 19, 2008, 10.

26. See Louis Amis, "The Problem of Violence No Longer Seems Intractable." *Financial Times,* November 15, 2010, Special Report on Brazil, p. 5.

27. *Latin American Weekly Report,* February 28, 2008.

28. Ibid., June 5, 2008, 1.

29. Ibid., April 17, 2008, 9.

30. See ibid., February 11, 2010; and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador, "Presidente Funes finaliza consultas de la política nacional de justicia, seguridad pública y convivencia," published online February 19, 2010, *Seguridad Ciudadana en las Américas,* http://scela.wordpress.com/2010/02/19/el-salvador-presidente-funes-finaliza-consultas-de-la-politica-nacional-de-justicia-seguridad-publica-y-convivencia/.

31. Guatemala's president, Álvaro Colom, is arguably center-left, in the context of Guatemalan party politics. I include him here for reference. He has announced measures to address crime, but in marked contrast to the *mano dura* approach of his predecessors (and rival presidential candidate General Otto Pérez Molina), Colom announced that security would be one of his primary goals in his first 100 days in office. He vetoed a death-penalty bill (despite its overwhelming legislative support and majority public opinion support), and under his administration the much-awaited International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) started functioning (and was extended by two years in 2009 when it was due to expire). Moreover, he indicated that the military would get out of the business of providing citizen security and cede that task to the Guatemalan police, which has had a terrible track

record on all dimensions. See *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central America Reports,* January–February 2008; and *Latin American Weekly Report,* March 27, 2008. And in 2009, Colom oversaw the signing of a national security justice agreement (*Latin American Weekly Report,* April 23, 2009). Thus far, however, Colom has arguably done little either to advance a left agenda or to promote a citizen security plan.

32. Information about Peronist policies can be found at www.casarosada.gov.ar (under "Obra de Gobierno" and "Planes y Programas") as well as from The Acuerdo, www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1–137771–2009–12–29.html, p. 12. For discussion of the lack of funding for the proposed *programa integral de seguridad ciudadana,* see "Plan de Seguridad de Lenta Ejecución," *Clarín.com,* March 31, 2010, http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2010/03/31/opinion/0-02170757.htm. Also see Rodolfo Lara, "El Gobierno ahora libera fondos para su programa de seguridad," published in *Clarín.com* the same day, http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2010/03/31/policiales/g-02170804.htm.

33. An array of solutions is under debate, including preventive measures, institutional professionalization, law and order, and even coercion.