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LOGICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, STATE LINKAGES, AND AGGREGATE TRAITS: THE UP-HUB VERSUS THE A-NET

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The shift in the popular interest regime from one centered on a union-party hub (UP-Hub) to one based in urban associational networks (A-Net) has entailed a new organizational infrastructure for popular-sector representation and problem solving. To analyze the dynamics of the new interest regime, it is useful to compare explicitly some important characteristics of the UP-Hub and the A-Net. This comparison is necessarily drawn in broad strokes, presenting a general picture that overlooks differences among national interest regimes. However, it provides an important context for subsequent chapters that carry out a more focused empirical examination of popular problem solving and the organizational infrastructure of the A-Net.

The chapter presents two kinds of comparisons between the popular interest regimes. The first concerns patterns of collective action; the second, relations between states and popular organizations. Collective action is directly relevant to two of the major themes in the volume: the extent of individual participation in the interest regime and the nature of coordination among popular organizations. We develop a theoretical framework for contrasting the logic of collective action in the UP-Hub and A-Net, one that moves beyond previous conceptions in several respects. We start by making an analytic distinction between collective action among individuals in the formation of and participation in organizations ("individual collective action") and that among organizations themselves ("organizational collective action") in coordinating their activities. This distinction, while simple in the abstract, has not been fully

developed in other studies that have followed in the Olsonian tradition of elaborating a single logic of collective action. The chapter suggests that incentives and disincentives for the two kinds of collective action emerge both from characteristics of organizations themselves as well as from the economic orientation of the state. The analysis suggests that unions, which predominated in the UP-Hub, tend to be characterized by greater obstacles to individual collective action *unless* the state steps in to solve these problems, and indeed, during the period of the UP-Hub the state under ISI did play this role in many ways. Associations, which predominate in the A-Net, do not face the same obstacles to individual collective action for organizational formation and participation. Hence, associations are less reliant on the state in this sense. "Spontaneous emanation" (Berger 1981) is at least a greater possibility. The relationship is reversed with regard to organizational collective action: coordination among organizational entities is likely to be more difficult in the A-Net than the UP-Hub, and the state, in the two historical periods respectively, reinforces this difference, again providing incentives for organizational collective action among unions but not (or much less so) for associations.

These logics of collective action have implications for two aggregate traits of the interest regime: scope and scaling, to which the chapter then turns. Scope refers to the extent to which the interest regime attracts the participation of the popular sectors; it is affected by the logic of individual collective action for organizational formation and participation. Scaling refers to overall trends in organizational coordination within the interest regime; it is affected by the ease of organizational collective action. An advantage of the A-Net is that it is potentially more inclusive; that is, while unions, as the core organizations of the UP-Hub, are restricted to formal workers, with others able to organize but consigned to a peripheral status, the A-Net does not marginalize associations of the larger popular sectors. In the specific sense of comparing unions in the UP-Hub to associations in the A-Net, the scope of the A-Net is potentially greater. Even if the state helps solve collective problems for unions, they still have the potential for encompassing a more restricted base of participants, whereas associations are organizational forms that are available to a much larger base, such as *amas de casa* and informal workers, who would be unable by definition to participate in unions in the UP-Hub. While empirical comparison is difficult, the data that will be presented below suggest that to date this potential advantage of associations in the A-Net compared to unions in the UP-Hub has not generally been realized. In terms of scaling, associations have been able to overcome some disincentives for organizational collective action, but the A-Net remains substantially less coordinated than the UP-Hub.

The second comparison between the two interest regimes involves the nature of relationships popular organizations have with the state. Unions in the UP-Hub had extensive and complex relations with the state, which often penetrated and co-opted them. Associations in the A-Net are quite different. During the period of democratization, many associations participated in antiauthoritarian opposition to the state; and during times of economic crisis, particularly the 1980s debt crisis, many associations engaged in provisioning or subsistence activities quite independent of the state. But subsequently, "ordinary times" have lent themselves to more routinized patterns of claim making and other forms of associational interaction with the state—as the deliverers of government programs, as participants in institutional fora established by the state, as recipients of state financing, and sometimes as partial creations of the state, in that officials played a role in the founding of the association. This pattern of state-association relations in the A-Net has occurred in the context of changes in the state, including, most prominently, shifts in the state's approach to social policy delivery, political decentralization, and change in state support of associations.

State relations are important for two aggregate traits of the interest regime: access and autonomy. Neither trait can be observed directly. Therefore, in the data analysis we examine the accessing *strategies* of popular organizations, which can be viewed in terms of the institutional channels for voice that popular organizations utilize for presenting claims to the state, the level of the state at which claims are made, the role of political parties as intermediaries, and the kinds of demands that flow through these channels. To explore autonomy, we examine relationships of direct dependence that organizations have with the state or political parties for resources or organizational advantage. Such relations of dependence may provide the incentives for organizations to behave in certain ways, thereby compromising their own autonomy. In this latter vein, autonomy is often seen as potentially jeopardized by the mechanisms that provide access, so that there may be a trade-off between access and autonomy. The examination in this chapter of accessing strategies, state dependence, and party-association relations in the A-Net anticipates the analysis in subsequent chapters, where these issues are addressed in greater detail.

Comparative Logics of Collective Action: Implications for Scope and Scaling

The popular interest regime, as an infrastructure constituted by organizations, is shaped by both patterns of collective action among individuals in forming

and participating in these organizations and by patterns of collective action among the organizations in coordinating their activities.¹ In considering differences between the UP-Hub and the A-Net, then, a natural place to start is a theoretical analysis of these two different "logics of collective action" (Olson 1965) in the two interest regimes. The present section develops a framework for this analysis, which has implications for scope and scaling, two important aggregate traits of the UP-Hub and the A-Net. These two traits affect the representational capacity of the interest regime. As Peruzzotti (2004b) argues, participation is not necessarily required for an organization to represent constituencies, particularly for those organizations that perform monitoring functions. Yet the extent of participation in aggregate is an important indicator of how the infrastructure functions as a vehicle for representation that articulates, aggregates, and otherwise pursues popular-sector interests. Scaling, or engaging in joint activity across organizations, is a powerful option for any set of interest organizations. For the popular sectors, as a group endowed more with numerical than with financial resources, coordination can be particularly important for leveraging strength—exerting influence, undertaking activities on a bigger scale, and reaching higher levels of government.

A useful approach to theorizing these dimensions is to view scope and scaling as empirical outcomes of two distinct logics of collective action. The analytic approach developed here elaborates on Olson's original formulation, which outlined a single and universal logic of collective action, and on subsequent research, which has focused on differentiating distinct collective action challenges faced by different societal groups, particularly capitalists versus the working class in industrial societies. While Olson focused on the size of groups and the problem of free riding, other scholars have stressed both the more onerous problems of collective action faced by labor compared to capital (Offe and Wiesenhal 1980) and the further asymmetry that the market mechanism provides a degree of coordination that mitigates the need for concerted or organized action among capitalists (Lindblom 1982). Analysts have since further disaggregated the capitalist side of this dichotomy, positing that differences in the logic of collective action. Less work has been done to disaggregate the other half of the dichotomy: the working classes. In pointing to the relative strengths or weaknesses of working-class groups, some analysts have differentiated them according to their structural and associational power (Wright 2000:962; see

1. The distinction between individual and organizational collective action, or action within and between organizations, is similar to that utilized by Olson (1965).

also Silver 2003:13), derived from, for example, size of plant, isolated enclaves, competitive versus noncompetitive sectors, skill levels, and craft versus industrial organizations. However, these analyses, rooted primarily in the experiences of advanced industrial countries, are oriented toward formal wage earners and fail to capture an important aspect of Latin American countries with their heterogeneous mixture of informal and formal workers, as well as the unemployed and underemployed, who are more likely to pursue interests through popular associations than through union organizations. For these groups, the analyses of social movement theorists are often insightful.

The present approach extends the literature on collective action in several ways. First, as mentioned, we distinguish individual collective action from organizational collective action. Second, the analysis focuses on two sets of factors that shape incentives for individual and organizational collective action—the traits of the predominant base organizational units of the interest regime and aspects of the state. In this section we ask how these other factors, organizational traits and the state, affect the incentives for participation in order to form organizations (unions and popular associations) and, once formed, to sustain participation in them and achieve coordination among them. Many organizational differences distinguish unions and popular associations. Although the upsurge of associationalism in Latin America has attracted great scholarly interest, the specific question of how these distinct organizational forms provide different incentives or disincentives for collective action compared with unions remains underexamined. For this question, the literature on social movements, in its emphasis on framing and mobilizational structures, provides a theoretical touchstone. The other set of factors pertain to the state. Whereas much of the Olsonian tradition is rather “inward-looking” in that it focuses on the characteristics of the group itself, the present approach focuses equally on factors “external” to the organization itself, especially on how the orientation of the state both directly and indirectly shapes incentives for collective action within and among organizations. The indirect effect of state factors bears similarities to arguments in the political process theory of social movements, although the emphasis in that literature is often on more conjunctural political factors that explain episodes or cycles of protest, rather than the more structural factors emphasized here, specifically the orientation of the state toward a particular model of political economy. In this regard, we distinguish the ISI state from the neoliberal state.

The analytic framework thus views the logics of both types of collective action as mechanisms by which organizational and state traits shape the scope and scale of the interest regime. Of the organizational traits, three are

highlighted: (a) resources, that is, constituency participation and finances, (b) interest convergence, and (c) the nature of demands. The state factors derive from the “type” of states, or the political economy of its basic policy orientation. Three dimensions of state policy are particularly relevant: (a) policy regarding the regulation of the base organizational unit, (b) policy regarding state macroeconomic intervention, and (c) social policy. It should be emphasized that these two sets of factors are interrelated, as the organizational factors are themselves influenced by the state. State action may affect the dominance within the overall interest regime of a particular type of organization as well as the three specific organizational traits under examination here.

The analysis begins by looking at the logics of collective action that derive from organizational and state traits. The former suggests that unions, which predominated in the UP-Hub, tend to be characterized by greater obstacles regarding individual collective action; however, the ISI state typically stepped in to solve or ameliorate some of these problems. Associations, which predominate in the A-Net, face less severe individual collective action problems and hence rely less on the state in this sense. With regard to organizational collective action, the problems are reversed: coordination among organizations is likely to be more difficult for associations than for unions.

Organizational Traits and Collective Action

Labor unions and popular associations, the two predominant base organizations of the UP-Hub and the A-Net respectively, are quite distinct types of organizations, often with contrasting implications for collective action. The following analysis examines differences between unions and associations in terms of resources, interest convergence, and the nature of the demands typically made. These are traits largely “inherent” to unions and popular associations. In this discussion, it must be remembered that, as we will see in the next section, the state may step in to “solve” collective action problems so that some of the problems described here, particularly those of unions, are often overcome.

Resources. Labor unions and popular associations differ in terms of the resources at their command, particularly personnel and material resources, or the type of constituency participation and the type of financing.

For unions, resource requirements are very high if they are to have any capacity. Because collective bargaining is their basic activity and their ultimate weapon has historically been the strike—or credible strike threat—they need the constituency participation of a significant number or percentage of relevant

Table 3.1 Organizational Traits and Collective Action

Organizational Traits	Unions in UP-Hub	Associations in A-Net	Effect on Collective Action	
			Individual	Organizational
Resources	Personnel: High-cost formal membership Material: Significant and self-funded; stable, reliable level	Personnel: Low-cost flexible participation Material: Varies, but rarely both significant and self-funded; uncertain level	Unions: - Assoc: +	Unions: + Assoc: -
Interest Convergence	Low among competing workers but high among union members, high among unions	High among self-selecting participants, low among associations	Unions: - Assoc: +	Unions: + Assoc: -
Demands	Recurrent, often nondisaggregable	Often one-shot and disaggregable	Unions: +/- Assoc: +/-	Unions: + Assoc: -

workers and, if possible, material resources for a strike fund. Hence the model of constituency participation of unions is one of formal membership, usually drawn from a delimited group of individuals who are employed in similar circumstances. Membership carries costs, which are high, such as dues and the need to conform to organizational choices, like the decision to strike and forego income. Unions thus experience serious obstacles to individual collective action. Although these barriers may be somewhat mitigated by the low cost of participation in terms of time and by the side payments of member services, like health care, pensions, and vacation resorts, the obstacles remain high: unions are difficult to form and, as Olson (1965:66ff.) suggested, unions must often sustain participation through some type of "coercion," such as the union shop or, as we shall see in the next section, state regulation.

Once formed, however, the formal membership model "locks in" both participation and material resources. The stability and ample funding of the resource model help unions coordinate. With formal membership, leaders are able to commit to cross-organizational collective action and pursue long-term strategic goals that may impose short-term costs without fear of defection. Union dues provide predictable funding for day-to-day operations, professional staff, and long-term budgetary and strategic planning.

Popular associations rarely have formal members and exhibit considerably

more variation than unions in the nature of constituency participation. Although exceptions exist, such as some associations of street vendors (Roever 2005), in most cases it is probably a misnomer to speak of membership at all. Rather, these associations have participants, and the costs to participation are low. Dues are rarely required, and participation is generally voluntary and intermittent and can be tailored to fit one's changing level of enthusiasm. Further, many associations, particularly NGOs providing services, rely on professional staff and only minimally need or even seek participants. In contrast to unions, then, the more flexible models of participation that characterize most popular associations require lower levels of commitment and tend to facilitate associational formation. On the other hand, associations often have more trouble sustaining individual participation, because, unlike unions, which have substantial barriers to exit (leaving a union not only entails forgoing these benefits, but is also often costly and disruptive, generally requiring a change of jobs) associations are characterized by few barriers to exit. However, because some associations can easily replenish their participants and others have little reliance on them, on balance the associational resource model provides incentives for individual collective action.

With respect to collective action among associations, the resource models of associations may, in some ways, provide incentives for coordination. Associations, which are generally resource-poor, sometimes rely for funding or training on other associations that have the *raison d'être* of coordination and/or receive money from the state or international donors that is explicitly earmarked for such activities. At the same time, popular associations that rely on constituent participation tend to find coordination more difficult precisely because coordination across associations heightens the Olsonian free rider problem of larger numbers and because participants are presented with no barriers to exit.

In sum, the union resource model, based on formal membership with dues, makes individual collective action initially problematic for organizational formation, but once unions are formed, it facilitates organizational collective action. For associations, the low resource requirements and low cost resource model is an incentive for individual collective action for organizational formation. At the same time, however, associations have a resource model of substantial uncertainty, which makes individual collective action for ongoing participation and organizational collective action or coordination more difficult.

Interest Convergence. A second organizational factor is interest convergence or heterogeneity among individuals and organizations. As is widely recognized, interests are constructed; however, the burden of this task is not everywhere

the same. This factor makes formation easier for associations than for unions and coordination more difficult.

In terms of individual collective action for organizational formation, unions confront a notable difficulty regarding a lack of interest convergence, based on a particularly acute individual coordination problem. Though workers converge on a desire for better wages and working conditions, they directly compete with one another in a flexible, nonunionized labor market, driving wages down and making interest heterogeneity, indeed competition, endemic to proletarian status. The importance of framing and collective identity, like class consciousness, in overcoming this problem for collective action has long been recognized, but the nature of the task is usefully formulated by Offe and Weisenthal, who suggest that forging a collective identity involves a somewhat paradoxical dynamic in which "interests can only be met to the extent that they are partly redefined" (1980:81).

Associations, on the other hand, do not face the same kind of competition among would-be participants. They more typically attract participants for projects, issues, or policy goals that are more specific and delimited—for example, neighbors may participate in associations for specific infrastructural projects, or vendors may cooperate to secure space on the streets when its use is threatened. They thus have the advantage that participants self-select, come together around specific common interests, and have less to overcome in forging a convergence of interests for initial formation.

The comparison is reversed for organizational collective action: interest convergence is likely to be greater across unions than across associations, making coordination more difficult for associations. The union movement focuses on a limited number of productionist issues, related to wages and work conditions. Even when union interests differ by sector, the most important sectoral unions are generally large and cohesive enough to scale and often to win bargaining rights at the national level. In addition, as we shall see, under ISI, many workers in key sectors had a commonality in the state as an employer and as a target of grievances. Furthermore, the interests of those in the private and public sectors converged on many issues of national policy, such as those that protect jobs, set minimum wages as a benchmark, and regulate individual contracts and collective rights, as well as macroeconomic regulation. Even across sectors, then, enough commonality of interest existed to provide an incentive to establish vertical structures for representing common interests at the national level. Furthermore, the affiliation of unions to LBPS, through institutionalized organizational links, interlocking leadership, or a history of collaboration, has played some role in constructing a convergence of interests. Not only did party

linkage impart a common party identification, but in addition, political parties could be brokers that helped unions coordinate on specific programmatic priorities or concessions.

By comparison, associations in the aggregate cover more heterogeneous interests. The work situations of participants in associations vary widely. While most are in the informal sector, others are formal workers, unemployed, or out of the labor force altogether. Further, even informal workers are a diverse category, sometimes explicitly defined as including wage earners in small or informal enterprises, microentrepreneurs who hire them, domestic workers, and the self-employed. Given this diversity, most associations do not take up productionist demands at all. They focus on a great variety of other, usually consumptionist issues, including most prominently social services, poverty, and neighborhood and local development. With such a great diversity of issues being addressed and interests being advanced, it may be more difficult for associations to coordinate. Of course, interest heterogeneity is not as great a problem for the subset of associations that focus on the same issue. However, as we will see below, a third organizational trait may mean that coordinating around even the same issue may be difficult.

There is, of course, some asymmetry in comparing only unions in the UP-Hub to a diverse set of popular associations in the A-Net. However, the point is that in the UP-Hub, working-class interests were constructed in a homogeneous way and framed around at least a minimal level of common ideological orientation and class identity and around a limited set of productionist issues. By contrast, the A-Net does much less to construct a commonality of interest and identity or to prioritize a subset of issues: its "pluralism" is almost necessarily less homogenizing.

Nor do associations have a common partisan affiliation that helps construct common identities or convergent programmatic priorities across these separate issues or that subsumes them under a larger whole. As mentioned above, it has long been suggested that collective identity can help overcome the problem of interest heterogeneity, and the social movements literature similarly has emphasized the importance of common frames for collective action. Some observers have seen a common discourse of rights and grassroots participatory democracy, but an overarching identity may not be readily available when interests are as fragmented as they are in the associational world.

Demands. A final factor shaping the logic of collective action is the nature of demands central to each type of organization. Two aspects of demands affect the logic of collective action. The extent to which demands are "deliverable" can affect incentives for sustaining participation and for organizational

coordination. The degree to which demands can be "disaggregated" can shape incentives for both the formation of organizations and, more directly, coordinating across associations.

"Deliverability" is in part affected by the nature of demands, as envisioned on a spectrum running from discrete, one-shot demands to those that are ongoing, and in some cases essentially unbounded, in that they cannot be satisfied at some determined point. It is useful to contrast associational and union demands with those of the new social movements (NSM), which have been important cases for theorizing collective action, and typically have demands that represent one end of the "deliverability" spectrum: transformative, virtually unbounded, postmaterial demands that cannot be "satisfied." Though NSMs also make more specific deliverable demands, dominating their larger agenda is usually a much broader demand that is ultimately unfeasible within any reasonable time frame. Even a responsive government can, for example, only partially "satisfy" demands for racial equality, fulfill an environmental agenda, or even save the forests. This "insatiability" of demands can be a powerful inducement for continued organization and mobilization; indeed, responsiveness on the part of the government may be as likely to energize as demobilize such movements and sustain them over time. Such transformative and long-term orientations also provide a common, salient goal that subsumes the many immediate, concrete demands made by individual associations, thereby uniting the larger network and facilitating coordination among organizations.

A quite different dynamic is more likely to hold both for unions and especially for popular associations, whose demands are more immediate and discrete rather than unbounded. Along a continuum of this dimension, the demands of unions and some popular associations may be seen as intermediate, in the sense that although they tend to be discrete and can be satisfied in a relatively short time frame, they are not one-shot but rather, they recur. For unions, wages as well as many national policies, such as many aspects of macroeconomic policy that unions may be involved in negotiating, are set only for the short term, and then they must be renegotiated. The recurrent nature of these demands gives incentives for sustaining participation and facilitates organizational coordination, as stable coordinating structures are needed for ongoing proclaim making and concertation. Similarly, associations that administer programs, and those that may be concerned with ongoing issues such as policing, health, or education, may, like unions, have recurring demands.

On the opposite end of the spectrum from the NSMs, many associations engage in activities around discrete and immediate demands or problems that

do not recur, such as urban services, infrastructure investments, or land titles. Once such demands are fulfilled, the activities come to an end. Evidence suggests that having these demands fulfilled may be more likely to demobilize than energize associations (Dosh 2006). In parallel fashion, some associations engaged in society-targeted rather than state-targeted activities may also address problems that are one-shot in nature, in which participants organize to achieve a particular goal, which can be accomplished and fulfilled. To the extent they engage in one-shot, deliverable demands, organizations may have difficulty sustaining participation, as participants are more likely to exit once an immediate need is fulfilled. Moreover, the one-shot nature of many associational demands makes organizational coordination more difficult, as it is less likely that a critical mass of organizations will be willing to make a commitment to long-term coordination.

The second aspect of demands is whether they are directed toward policies that are easy or difficult to disaggregate in terms of constituencies, or the degree to which demands are for targetable or excludable goods. Lowi (1964) insightfully argued that policies that lend themselves to disaggregation display different patterns of group contestation and are played out in different "political arenas," or through different policy processes, compared to those not easily disaggregated. Distinguishing distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies, Lowi made the fundamental observation that different types of actors are the "primary political units" in each policy arena—peak associations weigh in on redistributive issues, coalitions of more discrete interest groups tend to contest regulatory policy, and individuals, firms, or small interest groups operate in the distributive arena of disaggregable policy. This correspondence between interest groups and policy type helps us understand the differing logic of collective action of unions and popular associations.

While unions and associations may have multifaceted agendas and make a variety of demands that differ in their ease of disaggregation, it is possible to draw some general distinctions and posit some basic implications. Many union demands concern the workplace, and much union activism occurs at the plant level. Nevertheless, a powerful logic operates for unions to present demands at the level of the entire economic sector so that competing firms won't be advantaged by labor concessions. Further, as we will see, particularly under ISI union interests often converged on highly "aggregated" demands at the level of national economic, social, and regulatory policy, including, of course, labor market regulation and legal provisions that regulate unions and collective rights. To the extent unions embrace such aggregated demands or those that involve a larger number of beneficiaries, the free rider problem is greater, and individuals

may be less willing to pay the cost of participation in collective action. However, organizational incentives for coordination across unions increase when demands cannot be disaggregated.

Many popular associations present a different picture. As the above examples of demands for urban services, infrastructure investments, and land titles indicate, popular associations are more likely to focus on distributive demands that can be disaggregated, in the sense that a government response can be targeted to one association and withheld from another. The disaggregability provides an incentive for individual collective action, since success is more likely when the response is cheap (as it is when targeted), and would-be participants are more likely to join an effort that promises to reap quick rewards. However, disaggregability has negative implications for associational coordination. The piecemeal and discretionary response to these demands—a sidewalk here, a health clinic there—is conducive to clientelism and co-optation, and it discourages the establishment of ongoing, institutionalized relations of cooperation among associations. While some analysts see the new associationalism as a bulwark against clientelism, the opposite may be equally likely: fundamental characteristics of associations, their desire for state access and resources, and the nature of their demands make them vulnerable to clientelistic relations.

Some associations may, of course, have a larger—and national—political agenda, for example, health and education policies, active labor market policies, poverty relief, and tax and redistributive policies. However, many associations focus on disaggregable demands, and the fact that core demands can be satisfied individually lowers the incentives for cooperation or coordination. Precisely because it is cheaper to dole out targeted benefits and hence disaggregated demands are more easily fulfilled, associations may have an incentive to demand a particular subsidy or distribution for just one neighborhood, rather than to present the demand as a politically more difficult form of “entitlement” for all similar neighborhoods.

In sum, for both unions and associations the nature of demands produces countervailing incentives for individual collective action. The recurrent nature of union demands provides an incentive for collective action, but their aggregated nature increases incentives for free riding. The disaggregated nature of associational demands facilitates formation, but their nonrecurrent nature makes sustaining participation more difficult. With respect to collective action between organizations, however, the effect of demands is less ambiguous: they provide incentives for coordination among unions, while discouraging coordination among associations.

State Characteristics and Collective Action

The incentives and disincentives for collective action that derive from state characteristics illuminate key contrasts between the UP-Hub and A-Net. The two interest regimes developed in distinct historical periods, in the context of very different types of states. The UP-Hub generally emerged in tandem with an interventionist state fostering industrialization through policies of import substitution, while the A-Net has emerged alongside a leaner neoliberal state that has redefined appropriate state action, retreating from many policy areas and reformulating its intervention in others. The political economy of the ISI and neoliberal states differ regarding three major policy areas that are central in terms of their effects on collective action: state regulation of popular organizations, macroeconomic policy, and social policy. In considering the impact of the state, then, the following discussion will refer specifically to the ISI state of the UP-Hub and the neoliberal state of A-Net.

Regulatory Policy. The first contrast concerns state regulation of the base organizations of the interest regime. The ISI and neoliberal states took very different approaches to regulating, respectively, unions and popular associations. In the current period, neoliberal states have adopted a “pluralist” approach to associations, typically marked only by minimal and voluntary registration requirements, in contrast to the ISI period, when Latin American states extensively regulated unions in a pattern widely analyzed as state corporatism, in which the state legally recognized strike and bargaining rights—necessary for basic union functioning—in exchange for extensive regulation (Schmitter 1971, 1974; Erickson 1977; Stepan 1978; Collier and Collier 1979).

Regarding collective action among individuals, state regulation of unions had somewhat contradictory effects regarding incentives for union formation.

Table 3.2 State Traits and Collective Action

State Traits	ISI State/ UP-Hub	Neoliberal State/A-Net	Effect on Collective Action	
			Individual	Organizational
Regulations of Popular Organizations	High (unions)	Low (associations)	Unions: + Assoc: 0	Unions: + Assoc: 0
Economic Policy	Interventionist	Market- oriented	Unions: + Assoc: 0	Unions: + Assoc: 0
Social Policy	Employment- based, centralized	Broader, more decentralized	Unions: + Assoc: +	Unions: + Assoc: +

Regulations regarding registration, legal recognition, and minimum membership requirements were an impediment to union formation, and, more importantly, monopoly representation presented a barrier to entry that made it virtually impossible to form new unions among an already unionized workforce. At the same time, however, regulatory provisions often took a form that amounted to compulsory membership and had the effect of virtually mandating the formation of and workers' participation in unions in specific sectors. Taken together, these contradictory effects often created situations in which regulation induced or allowed the formation of a group of unions that were legally recognized and hence legitimized as political actors, but blocked subsequent union formation, especially of dissident or alternative unions competing for the same members. The system of corporatist regulation had unambiguously positive effects on the ability of extant unions to sustain participation. Versions of compulsory membership or closed shop were clearly the most important provision, but various types of incentives also existed. Legal recognition was accompanied by formal participation in an institutionalized system of industrial relations that produced benefits for union members. Further, the monopoly of representation enjoyed by privileged unions sharply reduced any incentives members had for defection, since the benefits of union membership were available through a single source. All in all, state regulation did much to solve the collective action problem of competition among workers, and effectively mandated that people join unions—but not a multiplicity of unions in the same firm or sector.

With regard to organizational collective action, regulation often gave strong inducements for coordination among unions, and federations and confederations were formed virtually everywhere and became especially powerful when the state allowed them to bargain collectively. The regulation of this right varied across countries. Chile, for instance, historically allowed only plant-level bargaining except during the Allende period. More typically, however, Latin American countries granted official recognition and bargaining rights to federations at the national level. The state thus provided an incentive for local unions to coordinate and to form peak labor federations and confederations.

In comparison, the neoliberal state does little to regulate associations. Registration with the state is fairly common among popular associations but often voluntary. It may be required for associations participating in or serving in the implementation of government social programs, as may additional forms of regulation. In general, however, nonregistration does not affect the basic functioning of associations in a manner parallel to that of unions. Overall, and in comparison with unions, the associational world seems to be relatively

free of regulation, characterized by a pluralist environment that neither encourages nor impedes individual or organizational collective action.

Economic Policy. A second state characteristic concerns the approach to economic intervention and macroeconomic policy. The ISI state was interventionist. It was a major employer both in state firms and in an often bloated bureaucracy, and it undertook responsibility for an extensive range of economic policies, including macroeconomic regulation, an array of subsidies, and wage policy. Since these were policies in which workers had a direct interest, the state itself, and not only private firms, became a target for union claim making, both as an employer and as a policy maker at the national level. The involvement of the state in these roles offered incentives for individual collective action, in both union formation and ongoing participation. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2, the ISI state paralleled the Keynesian welfare state in the advanced industrial countries in that it could make room for a certain degree of class compromise, supporting unionization in many sectors and encouraging a kind of organized capitalism with peak confederations and, in some countries, their participation in negotiations on aspects of economic policy. The economic role of the state and the privileging of union members among the broader popular sectors provided incentives for individuals to remain union members, even if unions intermediated state-society relations in contradictory ways that compromised worker interests. Statist economic policy also offered substantial incentives for organizational collective action, specifically for unions to coordinate in a way that would allow them to scale to the national level and make demands regarding national policy.

Under the neoliberal economic model, which is oriented to market mechanisms and deregulation, Latin American states have privatized state firms and retreated from many areas of economic policy intervention. State withdrawal from policy areas—through the privatization of state firms, the elimination of subsidies, or the free rein of the market in areas such as exchange rate policy—can depoliticize these policies, removing them from the arena of political contestation and shifting them to the arena of market competition and provision. Kurtz (2004b) has demonstrated how the change of economic model (such as the substitution of a land market for state-sponsored land reform) has depoliticized and disorganized the rural popular sectors in this fashion. Further, the neoliberal state relies little on the cooperation or participation of popular associations regarding economic policy, parallel to the way it sometimes used to rely on unions in controlling inflation.² Economic policy thus does not provide the

2. In some cases, such as Argentina or Mexico, such cooperation has survived or been re-established in the context of the new economic model. See Etchemendy and Collier (2007).

incentives for individual or organizational collective action among associations that the ISI state provided for unions.

Social Policy. The third state dimension for analysis is social policy. While the ISI and neoliberal states have substantially different orientations toward social provision, both provide some incentives for collective action for popular organizations. Social policy under ISI was primarily employment based and largely restricted to formal workers or to unionized workers, leading to a pattern of truncated welfare states (Garretón 1994; Mesa-Lago 1997; Raczynski 2001). To the extent that unionization helped deliver benefits such as pensions and health care that other workers had more difficulty attaining, this approach to social policy gave strong incentives for individual collective action. The exclusionary character of welfare provision also offered substantial barriers to—or disincentives for—exit, as workers might risk losing important benefits if they left their unions. Finally, the centralized nature of social policy making offered further incentives for organizational collective action or coordination in order to make claims concerning health care, pension systems, and other policies that were almost exclusively handled at the national level under ISI.

The neoliberal state has remained active in social policy provision but has been characterized by a different orientation toward making and implementing policy. Many governments have expanded social services to previously excluded sectors and have often decentralized their implementation. Social policy has been especially affected by the larger trend toward decentralization in the region, as governments have often moved to devolve implementation, programmatic initiatives, and budgetary control of various policies to lower levels. Many proponents have anticipated that the result would be greater responsiveness to grassroots demands. Greater responsiveness has also been advanced by a variety of experiments with “deepening democracy,” although their design, implementation, and effectiveness have varied substantially.³ Further, in bringing service delivery to the local level, the neoliberal state has increasingly embraced a partnership model for implementing these policies, based not only on the state bureaucracy but also on private associations. This new orientation of social policy provides a strong impetus to individual collective action in order to form associations that can become service providers and recipients of government programs. The partnership model of implementation, in which associations may become de facto arms of a “privatized” state, is also an incentive for sustaining individual participation in associations,

3. See Roberts (1998), Abers (2000), Dagnino, Olvera, and Panfichi (2006), and Goldfrank (2007).

especially for those who draw salaries to run and maintain these programs or whose access to benefits may depend on participation, as is often the case for communal kitchens. In terms of organizational collective action, the decentralization of social policy provision may not provide the same incentives for scaling in the form of national peak organizations as did the ISI state, but may provide substantial incentives for inter-associational coordination on a more local or metropolitan level.

Scope and Scaling in the UP-Hub and the A-Net

The analysis above considered several factors, each of which suggested implications for the scope and scaling of the interest regime. How does the theoretical framework just presented bear out empirically? Since the factors did not all point in the same direction, it is not possible to weight and aggregate them into a straightforward prediction. This problem is particularly vexing for scope. The greater ease of individual collective action in associations would suggest greater density in the A-Net; however, the more active role of the state in solving the individual collective action problems of unions may attenuate the potential scope advantage of the A-Net. Thus, despite the fact that associations are potentially open to a greater portion of the popular sectors than just formal workers and may have greater incentives for individual collective action, we have no strong basis for a “prediction” of how scope might differ in the two interest regimes. The outcome might also be strongly shaped by other factors in effect “held constant” in the above discussion, such as the level of industrialization and size of the formal sector. We might expect a greater and more consistent empirical difference with respect to scaling, as the different logics of organizational collective action in the UP-Hub and the A-Net are less ambivalent—both state and organizational factors seemed to be consistently more supportive of coordination in the former. For these reasons, in addition to the limitation of data that can be marshaled, “testing” the distinct logics of collective action, as suggested above, is not appropriate or feasible. Nevertheless, it may be instructive to examine available data and compare the scope and scale of the UP-Hub and the A-Net across the four countries examined in the present study.

We start with a comparison between the UP-Hub and A-Net regarding the scope encompassed by the predominant base units, unions and associations, respectively (see table 3.3). One must obviously exercise caution in interpreting these data, in light of a number of issues concerning measurement and comparability. Although these data reflect only the predominant organizational

Table 3.3 Density of Organizational Participation Across Interest Regimes

	Argentina	Chile	Peru	Venezuela
Union Density in Peak Years	50.1 (1975)	35.0 (1973)	25.0 (1976/7)	26.4 (1988) ^a
Union Density in 1995	22.3	12.7 (8.4 in 1985) ^b	5.7	13.5
Associational Density (programmatic)	22.2	25.2	55.9	17.8
Associational Density ("political")	34.2	40.6	68.4	25.9

Sources: Union density from Roberts database and Roberts (forthcoming). Associational density from CIRELA database.

Note: Union density is calculated as the percent of the total labor force that is unionized. Associational density is based on the percent of a random sample of popular-sector adults living in the capital city. Of the two scores of associational density, the first reports those belonging to at least one association specifically dedicated to problem solving; the second indicator also includes those reporting participation in sports, cultural, recreational, and religious organizations if respondents report that this association undertakes political, that is, problem-solving, activities. It should be noted that the data here differs slightly from that presented in figure 4.1, in which the data is not restricted to the popular sectors.

^aBecause of the late adoption of economic reforms in Venezuela, union density peaked later than elsewhere.

^bBecause of the early economic reform in Chile, union density declined earlier than elsewhere.

form of each interest regime, associations of course existed during the UP-Hub, and unions continue to be important in the A-Net. Further, union density is calculated as a proportion of the total national labor force, whereas associational participation is calculated as a proportion of the popular sectors in the capital city. For these and other reasons, the measures are not directly comparable.⁴ Nevertheless, some general points can be made.

Even though unions, unlike popular associations, have the potential of reaching only a restricted subgroup of formal workers, union density in the UP-Hub relative to the total workforce (including agricultural workers) was often substantial, aided by the role of the state in solving the collective action problem of workers in forming and participating in unions. Yet associationalism has

4. The populations assessed by the two statistics differ in three ways. As a proportion of the labor force, union density is calculated at the national level, irrespective of the social class of workers (unions include some white-collar workers who are probably middle class), and only from the economically active population. In contrast, our survey-based approach to measuring associational density is calculated only in the capital city, only from the popular sectors, and without regard to whether individuals are economically active. It should also be noted that, in terms of associational participation, the CIRELA survey asked about a wide range of associations, but the list is not exhaustive.

also become widespread. Despite the shortcomings in comparing measures, it seems likely that in Peru associational density has outstripped the peak union density of the UP-Hub, and only in Argentina does it seem clear that associational density might be lagging behind peak union density. The data also demonstrate the degree to which union density declined from the time of the 1st state and the UP-Hub to the time of the neoliberal state and the A-Net, and, with the exception of Argentina, the degree to which participation in associations appears to outpace union density in the contemporary period.

A sharper contrast exists between the UP-Hub and the A-Net regarding scaling. Unions under the UP-Hub developed a high degree of cooperation over time, both in terms of coordination among unions in activities and integration into formal coordinating structures. As labor movements became institutionalized, base-level unions were frequently integrated into regional, sectoral, or national labor federations and confederations, which then represented or intermediated their interests in both the private arena of collective bargaining and in interactions with state and party officials. This pattern of hierarchical integration was generally formalized—federations had explicit roles and powers in the representation of local unions, and some type of formal election or delegation from the base organizations to the higher bodies generally provided at least quasi-legitimation. In addition to providing a structure for coordinating and representing base-level unions in making claims through institutional channels, the federations also played a role in organizing coordinated action for protest. Although no data offer a precise measure, the vast majority of unions were integrated into these structures.

Our theoretical framework predicts that coordination would be significantly lower in the A-Net, with associations more likely to have few ties and also less likely to have linkages to coordinating bodies. While there are no measures available for explicitly comparing across interest regimes in this respect, this prediction does seem to be generally born out in the data, even with respect to our snowball sample of associations, which, as discussed in chapter 2, captures a more linked and interconnected "core segment" of the A-Net. Table 3.4, which presents data for the pooled sample, shows that while portions of the A-Net are characterized by relatively dense inter-associational linkage and an active role for coordinators, many other associations, even within a chain-referral sample, remain relatively isolated and without regular activation of linkages to coordinating bodies. This pattern contrasts with that of the UP-Hub, in which unions very rarely operated in complete isolation and were nearly all affiliated with some kind of federation or confederation. Not shown

Table 3.4. Coordination Among Popular Associations

Inter-Associational Linkages (number of linkages)	Percent of Associations
0	19.4
1-4	28.9
5-10	18.4
11-30	19.2
31+	14.1
Linked to Coordinating Association	36.8

in this data, but clearly evident, is also a marked difference in the type of coordinating structures characterizing each interest regime.⁵

Associations thus exhibit a pattern of, at best, loose coordination in fluid networks, with "federations" or coordinating organizations playing some role. This pattern accords with numerous other findings in the literature on civil society and social movements in Latin America (Chalmers, Martin, and Piester 1997; Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Alvarez 1998) and cautions against an overstatement of extreme atomization. The implications of this pattern of coordination for the operation of the A-Net as a structure of representation are double-edged. As many analysts have noted, networked patterns of coordination may be less prone to Michelsian oligarchy and threats to democratic accountability: to the subordination of base-level interests and to co-optation of organizational leaders by political elites. However, a pattern of loose, networked coordination may make it more difficult for associations to leverage their strength in national-level claim making and may make associational networks less attractive allies for political parties, although, as will be suggested in chapter 8, electoral support is often sought among associations.

State Linkages: Implications for Access and Autonomy

In addition to providing different logics of collective action, a second contrast between the UP-Hub and the A-Net regards linkages between the state and popular organizations. These affect the access popular organizations may have

5. For analysis of country variation, further discussion of differences in coordinating associations between the two interest regimes, and a much more detailed investigation of scaling in the A-Net more generally, see chapter 7.

to the state as well as their autonomy. Relations with the state are thus fundamental to the way the interest regime is inserted into politics and operates as a structure of representation. As noted in chapter 1, accessing strategies are so fundamental that many analysts define political activities in these terms. However, as further noted, not all problem solving by popular organizations is state targeted—bargaining with employers is an integral part of the activities of labor unions, while many society-targeted activities are widespread among associations. Yet the state remains the locus of policy-making authority and the target of contestation, so that the accessing capacity of an interest regime is a fundamental trait.

Relations with the state also may compromise autonomy, a dynamic that is particularly important given that many elite actors use state resources to shape and control popular organizations or mobilize political support. We can think of two general kinds of relationships that present threats to autonomy. Associations may enter into relationships of dependence on the state, relying on state funding, implementing state programs, or even being partially founded by state actors. More generally, threats to autonomy can emerge from the pursuit of accessing strategies themselves. Access and autonomy are often in tension with each other—autonomy may wane as access increases. Popular organizations may thus face a tradeoff between access and autonomy. Relations that offer access for claim making and opportunities to participate in government programs may provide inducements or incentives that can lead autonomy to be compromised, as when associations modify demands to maintain favor with the state or are induced to become partisan actors. Given this tradeoff, popular organizations that value autonomy may be reluctant to pay the cost of entering into relationships with state and party actors, while others may opt for the access these relationships afford. The relationship to representation is therefore particularly complex.

Access

The classical form of interest activity is claim making directed toward government officials, and for many popular associations, institutionalized channels of access are central for pressing claims. Thus, the degree to which the interest regime as a whole provides access to officials, and at what level of government, is an important aggregate property of the interest regime. Of course, access to policy makers is not always desired by popular organizations or necessary for them to be effective representative structures. Historically, anarcho-syndicalist unions were unwilling to enter into any relationship with the state (although

that strategic posture changed once socialist and communist tendencies became dominant within the labor movement). Some popular associations may emphasize society-targeted strategies or may press claims through protest, without seeking institutional channels of access. For many associations, however, accessing strategies are central for representing their constituencies. Some associations target claims primarily toward local-level officials, who are responsible for the decisions and distributions of most relevance, particularly in the context of administrative decentralization; for some claims, however, access at the national level is vital. Therefore, variation in the degree to which a popular interest regime has channels of access at the national, as well as local, level is an important dimension for comparison. The absence of popular-sector organizations from policy-making arenas would leave these constituencies without voice in policy areas central to their well-being.

As noted in chapter 1, it is important to emphasize the distinction between accessing and influence. The latter is notoriously difficult to assess and has posed problems that have often plagued analysts of the interest arena (Baumgartner and Leech 1998:58). Accessing refers not to influence but to patterns of contact between popular organizations and elected or appointed decision makers within the state either directly or indirectly through political parties. These patterns can be intermittent or more regularized, and they can take place through channels that may be either formal or informal.

Variation in access between the UP-Hub and the A-Net is influenced by the orientation of the state. With the contrast between the ISI and the neoliberal states, the UP-Hub afforded more access to unions, particularly at the national level, than the A-Net does to associations. The ISI state established formal systems of industrial relations, involving both a "private" (but highly regulated) space of policy making of primary importance to workers (collective bargaining) and spaces in state institutions, such as conciliation and arbitration boards and labor courts, in accordance with an economic model that could accommodate a certain degree of class compromise at both the micro and macro levels of the firm and national policy respectively. In addition, it often engaged in forms of concertation and negotiation with labor confederations over aspects of national economic policy, though these arrangements were typically informal, ad hoc, and quite asymmetric. As a result, unions in the UP-Hub had institutionalized channels of access, although the institutional configurations that were implemented varied across cases.

The logic of the neoliberal state has provided a different pattern of access under the A-Net. With the withdrawal of the state from many forms of economic intervention and a move toward more insulated, technocratic policy

making, access regarding macroeconomic policy has been largely closed off. However, other political changes have left the neoliberal state more open to access regarding social policy and other issues. Fiscal and administrative decentralization has brought the locus of policy making and implementation regarding some issues closer to societal actors (Oxhorn 2004; Montero and Samuels 2004a). Greater emphasis on accountability has arguably put pressure on government officials to be more responsive to societal input. Many localities, and even provinces or states, have begun to implement innovative institutional arrangements for participation in policy councils that give associations some voice in social policy or in the distribution of the budget for urban infrastructural improvements, usually at the local level. While this template is becoming more common, it has so far been partially and unevenly implemented, and its ability to deliver real policy-making access to associations, especially beyond the municipal level, is still uncertain. In sum, state channels for access under the A-Net are often substantial but appear to be more confined to the local level and involve a different set of issues and policy areas when compared to patterns under the UP-Hub.

Disparities between the two interest regimes in terms of access also derive from the gatekeeping role of parties, which may act as intermediaries between popular organizations and the state. In the UP-Hub, parties initially forging ties and mobilizing union support could do so only by offering substantial concessions (Collier and Collier 1991). The implications and payoffs of party affiliation to unions varied across countries and across time within countries, but in general, the relationship was grounded in a basic exchange.⁶ As volunteer labor, unions served as electoral "shock troops" that could mobilize the vote and provide large-scale demonstrations of public support. They helped to cement party identification, and, as more general sources of core political support, to legitimate parties among the larger popular sectors. In exchange, unions often gained some degree of access. As members of these LBPS, unionists had influence within the party and often ran for office as party candidates and won elected positions. Populist LBPS were typically the largest party in the country; leftist LBPS, as in Chile, constituted a large, competitive bloc. Since such parties or blocs organized governments or oppositions, they constituted

6. A clear example of the temporal variation in the balance of power between the labor movement and the central party organization can be seen in the contrast between what Collier and Collier (1991) call the incorporation and postincorporation periods, when the political goals and strategies of leaders of populist LBPS were quite different. In the former, unions had substantial clout in the party; in the latter they were often subordinated to party control.

Table 3.5 Institutional Channels of Access Across Interest Regimes

	UP-Hub		A-Net
Direct State Access	Formal Channels	Industrial relations system (mandatory participation)	Participatory policy councils (uneven implementation, limited participation)
	Informal Channels	Informal ad-hoc concertation on macroeconomic policy	Irregular patterns of contacting and claim making initiated from below
Policy Areas	Level	Predominantly national	Predominantly local
	Policy Areas	Macroeconomic policy, national social policy	Social policy, infrastructure, local development and governance
Party Access		Organic ties; exchange of access for support	More distant relations with possible short-term negotiated exchanges

important policy-making structures, and in this way too they provided a channel of access for unions at all levels, from municipal to national, depending, of course, on their own relationship to power.

Parties in the current period tend to have more distant relationships with their constituencies and to rely much less on societal organizations for electoral and political support. Consequently, the same basic exchange of support for access has not been reproduced. New parties have often formed around "neopopulist" candidates, who make personalistic appeals that are largely unmediated through organizations. "Audience" (Manin 1997) parties similarly make appeals to an atomized mass public, so that most parties do not seek to affiliate associations in the same way. Even the old LBP's have adopted new patterns of linkage to voters. These parties have reordered their constituencies and transformed their relationships to unions, which no longer tend to hold such a privileged position as a core support group. While adaptation has typically involved continued targeting of the popular sectors for electoral support, party strategies have generally emphasized contingent, instrumental relations, activated episodically, particularly at election time, rather than more "organic" linkages with popular associations. Even for those parties most oriented toward an associational support base, however, political parties do not institutionally incorporate associations in a way that is comparable, for example, to the PRI's labor sector in Mexico, the PJ's *tercio* in Argentina, or AD's labor bureaus in Venezuela, in the earlier interest regime. As Roberts (forthcoming)

has argued, the neoliberal critical juncture "has undermined . . . mass parties and led to a proliferation of individualized linkages to machine, personalist, or professional-electoral parties. . . . A more fragmented, autonomous, and pluralistic civil society . . . [now has] fluid and tenuous linkages to party organizations." Parties thus provide less access for associations in the A-Net.⁷ It should be noted, however, that this pattern is consistent with the strategy of elected leaders to win political loyalty by using associations to implement state programs.

The contrasts just described are summarized in table 3.5. While no comparative data directly taps these contrasts, some survey results give more empirical detail about the pattern of accessing in the core segment of the A-Net. The top row of table 3.6 compares four indicators of accessing: the proportion of associations for which contacting local and national officials is important, the proportion that reports regular participation in institutional spaces provided by government, and the proportion that reports contacting leaders of political parties as important. The data confirm a pattern of accessing that occurs primarily at the local level. Yet national-level contacting is not insignificant, nor are the institutional spaces provided by the state, at least for the core segment of the interest regime captured in the sample. The data also confirm that political parties are less active as intermediary structures.

The table also shows the main issue categories of concern to associations and, for each issue area, the proportion of associations working on that issue that engage in each accessing strategy. Associations are dedicated to a great diversity of issue areas, a broad repertoire that contrasts sharply with the productionist bias of the UP-Hub. The chain-referral sample makes it difficult to

Table 3.6 Patterns of Accessing in the A-Net

Incidence (A)	Total (% of A)	Local Contact (% of A)	National Contact (% of A)	Institutional Space (% of A)	Party Contact (% of A)
Social Service	30.5	55.0	29.1	31.7	16.3
Poverty	24.9	64.0	27.1	27.0	17.0
Neighborhood	21.5	62.3	26.0	35.9	22.0
Public Bads	14.6	63.8	28.3	46.2	20.4
Politics	13.3	69.8	45.2	52.5	22.1
Productionist	13.2	66.4	39.2	31.9	15.0
Total	100.0	60.0	29.7	33.3	16.7

7. Since our surveys were fielded, leftist presidents in Argentina and Venezuela have established new forms of linkage with associations. These new developments are discussed briefly in chapter 9.

assess the distribution of issue orientations in the associational world, but in these data the emphasis is on social service delivery, poverty, and neighborhood issues, while productionist issues, political issues (such as corruption and human rights), and public bads (such as violence and pollution) take a back seat. To some extent, particular issues are more likely to be pursued through distinct channels or accessing strategies. Associations dedicated to productionist and political themes are considerably more likely to make national-level contacts, compared to associations pursuing other issues. If we infer that these national-level channels are especially vital for the pursuit of these interests, then the overall local orientation of the A-Net may introduce a general bias against the pursuit of these issues. With respect to political problems, this bias might be ameliorated somewhat since these issues—along with public bads—also seem especially conducive to access through institutional spaces and other participatory innovations. However, this is not the case with productionist issues.

The A-Net thus may differ from the UP-Hub not just in terms of its greater diversity of issues addressed, but also because the pattern of accessing seems specifically biased somewhat against productionist and political issues that are more often pursued through national-level accessing, which is harder to secure. The significance of this issue bias, especially regarding productionist issues, can be more fully appreciated if we compare (cautiously, given the nature of the sample) the distribution of issue categories from table 3.6 with data on issue salience drawn from our survey of individuals. The categories do not match up perfectly (the responses aggregated into the issue categories in table 3.6 were generated through an open-ended question, whereas the responses for salience were selected from a list), but the comparison is nevertheless instructive and suggests a relative inability of the A-Net to address salient, work-related issues. In response to a question concerning the most important problem in the country, 45.1 percent of popular-sector individuals pointed to unemployment or work. In comparison, only 22.2 percent chose health, basic needs, housing, or education. Yet, as table 3.6 indicates, associations are far more likely to address the latter group of issues than the former.

Autonomy

As mentioned in chapter 1, "autonomy" presents both conceptual and empirical challenges. Conceptually, instead of a dichotomous approach, we prefer that of Fox (1992:23; see also Haber 2006:37), who defines an organization's autonomy as the "degree of control over setting its own goals and making its

own decisions without external intervention, whether by governments, political parties, religious groups or development agencies." Linkages with the state, either directly or through political parties, can lead to challenges to autonomy. Because the word "representation" invokes autonomous societal actors, Schmitter (1977) appropriately insisted on the word "intermediation" to invoke instead the idea that structures that stood between society and the state to present societal interests were to one degree or another shaped by the state and were channels of "state interest" as well as of societal interest. The kinds of relationships popular organizations have with states and parties and the ways these may potentially challenge autonomy thus become a key dimension for analysis of interest regimes.

It is useful to analyze the challenges posed by relationships with external actors, particularly the state, in terms of inducements as well as constraints (Collier and Collier 1979). Relationships between unions and the state within the UP-Hub were governed by corporatist labor laws that regulated unions in great detail through a combination of the two mechanisms. Constraints refer to overt controls regulating the activities of unions, their leadership, and their internal governance. Inducements bestow benefits or advantages, which may shape organizational behavior through incentives that derive from, for example, the prospect of continuing government subsidies. The bestowal of benefits may also induce cooperative behavior, even co-optation, providing incentives through discretion in their application, thereby privileging some unions but denying these benefits to other, often dissident elements of the labor movement. Both types of control by the state were extensive and formally embodied in labor law.⁸

Compared to unions, states generally impose relatively few regulations on popular associations that constitute direct constraints. While most associations register with the government, this formal state recognition seems to be mostly pro forma and largely optional for many kinds of activities. There is no "associational law," comparable to labor law, that provides either direct regulation or "rights" to carry out basic activities (parallel to the right to bargain collectively), and some associations, those oriented toward certain kinds of self-help activities, may not come into contact with the state at all.

More frequently, however, associations are presented with a set of state inducements. Despite the lack of regulation under the A-Net, most associations

8. In addition, other types of inducements and constraints have typically taken place informally in Latin America. These range from many types of co-optive favors to corrupt practices and illegal forms of coercion.

engage in activities that in various ways lead them to interact with the government. Although state influence tends to be substantially more subtle than for unions, and although associations may indeed maintain greater independence than many unions, interactions with the state may nevertheless have implications for the autonomy of associations. In theorizing how the engagement of the state may create inducements that challenge autonomy, it is useful to think of two kinds of state-association linkage that are relatively widespread and their possible implications.

First, the pursuit of accessing strategies and the orientation of state policy may shape associational agendas. Associations that attempt to gain or maintain access to policy makers or party brokers may be induced to enter into cooperative—or perhaps co-optive—relationships, especially with the prospect of repeated interaction. Cooperative relations and some adjustment to the nature of demands may be beneficial to the organization in representing the interests of its base, and an association may, in the process, retain substantial autonomy. At the same time, just as journalists may have an incentive to refrain from critical reporting on valued sources, the effect may be stronger: associations may shape their agendas and political support accordingly, gambling on an unknown return to this behavior. These inducements present potential challenges to autonomy.

Similarly, the orientation of state policy and programs may offer strong incentives that guide associational activities and shape the agenda of the larger popular interest regime by signaling the greater “availability” of specific demand-making targets. As a consequence, associations may turn away from or give less priority to other substantive goals. For example, the existence of labor programs in Argentina channeled the energy and demands of both new and existing associations toward a government-initiated program, in a sense diverting attention from other approaches to welfare and income support (Garay 2007). Thus, through incentives provided by existing programs, the state can shape the substantive orientation of individual associations and even weight or skew the larger, aggregated interest regime toward programs the state finds most acceptable (e.g., Cigler and Loomis 2002).

A second set of inducements stem from more direct dependence on the state, usually for resources. Over the last two decades, states have more frequently become directly involved in funding associations. The growing trend of public-private partnerships or state “outsourcing” of service delivery and program implementation makes associations dependent on the government for a major part of their activities. Through the threat of exclusion from a program or denial of funding, the state may implicitly constrain associational behavior, for instance

Table 3.7 Relationships of Dependence (percent of associations)

State Dependence	Receives money from the state	29.5
	Distributes government program	23.0
	State actor involved in founding	14.1
Party Dependence	Receives money from party	3.3
	Party involved in founding	6.3

through a tacit understanding between associations and political leaders or state officials that criticisms should be blunted. In addition, the state may effectively exert controls on associations through requirements for funding or participation in programs, such as criteria for constituting a soup kitchen or distributing resources in a particular way. Finally, states have sometimes become involved in the founding of associations and may in that way exert influence, especially on younger associations. Table 3.7 shows the proportion of associations in our sample that reported each of these three types of state-association linkages.

In addition to these activities involving dependence on states, popular organizations may of course develop similar relations with political parties. In the UP-Hub, the “exchange” relationship mentioned above often led to substantial restrictions on union autonomy, although these restrictions varied across parties and even across time periods. Subordination of unions to the party occurred, as in Venezuela, when governing populist parties had the responsibility of constructing and sustaining policy and governing coalitions. Other LBPs also faced the classic trade-off between the representation of the core constituency and party or electoral strategies. APRA in Peru conservatized substantially with the goal of escaping the military ban on its electoral victory; while in the face of a more severe ban on the party that stood little chance of reversal, the PJ in Argentina did not subordinate unions or conservatize in the same way. Some subordination of union interests to party goals was also a feature of leftist LBPs, like the Socialist Party in Chile, though, again, these relationships varied through time, with the strategic position and goals of the party. In addition, LBPs could be vehicles of co-optation, so that union leaders became more dependent on favors and career opportunities through the party than they were on the rank and file.

In the A-Net, with the change in their strategies for mobilizing electoral support, parties generally do not subordinate popular associations in the way LBPs traditionally subordinated and controlled unions. As described above with regard to access, party-association relationships are less frequent and, even when they exist, tend to be characterized by significantly greater distance. Relationships almost never take the form of formal or informal integration into

the party, but instead are negotiated on an ad hoc, recurrent basis. As shown in table 3.7, very few associations rely on parties for financial support or have had parties involved in their founding. Just as the greater distancing of associations from parties accentuates a difference between the A-Net and UP-Hub with regard to access, so it does with the role of parties in their subordination of popular interest organizations. However, this reduced role of parties does not eliminate the risk to autonomy stemming from individual politicians who may seek to form clientelistic relationships with associations. Support mobilization through associations is available to politicians at all levels, from incumbent presidents to mayors and also to those in the legislative branches at both national and local levels.

Conclusion

This chapter has compared the UP-Hub to the A-Net in terms of four dimensions: scope, scaling, access, and autonomy. The first part of the analysis examined the logic of collective action and relations between the state and popular organizations as a means of exploring two aggregate traits of the interest regime. The analysis regarding collective action suggested that the scope of the UP-Hub and the A-Net might be roughly comparable, despite the much larger group of potential participants under the A-Net, and that scaling might be

Table 3.8 Comparison of UP-Hub and A-Net

	UP-Hub	A-Net
Scope	State actions solve otherwise greater individual collective action problems	"Natural" ease of individual collective action
Scaling	Unions generally highly coordinated, prominent role of federations and confederations	Associations substantially less scaled, less dominant role of coordinating associations
Access	Accessing predominantly at national level, parties often play intermediary role, mainly productionist and macroeconomic claims	Accessing predominantly at local level, parties more rarely play role as intermediaries, great diversity of claims
Autonomy	Detailed state regulation and party affiliation; constraints as well as inducements to affect union activities	Associations more autonomous, but involvement in government programs and state subsidies may create dependence and shape activities

considerably more extensive in the UP-Hub than in the A-Net. Although bringing data to bear on these comparisons is difficult, both contrasts seem largely born out.

The subsequent analysis of relations with the state suggested that the two interest regimes have been marked by different patterns of access and autonomy. The UP-Hub offered formal and informal channels of access predominantly at the national level, both directly to the state and through parties as intermediaries, which largely served as conduits for productionist claims. The A-Net is characterized by greater access than has sometimes been assumed, over a much greater diversity of issues; yet the pattern is more fragile, occurring primarily at the local level, rarely involving political parties as intermediaries, and at least to some extent not prioritizing the most salient issues. This divergent pattern of access emerges in tandem with a difference regarding autonomy. The UP-Hub involved substantial restrictions on union autonomy, marked by the controlling or co-optive influence of both state and party actors. The A-Net is not free of such controls, but relationships that threaten associational autonomy are more indirect, partial, and less pervasive.

Table 3.8 presents the general contrast that emerges from this analysis, which has focused on sketching the characteristics of the UP-Hub and A-Net in broad strokes. Of course, the actual operation of the A-Net regarding each of these aggregate traits is considerably more complex, and across countries the emergent interest regime is still taking on different forms and must be a subject of ongoing analysis. Subsequent chapters shed light on each of these aggregate traits from various perspectives with more focused empirical investigation.